The Reasons of the Christian Religion Part 1, Conclusion · Objection
An OBJECTION about the Worlds Eternity.
HAving ſaid thus much about the point which I thought moſt conſiderable, I ſhall anſwer an Objection about the Worlds Eternity, becauſe I perceive that it ſticks with ſome.
Obj. We finde it the harder to believe the Scripture, and the Chriſtian Doctrine, becauſe it aſſerteth a thing which Ariſtotle hath evinced to be ſo improbable, as is the Creation of the World within leſs than 6000 years. When no natural reaſon can be brought to prove that the World is not eternall.
Anſw. 1. It is you that are the affirmers, and therefore on whom the natural proof is incumbent. Prove if you can that the World is eternal. Were it not tedious, I ſhould by examining your reaſons ſhew that they have no convincing force at all.
Vid. Paul. Carteſ. in a ſent. d. 1. p. 30, 31.2. There is ſo much written of it, that I am loth to trouble the Reader with more. I now only again referre the Reader to Raymundus Lullius, deſiring him not to reject his arguments if ſome of them ſeem not cogent, ſeeing if any one of all his multitude prove ſuch, it is enough.
3. I now only deſire that the Controverſie between the Chriſtian and the Infidel may be but rightly ſtated.Some think, becauſe they read much in Plato of the making of the World, that his opinion was not for its eternity; but I doubt they are quite miſtaken. Alcinous in li. de doct. Plat. ſaith too truely, [Cum vero mundum Plato genitum inquit, haudquaquam ſic eum ſenſiſſe credendum eſt, ut aliquod olim temp…s ante mundum praeceſſerit; Verum quia ſemper in generatione perdurat, indicat que ſubſtantiae ſuae cauſam praeſtantiorem. Animam praeterea mundi, quae ſemper extitit, haud officit Deus; ſed ornat: eâ que ratione eam facere nonnunquam aſſeritur, quod excitat eam, & ad ſeipſum ejus mentem velut ex profundo quodam ſomno convertit, &c. And to that end do not charge Chriſtianity with any School-mans or other confident perſons private opinions, nor ſuppoſe Chriſt or Scripture to determine any thing, which they do not determine. 1. Chriſtianity and Scripture do not at all determine, whether the whole Univerſe was created at the ſame time when this our Heaven and Earth was: But only that the Syſteme or World, which we belong to, the Sun, and Moon, and Starrs, and Earth were then created. Nay, a great part of the ancient Doctors, and of the moſt learned late Expoſitors on Gen. 1. do expound the Heavens which God is ſaid to create as being only the viſible Heavens, and not including the Angels at all. And others ſay, that by [In the beginning] is meant ab initio rerum, and that the Heavens there meant being the Angelical Habitations, and the Earth as without form, were both ab initio rerum before the ſix dayes Creation, which began with the making of Light out of the pre-exiſtent Heavens or Chaos. I think not this opinion true; but this liberty Chriſtian Doctors have taken of differing from one another in this difficult point. But they utterly differ about the time of the creation of Angels (on Gen. 1. and on Job 1.) and conſequently whether there were not a World exiſtent, when this World was created.
2. Or if any that ſeeth more than I, can prove the contrary, yet it is certainly a thing undetermined by Scripture and in the Chriſtian Faith, whether there were any Worlds that had begun and ended before this was made: That God is the maker of Heaven and Earth, and of all things viſible and inviſible, is moſt certain: But whether this Heaven and Earth, which now is, was the firſt which he hath made, is a thing that our Religion doth not at all meddle with. They that with Origen affirm, that there were antecedent worlds, are juſtly blamed on one ſide, not for ſpeaking things falſe, but things uncertain and unrevealed, and for corrupting Chriſtianity by a mixture of things alien and doubtfull. And thoſe who affirm that there were no antecedent worlds, are as much culpable on the other ſide, if not more, on the ſame account and upon further reaſons. On the one ſide, we know that God needeth nothing to his own felicity, but is perfectly ſufficient for himſelf; and that he createth not the World ex neceſſitate naturae as an agent which acteth ad ultimum poſſe. And on the other ſide we know, that though he hath a Goodneſs of ſelf-perfection, unſpeakably more excellent than his Benignity as Related to man (not that one Property in God is to be ſaid more excellent than another in it ſelf, but that quoad Relationem there is an infinite difference between his Goodneſs in Himſelf, and his Goodneſs only as Related to his Creatures, and meaſured by their intereſt), yet we confeſs that his Fecundity, and Benignity is included in his own Goodneſs; and that he delighteth to do Good, and is communicative; and that he doth Good ex neceſſitate voluntaria, ex naturae perfectione, without coaction; it being moſt neceſſary that he do that which his Infinite wiſdom ſaith is beſt: (which made Th. White de Mundo ſay, that God did neceſſarily make the World, and neceſſarily make it in time, and not ab aeterno, and yet all this moſt voluntarily, becauſe he doth neceſſarily do that which is beſt in the judgement of his Wiſdom.) And we deny not that if a man will preſume to give liberty to his Reaſon to ſearch into unrevealed things, that it will ſeem to him very improbable, that he who is Actus purus, of Infinite Power, Wiſdom and Goodneſs, and who now taketh pleaſure in all his works, and his delights are with the Sons of men, ſhould from all Eternity produce no Creature till leſs than 6000 years ago; when a thouſand years with him are but as a day; and that he ſhould reſolve to have Creatures to all Eternity, who as to future duration ſhall be ſo like to Himſelf, when from all Eternity he had no Creature, till, as it were, five or ſix dayes agoe! Chriſtians are apt to have ſuch thoughts as theſe as well as you, when they look but to rational probabilities. But they hold that all theſe matters, whether there were antecedent worlds, and how many, and of what ſort, and of what duration, whether this was the firſt, are matters unrevealed, which they ought not to trouble the world or themſelves with prying into, or contending about: And they finde that they are unfruitfull ſpeculations,Lumine naturae non conſtat quod Angeli facti ſint in tempore, & non fuerint ab aeterno: Nam imprimis per lumen naturae cognoſcimus, exemplo Solis & luminis, effectum poſſe coaevum eſſe ſuae cauſae: unde nulla repugnantia eſt, ex parte Dei vel ex parte Creaturae, ut haec ſit Deo coaeva. Schibler Met. de Angel. See alſo Durandus Ariminenſis, Aquinas, Pererius, Suarez, &c. which do but overwhelme the minde of him that ſearcheth after them; when God hath provided for us in the Chriſtian Faith, more plain, and ſure, and ſolid, and wholſom food to live upon.
3. And if it be unrevealed in Scripture, whether before this there was any other World, we muſt confeſs it unrevealed whether there were any emanant or created Entity, which God did produce from all Eternity conſidered quoad durationem only. For the Scripture ſaith no more of one than of the other. And if there were one moment (dividing Eternity only imaginarily) in which there had been nothing but God, we muſt equally confeſs an Eternity in which there was nothing but God: becauſe Eternity hath no beginning.
