A Treatise of Knowledge and Love, Part 2 · Chapter 1
Chap. I.
Knowledge is to be eſtimated more, by the end it tendeth to, than by it ſelf.
HAving done with that Epidemical mortal diſeaſe, (SELF-CONCEITEDNESS or PREFIDENCE or overhaſty judging, and Pretending to know that which we know not) which I more deſire than hope to cure; I have left but a little room for the nobler part of my Subject, True ſaving Knowledge, becauſe the handling of it was not my principal deſign.
The meaning of the Text I gave you before: The true Paraphraſe of it is as followeth: As if Paul had ſaid; [You overvalue your barren notions, and think that by them you are wiſe; whereas Knowledge is a means to a higher end; & is to be eſteemed of as it attaineth that end; And that end is to make us Lovers of God, that ſo we may be known with Love by him; For to Love God and be beloved by him is mans felicity and ultimate end; and therefore that which we muſt ſeek after and live for in the world; and he is to be accounted the wiſeſt man that loveth God moſt; when unſanctified Notions & Speculations will prove but folly.]
This being the true meaning of the Text, I ſhall briefly ſpeak of it by parts, as it containeth theſe ſeveral Doctrines or Propoſitions.
Doct. 1. Knowledge is a means to a higher end, according to which it is to be eſtimated.
Doct. 2. The End of Knowledge is to make us Lovers of God, and ſo to be known with Love by him.
Doct. 3. Therefore knowledge is to be valued, ſought and uſed, as it tendeth to this holy bleſſed end.
Doct. 4. And therefore thoſe are to be accounted the wiſeſt or beſt-knowing men, that Love God moſt; and not thoſe that are ſtored with unholy knowledge.
For the firſt of theſe, that [Knowledge is a means to a higher end] I ſhall firſt open it, and then prove it.
I. Aquinas and ſome other Schoolmen make the Viſion or Knowledge of God, to be the higheſt part of mans Felicity: And I deny not but that the three faculties of mans Soul, (Vital Activity, Intellect and Will) as the Image of the Divine Trinity, have a kind of inſeparability and coequality. And therefore each of their perfections and perfect Receptions from God, and operations on God, is the ultimate end of man: But yet they are Diſtinguiſhable, though not diviſible; and there is ſuch an Order among them, as that one may in ſome reſpects be called the Inceptor and another the Perfecter of humane operations; and ſo the Acts of one be called a means to the Acts of the other. And thus though the Viſion or Knowledge of God be one inadequate conception (if not a part) of our ultimate end; yet the Love of God, and Living to God, are alſo other conceptions or parts of it: yea and the more completive perfect parts, which we call finis ultimate ultimus.
II. The proof ſhall be fetcht, 1. From the Order and uſe of the Faculties of the Soul. 2. From the Objects. 3. From the conſtitution of the Acts. 4. From expreſs Scripture.
I. It is evident to our internal perception, 1. That the Underſtanding is but the Guide of the Will, and its acts but mediate to determine the Will: As the Eye is to lead the Appetitive and Executive faculties, by preſenting to them their proper objects. To know is but an initial introductory act.
Yea, 2. It is evident that the Soul is not Satisfied with bare knowing if no Delight or Complacency follow: For what is that which we call Satisfaction but the Complacency of the Will? Suppoſe a man to have no effect upon his Will, no Pleaſure, no Contentation in his Knowledge, and what Felicity or Deſireable Good to him, would there be, in all the Knowledge in the world? Yea when I name either [Good] or [Deſirable] every one knoweth that I name an object of the Will. Therefore if you ſtop at bare Intellection, it is not to be called Good or Deſireable as to the Intellect, theſe being not proper intellectual objects: Though remotely I confeſs they are; that is, that which is called Good, Amiable and Deſireable primarily as the proper object of the Will, muſt be diſcerned to be ſuch by the underſtanding: When yet the Formal notion of the Intellects object, is but quid Intelligibile, which materially is Ens, Unum, Verum, Bonum: But Goodneſs is the Formal notion of the object of the will, and not only the material.
☞If any ſay that I ſeem here to take part with Epicurus, (and Cicero's Torquatus) who erred by placing the chief excellency of Virtue in the Pleaſure of it; and conſequently making any thing more Excellent which is more Pleaſant, though it be ſin itſelf; I anſwer, he that will decide that great controverſy, muſt diſtinguiſh, 1. Between Senſitive Pleaſure, and the Complacency of the Will. 2. Between that which is Good only to me, and that which is Good to others, and that which is Good in relation to the Supream and Final Will of God. 3. Between the Exterior and the Interior acts of Virtue. And then you ſhall ſee Cicero and Torquatus eaſily reconciled, thus.
