The Reasons of the Christian Religion Part 1, Part 1 · Chapter 11

The Reasons of the Christian Religion Part 1 · Part 1 · Chapter 11

p. 80CHAP. XI. III. Of GOD's Relation to Man as his BENEFACTOR and his END. Or as his CHIEF GOOD.

THE Three Eſſential Principles in God, do eminently give out themſelves to Man in his Three Divine Relations to us. His Power, Intellect and Will; His Omnipotency, Omniſcience and Goodneſs; in his being our Owner, our Ruler, and our Chief Good. The two firſt I have conſidered already; our Omnipotent Lord or Owner, and our moſt wiſe Governour, and our Counter-relations with the duties thereof. I now come to the third.

For the right underſtanding whereof, let us a little conſider p. 81of the Image of God in Man,Porro coeli generationis authorem ſumme Bonum atque excellentiſſimum (aſſeruit Plato): ejus quippe quod ſit in rebas conditis pulcherrimum, eum eſſe conditorem quem intelligibilium omnium conſtet eſſe praeſtantiſſimum. Itaque quoniam hujuſmodi Deus eſt, coelam vero praeſtantiſſimo illi ſimile eſt, quoniam pulcherrimum cernitur, nulli creaturae erit ſimilius, quàm Deo ſoli. Laert. in Plat. in which we muſt here ſee him. It is Man's WILL, which is his ultimate, perfective, imperant faculty; it is the proper ſubject of Moral habits, and principal agent of Moral acts: And therefore in all Laws and Converſe, the WILL is taken for the Man; and nothing is further morally Good or Evil, Virtuous or culpably Vicious, than it is Voluntary. The INTELLECT is but the Director of the WILL: Its actions are not the perfect actions of the Man: If it apprehend bare Truth without reſpect to Goodneſs, its Object is not the higheſt or felicitating or attractive Object, and therefore the act can be no higher: if it apprehend any Being or Truth as good, it apprehendeth it but as a ſervant or guide to the WILL, to bring it thither to be received by LOVE. The perfect excellency of the object of humane acts is Goodneſs, and not meer Entity or Verity. Therefore the excellenteſt faculty is the Will: It is Good that is the final-Cauſe in the object of all humane acts: Therefore it is the fruition of Good which is the perfective final Act; and that fruition of Good as Good, is, though introductorily by Viſion, yet finally and proximately by Complacencies, which is nothing elſe but Love in its moſt eſſential act, delighting in its attained object. And for the executive Power, though in the order of its natural being, it be before the Will, yet in its operation ad extra, it is after it, and commanded by it.

Accordingly, while we ſee God but in this Glaſs, we muſt conceive that his Principle of Ʋnderſtanding and Power, ſtand in the foreſaid order as to his WILL: and his Omnipotence and Omniſcience, to that eminently-moral Goodneſs, which is the perfection of his will. (The natural goodneſs of his Eſſence filling all.)

Therefore here note, that this Attribute of God (his GOODNESS) doth make Him our Chief Good, in a two-fold reſpect, both EFFICIENTLY and FINALLY. In ſome ſort it is ſo with the other Attributes: His Power is Efficiently the ſpring of our being and actions; and finally and objectively it terminateth our ſubmiſſion and our truſt. His Wiſdom is the principle of his Laws, and alſo the object and end of our enquiries and underſtandings. But his Goodneſs is the EFFICIENT of all our good in its perfection of cauſality, and that p. 82END of our Souls,Nihil eſt Deo ſimilius & gratiis, quàm vir, animo perfecto bonus, qui hominibus caeteris antecellit, quod ipſe à Diis immortalibus diſtat. Luc Apul. de Deo Socr. which is commonly called ULTIMATE ULTIMUS. So that to ſubmit to his Power, and to be ruled by his Wiſdom, is, as I may ſay, initially our end. But to be pleaſing to his good-will, and to be pleaſed in his good-will; that is to Love Him, and to be beloved by Him, is the abſolute perfection and end of man.

Therefore under this his Attribute of Goodneſs, God is to be ſpoken of both as our BENEFACTOR and our END; which is to be indeed our ſummum bonum.

§. 1. Man hath his Being, and all the good which he poſſeſſeth, from God, as the ſole firſt Efficient by Creation.

§. 2. Therefore God alone is the Ʋniverſal Grand BENEFACTOR of the world, beſides whom they have no other, but meerly ſubordinate to him.

No creature can give us any thing which is originally its own, having nothing but what it hath received from God: Therefore it is no more to us, but either a gift of God, or a Meſſenger to bring us his gift; they have nothing themſelves but what they have received: nor have we any ſort of Good, either Natural, Moral, of Mind, or Body, or Fortune, or Friends, but what is totally from the Bounty of our Creator, and as totally from him, as if no creature had ever been his inſtrument.Quis dubitare poteſt mi Lucili, quin Deorum immortalium munas ſit quod vivimus. Senec. Prope Deus eſt, tecum eſt, intus eſt: Ita dico Lucili, ſacer intra nos ſpiritus ſedet, bonorum malorumque noſtrorum obſervator & cuſtos. Hic prout à nobis tractatur, ita & nos tractat ipſe: Bonus verò vir ſine Deo nemo eſt. An poteſt aliquis ſupra formam, niſi ab illo, adjatus exurgere. Ille dat conſilia, magnifica & erecta in unoquoque bono viro. Senec.

§. 3. As God's Goodneſs is that by which he communicateth Being and all Good to all his Creatures, and is his moſt completive Attribute, in point of Efficiency, ſo is it that Attribute which is in genere cauſae finalis, the finis ultimate ultimus of all his works. God can himſelf have no ultimate end but Himſelf: and his rational creatures can have no other lawful ultimate End: And in Himſelf, it is his Goodneſs, which is completely and ultimately that End.

Here I am to ſhew, I. That God himſelf can have no ultimate end but Himſelf. II. That Man ſhould have no other. III. That God, as in his Goodneſs, is ultimate ultimus, the End of Man.

I. 1. That which is moſt Beloved of God is his ultimate End: but God Himſelf is moſt beloved of Himſelf: Therefore he is his own ultimate End.

The reaſon of the major Propoſition is, Becauſe to be the ultimate end, and to be maxime amatum, is all one▪ Finis quaerentis p. 83hath reſpect to the Means of attainment, and is that cujus amore media eliguntur & applicantur. This God is not capable of, (ſpeaking in propriety) becauſe he never wanteth his End. Finis fruitionis is that which amando fruimur; which we love complacentially in full attainment: And ſo God doth ſtill enjoy his end: and to have it in Love is to enjoy it.

The Minor is paſt controverſie.

