The Reasons of the Christian Religion Part 1, Part 1 · Chapter 8

The Reasons of the Christian Religion Part 1 · Part 1 · Chapter 8

p. 38CHAP. VIII. II. Of GOD's Relation to Man as his Governour.

Stoici dicunt Mundum regi & adminiſtrari ſecundum mentem & providentiam. Laert. in Zenone. Note, that all Cicero's unanſwerable reaſons for the Law of Nature, lib. de Leg. prove, that God governeth us by Laws: For the Law of Nature is God's Law, who is the Maker of Nature.ſect;. 1. GOD having made Man a rational free Agent, and ſociable, among ſenſible Objects, and out of ſight of his inviſible Creator, and ſo infirm and defectible, it followeth neceſſarily, that he is a creature which muſt be governed by moral means, and not only moved by natural neceſſitation as inanimates and bruits.

The thing that I am firſt to prove, is, That Man's Creator hath made him ſuch a creature, whoſe nature requireth a Government; that he hath a neceſſity of Government, and an aptitude to it.

By Government I mean, the exerciſe of the moral means of p. 39Laws and Execution, by a Ruler,Omnium quae in hominum doctorum diſputatione verſantur, nihil eſt profecto praeſtabilius, quàm plane intelligi nos ad juſtitiam eſſe natos; neque opinione ſed naturâ, conſtitutum eſſe jus. Id jam patebit, ſi hominum inter ipſos ſocietatem conjunctionemque proſpexeris, &c. Cicer. de Leg. 1. pag. 221. for the right ordering of the Subjects actions, to the good of the Society, and the honour of the Governour.

I diſtinguiſh Laws from all meer natural motions and neceſſitation: for though analogically the Shepherd is ſaid to rule his Sheep, and the Rider his Horſe, yea, and the Pilot his Ship, and the Plow-man his Plow, and the Archer his Arrow: yet this is but equivocally called Government, and is not that which we here mean, which is the propoſal of duty, ſeconded with rewards or puniſhment for the neglects, by thoſe in authority, for the right governing of thoſe that are committed to their care and truſt. So that it is not all moral means neither which is called Government, for the inſtruction or perſwaſion of an Equal is not ſuch. Laws, and Judgment, and Execution are the conſtitutive parts of Government. But by Laws I mean the whole kind, and not only written Laws, nor thoſe only which are made by Sovereign Rulers of Common-wealths, which by excellency are called Laws: but I mean, The ſignification of the will of a Governour, making the ſubjects duty, and determining of Rewards to the obedient, and puniſhments to the diſobedient. Or, [An authoritative conſtitution de debito officii, praemii & poenae, for the ends of Government.] So that as Parents, and Tutors, and Maſters, do truly govern as well as Kings; ſo they have truly Laws, though not in ſuch eminency as the Laws of Republicks. The will of a Parent, a Tutor, or Maſter, manifeſted concerning duty, is truly a Law to a Child, a Scholar, or a Servant. If any diſlike the uſe of the word [Law] in ſo large a ſenſe, it ſufficeth now for me to tell them in what ſenſe I uſe it, and ſo it will ſerve to the underſtanding of my mind. I take it for ſuch an Inſtrument of Government. The parts of it are, 1. The conſtituting of the debitum officii, or what ſhall be due from the Subject. 2. The conſtituting the debitum praemii vel poenae, or what ſhall be due to the Subject, which is in order to the promoting of obedience, though as to the performances obedience may be in order to the reward. Now that man is a creature made to be governed, by ſuch a proper moral Government, I prove.

1. The ſeveral parts of Government are neceſſary, therefore Government is neceſſary. From all the parts of Government p. 40to the whole, Si leges abregantur & curvis licentia faciendi quicquid voluerit data ſit, non ſolum Reſpub. peſſum ibit, ſed nec quicquam intererit inter noſtram & ferarum vitam. Demeſt. Or. 2. cont. Ariſtog.is an unqueſtionable conſequence. It is neceſſary that man have Duty preſcribed and impoſed; elſe man ſhall have nothing which he ought to do: Take away Duty, and we are good for nothing, nor have any employment fit for reaſon: And take away all Reward and Puniſhment, and you take away Duty in effect; experience teacheth us that it will not be done, for a rational agent will have ends and motives for what he doth.

2. From the imbecility of our younger ſtate: ſo weak is our infant underſtanding,Bonis legibus, honeſtorum ſtudiorum aemalatione pia, …emperans, juſta, & re bellica praeſtans civitas redditur. Dio…. H…l. c. l. 4. and ſo ſtrong our ſenſitive inclination, that if Parents ſhould leave all their Children ungoverned, abuſed Reaſon would make man worſe than beaſts.

3. From the common infirmity and badneſs of all the world. The wiſe are ſo few, and the ignorant ſo many, that if all the ignorant were left ungoverned to do what they liſt, they would be like an Army of blind men in a fight,Modeſliam quandam cognitio re: n… coeleſt▪ u…n aſſert is, qui videant quanta ſit etiam apud Deos moderatio, quantas ordo; & magnitudinem animi, Deorum opera & facta cementibu…. Juſtitiam etiam, cum cognitum habeas, quid ſit fummi RECTORIS & DOMINI numen, …uod conſilium, quae voluntas, cujus ad naturam apta ratio vera illa & ſumma Lex à Philoſophis dicitur. Cicer. de Finib. l. 4 p. 156. or like a world of men bewildred in the dark. What a confuſed loathſome ſpectacle would the world be? and the rather becauſe men are bad as well as fooliſh. Would all the ſenſual vitious perſons in the world be ordered like men, without any Government, by ſuch as are wiſer than themſelves?

4. From the power of ſenſitive objects: The baits of ſenſe are ſo numerous, ſo near and ſo powerful, that they would bear down reaſon in the moſt, without the help of Laws: nay, Laws themſelves, even of God and Man, do ſo little with the moſt, as tell us what they would be without them.

5. The variety of mens minds and intereſts and diſpoſitions is ſuch, as that the world ungoverned would be utterly in confuſion: as many minds and ways as men. No two men are in all things of the ſame apprehenſions.

6. From the nature of mans powers: He is a noble creature, and therefore hath anſwerable ends to be attain'd, and therefore muſt have the conduct of anſwerable means. He is a rational free Agent, and therefore muſt have his End and Means propoſed to his Reaſon, and is not to be moved by Senſe alone; his chiefeſt End as well as his chief Governour, being out of his ſight.

7. The experience of all mankind conſtraineth them to conſent to this, that Man is a creature made for Government. p. 41Therefore even among Cannibals, Parents govern their Children, and Husbands govern their Wives; and in all the rational world, there are Rulers and Subjects, Maſters and Servants, Tutors and Scholars, which all are Governours or Governed. Few men are to be found alive on earth, who would have all men, or any men ſave themſelves ungoverned. Otherwiſe Men would be worſe to Men, I ſay not, than Serpents, and Toads, and Tygers are to one another, but than any of them are to men. Every man that had ſtrength and opportunity, would make a prey of the life or welfare of his brother. Mens own neceſſity forceth them every where to ſet up Governments, that they may not live as in a continual war, in danger and fear of one another; nay, a war that is managed by Armies, is alſo ordered by Government, becauſe many muſt agree for mutual defence: but elſe, every man would be againſt another, and they would be as ſo many fighting Cocks or Dogs, every one would fight or flie for himſelf; for fighting or flying, injuring and being injured would be all their lives.

He that denieth Man to be a Creature made for Government, and conſequently denieth God's Government of the world, by Moral proper Government, doth own all theſe abſurdities, (which elſe-where I have heretofore enumerated.)

1. He denieth that there is a God: for to be GOD includeeth to be Governour of the Rational world.

2. He denieth that Man Oweth any Duty to God or Man: for where there is no Government, there is no proper Duty.

3. He denieth the Juſtice of God: for Juſtice is the attribute of a Governour, that is, diſtributive Juſtice, which we ſpeak of: for commutative Juſtice God cannot exerciſe towards Man, becauſe of our great inferiority to him.

4. He denieth all the Laws of Nature: for where there is no Government, there are no Laws.

5. He denieth the Virtue of Obedience, and all other Virtues concatenated with it: for where there is no Government,Fundamentum libertatis, fons aequitatis, mens & animus & conſilium, ſententia civitatis poſita in legibus. Cic. there is no Obedience.

