Of Justification — Richard Baxter

Of Justification · Richard Baxter

Dear Sir,

IF you doubt of the truth of my bodily infirmity, it is becauſe you neither know my body nor mind. The diſpute at Bewdley, as it was almoſt at home, ſo I had the choice of the time, and ſuch ſtrength vouchſafed from God, which I cannot again expect, much leſs promiſe my ſelf. I told you I have ſome lucida intervalla, perhaps a few hours in a monethmonth: but if upon ſuch uncertainty I ſhould draw you to a journey, and then ten to one fail you, I ſhould be injurious. But ſeeing you ſo far and freely condiſcend, if God wil ſhew me ſo much Mercy, as to enable this reſtleſs unceſſantly-pained Sceleton to ſuch a work, I ſhall be bold to ſend you word, and claim the favour you offer. In the mean time it is my duty to let you know, I have received your Letter, and to return your hearty thanks for it, though it be not that which I hoped for, and ſhall now ceaſe to expect. I am convinced now as well as you that Letters are but a loſs of time: but your Arguments or direct anſwers to my Queſtions, would have been for my advantage, a precious improvement of it: but ſeeing I may not be ſo happy, I muſt reſt content. It ſtill ſeemeth to my weak underſtanding to be no impertinency to prove that your ſelf affirm Repentance, Confeſsion, Turning, Forgiveing others, &c, to be more then ſigns, i. e. to be conditions to qualifie the Subject to obtain forgiveneſs; and to tell you that I ſay no more, and to tell you ſtill, that you give more to faith (and ſo to man) then I; but I give no more to works for ought I deſcern then you; I am ſure then our ordinary Divines do: And if I do miſtake herein, you have little reaſon to ſuſpect me of willfulneſs; though of weakneſs as much as you pleaſe. As for the ſtate of the Queſtion between us, which you ſpeak of, I am a ſtranger to it, and know not what you mean. I never came to the ſtating of a Queſtion with you; nor did you ſtate any to me in your letters, but mentioned your vehement diſſent from ſeveral paſſages in my book, and therefore I had reaſon to think that you fell upon the Queſtions as there they were ſtated; ſo that it is intime & medullitùs, pertinent to my queſtion, which is impertinent to yours. You ſay the queſtion is, [Whether the Goſpel righteouſneſs be made ours otherwiſe then by believing?] and tell me that I ſay [by believing and obedience] when I never ſtated ſuch a queſtion, nor ever gave ſuch an anſwer. I ſuppoſe by [Goſpel Righteouſneſs] you mean Chriſts Righteouſneſs given to Believers: Now I have affirmed that [thoſe only ſhall have part in Chriſts ſatisfaction, and ſo in him be legally righteous, who do believe and obey the Goſpel, and ſo are in themſelves Evangelically righteous.] But your phraſe [made ours] doth intimate that our firſt poſſeſſion of Chriſts Righteouſneſs ſhould be upon Obedience as well as Faith; which I never affirmed: But Chriſts Righteouſneſs is continued ours on condition of obeying him, though not made ours ſo: and we ſhall be juſtified at Judgement alſo on that condition. As it is not marriage duty, but Contract which is the condition of a womans firſt Intereſt in her Husband and his riches; but marriage duty and the performance of that Covenant, is the condition of her Intereſt as continued. And indeed it is much of my care in that Book to ſhun and avoid that queſtion which you ſay is ſtated between us: for I knew how much ambiguity is in the Word [By] which I was loth to play with. I know we are juſtified By God the Father, By Chriſts ſatisfaction, By Chriſts abſolution, By the Goſpel Covenant or Promiſe, By the Sacraments, By Faith, By Works, (for I will never be aſhamed to ſpeak the words of the Holy Ghoſt) By our words (for ſo ſaith Chriſt) Therefore if you will needs maintain in general, that Chriſts Righteouſneſs is made ours, no otherwiſe then by beleiving, nor otherwiſe continued ours; you ſee how much you muſt exclude. But to remove ſuch Ambiguity, I diſtinguiſh between juſtifying [By] as an efficient inſtrumental Cauſe, and [By] as by a condition: and I ſtill affirm that Works or Obedience do never juſtifie as any cauſe, much leſs ſuch a cauſe; but that by them as by a condition appointed by the free Lawgiver and Juſtifier we are finally juſtified. And truly Sir, it is paſt my reach at preſent to underſtand what you ſay leſs in this then I, except you differ only about the word [By], and not the ſence; and think that it is improper to ſay that Pardon or Juſtification is By that which is but a condition: You ſeem here to drive all at this, and yet me thinks you ſhould not. 1. Becauſe you affirm your ſelf, that conditions have a moral efficiency: and then it ſeems when you ſay Repentance, Confeſſion, &c. are conditions, you mean they are morally efficient; which is a giving more to works then ever I did. 2. Becauſe you know it is the phraſe of Chriſt and his Spirit, that we are juſtified By our words and works; and it is ſafe ſpeaking in Scripture phraſe. 