Obj. But if God have not finem quaerentis, then in every inſtant he enjoyeth his end: and if ſo, then he uſeth no means at all: for what need any means be uſed for that end, which is not ſought but ſtill enjoyed. And conſequently, where there is no means there is no end.

Anſw. As finis ſignifieth nothing but effectum, viz. perfectionem operis, which is but finis terminativus; ſo it is not always at preſent attained; and God may be ſaid to uſe means, that is, ſubordinate efficients or inſtruments to accompliſh it. But as it ſignifieth cauſam finalem, ſcil. cujus amore res fit, ſo far as it may (without all imperfection) be aſcribed to him, he muſt be ſaid continually to enjoy it: And yet to uſe means for it, but not as wanting it, but in the ſame inſtant uſing and enjoying: that is, He conſtantly communicateth himſelf to his creatures, and conſtantly loveth himſelf ſo communicated. He is the firſt efficient and ultimate end, without any interpoſing inſtant of Time, (were Eternity diviſible) but in order of Nature, he is the Efficient before he is the End enjoyed, but not before the End intended. He ſtill ſendeth forth the beams of his own Glory, and ſtill taketh pleaſure in them ſo ſent forth: His works may be increaſed and attain perfection, (called finem operis by ſome) but his Complacency is not increaſed or perfected in his works, but is always perfect: As if the Sun took conſtant pleaſure in its own emitted light and heat, though the effects of both on things below were moſt various. God is ſtill pleaſed in that which ſtill is, in all his own works, though his works may grow up to more perfection.

Or if any think fit to ſay, that God doth quaerere finem, and that he may enjoy more of it at one time than another, yet muſt he confeſs, that nothing below the complacency of his own will, in his own emitted beams of Glory, ſhining in his works, is this his ultimate end.

p. 842. That which is the Begining muſt be the End: But God is the Beginning of all his works: therefore he is the End of all. He himſelf hath no Beginning or Efficient, and conſequently no final cauſe of himſelf: but his works have himſelf for the Efficient, and for their End: that is, He that made them, intended in the making of them, that they ſhould be illuſtrious with his communicated beams of Glory, and thereby amiable to his will, and ſhould all ſerve to his complacency.

If the End were lower than the Beginning, there would be no proportion; and the Agent would ſink down below himſelf.

3. If any thing beſides God were his ultimate End, it muſt thereby be in part Deifi'd, or his actions debaſed by the lowneſs of the End: but theſe are impoſſibilities. The Actions are no nobler than their End: and the End is more noble than the Means as ſuch.

4. The ultimate End is the moſt amiable and delectable: The Creature is not to God the moſt amiable and delectable: Therefore the Creature is not his ultimate end. The firſt Argument was from the Act, this from the Object.

5. The ultimate end is that in which the Agent doth finally acquieſce: God doth not finally acquieſce in any creature. Therefore no creature is his ultimate end.That the finis cui is properly the ultimate end, and the finis cujus is ſubordinate to it, Cicero ſheweth in Piſo's ſpeech, l. 5. de finib. p. 188. In nobis ipſis ne intelligi quidem, ut propter aliam quampiam rem, verbi gratiâ, propter voluptatem, nos amemus. Propter nos enim illam, non propter eam noſmetipſos diligimus. Quid eſt quod magis perſpicuum eſt, non modo carum ſibi quemque, verum etitiam vehementer carum.

6. That which is God's ultimate End is loved ſimply for it ſelf, and not as a means to any higher end: The Creature is not loved by him ſimply for it ſelf, but as a means to a higher end, (viz. his complacency in his glory ſhining in it): Ergo, it is not his ultimate end. The ultimate end hath no end; but the creatures have an end, viz. the complacency of God in his glory ſhining in the creature.

Obj. But you confound the final Object and the final Act: God's complacency of love is his final Act, but our enquiry is of the final Object.

Anſw. The finis cui, or perſonal end is moſt properly the ultimate, he for whoſe ſake, or for whom the thing is done: But this is God only, and therein he is both the act and object. He that did velle creaturas, did velle eas ad complacentiam propriae voluntatis. The queſtion is not of the actus complacentiae, but of the actus creandi vel volendi creaturarum exiſtentiam: p. 85which he doth propter voluntatis impletionem, & inde complacentiam; which is the final act, and the final object of the creating act; But for the actus complacentiae it is not actus intentionis but fruitionis; and therefore hath no end, above it ſelf: And the final object of that Complacency, is not the Creature it ſelf, but the Impletion of the Divine will in the Creature; yea, the Image of his Omnipotency, Wiſdom and Goodneſs ſhining in the Creation, is not loved propter ſe, ultimately; but for the ſake of that Divine Eſſence and Perfection of which it is the Image: (as we love the Image of our friend for his ſake;) ſo that when all is done, God himſelf is his own end in all his works, ſo farr as (very improperly) he may be ſaid to intend an end.

Or if you could prove the Creature to be the Objectum finale, that proveth him not to be properly the finis ultimus: For that is a difference between Mans agency and Gods: Man is an Agent made and acting for his final Object, and more ignoble than his Object (as the eye of a Flie that beholdeth the Sun): But God is an Agent more noble than the Object, who gave the Object it ſelf its being, and made it of nothing, for himſelf; and ſo the Object is for his final Act.

Obj. But God being Perfect needeth nothing, nor can receive any addition of perfection or bleſſedneſs; and therefore it is not any addition of Good to himſelf which he intendeth in the Creation, and conſequently it is his ultimate end to do the Creature good.

Anſw. All the antecedent part is granted, and is anon to be further aſſerted: But the laſt conſequence is denyed; becauſe there is no other end beſide the addition of Good to himſelf, which God may intend, ſo farr as he may be ſaid to intend an end. He doth all the Good to the Creature which it receiveth, but not ultimately for the Creatures ſake.

II. That man ſhould have no ultimate End but God, (that is, ultimate ultimus as its called) is proved in what is ſaid: and the fuller opening of it, belongeth to the next Chapter.

III. It is God in all his Perfections, Omnipotency, Wiſdom and Goodneſs, that is mans ultimate end; but it is the laſt which ſuppoſeth both the other, and to which mans will, p. 86which muſt perform the moſt perfect final act, is moſt fully ſuited: And therefore is in a ſpecial ſort, our ultimate end. The Omnipotency of God, is truly the efficient, dirigent and final Cauſe of all things, but it is moſt eminent in Efficiency: The Wiſdom of God is truly the efficient, dirigent and final cauſe of all things: but it is moſt eminent in Direction and Government: The Goodneſs of God is truly the efficient, dirigent and final cauſe: But it is moſt eminent in being the perfective efficient, and final Cauſe.

§. 4. Gods ultimate end in Creation and Providence, is not any ſupply or addition of Perfection or Bleſſedneſs in himſelf; as being abſolutely perfect in himſelf, and capable of no addition.

