Two Disputations of Original Sin, Disputation 2

Two Disputations of Original Sin · Disputation 2

p. 144Whether Posterity be guilty of Death, by reaſon of the Actual ſins of their immediate Parents?

AS little as is ſaid by Divines on this Queſtion, it is no over-curious, or needleſs unprofitable ſubject; but very weighty, and needful to be underſtood by all Chriſtians, that can reach to the underſtanding of it. For as it is uſeful for the opening of the cauſe and nature of Original guilt, ſo, if it ſhould prove true that we are guilty by the ſins of our immediate Parents, it would be neceſſary that we know it, for our due humiliation, and that we may in penitent confeſſions and deprecations prevail with God for the pardon thereof: As it is thought a dangerous thing to deny original ſin, becauſe they that ſo do, will not be humbled under it, and ſenſible of their miſery by it, nor of the neceſſity of God's mercy, or Chriſt's blood for the pardon of it, nor will apply themſelves to God by Chriſt in Faith, Confeſſion, and Prayer for pardon, p. 145and conſequently are in danger of miſſing of pardon: ſo in the preſent caſe, the ſame reaſons will prove it as well dangerous to deny our guilt of our Parents ſins, if indeed we are ſo guilty. Which that we may enquire into, after a very brief explication of the terms of the Queſtion, I ſhall lay down a few neceſſary diſtinctions, and then aſſert what I judge to be the truth in certain Propoſitions, and prove ſuch of them as moſt require proof.

1. By [immediate Parents], we mean thoſe that perſonally beget: By [Poſterity], we mean their children ſo begotten. By Reaſon of [Actual ſin], we mean, by the Merit of thoſe ſins which our Parents themſelves committed; or by a reſultancy from ſuch ſin compared with the rule. By guilt, we mean obligation to puniſhment, or duneſs of puniſhment. By death, we mean the deſtruction, or final miſery of the creature; either death temporal, or eternal.

We muſt here diſtinguiſh, 1. Between the ſeminal, cauſal, potential, and virtual being which we have in our Parents, and the perſonal exiſtence that we have in our ſelves. 2. Between the guilt which immediately reſulteth from actual ſin, and the guilt which riſeth but mediately from it, viz. by the means of ſome intervening corruption of p. 146our own. 3. Between the ſins of Parents while we are ſeminally in them, and their ſins after our birth: either, 1. in our infancy, or 2. in our riper age. 4. Between guilt of fault, and guilt of puniſhment. 5. Between the aggravation of voluntarineſs actual, and of voluntarineſs habitual, or diſpoſitive. 6. Between plenary proper guilt, and guilt ſo called by analogy of attribution, and guilt ſo called equivocally. 7. Between puniſhment univocally, analogically, or equivocally ſo called. 8. Between obligation to the pain of loſs, and to the pain of ſenſe. 9. And between the meer ſenſe of that loſs, and the ſenſible accuſations of conſcience for actual ſin. 10. Between the curable obligation of the Law of Nature, or Works, and the peremptory and remedileſs obligation of the Law of Grace.

Though theſe diſtinctions reach further than to the terms of the Queſtion, yet are they all ſuch as will be of neceſſary uſe in our determination.

Prop. 1. God doth not impute to us the ſins either of our firſt or neereſt Parents, further than our true intereſt in ſuch ſins doth give ſufficient ground for ſuch imputation.

As Dr. Twiſs, among others, hath oft and well proved.

p. 147Prop. 2. God doth not eſteem us to have perſonally committed the ſins which our firſt or neereſt progenitors did actually commit. For his judgment is true; and therefore he judgeth of things as they are; and therefore he judgeth us not to have done that perſonally, which we did not do.

Prop. 3. God doth not by any Law oblige us to puniſhment, as the perſonal committers of ſuch ſins, which any progenitors of ours did commit, and not we: and therefore we are not guilty of puniſhment on that account. He never made ſuch a covenant with Adam, or any ſince, as ſome imagine, wherein he declareth that he will judge the Poſterity guilty of the Parents ſin further than their true deſert or intereſt in it, meerly becauſe God will ſo judge, or becauſe he will impute the ſins of one to another, without his deſert: that were to make him the cauſer of ſuch mens ſins, or rather to miſtake, and call that their ſin which indeed is not ſo.

Prop. 4. It ſeems to me that in the ſame kind as we are guilty of Adam's actual ſin, we are alſo guilty of the ſins of our neereſt Parents; allowing for ſome accidental differences, and alſo our guilt having a remedy at hand, which his had not that he knew of, we being under a pardoning covenant. Becauſe p. 148this propoſition is not agreeable to the commoneſt opinion, I ſhall ſpeak to the proof of it, and of ſome that are near to it, anon towards the end.

Prop. 5. If it ſhould prove true, which ſome of the Reformed Divines maintain, that original ſin doth conſiſt only in the real qualitative corruption of our nature, and not directly in any imputation of Adam's actual ſin to us; and that there is no ſuch direct imputation of his ſin to us, but that it is only the cauſe of our proper Original ſin, and not our ſin formally: then muſt it needs follow that the like muſt be ſaid for the negative, of the ſins of our immediate Parents: for they can be no more our ſins, than Adam's was. If this opinion therefore ſtand good, then our controverſy is at an end; and we are not guilty either of Adam's ſin, or of our next Parents, nor of death for them. I will not preſume to make my ſelf judge between the Learned Divines that diſagree upon this point: Camero and his followers go this way, againſt the imputation of Adam's ſin to us: of which ſee the ſum of their Arguments in Joſ. Placaeus his Diſputat. de ſtatu hominis lapſi ante Gratiam in lib. 1. Theſium Salmurienſ. pag. 206, 207. And Chamier is not only of the ſame mind, but confuteth the contrary among p. 149the Popiſh errors, as you may ſee in Tom. 3. lib. 1. cap. 7. againſt Pighius ſect. 20, 21. but ſpecially throughout chap. 8. contra Salmeronem. So alſo Peter Martyr on Rom. 5. But yet the far greater number of our Writers go the other way, and ſo do the Papiſts too.

Prop. 6. It ſeems not to be a guilt ſo plenary and perfect, which we lie under for any Parents ſin, (if ſuch a thing be proved), as that is which a man is under for his own perſonal ſin. The difference will appear, if we conſider that it is not a puniſhment in ſo full and perfect a ſenſe, which we are obliged to: for the ſuffering is but the matter of the puniſhment; its form lieth in the relation of that ſuffering to the fault: if the malum naturale be not propter malum morale, it is not puniſhment: and the puniſhment is his in the fulleſt ſenſe, who ſuffereth for his own ſin: now the ſin of Adam, or any Parent, is not ſo fully our own as that is which we perſonally commit; ſeeing as we were but ſeminally, cauſally, and potentially in our Parents, and not by exiſtence perſonally; ſo it is not ſo much to be eſteemed the ſon of a ſinner, as to be eſteemed the actual ſinner himſelf. So that it ſeems our guilt of, and puniſhment for the actual ſin of any Parent, is ſo called by analogy of attribution p. 150as they ſpeak, (as Accidens is called Ens), being a more imperfect kind of guilt and puniſhment.

Prop. 7. It is paſt doubt that God may and doth puniſh Parents in their children: In which caſe the ſufferings of the children are materially (though not as the next matter) the puniſhment of the Parent; but the next matter is the Parents own ſuffering (real or reputative) in the ſuffering of his children: but this God doth not without reſpect to ſome concurrent guilt in the child, unleſs as he will repair his hurt with a greater good.

Prop. 8. When the ſufferings of a child are but the meer conſequents of the Parents ſin or puniſhment, then are they no puniſhment themſelves, unleſs equivocally ſo called: but when they are intended by the Rector for the demonſtration of juſtice for the Parents fault, then it hath the nature of puniſhment, though the child were imagined innocent. For example; If a Traytor be ſentenced to death, and his eſtate forfeited to the Prince, his Heirs will be deprived of all their hopes, though the Judge never thought of them in his ſentence, becauſe the Parent cannot convey to his poſterity what he hath loſt himſelf. And here the ſuffering of the Heirs is not formally a puniſhment, p. 151but the meer conſequent of a puniſhment. But if the Rector do ordain that the Heirs of a Traytor ſhall be deſinherited, and intend this as part of the penalty, to deter others from Treaſon, then it is not a meer conſequent, but a real puniſhment, though the Heir be perſonally innocent.

Prop. 9. It ſeems to me that we are ſo far guilty both of Adam's ſin, and of our neerer Parents, committed whilſt we were ſeminally in them, as that God may, not only without injuſtice, but alſo in poſitive execution of vindictive juſtice, puniſh us with temporal death for ſuch guilt, though it be but a more imperfect kind of guilt and puniſhment.

Prop. 10. If this intereſt in our Parents ſins deſerve a temporal death, then alſo an everlaſting death. For when the creature hath loſt his life by the ſtroke of juſtice, God is not bound to reſtore it.

Prop. 11. It hence followeth that God may in juſtice deprive us of everlaſting glory for ſuch guilt; which is one part of Hell, viz. the poena damni: for the dead enjoy not glory.

Prop. 12. Hence alſo it followeth that God may juſtly, for ſuch guilt, leave man under ſome penalty of ſenſe too, as well as of loſs: 1. Becauſe he may, if he pleaſe, p. 152continue natural life to man, when he depriveth him of glory; (for he that may juſtly take away both, may take away one only): and then man being rational, muſt needs have a ſenſe of the greatneſs of his loſs. 2. And there is no man of reaſon, but would rather chooſe a tolerable degree of pain for ever, (as a leſs evil) than to be annihilated. And he that may inflict the greater, may inflict the leſſer.

Prop. 13. Thoſe poſitive torments of conſcience which follow the review of wilful actual ſin, and which men muſt ſuffer for ſuch in Hell, cannot be the puniſhment of our guilt either of Adam's or our neereſt Parents actual ſin. Becauſe conſcience hath no ſuch matter to work upon; it cannot charge us with chooſing that evil by our own wills; for ſo far this guilt was involuntary.

Prop. 14. God is the Rector of the Univerſe, of Common-wealths, Churches, and Families, as well as of individual perſons; and therefore he may puniſh the World as ſuch, and puniſh a Common-wealth as ſuch for their ſins, or a ſinful Church, or a ſinful Family: And ſo ſome individual perſons, not as ſuch, but as parts of the ſociety, may juſtly ſuffer the loſs of thoſe benefits, which as members of that ſociety they did poſſeſs, p. 153though they committed not the ſins for which the puniſhment is inflicted: In which caſe the nature of puniſhment is divided between the ſociety, and that individual ſufferer. It is the Societies fundamentaliter, becauſe they are the ſinners; it is the ſufferers Terminative, becauſe he beareth it: and true puniſhment it is; for it is [ſuffering for ſin], though not for his perſonal ſin. And thus a Child, a Subject, a Church-member may ſuffer for the ſins of the Heads or Body of the Society. Nor can it well be ſaid that this is but on occaſion of their ſin, and not for it, and ſo that it is but equivocally puniſhment, and not truly ſo: for it is an evil of ſuffering for the evil of ſin, and inflicted for demonſtration of juſtice on the whole, and ſo on each part. Yea, and it ſeems that poſitive puniſhments, as well as loſſes, may be inflicted on this account.

Prop. 15. Yet as God is Rector of each particular perſon as well as of ſocieties, ſo he dealeth juſtly with every perſon, and therefore in puniſhing ſocieties, he ſtill obſerveth his eſtabliſhed Laws concerning individuals: and therefore he puniſheth no perſon beyond his due: For, 1. it is ſuppoſed that a man who by conſent is a member of any Society, doth conſent to bear or venture on the common inconveniencies and infelicity p. 152duplicate page p. 153duplicate page p. 154of that Society, ſo that he may be partaker of the felicity and benefits of it: and where nature makes a man a member of a ſociety, it ſupplies the place of our perſonal conſent. For in it ſelf it is a neceſſary good to us to be in ſociety with others, ſeeing no man can live happily by himſelf; and it is ſuppoſed in nature, that no man will diſſent from his own neceſſary good. It is therefore by their own conſent fundamentally, that ſuch perſons, though innocent in themſelves, are made liable to puniſhment; and therefore in all wars, when the innocent do ſuffer with the guilty, in the beſieging of a City, the puniſhing of a Country, it is no injuſtice.

Obj. But that is becauſe men are not able to diſcern between the righteous and the guilty, or to difference in the execution, as God can do.

Anſw. It's true that God can do this, and man cannot: but withal God doth not all that he can do. He ruleth the World by means in an eſtabliſhed order, and it is he that hath given men authority to rule under him: and therefore whatſoever puniſhment they righteouſly execute, it is God that righteouſly doth it by them. So that as men do us no wrong in ſuch caſes, ſo neither doth God. 3. But yet God hath determined in p. 155his Laws, that none ſhall bear the puniſhment of eternal damnation, for the ſins of a ſociety, but for his own ſin: yea, he hath reſolved that all ſhall tend to the everlaſting felicity of the innocent. 4. It cannot be accounted any wrong to ſuch, when God will repair their hurt or loſs with far greater advantages, which he might have denied them. 5. But yet for all this, it is certain that de facto God doth not puniſh any man who is not guilty by perſonal ſins; for there is none ſuch on earth to puniſh: but though God doth ſo ſweetly, and in perfect order carry on the work of Government, that none ſhall have cauſe to complain of injuſtice, and doth keep an harmonious conſent between his more general and his particular puniſhing juſtice, ſo puniſhing ſocieties, that he will make good all his promiſes to each individual: yet, 1. It ſeems to me that in one and the ſame penalty materially conſidered, God may puniſh us both as individual perſons for our own ſin, and as members of a Society for the ſins of the Society, which are no otherwiſe ours, than by being ſuch members of a ſinful body, and ſo being liable to the juſtice which that Body is liable to. 2. And it ſeems to me, that if we were ſuppoſed to be perſonally innocent, yet God might in juſtice puniſh us with ſuch a p. 156ſociety, ſo far as may ſtand with his Covenant to individuals: and that that Covenant doth not reſtrain him from inflicting the leaſt penalty on us for any beſides our own ſins which we have perſonally committed: Though ſtill even the guilt of that common ſin, is participative perſonally ours, as we communicate in it by being members of the ſociety: as the hand is guilty of the ſin of the tongue, becauſe it is a member of the body that is guilty.

Obj. There is no ſin, and ſo no puniſhment, where there is no willingneſs.

Anſw. Here is a willingneſs fundamentally, in that in hope of the good of the ſociety, and benefit from it, we conſent to ſhare with them, and ſpeed as they, though we conſent not to the ſin: ſo that the ſin is reputatively ours, ſo far as that we ſhould be obliged to puniſhment by it, though not in it ſelf, nor ſo as that we ſhould be accounted the actual offenders. Even as our ſins became Chriſt's by his voluntary ſponſion, ſo far as to bear the penalty, but not ſo far as to be accounted the committer of them: ſo that his ſufferings were truly puniſhments, becauſe for ſin, though not for his own; yet not puniſhments in ſo full and ſtrict a ſenſe as ours that ſuffer for our own ſins; but by analogy of attribution, or ob inaequalem generis p. 157attributionem: and ſuch, as it ſeems to me, are thoſe puniſhments which innocent perſons ſuffer meerly for the ſins of the Societies that they are members of.