6. He denieth that there is any ſuch a thing as ſin, or any fault againſt God or Man: for where there is no Government, there is no tranſgreſſion. Both the vicious Habits and the p. 42Acts,Atqui ſi natura confirmatum jus non erit, virtutes omnes tollantur: ubi enim liberalitas? ubi patriae caritas? ubi pietas? ubi aut bene merendi de altero, aut referendae gratiae voluntas, poterit exiſtere? Nam haec naſcuntur ex co qued naturà propenſi ſumus ad diligendos homines, quod fundamentum juris eſt. Neque ſolum in homines obſequia, ſed etiam in Deos Ceremoniae Religioneſ que tolluntur, quas non metu, ſed eâ conjunctione, quae eſt homini cum Deo, conſervandas puto. Cic. de leg. 1. p. 225. will have no more crime than the poiſon of a Toad.

7. And then no man ſhould forbear any act as ſinful or criminal.

8. Nor ſhould any perſons reprove ſin in others, nor exhort them from it.

9. Nor ſhould any one confeſs any ſin, or repent of it, (becauſe it is not.)

10. Nor ſhould any man ask forgiveneſs of any crime of God or Man.

11. Nor ſhould any man thank God for the pardon of his ſin.

12. It will follow that there is no moral difference between men or actions, as Good and bad, but all are alike, what ever they be or do.

13. He denieth all God's Judgments, and all his Rewards and Puniſhments; for theſe are all of them acts of Government.

14. It will follow, that every man ſhould do what his liſt.

15. And that all Parents may forbear the government of their Children, and all Maſters of their Servants, and Governours of their Families.

16. It treaſonably ſubverteth all Kingdoms and Commonwealths, and denieth that there ſhould be any Kings or Subjects.

17. It denieth all humane Juſtice, becauſe it denieth humane Government.

18. It maketh Man a Beaſt, who is uncapable of Moral Government.

19. It maketh him far worſe than a Beaſt, as corruptio optimi eſt peſſima: for a Beaſt hath an analogical improper government by Man, but Man muſt have ſuch as moveth him rationally, according to his nature, or he muſt have none at all. And it would baniſh all Order, Duty and Virtue out of the world, and make Earth ſomewhat worſe than Hell, which is not wholly deſtitute of Government.

20. But the beſt of it is, while it nullifieth Right and Wrong, it inferreth, that whoſoever ſhall beat or hang the owners of this Doctrine do them no wrong, nor offend any Laws of God or Man: For if there be no Government, there is no Tranſgreſſion; and if they are Bruits, they may p. 43be uſed as Bruits, who are incapable of Titles, Rights, Inheritances, or of any plea as againſt an injury.

§. 2. Man being made a Creature to be governed, it thence followeth, that his Creator muſt needs be his Soveraign Governour, as being only fit, and having in his Propriety, the only Right.Mundus Numine regitur, eſtque quaſi communis urb▪ & civitas hominum. Cicero 2 de finib.

1. A Governour he muſt have; for there is no Government nor governed, without a Governour. 2. If there be never ſo many Inferiour Governours, there muſt be ſome Supream: Or elſe each one would be abſolutely Supream, and none Inferiour. But I will firſt prove that God is Mans Soveraign,Nec ſolum jus à natura dijudicatur, ſed omnino omnia honeſta & turpia: Nam & communis intelligentia nobis nota res edicit; eaſ que in animis noſtris inchoavit, ut …oneſta in virtute ponantur, in vitiis turpia. Haec autem in opinione exiſtimare, non in natura ponere, dementis eſt. Nam & nec arboris, nec equi virtus, quae dicitur in quo abutimur nomine, in opinione ſita eſt ſed in natura. Cicero de leg. 1. p. 225. and then ſhew the foundation of his right, and of this Relation.

The only objection made againſt it, conſiſteth of theſe two parts: 1. That God moveth man effectually per modum naturae as an Engineer; and that this is more excellent than Moral Government. 2. And that Moral Government being a leſs effectual way, is committed to Angels and to Men, viz. Kings, and States, and Magiſtrates, who are ſufficient to perform it.

This Objection confeſſeth the Government of one man over others, but denyeth the Government of God over Man, and inſtead of it ſubſtituteth his meer Phyſical motion, or natural Government, ſuch as a Pilot uſeth to his Ship. I ſhall therefore againſt it prove, that not only Man but God, doth exerciſe this proper Moral Government, by Laws, and Executions, and not a Phyſical motion only.

§. 3. I GOD hath de facto made Laws for Mankinde: Therefore he is their Governour by Laws.

The conſequence is undenyable: The antecedent I further prove.

§. 4. He that doth by authoritative conſtitution of Duty, oblige Man to obedience, doth make Laws for him, and Govern him by Laws: But God doth by authoritative Conſtitution of duty, oblige man to obedience: Rerum natura malè adminiſtrari non vult: & multorum dominatus & principatus non eſt utilis: unus ergo ſit Princeps. Ariſtot. lib. … 11. Metaph. c. 10.Therefore he maketh Laws for him, and ruleth him thereby.

The Major is not to be denyed; for it only aſſerteth the Name from the Definition: The authoritative appointment of the Debitum Officii, obliging to obedience, is the definition of Legiſlation, as to its firſt and principal act; which p. 44the appointment of the debitum praemii vel poenae followeth. And I think that the intereſt of Mankinde will not ſuffer him to be ſo erroneous as to deny the Minor: I think few will believe that there is no ſuch thing as a Law of Nature made by the God of Nature;Quod in navi Gubernator, quod in curru agitator, quod in Choro praecentor, quod deni que lex in Civitate, & dux in exercitu, hoc Deus eſt in M…ndo. Ariſtot. de Mund. c. 6. or that there is no ſuch thing as Duty incumbent on Man from God; and ſo no ſuch thing as an accuſing or excuſing Conſcience: Few perſons will believe, that it is no duty of Parents to nouriſh their Children, or no crime to murder them: Or that it is no duty for Children to be thankfull to their Parents, and to love them, or no ſin to hate, or ſcorn, or kill them: Few Kings will believe, that it is no duty towards God, for their Subjects to obey them, and no crime to rebell or murder them; and that Conſcience hath nothing to ſay againſt him for ſuch things, that can but ſcape the judgement and revenge of man: And few Subjects will believe, that it is no crime for a Prince to oppreſs them, in their liberties, eſtates and lives: And few neighbours will think that he is innocent before God, who beateth them, or ſetteth fire on their Houſes, or murdereth their children or other Relations. If man be under no duty to God, and if nothing that he can do is a ſin againſt God, what a thing will Man be, and what a Hell will Earth be? Deny the Law of Nature, and you turn men looſe to every villany; and engage the World to deſtroy it ſelf, and ſet all as on fire about their ears.

For if God only move us Phyſically, there is neither virtue nor vice, good nor evil, in a moral ſenſe: But what God moveth a man to, that he will do, and what he doth not move him to, he will not do; and ſo there being only motion and no motion, action and no action, there will be no Duty and no obligation, and ſo no Moral good or evil.

§. 5. II. If God ſhould Rule us only by Phyſical motion, and not by Laws, he ſhould not rule man as man, according to his Nature: But God doth rule man according to his Nature: Therefore not only by Phyſical motion.

Otherwiſe Man ſhould not differ from Inanimates and Bruits.Eſt enim virtus perfecta ratio, quod certè in natura eſt. Cicero de leg. 1. p. 226. A ſtone is to be moved Phyſically, and a Bruit by the neceſſitating objects of ſenſe: But Man hath Reaſon, which they have not, and he is a free Agent: And therefore though God concurr to his Phyſical motion as ſuch, p. 45yet he muſt move him as Rational, by ſuch objects, and ſuch propoſals, and arguments, and means, as are ſuited to Reaſon. By preſenting things abſent to his underſtanding, to prevail againſt the ſenſe of things preſent; and by teaching him to preferre greater things before leſſer; and by ſhewing him the commodity and diſcommodity, which ſhould move him; God would not have made him Rational, if he would not have Governed him accordingly.

§. 6. III. If the way of phyſical motion alone, is not ſo excellent and ſuitable as the way of Moral Government by Laws alſo, then God doth not only move man phyſically, and leave it to Magiſtrates to Rule as Morally: But the antecedent is true: Therefore ſo is the Conſequent.