But thoſe who think that God doth produce all things ex neceſſitate naturae from Eternity, ſay, that as the Tree is not perfect without its fruits, ſo neither is God without his works: They ſay with Balbus in Cicero, and other Stoicks, that the World is the moſt excellent Being; and that God is but the ſoul of the World: and though the Soul be a compleat ſoul if it had no body, yet it is not a compleat Man: and as the Tree is compleat in genere cauſae without the fruit, yet not as a Totum containing thoſe effects ab eſſentia which are its Part and End: So ſay they, God may be perfect without the World, as he is only the Soul and part of the World; but he is not a compleat world, nor in toto.

Anſw. 1. That God is not the ſoul or conſtitutive cauſe of the World, but ſomewhat much greater, is proved before**Chap. 4.: And alſo that it was not from Eternity; and conſequently that he created it not by naturall neceſſity: The foundation therefore being overthrown, the building falleth. Thoſe that hold the foreſaid opinion muſt hold, that God is in point of duration, an eternall efficient, matter, form and end; and that in order of Nature, he is firſt an Efficient principle cauſing matter, and ſecondly, he is an efficient with matter, and in the third inſtant he is the form of the effected matter, and in the fourth inſtant he is the end of his operations herein. And if you call the efficient Principle only by the name of God, then you grant what I prove and you ſeemed to deny: But if he be not God as the meer efficient and end, but alſo as the matter; then you make every ſtone, and Serpent, and every thief and murderer, and devil, to be part of God, p. 87and make him the ſubject of all the ſin and evil, all the weakneſs, folly and mutations which be in the World: (with the other abſurdities before mentioned). And if you ſay, that he is God, as efficient, form, and end, and not as matter, then you contradict your ſelf, becauſe the form and matter are parts of the ſame being: And whether you call him God as the form only (and ſo make him but part of Being, and conſequently imperfect, and conſequently not God) or as matter and form alſo, and ſo make him a compounded being, ſtill you make him imperfect, in denying his ſimplicity or unity, and as guilty of all the imperfections of matter, and of compoſition: And you make one part of God more imperfect than the reſt, as being but an effect of it. All which are inconſiſtent with the nature of God, and with the nature of Man and every Creature, who is hereby made a part of God.

2.Quid enim eſt aliud natura quàm Deus? & divina ratio? toti mundo partibuſque ejus inſerta? Ergo nihil agis ingratiſſime mortalium, qui te negas Deo debere, ſed naturae; quia nihil natura fine Deo eſt, nec Deus ſine natura, ſed idem eſt uter que nec diſtat officio. Senec. de Benefic. If this had been true of the World as conſiſting of its conſtitutive cauſes, that it is God in perfection, and eternal, &c. yet it could not be true of the daily-generated and periſhing beings. There are millions of men and other animals, that lately were not, what they are: Therefore as ſuch they were no eternall parts of God, becauſe as ſuch they were not eternall: Therefore if God brought them forth for his own Perfection, it would follow that he was before imperfect, and conſequently not God; and that his Perfections are mutable and periſhing. Therefore at leaſt ſome other cauſe of theſe muſt be found out.

And as for the ſimilitudes in the objection, I anſwer; 1. That the fructifying of a Tree is an act of Generation;Leg. Aenean. Gazeum de Anima 3. P.T. 2 Gr. lat. p. 385, 386, &c. and the ends of it are partly the uſe (for food) to ſuperiour ſenſitive Creatures, eſpecially man; and partly the propagation of its ſpecies, becauſe it is mortall. Fructification is indeed its perfection, but that is becauſe it is not made for it ſelf, but for another. Sic vos non vobis, may be written upon all. But God is neither mortall needing a propagation of the ſpecies, nor is he ſubſervient to any other, and finally for its uſe.

And as for the Soul, it made not the matter of its own body, but found it made, though in the formation of it, it might be ſo efficient as domicilium ſibi fabricare. But God p. 88made all matter of nothing, and gave the World whatſoever it is or hath; And therefore was Perfect himſelf before: For an imperfect being could never have been the cauſe of ſuch a frame: Therefore he needed no domicilium for himſelf, nor as an imperfect Part (a form) to concurr to the conſtitution of a whole. But he is the efficient, dirigent and final cauſe of the World and all things, but not the conſtituent or eſſential; for then the Creature and Creator were all one, and God debaſed, and the Creature deified: But he is to them a ſupra-eſſential cauſe; even more than a form and ſoul, while he is a total efficient of all.

3. If all that is in the Objection had been proved, it would not at all ſhake the main deſign of my preſent diſcourſe, which is to prove that God is our Grand Benefactor and Chief Good! and that he is mans ultimate end. For if the World were his Body, and he both its Efficient and its Soul, he would be the cauſe of all its Good; and the Cauſe would be more excellent than the Effect: And if our Souls that never made the matter of our Bodies, are yet the nobleſt part of us, and far more excellent than the Body; much more would God that made or cauſed all the Matter and Order in the World, be more excellent than that World which he effected: And as the Soul is not for the Body as its ultimate end, (though it be the Life of the Body, and its great Benefactor,) but the Body is finally more for the Soul, though the Soul need not the Body, ſo much as the Body needeth the Soul; and as the Horſe is finally for the Rider, and not the Rider for the Horſe; though the Horſe needeth his Maſter more than the Maſter doth the Horſe; (for the Horſes life is preſerved by the Maſter, when the Maſter is but accommodated in his Journey by his Horſe;) Even ſo, though the World need God, and he needeth not the World, and God giveth being and life to the World, which can give nothing at all to him, yet the World is finally for God, and not God for the World. The nobleſt and firſt Being is ſtill the End.

And the generated part of the World, which is not formally eternal, but doth oriri & interire, is it that our diſpute doth moſt concern which the Objection doth no whit invalidate.

p. 89§. 5. The ſame Will of God which was the free efficient, Goodneſs ſignifieth more than utility or Pleaſure to our ſelves: As when we call a Man, a good Man, a good Scholar, a good Judge, &c. And ſo doth evil ſignifie on the contrary. Bonum eſt quod ſui ipſius gratiâ expetendum eſt. Ariſtot. Rhet. 1. Bonum omnis originis & ortûs finis eſt. Id. Metaph. l. ae. c. 3.is the End of all his Works ad extra.