Prop. 16. It is not a meer reputative intereſt, (as the laſt deſcribed), but a natural intereſt which we have in the guilt of Adam's actual ſin, and ſo in the guilt of the actual ſins of our neerer Parents, as to meer deſert: For our nature was in him: our perſons, though not exiſtent, were ſeminally in him; we come not from Adam as our Creator, that makes us of nothing, nor as our Fabricator, that makes us of an extrinſick pre-exiſtent matter; but as our Progenitor, who deriveth a being to us by communication, out of himſelf; and therefore can give us no better than he had himſelf, either qualitatively or relatively; and therefore being a ſon of death, he could not beget ſons of life: being guilty, he could not beget perſons that are innocent; nor bring a clean thing from himſelf, who was unclean.

Prop. 17. This natural intereſt in the guilt of Progenitors, is only from thoſe ſins which they committed while we were in their loins, or ſeminally in them, and not from any that they committed after we were born: but the reputative guilt which we have from the ſins of ſocieties (whereof we p. 158are naturally or electively members) may befall us as much (and rather) from the ſins which they commit when we are at age, and have the fulleſt uſe of reaſon; therefore all men ſhould be careful what ſociety they voluntarily joyn themſelves to, or abide in, and ſhould diligently endeavour the reformation of ſuch ſocieties: and when they are falling into ruine paſt hope of recovery, ſhould foreſee the fall, and ſave themſelves.

Prop. 18. It is both theſe ſorts of guilt which adhere to us in our infancy from our Parents ſins. 1. The guilt which followeth our natural intereſt, as we are ſeminally in them, adhereth to us all, as ſoon as we have our being. 2. The other is varied according to the ſeveral ſocieties that we are members of. 1. As we are members of the great Common-wealth of the World, whereof God is the Soveraign, ſo we are guilty by reaſon of the ſin which mankind in our firſt Parents committed in the beginning. For God dealt with Adam in his firſt Laws, not only as an individual perſon, but alſo as whole mankind, he and his wife being then the whole World. And ſo as we are firſt guilty of death, becauſe of our natural intereſt in Adam's ſin, as being his Progeny, ſo next we are alſo guilty by reaſon of this civil or reputative intereſt, as being members p. 159of the ſinful World, or of ſinful mankind: which later yet ſuppoſeth the former as its ground, and doth not ariſe from any Covenant or Will of God to impute that to us which we were never guilty of, by any natural intereſt of our own. Not that we were perſonally guilty before we were perſonally exiſtent; but that we were then ſeminally guilty as we had a ſeminal being in the nature and perſon of our Progenitors; and when our perſons from that ſeed do firſt exiſt, they are guilty perſons, as ſoon as perſons. And therefore when man had firſt ſinned, God, that had given him a Law, as being all mankind, and the root of a Poſterity in courſe of nature to ſpring from him, did alſo in the ſame relation call him to judgment, and ſentence him for his ſin; and therefore paſſed ſuch a ſentence which we ſee by experience is executed on all mankind; and as the individuals multiply from the firſt condemned root, ſo doth the guilt and the ſentenced puniſhment adhere to each individual. (And in the ſame relation was the promiſe of a Redeemer made to him.) As it was not Adam only, but all mankind that is meant by God's ſentence, [Duſt thou art, and to duſt thou ſhalt return, &c.] yet only Adam as then perſonally exiſtent and condemned, and all others as ſeminally p. 160in him, and the ſentence makes its firſt ſeizure on their perſons when their perſons ſhall firſt exiſt, and not before; Even ſo is it by the guilt, as it is by the ſentence: It was only Adam's perſon that was at firſt guilty; but not only as a particular private perſon, but as mankind, and as the root of all that ſhould ſucceed; and therefore we were ſeminally guilty in him, and are perſonally guilty from him, when we firſt perſonally exiſt. 2. And as we are thus guilty as members of ſinful mankind, ſo alſo as members of ſinful Families; and in that reſpect may for the ſins of our neereſt Parents, lie under Family puniſhments. 3. So are we alſo as members of wicked Common-wealths, and particular ſubordinate Societies in thoſe Common-wealths: And therefore it is ſo common for God to puniſh men for common abhominations, and provoking enormities, which yet themſelves did not commit.

4. The like may be ſaid of heretical, impure, and ſcandalous Churches, whoſe members become liable to Church-puniſhments, as thoſe aforeſaid to Common-wealth-puniſhments.

Prop. 19. It is one thing to be ſo far guilty, or to deſerve puniſhment, as that God may in the execution of vindictive juſtice, lay it on us as our due, (unleſs remedied): and p. 161it's another thing to be ſo far guilty, as that God muſt puniſh us, or elſe be unjuſt, or not attain the ends of right Government, by ordinary means. It is the firſt guilt only which I ſay ariſeth from the ſins of our Parents to us: the ſecond I neither affirm nor deny, as not intending now to meddle with that Controverſy.

Prop. 20. Though according to the ſtrict rigor of the Law of nature or works, conſidered alone, God might, for the ſin of Adam, or our neerer Parents, adjudge us to everlaſting death, as our due, becauſe of our forementioned participation therein: yet hath he provided ſuch a remedy in the Goſpel, that no man ſhall everlaſtingly periſh for any ſuch ſin, who is made partaker of that remedy. And therefore though the Goſpel findeth men under ſuch a guilt by nature, yet doth it not bind it on them, but free them from it, if they be in Chriſt: therefore when God telleth men that if they repent and believe, it is not their Fathers ſins that ſhall damn them, yet bids them take heed leſt they periſh by their own, this doth not deny that we deſerve death for Adam's, or our other Parents ſins; but only that if we repent, and be our ſelves evangelically righteous, the deſerved evil ſhall not befall us. The remedy ſuppoſeth, and not denieth the malady.

p. 162Prop. 21. A further difference may yet appear between the guilt of Adam's firſt ſin, and our guilt of his following ſins, or the ſins of our neerer Parents; if we diſtinguiſh between the Fundamentum and the Terminus of guilt, and then obſerve, that the Terminus is but one and the ſame, but the Foundation is divers. The puniſhment which we are guilty of, or liable to, by Adam's ſin, is the privation of our whole felicity. The new guilt of our neerer Parents ſin, or Adam's further ſins, yea, or our own actual ſin, can bring no new puniſhment on us according to the covenant of Works, (though according to the covenant of Grace, which giveth new mercies, whoſe privation we are capable of, we may have new puniſhments, which the firſt ſin did not bring us under). As to the pain of loſs it is clear; becauſe when we have forfeited all, we can forfeit no more: but by the firſt ſin we forfeited all. But this is not becauſe the ſin in its own nature hath not the ſame demerit as the firſt: but becauſe man is capable of no greater privation than he hath incurred already; nor of any greater torment, if the firſt ſin deſerved as much torment, as mans nature was capable of. So that terminative here is no new ſuper-added puniſhment, according to the firſt Law. p. 163But yet none may hence conclude that here is no new guilt; becauſe it is another fundamentaliter & formaliter. For divers relations may have the ſame Terminus. We do by following ſins incur a new and further obligation to the ſame penalty; which would be to a greater penalty, were we capable of it naturally. When a Felon is guilty of death on one crime, yet twenty bills may be brought in againſt him, which may charge him with a manifold guilt, though but of one death. As a man may have a manifold right to one good thing which he poſſeſſeth, and a right ſuper-added to his firſt right, (as God hath the right of Redemption to us, ſuper-added to the right of Creation); ſo may a ſinner have ſuper-added, and manifold obligations to the ſame puniſhment. Yet here we ſee ſome difference between our firſt guilt of Adam's ſin, and all ſuper-added guilt; that the firſt having deprived us of all our felicity, none that follows can deprive us of any more, (except of the mercies new given us by the Goſpel, which the meer ſins of Parents ſhall deprive no man of, that diſowneth them).

Prop. 22. Though it be but an imperfect analogical guilt, which the act of Adam's, or other Parents ſin doth directly and immediately leave upon us; yet the corruption p. 164or pravity of our own nature, inherent in each perſon, which by Adam's ſin was introduced, doth bring on us a further guilt. And ſo mediately the ſaid actual ſin doth bring it. Which occaſioneth ſo many Proteſtant Divines to place original ſin (as ours) in this pravity alone.

Prop. 23. Though this natural depravedneſs may ſeem to infer a leſſer guilt, becauſe it is not voluntary, as our actual ſins are: Yet, 1. we being ſeminally in him that voluntarily cauſed it; and, 2. it being the habitual pravity of the will it ſelf, and ſo far voluntary; and, 3. therefore containing virtually all future actual voluntary ſins; 4. and being more contrary to God's holy nature and will, than one ſingle actual ſin would be; it hath therefore many aggravations inſtead of that one, which it ſeemeth to have leſs of: And ſo muſt needs bring a true and proper obligation to puniſhment, (till Chriſt diſſolve it), as well as actual ſins.

Prop. 24. It ſeems to me that the ſins of neerer Parents may do much to the corrupting of our natures, as well as the ſin of Adam; and to increaſe the pravity that from his only ſin, would have been upon them. Proved, 1. There is the ſame reaſon why the ſins of immediate Parents ſhould deprave the nature of Poſterity, as there is that Adam's ſin ſhould do it.

p. 165Some Divines ſay that God took away his image from Adam: ſome that he took away his ſpirit, and ſo the loſs of his image followed: ſome that Adam's ſin did it ſelf deſtroy, or blot out that image. As to the firſt; I ſay, 1. It is not ſound; becauſe it makes God the moſt proper immediate, (if not the only true) efficient cauſe of ſin, and of the ſinning ſin, which is the worſt of ſins: Alſo, becauſe there is no word of God that ſaith any ſuch thing. 2. If it were true, the ſin of Cain deſerved the ſame, as well as the ſin of Adam.

As to the ſecond opinion, I ſay, 1. It is yet undetermined (de nomine) among Divines, whether it be not the Redeemer only that giveth the ſpirit, and whether it can properly be ſaid that God gave his ſpirit to Adam in innocency? though I am for the affirmative. 2. But ſuppoſe that there be ſome conſerving aid which God did withdraw, by what name ſoever it be called: yet thaat withdrawing was in order of nature conſequential to mans ſinning, and not before it: and that ſin it ſelf did deprave the ſoul. 3. The ſin of Cain deſerveth the like deſertion as well as the ſin of Adam: but man's nature is not now capable of it in the ſame ſort as then it was, becauſe then we were innocent, and had the perfect image of p. 166God upon us, and were capable of loſing it: but now we have loſt it already, our Parents ſins can but remove us further from God, and hinder our recovery.

The third opinion ſeemeth moſt warrantable, that Adam put away, or blotted out God's image, and ſo depraved his own ſoul: (for which ſee Capel of Tempt, and Theſ. Salmurienſ. Vol. 1. diſp. de ſtatu hominis lapſi ante gratiam; ſect. 19, 20, 21.) But there is the ſame reaſon why Cain's ſin ſhould deprive his poſterity of God's image, ſave only that they had not the ſame to loſe: for the deſtructive nature of the ſin is the ſame, and ſo is the merit. And though they have not that perfect image of God now to loſe, yet they have ſome remnants of moral virtue, aſſiſted by the light and law of nature; and the nature of man is capable of being made worſe than yet it is: And there is the ſame reaſon why Cain's ſin may make it worſe, as there is why Adam's may make it bad.

Man's fall was a change of his end: He firſt took God for his ultimate end, and chief good: He was ſeduced to take him for one that envied his felicity, and for a liar, and to ſeek his felicity in the creature, againſt the command of God. The ultimate end of man's actions being thus changed, all moral p. 167good is ſo far perverted; for all means and ſubordinate ends depend on it. And ſo the ſtream of mans actions are turned into a wrong channel; the ſenſitive appetite is hereupon become the maſter-principle in the ſoul, as ruling the reſt. For, as Placaeus ſaith, ubi ſup. Cujus facultatis finis proximus eſt hominis ultimus, ea caeteris omnibus facultatibus, tanquam architectonica, imperat: that faculty whoſe neereſt end is mans ultimate end, doth rule all the other faculties, as the maſter of the work. And thus man being turned finally to ſenſibles from God, his nature is depraved, and God's image defaced. Yet is not the ſoul removed to the utmoſt diſtance from God; for then he ſhould be as bad as the Devils, and all men ſhould be equally evil; and the ſenſitive appetite would ſo uncontrouledly reign, that man would be worſe than bruitified, his reaſon ſerving only to purvey for the fleſh, ſo that the light and law of nature would not reſtrain him, nor any thoughts of a God, and a life everlaſting, once ſtop him in his ſin. Now it is apparent that there is the ſame natural (and meritorious) force in Cain's ſin to turn his nature further from God, as was in Adam's to turn it ſo far away: Or if man were at the worſt, yet his following ſins have the ſame power to fix him in that miſery, as p. 168his firſt had to bring him into it. For they alſo are a wilful turning from God to the creature, as well as the firſt.

Arg. 2. It is paſt all doubt that the ſinners own perſonal nature is made worſe by his own actual ſin: experience proves it too fully: Scripture ſaith, that they that have been accuſtomed to do evil, can no more learn to do well, than a Blackmoor can change his skin, or a Leopard his ſpots. And there is no reaſon that I know of that can be given, why a more corrupt Parent ſhould not beget a child more corrupt, and deliver him the ſinful improvement of his pravity, as well as that all ſinful depraved Parents ſhould beget depraved children: And though this controverſy be mixed with the great difficulties about the propagation of the ſoul, and the matter of its corruption, yet which way ſoever thoſe be determined, it makes not againſt the thing that I aſſert. If the ſoul be ex traduce, and ſo corrupted, then the caſe is moſt eaſy. If man beget the ſenſitive ſoul corrupted, and God do then promove that to the excellency of being a rational ſoul, (as ſome think the material ſpecies of the phantaſy is raiſed by the active intellect to be the intelligible immaterial ſpecies); ſtill there is the ſame reaſon why the more corrupt Parent ſhould propagate a ſoul more corrupt, as that all p. 169ſhould propagate a corrupt one. If the ſoul be depraved either by a taint from the body, or by a willing accommodation of it ſelf to the body, through the force of the natural deſire of union, (de quo vide Placaeum ubi ſupra,) as water to the ſhape of the veſſel that it is put into: ſtill the reaſon holds the ſame for the degree of corruption, as for the thing it ſelf. That God by way of penalty ſhould create the ſoul ſinful immediately, ſeems plainly to make him the Author of ſin: But if it were ſo, yet there is the ſame reaſon of demerit, to provoke him to create the ſoul of Cain's ſon yet more ſinful, as there is in Adam's to provoke him to create it ſinful at all.