3. Becauſe you ſay after that my Aſſertions are deſtructive of what Divines deliver: but the word By, if we are agreed in the ſence, cannot be deſtructive; and except the phraſe only By, &c. be the difference, where is it? When you ſay Repentance, &c. are conditions, and I ſay they are no more: and I have nothing from you of any diſagreement about the ſence of the word condition. Leſt you ſhould doubt of my meaning in that, I underſtand it as in our uſual ſpeech it is taken, and as Lawyers and Divines generally do, viz. Eſt Lex addita negotio, quae donec praeſtetur, eventum ſuſpendit. Vel eſt modus, vel cauſa quae ſuſpendit id quod agitur, quoad ex poſt facto confirmetur, ut Cujacius. And whereas Conditions are uſually diſtinguiſht into poteſtativas, cauſales & mixtas, ſeu communes, I mean conditiones poteſtativas. Where you add that you ſay only faith is the condition juſtifying. &c. but I make a juſtifying Repentance, &c. And whereas heretofore we had only juſtifying faith, now, &c.] I anſwer, 1. If by juſtifying Repentance, &c. you mean that which is (as you ſay Faith is) an inſtrument or efficient Cauſe, I never dreamed of any ſuch: If as a Condition; you confeſs it your ſelf. 2. If you ſpeak againſt the ſence, we are agreed in that for ought I know: If againſt the phraſe, then juſtifying Faith or Repentance is no Scripture phraſe: but to be juſtified By faith, and By works, and By words, are all Scripture phraſes. You ſay, you firmly hold that Repentance and other Exerciſes of Grace are antecedent qualifications, and media ordinat…, in the uſe whereof only Pardon can be had: but what is this to me? &c. I anſwer. 1. Add conditions as you do in your Book, and you ſay as much as I. 2. If by the other exerciſes of Grace you mean the particulars in your book enumerated, or the like; and if by Pardon, you mean even the firſt pardon (as the word Only ſhews you do) then you go quite beyond me, and give far more to thoſe exerciſes of grace then I dare do. For I ſay that Chriſt and all his imputed Righteouſneſs, is made ours, and we pardoned and juſtified at firſt without any works or obedience more then bare faith, (and what is precedent in its place or concomitant) and that bona opera ſequuntur juſtificatum non praecedunt juſtificandum, in regard of our firſt juſtification. I dare not ſay, they are Antecedents or media ordinata. Where you add, what is that to you that make the righteouſneſs of the Covenant of grace to be made ours upon our godly working. &c. I anſwer, 1. I have ſhewed it is as much as I ſay, if not more, [upon] intending but a condition or medium ordinatum. 2. I never ſaid what you ſay I maintain in phraſe or ſenſe (if the word [made] intend either efficiency or any cauſality, or the firſt poſſeſſion of Righteouſneſs. 3. You much uſe the harſh phraſe of [working] as here [Godly working] as mine; which I doubt whether ever I uttered or uſed; And the term [works] I little uſe, but in the explication of James. For I told you that I diſclaim works in Pauls ſenſe, Rom. 4.4. which make the reward not of grace, but of debt. You add [If therefore you had ſpent your ſelf to ſhew that faith hath no peculiar inſtrumentality in our juſtification but what other graces have, then you had hit the mark.] Anſw. I confeſs Sir you now come to the point in difference. But do you not hereby confeſs that I give no more to works then you, but only leſs to faith? Why then do you ſtill harp upon the word [works] as if I did give more to them? the task you now ſet me is to prove that faith doth no more, and not that works do ſo much: That faith is not an inſtrument, and not that love or obedience are conditions. And to this I anſwer you: 1. I have in my book ſaid ſomewhat to prove faith no inſtrument of juſtifying, and you ſaid nothing againſt it. Why then ſhould I aim at this mark? 2. I think I have proved there that faith juſtifieth primarily and properly as the condition of the Covenant, and but remotely as A receiving juſtification, this which you call the inſtrumentality, being but the very formal nature of the act, and ſo the quaſi materia or its aptitude to the office of Juſtifying. And becauſe I build much on this ſuppoſition, I put it in the Queries, which you judge impertinent. 3. Yet if you will underſtand the word inſtrument laxely, I have not any where denyed faith to have ſuch an inſtrumentality (that is, receiving or apprehenſiveneſs) above other graces: Only I deny and moſt confidently deny that that is the formal, proper or neereſt cauſe of faith's juſtifying: But the formal reaſon is, becauſe God hath made it the condition of the Covenant, promiſing juſtification to ſuch receiving, which elſe would have no more juſtified then any other act: And therefore ſo far as others are made conditions, and the promiſe to us on them, they muſt needs have ſome ſuch uſe as well as faith: And that they are conditions, you confeſs as much as I. 4. But what if I be miſtaken in this point? what is the danger? If faith ſhould deſerve the name of an inſtrument, when I think it is but a condition? 1. Is it any danger to give leſs to faith then others, while I give no leſs to Chriſt? (For if you ſhould think I gave leſs to Chriſt then others, I ſhould provoke you again and again to ſhew wherein) 2. I deny nothing that Scripture ſaith: It ſaith not that faith is an inſtrument: (perhaps you will tell me Veronius argues thus: But I mean it is neither in the letter nor plain ſenſe; and then I care not who ſpeaks it, if true.) 3. You make man an efficient cauſe of juſtifying himſelf. (For the inſtrument is an efficient cauſe): And what if I dare not give ſo much to man? is there any danger in it? or ſhould I be ſpoke againſt for the Doctrine of obedience, as if I gave more to man then you, when I give ſo much leſs? 4. Thoſe that diſſent from me do make the very natural act of faith, which is moſt eſſential to it, and inſeparable from it, as it from it ſelf, viz. Its apprehenſion of Chriſts Righteouſneſs, to be the proper primary reaſon of its juſtifying. What if I dare not do ſo, but give that glory to God, and not to the nature of our own act? and ſay, that Fides quae recipit Juſtificat, ſed non qua recipit primarily, but as it is the condition which the free juſtifier hath conferred this honour upon? is there any danger in this? and will there be joy in heaven for reducing a man from ſuch an opinion?