Gods Eſſence hath no Efficient or final Cauſe, but is the efficient and final cauſe of all things elſe: They proceeded from his Power, his Wiſdom and his good-will; and they bear the Image of his Power, Wiſdom, and Good-will; and he loveth his own Image in them, and loveth them as they bear his Image; and loveth his Image for Himſelf. So that the act of his Love to Himſelf is neceſſary, though voluntary; and ſo is the act of his Love to his Image, and to all the Goodneſs of the Creature, while it is ſuch: But he freely and not neceſſarily made and continueth the Creature in his Image; and needeth not the Glaſs or Image, (being ſelf-ſufficient) ſo that his Creature is the mediate Object, Maximum Bonum maxime ſemper expetendum. Ariſtot. 1▪ Eth. c. 7. Duplex bonum eſt: alterum quod abſolute & per ſe bonum ſit; alterum quod alicui bono ſit & uſui. Ariſt. Eth. l. 7. c. 12. Veteres probe ſummum bonum definierunt, id ad quod omnia referuntur. Ariſt. Eth. 1. c. 1.his Image on the Creature is the ultimate created Object; his own perfections to which that Image relateth, is the objectum ſimpliciter ultimatum; his complacency or love is the Actus ultimus; and that very act is the object of his precedent act of Creation, or volition of the Creatures: But all this is ſpoken according to the narrow imperfect capacity of man, who conceiveth of God as having a prius & poſterius in his acts, which is but reſpectively and denominatively from the order of the objects. In ſhort, Gods free-will is the Beginning of his works ad extra; and the complacency of that will in his works as Good in relation to his own perfections, is the END: And therefore he is ſaid to Reſt when he ſaw that all his works were Good.

§. 6. Whatſoever is the fulleſt expreſſion, It is a ſaying of Pliny's, that as Pearls though they lie in the bottom of the Sea, are yet much neerer kin to Heaven, as their ſplendour and excellency ſheweth; ſo a godly and generous ſoul, hath more dependance on Heaven, whence it cometh, than on earth where it abideth.and Glorifying demonſtration of God in the Creature, muſt needs be the chief created excellency.

Becauſe he loveth Himſelf firſt, and the Creature for Himſelf: And ſeeing the Creature hath all from him which is good and amiable in it, it muſt needs follow, that thoſe parts are moſt amiable and beſt, which have moſt of the impreſſion of the Creators excellencies on them. Not that he hath greater Perfections to imprint on one Creature than another, but the impreſſion of thoſe Perfections, is much greater on one, than on another.

§. 7. The Happier therefore God will make any Creature, the more will be communicate to it of the Image and demonſtration p. 90of his own goodneſs, and ſo will both love it the more, for his own Image, and cauſe it to love him the more, which is the chief part of his Image.

§. 8. The Goodneſs of God is conceived of by our narrow mindes, in three notions, as it were in three degrees of altitude: The Higheſt is, The infinite perfections of his Eſſence as ſuch: The ſecond is, The infinite perfection of his Will as ſuch, which is called His Holineſs, and the Fountain of Morality; The third is that one part of his Wills perfection, which is his Benignity to his Creatures, which we call his Goodneſs in a lower notion, as relative to our ſelves, becauſe he is inclined by it to Do us good: This is his Goodneſs in condeſcention.

§. 9. Though all this is but one in God, yet becauſe our mindes are fain to receive it as in ſeveral parts or notions, we may therefore not only diſtinguiſh them, but compare them, as the Objects of our Love.

§. 10. Man uſually beginneth at the loweſt, and loveth God firſt, for his Benignity and Love to us, before he riſeth to the higher acts.

And this is not an irregular motion of a lapſed Soul, in its return to God, ſo be it we make haſte in our aſcent, and make no ſtay in theſe lower acts; otherwiſe it will be privatively ſinfull.

§. 11. Therefore God multiplyeth Mercies upon Man, that he might facilitate this firſt act of Love by gratitude.

Not that theſe Mercies being good to our ſelves, ſhould lead us to love God ultimately for our ſelves; But they ſhould help us firſt to love him for our ſelves, as the immediate paſſage to a higher act of Love, with which we muſt love Him in and for Himſelf, and our ſelves for Him.

§. 12. Therefore God hath planted into our Natures the Principle of ſelf-love, that it might ſuit our Natures to the Mercies of God, and make them ſweet to us: Not that we ſhould ariſe to no higher an eſteem of them, but that this ſweetneſs in them which reſpecteth our ſelves, and is reliſhed by ſelf-love, ſhould lead us to the Fountain of perfect Goodneſs from which they flow.

Our very ſenſes and appetites are given us to this end, not that we ſhould judge by no higher faculties, but that the delights of the patible or ſenſible qualities in the Creatures, p. 91by affecting the ſenſe, might preſently repreſent to the higher faculties, the ſweetneſſes of Infinite Goodneſs to the Soul; and ſo we might by all aſcend to God.

§. 13. Thoſe mercies therefore are the greateſt, Bonum ſummum eſt animi operatio ſecundum virtutom optimam & perfectiſſimam in vitâ perfectâ. Ariſtot. Rhet. 1. Tria ſunt genera bonorum; maxima animi, ſecunda corporis; externa tertia: Cicero 3. Tuſcul. Nihil bonum niſi quod honeſtum; nihil malum niſi quod turpe. Cicero. Att. l. 10.which reveal moſt of God, with the leaſt impediments of our aſcent unto him:

§. 14. Therefore his Love moſt revealed and communicated, and his perfect Goodneſs moſt manifeſted to the Soul, is the Greateſt Mercy; and all corporal Mercies are to be eſtimated and deſired but as they ſubſerve and conduce to theſe, and not as they are pleaſing to our fleſh or ſenſes.

§. 15. The Perfect Goodneſs of the Will of God, though it contain Benignity, and Mercy, yet is not to be meaſured by the good which he doth to us our ſelves▪ or to any Creature; But its higheſt excellency conſiſteth in its Eſſential Perfection, and the Perfect Love that God hath to himſelf, and in the conformity of his Will to his moſt perfect Wiſdom, which knoweth what is to be willed ad extra; and in his complacency in all that is good as ſuch.If a man muſt love his Countrey better than himſelf, then God much more: And then ſelf is not to be the higheſt in our Love. Reſpublica nomen univerſae civitatis eſt, pro qua mori, & cui nos totos dare, & in qua omnia noſtra ponere, & quaſi conſecrare debemus. Cicer. 2. de leg.