God doth not omit the more excellent, and chooſe a lower way of Government, and leave the more excellent way to man. And that the Minor is true appeareth thus. The way which is moſt ſuitable to the object or ſubject of Government is the moſt excellent way: But ſuch is the Moral way by Laws: The other Beaſts are as capable ſubjects of as men, and Trees as either. Wiſdom and Juſtice are eminently glorified in the Moral way: And Omnipotency it ſelf alſo appeareth in Gods making of ſo noble a Creature, as is governable by Reaſon without Force.

§. 7. IV. If God were not the Soveraign Ruler of the World, there could be no Government of mens hearts: But there is a government of hearts: Therefore God is the Ruler of the World.

Man knoweth not the Hearts of thoſe whom he governeth: And therefore he can take no cogniſance of heart-ſins or duties, unleſs as they appear in words or deeds: And therefore he maketh no Law for the government of hearts. But the Heart is the Man: and a bad heart is the fountain of bad words or acts, and is it ſelf polluted, before it endeavoureth the injury of others. He that thinks all indifferent that is within him, is himſelf ſo bad, that it is the leſs wonder if being ſo indifferent, yea ſo vitiated within, he think nothing evil which he hath a minde to do. He that thinketh that the heart is as good and innocent which hateth his God, his King, his Friend, his Parents, as that which loveth them, and that it is no duty to have any good thought or affection, p. 46but only for the outward actions ſake; nor any ſin to be malicious, covetous, proud, deceitfull, luſtfull, impious, and unjuſt, in his cogitations, contrivances, and deſires, unleſs as they appear in the acts, doth ſhew that he hath himſelf a heart, which is too ſuitable to ſuch a Doctrine. But Nature hath taught all the World, to judge of men by their Hearts, as far as they can know them, and not to take the Will, which is the firſt ſeat of Moral Good or Evil, to be capable of neither Good nor Evil. Therefore ſeeing Hearts muſt be under Government, it muſt not be man, but the heart-ſearching God, that muſt be their Governour.

§. 8. V. If God were not the Governour of the World, all earthly Soveraigns would be themſelves ungoverned: But they are not ungoverned: Therefore God is their Governour, and ſo the Governour of the World.

What Cicero de leg. 3. ſaith, that He muſt firſt learn to Obey who will learn to Govern, is true in reſpect of obedience to God.The Kings and States that have Soveraign power through all the World, are under no humane Government at all. Though ſome of them are limited by Contracts with their people. But none have ſo much need to have the benefit of Heart-government; none have ſo ſtrong Temptations as they; And no mens actions are of ſo great importance, to the welfare or miſery of the World. If the Monarchs of the Earth do take themſelves to be left free by God to do what they liſt; what work will be made among the people? If they think it no duty to be juſt, or mercifull, or chaſte, or temperate, what wonder if they be unjuſt and cruel, and filthy, and luxurious, and uſe the People for their own ends and luſts, and eſteem them as men do their Dogs or Horſes, that are to be uſed for their own pleaſure or commodity. What is the preſent calamity of the World, but that the Heathen and Infidel Rulers of the World are ſo ignorant, and ſenſual, and have caſt off the fear of God, and the ſenſe of his Government, in a great degree; when yet moſt of them have ſome conviction that there is a God, who Ruleth all, and to whom they muſt be accountable: What then would they be, if they once believed that they are under no Government of God at all. If they ſhould oppreſs their Subjects, and murder the innocent, it would be no fault: For where there is no Government and Law there is no tranſgreſſion: No one forbiddeth it to them, and none commandeth p. 47them the contrary if God do not: For the people are not the Rulers of their Rulers, nor give them Laws:Quae Lex eſt recta ratio imperandi at que prohibendi: Quam qui ignorat, is eſt injuſtus, ſive eſt illa ſcripta uſpiam, ſive nuſpiam. Quod ſi juſtitia eſt obtemperatio ſcriptis legibus, inſtitutiſ que populorum, etſi, ut iidem dicunt, utilitate omnia metienda ſunt, negliget leges, eaſ que perrumpet, ſi poterit, is qui ſibi eam rem fructuoſam putabit fore. Cicero de leg. 1. p. 225. And Neighbour Princes and States are but Neighbours: Therefore if they ſhould ſacrifice peace and honeſty, liberties, lives and Kingdoms to their luſts, no man could ſay, They do amiſs, or violate any ſort of Law.

Obj. But the fear of Rebellions, and the peoples vindicating their liberties would reſtrain them.

Anſw. Only ſo far as they feel themſelves unable to do hurt: As a man is reſtrained from killing Adders leſt they ſting him: And the advantage of their place doth uſually empower them, to make deſolations, if they have a minde to it. And great mindes will not eaſily bear a popular reſtraint: And indeed the honeſter and better any people are, the more undiſpoſed are they to rebell: And therefore Tyrants may with ſmalleſt danger and fear deſtroy them.

Obj. But their own intereſt lieth in the peoples welfare; and therefore there is no danger of ſuch miſeries.

Anſ. Did Nero think ſo, that wiſhed Rome had but one neck; that ſet the City on fire, that he might ſing over it Homers Poem of the flames of Troy? that ript up his own Mother, that he might ſee the place where once he lay? Did Caligula think ſo? Did Commodus, Caracalla, Heliogabalus, think ſo? Did the Spaniards think ſo by the Indians, who are ſaid by their own Writers, to have murdered in forty two years ſpace, no leſs than fifty millions of them? Did King Philip think ſo, who put his own Son and Heir to death, by the Inquiſition? beſides ſo many thouſands more in Spain and the Low Countreys, by that and other wayes? How full of ſuch bloody inſtances is the World. If it were a Tyrants intereſt that kept him under ſome moderation to the people of his own Dominions, it might yet poſſibly leave him a bloody deſtroyer of other Nations, in his Conqueſts. The World hath not wanted men that think the lives of many thouſands, a little ſacrifice to a proud deſign, or furious paſſion; and are no more troubled at it, than a Pythagorean would be to kill a Bird. It hath had ſuch as Sylla, Meſſala, Catiline, and the Conquerours of Jeruſalem, who as Joſephus ſaith, crucified ſo many thouſands, till they wanted Croſſes for men, and place for Croſſes, beſides the greater numbers famiſhed.

p. 48Obj. But if Chief Governours be under no Law, they are under Covenants, by which they are obliged.

Anſw. What ſhall make their Covenants obligatory to their conſciences, if they be under no government of God? The reaſon why mens Covenants bind them, is, becauſe they are under the government of God, who requireth all men to keep their Covenants, and condemneth Covenant-breakers. But if God had never commanded Covenant-keeping, nor forbad Covenant-breaking, they could never be matter of duty or ſin. So that this Doctrin, that God hath made no Laws for man, and is not his Governour, doth leave all Soveraigns from under the leaſt conſcientious reſtraint from any acts of cruelty or injuſtice, and tendeth to deliver up the world to be a ſacrifice to their luſts: when it is the government of the univerſal Soveraign that is their reſtraint.

There is ſcarce any thing that the world needeth ſo much as good Governours, nor that is a greater bleſſing to them: Which Diogenes intimated when he was to be ſold, and bid the Crier cry, VVho will buy him a Maſter: and when they ask'd him what he could do, he ſaid, He could tell how to command or rule men. Laert. in Diog. Dicebatque cum intueretur in vita gubernatores, medicos, & philoſophos, animalium omnium ſapientiſſimum, hominem eſſe: cum autem inſpiceret ſomniotum interpretes, conjectores, vates, vel qui gloriae aut divit…is addicti eſſent, tunc demum nihil ſe ſtultius exiſtimare homine. Id. ibid.§. 9. VI. If God have not the Soveraignty over all the world, then no man on earth can have any Governing Power: But Princes and Rulers have a Governing Power: Therefore the Soveraignty is in God.