You ſay, [What more obvious then that there are many conditions in juſtificato, which are not in actu juſtificationis: The faſtning the head to the body, &c.] Anſw. 1. You ſaid before that they are Antecedents & Media ordinata, and then they are ſure conditions in juſtificando as well as in juſtificato. 2. Your mention of the condition in homine vidente is beſides our buſineſs, and is only of a natural condition, or qualification in genere naturae; When we are ſpeaking only of an active condition in genere moris: The former is improperly, the later properly called a condition. 3. If this be your meaning, I confeſs there are many natural or paſſive qualifications neceſſary, which are no active or proper moral conditions in a Law-ſenſe; But this is nothing to the matter. 4. The phraſes of [Conditions in juſtificato, & in actu juſtificationis] are ambiguous, and in the Moral ſenſe improper. Our queſtion is whether they are conditions ad juſtificationem recipiendam: Which yet in regard of time are in actu juſtificationis, but not conditiones vel qualificationes ipſius actus. And if you did not think that repentance is a condition ad juſtificationem recipiendam, and ſo in actu juſtificationis, how can you ſay it is medium ordinatum? A medium, as ſuch, eſſentially hath ſome tendency or conducibleneſs to its end. 5. As obvious therefore as you think this is, it is paſt the reach of my dull apprehenſion to conceive of your conditions in a judiciary ſenſe, which are in juſtificato for the obtaining of juſtification, and not be both ad actum & in actu juſtificationis: for I ſuppoſe you are more accurate and ſerious then by the word condition to mean modum vel affectionem entis Metaphyſicam, vel ſubjecti alicujus adjunctum vel qualificationem in ſenſe Phyſico, when we are ſpeaking only of conditions in ſenſu forenſi. And there are many thouſand honeſt Chriſtians as dull as I, and therefore I do not think it can be any weighty point of faith which muſt be ſupported by ſuch ſubtilties which are paſt our reach, though obvious to yours: God uſeth not to hang mens ſalvation on ſuch School diſtinctions which few men can underſtand. 6. And every ſuch Tyro in Philoſophy as I, cannot reach your Phyloſophical ſubtilty neither; to underſtand that the faſtning of the head to the body is not conditio in actu videntis; (though it be nothing to our purpoſe); Indeed we may think it of more remote uſe then ſome other, and but propter aliud, & quaſi conditio conditionis; and if you ſay ſo of Repentance, &c. we ſhould not diſagree.

