The Reasons of the Christian Religion Part 1, Part 1 · Chapter 1 – Chapter 2
Non tam authoritatis in diſputando, quàm Rationis momenta quaerenda ſunt. Cicer. de Nat. Deor. 1. p. 6. Animo ipſo animus videtur, & nimirum, hanc habet vim praeceptum Apollinis, quo monet UT SE quiſque NOSCAT: Non enim credo id praecipit ut membra noſtra, aut ſtaturam figurámve noſcamus: Neque nos corpora ſumus … neque ego tibi dicens hoc CORPORI tuo dico. Cum igitur NOSCE TE, dicit, hoc dicit, NOSCE ANIMUM TUUM. Nam corpus quidem quaſi vas eſt, aut aliquod animi receptaculum: ab ANIMO tuo quicquid agitur id agitur à te. Hunc igitur noſce niſi Divinum eſſet, non eſſet hoc acrioris cujuſdam animi praeceptum, ſic ut tributum Deo ſit, hoc eſt, SEIPSUM poſſe cognoſcere, ſed fi qualis ſit animus, ipſe animus neſciat, dic quaeſo, ne eſſe quidem ſe ſciet? Cicero Tuſcul. Quaſt. l. 1. pag. (mihi) 226, 227. Patet aeternum id eſſe quod ſeipſum movet: & quis eſt qui hanc naturam animis tributam neget. Inanimum eſt enim omne quod pulſu agitatur externo.— Sentit igitur animus ſe moveri: Quod cum ſentit, illud una ſentit, ſe vi ſuâ, non aliena moveri; nec accidere poſſe ut ipſe unquam à ſe deſeratur, ex quo efficitur aeternitas. Id. ibid.CHAP. I. Of the Neareſt Truths, viz. of Humane Nature.
RESOLVING on a faithful ſearch into the Nature and certainty of Religion, as being the buſineſs which my own and all mens happineſs is moſt concerned in, being conſcious of my weakneſs, and knowing that truths have their certain order, in which they give much light to one another; I found it meet to begin at the moſt evident, from whence I aſcended in the order following.
Obj. Age oſtende mihi Deum tuum. Reſp. Age oſtende mihi hominem tuum: fac te hominem eſſe cognoſcam, & quis meus ſit Deus demonſtrare non morabor. Theophil. Antioch. ad Autolycum. lib. 1. initio.§. 1. I am paſt all doubt that I have ſenſe, cogitation, underſtanding and will, with executive operation.
Though I could not exactly define what theſe are, yet I am ſatisfied that I have them: and I diſcern, that a ſimple term doth better expreſs one of theſe to me, than a definition doth: becauſe they are known ſo immediately in and of themſelves, partly by internal ſenſation, and partly by intuition. And words are but to make known my mind about them to another, and anothers to me; but the things themſelves are otherwiſe to be known. What it is to ſee, to hear, to ſmell, to taſte,Cum deſpicere coeperimus & ſentire, quid ſimus, & quid ab animantibus caeteris differamus, tum ea inſequi incipiemus, ad quae nati ſumus. Cicer. 5. de fin. I know better by ſeeing, hearing, ſmelling, taſting, than by any definitions of them: and the bare denomination, when I underſtand the term, is my beſt expreſſion. And if I could not anſwer a Sceptick, who denied the certainty of my judgment by ſenſation and reflexive intuition, yet nature would not ſuffer me to doubt. Or if any ſuch ſhould really make me doubt, whether I may not poſſibly live in a continual deluſory dream,Qui ſeipſum cognoverit cognoſcet in ſe omnia: Deum, ad cujus imaginem factus eſt: Mundum, cujus ſimulachrum gerit. Creaturas omnes cum quibus ſymbolum habet. Paulus Dom. de Scala Theſſ. pag. 722. and all my ſenſes and underſtanding be deceived; yet would it ſatisfie me in the main, that I muſt judge by ſuch powers as I have, and can do no better, and therefore ſhould be no further ſollicitous. If any would perſwade me that I feel not when I am ſick or wounded, or ſee not when I ſee, or taſte not when or what I taſte; yet muſt I be perſuaded, that fallible or infallible, this ſenſe muſt be uſed, and ſerve for the ends to which it is given me. And that I have no better faculties to uſe.