4. But Chriſtianity aſſureth us of theſe two things, 1. That certainly there is no Being beſides God but what was created, produced or totally cauſed by Him: And that if any Creature were eternal as to duration, yet it is after God in order of being as cauſed by Him, as the ſhadow is after the ſubſtance, and as the beams and light are after the Sun; or rather as the leaves would be after the life of the Tree, if they were conceived to be both eternal: One would be an eternal Cauſe, and the other but an eternal Effect. 2. It is certain, that this preſent World containing the Sun, and Moon, and Heavens, and Earth, which are mentioned Geneſ. 1. is not from Eternity. And indeed Reaſon it ſelf doth make that at leaſt very probable, as Revelation makes it certain. Which will appear when I have opened the Philoſophers opinions on the other ſide.
2. Among your ſelves there are all theſe differences, (and ſo we have ſeveral Caſes to ſtate with you). 1. Some think that this preſent Syſteme of compounded beings is from Eternity. 2. Others think, that only the Elements and Heavens, and all ſimple Beings are from Eternity. 3. Others think that Fire or Aether only as the Active Element is from Eternity, or the incorruptible matter of the Heavens. 4. Others think that matter and motion only were from Eternity. 5. Others think, that only ſpiritual purer beings, Intelligences or Mindes were from Eternity, and other things produced immediately by them. 6. And there have been thoſe Heathen Philoſophers, who held that only God was from Eternity.
Among all this variety of opinions, why ſhould any one think the more doubtfully of Chriſtianity, for denying ſome of them, which all the other deny themſelves? Is it a likely thing that any individual mixt body ſhould be eternall, when we know that mixt bodies incline to diſſolution? and when we ſee many of them oriri & interire daily before our eyes? And if Man and Beaſt as to each individual have a beginning and end, it muſt be ſo as to the beginning of the ſpecies; for the ſpecies exiſteth not out of the Individuals, and ſome individual muſt be firſt; (And as Bp. Ward argueth againſt Mr. Hobs, If the World be eternal, there have infinite dayes gone before, e. g. the birth of Chriſt: and then the whole is no greater than the parts, or infinity muſt conſiſt of finite parts.) The Heavens and the Earth therefore which are compounded beings, by the ſame reaſon are lyable to diſſolution,Read in Bib. Pat. the diſpute of Zachary Mitilene with Ammonius and a Phyſician about the Worlds Eternity. as man is; and therefore had a beginning. So that the truth is, there is no rational probability in any of your own opinions, but thoſe which aſſert the Eternity of ſome Simple Beings, as Matter or Intelligences, or an Anima Ʋniverſalis. Now conſider further, that if ever there was a moment when there were no Individuals, or mixt Beings,How neerly the Manichees opinion agreed with the Platoniſts, ſee in Nemeſius de Anim. pag. 487, 488, &c. (but only ſome univerſal Soul or Matter) then there was an Eternity when there was nothing elſe: (For Eternity hath no beginning): And then will it not be as ſtrange to your ſelves, to think that God ſhould from all Eternity delight himſelf in Matter unformed (if that be not a contradiction) or in an Anima ſimplex & unica, without any of all the variegated matter, and beings which we now finde beſides in Nature, as that he ſhould eternally content himſelf with Himſelf alone? If all individuals of compound beings were not from Eternity, what was? Either the Egge or the Hen muſt be firſt: (as the old inſtance is.) If you will come to it, that either Anima unica, or Atoms unformed were eternal, why ſhould not God as well be without theſe, as be without the formed Worlds?
What ſhall a preſumptuous minde now ſay to all theſe difficulties? why return to modeſty: Remember that as the Bird hath wit given her to build her neſt, and breed her young as well as man could do it, and better, but hath no wit for things which do not concern her; ſo man hath reaſon for the ends and uſes of reaſon, and not for things that are not profitable to him; and that ſuch looks into Eternity about things unrevealed, do but over-whelm us, and tell us that they are unrevealed, and that we have not one reaſon for ſuch employments.
And what is the end of all that I have ſaid? Why to tell you that our Religion doth not only ſay nothing of former worlds, but, 2. that it alſo forbiddeth us to ſay, Yea or Nay, to ſuch queſtions, and to corrupt our minds with ſuch preſumptuous ſearches of unrevealed things. And therefore that you have no reaſon to be againſt the Scripture on this account; for it doth not determine any thing againſt your own opinion, if you aſſert not the eternity of this preſent world or ſyſtem; but it determineth againſt your preſumption, in medling with things which are beyond your reach.
And withall it giveth us a certainty, that as in one Sun there is the Lux, Radii & Lumen; ſo in one God there is Father, Son, and holy Spirit; eternally exiſtent and ſelf-ſufficient; which quieteth the mind more than to think of an eternity of an Anima or Materia, which is not God.
All this I have here annexed, becauſe theſe Philoſophical ſelf-deceivers are to be pitied, and to have their proper help: And I thought it unmeet to interrupt the diſcourſe with ſuch debates, which are not neceſſary to more ſober Readers, but only for them who labour of this diſeaſe: and I know that when they read the firſt leafe of the book, which proveth that man hath a Soul or Mind, they will riſe up againſt it with all the objections which Gaſſendus, Mr. Hobs, &c. aſſault the like in Carteſius with, and ſay, You prove not this Mind is any thing but the ſubtiler part of Matter, and the temperament of the whole: To whom I now anſwer, 1. That it is not in that place incumbent on me, nor ſeaſonable to prove any more than I there aſſert. 2. But I have here done it for their ſakes, more ſeaſonably, though my diſcourſe is entire and firm without it.