Arg. 3. Beſides, experience aſſureth us, that all children bring not an equal degree of pravity into the World, if we may judge by their firſt exerciſe of reaſon, or uſe of paſſions. But if there were no difference made ſince, it ſhould ſeem that all ſhould be corrupted alike, (further than God cureth any, and ſo maketh a difference.) We ſee alſo that many of the children of the moſt vicious people are more vicious than the ordinary ſort of men are. We ſee alſo that ſome mens bodies being diſtempered by their vices, they propagate thoſe bodily diſtempers to their poſterity; which we evidently perceive p. 170do make a great alteration on the ſoul: from whence we ſee ſome perſons very ſottiſh and ſilly, yea ſome ideots, and ſome extreme talkative, ſome extreme paſſionate, ſome luſtful, ſome malicious, ſome gluttonous, ſome drunkards, and this above the corrupt inclination which appeareth in the ordinary ſort of men; and plainly ſed by the temper of the body.

Obj. 1. If our corruption were increaſed by the ſins of immediate Parents, then the World would grow worſe and worſe, and we ſhould have been Devils long before this age.

Anſw. 1. Moſt Divines ſay that the firſt ſin would have done all this, if God in mercy had not prevented or remedied it. 2. God ſtill reſolveth to keep the World in order under his Government; and therefore reſtraineth corruption, and will not ſuffer it to grow, as according to its nature it would. 3. This is one of the common benefits that the World receiveth by the grace of the Redeemer, that they grow not as bad as elſe they would. 4. For the ſake of the Church God will reſtrain them.

Obj. 2. We ſee many of the worſt men have good children.

Anſw. No mans corruptions do put his children into a remedileſs condition: and therefore God may ſanctifie whom and p. 171when he pleaſeth. So may he do alſo by the Parents themſelves, for all their ſins; and yet thoſe ſins do make them worſe.

Obj. 3. Then you may ſay that Grace is propagated by generation from our immediate Parents, as well as ſin: and yet experience telleth us the contrary.

Anſw. 1. This makes as much againſt the propagation of original corruption from Adam, as from our neerer Parents. If it were of any force, it would be againſt both. 2. There is ſo great a difference between grace and ſin, that quite alters the caſe. For, 1. Grace is ſomething extrinſecally adventitious, and now (as to the cauſe of it, and manner of working it) ſupernatural: but ſo is not ſin. 2. Grace is an adventitious perfecting quality: Sin is a defect, (as it is in the rational faculties). But defects are more eaſily propagated, than adventitious qualities: for one requireth nothing thereto but a defective nature; (for nothing can convey to another that which it hath not it ſelf:) but the other requireth more than nature to its propagation. No acquired knowledge or skill in Languages, Sciences, Arts, or Manufactures, are propagated to poſterity by nature: but the ignorance of theſe is natural. 3. But above all, it's conſiderable that original ſin, ſo far as it p. 172containeth a poſitive inclination, ſeems to be radically in the inordination of the ſenſitive appetite, raging againſt the rule of reaſon, (though the rational faculty be corrupted too, and gives up it ſelf to the ſlavery of the ſenſitive; yet the ſenſitive ſeems to be the root.) Now it is evident that nature doth much in propagation of the ſenſitive, (or elſe man ſhould do leſs in generation than a beaſt). But Grace is radically ſubjected in the rational faculties, (though by participation alſo it reach the ſenſitive:) and here nature doth leſs in propagation. We ſee by experience that a natural gentleneſs and calmneſs of the paſſions, and ſuch other lower common virtues as are ſubjected in the ſenſitive part, are born with ſome men; and from the temperament of the body, one man is more mild, patient, temperate than another: but it is not ſo with the intellectual Perfections, nor Chriſtian Graces, Faith, Hope, or Charity.

I ſhall now proceed to prove ſo much of the affirmative, as I have here owned more than is now held, viz. That there ariſeth to children from the ſins of their neereſt Parents, ſuch an imperfect guilt, ſo called by analogie of attribution, as that God may in vindictive juſtice inflict on them for the ſame, the penalty (ſo called by the ſame analogy) both of temporal p. 173death, and of eternal, at leaſt as to the penalty of loſs; ſuppoſing that it be not pardoned through Chriſt.

And this I prove by theſe following Arguments.

Arg. 1. If we are guilty of Adam's firſt ſin, on that account, becauſe we were ſeminally in him, and are propagated from him, then are we guilty of our neerer Parents ſins on the ſame account. But the antecedent is true: go. ſo is the conſequent.

Here I ſuppoſe it granted that Adam's firſt ſin is imputed to us, and we guilty of it: for I now deal not with thoſe Divines that deny it, but with thoſe that maintain it:

For as I ſaid before, if we are not guilty of Adam's ſin, then I muſt give up my cauſe, and confeſs that we are not guilty of the ſins of our neerer Parents. Suppoſing then the imputation of Adam's ſin to us, I muſt Firſt prove that the reaſon of that imputation is, becauſe we are propagated from him, and were ſeminally in him. 2. That on the ſame reaſon, we have the like guilt of neerer Parents ſins.

1. For the firſt, I may ſafely premiſe this, that as in all relations there muſt be a relate, correlate and foundation; and as to the diſconformity of a crooked line from the rule, there muſt be the crookedneſs of the p. 174line, and the ſtraightneſs of the rule; and is the rule will not give you ground to denominate the line diſconform or crooked, unleſs it be truly ſo: even ſo there muſt be merit on mans part, conſiſting in performance, or ſome participation in the evil, before the Law (which is the rule) will judge him guilty. The Law is firſt the rule of duty, and then the rule of judgment. And it firſt ſhews them to be guilty of the ſin (reos culpae) before it ſhew their obligation to puniſhment, (reatum poenae.) This being ſo, it ſeems clear that the doctrine (of too many) that lay the chief or only cauſe of man's guilt and puniſhment upon God's covenant, is not ſound. They ſay God made a covenant with Adam that he ſhould ſtand or fall for all his poſterity: that is, as ſome expound it, that his deſert of life or death ſhould be imputed theirs: and as others; that if he ſinned, he and his poſterity ſhould be guilty of death; and if he did not ſin that firſt ſin of eating the forbidden fruit, both he and his poſterity ſhould be confirmed in their happineſs, as the good Angels, and never fall afterward: And this covenant, ſay they, makes us guilty of Adam's ſin, though we have not a natural intereſt to make us guilty; and ſo God imputeth it to us, not becauſe it was ours before the imputation, but p. 175becauſe he is pleaſed to make it ours by that imputation, or by his covenant. That it is not the imputation or covenant that primarily makes us guilty, but determineth us guilty of the fault who are ſo in our ſelves, and conſequently determineth us guilty of puniſhment; I prove thus:

1. Elſe it ſhould be God only or primarily that ſhould make us ſinners, and not we our ſelves, nor our Parents: But that's moſt falſe: go. The conſequence is moſt apparent. If a man be therefore a ſinner, becauſe God by his covenant or imputation ſaith he is one, and not becauſe he is firſt made one by himſelf, or Parents, then God is the principal, if not only cauſe of ſin.

2. Yea, then God ſhould make a man a ſinner by that Law whoſe eſſential nature is to prohibit and hinder ſin.

3. Or elſe thus; God's judgment (by Law or Sentence) is ever according to the truth of the thing: (He judgeth or pronounceth things to be as they are, and not as they are not.) But if he ſhould determine or pronounce a man a ſinner that is not, his judgment were not according to truth: but he ſhould make that which is falſe become true by judging it true; which is no tolerable conceit.

4. If it were without any antecedent p. 176ground in us, that God's covenant doth judge or make us guilty of Adam's ſin, (or God impute it to us,) but meerly becauſe he will do it; then on the ſame reaſon might God have made or judged the innocent Angels, or the Lord Jeſus Chriſt guilty of Adam's ſin: yea, he might have imputed it to the Sun, or Moon, or any creature. For if real innocency ſecure not us from being made ſinners by God, or reputed ſuch, then it would not ſecure them: Or if God's will to impute it be enough, without an antecedent intereſt to ground that imputation upon, then there is no difference, as to intereſt in that ſin, between them and us: But that's too groſs a conceit to be defended.

5. There is no ſuch covenant of God with Adam mentioned in Scripture, as lays the final ſtanding of his poſterity upon that firſt obedience, or diſobedience of his, much leſs that determineth that they ſhall be judged guilty for his ſake, of more than they are guilty of indeed, by natural intereſt. The foundation of the relation is in our ſelves.

I conclude therefore that it is moſt certain that there is in man ſome ſufficient ground or cauſe why God's Law ſhould denominate or judge him guilty before it do ſo. And this cauſe can be no other than one of theſe p. 177two: either becauſe we were ſeminally in Adam, and are his children; or becauſe God making his covenant as the Rector of all mankind, did make it upon ſuppoſition of a virtual conſent contained in the very nature of man, and ſo ſuppoſing that what we ought to do, we would do, and that if all men had then exiſted, we ought to have conſented to venture our felicity upon Adam's act, and to run the hazard… of periſhing with him, on condition we might be ſaved with him if he ſtand; and ſo ſuch a ſuppoſed conſent is the ground of our guilt. But, though I will not exclude this laſt ground, yet certainly it is upon a ſuppoſition of the former, or elſe it is none at all. For man was not to exiſt till the fall was paſt, and therefore could not be ſuppoſed to exiſt. And if God had decreed to create every individual perſon to the end of the World, of nothing, as he did Adam, without any derivation from him; what virtual conſent can be ſuppoſed? or on what ground ſhould it be preſuppoſed that we would all conſent to live and die with him, any more than with the Angels that fell? or any more than the good Angels might be ſuppoſed to conſent to ſuch a thing? I conclude therefore that the firſt ground of our intereſt in Adam's ſin, or our guilt of it, is our being his off-ſpring, and then p. 178ſeminally in him; and next, that God might make one Law for him and all that ſhould come of him, as ſuppoſing the equity of their conſent: yet by that Law, he hath not (that I know of) involved them in his firſt ſin any more than in his ſecond or third; nor offered them happineſs meerly on condition of his avoiding that firſt ſin, whatſoever they ſhould afterwards do themſelves; nor yet promiſed to make them impeccable, or prevent all after ſin.

2. It being then our natural intereſt that is the firſt ground of our guilt of Adam's actual ſin, (ſo far as we are guilty): and we being as truly the children of our neere Parents, as of him, and ſeminally in them as well as in him, it follows that we have the ſame natural intereſt in their ſins as in his; and therefore the ſame guilt, and reaſon why God ſhould impute them to us: Unleſs the change of Laws do make a difference, which if it do, it can be no more, than by adding the Law of Grace to that of Nature to remedy its obligation: For the nature of things being ſtill the ſame, the ſame Law of nature ſtill remains: and therefore children muſt now be naturally guilty of all Parents ſins, as well as then, before that guilt be diſſolved by remiſſion. Though now God will not puniſh the adult meerly for Parents ſins p. 179imputed to us, yet he might do it if he would, ſuppoſing he had not by the Law of Grace determined the contrary, if it be proved that he might do it then.

Moreover, as then God might ſuppoſe a civil intereſt in Adam's ſin, (as we were parts-future of the ſame World of mankind,) on preſuppoſition of our natural intereſt, (as his off-ſpring;) ſo now (though our Parents be not the root of mankind as Adam was; and that's the main difference, yet) ſeeing our neereſt Parents may be the root of Families, or other Societies, whereof God is alſo the Rector, he may ſuppoſe another ſort of civil intereſt or guilt of their ſins upon us. As he imputed Adam's ſin to us as he was Rector of all mankind, ſo may he our neerer Parents as he is Ruler of a Family, or of ſome more remote, as Ruler of a Common-wealth.

Obj. But that Law which made us guilty of Adam's ſin, is abrogated, and inſtead of it is made the Law of Grace. God doth not now ſay to any, In the day thou ſinneſt thou ſhalt die.

Anſw. I know that commination ſtands not alone, and unremedied; and I yield that the promiſſory part is ceaſed: but ſtill every ſin doth leave upon us a guilt of death, till Chriſt take it off; or elſe what p. 180need could we have of the pardon of it?

Obj. But that Law was particular and poſitive, [in the day thou eateſt thou ſhalt die]: go. it is ceaſed.

Anſw. The particular prohibition of that act of eating is ceaſed, ceſſante objecto: But that particular was grounded on, and preſuppoſed a general, and that which you call poſitive (how fitly, I now enquire not) was firſt natural, as to the duneſs of penalty for each particular ſin. The Law of nature firſt ſaith [death is the due wages of ſin]. or [every ſin deſerveth death]: and this Law doth ſtill remain. So that though, as to the event, we have not that reaſon to expect eternal death now, for Parents ſins, (nor for every ſinful act of our own,) as before the promiſe of Chriſt we might have had; yet that is not becauſe the Law is abrogated, which is the very ſtanding Law of nature, nor becauſe now each ſin deſerveth not ſuch death: but becauſe we have now a remedy at hand to put away the guilt. I am ſure, this is the commoneſt judgment of thoſe Divines that are moſt againſt Arminianiſm; for they maintain that all the unbelievers are ſtill under the Law of works it ſelf, as to the curſing and puniſhing power.

Arg. 2. If we receive the guilt of one ſin p. 181from our immediate Parents, then may we as well receive the guilt of more: But we do receive the guilt of one from them: go.

The antecedent is plain: For we receive from them the guilt of Adam's ſin. It is theirs before it can be ours. Adam delivered it not immediately to us. As we received our nature and perſons from our neereſt Parents, ſo did we therewith our guilt of that ſin.

The conſequence is proved, in that there is the ſame reaſon of both. Why did not our Parents propagate us free from the guilt of Adam's ſin? Becauſe they were not free from it themſelves naturally; and therefore cannot give us a better nature than they have themſelves.

And ſo on the ſame reaſon it muſt follow, that being themſelves guilty of other ſins, they cannot convey to us a nature not guilty of them. If one be therefore ours becauſe it was firſt theirs, and our nature from them, the other muſt be ſo too.

Obj. The Law makes the difference: for God hath not made us liable to Juſtice for our neerer Parents ſins, as he did for the firſt.

Anſw. This is already anſwered. The Law indeed makes a difference as to the event and execution, and actual remaining obligation: but not as to the deſert. The Law declares p. 182and ſhews men to be as they are, and doth not judge unequally of men that are equal, or of equal actions. The ſame Law, though remedied, is ſtill ſo far in force.

Obj. Our Parents, if faithful, are pardoned and juſtified, and therefore cannot convey to us the guilt of any ſin, becauſe they have it not themſelves.