When ſelf-love ſo far blindeth us, as to make our Intereſt the Standard to judge of the goodneſs of God, we do but ſhew that we are fallen from God unto our ſelves, and that we are ſetting up our ſelves above him, and debaſing him below our ſelves: As if we and our Happineſs were that ultimate end, and he and his Goodneſs were the Means, and had no other Goodneſs but that of a means to us and our felicity! If he made us, he muſt needs have abſolute Propriety in us, and made us for himſelf: To meaſure his Goodneſs by our own Intereſt, is more unwiſe than to meaſure the Sea in our hand, or the Sun and all the Orbs by our ſpan. And to meaſure it by the Intereſt of the Ʋniverſe, Laudandus eſt is qui mortem oppetit pro Republica, qui doceat patriam eſſe chariorem nobis, quam noſmetipſos: Eſt que illa vox inhumana & ſcelerata corum, qui negant ſe recuſare, quo minus ipſis mortuis terrarum omnium deflagratio conſequatur. Cicer. 3▪ de finib.is to judge of that which is infinite, by that which is finite; betwixt which there is no proportion. As God is infinitely Better than the World, ſo he is infinitely more Amiable, and therefore muſt Infinitely more Love himſelf than all the World; and therefore ſo to do, is Infinite excellency and Perfection in his Will. But the out-going of his Will to the Creature, by way of cauſative volition, is free; and conducted by that Wiſdom, which-knoweth what is fit, and what degrees of Communication are moſt eligible to God. p. 92God is Perfect without his Works: He had wanted nothing if he had never made them. He will not herein do all that he is ſimply Able to do, but all that his Wiſdom ſeeth fitteſt to be done. He was as Good before he made the World as ſince; And thoſe that think he cauſed it eternally, muſt confeſs him in order of Nature to be firſt perfect in Himſelf, and to have more Goodneſs than all which he communicateth to the World. He was as Good before this preſent generation of men on Earth had any being! He is as good before he bringeth us to the Heavenly Glory, as he will be after;It was the erroneous reaſoning of the Philoſophers, to prove the World eternall, that Optimum & Pulchrum, God and the World muſt be inſeparable; and ſo to conclude the Being of that, which their fancies think beſt to be; (as Ammonius argueth with Zachar. Mytilen.): whereby they might as well prove (as Zach. telleth Ammon▪ ) that Plato and Ariſtotle were from eternity, and muſt never die. It is fooliſh to reaſon againſt ſenſe and experience, or to deny that which is, becauſe we think that it ſhould be otherwiſe. though before he did not ſo much good to us. It is no diminution of his Goodneſs, to ſay, that he made millions of Toads, and Flies, and Spiders, whom he could have made men if he had pleaſed; or to ſay, that he made millions of Men, whom he could have made Angels; nor that he made not every Clod or Stone a Starr or Sun: nor that he ſuffereth men to be tormented by each others cruelty, or by ſuch diſeaſes as the Stone and Strangury, Convulſions, Epilepſies, &c. nor that men at laſt muſt die, and their bodies rot and turn to duſt. That theſe things are done, is paſt diſpute: And that God is good is paſt diſpute: And therefore that all this is conſiſtent with this Goodneſs, is paſt diſpute: and conſequently that his goodneſs is not to be meaſured by ſo low a thing as humane or any Creature Intereſt.

If you ſay, that all this is hurtfull to the Individuals, but not to the Ʋniverſe; to which it is better that there be a mixture of evil with good, than that every part had a perfection in it ſelf: I anſwer:

1. It ſeemeth then that the good which you meaſure Gods goodneſs by, is not the Intereſt of any individual Creature, at leaſt that is in this lower World. For you confeſs, that the good which would make it Happy, is given to it limitedly, and with mixtures of permitted or inflicted evil; and that God could have given them more of that goodneſs, if he would: God could have freed them from pain and miſery; yea, and have given the ignorant more knowledge, and honeſty, and grace. So that it is not our intereſt that is the meaſure of his goodneſs: And if ſo, what is it that you call the Ʋniverſal intereſt. Surely, the univerſality p. 93of Rational creatures, hath no being but in the Individuals; and if it be not the welfare of the Individuals, which is the Meaſure, then is it not any intereſt or welfare o the Ʋniverſe, which is of the ſame kind: and for the inſenſible creatures, they feel neither good nor hurt; and therefore by your Meaſure ſhould be none of the Univerſe, whoſe intereſt is the Meaſure. Therefore it muſt be ſomewhat above the ſenſible intereſt of any or all the Individuals, which you call the Bonum Ʋniverſitatis: and that can be nothing elſe but that ſtate and order of the Ʋniverſe, in which it is conform to the Idea of the Divine Intellect, and to the Volition of the Divine Will, and ſo is fitteſt for him to take complacency in, as being the meaſure and reaſons of his own volitions and operations, which he fetcheth not aliunde; or at leaſt which are unknown to ſuch as we. No doubt but it is more for the happineſs of the Individuals, that every Duſt, and Stone, and Fly, and Beaſt, and Man were an Angel: but it is not ſo.

2. And ſurely they that believe the evil of ſin, and that God could have kept it out of the world, and ſaved the Individuals from it, will confeſs, that man's intereſt is not the Meaſure of God's goodneſs: eſpecially conſidering what conſequents alſo follow ſin, both here and hereafter.

3. And as to this lower part of the Ʋniverſe, how many Nations of the Earth are drown'd in woful ignorance and ungodlineſs: how few are the wiſe, and good, and peaceable? When God could have ſent them Learning, and Teachers, and Means of Reformation, and have bleſſed all this Means to their deliverance. So that the far greater part of this lower world hath not ſo much good as God could give them; and the infirmities of the beſt do cauſe their dolorous complaints.

It is certain that God is infinitely good, and that all his works alſo are good in their degree: but withall it is certain, that God in himſelf is the Simple Primitive Good, and that created goodneſs principally conſiſteth in a conformity to his Will, which is the ſtandard and meaſure of it.

§. 16. God as conſidered in the Infinite Perfections of his Nature and his Will, is moſt Amiable, and the object of our higheſt love.

§. 17. But he is not known by us in thoſe Perfections, as p. 94ſeen in themſelves immediately, Cotta telleth Vell…iu…, That h…, …y making …od … of …eaſ…s o… Man, S… …u…it Relig…o… …: Quidem enim cur De… as humibus … …do dica…, cum D…i non modo hominibus non conſ…iant, ſed o…ni…o nihil c…ent. nihil agant▪ At eſt corum c…mia quaedam praeſtanfere natura, ut ea debeat ipſa per ſe ad…e colendam elicere ſapientem. (This reaſon is …o… d…ed, but the goodneſs of God's Nature p…o…d by his doing good.) — Quae porro pietas e…debetur, à quo nihil accepe…is? aut quid o…n no, cujus nullum merit m…t, e… debere poteſt? Eſt enim Pietas Juſtitia adverſus Deos: cum quibus quid poteſt nobis eſſe juris, cum homini nulla cum Deo ſit communitas, ſanctitas eſt ſcientia colendorum Deorum: qui q…a …obrem colendi ſ…nt non intellige, nullo nec accepto ab us, nec ſpe…a o bon…. ſic. de Nat. Deo. c. 1. p. 32.but as demonſtrated and glorified expreſſively in his works, in which he ſhineth to us in his goodneſs.

§. 18. His works therefore are made for the apt revealing of himſelf as amiable to the intelligent part of his Creation.