And I deſire the unbelieving Reader to obſerve, that I am ſo far from an unneceſſary incroaching upon his liberty, and making him believe that Chriſtianity condemneth all thoſe conjectures of Philoſophers which it aſſerteth not it ſelf, that I have taken the liberty of free conjecturing in ſuch caſes my ſelf,Nor do I here preſs you with the authority of a Hermes, Zoroaſter, or Orpheus, as knowing how little proof is given us, that the writings were theirs which are fathered on them: and giving ſome credit to Porphyry himſelf, who in the life of Plotinus telleth us, that there were then [Ex antiqua Philoſophia egreſſi haeretici, Adelphii Acylinique ſectatores, qui Alexandri Lybici Philocomi, Demoſtrati, & Lydi plurimos libros circumferebant, & revelationes quaſdam Zoroaſtris, Zoſtriani, Nichotei, Allogenis, Meſi, aliorumque ejuſmodi palam oſtendentes, & deceperunt multos, & ipſi decepti jam fuerant: —Ego vero Porphyrius argumentationibus multis oſtendi, librum Zoroaſtri ab illis inſcriptum adulterinum novumque eſſe, & ab eis confictum qui ſtruebant haereſin: ut inſtitutiones ſuae eſſe Zoroaſtris voteris crederentur. And hereupon Plotinus wrote his Book againſt the Gnoſticks. not going beyond the evidence of probability, or the bounds of modeſty: and that I think them betrayers of the Chriſtian cauſe, or very injurious to it, who would intereſs it in matters with what it medleth not; and corrupt it, by pretending that it condemneth all the opinions in Philoſophy which themſelves are againſt. Nor am I one that believe that Chriſtianity will allow me that zeal, which too haſtily and peremptorily condemneth all, that in ſuch points do hold what I diſlike. I do not anathematize as Hereticks all thoſe, who hold thoſe opinions which either Stephanus, or Guilielm. Epiſc. Pariſienſes condemned in their Articul. Contra varios in fide errores: though I think many of them dangerous, and moſt very audacious. e. g. Quod intelligentia motrix coeli fluit in animas rationales, ſicut corpus coeli influit corpus humanum: Quod ſcientia intelligentiae non differt à ſubſtantia ejus. Quod intelligentia ſola voluntate movet coelum: Quod omne quod non habet materiam eſt aeternum. Quod intellectus non eſt forma corporis niſi aſſiſtens: Quod anima ſeparata non patitur ab igne: Quod anima ſeparata manet animal vivum, &c. I can more charitably bear ſuch opinions than thoſe that ſo ſeverely then condemned them. Though yet I think that in this age, it is one of the devils chief deſigns, to aſſault Chriſtianity by falſe Philoſophy.
Pretend not then your by-opinions to prejudice you againſt Chriſtianity in the main: much leſs againſt thoſe natural verities, which all wiſe, and ſober, and honeſt Philoſophers are agreed in. When Xenocrates, de morte, (tranſlated by Ficinus) had in the name of Socrates, told Axiochus what Gobrias told, of an inferiour place whither ſouls went at death, and of their judgment, and of the torment, Ʋbi homines impii omniformibus ſuppliciis cruciati perpetua punitione vexantur, he diſclaimeth the impoſition of the belief of ſo much, but ſelects this certainty, Ego ratione coactus hoc ſolum plane firmiterque cognoſco, animam omnem immortalem exiſtere, & eam, quae pura ex iis locis abierit, ſine triſtitia vivere; Quamobrem ſive ſurſum ſive deorſum tendas, Axioche, beatum fore te oportet, ſi modo pi… ſancteque vixeris. N.B. And he holds to this, [Non in mortem, ſed in ipſam immortalitatem migras: neque bonis privaberis, ſed integra bonorum poſſeſſione frueris: nec voluptates mortali corpori mixtas percipies amplius, ſed omni prorſus triſtitia vacuas: Illuc inquam proficiſceris ex hoc carcere liber, ubi quieta omnia, & à triſtitia ſenectuteque ſemota. Ʋbi exultatio ſancta, vitaque malorum neſcia, & tranquilla pace nutrita, naturam rerum ſpeculans, & arcana Philoſophiae contemplans; haud ſane ad turbae theatrive gratiam, ſed ad perſpicuae veritatis objectum.]
If you are not wiſe enough to be Chriſtians, why will you not be as wiſe and honeſt as the better ſort of Heathens? Muſt we have ſo much adoe to reaſon debauched hypocrites and apoſtates, to that which nature taught ſo many, who yet did but in part improve it? Believe this much which a Xenocrates or Socrates could teach you, and live accordingly, and you will not be blinded and deceived with ſo many beaſtly luſts, which hinder your belief, and will drown you in perdition. Or rather come to Chriſt, who will better cure thoſe luſts than Socrates or Plato, or any Philoſopher could do. But alas, Epicurus had more Court and Country diſciples than the manly ſort of Philoſophers, however the wiſe men vilified him in the Schools: And his Apoſtles, while they contemn the doctrine of incorporeal ſpirits, do ſo often animate themſelves with thoſe corporeal ſpirits, which the hearers of Chriſts diſciples thought they had drunk in, Act. 2. That they are more fool-hardy and pot-confident than their wiſer adverſaries; and get that with audacity, that I ſay not impudency, which others loſe by humble modeſty: for (ſaith Cicero, de fin. l. 2. p. 100.) Eſt tanti Philoſophitamque nobilis, audacter ſua decreta defendere.] And his doctrine ſo befriendeth ſin, that ſin will befriend it; and then it is not like to want entertainment. For as Cicero, ibid. Qualis eſt iſta philoſophia, quae non interitum afferat pravitatis, ſed ſit contenta mediocritate vitiorum? —In magnis interdum verſatur anguſtiis, ut hominum conſcientia remota, nihil tam turpe ſit, quod voluptatis cauſa non videatur eſſe facturus. Deinde ubi erubuit (vis enim eſt permagna naturae) confugit illuc ut neget accedere poſſe quidquam ad voluptatem nihil dolentis.—Luxuriam non reprehendit, modo ſit vacua infinita cupiditate & timore. Hoc loco diſcipulos quaerere videtur, ut qui Aſoti eſſe velint, Philoſophi fiant.