The reaſon of the major is, becauſe Kings can have no power but what they receive from ſome or other: there is no effect without a cauſe. And if they receive it, it is either from God or Man as the Original. Not from Man, for the people themſelves have no governing power to uſe or give, as to the government of Commonwealths: for their perſonal power over themſelves is of another ſpecies, and cometh ſhort of this in many reſpects, (as elſe-where I have proved): And if it were otherwiſe, yet they have nothing themſelves but derivatively from God, as is proved before: and therefore they themſelves muſt have their power from him, from whom they are, and have all that they poſſeſs: But God cannot give that which he hath not himſelf, either formally or eminently: Therefore he hath governing power formally or eminently, or elſe no Prince, or Man, or Angel can have any, no more than they can have being or reaſon without him. And though his power be tranſcendent, his exerciſe of it muſt be according to the capacity of the ſubject: and therefore morally by Laws and Executions. So that as all things elſe in the creature are derived, ſo is power. And as in beings, aut Deus aut nihil is an undeniable truth, ſo as p. 49to governing power, or Soveraignty, either it is, Primitively, Supremely and Tranſcendently in God, or there is none in any Prince or Parents: for if they have it not from Him, they can have none at all.

Obj. Governing by Laws is cauſed by humane impotency, Cicero, de Leg. r. proveth, That Right is founded in the Law of Nature, more than in Man's Laws; becauſe, elſe (ſaith he) men may make evil good, and good evil; and make Adultery, Perjury, &c. juſt, by making a Law for them.] A curſed conſequence, which the Atheiſt cannot deny upon his Principles. Quod ſi populorum juſſis, ſi Principum decretis, ſi ſententiis judicum jura conſtituerentur, jus eſſet latrocinari, jus adulterare, jus teſtamenta falſa ſupponere, ſi haec ſuffragiis, aut ſcitis multitudinis probarentur. Quae ſi tanta potentia ſtultorum ſententiis atque juſſis, ut eorum ſuffragiis rerum natura vertatur, cur non ſanciunt, at quae mala pernicioſaque ſunt habeantur pro bonis & ſalutaribus. Aut cur cum jus ex injuria facere Lex poſſit, bonum eadem facere non poteſt ex malo. Atqui nos Legem bonam à malâ, nulla alia niſi naturali norma dividere poſſumus. Cicer. de Leg. 1. p. 225.becauſe man is not every where preſent, nor of power to effect himſelf in and by others, all the things which he commandeth: But were man Omnipreſent and Omnipotent as God is, he would make all men do well, and not command them to do it: Therefore it is ſo in the Government of God.

Anſw. It is granted that man is impotent, and God Omnipotent, and Omnipreſent, and therefore that God could indeed do as is here intimated, even make all men do well, and not command it: But, 1. it is apparent, that de facto he doth not ſo. 2. And his wiſdom being more eminently to be manifeſted in the work of Government than his Omnipotency, doth ſhew us partly, why he doth not ſo, even becauſe the ſapiential way is more ſuitable to his ends and to the ſubject. Creation did moſt eminently glorifie (or manifeſt) Omnipotency; Government doth moſt eminently glorifie God's Omniſcience or Wiſdom, as our Perfection or Glorification will moſt eminently manifeſt, and glorifie his Love and Goodneſs. Each Attribute ſhineth moſt eminently in its proper work: and mans conceits muſt not confound this perfect order.

Yet let it be here noted, that all this while I meddle not with the controverſie of the Liberty of man's will; and ſo, whether God's ſapiential government by Laws, do operate alſo by neceſſitation, and Phyſical cauſation, as the natural motions of the Orbs, or the artificial motions of an Engine. I only argue, that whether God thus operate by his Government by ſecret neceſſitation or not, yet it is moſt certain, that he governeth Morally, and uſeth the Means of Doctrin, Laws and Judgments: which might conſiſt with Phyſical neceſſitating efficacy in all that do obey indeed, if God's wiſdom, and man's freedom of will did inferr nothing to the contrary. But if it had been granted, that all God's government is by Phyſical efficacy, it would ſtand good nevertheleſs, that Laws and Judgment are part of the means which he maketh ſo effectual. But yet I ſhall go further in the next Argument.

p. 50§. 10. VII. Experience ſatisfieth all the rational world, that there is, de facto, a courſe of Duty appointed by God for men, which they do not eventually fulfil. Therefore there is not only a Moral Government, which is effectual, but alſo which is ſeparated from neceſſitating efficacy.

They that deny this, and plead for Phyſical Government only, muſt affirm, that nothing is any man's Duty, but what he actually performeth: and that nothing is any man's ſin which he doth, or omitteth to do; that is, that there is no ſin or moral evil in the world: For all that God Phyſically effecteth is good; and they ſuppoſe him to have no Law which commandeth any thing but what he Phyſically effecteth, and he will not Phyſically effect that which he forbiddeth. And if there be no ſuch thing as moral evil or ſin in the world, then no man ſhould fear any, or avoid any! Let but a man leave any thing undone▪ (if it be nouriſhing his children, defending his King, loving God or man) and he may thence conclude that it never was his duty: Let him but do any thing that he hath a mind to, (if it be killing Father or Mother, or his Prince or Friend) and he may be ſure that it is no ſin, becauſe he hath done it; for if God forbid it not, it is no ſin: nay, he may make it an effect of God's government. But this conſequence is ſo falſe and horrid, that no Nation on earth receiveth it, and Cannibals themſelves abhor it, who eat not their friends, but ſtrangers and enemies.

Stoici dicunt, ſinceros eſſe ſapientes, obſervareque & cavere ſolicitè, ne quid de ſe melius quàm ſit commendare putemur, fuco ſeu arte aliqua mala occultante, & bona quae inſunt apparere faciente, ac circumcidere vocis omnem fictionem. Laert. in Zenone.§. 11. VIII. If God be not the Governour of the world by Laws, then no man need to fear or avoid any thing forbidden by the Laws of Man, who can either keep it ſecret by Wit, or keep himſelf from humane revenge by Power. But the conſequent is falſe: therefore ſo is the Antecedent.

The reaſon of the conſequence is evident; becauſe, where no humane revenge is to be feared, there no puniſhment at all is to be feared, if God be no Governour of the world: but thoſe that can hide their actions by craft, or make them good by power, need not fear any humane revenge; therefore they need to fear none at all, upon the Atheiſts grounds. And if that be ſo, 1. How eaſie is it for cunning malice to burn a **As London now is.Town, to kill a King, to poiſon wife or children, and to defraud a neighbour, and never be diſcovered? If this be ſo, then Thieves, Adulterers, Traitors, when they are detected, p. 51have failed only in point of wit,Tutum aliqua res in mala conſcientia praeſtat, nulla ſecurum. Putat enim etiamſi non deprehenditur poſſe ſe deprehendi: & inter ſomnos movetur, & quoties alicujus ſcelus loquitur, de ſuo cogitat Sen. ep. 106. Prima & maxima peccantium poena eſt peccaſſe: Haec & ſecundae poenae premunt & ſequuntur, timere ſemper & expaveſcere & ſecuritati diffidere. Id. ep. 47. Mihi laudabiliora videntur omnia, quae ſine venditatione & ſine populo teſte fiunt. Nullum theatrum virtuti conſcientiâ majus eſt. Cicer. in Tuſcul. 2. p. 268. (that they concealed it not) and not in point of honeſty and duty. 2. And then any Rebel that can get enow to follow him, hath as good a cauſe as the King that he rebelleth againſt; and if he conquer, he need not accuſe himſelf of doing any wrong: And then there will be nothing for conſcience to blame any man for, nor for one man to accuſe another of, but witleſneſs or impotency. And then the Thief muſt ſuffer only for want of ſtrength or cunning, and not becauſe he did any wrong.

§. 12. IX. If there be no Government by God, there can be no true Propriety but Strength: and he that is ſtrongeſt hath right to all that he can lay hold on. But the Conſequent is falſe: therefore ſo is the Antecedent.

The conſequence is undeniable: for if there be no Divine Government, there is no Law but Humane: and no man can have any Right beſides Strength to make Laws for any other whomſoever. For if God have no Government and Law, he conſtituteth no Debitum vel Jus, no Dueneſs or Right. And man can have no Right to govern others, if he have no Governour to give any. If God do give Right to Govern, he thereby maketh obedience to that Governour a duty: and he that conſtituteth or inſtituteth Right and Duty, governeth. And if God give men No Right to Govern, they can have none. And then, if Strength be all their Title, any man that can get as much Strength, doth get as good a Title; and may ſeize upon the Lives, the Lands and Eſtates of Prince or People, and give Laws to the weaker, as others before gave Laws to him. And ſo there will utter confuſion and miſery be let in upon the world. As in the Poet's deſcription of the degenerate Age, Vivitur ex raptu, non hoſpes ab hoſpite tutus, &c. Reaſon would have nothing to ſay againſt ſtrength: the great Dog would have the beſt title to the bone. Melior mihi dextera lingua eſt.