Anſw. It muſt be carefully underſtood, that pardon takes not away, 1. either the reatum culpae, ſo as that perſon ſhould hereafter be judged not to have done what he did, or not to have ſinned in ſo doing: 2. nor yet the natural merit of puniſhment, as if that ſin, and the perſon for it, did ceaſe to deſerve death; but only it remitteth the puniſhment deſerved, and takes away the legal effectual obligation to puniſhment, or that duneſs of puniſhment which muſt bring it upon us. So that Parents may nevertheleſs convey to their children that natural deſert which was not removed from themſelves. 2. And then remiſſion being a free act of God, extendeth no further than he pleaſeth: and therefore (unleſs the covenant to the faithful and their ſeed, do pardon all their guilt to their ſeed as well as themſelves) the very effectual obligation to puniſhment will follow the natural deſert of it, to thoſe children that have not ſuch a remiſſion. And if p. 183this would prove any thing, it would prove us not guilty of Adam's ſin.

Arg. 3. If we are guilty of more of Adam's ſins than the firſt, or than the eating of the forbidden fruit, then on the ſame grounds we may be guilty of the ſins of our neerer Parents: But the antecedent is true; go. ſo is the conſequent.

The antecedent is proved thus. If there were the ſame cauſes to make us guilty of Adam's following ſins, as of the firſt, then th…e is the ſame guilt. But there were the ſame cauſes: go.

1. We were ſeminally in Adam as well when he committed his ſecond ſin as his firſt. 2. The ſame Law as to the precept and threatning was in force (as de futuro) when he committed his ſecond ſin, as when he committed the firſt. 1. It cannot be doubted but Adam ſinned oft between the time of his eating the fruit, and God's making the promiſe of a Redeemer. For his ſoul being depraved, and turned into a wrong courſe of action, muſt needs act ſinfully. 2. Yea we could not be guilty of his eating the forbidden fruit, if we are guilty only of his firſt ſin. For that was not the firſt. His unbelief of God, and believing the Serpent, and others more, did go before it. 3. Yea, the p. 184ſins that Adam committed after the Promiſe, do in their nature deſerve our ſufferings as much as the firſt, though that deſert had a remedy provided. If any ſtill reduce all to God's meer will, and ſay that it was his will in his firſt actions to deal with Adam as the root of mankind, but not in his later ſins; I muſt expect, till they bring ſome proof of ſuch a will of God, or ſuch a Law; and ſtill ſay, that the will and law of God doth not make ſinners of innocent men, nor make ſinners no ſinners any otherwiſe than by pardoning and ſanctifying them▪ So that … were as much in Adam after the promiſe as before, and his ſin was of the ſame demerit naturally; and therefore we are as well guilty of that as of the firſt.

And then for the conſequent, it is acknowledged by moſt of thoſe whom we now oppoſe, that we are equally related to Adam's later ſins, and to thoſe of our neerer Parents, (I mean, to all that Adam committed before the propagation of his Progeny.) And there are the ſame cauſes, as is before manifeſted. Though our neerer Parents were not the root of all mankind as Adam was, yet are they as much a cauſe of us and our nature, and of ſo much of mankind as ſpring from their loins, as Adam was. And all the progeny of Cain did ſpring as truly from p. 185him as from Adam: And all the World ſince the Flood were as truly in the loins of Noah as of Adam: and ſo naturally equally intereſſed in their ſins.

Arg. 4. If our natures may be corrupted more by the ſins of our neerer Parents, then may they be guilty by them as well as by Adam's. But the antecedent I have before proved: go. The conſequence depends on the fameneſs of the reaſons, that guilt and depravation ſhould concur from our neerer Parents as well as from our firſt: And it ſeems that participation in guilt is pre-requiſite to the depravation of nature; elſe it might ſeem ſome kind of injury to us, that another ſhould have power to make us ſo miſerable. Sin is commonly called the puniſhment of ſin.

Arg. 5. If God may without any injuſtice bring death both temporal and eternal on the ſon of a ſinner, without intending it as a puniſhment to the Son for the Father's ſin; then may he alſo without injuſtice (nay in juſtice) inflict the ſame death as a penalty for the Father's ſin: But the antecedent is true; as I prove thus. 1. That which all Rulers may do without injuſtice, that God may do without injuſtice. But all Rulers may without injuſtice deprive the children of a Traytor, or other offender, of thoſe enjoyments p. 186which the Father hath forfeited himſelf, and which were to have been conveyed from the Father to the child, if the Father had not forfeited them. If a Traytor forfeit his Lands, and Honours, his Son is juſtly deprived of them, though the Prince intend it not as a puniſhment to the Son. Becauſe the Father cannot convey to his Son that which he hath not himſelf; as having loſt it on his forfeiture: and the Son hath no right to it when the Fathers right is gone. So if a wicked man do forfeit his right to all bleſſings in this life, or that to come, he cannot convey a right to his Son which he had not himſelf. And what other way ſhould that Son have ſuch a right, unleſs God ſhould give it him; which he is or was free to do or not. It's true that God by a new covenant hath given this everlaſting life to believers: but that's not to all; nor doth that deny them to be guilty of their Parents ſin before, nor yet that it deſerveth death ſtill as to its nature, and might bring it, were it not pardoned.

2. God hath no obligation on him according to the Law of works, to give health, peace, or any bleſſing in this life, much leſs eternal glory to the ſon of a ſinner.

2. And for the conſequence, 1. It is evident from what is ſaid, that God cannot be p. 187charged with hard or cruel dealing, in regard of any wrong that we ſhould ſuffer, if he puniſh us (thus by deprivation) for our Parents ſins: for if it be no cruelty to do the ſame thing upon the meer occaſion of their ſins, (which is unqueſtionable,) then it is no cruelty to do it in reſpect to their ſin, as the deſerving cauſe. 2. And for the point of juſtice, as it is already proved to be non injuſtum, ſo it may be proved to be juſtum, thus. Where there is a real participation in the ſin, there it is juſt that there ſhould be a participation in the puniſhment, becauſe of that ſin. But we did really participate in the ſin, as of Adam, ſo of our neerer Parents: go. For the minor: they that were ſeminally in them, (though not by perſonal exiſtence) did really participate with them in their ſin. But we were ſeminally in them: go. This will be further confirmed in that which followeth.

Arg. 6. If we ſhould have been guilty of the ſin of our neereſt Parents, though Adam had never ſinned, then are we guilty of them now: But the antecedent is true: go.

Here I ſuppoſe that Adam had not ſinned, and our neereſt Parents had. If any ſay this is not to be ſuppoſed. I anſwer; Though it may not be affirmed to have ſo been, yet we may in diſpute ſuppoſe it had been. Nor p. 188have I yet ſeen it proved that God made any ſuch promiſe to Adam, as to confirm all his poſterity, on condition that he did not commit that, or any ſin. If Adam had begot a poſterity no better than himſelf was in his firſt created perfection, and under the ſame Law, then they would have been peceable and mutable as he was, and liable to the ſame penalty upon their ſin as he was. But Adam would have begot a poſterity no better than himſelf, for ought we can find by Scripture, which no where promiſeth him a better, that is, an immutable or indeſectible poſterity: and they would have been under the ſame Law; for it was ſuited to their perfect nature: go.

From what is ſaid, the antecedent is evident. For if we ſhould have been as much in our neereſt Parents as we were in Adam, and they have been under the ſame: Law▪ then their ſin would have brought on us the ſame guilt and puniſhment. For example, if Cain had been the firſt ſinner, and Seth had been innocent; the poſterity of Cain would have been all guilty and corrupted, as Adam's poſterity now is. For the ſame cauſes would have produced the ſame effects.

The conſequence is clear, in that Adam's ſinning firſt can be no cauſe why we ſhould p. 189not be guilty of the following ſins of our neerer Parents, which otherwiſe we ſhould have been guilty of.

Arg. 7. None can be naturally the propagators of a nature better than their own, (or a perſon better than themſelves.) But if Parents who are manifoldly guilty of death did propagate a nature not guilty, then ſhould they propagate a nature (or perſon) better than their own: go.

Here I muſt explain my meaning, by diſtinguiſhing of evil poſitive (if ſuch be) and privative: Between evils adhering to our nature or eſſence, and thoſe that adhere but to ſome integral part: Between a total privation and a partial: Between a privation real or phyſical, and relative. And ſo I conclude that, 1. I ſpeak not here of poſitive evil, as ſuch, (if ſuch there be,) but of privative. 2. I ſpeak not of every evil that adhereth only to ſome part, and not to nature it ſelf. For I know a lame man may beget a Son not lame, and a ſick man may beget a ſound child. 3. Nor do I ſpeak of ſuch a partial privation which may conſiſt with the prevalency of the contrary; and which nature may ſupply, or overcome. 4. Nor yet of a privation of ſome phyſical good, (though that be another part of our unhappineſs,) but of a relation or right. p. 1905. Nor of a privation accidentally accrewing to the perſon, and limited to himſelf alone by the will … another; but of one that is without any ſuch limitation, naturally, or by neceſſary reſultancy fallen upon him.

Furthermore it muſt be obſerved; 1. that the guilt that we now ſpeak of is no natural being, but a relative, and that not proper and compleat, but, as we may call it, a privative relation, participating of the nature of a proper relation but little more than a natural privation doth of natural being. A right to life is a true relation, which by ſin we are deprived of: yet becauſe there is not only the non debitum habendi, but the debitum non habendi, I will not deny but even in this privation there is a kind of relatio rationis. 2. Obſerve that we are not now ſpeaking of the duneſs of poſitive torments; for I ſay nothing of that in this point of guilt of progenitors ſins. 3. Note that many learned Philoſophers and Divines affirm that all evil is a privation of good formally; (ſee Barlow's Exercit. de Natura Mali.) And if that hold, then it ſeems that our Parents ſins do bring upon us a guilt of all evil of puniſhment: for when they have forfeited all good, they can convey no right of any to us. 4. Note alſo, that right to bleſſedneſs more or leſs, doth not adhere to the p. 191nature of man as man; (for then thoſe in Hell ſhould have it:) but it is a ſeparable thing, depending on the will of God: And therefore our Parents may convey our nature, without any right to ſuch bleſſings. 5. When I ſay that it is naturally, and by neceſſary reſultancy, that a ſinner is thus guilty, I do not exclude God's free will as the antecedent cauſe in making Nature it ſelf, and the Law: but the indifferency, or non-neceſſity of the effect when the cauſes are once in nature thus laid. Gnd might have choſen to have made man ſuch as he is, that is, man: and having ſo made him, whether he might have choſen to make him that Law which we call the Law of nature, I will not now diſpute; (though I think not: becauſe that Law of nature is nothing but the very nature of man himſelf, conſidered as related to God, and withal the nature of the whole creation; which all per modum ſigni do ſhew man the will of God concerning what ſhall be due from man, and to man.) But this is clear, that God having freely made man in that relation, and under that Law as he did, his breach of that Law doth then by a natural neceſſity bring him under guilt: for if the ſubjectum, fundamentum & terminus be put in being, the relation cannot be avoided; for that were a contradiction.

p. 192Having given this explication, I ſuppoſe little more need to be ſaid for the proof of the premiſes. For the major, it ſeems now clear, that a perſon who hath loſt his right totally to life, or any bleſſing, cannot convey to another perſon, of whom he is the root, a nature that hath right to that life or bleſſing. For nemo dat quod non habet. 2. And this ſeems plainly to be no meer negation of right, (in the derived nature,) but a privation. Becauſe if our progenitors had none of them ſinned, we ſhould have been born with that right which now we want; and ſo we had ſeminally and virtually a right our ſelves: which being loſt, it is a privation to us, and not a meer negation; and ſo a puniſhment, and not a meer affliction: Yet as the right of our Parents themſelves, (as Adam) who were perſonally exiſtent, was a more full and proper right than ours who were but ſeminally in them; ſo our privation is not in ſo plenary and proper a ſenſe called a privation, nor a puniſhment, as theirs is, or as our own is for our actual ſins: And ſo our guilt is not ſo full and proper a guilt; but analogically ſo called, as Accidens is called Ens. And this ſeems to me to be the true difference between our guilt of our Parents ſins, and of our own: and our puniſhment for theirs, (original from Adam, p. 193or others,) and of our own actual ſin. And perhaps Zuinglius meant thus, when he denied Original ſin to be properly called ſin. So far as ſuch a ſeminal right or poſſibility which the ſeed hath through the Parent, doth differ from the Parents own right; ſo far there is a difference in the formal nature of penalty and guilt, upon the loſs of that right. It is doubtleſs ſome more loſs that the Son of a Traytor hath, by his Fathers forfeiture of his Lands, than a ſtranger may be ſaid to have by that forfeiture, who never was in a poſſibility of enjoying them. It is therefore no meer negation, but a privation, and conſequently participateth of the nature of penalty, and the obligation thereto of the nature of guilt. And thus in the major propoſition of this Argument I place the very reaſon of original guilt, from Adam, or any Parents.

The minor is plain: If Adam ſhould convey to Abel a nature that hath right to life, or that is not deprived of the right it was in poſſibility of, or ſeminally had, then he ſhould propagate a better nature than his own, and give that which he had not to give. And ſo if our neereſt Parents, who are by a manifold obligation deprived of that right, ſhould convey to us a nature that is deprived of it but by a ſingle obligation, they alſo p. 194ſhould propagate a better nature than their own. But that cannot be. God by his Grace may make us better than our Parents: but they by natural procreation cannot.

Arg. 8. Where puniſhment may juſtly follow, there guilt did go before: But puniſhment of children for their Parents ſin committed while they were in their loins, may juſtly follow: go. there guilt did go before.

The major is proved, in that all puniſhment is for ſome fault, whereof the perſon puniſhed was ſome way guilty. Obj. It ſufficeth that another were guilty of it: Anſw. One mans ſin deſerveth not another mans puniſhment, further than that other doth ſome way participate in the guilt. Only we muſt diſtinguiſh between guilt by perſonal commiſſion or omiſſion, and guilt by moral and reputative, or by natural participation: Only Adam or other Parents were guilty by perſonal commiſſion or omiſſion, as to thoſe particular ſins: but we are guilty by natural participation, in that we derive all our nature and perſonal being from perſons ſo guilty: And we are guilty by reputative participation, of the ſins of mankind, (in Adam,) and of the Societies that we are members of, (quoad nudum meritum, ſtill,) in that we are juſtly reputed to conſent to p. 195partake of the benefits or penalties of ſuch Societies, when we voluntarily become and continue members of them.

Obj. Chriſt himſelf was juſtly puniſhed, and yet was not guilty of our ſin.

Anſw. He was not guilty by commiſſion, or by natural participation: but he had an analogical guilt by reputative participation; that is, by his own voluntary ſponſion, putting himſelf quoad poenam in the room of finners: but mark the limitation; it was but quoad poenam, that he undertook this task, viz. that though he were not properly guilty, yet he conſented to ſuffer as if he were guilty, for the ſakes of them that were. So that his own conſent was a juſt cauſe of the derivation of the penalty to his own perſon which did not commit the ſin; and ſo that analogical guilt was inſtead of proper guilt. It may well he ſaid that Chriſt was guilty ad poenam, as obliged to puniſhment, in that his own conſent was ſufficient to induce an obligation to puniſhment.