I have cited more out of Cicero than any other in this Treatiſe, and yet when I think how far our Apoſtates are below him, ſeeing they deſpiſe the words of Chriſt, I will once more uſe the words of Cicero, to convince them, ſhame them or condemn them. Tuſcul. Qu. l. 1. pag. 229. [Quorſum igitur haec ſpectat oratio? Quae ſit illa vis & unde ſit intelligendum puto. Non eſt corte nec cordis, nec ſanguinis, nec cerebri, nec atomorum: Anima ſit animus, igniſve neſcio: (He doubted whether the Platoniſts or Stoicks were in the right) nec me pudet ut iſtos fateri me neſcire quod neſciam: Illud, ſi ulla alia de re obſcura, ☞affirmare poſſem, ſive anima, ſive ignis, ſit animus, eum jurarem eſſe divinum. N.B. (Cicero dare ſwear that the ſoul is divine, though he doubt of the immateriality: and our Apoſtates deny both.) And reciting its operations, he ſaith, p. 239. Prorſus haec divina mihi videtur vis, quae tot res efficiat ac tantas. —Vigere, ſapere, invenire, meminiſſe; ergo animus, qui, ut ego dico, divinus, ut Euripides audet dicere, Deus eſt: & quidem ſi Deus aut anima aut ignis eſt, idem eſt animus hominis. —Sin autem eſt quinta quaedam natura ab Ariſtotele inducta primum, haec & Deorum eſt & animorum. —Animorum nulla in his terris origo inveniri poteſt: nihil enim eſt in animis miſtum, atque concretum, aut quod ex terra natum atque fictum eſſe videatur: nihil ne aut humidum quidem, aut ſtabile, aut igneum: his enim in naturis nihil ineſt quod vim memoriae, mentis, cogitationis habeat; quod & praeterita teneat, & futura provideat, & complecti poſſit praeſentia; quae ſola divina ſunt: nec invenietur unquam unde ad homines venire poſſit, niſi à Deo. Singularis eſt igitur natura quaedam, atque vis animi ſejuncta ab his uſitatis notiſque naturis: Itaque quicquid eſt illud quod ſentit, quod ſapit, quod vult, quod viget, coeleſte & divinum eſt, ob eamque rem, aeternum ſit neceſſe eſt: nec vero Deus ipſe qui intelligitur à nobis, alio modo intelligi poteſt, niſi Mens ſoluta quaedam, & libera, ſegregata ab omni concretione mortali, omnia ſentiens, & movens, ipſaque praedita motu ſempiterno; hoc è genere atque eadem è natura eſt humana mens. (So that though he ſuſpected it to have ſome pure materiality, it was but ſuch as he thought God had, and conſiſted with its eternity.) Ʋbi igitur aut qualis iſta mens? (ſcil. Deus) ubi tua, aut qualis? poteſne dicere? An ſi omnia ad intelligendum non habeo, quae habere vellem, ne iis quidem quae habeo, mihi per te uti licebit? Non valet tantum animus, ut ſeſe ipſe videat: At ut oculus, ſic animus ſeſe non videns alia cernit.—
Page 226. he ſaith of them that plead for the ſouls mortality, [Praeclarum neſcio quid adepti ſunt, qui didicerunt ſe, cum tempus mortis veniſſet, totos eſſe perituros. —Quid habet iſta res aut laetabile aut glorioſum? ſed plurimi contra nituntur, animoſque quaſi capite damnatos morte mulctant: neque aliud eſt quidquam cur incredibilis his animorum videatur aeternitas, niſi quod nequeunt qualis animus ſit vacans corpore intelligere, & cogitatione comprehendere: Quaſi vero intelligant qualis ſit in ipſo corpore! quae confirmatio! quae magnitudo! qui locus.— Haec reputent iſti qui negant animum ſine corpore ſe intelligere poſſe: videbunt, quem in ipſo corpore intelligant! Mihi quidem naturam animi intuenti, multò difficilior occurrit cogitatio, multóque obſcurior, qualis animus in corpore ſit, tanquam alienae domi, quam qualis cum exierit, & in liberum coelum, quaſi in domum ſuam venerit. Si enim quod nunquam vidimus, id quale ſit intelligere non poſſumus. Certe & Deum ipſum, & divinum animum corpore liberatum, …ogitatione complecti non poſſumus.—
Page 225. Atque ea profecto tum multo puriora, & dilucidiora cernentur, cum, quo natura fert, liber animus pervenerit— Cum nihil erit praeter animum, nulla res objecta, impediet, quo minus percipiat, quale quidque ſit; Quamvis copioſe haec diceremus, ſi res poſtularet, quam multa, quam varia ſpectacula, animus in locis coeleſtibus eſſet habiturus.—
Page 210, 211. Ipſi majorum gentium dii qui habentur, hinc à nobis proſecti in coelum reperientur: —multi de diis prava ſentiunt: id enim vitioſo more effici ſolet: omnes tamen eſſe vim & naturam divinam arbitrantur: nec vero id collocutio hominum, aut conſenſus efficit: non inſtitutis opinio eſt confirmata; non legibus; omni autem in re conſenſio omnium gentium lex naturae putanda eſt.— Haec ita ſentimus natura du…e, nulla ratione, nullaque doctrina: Maximum vero argumentum eſt naturam ipſam de Immortalitate animorum tacitam judicare, quod omnibus curae ſunt, & maxime quidem, quae poſt mortem futura ſint. N.B. — Abiit ad deos Hercules: Nunquam abiiſset niſi cum inter homines eſſet, eam ſibi viam muniviſſet. Quid in hac Republica tot tantoſ que viros ad Rempublicam interfectos cogitaſſe arbitramur? Iisdemne ut finibus nomen ſuum quibus vita terminaretur? Nemo unquam ſine magna ſpe immortalitatis ſe pro patria offerret ad mortem.— Neſcio quomodo inhaeret in mentibus quaſi ſaeculorum quoddam augurium futurorum; id que maximis ingeniis, altiſſimiſ que animis & exiſtit maxime & apparet facillimè: Quo quidem dempto quis tam eſſet amens, qui ſemper in laboribus & periculis viveret?
This maketh me think of Auguſtines ſaying, Si anima mortalis eſt, Epicurus in animo meo palmam habet. Confeſſ. l. 6. c. ult.
Quod ſi omnium Conſenſus (inquit Cic. ib.) naturae vox eſt, Omneſ que qui ubi que ſunt conſentiunt eſſe aliquid quod ad eos pertineat qui è vita ceſſerunt, nobis quo que idem exiſtimandum: Etſi, quorum aut ingenio aut virtute animus excellit, eos arbitramur quia natura optima ſint, cernere naturae vim maxime; veriſimile eſt cum optimus quiſ que maxime poſteritati ſerviat, eſſe aliquid cujus is poſt mortem ſenſum ſit habiturus. Sed, ut deos eſſe natura opinamur, qualeſ que ſint ratione cognoſcimus: ſic permanere animos arbitramur conſenſu omnium nationam. N.B. Qua in ſede, qualeſ que ſint; ratione diſcendum eſt.