1. It is certain that GOODNESS and the WILL are ſo eſſentially related to each other, that they muſt each e…r the others definition. To be Bonum is to be Volibile; and to Will is ever Velle Bonum.
2. It is certain that God's Will is the Original and End of all Created Good, which hath its Eſſence in relation to His Will. And therefore if it were poſſible for Virtue to be unpleaſant or pernicious to the poſſeſſor, it would be Good as it is ſuited and related to the Will of God.
3. Therefore it cannot be ſaid, that Virtue as Virtue is better than Virtue as it pleaſeth God: But it is moſt certain that Virtue as Virtue is pleaſing to God, (as to the objective aptitude,) and that Virtue as pleaſing to God, and conſequently as Virtue, is Better than Virtue, as it is pleaſant to the poſſeſſor.
4. And it is certain that Virtue, as it is profitable, and juſtly pleaſing to Mankind, to the Church, to Kingdoms, to Publick Societies or multitudes, is better than as it is pleaſing unto one: Becauſe the Good of many is better than of one.
5. And it is certain that Virtue, as it pleaſeth the rational Will, is better than as it pleaſeth the meer Senſitive Appetite, which it ſeldom doth: And therefore Senſuality hath no advantage hence.
6. And Virtue as it profiteth, though at preſent it occaſion ſorrow or diſplicence in its conſequents, is better than that which at the preſent only pleaſeth; and quickly vaniſheth. But that Profit lieth in this, that it prepareth for everlaſting ▪ or more durable Pleaſure. And a long Pleaſure attained by preſent ſorrow, is better than a momentany pleaſure; which is another difference between ſenſual ſinful; and ſpiritual durable delights.
7. And to end all this Controverſie between us and Epicurus, it is notorious, that the Internal Vital Acts of true Virtue, are nothing elſe radically but Pleaſure it ſelf: For it is radically and ſummarily nothing but the Love of God and Goodneſs: And Love in its propereſt notion is nothing but the Complacency of the Will. To ſay, I love it, is but to ſay, It pleaſeth me; unleſs when you ſpeak of either ſenſual appetite and delight, or Love as conjunct with ſome other act or paſſion. And (though Occam here ſtretch it a little too far) it is certain that the external act of man hath no Virtue in it that is Moral, but ſecondary and derived from the Will, even as far as it is Voluntary: So that the informing root of all Virtue is Will, Love, or Complacency; which Auſtin uſeth to call Delectation, aſſerting what I now aſſert. So that the Queſtion now is, Whether Virtue, which is nothing but Complacency in Good, be better as Complacency or as Virtue, that is, under one Name or another? or whether it be better as Virtue, or as Virtue? as Complacency, or as Complacency?
If you think I make Cicero and the older Philoſophers fools, by feigning them to agitate ſuch a Queſtion; I anſwer, 1. If they do ſo, it is not my doing, but their own. 2. But I think Cicero meant not ſo fooliſhly, but underſtood Epicurus only of ſenſual pleaſure, and not of rational. 3. Or at leaſt of private pleaſure of a ſingle perſon, as oppoſite to the utility and pleaſure of multitudes. 4. And whether he had ſo much Theology as to remember that which is it that reſolveth the whole doubt, I know not; viz. that Virtus as Virtue is objectively pleaſing to the Will of God, and as pleaſing to God, it is better than as pleaſing to me, and all the world.
So that notwithſtanding this Objection (thus fully anſwered) the Acts of the Intellect meerly as ſuch, without their reſpect to ſome Will (either of God or Man) are not ſo much as formally Amiable, Deſirable or Good.
3. I further add, that the Acts of the Intellect may be forced, involuntary, diſpleaſing, and both morally and penally evil. A man may by God be forbidden to ſearch after, and to know ſome things; and to know them (as voluntarily done) may be his ſin. And all know that a man may be neceſſitated to know many things; and that knowledge may torment him: As to know dangers, loſſes, enmities, injuries, future evils; eſpecially ſins, by an accuſing Conſcience, and God's diſpleaſure: And Devils and damned Souls have ſuch knowledge.
Obj. All this is true of ſome knowledge, but not of the knowledge of God or Goodneſs.