Ut Deum noris, & ſi ignores & locum & faciem; ſic animum tibi tuum notum eſſe oportet, etiamſi ignores & locum & formam. Cicer. 1. Tuſcul.§. 2. By my actions I know that I am; and that I am a ſentient, intelligent, thinking, willing, and operative being; or a wight that hath theſe powers.
For ab operari ad poſſe & eſſe, the conſequence is undoubted. Nothing is no agent; and none doth that which he cannot do.
§. 3. This mind, or foreſaid power, is found in, or conjunct with an organized body.
He that doubteth not of his ſenſe and intellection, need not doubt of his body, which is the object of both.
§. 4. This body is a quantitative or extenſive, nutrite, changeable, corruptible matter.
Of which my ſenſes and experience will not ſuffer me to doubt.
§. 5. This mind is fitted to the uſe of KNOWING, and is deſirous of it, delighted in it, and the more it knoweth, Non ii ſumus quibus nihil verum eſſe videatur, ſed ii qui omnibus veris falſa quaedam adjuncta eſſe dicamus, tanta ſimilitudine, ut, &c. Cicer. de Nat. Deor. 1. p. 7. Lege Piſonis dicta de mente & corpore, in Cicer. de finib. l. 5. p. 189.the more it is able and diſpoſed to know.
All this our actions and experience teſtifie. Knowing is to the mind as ſeeing is to the eye. One act of knowledge promoteth and facilitateth another.
§. 6. Being and verity are its direct objects.
As light and colours are the objects of our ſight. To theſe it hath power and inclination.
§. 7. When I know the effects, I have an inclination to know the cauſe; not onelyonly the lower, but the very firſt.
Though it be poſſible that ſome ſenſual ſluggiſh perſon, may be ſo taken up with preſent earthly things, as to drown theſe deſires, and ſcarce to think of any firſt cauſe, or take any pleaſure in the exerciſe of his higher faculties; yet, as I feel it otherwiſe in my ſelf, ſo I find it otherwiſe in multitudes of others, and in all that have free minds, and in the worſt at certain times; ſo that I perceive it is natural to man, to deſire to know even the firſt Cauſe, and higheſt excellencie.Omnes ad id quod Bonum videtur, omnes ſuas actiones referunt. Ariſtot. de Republ. 1. c. 1.
§. 8. Yet do I find that my mind is not ſatisfied in knowing, nor is Entity and Verity the ultimate object which my mind looketh after; but Goodneſs.
Entity and Verity may be unwelcome loathed things, if againſt my good. The thief could wiſh, that neither Law,In homine optimum quidem Ratio, Haec antecedit animalia, Deos ſequitur. Sen. ep. 77. nor Judge, nor Gallows had a being, and that his ſentence were not true. Knowledge is but a mediate motion of the Soul, directive to the following volitions and proſecution.
§. 9. I find I have a Will, inclined to apprehended Good; that is, both to that which hath a ſimple excellency in it ſelf, Malitia praemiis exercetur: ubi ea dempſeris, nemo omnium gratuito malus eſt. Saluſt.and which maketh for the happineſs of the world, or for my own.
This maketh it ſelf as well known to me, as my natural appetite. For my apprehenſions do but ſubſerve it, and my life is moved or ruled by it.
§. 10. It is alſo averſe to apprehended evil as ſuch, as contrary to the foreſaid good.
Though real evil may poſſibly be choſen, when it is a ſeeming good, & alſo that which appeareth proximately evil, for a higher good to which it ſeemeth a means, yet ultimately and for it ſelf, no rational will deſireth or chooſeth Evil.
§. 11. While ſenſitive pleaſure is apprehended as good by the ſenſes, Reaſon may diſcern a further good, which may croſs at leaſt the preſent ſenſe.