You ſay [In other things I come off, and ſo mollifie my aſſertions, that you need not contend] Anſw. 1. I would you had told me wherein I ſo come off: For I know not of a word. If you mean in that I now ſay, obedience is no condition of our firſt attaining juſtification, but only of the continuance of it, &c. I ſaid the ſame over and over in my book, and leſt it ſhould be over-lookt, I put it in the Index of diſtinctions. If you mean not this, I know not what you mean. 2. But if explication of my ſelf will ſo mollifie and prevent contending, I ſhall be glad to explain my ſelf yet further: Yea, and heartily to recant where I ſee my error. For that which you deſire, I demonſtrate that its By love, and Through love, &c. I have anſwered before by diſtinguiſhing of the ſenſe of By and Through: and in my ſenſe I have brought you forty plain Texts in my book for proof of it, which ſhew it is no new Doctrine.

To your argument from Rom. 4. Where you ſay that Abrahams juſtification is the pattern of all others, I conceive that an uncouth ſpeech, ſtrange to Scripture for phraſe and proper ſenſe, though in a large ſenſe tolerable and true: Certain I am that Paul brings Abrahams example to prove that we are juſtified by faith without the works of the Law; but as certain that our faith muſt differ from Abrahams, even in the eſſentials of it: We muſt believe that this Jeſus is he, or we ſhall dye in our ſins; which Abraham was not required to believe. Our faith is an explicite Aſſent and Conſent to the Mediators Offices, viz. that he be our Lord and Saviour, and a Covenanting with him, and giving up our ſelves to him accordingly: But whether Abrahams (and all recited in Heb. 11.) were ſuch, is queſtionable. Too much looking on Abraham as a pattern, ſeems to be it that occaſioned Grotius to give that wretched definition of faith, (Annot. in loc.) that [it is but a high eſtimation of Gods power and wiſdom, and faithfulneſs in keeping his promiſes, &c.] (yet I know he came ſhort alſo of deſcribing that faith which he lookt on as the pattern.)

My firſt anſwer was that I exclude alſo any effective co-operation; to which you ſay, [Why do we ſtrive about words, &c.] I ſee that mens conceivings are ſo various, that there is no hopes that we ſhould be in all things of one mind. Becauſe I was loth to ſtrive about words, therefore I diſtinguiſhed between cauſality, and conditionality, knowing that the word By was ambiguous (when we are ſaid to be juſtified By faith &c.) now you take this diſtinguiſhing to be ſtriving about words, to avoid which, you would bring we back to the ambiguous term again. Whereas I cannot but be moſt confident, that as guile is moſt in Generals, ſo there would be nothing elſe between us but ſtriving about words, if we diſpute on an unexplained term, and without diſtinction. Do you indeed think, that to be an efficient cauſe of our juſtification, and to be a bare condition, is all one? or do you think the difference to be of no moment? You ſay, I do not exclude works juſtifying as well as faith, let the expreſſions be what they will.] Anſw. 1. You ſhould have ſaid, [Let the ſenſe, or way of juſtifying be what it will▪] for ſure the difference between an efficient cauſe and a condition is more then in the expreſſion, or elſe I have been long miſtaken. 2. I do not exclude God juſtifying, Chriſt juſtifying, the Word juſtifying, &c. and yet to diſtinguiſh between the way that theſe juſtifie in, and the way in which faith juſtifies, I take to be no ſtriving about words, but of as high concernment as my ſalvation is worth. 3. Either you miſlike my phraſe, or my ſenſe: if the phraſe, then you miſlike the word of God, which ſaith, a man is juſtified by works and not by faith only; If the ſenſe, then you ſhould not fall upon the phraſe: and then to diſtinguiſh and explain, is not to ſtrive about words. 4. If I do bring faith and obedience neerer in juſtification then others, it is not by giving more to works then others, but by giving leſs to faith; And if in that I err, you ſhould have fallen on that and ſhewed it, and not ſpeak ſtill as if I gave more to works then you. I am ſure I give leſs to man, and therefore no leſs than you to Chriſt. I perceive not the leaſt diſadvantage herein that I lye open to, but only the odium of the phraſe of juſtification by works, with men that are carried by prejudice and cuſtome. 5. I will not quarrel about ſuch a word; but I like not your phraſe of [Faith juſtifying, and works juſtifying,] for it is fitter to introduce the conceit of an efficiency in them, then to ſay, [We are juſtified by faith and by works] which are only the Scripture phraſe, and ſignifie but a conditionality.