Pag. 232. Haec igitur & alia innumerabilia cum cernimus, poſſumuſne dubitare, quin his praeſit aliquis vel Effector, ſi haec nata ſunt ut Platoni videtur, vel ſi ſemper fuerint ut Ariſtoteli placet, moderator tanti operis & muneris? ſic mentem hominis, quamvis eam non videas, ut Deum non vides, tamen ut Deum agnoſcis ex operibus ejus, ſic ex memoria rerum & inventione & celeritate motus, omni que pulchritudine virtutis vim divinam mentis agnoſcito. In quo igitur eſt loco? — Ʋbi ubi ſit animus, certe quidem in te eſt. Quae eſt ei natura? Propria puto & ſua. Sed fac igneam, fac ſpirabilem! Nihil ad id de quo agimus: Illud modo videto: ut Deum noris, etſi ejus ignores & locum & faciem: ſic Animum tibi tuum notum eſſe oportere, etiamſi ejus ignores & locum & formam: In animi autem cognitione dubitare non poſſumus, niſi planè in phyſicis plumbei ſumus, quin nihil ſit animis admiſtum, nihil concretum, nihil copulatum, nihil coagmentatum, nihil duplex. Quod cum it a ſit, certè nec ſecerni, nec dividi, nec deſcerpi, nec diſtrahi poteſt; nec interire igitur. Eſt enim interitus quaſi diſceſſus & ſecretio, ac direptus earum partium, quae ante interitum junctione aliqua tenebantur. His & talibus adductus Socrates, nec patronum quaeſivit ad judicium capitis, nec judicibus ſupplexfuit, adhibuit que liberam contumaciam, à magnitudine animi ductam, non à ſuperbia: & ſupremo vitae die de hoc ipſo multa diſſeruit, & paucis ante diebus, cum facile poſſet educi è cuſtodia, noluit: Et cum penè in manu jam mortiferum illud teneret poculum, locutus ita eſt, ut non ad mortem trudi, verum in Coelum videretur aſcendere. Ita enim cenſebat, ita que diſſeruit; Duas eſſe vias, dupliceſ que curſus animorum è corpore excedentium: Nam qui ſe humanis vitiis contaminaſſent, & ſe …otos libidinibus dediſſent— iis devium quoddam iter eſſe, ſecluſum a Concilio deorum. Qui autem ſe integros caſtoſ que ſervaviſſent, quibuſ que fuiſſet minima cum corporis contagio, ſeſe que ab his ſemper ſevocaſſent, eſſent que in corporibus humanis, vitam imitati deorum, his ad illos a quibus eſſent profecti reditum facilem patere. — Cato autem ſic abiit e vita, ut cauſam moriendi nactum ſe eſſe gauderet. Vetat enim Dominus ille in nobis Deus miſſu hinc nos ſuo demigrare. Cum vero cauſam juſtam Deus ipſe dederit, ut tunc Socrati, nunc Catoni, ſaepe multis; ne ille medi…s fidius vir ſapiens laetus ex his tenebris in lucem illam exceſſerit: nec tamen illa vincula carceris ruperit; leges enim vetant.
Pag. 227. Licet concurrant Plebeii omnes philoſophi (ſic enim ii qui à Platone & Socrate, & ab illa familia diſſident, appellandi videntur) non modo nihil unquam tam eleganter explicabunt, ſed ne hoc quidem ipſum quàm ſubtiliter concluſum ſit, intelligent. Sentit animus ſe moveri: quod cum ſentit, illud una ſentit, ſe vi ſua, non aliena moveri: nec accidere poſſe, ut ipſe unquam à ſe deſeratur: Ex quo efficitur aeternitas.
I have been tedious, and will therefore only adde his application, Pag. 233, 234. Tota Philoſophorum vita, commentatio mortis. Nam quid aliud agimus cum à voluptate, id eſt à corpore, cum à re familiari, quae eſt miniſtra & famula corporis, cum à Repub. Cum à negotio omni ſevocamus animum? Quid inquam tum agimus, niſi animum ad ſeipſum, aduocamus? ſecum eſſe cogimus? maximè que à corpore abducimus: ſecernere autem à corpore animum, nec quidquam aliud eſt quàm emori diſcere. Quare hoc commentemur, mihi crede; disjungamuſ que nos à corporibus, id eſt, conſueſcamus mori. Hoc & dum erimus in terris erit illi coeleſti vitae ſimile. Et cum illuc ex his vinculis emiſſi feremur, minus tardabitur curſus animorum: Quo cum venerimus, tum deni que vivemus: Nam haec quidem vita, mors eſt, quam lamentari poſſem, ſi liberet.
And how the Somatiſts were then eſteemed, he addeth, [Catervae veniunt contradicentium, non ſolum Epicureorum, quos equidem, non deſpicio; ſed neſcio quomodo, doctiſſimus quiſ que contemnit. And among Chriſtians they will never recover their reputation.
I know that ſome doubting Chriſtians are ready to ſay as Cicero's Auditor, who ſaith, that he had often read Plato; ſed neſcio quomodo dum lego aſſentior; cum poſui librum, & mecum ipſe de Immortalitate Animorum caepi cogitare, aſſenſio omnis illa elabitur. But this is becauſe the truth is not ſufficiently concocted, nor the conjoyned Frame of Evidences entirely and deeply printed on the minde; and ſo diverſions alienate the minde from the juſt apprehenſion of ſome of thoſe Evidences which it had formerly had a glimpſe of, and leave it open to the contrary ſuggeſtions. He that is ſurpriſed when his Proſpective Glaſs or Teleſcope is not with him, will not ſee thoſe things which by their help he ſaw before. And the remembrance of former convictions in the generall, will hardly ſatisfie a man againſt his preſent different apprehenſion, though he be conſcious that he had then more help than now. I have found my ſelf a far clearer apprehenſion of the certainty of the Life to come, and of the truth of the Goſpel, when I have come newly from the ſerious view of the entire frame of convincing Evidences, than I can have at other times, when many particulars are out of the way, or much worn off my apprehenſions.
Theſe paſſages I have cited out of Heathens, to convince or confound thoſe that under the Goſpel, with their hearts, tongues or lives, deny thoſe truths which the light of Nature hath ſo far made clear. Remembring both thoſe Symbols of Pythagoras, De rebus divinis a…ſ que lumine ne loquaris, & de Dis…rebuſ que divinis, nihil tam minabile dicitur, quod non debeas credere: and his Verſe (tranſlated by Ficinus),
Corpore depoſito cum liber ad aethera perges,
Evades hominem factus deus aetheris almi.
Alcinous reciting Plato's reaſons for the Immortality of the Soul, cap. 25. mentioneth ſeven reaſons, 1. Anima cuicun que adeſt, Vitam affert, …tpote illi naturaliter inſitam: Quod vero vitam praeſtat, mortem minime ſuſcipit: Ergo immortale exiſtit, 2. Anima cum per corporis ſenſus ad illa quae ſenſibilia ſunt deſcendit, angitur & turbatur; nec ſimilis eſſe poteſt illius cujus praeſentia turbatur. 3. Anima ipſa natura corpori dominatur. Quod autem natura ſua regit, & imperat, divinitati cognatum: Ergo anima Deo proxima immortalis eſt, &c. And becauſe it may be objected, that by the firſt reaſon, the Souls of Bruits would be immortall, he anſwereth that, but ſo doubtfully and darkly as is not worth the reciting. But though Alcinous incline to the negative (of the Immortality of the Animae brutorum) Porphyrius is peremptory for the affirmative, upon the ſuppoſition of their rationality.