To take bitter Phyſick, to corrode or cut off ulcerated parts, to uſe hard dyet and Exerciſe, &c. may be ungratefull in themſelves to ſenſe, and yet commended by Reaſon, and commanded by the will (I yet forbear all higher inſtances.)
Animi imperio, corporis ſervitio magis utimur: Alterum nobis cum Diis, alterum cum belluis commune eſt. Saluſt. Cat.§. 12. My ſenſe and bodily faculties, are naturally to be ſubjected to the guidance of my Reaſon, and the command of my Will, as the ſuperiour faculties.
For one is common to Bruits, and the other proper to Rational creatures: And rational Agents are more excellent than Bruits: and the moſt excellent ſhould rule. Reaſon can ſee further than Senſe:Eſt homini cum Deo Rationis ſocietas, Cic. 1. de leg. And the wiſeſt is moſt fit to govern. They that deny this, ſhould claim no government or power over their beaſts, their dogs, or ſheep. If Reaſon ruled not Senſuality, moſt perſons would preſently deſtroy their lives: Even as ſwine would kill themſelves with eating, if the reaſon of man did not reſtrain them.
Deus animal unum ſpectabile hominem, in quo omnia animalia continerentur effecit. Cic. de univerſ.§. 13. The ſumm is, that Man is A living Wight, having an active and executive POWER, with an UNDERSTANDING to guide it, and a WILL to command it: And that there is a certain difference between Truth and Falſhood, Natural Good, and Evil.
All this is quite beyond diſpute.
CHAP. II. Of Man as Related to the things below him.
Aliorum cauſâ omnia generata ſunt, ut effruges at que fructus quos terra gignit animantium cauſâ; animantes autem hominum; ut equum vehendi cauſâ, &c. Ipſe autem homo ortus eſt ad mundum contemplandum, &c. Cicer. 2. de Nat. Deor.§. 1. THere are other things, called Inanimates and Bruits, in being, beſides Man.
My underſtanding by the help of all my ſenſes, telleth me, that there are Beaſts and Birds, Trees and Herbs, and that I live among a multitude of Beings, inferiour to Man. Though I may be ignorant of their Principles, and many things in their Natures, yet can I no more doubt of their being than of mine own, nor of the inferiority of their natures, when I ſee their inferiour operations.
§. 2. Man hath a certain ſub-propriety in them for his uſe.
They that deny this, will not ſay their Lands, their Fruits,Beſtiis homines uti ad utilitatem ſuam poſſint ſine injuriâ. their Money, their Goods, and Cattle are their own: nor queſtion any one for ſtealing them, or depriving them of the Propriety: Nor may they poſſeſs and uſe them as their own.
§. 3. Man hath the Right of governing the Bruits, ſo far as they are capable of government.
Which is not by proper moral Government, by Laws and Judgement; but ſuch an Image of it, as is ſuitable to their ſeveral kinds. This is in order to their own preſervation; but eſpecially for our uſe and ends: He that denyeth this, muſt not Rule his Dog, his Horſe, or Oxe, or Sheep; but leave them every one to themſelves.
§. 4. Man is alſo (ſubordinately) their Benefactor, and their End: and they are more for Him than for themſelves.
He is their End as he is better than they, and hath the foreſaid Propriety in them; The cauſe will further appear anon. The beauty and ſweetneſs of my Flowers, is more for me than for themſelves: and I do more enjoy them. My trees and herbs, and fruits, and mettals; my Horſe and Oxe that labour for me; and all the creatures on whom I feed, I finde are for my uſe; even their life and labour: Mankinde accuſeth not himſelf as wronging them, when for his own advantage he maketh uſe of both. And his care is neceſſary to their preſervation; planting, dreſſing, watering, feeding, defending, providing for them: without which the uſefulleſt would periſh.
§. 5. The ſumm is, that MAN is the OWNER, the GOVERNOƲR, and the END and BENEFACTOR of the Inferiour beings; and ſo is LORD among them in the World.