Obj. May not God's pleaſure bring on us a reputative guilt of Adam's ſin, and not of our neerer Parents? ſeeing he hath abſolute power over us, and therefore his will may ſerve inſtead of our conſent, as the will of a Parent may be inſtead of the infants will.

Anſw. God bringeth not guilt on any by p. 196efficiency, or making them ſuch as deſerve puniſhment: but by imputation and adjudication. Otherwiſe God ſhould be the cauſe of ſin, as ſin: for ſo to make guilty, is to make a man really a ſinner. Our Parents may will ſin, and ſo may do it for us, becauſe we are ſeminally in them: but God cannot will ſin. Our Parents by willing it, do firſt become ſinners themſelves, and then convey the guilt to us: but ſo cannot God. It being therefore but by reputation and adjudication that he judgeth men ſo guilty of ſin, it is apparent that his judgment muſt have ſome ground in the nature of the thing; and the man muſt be guilty before God judge him ſo: for his judgment is according to truth. And therefore it muſt needs be that there muſt be ſome reaſon in our ſelves why Adam's ſin ſhould be judged ours, or why we ſhould be judged liable to puniſhment for it: and that muſt be, becauſe we derive our natures from him: And then there is the ſame reaſon for our guilt of neerer Parents ſin, ſave only that God hath ſince more freed us from the danger of that ſuffering, which by ſuch ſins we might have undergone, (as he pardoneth to us Adam's imputed ſin alſo.)

The minor of the Argument will be anon cleared in the following Arguments.

p. 197Obj. It is indeed a puniſhment that is due to children for their Parents ſins: but it is only to the Parents that it is formally puniſhment; and to themſelves it is but materially ſo, and ſo but affliction, becauſe the ſin, and ſo the guilt, was only the Parents, though the child be the ſubject of the ſuffering.

Anſw. 1. If this were granted, it would ſtill hold good, that God may juſtly lay that ſuffering which is materially puniſhment, upon children, for the ſins of immediate Parents. 2. If this were ſo, then it will equally follow that we may not be formally but materially puniſhed for Adam's ſin, ſeeing the reaſon is manifeſted to be the ſame. 3. I have ſhewed that there muſt be ſome reaſon on the part of the ſufferer, why he ſhould ſuffer for another mans ſin: Now with us in the preſent caſe, it is evident that the reaſon is, becauſe we are their ſeed, and have our natures from them: go. this is a leſs-perfect, or analogical guilt.

Obj. God doth inflict ſufferings on the beaſts for mans ſin, without any cauſe on their part: go. he may do ſo by infants.

Anſw. 1. God is not the Rector of Beaſts in a moral proper ſenſe; but only in a natural improper ſenſe, as a Pilot ruleth a Ship, or an Herdſman Cattel: And therefore he hath made no Law for them, nor hath engaged p. 198his fidelity to them concerning the conditions of their happineſs or miſery, as he hath done to man: And therefore bruits are not capable of ſin or puniſhment, though they be of ſuffering. So that childrens caſe and theirs do differ. 2. Yet when the bruits ſuffer for mans ſin, it is becauſe of their relation to man: And therefore children muſt ſuffer becauſe of their relation, which is natural, and ſo neer that it makes them truly capable of guilt. So that according to the ſubject, the ſame ſuffering receives a various form and denomination, and ſo doth the obligation. In the perſonal committers of the ſin, there is guilt and puniſhment due to them, in the primary, fulleſt, and moſt proper ſenſe: on the children that were then in their loins, it is guilt and puniſhment, more imperfectly, as by analogy of attribution: in the bruits, when ſacrificed, or deſtroyed for their Maſters ſin, it is but equivocally guilt and puniſhment.

I ſhall proceed to ſome Texts of Scripture.

Arg. 9. Deut. 28. 18. Curſed ſhall be the fruit of thy body. Children are curſed for the ſins of immediate Parents: go. puniſhed.

Obj. It is only to the Parents that it is a puniſhment.

p. 199Anſw. True in the primary ſenſe: but as the children participate of their nature, ſo alſo of the nature of guilt and puniſhment. It is a threatning of natural evil to a rational creature, becauſe of a moral evil, which he hath ſome participation of: go, it is by participation a true puniſhment.

Obj. You may as well ſay that the bruits and inanimates are puniſhed, for they are here curſed too.

Anſw. This was anſwered even now. The ſame evil threatned againſt a bruit, is no puniſhment, which threatned againſt a reaſonable creature, is a puniſhment, becauſe of, their different capacities.

Obj. The meaning of the Text is but this: Thou ſhalt be denied the deſired fruit of tby body; i. e. your women ſhall be barren.

Anſw. That may be part of the meaning: but as that is not the full proper ſenſe of the words, ſo is there no reaſon from the Text for limiting it to that only; and many other Texts of Scripture tell us that it is, to be extended further.

Obj. This was the voice of the Law of Works, which God doth not now govern the World by.

Anſw. 1. This is a Law which was in force ſince Adam, and the Promiſe: and therefore not then abrogated. 2. It is as p. 200much as I plead for, that according to the law of nature, puniſhment is our due for our neerer Parents ſins or elſe it had not been put in this curſe by Moſes: But that Chriſt hath provided a remedy in the Goſpel, for that and original ſin as from Adam, and our actual ſin it ſelf, I thankfully acknowledge. I ſay not therefore that eventually any ſhall periſh for the imputed act of his Parents ſin, to whom it is pardoned by the Grace of Chriſt.

Arg. 10. Exod. 20. 5. It is expreſſed in the moral Law it ſelf, [For I the Lord thy God am a jealous God, viſiting the iniquity of the Fathers upon the children to the third and fourth Generation of them that hate me;] ſo Deut. 5. 9. and ſo God proclaims his name to Moſes, Exod. 34. 7. Here then is a threatning determining puniſhment to be due to the children for their neerer Parents ſin: for God will viſit; that is, in juſtice puniſh it on them. The objections before anſwered, I paſs by.

Obj. This is only againſt thoſe children that do themſelves tread in their Fathers ſteps.

Anſw. True, as to the adult. But it is the Parents ſins that are viſited on them. Thoſe children are eſpecially threatned, becauſe it is they that lie under ſuch guilt ununremedied: p. 201But it's thence plain that it was the caſe of all, till they receive the remedy: for the childs actual ſin doth not then begin to make him guilty of his Parents ſin, but only ſhews him to lie under that guilt.

Obj. Yes; it is by conſenting to our Parents ſin when we come to age, that we become guilty of them.

Anſw. That's not the firſt guilt: and that conſenting brings not on us the ſame formal numerical ſin or guilt that was on our Parents; (for one accident cannot paſs from one ſubject to another, nor remain in two ſubjects:) but it brings only a guilt of the like ſort; ſo that ours is but the guilt of conſenting to their ſin: But the Text here ſaith expreſly, that it is the ſins of the Fathers that are viſited on the children.

Obj. It is meant of children in an ethical ſenſe, that is, not natural, but the heirs of their vices.

Anſw. It is plain in the Text that it is to natural children, and therefore the third and fourth Generation are mentioned: (though it's true, that it is not all thoſe children that lie under that guilt, but only thoſe that inherit their vices.) Otherwiſe the threatning ſhould be equally to any other mans natural children, that imitate your ſin: But that's p. 202againſt the plain Text: Though it be true, that any other mans children that imitate your ſin, are liable to puniſhment for ſuch imitation: yet not for your ſin.

Arg. 11. Eph. 2. 3. 11, 12. [Were by nature the children of wrath, even as others.—Remember that ye being in time paſt Gentiles in the fleſh,—that at that time ye were without Chriſt, being aliens from the Commonwealth of Iſrael, and ſtrangers from the Covenants of Promiſe, having no hope, and without God in the World.] The firſt words are commonly underſtood of a ſtate of wrath derived from Parents by natural Generation. If that be not the meaning, then I confeſs it makes nothing to prove either the imputation of Adam's ſin, or other Parents; nor native corruption neither: But if that be the ſenſe, as is commonly judged, then is there no intimation for a reſtriction of it to Adam's ſin, as the only cauſe of our deſert of that wrath; nay, the later verſes, and the whole ſcope of the place gives it as a ſpecial reaſon; that [they were Gentiles in the fleſh]. So that it ſeems to me ſome ſtate of wrath which Iſrael was not under, that is here meant; or at leaſt, ſome what more to them as the ſeed of the Gentiles, than was common to Iſrael. It appears alſo from the following verſes, that when Chriſt took away p. 203the enmity, ſo that the Gentiles were no more ſtrangers and foreigners, but fellow-Citizens of the Saints, and of the houſhold of God, and no more without God, Covenant, Hope, &c. that Chriſt did deliver the Gentiles from a ſpecial puniſhment (and conſequently guilt) which lay on them and their ſeed, more than on the Jews.

So Gal. 2. 15. [We who are Jews by nature, and not ſinners of the Gentiles] which intimates plainly that the Gentiles were by nature in a worſe ſtate than the Jews: and therefore had by nature ſome more guilt than they.

Obj. That is not becauſe the Gentiles were by nature guilty of any more than Adam's ſin, but becauſe the Jews were by nature freed from that guilt; which made the difference.

Anſw. I confeſs that may be much, taking the word [nature] but as the cauſe of the perſons to whom the benefit is given, and not as the cauſe of the gift, or thing given. But yet that ſeems not all which is meant, when we are called [ſinners of the Gentiles, and ſtrangers and foreigners, &c.] For theſe ſhew ſome further tranſgreſſion of our Parents that bound the ſin of Adam falier on us, and increaſed our guilt beyond that of the Jews, I mean, increaſed it fundamentaliter p. 204quoad …iuſam meritoriam, though not terminative quoad poenam demeritam. And indeed, it was not all the Jews that were freed from the guilt of Adam's ſin; but only thoſe of them that were within the ſpecial Covenant of Grace.

Arg. 12. Matth. 23. 31, 35, 36. [Wherefore ye be witneſſes to your ſelves that ye are the children of them which killed the Prophets: Fill ye up then the meaſure of your Fathers. Ye ſerpents! ye generation of vipers! how ſhall ye eſcape the damnation of hell?— That upon you may come all the rightous blood ſhed on the earth, from the blood of righteous Abel to the blood of Zaccharias ſon of Barachias, whom ye ſlew between the Temple and the Altar: Verily I ſay unto you; all theſe things ſhall come upon this Generation.]

Here, 1. that which they are brought in to witneſs againſt themſelves, is ſomething that may juſtly ſubject them to puniſhment: But that which they muſt ſo witneſs is, [that they are the children of them that killed the Prophets,] (and not of Adam only:) go. &c. 2. From hence Chriſt concludeth, 1. [Fill up the meaſure of your Fathers, &c.] q. d. 1. Having the ſame corrupt natures with your Parents, no wonder if ye do the ſame deeds. 2. It is juſt with God to forſake p. 205you for their ſakes, and permit you to follow the nature that you have from them. 2. He calls them a generation of vipers and ſerpents, not only becauſe of their firſt Father, but becauſe of the murderers of the Prophets. 3. He ſaith, that the righteous blood ſhed by their Fathers ſhall come on them: ſo that it appeareth that it is not only their own imitation of their Parents blood ſhed that comes on them, but even that very blood that was ſhed by their Parents before they were born. 4. He gives the reaſon from their natural participation, [whom ye ſlew:] and [ye are the children of them that killed, &c.] q. d. In as much as your Parents did it, and you have your nature from them, it's juſt that all this be imputed to you, and that you ſuffer as the doers of it your ſelves; which yet you might have remedied by leaving their ſinful ways: but being your ſelves imitaters of them, you ſhall bear both the ſins which they and which your ſelves have committed.

Arg. 13. Pſal. 109. 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16. [Let his children be continually vagabonds, and beg: and let them ſeek their bread alſo out of their deſolate places.—Neither let there be any to favour his fatherleſs children: let his poſterity be cut off, and in the generation following let their name be blotted out. Let the p. 206iniquity of bis Fathers be remembred with the Lord, and let not the ſin of his Mother be blotted out. Let them be before the Lord continually, that he may cut off the memory of them from the earth.] Here ſeems to be as plain evidence, that we may be juſtly puniſhed for the ſins of our neerer Parents, as any is in Scripture to prove the imputation of Adam's ſin. 1. David deſireth a curſe upon this ſinners poſterity, even before they are born, or before he knows what they will prove. 2. And this is not becauſe of Adam's ſin, though that alſo lay upon them; but, as he expreſſeth it, ver. 16. [becauſe he remembred not to ſhew mercy, but perſecuted the po… and needy man, &c.] 3. Yea, he deſireth that God would remember the iniquity of his Father, and not blot out the ſin of his Mother: which cannot be meant of any puniſhment that David would have God inflict on that Father or Mother. He is not of a ſpirit ſo cruel and contrary to the Goſpel, as to deſire that God would not forgive them that are dead long ago, and either in joy or miſery; when he knew not whether they died penitently, or impenitently. If any ſay that he did know by the ſpirit of propheſie, or ſpecial viſion, that they did die impenitently, and are in hell: 1. I deſire them that affirm it, to prove it. 2. If ſo, what need he deſire p. 207that God would not forgive them, or blot out their ſin, which he knew was now beyond poſſibility. 3. But the next words in the Text ſhew that he ſpeaks only of the ſin of the dead Anceſtors, as it lieth on the poſterity, and not on themſelves: For as it was not the dead, but the living, that David prayeth againſt, ſo he next ſaith, Let them be before the Lord continually, that he may cut off the memory of them from the earth.] So that it is a penalty on him that then was living, and upon his poſterity, that David prays for, even that his Parents ſin may be remembred againſt him, and his ſin remembred againſt his children; and not that any of them may be remembred againſt the dead, who, for ought he knew, might ſome of them be pardoned in Heaven.

Obj. This might be an unlawful Prayer.

Anſw. Then would it not be recorded among the ſacred forms which were dictated by the Holy Ghoſt, without one word of check or reprehenſion.

Obj. It is but temporal judgments that David deſires for the Parents ſin.

Anſw. 1. It's known that the judgments and bleſſings of God are moſtly expreſſed in the old Teſtament, as conſiſting in things temporal; becauſe it was not yet the fulneſs p. 208of time for Grace, and the great fruits and concomitants of it to be revealed to the full. Life and immortality are brought to light (in a greater meaſure) in the Goſpel. 2. I have proved in the beginning, that If God may inflict temporal death on children for Parents ſin, then alſo may he inflict eternal, as to the penalty of loſs, and ſo much of the pain of ſenſe as the apprehenſion of that loſs muſt needs infer. He that depriveth man of life, depriveth him of all the comforts of it: and he that may do ſo, may leave him his life without thoſe comforts, if he pleaſe.