Dummodo pugnando ſuperem, tu vince loquendo, Ovid. Met.

The honeſt, poor and peaceable would have ſuch a peace with thieves and ſtrong ones, Cum pecore infirmo quae ſolet eſſe lupis. Ovid.

§. 13. If God govern not the world, then meer Communities are uncapable of Right or Wrong, Par & aequum Legibus acceptum ferre debetis. Demoſth.and no man is bound in duty to ſpare his brother's life or ſtate. But p. 52the Conſequent is falſe: therefore ſo is the Antecedent.

Animal hoc providum, ſagax, multiplex, acutum, memor, plenum Rationis & conſilii quem vocamus hominem, praeclarâ quâdam conditione generatum eſſe à ſupremo Deo: ſolem eſt enim ex tot animantium generibus & naturis particeps Rationis & cogitationis, cum caetera ſint omnia expertia. Quid eſt autem non dicam in homine, ſed in omni coelo, atque terra ratione divinius, quae cum adolevit atque perfecta eſt, nominatur rite ſapientia. Eſt igitur quoniam nihil eſt ratione melius, eaque & in homine & in Deo, prima homini cum Deo Rationis ſocietas. Inter quos autem Ratio, inter coſdem recta ratio eſt communis: Quae cum ſit Lex, lege quoque conſociati homines cum Diis putandi ſumus; Quibus autem haec ſunt inter cos communia & civitatis ejuſdem habendi ſunt unde univerſus hic Mundus una civitas communis Deorum atque hominum exiſtimanda. Cic. de Leg. 1. p. 219.By a Community I mean a company of men that have yet ſet up no Government among them: If God be not their Governour, ſuch have none at all, and ſo are under no moral obligation: for Covenants themſelves cannot bind, if there be no ſuperiour obligation, requiring man to ſtand to his Covenants.

Obj. Then God's Covenants to man do not bind him.

Anſw. Not at all, by proper obligation, as if it were his Duty to keep them, and his Sin to break them; for God is not capable of duty or ſin. But yet improperly they may be called Obligations, becauſe they are the demonſtrations of his Will, which the perfection of his Nature will not let him violate. It would be an imperfection, if God ſhould break promiſe, though not a ſin or crime: And therefore it is impoſſible for God to lie.

Obj. But ſuppoſe we ſay, that Man is under no other obligations than a Beaſt; and that among men there is no proper right or wrong, duty or fault: yet men by confederacies, without any other Government, would ſettle Rules for the ſafety of cohabitation and converſe, and for love of themſelves would forbear wronging others. And this is all the Law of Nature that Man hath above Bruits.

Anſw. Thoſe Confederacies would no further oblige them, than their Intereſt required them to obſerve them. Still by this rule a man is left free to kill wife and children; if he be weary of them, which no neighbour, being wronged by none, will ſeem obliged to revenge: ſtill he that is the ſtronger is left to do his worſt, without fault, to ſeize upon other mens eſtates, and to depoſe Kings and deſtroy them, and all the world would be in a ſtate of war. Or if ſelf-intereſt keep ſome quiet for a time, it would be but till they had ſtrength and opportunity to do otherwiſe. He is not fit for humane ſociety, who would tell all about him [I take my ſelf free to defraud and murder any of you, as ſoon as my own ſafety and intereſt will allow it me.] And no man that thus taketh a man for a beaſt, can expect any better uſage than a beaſt himſelf, any further than ſelf-love ſhall reſtrain others from abuſing him: nor can he plead any better title to his eſtate, nor exemption from the violence of the ſtronger. And it will p. 53alſo follow, that honeſty is nothing but ſelf-preſerving policy; and that blaſphemy and impiety againſt God need not be feared or avoided; nor any thing as a fault, but only as a folly, expoſing the perſon himſelf to danger. Inceſt, Perjury, Lying, might be impudencies, but not any crimes.

Obj. If you ſuppoſed them in God, they would be but imperfections, and not crimes, and why ſhould you judge othewiſe of them in Man.

Anſw. Becauſe the abſolute perfection of his Nature is inſtead of a Law to God, who hath no Superiour. But man hath a Superiour, and hath an imperfect nature, which is therefore to be regulated by the wiſdom and will of that perfect Superiour.

And moreover, if Man have reaſon and wiſdom above a Beaſt, which maketh him capable of knowing Right and Wrong, and of being moved by the things that are evident to reaſon, though not to ſenſe; and if he be made to be governed by Laws, (as was proved before) then he is certainly governed accordingly; or elſe his nature and reaſon were given him in vain, which could not be by the moſt wiſe Creator.

Obj. God governeth the world as the Soul governeth the Body, which is rationally ex parte animae; but not by giving reaſon or laws to the Body: but deſpotically by the natural power of the Will.

Anſw. The fleſh is not capable of Laws, as having no Reaſon, and therefore no proper Laws can be given to it in it ſelf by the Soul: But the Soul is capable of Reaſon, and made to be moved by propoſed Reaſons in a Law, and not only by natural force as the fleſh. The Government muſt be agreeable to the capacity of the Subject. Though the Rider rule the Horſe by a bridle and ſpur, and not by a Law, it followeth not that the King muſt not rule the Rider ſo. The Soul and Body conſtitute one Suppoſitum or Man; and therefore the Body is governed by a Law, becauſe the Soul is ſo, which deſpotically moveth it: Laws are for diſtinct individuals, and not for one part of an individual to give to another part.

Obj. If God be the conſtitutive Soul of the world, then he need not give it Laws.

Anſw. Becauſe it is moſt certain de facto, that he doth give us Laws, therefore it is certain that he is not the conſtitutive p. 54Soul of the world, as is alſo further proved before: though he be much more to it than a Soul.

§. 14. XI. If man act, per media propter finem, and loth diſcerned by reaſon, then he muſt be ruled by a Law. But the Antecedent is ſure: Ergo, &c.

For the End is ever ſomething apprehended ſub ratione boni, (and the ultimate end, ſub ratione optimi poſſibilis:) and the Means are choſen and uſed, ſub ratione conducibilis, as apt to attain the End. This Means and End are not to be diſcerned onelyonly by ſenſe and imagination, as in bruits every object is apprehended, but by reaſon; this Reaſon is defectible and liable to error, and therefore the rational evidences muſt be propoſed to it, and that conveniently: For he that knoweth not Reaſon, why he ſhould chuſe, refuſe, or act, cannot do it Rationally. And the Will being as apt to be ſeduced by the ſenſe,Non poteſt conſiſtere Reſpablica, ubi non eſt honos virtuti, nec poena ſceleroſis. Demoſth. hath need of due motives to determine it. Therefore there is need of the Regulation of a Law, containing the direction of a ſuperiour wiſdom, with authority and motives of conſequential Good or Evil, propoſed by one that can accompliſh it.

But the whole world doth ſo univerſally conſent, that there is a difference between Right and Wrong, Duty and Crimes, Good and Evil, and ſo a neceſſity of ſome Government (humane at leaſt) and that man is not like the beaſts, where ſtrength is the only title, and good and evil is but natural, called jucundum & utile, with their contraries, that I need not plead that part of the cauſe any further, univerſal conſent not only making it unneceſſary, but alſo being a valid argument againſt it, as proving that it is againſt the common reaſon of Mankind, and light of Nature.

§. 15. XII. If God be not the univerſal Governour of the world, then error, malice, and tyranny, and ſelfiſhneſs will make injuſtice finally proſperous, and oppreſſed innocency remedileſs. But that cannot be, as ſhall hereafter be fullier made appear.

There muſt be ſome infallible Judge to paſs the final ſentence, and hear all Cauſes, as it were, over again; and ſome perfect righteous Judge to ſet ſtraight, all that mens unrighteouſneſs made crooked; or elſe unrighteouſneſs will finally prevail. And this muſt be God, who being the fountain of all Government, is alſo the end of all.

p. 55§. 16. XIII. If God be not the Supreme Ʋniverſal Governour, there can be no unity and harmony in the moral Order and Government of the World.