Anſ. 1. It is granted then that Knowledge as ſuch is not ſufficient to be man's felicity, or final act. 2. And as to the Object, I eaſily grant that the true Knowledge of God is the initial part of man's felicity: But that is much, becauſe it ever inferreth that Love or Complacency of the Will, which is the more completive part. 3. But there is a Knowledge even of God, which being ſeparated from Love, is ſin and miſery: As the Devils and damned that believe and tremble, and hate and ſuffer, are not without all knowledge of God. So much for the firſt proof, fetcht from the order of the faculties of the Soul.
II. The ſecond proof is fetcht from the Objects: It is not meer Intelligibility that bleſſeth a man, but Goodneſs, which as ſuch is the formal Object of the Will, though the material Object of the Underſtanding. It is a pleaſant thing for the Eyes to behold the Sun: And as pleaſant, it is good; and alſo as uſeful to further pleaſure of our ſelves or others. Nothing maketh a man Good or Happy but as it is Good. Therefore the Goodneſs of God, (his tranſcendent perfection by which he is firſt Eſſentially Good in himſelf, and amiable to himſelf, and then Good and Amiable to us all) is the ultimately ultimate object of mans Soul, to which his Intelligibility is ſuppoſed.
III. The third proof is from the Conſtitution of theſe ſeveral … a Knowledge being but an introductive act, ſuppoſeth not Love, as to its Eſſence (though it produce it as an Effect:) But Love included knowledge in it; as the number of two includeth one, when one doth not include two. Therefore … …ogether muſt needs be perfecter than one alone.
IV. The fourth proof is from expreſs Scripture; I will only cite ſome plain ones which need no tedious comment. 1. For Love it's ſaid, 1 Joh. 4.16, 17, 18. We have known and believed the Love that God hath to us: God is Love; and he that dwelleth in Love, dwelleth in God, and God in him. Herein is our Love made perfect, (or in this the Love with us is perfected) that we have boldneſs in the day of Judgment. Becauſe as he is, ſo are we, in this world: There is no fear in Love, but perfect Love caſteth out fear. He that feareth is not made perfect in Love.] So that Love is the perfection of man.
1 Cor. 12.31. and 13.2, &c. Yet ſhew I unto you a more excellent way: Though I underſtand all myſteries and all knowledge, and have not Charity, I am nothing. —Charity never faileth— 13. The greateſt of theſe is Charity.]
Rom. 8.35. Who ſhall ſeparate us from the Love of God, &c.
Rom. 13.10. Love is the fulfilling of the Law.
Rom. 5.5. The Love of God is poured out on our hearts by the Holy-Ghoſt which is given to us.]
Gal. 5.6. Faith which worketh by Love.
Mat. 22.37. The firſt and great Commandment is, Thou ſhalt Love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, &c.
Luk. 10.27. Deut. 10.12. and 11.1.13.22. and 19.9. and 13.3. and 30.6.16.20. Joſh. 22.5. and 23.11. Pſal. 5.11. and 31.23. and 69.36. and 119.165. and 145.20. Jam. 1.12. He ſhall receive the Crown of life, which the Lord hath promiſed to them that Love him. So 2.5.
Prov. 8.17. I love them that love me.
See Joh. 14.21. and 16.27. 1 Joh. 4.19. Joh. 21.15, 16, 17. 1 Joh. 3.22. Heb. 11.6, &c.
And of Knowledge it is ſaid, [Joh. 13.17. If ye knew theſe things, happy are ye if ye do them.
See Jam. 2.14. to the end, Joh. 15.24. But now they have both ſeen and hated, both me and my Father.
Luk. 12.47. Knowing Gods will, and not doing it prepareth men for many ſtripes. See Rom. 2. And as barren knowledge is oft made the aggravation of ſin, ſo true knowledge is uſually made the cauſe or means of Love and Obedience., 1 Joh. 4.8. He that loveth not, knoweth not God. 2 Pet. 1.2. Grace and peace be multiplied to you, through the knowledge of God.— 2 Pet. 2.20. and many ſuch like.
I conclude therefore that the knowledge of Creatures is not deſirable ultimately for itſelf, but as it leadeth up the Soul to God. And the knowledge of God, though deſirable ultimately for it ſelf, yet not as the perfect, but the initial part of our ultimate act or end, and as the means or cauſe of that love of God, which is the more perfect part of that ultimate Perfection.