The Stoick Philoſophers bear alſo as full a teſtimony againſt the Athieſt and the denyers of humanity, as the reſt: For though Cicero thank them for nothing, and rebuke them for denying the Souls eternity, and giving us but Ʋſuram, ut cornicibus, a longer and not an everlaſting life, yet ſome of them ſeem to be of another minde, and the reſt rather think that the Souls of men will participate in the Worlds periodical revolutions, than be at all annihilated or deprived of felicity. The paucity of their writings which have come down to us, and the malice of the Epicureans with whom they were at the greateſt odds, did make them repreſented as if they had held more unreaſonable opinions, and been more ſowre and inhumane than indeed they were. And ſome who of late times condemn them for that in which they agree with the doctrine of Chriſt, do ſeem to mean Chriſtianity, while they exclaim againſt the ſeverities of Stoiciſme, and mean the Church while they name but the Porch. Certainly, if Cicero himſelf, who is offended with their ſchiſme, do repreſent their opinions aright, and if we may judge of the reſt by his ſpeeches of Cato, and by the writings of Seneca, Epictetus and Antonine, and if Barlaam hath truely collected their Ethicks, there were no men that ſpake and lived ſo like Chriſtians, who were ſtrangers to Chriſt. He that would ſee the difference between them and the Epicureans, let him but read the Praeloquium before his Antoninus of Mr. Gataker (that man of admirable Learning, Humility, and Piety, not to be named without love and honour, nor in this Age without tears): Of Antoninus himſelf he ſaith, [Certè quaecun que Dominus ipſe Chriſtus in concionilus collationibuſ que ſuis Hiſtoriae Evangelicae inſertis [de mali cogitatione etiam abſtinenda, de affectibus vitioſis ſupprimendis, de ſermone otioſo non inſuper habendo, de animo cum primis excolendo, & ad imaginem divinam effingendo, de beneficentia ſimpliciſſime exhibenda, de injuriis aequanimiter ferendis, de admonitione & increpatione cum moderatione cautione que accurata exercendi…, de relus quibi ſlibet, adeo que vita ipſa, uli res ratio que poſcit nihili habendis, de aliis deni que pleriſ que pietatis, charitatis, aequitatis, humanitatis, officiis quam exquitiſſime obeundis exequendiſ que ] praecepta dedit; apud noſtrum hunc eadem, perinde acſi illa lectitaſſet ipſe, in diſſertationum commentationum que harum congerie inſperſa paſſim, nec ſine vehementia et vivacitate inſigni quae in praecordia ipſa penitus penetret. — Lector quivis ſedulus advertet, ingenuus agnoſcet.
The ſum of their doctrine, different from the Epicureans, he thus reciteth, (and by citations copiouſly proveth) [Numen coeleſte rerum humanarum curam gerere; nec univerſi tantummodo, ſed hominum etiam ſingulorum, & rerum quoque ſingularum; rebus humanis praeſto eſſe, generique humano, non ad bona vere ſic dicta duntaxat, ſed & ad vitae hujus commoda, & adminicula ſuppetitias ferre. Deum itaque ante omnia colendum; ad omnia invocandum, per omnia cogitandum, in omnilus agnoſcendum & comprobandum, de omnibus laudandum & celebrandum; huic uni in omni negotio ſimpliciter obſequendum; ab ipſo quicquid obvenerit animo prompto ac lubenti excipiendum atque amplexandum, nihil mellus, nihil convenientius, nihil conducibilius, nihil opportunius, aut tempeſtivius, quàm id, quicquid exiſtat, quodipſe voluerit, exiſtimandum: qu…cun que ducere viſum fuerit, citra tergiverſationem aut murmurationem, ſponte ſequendum; locum ſtationemque quemcunque is aſſignaverit, ſtrenuè tuendum, enixè tenendum, etiamſi mortem millies oppetere oporteret.] Haec de Numine Stoici & erga numen affectu.
De homine & officiis — [Hunc & corditus diligere & curare & ſuſtinere, injuriaque omni (ut quae impietatis etiam notam inurat) abſtinere; & beneficentia proſequi, nec ſibi ſoli genitum cenſere ſe, aut vivere, ſed in commune bonum ac beneficium, cunciis pro facultate viribuſque ſemet exhibere, re ipſa, reique bene geſtae conſcientia, (nec hac etiam ipſa quadantenus reputata) citra veſtem, aut mercedis ſpem commodive proprii intuitum, contentum agere; à beneficio uno praeſtito ad aliud tranſire, nec unquam benefaciendo defatiſci; ſed vitae telam, tanquam vivendi fructus hic ſit; benefactis ſi…i invicem continenter annexis, ita totum pertexere, ut nuſquam interveniat hiatus ullus vel minimus; beneficii loco, quod benefecerit habentem; ſibique profuiſſe exiſtimantem; ſi alii cuiquam uſui eſſe poterit; nec extra ſe proinde quicquam vel laudis humanae, vel lucelli, aut aucupantem aut expetentem: Ad haec nihil mentis cultu antiquius, nihil honeſti ſtudio petius aut pretioſius habere: ab eo denique quod officii ſui eſſe norit, nulla vel vitae, nedum alius rei cujuſpiam, cupidine abducendum, nulla mortis cruciatuſve illius, ne dum damni aut detrimenti formidine abigendum ſe permittere.] Haec Stoicorum praecepta ſunt —▪
When will the whole tribe of the Epicureans ever give the world ſuch a Prince as Antonine? who taught the world, that a Prince ſhould be a Philoſopher, and that ſelf-government, and a well-ordered mind and life, is the firſt point in the government and well-ordering of the Common-wealth; and that Monarchy may be ſo uſed, as to conſiſt as well with the peoples intereſt and liberty, as the moſt accurate Venetian Democraty: The only hurt that ever he was charged to do being this, that he lived ſo well, that he ſeemed ſomewhat to hinder the ſucceeding luſtre of Chriſtianity, even in Conſtantine and Theodoſius themſelves.