They are the Book in which he hath appointed us to read, and the Glaſs in which he hath appointed us with admiration to behold the Infinite power, Wiſdom and Goodneſs of the Creator, and in which we may ſee, that he is not only our Chief Benefactor, but the Ʋltimate Object of our Love, and ſo the End of all our Motions.

§. 19. This third Relation of God to us as our Chief Good, efficiently and finally, is the higheſt and moſt perfective to us, but is not ſeparated from the former two, but they are all marvelouſly conjunct, and concur in the production of moſt of the ſubſequent effects of Gods providence.

As the Elements are conjuct, but not confounded in mixed bodies, and in themſelves, are eaſily to be diſtinguiſhed, where they are not divided, and their effects ſometimes alſo diſtinct, but uſually mix'd as are the cauſes; ſo is it in the caſe of theſe three Great Relations: though God's Propriety extend further than his Government; becauſe Inanimates and Bruites are capable of one, and not of the other; yet as to the Rational Creatures, they are in reality of the ſame extent. God is as to Right the Owner and the Ruler of all the world, and alſo their real Benefactor, and quoad debitum their ultimate end. But as to conſent, on their parts, none but the godly give up themſelves to him in any one of theſe Relations. In order of Nature, God is firſt our Owner, and then our Ruler, and our chief Good or End. His work in the firſt Relation, is Arbitrary Diſpoſal of us; his work in the ſecond is to Govern us; and in the third, Attraction and Felicitating. But he ſo Diſpoſeth of us, as never to croſs his rules of Government; and ſo governeth us, as never to croſs his abſolute Propriety; and attracteth and felicitateth us in concent with his Premiant act of Government; and all ſweetly and wonderfully conſpire the perfection of his works.

§. 20. All theſe Relations are oft ſummed up in one name, which principally importeth the laſt, which is the perſective Relation, p. 95but truly includeth both the former: and that is, Epicurus verò ex animis hominum extraxit radicitus Religionem, cum Diis immortalibus & Opem & Gratiam ſuſtulerit. Cum enim & praeſtantiſſimam naturam Dei dicat eſſe, negat idem eſſe in Deo gratiam: toliit id quod maximè proprium eſt optimae praeſtantiſſimaeq, naturae. Id. ibid. p. 33, 34. Quae enim poteſt eſſe ſanctitas, ſi Dii humanae non curant. Id ibid. Utinam iſtam caliditatem homimbus Dii ne dediſlent: qua perpauci bene utuntur; qui tamen ipſi à male utentibus opprimuntur; innua etabiles autem improbè utuntur: ut donum hoc divinum Rationis & conſilii, ad fraudem hominibus non ad bonitatem, impertitum eſſe videatur: ſed urgetis, hominum eſſe iſtam culpam, non Deorum— Reſp. At, ſi medicus ſciat eum aegrotum, qui juſſus eſt vinum ſumere, meracius ſumpturum ſtatimque periturum, magna ſit in culpa: ſic veſtra iſta providentia reprehendenda, quae rationem dederit iis, quos ſciverit ea perverſe & improbe uſuros. Non intelligo quid interſit, utrum nemo ſit ſapiens, an nemo eſſe poſſit. Debebant Dii quidem omnes bonos efficere, ſiquidem hominum generi conſulebant; ſin id minus, bonis quidem conſulere debebant. Cotta in Cic. de Nat. Deor. l. 3. p. 105, 106.That GOD is Our FATHER.

As the Rational Soul doth ever include the Senſitive and Vegetative Faculties, ſo doth God's Fatherly Relation to us include his Dominion and Government. A Father is thus a kind of Image of God in this Relation: For, 1. he hath a certain Propriety in his children. 2. He is by nature their rightful Governour. 3. He is their Benefactor, (for they are beholden to him for their being and well-being) Nature cauſeth him to love them, and bindeth them again to love him. And the Title [OƲR FATHER which art in Heaven] includeth all theſe Divine Relations to us, but ſpecially expreſſeth the Love and Graciouſneſs of God to us.

Obj. But I muſt go againſt the ſenſe of moſt of the world, if I take God to be infinitely or perfectly good: for operari ſequitur eſſe: He that is perfectly good, will perfectly do good. But do we not ſee and feel what you ſaid before. The world is but as a wilderneſs, and the life of man a miſery! We come into the world in weakneſs, and in a caſe in which we cannot help our ſelves, but are a pity and trouble to others: we are their trouble that breed us and bring us up: we are vexed with unſatisfied deſires, with troubling paſſions, with tormenting pains, and languiſhing weakneſs, and enemies malice; with poverty and care; with loſſes and croſſes, and ſhame and grief; with hard labour and ſtudies, with the injuries and ſpectacles of a Bedlam world, and with fears of death, and death at laſt! Our enemies are our trouble, our friends are our trouble: our Rulers are our trouble, and our inferiours, children and ſervants are our trouble: our poſſeſſions are our trouble, and ſo are our wants. And is all this the effect of perfect Goodneſs? And the poor Bruits ſeem more miſerable than we! they labour, and hunger, and die at laſt to ſerve our will! we beat them, uſe them and abuſe them at our pleaſure! And all the Inanimates have no ſenſe of any good! and which is worſt of all, the world is like a Dungeon of ignorance, like an Hoſpital of mad-men for folly and diſtractedneſs; like a band of Robbers for injury and violence, like Tygers for cruelty, like ſnarling Dogs for contention, and, in a word, like Hell for wickedneſs. p. 96What elſe ſets the world together by the ears in wars and bloudſhed in all generations! what maketh peace-makers the moſt neglected men? what maketh vertue and piety the mark of perſecution and of common ſcorn? how ſmall a part of the world hath knowledge or piety? And you tell us of a Hell for moſt at laſt. Is all this the fruit of perfect Goodneſs. Theſe thoughts have ſeriouſly troubled ſome.

Anſw. He that will ever come to knowledge, muſt begin at the firſt Fundamental Truths, and in his enquiry proceed to leſſer Superſtructures, and reduce uncertainties and difficulties to thoſe points which are ſure and plain, and not caſt away the plaineſt certain truths, becauſe they over-take ſome difficulties beyond them. The true method of enquiry is, that we firſt try whether there be a God that is perfectly Good or not: If this be once proved beyond all controverſie, then all that followeth is certainly reconcilable to it: for Truth and Truth is not contradictory. Now that God is perfectly Good hath been fully proved before: He that giveth to all the world, both Heaven, and Earth, and all the Orbs, all that Good, whether Natural, Gracious or Glorious, which they poſſeſs, is certainly Himſelf better than all the world: for he cannot give more Goodneſs than he hath: this is not to be denied by any man of reaſon: therefore it is proved that God is perfectly Good.Iſ God's making man a free Agent be not againſt his Goodneſs, then the ſin which a free Agent committeth is no impeachment of Gods Goodneſs: At verum prius: Ergo— The reaſons why God made man with freewill, the antient VVriters commonly render to the Infidels: itenaeus, Tertullian, Clemens Alexand. Arnobius, Lactantius, Euſebius, Tatianus, Origen, &c. vid. Zachar. Mitylen. Diſput. p. 364. B.P. Graeco-lat …o. 1. Beſides, his Perfections muſt needs be proportionable: we know that he is Eternal, as is unqueſtionably demonſtrated: we ſee by the wonderful frame of Nature, that he is Omnipotent and Omniſcient: and then it muſt needs be, that his Goodneſs muſt be commenſurate with the reſt.