To that you ſay out of Phil. 3.9. I believe Paul doth moſt appoſitely oppoſe the righteouſneſs which is by faith to that which is by the Law. But then 1. He means not [By faith as an inſtrument of juſtification] 2. Nor by faith which is but a meer affiance on Chriſt for juſtification, or only as ſuch. 3. Nor doth he exclude Knowledge, Repentance, Obedience, &c. 4. But to ſay that righteouſneſs or juſtification is by love, or by obedience, &c. Without adding any more, is not a convenient ſpeech, as it is to ſay that righteouſneſs is by faith. 1. Becauſe the ſpeech ſeems to be of the firſt receiving of righteouſneſs, wherein obedience or works have no hand. 2. Becauſe faith having moſt clear direct relation to Chriſt, doth moſt plainly point out our righteouſneſs to be in him. 3. Becauſe faith as it is taken in the Goſpel, is a moſt comprehenſive grace, containing many acts, and implying or including many others which relate to Chriſt as the object alſo. Even obedience to Chriſt is implyed as a neceſſary ſubſequent part of the condition, ſeeing faith is an accepting of Chriſt as Lord and King, and Head, and Husband, as well as a juſtifier. 5. Yet Scripture ſaith as well as I, that Chriſt ſhall juſtifie us By his knowledge, and we ſhall be juſtified by our words, and by works; and me thinks it ſhould be no ſin to ſpeak the words of God, except it be ſhewed that I miſunderſtand them. It is not ſo fit a phraſe, to ſay, that a poor ignoble woman, was made rich and honorable by her Love, or Obedience, or Marriage, faithfulneſs, and conjugal actions, as to ſay, it was by marriage with ſuch a Noble man, or conſent to take him to be her husband: For the marriage conſent and Covenant doth imply conjugal affection, action and faithfulneſs. Yet are theſe laſt as flat conditions of her continuing her enjoyments as the marriage Covenant was of firſt obtaining them.

To my ſecond Anſwer, you ſhew that Paul excludes works under any notion. 1. From his oppoſition between faith and works, where you ſay I contradict Paul, and give a tertium. To which I anſwer, to diſtinguiſh of Pauls terms, and explain his meaning in his own words is not to give a tertium, or contradict; but this is all that I do. I diſtinguiſh of the word Works; ſometime it is taken more largely for Acts or Actions, and ſo James takes it: ſometimes more ſtrictly for only ſuch Actions as a Labourer performeth for his Wages, or which make the Reward to be not of Grace, but of debt. So Paul tells you that he underſtandeth or uſeth the term, Rom. 4.4. uſually therefore calling them Works of the Law. Now he that excludes Works only under this notion, doth not therefore exclude them under every notion. Where you add that Pauls oppoſition is between Faith and any thing of ours: I anſwer. 1. Is not Faith ours as much Love, &c? 2. Are not Knowledge, Words, Works, ours, by all which God ſaith, we are juſtified? 3. There is no ſuch Scripture where Paul makes any ſuch oppoſition: but only he renounceth his own Righteouſneſs which is of the Law, Phil. 3.8, 9. and any thing of our own that may be called Works in the ſtricter ſence.

Your ſecond is, becauſe Paul excludes Abrahams works, &c. Anſwer. 1. You make my tertium to be [works that are of Grace] and here again, works that flow from Grace, and ſay, Abrahams were not by meer ſtrength of the Law: But theſe are no words of mine; nor is it candid to feign them to be mine; but that I impute it to your haſte: I believe you remembred ſo well the words of Andradius, Bellarmine, and other Papiſts, that they dropped from your pen in haſte in ſtead of mine; nor is my ſence any whit like theirs; for I ſpeak not of the efficient cauſe of works, (Nature or Grace) nor the meer command requiring them, when I ſpeak of Law and Goſpel: but the full entire Covenant or Law conſiſting of all its parts, and ſo making our Acts the conditions of the Puniſhment or Reward: as I have opened over and over in my Book. 2. You ask, Were Abrahams works in oppoſition to that, &c? Anſwer. 1. Paul excludes alſo works in co-ordination with Chriſt, and ſo do I. 2. Yea and works ſuppoſed to be ſubordinate to Chriſt, which are not capable of a real ſubordination, 3. but not ſuch as are truly ſubordinate, from being ſuch conditions as is before ſaid. 4. You ſeem to me to miſtake Paul much, as if he took it for granted, that Abraham had ſuch works which Paul diſputeth againſt, but could not be juſtified by them; Whereas I doubt not to ſay, that Paul contrarily ſuppoſeth that Abraham had no ſuch Works, (which make the reward to be of Debt, and not of Grace) and therefore could not be juſtified by them.

Your third Argument is, [becauſe imputing, covering, all is wholly attributed to God.] Anſwer, I doubt not but that God is the only Principal efficient Cauſe, and his Promiſe or Covenant the Inſtrumental: therefore I cannot think as others, that man is the efficient Inſtrumental by believing, or that Faith is ſuch: But what Is all therefore attributed to God? Even the performance of the Conditions on mans part? Or are there no ſuch conditions which man muſt perform himſelf or periſh? God only covereth ſin, imputeth Righteouſneſs, &c. but to none who have not performed the Conditions. Is Believing attributed to God, or is it an act of man? Or is it excluded? When will you prove the Conſequence of this Argument?