As all the Corporations in the Kingdom would be in continual diſcord with one another, if they were not all united in one King; ſo would all the Kingdoms of the World (much worſe than they are) if they were not under the Government of one God.

§. 17. XIV. The laſt argument ſhall be à Jure & aptitudine: If Man be made a Creature to be morally Governed, and the undoubted Right and Aptitude, for ſupream Government be in God alone, then God is actually the ſupream Governour of the the World: But the antecedent is true, therefore the conſequent.

1. That God only is Able, is undenyable: Men can govern but their particular Provinces or Empires: and none of them is capable of Governing all the World, for want of Omnipreſence, Omnipotency, and Omniſcience: And therefore the Pope that claimeth the Government of all the World, if all turn Chriſtians, doth thereby pretend to a kinde of Deity. And if Angels were proved able to govern the Earth, it can be but as Officers, and not in abſolute ſupremacy:Atticus in Cicer. de leg. 1. p. 213. ſaith, That he cannot but believe that Jus eſt ortum ex natura, becauſe of theſe Principles. 1. Quaſi muneribus Deorum nos eſſe inſtructos & ornatos. 2. Unam eſſe hominum inter ipſos vivendi parem communem que rationem. 3. Omnes inter ſe naturali quâdam indulgentiâ & benevolentiâ, tum etiam ſocietate juris contineri. For who then ſhall be the Governour of them: Their being is meerly derivative and dependent; and therefore ſo muſt be their power. God only is all ſufficient, omnipreſent, omnipotent, omniſcient, and moſt good: Sufficient to give perfect Laws to all; to execute righteous Judgement upon all; and to protect the World as his Dominion: when Princes cannot protect one Kingdom, nor themſelves.

And Gods title and right is as undoubted as his Power: For he is Abſolute Owner of the World. And who ſhould claim Soveraignty over him or without him, where he is ſole Proprietor. He hath undoubted right to rule his own.

Obj. Propriety among men is no title to Government.

Anſw. Abſolute Propriety in a Governable creature, is a plenary title. But no man hath abſolute Propriety in another. Yet Parents, and the Maſters of Slaves, who come neereſt it, have an anſwerable Power of Governing them. But mans fulleſt Propriety is in Bruits and Inanimates, which are not Creatures capable of Government.

p. 56§. 18. The Relation then of Soveraign King or Rector in God to man, is founded in the forenamed Relation of a Proprietor; ſuppoſing the Aptitude of the Subject and the Owner.

Having proved that God is the Ʋniverſal King, I come to ſhew his title to his Kingdom …itulus eſt fundamentum juris. Soveraignty or ſumma poteſtas, is Jus ſupremi Regiminis. Where this Right is founded, great ignorance hath made a great controverſie, the thing to men that are of competent underſtandings in ſuch ſubjects, being moſt eaſie and paſt controverſie. God having made man, is immediately his Owner, becauſe his maker. Having made him a Rational free Agent, and ſo to be Governed, he hath the Jus Regendi by Immediate Reſultancy from his Abſolute Propriety; ſuppoſing the Nature of the Creature, and the Perfection of the Creator alone, which ſo qualifie one to be a Subject, and the other to be the Governour, that they are as it were the remoter fundamentum Relationis. From the being of Man Hoc aliquid à Deo creatum, reſulteth the propriety of God: From the ſpecifick nature of Man, as a Rational, free, ſociaile Creature, he is by immediate Reſultancy Gubernandus: and being ſuch, his Creator, remotely for his Infinite Perfections and ſole aptitude, and proximately, becauſe he is Mans abſolute Owner, is by Reſultancy his rightfull Governour: And that he neglecteth not this his Right, but actually Governeth him, appeareth in the very making man ſuch, and continuing him ſuch as is made to be Governed,See this fullyer proved in my Political Aphoriſ. p. 52, &c. Videtis Magiſtratus hanc eſſe Vim, ut praeſit, praeſcribat que recta & utilia, & conjuncta cum legibus: ut enim magiſtratibus leges, ita populo praeſunt magiſtratus: Veré que dici poteſt, Magiſtratum eſſe legem loquentem, legem autem …n utum Magiſtratum. Cicer. de leg. 3. i…. as alſo in his actual Laws and Judgements. This is the true and plain reſolution of the Queſtion of the Title of God to his Kingdom, or fundamentum of the Relation of Univerſal King.

§. 19. Humane Government is an Ordinance of God, and Humane Governours are his Officers as he is ſupream: And he hath not left it free to the World, whether they will live in governed Societies, or not.

That Humane Government is appointed by God, appeareth thus: 1. In that the light of Nature teacheth it all the World. 2. In that God hath put into mans Nature a neceſſity of it, and therefore ſignified his will concerning it: It is, needfull to the very lives of men, and to their higheſt perfections, order, and attainments. If Parents did not govern p. 57Children, and Teachers their Scholars, and Maſters their Servants, and Princes their Subjects, the World would be as a Wilderneſs of wilde beaſts, and men would not live like men, according to their natural capacities: I deny not, but ſome one or few by neceſſity or ſome extraordinary circumſtances, may be exempted from this obligation, by being uncapable of the benefit: being caſt into a Wilderneſs, or ſuch like place, where the benefit of Government is not to be had. But that's nothing to the commoner caſe of Mankinde: As Marriage is indifferent to thoſe individuals that need not the benefits of it; but it is not lawfull for the World of Mankinde, to forbear procreation, to the extinction of it ſelf.

§. 20. Therefore as all Rulers receive their Power from him, and hold it in dependance on him, ſo muſt they finally uſe it for him, even for his will and intereſt, which they muſt principally intend.

He that is the Original of Power muſt needs be the End: He that giveth it to man, doth give it for the accompliſhment of his own Will. It is held in pure ſubordination to him, and ſo it muſt be uſed, or it is abuſed.

§. 21. Therefore no man can have any Power againſt God, or his Laws or Intereſt: For he giveth not Power againſt Himſelf.

That is, he giveth no man Right, authority or commiſſion to diſpleaſe him, by the breaking of his Laws; for that is a contradiction, or chargeth his Laws with contradiction. Yet muſt not any Subjects make this a pretence to deny any juſt obedience to their Rulers, or to rebell againſt them, on ſuppoſition that their Government is againſt God. For as private men are not made Publick Judges of the intereſt of God, but only private diſcerners, in order to their own obedience to him; ſo may that Government be for God in the main, which is againſt him in ſome few particulars.

§. 22. The Higheſt Duty of Man, is to Him who is the Higheſt: And the greateſt Crime is that which is committed againſt the greateſt Authority.

This is ſuâ luce ſo evident, that it needs no proof: formally the chief obedience is due to the chief Governour: p. 56duplicate page p. 57duplicate page p. 56duplicate page p. 57duplicate page p. 58(To a King rather than to a Juſtice of Peace or Conſtable:) And conſequently the greateſt ſin is againſt him. If God be above man, ſo is duty to God, and ſin againſt God, the greateſt in both kinds.

Read what is after cited out of Zeno. Laert. in Zen. ſaith, that the Stoicks ſay, Virtutes ſibi invicem eſſe connexas, ut qui unam habuerit, omnes habeat: eſſe enim illarum communes ſpeculationes, &c. Qui enim probus eſt, ea deſpicere & agere quae ſint agenda: quae vero facienda ſint, ea & eligenda eſſe, & ſuſtinenda, & diſtribuenda, & perſeveranter tenenda: ſequuntur autem prudentiam conſiliorum maturitas & intelligentia; temperantiam vero ordinis dexteritas & ornatus; Juſtitiam autem aequitas & gratitudo: fortitudinemque conſtantia, at que valentia. Placet autem eis, nullum inter Virtutem & Vitium eſſe medium-Quemadmodum enim lignum aut diſtortum aut rectum oportere eſſe aiunt, ita juſtum vel injuſtum— At virtutem Chryſippus quidem amitti poſſe, Cleanthes verò non poſſe ait.§. 23. Therefore there is Good and Evil, which reſpecteth God, and are called Holineſs and Sin, which are incomparably greater, than Good and Evil ſo called from reſpect to any Creatures, whether Individuals or Societies.