Therefore to come back again upon every conſequent which you underſtand not, and to deny a fundamental principle, which hath been undeniably demonſtrated; this is but to reſolve that you will not know. By this courſe you may deny any demonſtrated truth in Mathematicks, when you meet with difficulties among the ſuperſtructed conſequents.

Let us therefore methodically proceed: We have proved that God is the cauſe of all the Goodneſs in the world, in Heaven and Earth, and therefore muſt needs be Beſt himſelf. And it is certain, that all the ſins and calamities which you mention are in the world, and that the creature hath all p. 97thoſe imperfections:Siquidem anima regalem Majeſtatem oſtendit, null us dominio ſubjecta, & propriae poteſtatis, tanquam imago Dei communia cum archetypo quaedam habens. Greg. Nyſſen. citat. etiam in Caeſarii Dial. 3. The Ancients commonly make the Freedom of the will as well as Rationality, to be God's natural Image on the Soul. See eſpecially the full diſcourſe of Nemeſius, de Natur. hom. cap. 39, 40, 41. Lege Pennotti propugnacul. libert. therefore it is certain that theſe two Verities are conſiſtent, what ever difficulty appeareth to you in the reconciling them. Thus far there is no matter of doubt. And next we are therefore certain, that the Meaſure of God's Goodneſs is not to be taken from the Creatures intereſt. And yet we know that his Goodneſs inclineth him to communicate goodneſs and felicity to his creatures: for all the Good in the world is from him. It remaineth therefore, that he is good, neceſſarily and perfectly: and that he doth all well whatſoever he doth: and that there is in the Creature a higher Goodneſs than its own felicity, even the Image of God's Power, Wiſdom and Goodneſs, in which his Holineſs and Juſtice have their place. And that this Goodneſs of the Univerſe (which conſiſteth in the Glorious appearances of God in it, and the ſuitableneſs of all to his Will and Wiſdom) includeth all things except ſin, which are contained in your objection; and that puniſhment of ſinners, though it be malum phyſicum to them, is a moral good, and glorifieth God's Juſtice and Holineſs: and even the permiſſion of ſin it ſelf is good, though the ſin be bad. And yet that God will alſo glorifie that part of his Goodneſs which conſiſteth in Benignity; for he hath an amor beneficentiae, of which the creature only is the object; but of his amor complacentiae he himſelf is the chief object, and the creature but the ſecondary, ſo far as it participateth of Goodneſs. (And Complacency is the eſſential act of Love.) Think but what a wonderful Fabrick he hath made of all the Orbs, compoſed into One World! and can you poſſibly have narrow thoughts of his Goodneſs? He hath placed more Phyſical Goodneſs in the nature of one ſilly Bird, or Fly, or Worm, than humane wit is able to find out; much more in Plants, in Beaſts, in Men, in Sea and Land, in the Sun, and fixed Stars, and Planets: Our underſtandings are not acquainted with the thouſandth thouſandth thouſandth part of the Phyſical goodneſs which he hath put into his creatures: there may be more of the wonderful skill, and power, and goodneſs of God, laid out on one of thoſe Stars, that ſeems ſmalleſt to our ſight, than millions of humane intellects, if united, were able to comprehend. And who knoweth the number any more than the magnitude and excellency of thoſe Stars. What man p. 98can once look up towards the Firmament in a Star light night,Si quis omnia alia habeat, valetudinem, divitias, &c. ſed malus ex confeſſo ſit, improbabis illum. tem ſiquis nihil habet eorum quae retulit, careat pecuniâ, clientum turba, avorum & proavorum ſerie, ſi ex confeſſo bonus fit, probas illum. Ergo hoc unum bonum hominis, quod qui habet, etiamſi aliis deſtituitur, laudandus eſt; quod qui non habet, in omnium aliorum copia damnatur ac rejicitur. Senec. Inter fines is qui perfectus eſt, ſemper praecellit imperfectum. Perfectus porro eſt quo admoto, nullo amplius opus eſt. Ariſt. Mig. Mor. 1 c. 3. & 1 Rhet. c. 7. Finis eſt cujus gratiâ omnia comparantur, —Majus bonum eſt finis, quàm quod finis non eſt. & Met. 2. c. 2. Quod per ſe bonum eſt, ſuâque vi & naturâ, id omne finis eſt. Nothing commoner in Philoſophy, than that Publicae ſaluti privaca incolumitas eſt poſtponenda. Therefore ſelf-love muſt not perſwade us, that there is nothing higher than our own good to be intended. or once read a Treatiſe of Aſtronomy, and then compare it with his Geography, and compare thoſe far more excellent Orbs with this narrower and darker world we live in, and not be wrapt up into the aſtoniſhing admiration of the Power, Wiſdom and Goodneſs of the Creator? When the anatomizing of the body of one man or beaſt might wrap up any conſiderate man into Galen's admiration and praiſes of the Maker! and how many myriades of ſuch bodies hath God created? and how much more excellent are the forms or ſouls than any of thoſe bodies? And how little know we how incomparably more excellent the nature of Angels may be than ours? and what glorious Beings may inhabit the more glorious Orbs? and yet can you think meanly of the Creator's Goodneſs?

O but you ſay, that all theſe lower Creatures have ſtill the forementioned ſorrows and imperfections.