Your fifth Argument is, [becauſe the Aſſertion is univerſal without works in general] Anſwer, 1. Doth not the Apoſtle contradict you by expounding himſelf in the very next verſe before thoſe you cite? Rom. 4.4. That by works he means not ſimply good Actions, as James doth, but ſuch as make the reward to be of debt and not of Grace? Indeed ſuch works are univerſally excluded. 2. Therefore he excludes the very preſence of works, and ſaith, to him that worketh not, &c. ver. 5. But the preſence of good actions you ſay is not excluded.

Your laſt Argument ſeems to me the ſame with the fourth, and it forceth me to admire that you ſhould think the conſequence good. Bleſſedneſs is when ſin is forgiven; therefore no work or good act performed by man is the condition of forgiveneſs, either as begun or continued, or conſummate] If this be not your conſequence, you ſay nothing againſt me: if it be, I aſſure you it is not in my Power to believe it, nor to diſcern the leaſt ſhaddow of probability of truth in it, nor to free it from the charge of being the groſſeſt Antinomianiſm (ſi pace tui ità dicam.) And here I muſt needs tell you alſo my utter diſability to reconcile you with your ſelf; for you before ſay, they are media ordinata, and here you ſay, They are excluded under any notion: As if to be a medium were no notion; or the medium did nothing in or to the very juſtifying of the perſon.

To my next Anſwer. If works be excluded under any notion, then James his words cannot be true, that we are juſtified by works. You reply, If there be juſtifying works, how ſaith Paul true? I anſwer. This is a moſt evident Petitio principii. It is undeniable that James includeth works under ſome notion: and that Paul excludeth them under ſome other notion: now therefore I might well ask, How ſaith James true elſe? Becauſe my ſuppoſition cannot be denyed: But you ſuppoſe that Paul excludeth works under any notion, (which is the very Queſtion, and is denyed.) When you ask how ſaith Paul true? Paul ſaith true becauſe he ſpeaks of works ſtrictly taken, as is by himſelf explained: James could not ſay true, if works under every notion (as you ſay) be excluded.

Next you come to reconcile them by expounding James; where you ſay, Faith which in reſpect of its Act ad intra, only juſtifies, yet it works ad extra: fides quae viva, non qua viva. I anſwer. Whats this to the Queſtion? The Queſtion is not whether Faith work? Nor whether Faith juſtifie? Nor what Faith juſtifieth? But in what ſence James ſaith, we are juſtified by works, and not by Faith only? You anſwer by a direct contradiction to James, (if I can reach the ſence of your Anſwer) ſaying, It is by Faith only, and that not as it liveth, &c. So dare not I directly ſay, it is not by works, when God ſaith it is: but think I am bound to diſtinguiſh, and ſhew in what ſence works juſtifie, and in what not; and not to ſay flatly againſt God, that we are not juſtified by works under any notion, but only by the Faith which worketh. A denyal of Gods Aſſertions is an ill expounding of them.

To what you ſay of the judgement of the Orthodox, [that they go eadem via et ſi non eadem ſemita] I anſwer, you may underſtand your diſtinction as you pleaſe, but I have ſhewed the difference: ſome underſtand it of juſtification before God; others before men, &c. And if you pleaſe to make the way wide enough, you may take me among the Orthodox, that go eadem via: if not, I will ſtand out with James.

When you ſay [they exclude works under any notion in the act of juſtification.] I anſwer, 1. Your ſelf include them as antecedents and concomitants (thought I do not,) 2. I have ſhewed before that [in the act, &c.] is ambiguous. If you mean [as Agents of Cauſes], ſo do I exclude them. If you mean [as conditions required by the new Law to the continuing and conſummating our juſtification] I have ſhewed you that Divines do judge otherwiſe.

My next anſwer was [If works under any notion be excluded, then faith is excluded] You reply 1. [Thus Bellarmine, &c.] Anſw. I knew indeed that Bellarmine ſaith ſo. But Sir, you ſpeak to one that is very neer Gods tribunal, and therefore is reſolved to look after naked truth, and not to be affrighted from it by the name either of Bellarmine or Antichriſt; and who is at laſt brought to wink at prejudice. I am fully reſolved by Gods grace to go on in the way of God as he diſcovereth it to me, and not to turn out of it when Bellarmine ſtands in it. Though the Divels believe, I will (by Gods help) believe too: and not deny Chriſt, becauſe the Divels confeſs him. You ſay, Non ſequitur, I prove the conſequence. If all works (or acts) be excluded under any notion whatſoever, and if faith be a work or act then faith is excluded. But, &c. Ergo, &c. By the reaſon of your denyal I underſtand and nothing that you deny, but [that faith is a work or act] which I never heard denyed before, and I hope never ſhall do again. The common anſwer to Bellarmine is, that faith which is a work juſtifieth, but not as it is a work: Which anſwer I confeſs to be ſound, and ſubſcribe to it. But then according to that, faith which is a work juſtifieth under ſome notion (ſuppoſe it were under the notion of an inſtrument) though not under the notion of a work. But you go another way, and ſay, 1. Faith is paſſive in its inſtrumentality, and though to believe, be a grammatical action, its verbum activum, yet its phyſicè, or huper phyſice paſſive. A man by believing doth not operari, but recipere. As videre, audire, are Grammatical actions, but phyſical or natural paſſions, &c. Anſwer. 1. Theſe are very ſublime Aſſertions, quite paſt the reach of my capacity, and of all theirs that I uſe to converſe with; and I dare ſay it is no Hereſie to deny them, nor can that point be neer the foundation that ſtands upon ſuch props which few men can apprehend. 2. What if Faith were paſſive in its Inſtrumentality? Is it not at all an Act therefore? If it be; Then that which is an Act or Work, is not excluded under the notion of a paſſive Inſtrument; and ſo not under every notion (I ſpeak on your grounds. But) becauſe you told me before that I ſhould have ſpent my ſelf againſt this Inſtrumentality of Faith if I would hit the mark; I will ſpeak the more largely to it now: And 1. Enquire whether videre, audire, be only Grammatical Actions (as you call them) and natural paſſions? 2. Whether Believing be ſo, only verbum activum, but Phyſically paſſive? And ſo to Believe, is not agere, but pati or recipere? 3. Whether faith be paſſive in its Inſtrumentality? 4. Whether the ſame may not be ſaid as truly of other Graces? 5. Whether Faith be any proper Inſtrument of our Juſtification? 6. If it were, Whether that be the primary, formal Reaſon of its juſtifying vertue? 7. Whether your Opinion or mine be the plainer or ſafer?