Arg. 14. [Pſal. 137. 9. Happy ſhall he be that taketh and daſheth thy little ones againſt the ſtones.] Here Babylon's children are to be daſhed againſt the ſtones, not only for Adam's, but their neerer Parents ſins: As is plain, in that thoſe are given as the reaſon, in the Pſalm.

Arg. 15. Job. 21. 19. [God layeth up his iniquity for his children,] that is, a puniſhment for his very iniquity. So Job 27. 14. If his children be multiplied, it is for the ſword; and his off-ſpring ſhall not be ſatisfied with bread: Thoſe that remain of him ſhall be buried in death. So Job. 17. 5. Even the eyes of his children ſhall fail. So Job 5. 4.

p. 209Arg. 16. The infants were to be part of the faſting, mourning, repenting, ſanctified Aſſembly, Joel. 2. 15, 16. which was not to lament Adam's ſin only, but their later ſins: go. the infants had ſome ſort of participation in the guilt and danger of puniſhment.

Arg. 17. Nahum. 3. 10. [Her young children alſo were daſhed in pieces at the top of all the ſtreets.] This mentioned as God's puniſhment for Parents ſins. The like is oft in the Lament.

So Hoſ. 13. 16. Samaria ſhall become deſolate, for ſhe hath rebelled againſt her God; they ſhall fall by the ſword, their infants ſhall be daſhed in pieces, and their women with child ſhall be rip'd up.

Arg. 18. Jer. 29. 32. [Thus ſaith the Lord; I will puniſh Shemaiah the Nehelamite and his ſeed, becauſe he hath taught rebellion againſt the Lord.] Mark here, it is called [puniſhing his ſeed.]

So of Jehoiakim, Jer. 36. 31. I will puniſh him and his ſeed, &c. So Jer. 22. 28, 30.

Arg. 19. Iſa. 14. 20. [The ſeed of evil doers ſhall never be renowned.] Iſa. 1. 4. [A people laden with iniquity; a ſeed of evil doers.] Pſal. 21. 10. [Their fruit ſhalt thou deſtroy from the earth, and their ſeed from among the children of men.] Pſal. 37. 28. [The ſeed of the wicked ſhall be cut off.] So Pſal. 106. 27. p. 210And it's oft made a reproach, and a note of men liable to contempt; as Iſa. 57. 3. [Ye ſons of the Sorcereſs, the ſeed of the Adulterer and the Whore: ſo oft. Mal. 2. 15. may have ſomewhat to this ſenſe; [And wherefore one? that he might ſeek a godly ſeed:] whereof one reaſon may be, when they contract no guilt of Parents Adultery.

I might here alſo draw an argument not contemptible from the intereſt of the ſeed of the faithful in the benefits of free Grace: But becauſe I have been ſo long, I will add but one more, and in that ſum up many more Scriptures.

Arg. 20. From all the examples of God's actual execution of Juſtice on children for the ſins of neerer Parents. 1. For that of Cain's I mentioned it before, out of Matth. 23. And the Text ſhews that his ſeed ſuffered for his ſake, and not only for Adam's, when there was ſuch a difference made between Seth's and his, that his ſeed are called, the children of men; and ſo far excommunicated, that the ſons of God were not to joyn with them in Marriage. 2. The infants of the whole World were drowned in the floud, not only becauſe of Adam's ſin, but becauſe their Fathers were grown ſo wicked. And it ſeems by Peter; 1 Pet. 3. 19, 20. that they are part of the ſpirits in Priſon. When in p. 211the mean time, Noah's whole Family (even wicked Cham) are ſaved for his ſake. 3. When Sodom is burnt, all the infants periſh. And it ſeems by Jude 7. that they ſuffer the vengeance of eternal fire; and the reaſon is, becauſe they gave themſelves over to fornication, and ſtrange fleſh. Ibid. 4. God deſtroyed all the firſt born of Egypt for the Princes and Parents ſin. 5. Moſes commandeth to kill every male of the Midianites among the little ones, even after they had given them quarter, and brought them home, Numb. 31. 17. 6. So did they, and more, to the ſubjects of Sihon, Deut. 2. 34. They utterly deſtroyed the men and the women, and the little ones of every City and left none to remain. 7. So did they by Og the King of Baſhan, and his ſubjects, Deut. 3. 6. beſides the reſt of the inhabitants, whom they drove out. 8. The like God denounceth againſt themſelves for their rebellion, Deut, 32. 25. 9. The like is executed on Achan's Family, Judg. 7. 24, 25. which indeed goes beyond the caſe in hand. 10. God commandeth Saul to ſlay both man, woman, infants, and ſuckling of … Amalekites, 1 Sam. 15. 3. 11. God killeth the child begotten by David in Adultery, for his ſin. 12. He threatens out of his own loins to raiſe up evil againſt David for that ſin, and other evils. 13. He bringeth p. 212a curſe on Eli's houſe after him, for his and his ſons ſins. 14. He ſaith, for Solomon's ſin, he will afflict the ſeed of David, 1 Kin. 11. 39. and ſo rendeth from him the ten tribes. 15. He cutteth off, and bringeth evil on Ahab's poſterity for his ſake, 1 Kin. 21. 21. 15. He rejected all the ſeed of Iſrael, and afflicted them, and delivered them into the hand of the enemy for their Parents ſin, 2 Kings 17. 20. 16. Manaſſeh's ſin God would not pardon to his poſterity, when he was dead, and pardoned himſelf, 2 Kin. 24. 3, 4. 17. Ezek. 9. 6. He gives the like command, [Slay utterly old and young, both maids and little children.] 18. The children of Babylon, Shemaiah and others are mentioned before. 19. I will mention but two more, which ſhall be very remarkable. The firſt is, 2 Sam. 21. where the plague of famine is inflicted for Saul's ſin, and healed by the ſacrificing of ſeven of his poſterity. 20. The laſt is the ſad example of the Jews, for killing Chriſt; who, being acquainted, it ſeems, with this doctrine that I maintain, did ſay to Pilate, His blood be on us, and on our children: and ſo it hath been, and is to this day, to the terror of all the Churches, who therein may behold the ſeverity of the Lord.

So much curſorily for the proof of the Aſſertion.

p. 213In the next place we muſt anſwer ſome more of the chief objections, beſides what are already anſwered on the by. And firſt I will anſwer thoſe that make equally againſt the imputation of Adam's or our neerer Parents ſin: And becauſe learned and judicious Placaeus hath ſaid more to the matter (in Theſ. Salmurienſ. Vol. 1. de ſtatu hom. lapſi ante Grat. pag. 206, 207. Theſ. 12, 13, 14, &c.) than any that I know of, I ſhall conſider of his reaſons; as they are brought againſt the imputation of Adam's actual ſin, to his poſterity; and conſequently make againſt our participation in the guilt of our neerer Parents actual ſins.

1. He ſaith it is not agreeable to that of Ezek. The Son ſhall not bear the iniquity of the Father: for we ſhould bear the iniquity of Adam.

Anſw. 1. This ſpeaks of a Son that diſowneth his Fathers iniquity, and hateth it, and goeth not in the ſame way; as is plain, Ezek. 18. 5, 6. 14, to 17. and of no other: ſuch ſhall not die for Parents ſins. 2. But this is no proof that he never deſerved death for them; but only that through gracious indulgence, it ſhall not be inflicted. So that this is a paſſage of Grace, and not of pure Juſtice according to the meer law of works.

p. 214Obj. God ſpeaks it to prove his Righteouſneſs, and not his Grace: ver. 29.

Anſw. It is his ordinate Righteouſneſs according to the promiſe of Grace, which he muſt fulfil, and not according to the meer law of works or nature, which he vindicateth: It is his juſt and equal dealings with men compared one to another, ſuppoſing that they ſtand all upon terms of Grace. 3. And this is yet more plain, in that the very ſame promiſe, on the ſame ground, is made to them that repent, and turn from their evil ways: ver. 21, 22. Certainly the promiſe of pardon of ſin is a promiſe of Grace, and not an effect of the pure law of nature or works. So that the reaſon here why that Son, who himſelf doth that which is lawful and right, ſhall not die for the Fathers ſin, is the ſame as why a repenting ſinner ſhall not die for his ſin, ver. 21, 22. which can be no other than pardoning Grace; which is ſo far from proving that there was no precedent guilt, that it undoubtedly proves that there was: for where there is no guilt, there can be no pardon.

This anſwer ſhall ſerve alſo to thoſe that confeſs the imputation of Adam's ſin, and yet from hence argue againſt the imputation of other Parents ſins. To which I ſhall add, as to them, that this Text is no more againſt p. 215one than the other: go. if it be not againſt the former, it is not againſt the later. Let them ſhew any intimated difference.

2. Saith Placaeus, It agreeth not with right reaſon. For, 1. If Adam's ſin be imputed, then his obedience ought to be imputed, if he had continued innocent.

Anſw. The word imputation, as ambiguous, I purpoſely avoid, unleſs where I may explain it: but not the ſenſe before explained. I grant that to be true, which he ſuppoſeth abſurd: But I ſay withal, that yet Adam's imputed righteouſneſs alone would have ſaved none that had had the leaſt perſonal unrighteouſneſs of his own. Becauſe bonum eſt ex cauſis integris, we ſhould have been innocent as we came into the World; but yet the next ſin of our own would have ſpoiled that innocency. 2. Further, I ſhewed before that there is not the ſame reaſon for conveying accidental benefits to nature, as for conveying a nature deprived of them. In caſe of privation, the Parents cannot convey what they have not: But though they had it, yet it followeth not that they ſhould convey it, if it were a ſupervenient accident ſeparable from nature: as for example, any right to a reward that Adam might be ſuppoſed to attain by his obedience: this might be proper to himſelf.

p. 2163. He addeth, [at leaſt, all the ſins which Adam committed while we were in his loins, muſt be imputed to us.]

Anſw. I grant it, and ſay that ſo they are: yet with the fore-mentioned difference, that the firſt ſin depriving us of all title to all God's benefits, the ſecond could deprive us of no more; and ſo could add no more guilt terminative, but only fundamentaliter.

4. He adds, [ſo ſhould all the ſins of our intermediate Parents, ſeeing when they committed them, we were as much in them as in Adam.]

Anſw. I grant all, with the laſt mentioned difference: Let thoſe that go on other grounds anſwer the Objector as well as they can.

5. He adds, [yea the death of Adam ſhould be ſo imputed to us: for if he ſinned as the Head of mankind, why ſhould he not alſo be puniſhed in the ſame reſpect? If we were not bound to obey that prohibition, but in his perſon, ſurely neither to be puniſhed: for the commination belongs no otherwiſe to us than the prohibition.]

Anſw. But withal conſider, that though God might have ſatisfied his juſtice with deſtroying Adam, and ſo putting an end to humane race; yet, 1. He was no way bound to do this: He that a little before bid man p. 217encreaſe and multiply, might let him enjoy his forfeited life: that was no injuſtice. 2. Yea, when God had ſo lately made ſo glorious a ſtructure for the demonſtration and communication of his goodneſs, &c. it may ſeem in wiſdom much fitter for him to let the ſinning creature live, while he provideth, propoundeth, and applyeth a remedy, than preſently to deſtroy the works that he had made, though man deſerved it. 3. I pray you mark then the grounds that I go on: I ſay not that we perſonally were then guilty in Adam; but that we draw a guilt with our natures from Adam. God having in juſt and merciful wiſdom reſolved that we ſhall ſurvive, and ſo humane nature be propagated, it can be no other but a guilty nature that is ſo propagated, which God is not bound to hinder; but rather in wiſdom not to hinder it, if that might be called an obligation.

6. It is further objected, [Moreover, how did we ſin in Adam actually, who were never actually in him?]

Anſw. 1. I ſay not that we then ſinned in Adam properly; no more than that we did exiſt in Adam. For, as I know that exiſtere eſt eſſe extra cauſas, ſo I know that the act of ſin, and the relation of guilt, are accidents that muſt have an exiſtent ſubject, if they p. 218exiſt: and therefore we cannot be ſinners, and guilty before we are. But I ſay, that when we firſt are, we have a nature received from a guilty progenitor, and therefore a guilty nature, becauſe he cannot convey to us the right to felicity which he loſt. 2. We were ſeminally in Adam, and ſo ſinned in him: though I know, as to perſonal actual exiſtence, this is but terminus diminuens, yet is it more than meerly potential.

7. It's objected, [How could that act be voluntary as to us, which was long paſt before that we had any will?]

Anſw. As we did not perſonally exiſt in Adam, ſo did we not will that act in Adam: But yet when we received a will from Adam, it was quaedam natura, and guilty of what his will was guilty, though not by the guilt of actual commiſſion, yet of derivation and participation: And thus it is reputatively voluntary.

8. It's next replied to ſome of the common reaſons on our part; [There was indeed humane nature in Adam; but ſingular, and divided from this of ours. And if the firſt act of ſin were an act of nature, why not alſo the firſt act of generation? yet no man will ſay that in Adam we did beget Cain or Seth.]

Anſw. 1. This makes nothing againſt me, who ſay not that we then ſinned in Adam properly: but that we received a guilty nature p. 219from Adam; which then began to be a ſinful or guilty nature or perſon, when it began to be a nature or perſon; and before that was but a guilty ſeed. 2. Faults and puniſhments being quid moral vel civile, a political thing, may be moraliter & reputative transferred: and therefore as a man may ſuffer as a membe… … a ſinful Society, though perſonally innocent, ſo might we as branches of mankind. But generation being quid naturale, there is no ſuch ground for ſuch an imputation, or reputative tranſlation of it. So that the caſe is not alike.

9. It follows; [And if Adam did deſerve to himſelf a puniſhment equal to that his ſin▪ that is, as great as God had threatned, ſhall we think that Juſtice will require other puniſhments from innumerable other men for that ſame ſin?]

Anſw. Adam did deſerve a puniſhment as great as his perſonal nature was capable of, and alſo the ſame to all that ſhould come from his loins. If God had deſtroyed him before he had any poſterity, it would indeed have prevented the propagation of guilt, by preventing the being of a capable ſubject; but yet there would have been in Adam's ſin a deſert of ſuch a propagated guilt, or a reaſon for it, on ſuppoſition that there were a nature from him propagated. I deny p. 220therefore the Antecedent, on ſuppoſition that God would let the courſe of humane generation go on, according to the newly eſtabliſhed Law of nature: It was not only to his own perſon that Adam deſerved this puniſhment. Or thus I may deny the Conſequence: Though Adam deſerved puniſhment only to his perſon, yet it being to his whole perſon, and our perſons being then ſeminally in his, and ſo after exiſting from his, it follows, that what he deſerved to his perſon, is propagated to thoſe to whom that perſon propagates a being; ſeeing it is of himſelf, and out of himſelf, that we proceed, and not by a meer efficient cauſality, as in creation, or fabrication, but he affordeth us our matter.