I anſwer you, 1. They were not made Gods, but Creatures, and therefore were not to be perfect. 2. It is the corrupt and blinded ſenſual mind which crieth out for want of ſenſible pleaſure, and can ſee no goodneſs in any thing but this: but true reaſon telleth any man that hath it, that our ſenſible pleaſure is a thing too low to be the higheſt excellency of the creature, and to be the ultimate end of God: and that the glory of the whole world, even the inanimate parts as well as the animate, ſhewing the glory of the Infinite Creator is the excellency of the world. What if the Sun, and Stars, and Earth, and Sea, the Fire and Air have no feeling; have they therefore no goodneſs but what is a Means to the ſenſible delights of lower things? Hath a Worm more goodneſs than the Sun, if it have more feeling? Theſe are the madneſſes of ſenſual men. May not an excellent Limner, Watch-maker, or other Artificer, make a Picture, a Watch, or Muſical Inſtrument, meerly for his own delight? and may he not delight in the excellency of it, though you imagine him to have no need of it, or of the delight? And what is the excellency of ſuch a Picture, but to be the full demonſtration of the Author's skill, in the moſt full repreſentation of the thing reſembled? Will you ſay that he hath done no good, becauſe he made not his Picture ſenſible, and made not p. 99its pleaſure his ultimate end? Thoſe things which in particulars we call Bad, are Good as they are parts of the Univerſal frame; as many darknings and ſhadowings in a Picture may conduce to make it beautiful. The eye is a more excellent part of the body than a finger or a tooth; and yet it maketh to the perfection of the whole that there be fingers and teeth, as well as eyes: So it doth to the perfection of the world, that there be Men, and Beaſts, and Plants, as well as Angels; and poor men as well as rich, and ſick man as well as ſound, and pain as well as pleaſure. Our narrow ſight that looketh but on a ſpot or parcel of God's work at once, doth judge according to the particular intereſt of that parcel, (and ſo we would have no variety in the world, but every thing of that ſpecies which we think beſt); But God ſeeth all his works at once, uno intuitu, and therefore ſeeth what is beſt in reference to the glory of the Univerſe; and ſeeth what variety is beautiful, and what each part ſhould be according to the office and order of its place.

And 3. doth not your own experience reprehend your own complaint as guilty of contradiction? You would have all things fitted to your particular intereſt, or elſe you think God is not good enough to you: and may not every other creature ſay the ſame as juſtly as you. And then how would you have a Horſe to carry you, an Ox to plow for you, a Dog to hunt for you, a Hare or Partridge to be hunted; yea, a bit of fleſh to nouriſh you, yea, or the fruit of trees and plants, yea, or the earth to bear you, or the air to breath in, or the water to refreſh you.Non quoniam mutabiles vires habemus, improbitatis noſtrae culpa in Deum conferenda eſt: Non enim in facultat bus ſunt vitia, ſed in habitibus: Habitus autem ex electione & voluntate ſunt. Ita que noſtra ipſorum electione & voluntate improbi evadimus, non naturâ ſumu…. Nemeſius de Nat. hom. cap. 41. For every one of theſe might expect to be advanced to be as high in ſenſual pleaſure as you.

He that compareth (as aforeſaid) the Elements and Orbs which have no ſenſe, with a Worm that hath it, will think that ſenſe hath blinded reaſon, when it is ſo overvalued, as to be thought the moſt excellent thing, or a meet meaſure of the goodneſs of the Creator.

4. Moſt of the calamities of the Rational creature which you mention, are ſin, and the fruits of ſin: and when Man bringeth in ſin, it is good that God ſhould bring in puniſhment. It is an act of Juſtice, and declareth his Holineſs, and warneth others. Therefore all your complaints againſt theſe p. 100penal evils, ſhould be turned only againſt the ſinner, and all ſhould be turned to the praiſe of the righteous Governour of the world.

5. And as for the ſin it ſelf, which hath depraved the world as fouly as you deſcribe it, it is none of the work of God at all; If you ſay,Homo eſt principium ſuarum operationum. Ariſtot. 3. Eth. Nemo nolens bonus & Beatus eſt. Sen. Si divitias velis, rem bonam eſſe ſcias, nec omnino in te ſitam. Si vero beari, id & bonum eſt & penes te. Opes enim fortuna ad tempus commodato dat. Beatitudo autem à noſtra voluntate procedit. Epictet. Read Gaſſendi Phyſ. ſect. 2. l. 1. c. 6. ſintne coelum & ſydera habitabilia? And Card. Nic. Cuſanus, l. 2. de Doct. ignot. 11. in Coroll. cited alſo, ibid. by Gaſſendus. that he might have prevented it if he had pleaſed; I anſwer, He hath declared his deteſtation of it: as our Ruler he hath forbidden it: he deterreth men from it by his ſoreſt threatnings: he allureth them from it by his richeſt promiſes of reward: he appointeth Kings and Magiſtrates to ſuppreſs it by corporal penalties. This and much more he doth againſt it, and more he could do, which ſhould prove effectual; but his wiſdom ſaw it not meet, nor conducible to the glory of the Univerſe, to make all Moral Agents of one ſize, any more than all Natural Agents: and therefore he made not man indefectible. Do you think that [a Rational creature with free-will, being the Lord of its own acts, and a ſelf-determining Principle, to act without force] is not a thing which God may make and take delight in? as well as a Watch-maker taketh delight to make a Clock that ſhall go of it ſelf, without his continued motion, (and the longer he can make it go without him, and ſo the liker to himſelf, the more excellent he thinks his work.) If God may make ſuch a free-agent, then is it no impeachment to his goodneſs, if it abuſe its freedom unto ſin; eſpecially when he will over-rule even that ſin, ſo far as to bring good out of it by accident.

And laſtly, as for all the objections from ſin and miſery againſt God's goodneſs; I anſwer you with thoſe Queſtions. Do you know what number the holy and glorious Angels are, in compariſon both of wicked men and Devils? Whether they may not be ten thouſand to one? Do you know how many thouſand fixed Stars there are, beſides Planets? Do you know whether they are all Suns? and how much bigger they are than the Earth? and how much more glorious? Do you know whether they are all inhabited or not? (when you ſee almoſt no place on Earth uninhabited, not ſo much as Water and Air) Do you know whether thoſe thouſands of more glorious Orbs have not inhabitants anſwerable to their greatneſs and glory, beyond the inhabitants of this darker Orb? Do you know whether ſin and ſorrow be not p. 101kept out there, and confined to this, and ſome few ſuch obſcurer receptacles? Do you know the degrees of holineſs and Glory which thoſe ſuperiour Inhabitants poſſeſs? And do you know that all theſe things ſet together, the demonſtration of Gods goodneſs by the way of Beneficence, is not ten thouſand times beyond the demonſtrations of it in the way of Juſtice, and all the other ſorrows that you complain of? Till you know all theſe, do not think your ſelves meet, from your ſenſible troubles, to argue againſt that Infinite goodneſs, which demonſtrateth it ſelf ſo unqueſtionably to all, by all the Goodneſs of the whole Creation.

I may boldly then conclude, that GOD is OUR FATHER, our CHIEF GOOD, our CHIEF BENEFACTOR, and ULTIMATE END.

And ſo that in ſenſu pleniſſimo, THERE IS A GOD; that word comprehending both the foreſaid Trinity of Principles in the Unity of his Eſſence, and the Trinity of Relations, in the Unity of the Relation of our CREATOR.