Therefore they that know no Good but that which is ſo called from its reſpect to mans commodity or benefit, nor no Evil but that which is ſo called from its reſpect to the hurt of Creatures, do not know God, nor his Relation to his works; but make Gods of themſelves, and accordingly judge of Good and Evil.

§. 24. The Conſciences of men do ſecretly accuſe them, or excuſe them, according to this ſort of Good or Evil.

When men have wrangled againſt Religion never ſo long, there are very few ſo blinde and bad, in whom God hath not a reſident witneſs, called Conſcience, which ſecretly telleth a man that he doth well or ill, as he keepeth or breaketh the Laws of Nature, and that with reſpect to the Soveraign Law-giver, and not only to the good or hurt of man. As Conſcience doth not accuſe a man for being poor or ſick, or wronged by another (though about theſe we may have alſo inward trouble) ſo it doth not juſtifie him for his Proſperity in the World (though it may be laid aſleep and quieted by ſuch means). But it is for Morall Good or Evil that Conſcience doth accuſe or juſtifie: If I make my ſelf poor wilfully, my Conſcience will trouble me for the wilful fault, and breed in me repentance and remorſe: And ſo it will if I hurt or impoveriſh my neighbour: But if I hurt my ſelf or neighbour unavoidably without any fault of mine, I am ſorry for it, but my Conſcience will not accuſe or condemn me for it.

§. 25. This power of Conſcience cauſeth all the World, to praiſe or diſpraiſe men according to this Moral Good or Evil.

Mark but the Infidels themſelves, or any whom Vice hath turned into Monſters, and they will commend men upon the account of that inward ſincerity, and honeſty, which God only can make Laws for: and diſpraiſe men for the contrary. p. 59If you ſay,Quae autem natio non comitatem, non benignitatem, non gratum animum, & beneficii memorem diligit? Quae ſuperbos, quae maleficos, quae crudeles, quae ingratos non aſpernatur, non odit? Cic. de leg. 1. p. 222. that they do this only becauſe ſuch virtues make men fit for humane converſe, and profitable or not hurtfull to one another; I anſwer, we are not enquiring of the final cauſe, but the formal: Though they praiſe ſincere and honeſt men, and thoſe that are loving, compaſſionate, kinde, and diſpraiſe diſſemblers, malicious, and men of hurtfull diſpoſitions, yet you may obſerve that they ſpeak not of theſe only as uſefull or hurtfull qualities, but as morall good or evil; as things that men ought or ought not to do; which they are bound to do, or not do by ſome obligation: And what Obligation can make it any mans duty, if there be no Law of God in Nature for it, when it is out of the reach of the Laws of men. Mark Heathens, and Infidels, and Atheiſts in their talk, and you ſhall hear them praiſe or diſpraiſe men, for ſome things which intimate a Divine Obligation; which ſheweth that the Conſcience of the World beareth witneſs to the ſupream univerſal Government of God.

No man who believeth that there is a God, can believe that the actions of his rational creatures have no relation to him; or that the good or evil of them, which is the reſult of their relation to God, can be of leſs or lower conſideration, than their relation to themſelves or one another: Therefore if it be laudable to perform duty to Kings, and Parents, and Neighbours, Conſcience will tell the World, that it is incomparably more neceſſary to perform our duty to God: And it cannot be, that the World ſhould ſtand related to God, as their Creator, Proprietor, Governour and end, and yet owe him no duty.

§. 26. Gods Government (as Mans) conſiſteth of three parts, Legibus & earum obſervantiâ exornantur omnia. Demoſth. Nihil omnino ne que pulchrum ne que decorum reperiri poteſt; quod non cum lege aliqua communicet: Id. Orat. 1. cont. Ariſt.Legiſlation, Judgement, and Execution.

Without Laws, the Subject can neither know his Duty, nor his Rewards and Puniſhments. Without Judgement, laws will be uneffectual; and without execution, judgement is a deceitfull ludicrous thing.

§. 27. By a Law I mean, An Authoritative Inſtitution what ſhall be due from and to the Subject for the ends of Government] Or [A ſign of the Rulers Will inſtituting what ſhall be Due to and from the Subject, for the ends of Government.]

The fuller reaſons of this Definition of a Law, I have given in another Writing. Signum is the Genus of it; The p. 60will of a Ruler being no otherwiſe to be known to Subjects, but by ſigns: The Relations of [Ruler and Subjects] is preſuppoſed:Lex nihil aliud eſt, quàm recta & à numine Deorum ratio, imperans honeſta, prohibenſ que contraria. Cicero Phil. 1. Vitiorum emendatricem legem eſſe oportet, commendatricem que virtutum: Ab ea enim vivendi doctrina ducitur. Cicer. 1. de leg.Phil 1 It is therefore only an Authoritative ſign, or the ſign of [a Rulers] will, becauſe a Ruler only hath the Power of Government: I ſay of his [Will] as that which is the neereſt perfective Efficient, or Imperant faculty, including the underſtandings conduct. I call it [an inſtitution] or [inſtituting ſign] to ſignifie its efficiency de debito, and to diſtinguiſh it from [the judicial deciſive determination of the Ruler.] It is only [to Subjects] that this ſignification is made, he being not a Ruler to any others. The product of the Inſtitution or Statutum, is only Debitum, which is the immediate full effect of Laws: This Debitum is twofold, 1. Officii, what ſhall be Due from the Subject (or what ſhall be the Subjects duty.)Ad ſalurem Civium, civitatum que incolumitatem, vitam que hominum & quietam & beatam, conditae ſunt Leges. Cicer. 1. de leg. 2. What ſhall be due to him, 1. If he keep the Law, which is the Debitum praemii: 2. If he break it, which is the Debitum poenae: I ſay [to the ends of Government.] For it is a Relation which muſt have the end in the definition; and ſeeing I only define a Law in genere, I mention but [the ends of Government] in genere:A majoribus noſtris nulla alia de cauſa leges ſunt inventae, niſi ut ſuos cives incolumes conſervatent. Cicer. in Vatin. Nil eſt tam aptum ad jus conditionemque naturae ſine quo nec domus ulla, nec civitas, nec gens, nec hominum univerſum genus, ſtare, nec rerum natura omnis, nec ipſe mundus poteſt. Nam & hic Deo paret, & huic obediunt maria terrae que & hominum vita juſſis ſupremae legis obtemperat. Cicer. de leg. 3. p. 253, 254. For ſeveral Governments have ſeveral ends: The Government of ſingle perſons only, as of a ſcholar, a ſon, a ſervant, by a Tutor, Parent, Maſter, intendeth proximately but the good of the individual ſubject: The mandates of ſuch Rulers, have the true nature of a Law, though it be of the lower ſort, as is the Government; And Cuſtom hath appropriated the word [Law] to a nobler ſpecies only. The Government of Societies is always immediately for [the Order of the Society:] But not always for their good; much leſs chiefly: The Government of a ſociety of Slaves (as the Spaniards over the Peruvians and Mexicans in digging their Mines) is for the Order of thoſe Slaves, but for the benefit of the Lords. The Government of ſome Armies, is for the Order of the Armies, but for the good of thoſe they fight for. The Government of a true Common-wealth is for the Bonum publicum, the common good, which includeth the happineſs of the Rulers with the Subjects. The univerſal Government of the World, is proximately for the Order of the World, and for its good, but ultimately and principally for the fulfilling and pleaſing the Will of God, in the ſaid Order and good, and in the glory or operations of his own Power, p. 61Wiſdom, and Goodneſs therein. (As ſhall be further proved afterward.)

§. 28. Any ſignification of the will of God, that man ſhall be benefited on condition of his obedience, is the praemiant part of his Law: And any ſignification of his will, that man ſhall be puniſhed if he ſin (or that puniſhment ſhall be his due) is the penal part of his Law.

If it only foretold that in a way of Phyſical efficiency, obedience will produce good, and diſobedience hurt to himſelf, this were not properly, praemiant or penal; But when the Good is promiſed upon the condition of obedience, and the hurt threatned upon condition of ſin, as means to move a rational free Agent to obey, this is truly a praemiant and penal act of Law: And this is fulfilled alſo in a phyſical way of production; the Law-giver being alſo the Creator and Diſpoſer of all the World, doth wiſely order it, that Morall good ſhall be attended with Phyſical good, and Moral evil with Phyſical evil; firſt or laſt.