10. It's further objected, [Either that ſin had but one adequate guilt, which was to be divided among all Adam's poſterity; or as many guilts as men: If the firſt, then it is but a little of that ſin that is imputed, or of the puniſhment that is due to each of us ſingularly. If the later; then one ſin ſhould not have one guilt, nor one adequate puniſhment, but innumerable.]

Anſw. The fundamentum is ſin; and that is one: ſo the guilt is one fundamentaliter & ſubjective primario; but more than one fundamentaliter & ſubjective per derivationem: p. 221on ſuppoſition, that according to the courſe of nature the one firſt guilty ſubject procreate more; for thereby ſin is propagated with, and in nature. If the Law of this Land do ordain, that a Traytor and his poſterity be all diſinherited and baniſhed; you may here put your dilematical queſtion, and as you anſwer it, ſo would we. If the Law of God deprive rebellious man of all his felicity, and leave him his natural being, he will beget a poſterity therefore deprived of it, becauſe they are his poſterity; Call this one guilt or two, as you pleaſe: I call it one fundamentally, and one ſubjectively while there was but one ſubject; and many conſequently by propagation, when that one ſubject is as it were multiplied into many. So that this is but about words, and not things.

11. It's further argued; [Laſtly, if we are therefore guilty of Adam's diſobedience, becauſe we are his Sons; ſo that neither the miraculous generation in reſpect of both Parents, (ſuch as was Iſaack's and John Baptiſt's,) nor yet a divine creation of the ſoul without the operation of man, can exempt any man from it: what then ſhall we ſay of our Lord? For his miraculous Conception by the Holy Ghoſt did not hinder him from being truly the Son of Adam, ariſing from the fruit of David's loins.]

p. 222Anſw. I confeſs this objection hath oft ſeemed more difficult to me than all the reſt: but I ſee no reaſon that it ſhould overthrow all our grounds. For it ſtands on the ſuppoſition of many uncertainties; eſpecially about the way of humane generation, and the natural intereſt of male and female comparatively therein, &c. But paſſing by all theſe, (becauſe the very naming of difficulties I find offendeth many,) I ſtand on the common anſwer, though the part or intereſt of Mary in Chriſt's Conception was ſo much as might prove him man of man, and give him the name of the Son of Man, of David, of Adam; yet that was but ſecundum quid, or in the ſmaller part: for the intereſt of the Holy Ghoſt in that Conception was the predominant intereſt: and therefore he is ſaid in our Creed ſimply, [to be conceived by the Holy Ghoſt, and born of the Virgin Mary;] and he is principally and more fully to be called the Son of God, than of Man, even according to his humanity, how much ſoever of his material ſubſtance might be of the Virgin. This being ſo, he could not ſtand guilty of Adam's, or any Parents ſin, becauſe in the predominant ſenſe, he was not one of their off-ſpring, but the Son of God, conceived by the Holy Ghoſt. 2. And if the Holy Ghoſt's Conception do free Chriſt from the actual p. 223corruption of his nature, as your ſelf confeſs; why not as well from the foreſaid guilt or imputation, ſuppoſing that ſuch there is? For why elſe ſhould not natural pravity adhere to the ſubſtance which he received from the Virgin? To imagine that Mary was born without original ſin, is but to make the difficulty greater; (how ſhe was free that was not conceived as Chriſt, by the Holy Ghoſt?) or to run it I know not how far. It were more plauſible to ſay, that ſhe was perfectly ſanctified by the Holy Ghoſt before Chriſt's Conception; and therefore could convey no guilt to him: but what proof this would have, let them tell that know.

12. After theſe reaſons, the judicious Author concluds thus; [Theſe things I thought good briefly to diſpute, following the authority of moſt grave Divines, (who have diſallowed this imputation either tacitly by their ſilence, as Calvin. Inſtit. Tilen. Theſ. &c. or elſe openly, and in expreſs words, as Pet. Martyr in Rom. 5. Chamier Panſtrat.) Firſt, that we may not take that for God's word which is not his word. 2. That we aſcribe not that to God which becometh him not. And that we may free the Chriſtian Religion from ſuch unneceſſary difficulties. And laſtly, that we may the ſtronglier prove original ſin as it is deſcribed, Art 10. and 11. of the confeſſion of our Churches.]

p. 224Anſw. 1. We ſtick not on mens names; though we have more Divines againſt you. 2. Whether it be God's word, let our foregoing proof manifeſt. 3. Which if we have proved, then ſhould not humane reaſon ſay, it becomes him not: eſpecially when the ſame reaſon confeſſeth the like to become all Princes and Common-wealths. 4. I think I have done more to free the Chriſtian Religion from difficulties, by aſſerting ſuch an imputation of all Parents ſins, as aforeſaid, than you have done by denying all. 5. And I think that we may far more rationally maintain original corruption, and the juſtneſs of puniſhment for original ſin, if we maintain the ſaid guilt, than if we deny it, as you do. So much to this excellent Writer.

Having anſwered their Objections, let me add this in the concluſion.

Arg. If we cannot be guilty of inherent original ſin, without the derived guilt of Adam's actual ſin; then we do derive a guilt of Adam's actual ſin. But the Antecedent is true: therefore ſo is the Conſequent.

That we are guilty of inherent original ſin, is by them confeſſed. But this cannot be without a cauſe, or foundation. And the foundation or cauſe muſt be ours, or elſe the guilt cannot be ours. Now this foundation is either meerly the inherent pravity p. 225it ſelf, or ſomewhat Antecedent. Not meerly the inherent pravity it ſelf:

For, 1. It would prove againſt no Law: for no Law forbad us to be born as we … Laws are not made to prohibit that which … not, to be what it cannot chooſe but be. The Law againſt Adultery prohibiteth the Parents to commit it, but not the child… be born in it. There might … be a Law to prohibit a child in the womb to come forth, as to prohibit the …eed to become a man, and ſuch a man. Laws … made to the intelligent …. Yet I deny not, but original … is contrary to the Law of God …: but that is only conſequentially, … which it could not be, if we had not the guilt of the voluntary act, which is primarily againſt the Law.

2. The eſse of our inherent … on p… …ations, is in order of nature before the … or culpability. But we could not have had ſo much as the eſſe without an antecedent guilt. Which I prove thus: Either the being of our original diſpoſitions is only a ſin, or alſo a puniſhment. If it be only a ſin, without any antecedent ſin or guilt of ours, then either God or Man is the Author of it. Not God; for he is not the author of ſin: and if he were, it would excuſe of the guilt p. 226If man, either our ſelves, or our Parents. Not our ſelves; for we made not our ſelves. If our Parents; then either their acts are imputable to us, or elſe that would make it never the more ours. So that our corruption would be miſerie, at non peccatum; no more ſin than the venom of a toad is ſin.

But it's certain that the very being of our natural qualities and privations, is a puniſhment. For God would not inflict ſo great an evil on us as that is, which ſhall ſubject us to eternal death, for nothing. And this is commonly confeſſed. Well then, the eſſe corruptionis is in order before the culpability of it. That eſſe is truly poena, a puniſhment; though not as cauſed by God, (for God cauſeth it not,) yet as permitted by God, and as the conſequent of his juſt deſertion. And omnis poena eſt peccati poena: puniſhment is eſſentially related to a fault deſerving it. This fault was meerly our Parents, or by participation and derivation ours. If meerly theirs, then our corruption is meerly their puniſhment. For God will not puniſh one for anothers fault, when there is no ground of imputation of it to themſelves. But it's certainly our puniſhment; or elſe it could not make us inherently ſinful, and ſo damnable therefore as the penalty is ours, ſome antecedent fault muſt be ours: which can be p. 227nothing but a derived guilt of Parents ſins.

Chamiers Reaſons alſo I ſhall briefly diſſolve; I mean thoſe paſſages againſt Salmeron and Pigbius, Pauſtrat. Vol. 3. l. 1. c. 7, 8. in which his ſtrength lieth.

C. 8. ſect. 9. Dico nullum peccatum unum numero poſſe eſſe commune omnibus hominibus,—Actiones ſunt ſuppoſitorum,—Ita que nego peccatum illud Adami eſſe peccatum originale.

Reſp. 1. In the inſtant of committing it we were not perſons diſtinct from Adam, and ſo had not a diſtinct ſin; but we were ſeminally in him, having our eſſence after from his eſſence: and ſo far as we were in him, we were guilty of that act in him. And when we become perſons from him, we becom guilty perſons of that act: that is, not reputed to have done it as diſtinct perſons, but juſtly reputed odious and puniſhable, as being then ſeminally in him, and as having our eſſence from him; and therefore ſuch as his eſſence was, as to the guilt: ſo that now we have numerically as many original ſins as we are. perſons, that is, individual guilty natures and perſons, from that one ſin, (beſides qualitative pravity.) The ſame he hath oft, ſect. 11, 12, &c.

Sect. 17. He ſaith, Reſp. Conſtitui nos peccatores formaliter vel cauſaliter—And he p. 228ſaith that formally it is that which in nobis ipſis ineſt tanquam qualitas peccatrix,—ut albus paries per albedinem,—But by Adam's act only cauſaliter.

Anſw. 1. Why is cauſaliter diſtinguiſhed from formaliter? as if forma non eſſet cauſa. 2. If by cauſaliter he mean efficienter only, he ſhould tell us what ſort of efficient it is. 3. If there be ſuch a thing as actual ſin, how doth that act make us ſinners? Is it formaliter? Then we are ſinners but in the inſtant of act: for our own acts are preſently gone, and nothing, as well as Adam's. If it be cauſaliter, then Adam's act is confeſſed to make us ſinners, as our own acts do when they are paſt. 4. The plain truth is, (whether learned Chamier ſaw it or not) both acts and habits make us ſinners in the ſame kind of cauſe, (and ſo may Adam's,) viz. as the fundamentum relationis; and the reatus culpae is that relation, or the formalis ratio peccati, (though the reatus poenae be but a conſequent.) And therefore Pet. Martyr on Rom. 5. doth ill to deny that reatus is ſin it ſelf, (cont. Pighium.) Now men call the fundamentum relationis in theſe morals, by the name both of cauſa meritoria efficiens, & materialis. Meritorious acts or qualities are called cauſa efficiens quoad ipſam relationem inde reſultantem: & cauſa materialis p. 229conſtitutiva, as the whole eſſence of ſin is made up of them, (as meritorious matter,) and of the relation together. If we will be Logical, we muſt be accurate, or we cheat men by words.

Reader, in concluſion, lament with me the common partiality of the beſt Diſputers. How little did this opinion diſhonour great Chamier, Pet. Martyr, &c. And why? Becauſe it was againſt Pighius and Salmeron that they wrote it: oppoſition to whom I think verily drew them alſo to it. But when Placaeus ſaid the like, or leſs, with what a heap of authority doth Rivet (well) overwhelm him? For then it was not the Papiſts that were concerned in the diſpute.

I ſhall next ſpeak to thoſe objections which are made only againſt the participation of guilt of the ſins of neerer Parents, by thoſe that confeſs our guilt of Adam's ſin. Suppoſing that of Ezek. 18. and conſequently, Deut. 24. 16. anſwered before. And they are theſe following:

Obj. 1. If we are thus guilty of our neereſt Parents ſins, then have we two ſorts of original ſin: when as we have hitherto acknowledged but one.

Anſw. It is but one ſubjective in each perſon, and but one terminative; that is, it is but one and the ſame puniſhment that one and p. 230the ſame perſon is obliged to: but it is manifold fundamentaliter, as ariſing from the deſert of many ſins. But, 2. if you take the word [Original,] not as ſignifying all that adhereth to us ab origine, but as ſignifying only that ſin which was the original or firſt in-let of all our miſery; then as there can be but one firſt, ſo is there but one original ſin, even Adam's. 3. As our natures are further polluted by ſome neerer Parents ſin, ſo may they be further guilty by them. I think I proved before, that the children of ſome ungodly Parents have an additional pravity in their natures, at leaſt as to the inclination to she creature the terminus ad quem of their apoſtacy, more than the generality of mankind have as meerly from Adam's firſt ſin.

Obj. 2. If we are guilty of the ſins of our neerer Parents, then this Generation ſhould be many hundred fold more guilty than the firſt was; and ſo the laſt man or age ſhould be the moſt ſinful.

Anſw. So they are fundamentaliter, but not terminative: They have forfeited but the ſame felicity which one ſin may forfeit; for there is no more to loſe: But it is on a manifold deſert or ground that they have forfeited that one felicity: and ſo incurred that one penalty. 2. But this I ſay but on ſuppoſition p. 231that the Parents are none of them pardoned. For if the Parents be pardoned themſelves, it is the judgment of very learned and judicious Divines, that by the ſame Covenant all their infants are pardoned with them, as ſoon as they have their being: And alſo that pardoned Parents cannot convey that guilt to their children which they have not on themſelves. And conſequently, that by the remedy, an interruption is made in the proceſs of guilt. 3. But then it is ſtill confeſſed, that the reatus ſimplex, as ſome call it, that is, the meer natural merit antecedent to the perſons obligation (which ſome call reatus redundens in perſonam) is not taken off by pardon from the Parent, and therefore not from poſterity.

But a great difficulty here ariſeth in the way: How then can the guilt of Adam's ſin be conveyed to any of us, ſeeing it was pardoned to Noah, from whom all the World proceedeth; and how could Noah convey the guilt which he had not?

Anſw. This objection was before anſwered in part. Remember ſtill that the meer merit of puniſhment, ſimply conſidered, is not taken away by pardon: nor the meer reatus facti vel culpe. It remaineth true to all eternity, that ſuch a man did commit ſuch a ſin, and that that ſin deſerved death: (but p. 232not that he is obliged to death for it.) Remember alſo that this is communicated to poſterity with their nature: And that it is a voluntary act of God that remitteth the deſerved puniſhment, and pardoneth the ſin; and therefore it can extend no further than he pleaſe. As alſo that this meer merit doth produce a proper guilt on every ſoul that hath it, which makes it capable of pardon; though to infants that are pardoned, the guilt and the pardon are in the ſame moment of time, yet in order of nature the guilt goes firſt.