And for the firſt, I ſhould not think it worth the looking after, but that I perceive you lay much upon it, and that Philoſophers generally ſuppoſe that the Sence and Intellect in this are alike; and for ought I diſcern, it is ſuch a Paſsiveneſs of the Intellect that you intend: and therefore we may put all together, and enquire whether videre & intelligere be only Paſsions? And here you know how ill Philoſophers are agreed among themſelves, and therefore how ſlippery a ground this is for a man to build his Faith upon in ſo high point as this in hand: you know alſo that Hippocrates, Galen, Plato, Plotinus, with the generality of the Platoniſts are directly contrary to you: you know alſo that Albertus Magnus, and his followers judge ſenſation to be an action, though they take the potentia to be paſſive. You know alſo that Aquinas with his followers judge the very potentia to be active as well as paſſive; paſſive while it receiveth the ſpecies; and active, Dum per ipſam agit & ſenſationem producit. And Tolet ſaith, that this is Scotus his ſentence, 2. de Anima. q. 12. & Capreol. & ferè communis. I know Aquinas ſaith, that intelligere eſt quoddam pati; but he taketh pati in his third wide improper ſenſe, as omne qu d exit de potentia in actum, poteſt dici pati: 1. q. 79 a. 2. C. And no doubt every ſecond cauſe may be ſaid to ſuffer even in its acting, as it receiveth the Influx from the firſt, which cauſeth it to act; but it will not thence follow that the foreign videre, intelligere eſt for maliter pati: I cannot think that you deny the intellectum agentem: and you know that generally Philoſophers attribute Action to the poſſible Intellect: and that Jandun. Apollina, &c. do accordingly make an Agent and patient ſence: and if the reception of the ſpecies were formaliter viſio & intellectio (which I believe not) yet how hardly is it proved that the Organ and Intellect are only paſsive in that reception? Yea how great a controverſie is it what the ſenſible and intelligible ſpecies are? Yea and whether there be any ſuch thing? Whether they be an image or ſimilitude begotten or cauſed by the Object, as Combacchius and moſt? which yet Suarez, &c. denyeth. And whether they ſtick in the air, and have all their Being firſt there, as Magyrus, and other Peripateticks? Or whether their Being is only in the eye? as ſome later. Or whether it be Sir Ken. Digbyes Atomes or number of ſmall bodies which are in perpetual motion? I doubt not you know that Ockam and Henricus quod. lib. 4. q. 4. reject all ſpecies as vain, and make the Intellect the only active proper cauſe of intellection. And Hobs of late in his book of humane Nature ſaith, that viſible and intelligible ſpecies, is the greateſt Paradox in the world, as being a plain Impoſſibility. And indeed it is ſomewhat ſtrange that every ſtone and clod ſhould be in perpetual Action, ſending forth that which we call its ſpecies; for doubtleſs it ſendeth forth as much when we behold it not as when we do. And more ſtrange that a Rock or Mountain ſhould be ſo active a creature, and ſo forcible in action, as to ſend forth its ſpecies ſo many miles! Yea, according to this Doctrine, many 1000 miles: for if our Organ were capable, we ſhould ſee it ſo far. Whether the Angels ſee theſe things on earth recipiendo ſpecies, or not; ſure according to this Doctrine, the ſpecies muſt reach as far as Heaven. And why do not ſtones waſt by ſuch an unceſſant emanation? And it is ſtrange to conceive how the Air is be painted with variety of ſpecies, if this be true! that every Graſs, Flower, Tree, Bird, Stone, &c. and other bodies, have their ſeveral diſtinct ſpecies in the Air night and day? How ſtrangely is it painted? What room is there for them all, without confuſion, If both color, quantity, odor, and all be there? And its ſtrange if we do not hear the ſound nor taſte the ſweetneſs, &c. but only the ſpecies of them! and beyond my Capacity how we ſhould diſcern Diſtance as well as the Object diſtant according to the paſſive opinion! and more hard is it for me to believe this Doctrine, when I conſider how Cats and Owls ſee in the night: and how a man in a deep ſtudy, or that ſteepeth with his eyes open, ſeeth not any thing diſtinctly (though I know the frivolous anſwers to theſe:) And yet more hardly do I believe it when I feel quanto labore & conatu I muſt ſee to read a ſmall print, or diſcern a thing afar off: but above all when I feel the labor of my ſtudies, I hardly believe that my underſtanding is not active; though I eaſily believe that I am alſo too paſſive. Why do I not underſtand with every dull thought? To believe alſo that every ſtone is ſtill active, and that the eye and Intellect of the living Creature is but paſſive, is hard to me; becauſe me thinks Action better agreeth to the living, then the inanimate. And yet the leſs do I aſſent when I obſerve what ſtreſs they lay upon the ſimilitude of a looking-glaſs receiving the ſpecies, which I am very confident it did never receive, when I ſee it moving as my eye moveth, and withdrawing when I withdraw, (though the Object be any ſtone or other immovable thing) I judge that when I am gone, the glaſs receiveth no more ſpecies from the wall, then the wall from the glaſs; nor that the water receives any more ſpecies of the Moon that there appears, then the earth doth; but that all is in mine eyes by the help of that reflection. I doubt not but you have read D'Orbellis arguments, (Diſt. 3. in 1. ſent. par. 3. q. 2.) againſt both extreams in point of intellection: Againſt yours his reaſons ſeem to me ſtrong: Quia effectus aequivocus non poteſt excellere in perfectione cauſam aequivocam totalem ſed deficit neceſſario ab ea; ſed intellectio eſſet effectus aequivocus ſpeciei intelligibilis, ſi ab eaſola cauſaretur, & ita eſſet ſimpliciter imperfectior ſpecie intelligibili, quod non eſt verum. Tum etiam quia tunc non poſſet ſalvari imago in mente, ut mens eſt: quia nihil ipſius mentis haberet rationem parentis. Item quomodo cauſarentur relationes rationis, ſive intentiones logicae, quae ſunt in actu collativo? cum illa intentio dicatur realis quae cauſatur im̄ediate à re vel ſpecie repreſentante rem in ſe. Even des Cartes his Doctrine of vibration ſeemeth to make the ſenſation and intellection to be formally Action, though the Organ muſt firſt be paſſive to the producing it, before it be Active. Zabarel, Combacchius, &c. ſay that in ſenſation there is firſt a receiving the ſpecies. 2. A judging, &c. The firſt by the Organ which is paſſive, and the later (which is the very ſenſation by the ſenſitive ſoul, which is active. Therefore Combacchius ſaith▪ Intellectio eſt operatio animae rationalis, &c. but paſſio is not operatio. Schibler determineth it (Top. p. 232. that the object doth but 1. Excitare potentiat Activas ad actus. 2. Terminare actus Viguerius Inſtitut. p. 261. beſides the intellect Agent, aſcribeth to the Poſſible three offices. 1. To draw and receive the ſpecies. 2. Actually to underſtand. 3. To conſerve the ſpecies. The ſame Viguerius, inſtit. p. 17. & Aquin. 1. q. 18 a 3.1. Suarez Tim. 2. diſp 48. §. 6. Scaliger Exercit. 307. ſ. 2. as alſo Bradwardine, Scotus, Cajetani ambo, Albert: D'Orbellis, Ruvio, Alſtedius, Keckerman St…ierius, Zanchius, Burgerſdicius, A.C. faſcic. log. Prideaux Hypomnem. with many more, have taught me to account viſion, intellection, and volition for Immanent Acts. And though there be a reception of the ſpecies, and ſo ſomewhat of paſſion as well as of action, yet that of paſſion is but a preparation or quaſi materiale, and the formale is in action, as Keckerman, Syſt. log. p. 110 Phyſici nonnulli diſcernunt materiale & formale: ſic materiale in viſu eſt receptio ſpecierum viſibilium in oculo, quae eſt paſſio: eſt deinde dijudicatio rei viſib. lis per illas ſpecies quae eſt actio: hinc eſt quod Ariſtot. ſenſum modo ad actionem, modo ad paſſionem refert. Zanchius ſaith, Vol. 1. T. 3. p. 581. Vim omnem ſenſitivam eſſe partim paſsivum, partim activum, diverſis reſpectibus: Paſsiva eſt quatenus, percipit objecta. Activa eſt quatenus ipſa ab objecto aff…cta, parit ſenſum, & rem unam ab alio diſcernit, Patentia enim viſiva poſtquam recepit coloris albi ſpeciem, diſcernit hans à nigro, &c. ſic in rebus Divinis vis noſtrae mentis & voluntatis & paſſiva & activa eſt. Paſſiva quatenus recipit gratiam à Deo i… nobis operante: Activa vero quatenus affecta Dei gratia, ipſa Credit, ipſa Amat; Acti enim Agimus. Res ſua natura intelligib…les vis haec animae Patiens intellectus appellata, efficit ſuo lum ne, ſuaque Actione, ut res actu intelligantur. Hoc lumen intellectus Agentis, hoc eſt, animae noſtrae, non minima pars eſt imaginis Det in qua creati ſumus. Obſcurata fuit lux nobis communicata per peccatum Ade, ſed illuſtratur denuo per Chriſtum: unde hac nova luce Deum Deique myſteria intelligimus, quae certe animalis homo percipere non poteſt. Proinde cum eſſemus tenebrae, denuo facti ſumus & vocantur lux in Domino. Ex hac nova luce donata per Chriſtum, intelligimus quid ſit intellectus Agens. Zanch. ibid. p. 596. You ſee how far Zanchius Philoſophy and Divinity is from yours ſo p. 594. Eſt autem manifeſta ia nobis hec intellectus Actio, nempet intelligere. Et pag. 638. He ſaith the intellect hath four operations. 1. Simplicium apprehenſio. 2 Horum Compoſitio 3. Compoſtorum aeſtimatio, eoque & verorum à falſis diviſio. 4. Ex his raticcinatio. And you know that Tolet, having formerly thought, with Aegid. Paul. Venet. & Cajet. that ſenſatio (& ita intellectio) eſt formaliter paſsio, did change his judgement, and at laſt conclude that Viſio vel ſenſatio alia duos motus dicit: unum materialiter, & hic eſt receptio ſpeciei: alterum formaliter, & hic eſt Actio: Prior ineſt Organo ratione materiae: poſterior ratione potentiae, & a…imae: tamen uterque eidem ineſt Organo. Prior quidem non eſt ſubſtantialiter & eſſenti… liter ſenſatio, ſed concomitans & velut diſpoſitio: poſterior eſt eſſentialiter ſenſatio.