And as for the Stoicks great doctrine of Virtues ſelf-ſufficiency to felicity, which Plato and Ariſtotle alſo own againſt the Epicurean felicity of Pleaſure, it is undoubtedly a very great and ſacred. Theological verity: But it implieth a higher truth,Whether God or our ſelves, Virtue or Pleaſure be chiefly to be loved? which I have vindicated in this Treatiſe, viz. That man hath an ultimate end above himſelf, and that God (for all that he is perfect, and can receive no addition of felicity) is both his own and our end, ☞(though intendere finem is not ſpoken univocally of God and man) and that his Goodneſs as eſſential in himſelf, Even in Friendſhip with Men, it is commonly ſaid, that we muſt have more reſpect to our friend than to our ſelves. And therefore Cicero pleadeth, that Epicurus's opinion is inconſiſtent with true Friendſhip. However that ſtand, I am ſure in our Love to God, we muſt love him more for himſelf, than for our own ends and benefit. Therefore it is, that I diſtinguiſhed Love before, from Obedience as ſuch, as being ſomewhat more excellent, and the final grace. And Proclus (de Anim. & Daemone) diſcerned this diſtinction, when he ſaith, [Belli finis eſt juſtitia: pacis autem aliud quiddam excellentius bonum, Amicitia, ſcil. atque unio Finis enim univerſae virtutis eſt ut tradunt Pythagorici. Ariſtoteleſque confirmat; …t omnibus jam factis amicis, juſtitia non ulterius egeamus, quando, viz. ſublatum fuerit, M…um, & Non-meum] And if this be true of the Love of man, Much more of the Love of God. Which they alſo may do well to conſider of▪ who moſt fear the ceſſation of that Individuation of ſouls, which conſiſteth in the diſtance that now we are at: For though doubtleſs there will continue an Individuation, yet Union is ſo much of the felicity, perfection and delight of ſouls, union, I ſay, with God, as we are capable, and with one another, that we ſhould rather be afraid leſt we ſhall not be near enough, than leſt too much …earneſs ſhould confound us.and as his own perfection, is, in the order of our conceptions, much higher than his Benignity or Goodneſs, as related to the good of man. I have read ſome late ſelf-eſteeming Writers, (who love not to be named by way of oppoſition) who have undertaken the defence of the Epicurean hereſie, that Pleaſure is formally both man's felicity, and his ultimate end: but their reaſonings for it are not half ſo handſome and adapted to deceive, as the diſcourſe of Torquatus in Cicero, de finib. is; which indeed may ſeem very plauſible, till Cicero's excellent Anſwer is compared with it. It is a fair pretence to ſay, That a good man is pleaſed with nothing but that which is good, and that true pleaſure is to be found eſpecially in virtue, and that temperance and chaſtity ſhould be more pleaſant, than exceſs and luxury; and yet that the beſt men, when they do any great and excellent work, do therefore do it becauſe it pleaſeth them. But the truth is, that Bonum qua bonum eſt objectum voluntatis; good and appetibile are the ſame: it is firſt good becauſe it pleaſeth us, but it pleaſeth us, becauſe it is eſteemed by us to be good. And the greateſt good ſhould greatheſt pleaſe us, becauſe it is firſt the greateſt good: And as God in himſelf is infinitely better than any delight or felicity of ours, ſo is he therefore to be more the object of our delight. And as the good of the world, or of Kingdoms, or of thouſands, is better than the pleaſure of one individual perſon, ſo ſhould it be better loved, and more delighted in. For if Good as Good be appetible and delectable, then the greateſt Good muſt have the greateſt love and pleaſure. And nature it ſelf telleth us, that he that would not rather be annihilated than the world ſhould be annihilated, or would not loſe his life and honour, to ſave the life, and honour, and felicity of King and Kingdom, is no good member of Civil Society, but a perſon blinded by ſelfiſhneſs and ſenſuality. Therefore man hath ſomething above himſelf, and his own pleaſure, to ſeek and to take pleaſure in. How far you can congruouſly ſay, that you take pleaſure in your pleaſure, and ſo make your own pleaſure the object, yea, the only ultimate object of it ſelf, I ſhall not now ſtay to enquire. But certain I am, that though our love, which is our complacency in the beloved object, is our actus finalis, yet is it not the objectum finale to it ſelf; but God himſelf, the infinite Good, is that final Object; and the Publick Good is a more noble and excellent object than our own. And though it be truly our felicity to love God, yet we love him not chiefly becauſe it is our felicity to love him, but becauſe he is chiefly Good and Lovely; and then in the ſecond inſtant, we love our own love, and delight even in our own delights. Indeed the ſenſitive life, as ſuch, can ſeek nothing higher than its own delight: but the rational life is made to intend and proſecute that end, which reaſon telleth us is beſt, and to prefer that before our ſelves, which is better than our ſelves. And therefore the Epicurean opinion, which maketh Pleaſure our higheſt end, doth ſhew that the Sect is ſenſual and bruitiſh, and have brought their reaſon into ſervitude to their appetites and luſts. And nature it ſelf doth abhor the notion, when it is brought into the light; and will hear him with ſome horrour who ſhall ſpeak out and ſay, [God is not to be chiefly loved for himſelf, nor as he is beſt in himſelf, nor as my ultimate objective end, but only to be loved next my ſelf, as a means to my felicity or pleaſure, as meat, drink, eaſe, and ſport, and luſt are. And virtue or holineſs is not to be loved chiefly for it ſelf, that is, as it is the Image of God, and pleaſing to him, but as it conduceth to my pleaſure.] As Cicero excellently noteth, there is a great deal of difference between theſe two; [To love vertue as vertue, and ſo to take pleaſure in it becauſe it is virtue;] and [To love virtue for pleaſures ſake, more than for its own:] For he that doth ſo, muſt ſay as Cicero chargeth Epicurus plainly to ſay, that Luxury is not to be diſcommended if it be not unpleaſant: for the end is the meaſure and rule to judge of all the means. If pleaſure as pleaſure be beſt, then to him that ſo continues it, to live more pleaſedly in whoredom, and drunkenneſs, and theft, and murder, than in godlineſs and honeſty, it will be better ſo to do: And virtue, and luſt or wickedneſs, will ſtand in competition only in the point of pleaſure. And then, which think you will have the greater party, and what a caſe would mankind be in? I am perſwaded, that the well ſtudying the excellent diſcourſe of Cicero on this point, and the reaſons which the Stoicks and the reſt of the Philoſophers give againſt the Plebeian Philoſophers, (as Cicero calleth them) may much conduce to help many Divines themſelves to a righter underſtanding of the ſame controverſie, as in Theology they have otherwiſe worded it, Whether God or our own felicity be moſt to be loved? (And yet without running into the fanatick extreme, of ſeparating the love of God and our ſelves, and calling men to try whether for his glory they can be willing to be damned.) Only when you read the Philoſopher ſaying, that virtue in and for it ſelf is to be loved as our felicity; elucidate it by remembring, that this is, becauſe that vertue in it ſelf is the Image of God, and by our felicity they mean the perfection of our natures, in reſpect of the end for which we were made. And that as the excellency of my knife or pen (yea, or my horſe) is not to be meaſured by their own pleaſure but their uſefulneſs to me, becauſe I am their end; ſo is it, as to man's perfection, as he is made for God, and related to him, (for all that he hath no need of us, ſeeing he can be pleaſed in us.) Thus this Philoſophical controverſie is coincident with one of the greateſt in Theologie.
Though I have diſpleaſed many Readers, by making this Treatiſe ſwell ſo big, by anſwering ſo many objections as I have done, yet I know that many will expect that I ſhould have made it much greater, by anſwering, 1. Abundance of particular objections from Scripture-difficulties: 2. And many diſcourſes of ſeveral ſorts of perſons, who contradict ſome things which I have ſaid. But I ſuperſede any further labour of that kind, for theſe following reaſons.