Theſe things premiſed, I further anſwer, that there are two opinions of Divines about pardon of infants. Some think-that only the elect are pardoned; and ſome (as Davenant, Ward, Amyraldus, &c.) think that all the infants of Believers (or that are baptized rightly) are pardoned. According to the principles of the former it muſt be ſaid, that when God pardoned Noah (or any godly Parent) and his elect ſeed, that pardon remaineth firm for ever: but a pardon it is to the ſeed as well as to the Parent, and therefore ſuppoſeth guilt, which is by a neceſſary reſultancy from the natural deſert, till Grace deſtroy it. But as for that ſeed (as Cham. e. g.) which was not elect, God pardoned Noah's original ſin but limitedly, intending that it ſhould not extend to the non-elect ſeed, but p. 233that they ſhould have a guilt on their ſouls from that natural merit, as if God had never pardoned the progenitors. For the deſert and imputability adhereth to nature, but the remiſſion will go no further than free Grace extendeth it. According to the principles of the later it muſt be ſaid, that God pardoned to Noah (and every godly Parent) the ſin of Adam, and all other, and to his infants while infants; but with this limitation, that if they themſelves at years of diſcretion believed not, they ſhould not continue pardoned, but periſh, either by the return of the ſin before ſo pardoned, as ſome think; or only for the ſuper-added ſin, as others think. In a word, every Parent begetteth a Son of Adam, and of himſelf a ſinner, and thereby begets a nature that hath in it ſelf compared with God's Law, the fundamentum reatus, and this he doth never the leſs for being pardoned himſelf. Unleſs his poſterity be pardoned with himſelf, they will remain guilty: for the relaxation of the commination being but to his own perſon, makes only a change on himſelf. The diſeaſe is natural, and the cure is accidental; and therefore though he be cured, yet will he convey the diſeaſe to poſterity.

To explain this by the like. Suppoſe that by a ſtanding Law of the Land, all the poſterity p. 234of any Traytor are to be diſinherited, diſhonoured and baniſhed. It pleaſeth the Soveraign not to deſtroy this Law, but to diſpenſe with it as he ſhall ſee ſpecial reaſons. Whereupon he pardoneth ſome one of a traytorous line, with this limitation; either that this pardon ſhall be but to his own perſon only, or at moſt but to his ſeed (immediate) till they forfeit the benefit by ungrateful rejection. In this caſe, all his poſterity would be nevertheleſs born guilty of the foreſaid puniſhment: only that guilt would be taken off according to the terms in the Law, and no further. For the Law is ſtill in force, and univerſal; and the children are naturally the poſterity of a Traytor, (whether in one degree or many;) and the pardon is but a ſingular and ſupra-legal act, and limited as is expreſſed; and is purpoſed for the removal of a guilt from the particular perſons, and not for the preventing it in any one of them; or if the pardon be univerſal-conditional, all is one.

What I have ſaid about Adam's ſin, will (more eaſily) anſwer the like objection, as to neerer Parents ſins.

Obj. 3. If we are ſo guilty of our Parents ſins, then Chriſt's ſatisfaction, and God's pardon of ſin is imperfect: for he pardoneth them upon Chriſt's ſatisfaction to every believing p. 235Parent: and if after this they muſt be puniſhed again on their poſterity, then were they not perfectly pardoned at the firſt.

Anſw. The perfection of pardon, and Chriſt's ſatisfaction, muſt be diſcerned by conſidering them in their own kind, and in their perfect ſufficiency to thoſe ends whereto God intendeth them, and not according to miſtaking conceits of men. Pardon is not ſimply and abſolutely perfect in this life: Manoſſeh's ſins muſt be puniſhed when he is dead, on his poſterity. But it hath no Imimperfection diſhonourable to God, or to Chriſt's ſatisfaction. 2. It is not the ſame numerical guilt that is pardoned to the Father, and not pardoned to the Son, or remaineth on him. From one ſin there ariſeth one ſingle guilt to the firſt ſinner, and that multiplyeth upon the multiplication of perſons from his loins: and every perſon hath a ſeveral guilt, though from the ſame root. 3. Note alſo that this objection makes as much againſt our guilt of Adam's ſin, as of our neerer Parents, and more: for they may ſay, that ſin hath been pardoned to many of our progenitors, between Adam and us. But it holds not againſt either.

Obj. 4. God would not drown Noah with the World; nor deſtroy Lot with Sodom: and Abraham ſaith, Let it be far from the p. 236Judge of all the earth to deſtroy the righteous with the wicked.

Anſw. 1. God was not then dealing with the World, or with Sodom, for ſuch ſins as Noah or Lot were guilty of. So that, though he might have found ſin in them deſerving his wrath, yet when he comes to execute an extraordinary judgment for an extraordinary ſin, he will not deal with thoſe, as with ſuch extraordinary, or great, or impenitent ſinners, who were not ſuch. 2. It is juſtice Evangelical therefore, or on terms of Grace, and not pure legal Juſtice, which Abraham appeals to for the reſcue of Lot. It's true, it is a perſonal righteouſneſs of Lot, which he pleadeth with God for his deliverance from judgment, even with the Judge of all the earth; as a neceſſary work of his juſtice: (which thoſe may note that will have no righteouſneſs inherent in our ſelves pleaded with God, much leſs with Juſtice, for freedom from his wrath:) But it is but a righteouſneſs conſiſting in a freedom from that impenitency and wickedneſs which God came to revenge; and not in perfect obedience. This therefore ſhews not▪ what God might do in ſtrict juſtice; but what he will do in that juſtice which is tempered with (and prevailed over as it were) by mercy. 3. The infants of the old World and Sodom periſh'd with them.

p. 237Obj. 5. Parents ſins are not voluntary as to us: go. not ours.

Anſw. This is anſwered before. They are the ſin of our wills, and ſo voluntary: and we come out of them that voluntarily committed them.

We muſt not look on Parents and children as on two diſtinct perſons that have no derivation from, or dependance on each other: but conſider that our very being is from them.

And that God doth actually puniſh and deſtroy children for their Parents ſins, is proved already by a multitude of Texts. And who dare ſay that he doth it unjuſtly, becauſe we are not conſenters? To prove that God doth it, is enough to prove it juſt, becauſe he can do nothing unjuſtly.

As for the great queſtion, whether any be damned for Original, or Parents ſin, I anſwer; Whatever the degree of penalty is, none can be freed from it but by pardoning Grace through Chriſt: and therefore none but thoſe that are the children of the pardoning promiſe.

I ſhall conclude all with theſe following Corollaries, containing ſome Uſe of what hath been ſaid and proved by us in this diſpute.

Cor. 1. This Doctrine of our liableneſs p. 238to puniſhment for our neerer Parents ſins, doth much clear up the reaſon of our original ſin, (as from Adam,) and conſequently much confirm us in the belief of it, and enable us to anſwer moſt of the cavils againſt it. And I muſt confeſs for my part, that I am not able to maintain our guilt of Adam's ſin, without this.

Cor. 2. It hence appeareth that it is a duty of all Chriſtians to bewail, and beg pardon of their Parents and Anceſtors ſins, as to the puniſhment which themſelves are liable to for them. They are not only to confeſs that they are the children of Adam, but alſo the ſeed of Idolaters, ſuperſtitious, ignorant, prophant, unbelieving Anceſtors; that their Father was an Amorite, and their Mother an Hittite, Ezek. 16. 3, 4. and that he whoſe eyes are on all the ſons of men, to give every one according to his waies and doings, doth recompence the iniquity of the Fathers into the boſome of their children after them. Jer. 32. 18, 19. 2 Kin. 22. 13. Great is the wrath of the Lord which is kind…d againſt us, becauſe our Fathers have not hearkned to the words of this Book, to do according to all that is written. So. 2 Chron. 29. 6. 9. 2 Chron. 34. 21. See a full example, Nehem. 9. from 16 to the end: eſpecially ver. 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37. Pſal. 106. 6, 7. p. 239We have ſinned with our Fathers: our Fathers underſtood not thy wonders in Egypt; they remembred not the multitude of thy mercies, but provoked, &c. ſee to the end. Jer. 14. 20, 21. We acknowledge, O Lord, our wickedneſt, and the iniquity of our Fathers; for we have ſinned againſt thee▪ Do not abhor us for thy name ſake, &c. Jer. 3. 25. We lie down in our ſhame, and our confuſion covereth us: for we have ſinned againſt the Lord our God, we and our Father, from our youth even to this day. Lament. 5. 7. Our Fathers have ſinned, and are not; and we have born their iniquities. Dan. 9. 16. I beſeech thee let thine anger and thy fury be turned away from thy City Jeruſalem, thy holy Mountain; becauſe for our ſins, and for the iniquities of our Fathers, Jeruſalem and thy people are become a reproach to all that are about us. See the whole prayer.

Nehem. 9. 2. They ſtood and confeſſed their ſins, and the iniquities of their Fathers.

Iſa. 14. 20, 21. The ſeed of evil doers ſhall never be renowned: Prepare ſlaughter for his children for the iniquity of their Fathers.

Iſa. 65. 6, 7. Behold it is written before me, I will not keep ſilence, but will recompence, even recompence into their boſoms; your iniquities, and the iniquities of your Fathers p. 240together, (ſaith the Lord,) &c. Jer. 16. 10, 11. They ſhall ſay to thee, Wherefore hath the Lord pronounced all this great evil againſt us? or what is our iniquity? or what is our ſin? Then ſhalt thou ſay unto them, Becauſe your Fathers have forſaken me, ſaith the Lord, and have walked after other Gods, and have ſerved them, and have worſhipped them, &c.

So, Jer. 44. 10, 11, 21, 22. The Lord could no longer bear, but the Land was made a curſe, becauſe he remembred the ſins of their Fathers.

I fear leſt many of us, yea moſt, have been guilty of not bewailing and praying for the pardon of our forefathers ſins, and deſire godly men to conſider more of it for the time to come.

Cor. 3. From hence it appears, that it is a ſad thing to be born of evil Parents; and a bleſſing to be born of thoſe that fear God: and accordingly to be acknowledged.

Cor. 4. Alſo it follows, that if God ſhew mercy to the children of wicked Parents, it is a double bleſſing, and the freeneſs of ſuch Grace is accordingly to be magnified.

Cor. 5. Though bleſſings be not merited, as curſes be, yet ſeeing the natural intereſt of children in their Parents, and Parents in children is ſo great, you may hence diſcern, that p. 241even to reaſon it is very probable that God ſhould deal better with the children of true Believers than with others: and that they ſhould have ſpecial benefit by their Parents Faith conſidering that God is as prone to mercy as to ſeverity.

Cor. 6. May we not hence ſee ſome ground to juſtify God's ſeverity againſt thoſe infidel parts of the World, whoſe Anceſtors have refuſed the Goſpel, and the Lord Jeſus? And are not thoſe infidels guilty of their fore-fathers ſin, in the ſenſe before-mentioned? If Chriſt died for them, and offered them himſelf, his grace and benefits, and they reject him, it is a juſt puniſhment to poſterity, if for this ſin of thier Fathers, he leave their Country in darkneſs, and ſeek out a people that ſhall give him better welcome. And if he do not ſo by us, who have ſo abuſed him, it is not becauſe in juſtneſs be may not, but becauſe in mercy he will not: and the greater and freer is that mercy. If he promulgate his Laws to the Fathers, and they reject them, he may take that as a ſufficient promulgation for the obligation of poſterity, and may judge them for rejecting that Law or Goſpel: and if they ſay We never heard it; it ſufficeth to tell them, It was ſent among you; and your Fathers would have none of it, but expelled it out of their p. 242Countrey; and refuſed to have him that redeemed them reign over them.

Aquinas handling this Queſtion, 1. 2. Q. 81. art. 2. Vtrum etiam alis pecata primi parentis, vel proximorum parentum traducantur in poſteros? denieth it; but then he ſeems not to ſpeak at all of the matter of meer guilt or imputation, but only of the traduction of inherent pravity: And therefore it is nothing to the matter that we have ſpecially here to deal with; and, 2. even in that his reaſons ſeem not of weight. The ſumm is, that only Adam's firſt ſin did corrupt nature in ſpecie, and others are but perſonal: The ground of this his aſſertion is that opinion wherein the Papiſts differ from our Divines; viz. that Grace was ſupernatural to Adam; and original ſin being nothing but the privation of that Grace or Rectitude, and the firſt ſin making a total privation of that to humane nature, there is nothing left for after ſins to do of that kind: This ſeems his full ſenſe, though he ſpeak it not out in ſo many words. But to this I ſay, 1. This (as is ſaid) doth not at all deny that we deſerve puniſhment for our Fathers ſins, but only that we are not capable of this puniſhment in ſpecie: and ſo the main thing is granted which we ſeek.

p. 2432. His ſentence about the ſupernaturality of Grace to Adam (which yet he affirmeth to be concreated with him) is not proved▪ The Scotiſts do reſiſt him in it, as well as the Proteſtants. Read an excellent Diſpute of it in Rada's firſt Controverſy, ſhewing how far it is or is not ſupernatural.

3. His ground, viz. that [naturals could not be loſt] is unproved: There be certain natural perfections of the mind which are ſo far under the power of exerciſed reaſon and free-will, that they may be depraved or much deſtroyed by the abuſe of theſe.

4. The word of God, and the experience of the World doth fully prove that wicked men grow worſe and worſe, and are prone to apoſtatize and depart yet further from God; and that the very light of nature may be extinguiſhed in part, and ſome men by cuſtome in ſinning make themſelves much worſe than they were by nature: go. it is certain that men are not ſo bad by Adam's firſt ſin, but their nature is capable of being made worſe: And they are not at the very worſt till they come to Hell: And in this life we ſee great variety in degrees of wickedneſs among wicked men.

Particularly as to his anſwers to the three Arguments. To the firſt, (drawn from Scripture examples of puniſhing children for p. 244the Fathers ſin) he ſaith it is only corporally, becauſe the child is as it were a part of the Father quoad corpus. Anſw. 1. Corporal puniſhment proves that we deſerve puniſhment, elſe God would not inflict it: for he will be no more unjuſt in the leſſer than in the greater. 2. He that deſerves corporal puniſhment for ſin, deſerves more. 3. The whole man, ſoul and body is as much from our neerer Parents as from Adam.

To the ſecond reaſon, (which is drawn from Parents traducing Adam's ſin to us, and therefore much more their own,) he confeſſeth it would hold were their own ſin traducible, which he ſaith, it is not; but the reaſon is before diſproved.

The third reaſon is, that if we therefore contract ſin from Adam becauſe we were in him, then may we do it from our other Parents becauſe we are in them, ſeeing the Scripture ſhews we are capable of growing worſe. To this he only ſaith, that the firſt ſin corrupteth nature, the ſecond only the perſon. But this is a bare denial, and no anſwer to the force of the reaſon. And unleſs he diſtinguiſh of common nature, and the perſons nature, what ſenſe hath it? For to corrupt the perſon qualitatively, is ſo to corrupt his nature.

What Bellarmine ſaith, Lib. 4. Cap. 18. de p. 245Amiſſ. Grat. & ſtatu pecc. being of leſs weight than this of Aquinas, needeth no other reply.

That we ſhould have been corrupted by Original ſin, if Cain and Seth had ſinned, and not Adam, ſee Aquin. de Malo q. 5. a. 4. ad ult. (of which ſaith Bellarmine groundleſly, fortaſſe locus corrumpitur.)

FINIS.

End of the text · Richard Baxter, Two Disputations of Original Sin (1675)