§. 29. The Immenſity (or Omnipreſence) the Omnipotency, Of this read Cicero's 2. lib. de nat. Deor.Omniſcience, and infinite goodneſs of God, with his total Cauſation in the ſupport of all his Creatures, do moſt undoubtedly prove his particular Providence, in obſerving and regarding all the actions of his Subjects in the World; and ſo declare his actual government.

It is the groſs ignorance of the Divine perfections, which ever made any one queſtion the particular Providence of God as extending to the ſmalleſt things and actions. 1. It is proved by his Immenſity (conceived of as without corporeal extenſion of parts as before ſaid): He that made and upholdeth all the World, did never make that which is greater than himſelf, and excludeth his preſence. Though being a Spirit he hath not Corporeal quantity, yet analogically and in a way of eminency and tranſcendency, we muſt ſay that he is Greater and Immenſe: And it is his perfection which denyeth extenſion and dimenſions; and therefore in a nobler kinde he is every where preſent. And if he be here as certainly as I am, and in a more excellent manner, he cannot but obſerve all things and actions which are here.

2. He is Omnipotent and All ſufficient, and therefore as Able to obſerve and govern every the ſmalleſt Thing and p. 62action, as if he had but that one to look after in the world. And I think, if God had but one man at all to mind and govern in all the world, the Adverſary himſelf, that now denieth his particular providence, would confeſs, that God doth obſerve and regard that one individual. It is mens Atheiſtical or Blaſphemous diminutive thoughts of God, who conceive of him as finite, though they call him infinite, which is the cauſe of all ſuch kind of errors.

3. His Omniſcience infallibly proveth alſo his particular obſervance of all things and actions in the world: for His Knowledge being his natural perfection is neceſſary: He cannot be ignorant of any thing that is. If I had but one thing juſt before my eyes to ſee, in the open light, I muſt needs ſee it, if it have the neceſſaries of a viſible object, unleſs I wink. If the Sun's illumination were an act of viſion, (as its like it is nothing more ignoble) how eaſily would it at once diſcern all that is upon one half of the earth at once? All things are naked and open before the eye of the Omniſcient being: He cannot but behold or know them, and therefore obſerve them and regard them.

4. His Creation, Cauſation and Manutetency alſo prove, that he both knoweth and regardeth all things: For can he be either ignorant, forgetful or mindleſs of that which he made, and ſtill doth ſo conſerve, as to continue a kind of Creation of it? His Omnipotent Will which gave it a being, doth ſtill continue it; ſhould he withdraw his active ſuſtentation, it would turn all, not only to confuſion but to nothing. And doth he not know and regard what is continually as in his hand, or by continual volition produced or maintained by him? He is the univerſal Cauſe of all the agency and motion in the world; in him we Live, Move and Be: and can he be ignorant or regardleſs of what he doth? Why will he make, maintain, and move that which he doth not regard?

5. His Relation of Owner proveth his regard: all things are his Own.

6. And his Relation of a Governour proveth his regard and his actual government of Man and all his actions. For he taketh not on him a vain Relation; and he that maketh Laws for every perſon and action, doth regard and govern every perſon and action: But ſo doth God. Ergo.

p. 63§. 30. Thoſe who think God doth nothing to all the reſt of the world, but by thoſe nobleſt creatures which are next him, and that he hath committed the government of all the reſt of the world to the Intelligences of the firſt Order; cannot without blindneſs and contradiction deny, that he is ſtill Himſelf no leſs the actual Mover and Governour of all, than if he uſed no Officer or Inſtrument at all.

For 1. God ceaſed not himſelf to be Omnipreſent, Omniſcient, Omnipotent, or moſt Benign, when he gave that ſuppoſed Power to thoſe Inſtruments. 2. He made them and ordered them under Him, through plenitude of Goodneſs, delighting to communicate Power and Dignity as well as Being to his Creatures, and not through impotency or inſufficiency, to ſupply any defect in his own Government, and to help him: He uſeth them to honour them, and not to diſhonour himſelf. He gave away from himſelf no degree of Perfection, nor deprived himſelf of the ſmalleſt part of Honour, which he communicateth to them; but honoureth himſelf in the appearance of his Perfections by the ſaid Communications. As God can do that by himſelf without the Creature, which he cauſeth the Creature to do; (as to move, illuminate and beat the lower parts without the Sun as well as with it, or any thing which importeth not impotency or contradiction) for he ceaſed not to be omnipotent; ſo that which he doth by any Creature is as truly and fully done by Himſelf, as if there were no created inſtrument or cauſe in it. For that Creature which is nothing of it ſelf, and hath not any Being but in full dependance on its Maker, can have no action of it ſelf, but in full dependance upon him; what ever it doth, it doth by him: though as to the ſpecifying compariſon, why this rather than that, God hath given men a power with liberty, yet the Action as an Action, being from the Power which was totally from him, is ſo it ſelf: There can be no leſs of God's agency in any action, becauſe he doth it by a Creature, than if he did it without; though there be more of the Creatures, there is no leſs of his: His communication of Power is not by diſcerption, or diviſion and diminution of his own. He that knoweth what a Creator and total firſt Cauſe is, needs no other proof of this. Men indeed communicate power to their Officers, through their own inſufficiency, p. 64to be their helpers, and ſupply the want of their preſence or action; but ſo doth not God. Therefore if Angels or Intelligences govern and move all inferiour things, they are all governed and moved no leſs certainly, proximately, honourably by God himſelf, than if he had never uſed ſuch a ſubordinate Agent; and that immediatione eſſentiae & virtutis; immediately, though not ſo immediately, as to uſe no honourary ſecond cauſe.

Dii, qui quo velint, poſſint laedere, nec à quodam laedi viciſſim, non nocent niſi improbis. Plut. in Lacon.§. 31. Juſtice is an Attribute of God as GOVERNOƲR, by which he maketh equal Laws, and giveth all their due according to them; (or judgeth them righteouſly according to his Laws) for the ends of Government.

As Juſtice is conceived of in God according to the image in Man,Hanc video ſapientiſſimorum fuiſſe ſententiam, Legem ne que hominum ingeniis excogitatam, neque ſcitum aliquod eſſe populorum, ſed aeternum quiddam quod univerſum mundum regeret imperandi prohibendique ſapientiâ. Ita principem Legem iilam & ultimam Mentem eſſe dicebant omnia ratione aut cogentis aut vetantis Dei. Cic. de Leg. 2. p. 234. which we call the Virtue or Habit of Juſtice, ſo it is his eternal Nature, being nothing elſe but the perfection of his infinite Wiſdom, and his Will or Goodneſs, as reſpecting a Kingdom of Subjects as poſſible and future. For he may ſo be called JUST, that hath no Kingdom, becauſe he hath that Virtue which would do Juſtice if he had a Kingdom. But as JUSTICE is taken either for the exerciſe of righteous Government, or for the honourable Relation and Title of one that doth ſo exerciſe it; that is, of an actually Juſt Governour, ſo formally and denominatively it is an Attribute of God, which is not Eternal, but ſubſequent to his Relation of a King or Governour. He that is not a Governour, is not a juſt Governour. A negatione eſt ſecundi adjecti ad negationem eſt tertii valet argumentum.

The Law is Norma Officii & Judicii. He that maketh a Law, thereby telleth his Subjects, that according to this they muſt live, and according to this they muſt be judged. Indeed the immediate ſenſe of the words of a Law, as ſuch, is not to be taken as de Eventu, but de Debito: He that ſaith, Thou ſhalt not murder, ſaith not, [Eventually it ſhall not come to paſs that thou ſhalt not murder] but [It ſhall be thy Duty not to do it.] And he that ſaith, [If thou murder thou ſhalt be put to death] doth primarily, in the ſenſe of the words themſelves, mean no more but [Death ſhall be thy due.] But in that he declareth that he will juſtly govern according to this Law, therefore he meaneth ſecondarily and conſequently, that ordinarily he will give to all their due. p. 65In what caſes the Letter and neareſt ſenſe of a Law may be diſpenſed with, or the Law-giver reſerveth a liberty of diſpenſation to himſelf, belongeth not to this place to be diſputed.