1. It would fill many volumes to do it, as the number and quality of the Objections do require. 2. Thoſe that require it are yet ſo lazie, that they will not read this much which I have already written, as eſteeming it too long. 3. They may find it done already by Commentators, if they will have but the patience to peruſe them. 4. I have laid down that evidence for the main cauſe of GODLINESS and CHRISTIANITY, by which he that well digeſteth it, will be enabled himſelf to defend it againſt abundance of cavils, which I cannot have time to enumerate and anſwer. 5. The ſcribles of ſelf-conceited men are ſo tedious, and every one ſo confident that his reaſons are conſiderable, and yet every one ſo impatient to be contradicted and confuted, that it is endleſs to write againſt them, and it is unprofitable to ſober Readers, as well as tedious to me, and ungrateful to themſelves. To inſtance but in the laſt that came to my hands, an Inquiſitio in fidem Chriſtianoram hujus ſeculi, (the name prefixed I ſo much honour, that I will not mention it.) Page 3. he calleth confidence in errour by the name of certainty, as if every man were certain that hath but ignorance enough to over-look all cauſe of doubting. Page 13. He will not contend if you ſay, that it is by divine faith, that we believe the words to be true which are Gods; and by humane faith by which we believe them to be the words of God. He ſaith, that Faith hath no degrees: but is alway equal to it ſelf: to believe is to aſſent, and to doubt is to ſuſpend aſſent; Ergo, where there is the leaſt doubt, there is no faith; and where there is no doubt, there is the higheſt faith; Ergo, Faith is always in the higheſt, and is never more or leſs: And yet it may be called ſmall when it is quaſi nulla, (that quaſi is to make up a gap) in reſpect of the ſubject, or at leaſt hardly yielded; and in regard of the object, when few things are believed. Page 26. He maketh the Calviniſts to be Enthuſiaſts, (that is, Fanaticks) becauſe they ſay, that they know the Scripture by the Spirit: (as if ſubjectively we had no need of the Spirit, to teach us the things of God; and objectively the ſpirit of miracles and ſanctification were not the notifying evidence or teſtimony of the truth of Chriſt.) The ſame name he vouchſafeth them that hold, That the Scripture is known by univerſal tradition to be God's word, and every mans own reaſon muſt tell him (or diſcern) the meaning of it. And he concludeth, that if every one may expound the Scripture, even in fundamentals, then every man may plead againſt all Magiſtrates, in defence of murder or any other crime, as a rational plea; and ſay, Why ſhould you puniſh me for that which God hath bid me do. As if God would have no reaſonable creature, but bruits only to be his ſubjects. As if a man could knowingly obey a Law, which he neither knoweth, nor muſt know the meaning of; and is bound to do he knoweth not what. And as if the Kings ſubjects muſt not underſtand the meaning of the fifth Commandment, nor of Rom. 13. Honour thy father and mother; and, Let every ſoul be ſubject to the higher powers, and not reſiſt. Or as if Kings muſt govern only dogs and ſwine, or might make murder, adultery, idolatry and perjury, the duty of all their ſubjects when they pleaſed, becauſe none muſt judge of the meaning of God's Law by which they are forbidden: or as if it were the only way to make men obedient to Kings and Parents, to have no underſtanding that God commandeth any man to obey them, nor to know any Law of God that doth require it: or as if all our Paſtors and Teachers were not to be ſo uſeful to us as a ſign-poſt; nor we were not to learn of them or of our Parents any thing, that God either by nature or Scripture ever taught us: or as if a child or ſubject, who is required to learn the meaning of his Ruler's Laws, to judge of them judicio privatae diſcretionis, were thereby allowed to mis-underſtand them, and to ſay that they command us that which they forbid us; and becauſe the King forbiddeth us to murder, he alloweth us to ſay, You propoſed it to my underſtanding, and I underſtand it that you bid me murder, and therefore you may not puniſh me. As if he that is bound to judge by a bare diſcerning what is commanded him, and what forbidden, were allowed to judge, in partem utramlibet, that it is or it is not, as pleaſe himſelf. As if when the King hath printed his Statutes, he had forfeited all his authority by ſo doing, and his ſubjects might ſay, Why do you puniſh us for diſobeying your Laws, when you promulgated them to us as rational creatures to diſcern their ſenſe? Will it profit the world to write confutations of ſuch ſtuff as this? or muſt a man that is not condemned to Stage-playing or Ballad-making, thus waſte his time? Do the people need to be ſaved from ſuch ſtuff as this? If ſo, what remedy, but to pity them, and ſay, Quos perdere vult Jupiter hos dementat, & ſi populus vult decipi, decipiatur.
And yet to do no more wrong to the Scriptures, than to Councils, and Bulls, and Statutes, and Teſtaments, and Deeds, and Bonds, he concludeth, Of all writings whatſoever, that by the meer words of the writer you cannot be certain of his ſenſe; though they be common words, and you take them in the common ſenſe. So that if any doubt ariſe about my words, if I reſolve it by writing I cannot be underſtood; but if I ſpake the ſame ſyllables by word of mouth, it would ſerve the turn. As if no man could be ſure of the ſenſe of any Law, or Teſtament, or Bond, or Covenant, which is committed to writing, nor of any expoſition of them, if once it fall under Pen or Preſs. As if God's writing the Ten Commandments had left them unintelligible, in compariſon of his ſpeaking them. Then farewell all Hiſtorical certainty. Hath every ſingle Prieſt himſelf any aſſurance of the ſenſe of the Council, the Canons, the Popes Decreetals and Bulls, but by the way of writing? And ſo the poor people muſt, inſtead of the Church, believe only that Prieſt that orally ſpeaketh to them, though he have no certainty of the matter himſelf. If this doctrine be made good once, it will ſpoil the Printers trade, and the Clarks, and Courts of Record, and the Poſt-Office too.
But, page 51. he maketh the conſent of the univerſal Church to be the only ſure communication of Chriſtian Doctrine in the Articles of Faith; yea, the conſent of the preſent age concerning the former: (But how the conſent of the whole Church ſhall be certainly known to every man and woman, when no writing can certainly make known any mans mind, is hard to tell a man that expecteth reaſon.) And that you may ſee how much the ſubject of this Treatiſe is concerned in ſuch diſcourſes, he addeth, that If the Church had at any time been ſmall, its teſtimony had been doubtful; but (ſaith he) it teſtifieth of it ſelf that Chriſtians were never few, and therefore it is to be believed. But we will have no ſuch prevaricating defences of Chriſtianity. The major is the Infidels erroneous cavil; the minor is a falſe defence of the faith. The Church never ſaid that Chriſtians were never few: it hath ever confeſſed the contrary, that once they were few; and yet it hath proved againſt the Infidel, that its teſtimony was not doubtful, having better evidence of their veracity than numbers.
You may perceive by theſe ſtrictures upon this one diſcourſe, what an endleſs task it would be to write confutations, of every man that hath leiſure to publiſh to the world his opinions, which are injurious to the Chriſtian verity. And therefore no ſober Reader will expect, that I or he muſt be ſo tired, before he can be ſatisfied and ſetled in the Truth.
FINIS.
End of the text · Richard Baxter, The Reasons of the Christian Religion Part 1 (1667)