But I have been too tedious on this, vid. ultra in l. 2. de Anima, p. 76, 77. &c. & l. 3. q. 13. &c. You ſee my reaſons in part why I may think my ſelf excuſable, though I build not an Article of my faith on your Philoſophical aſſertion; [that videee, audire, (and ſo to believe) are Grammatical actions (only) (for you muſt ſay [only] or you ſay nothing) and but phyſical paſſions.

Queſt. 2. Whether to Believe be only verbum activ…m? but phycally paſſive, and a man by believing doth not operari, but recipere.

This Queſtion comes a little cloſer. By operari I know you mean agere: for if you ſhould mean ſuch an operation as Operarius pro mercede ex debito performeth, then you ſhould ſay nothing, but diſpute againſt what I diſavowed even in the letter you anſwer (which I dare not impute to you) Now the reaſons that force me to differ vehemently from you (as you ſaid to me) in this point, are partly Philoſophical, partly Theological. And 1. I would ſain know what that is which you here call Faith, and ſay its paſſive? Is it the Habit? No: For 1. That cannot be paſſive. 2. That is not it that juſtifieth. 3. That is not a paſſion, as you ſay this is. 4. That is not a Grammatical Action, as you ſay this is; What then! Is it the Act of Faith? No: For 1. Thats it that you are denying, and ſay its but verbum activum. 2. You ſay, it is paſſive. But how an Action can be paſſive, is ſo far beyond the reach of my weak underſtanding, that I could not believe it, though it were judged Hereſie to deny it. P…ſs…o intrinſecum ordinem dicit ad ſubjectum, & repugnat dari paſſionem extra ſubjectum, ſaith Surrez. Tom. 2. diſp. 49. p. 451. And that Action can be the ſubject of Paſſion, is Philoſophy that I never learned, and I think never ſhall do. Eſpecially if Schibler and moſt Philoſophers ſay true that Actio & paſsio non differunt realiter ſed ſecundum inadaequato… conceptus. For very many have taught me, that to the Peripateticks it is abſurd for the ſame to be both the Action, Paſſion and Paſſum; yea to common reaſon it is —

Moſt certainly therefore it is neither Habit, nor Act of faith which you call faith. What is it then? Is it a Paſſion? ſo you ſay your ſelf, and therefore I muſt take that to be your meaning: And I cannot imagine what elſe you ſhould call faith. But here you leave me at as great a loſs as before. For, 1. You ſay it is Paſſive: But I never heard or read before of a Paſsive Paſſion, any more then of a Paſsive Action: And if I ſhould ſet my underſtanding on the wrack, it would not apprehend or acknowledge any ſuch thing. I cannot imagine that it is the ſoul it ſelf which you ſay is paſsive. 1. Becauſe you ſay it is faith. 2. Becauſe elſe your Argument muſt conclude that the ſoul only is the inſtrument: But we are not queſtioning the inſtrumentality of the ſoul now, but of faith. More I might urge to ſhew that this cannot be your meaning, but that I will not ſuppoſe that it is the ſoul it ſelf which you call faith. It being therefore neither the Soul, Habit, Act, nor Paſsion which you here ſay is Paſsive in its inſtrumentality, I am forced to confeſs I know not what you mean: Yet if you ſhould mean any Potentia Paſſive. 1. Whether there be any ſuch in the rational ſoul diſtinct from the ſoul it ſelf, is a great doubt. 2. If there were, I know not how it can be called faith. 3. Nor is it ſuch a Potentia that is the inſtrument of juſtification. Yet afterwards you ſay, It is an act of dependance, which here you call a Paſsion.

2. But whether Act or Paſſion, it muſt belong either to the Ʋnderſtanding, or Will, or both: And 1. If you ſhould place it only in the underſtanding, you would (beſides Dr. Downam) have few but the Papiſts with you. 2. If in the Will only, then (as Scripture is moſt plain againſt it, ſo) you would alſo go againſt the generality of our Divines Melancthon J…. Crocius, Ameſius, Davenant, &c. make it the common Proteſtant Tenet, that it is in both. In actu ſi…ei Juſtificantis tota an ma ſe convertit ad cauſam juſtificantem: Davenant, Determ. Q. 38. pag. 174. Fides illa quam Scriptura juſtificantem agnoſcit, habet in ſe complicatum actum voluntatis & intellectus. idem. ibid. Q. 37. pag. 166. And to them that think it abſurd to have it in both faculties. I anſwer with the ſame Author. 1. Quod philoſ…kantur voluntatem & intellectum eſſe duas potentias re ipſa diſtinctas, dogma philoſophicum eſt ab omnibus haud receptum, (not of Scotus and his followers, with many more) & Theologicis dogmatibus firmandis aut infirmandis fundamentū minime id…neum. 2. Ne que nobis abſurdum, ſed valde conſentaneum videtur, actum illum quo tota anima purificatur & juſtificatur, ad totam animam pertinere: ita ut in nudo intellectu habeat initium, in voluntate complementum. Idem. ibid.

3. If you ſay it is in both (as I doubt not but you will, it being the plain Truth) then 1. It cannot poſsibly by any one ſingle Act or Paſſion which you call the paſſive Inſtrument: and do you think to find out many ſuch? 2. For that which belongeth to the underſtanding, it muſt be either a ſimple apprehenſion, a compoſition or diviſion, or a ratiocination or Judgement. And 1. A ſimple Apprehenſion it cannot be: 1. For ſo the Intellect receiveth all Objects alike. It receiveth ſin, death, unrighteouſneſs, Satan, hell in the ſame kind as it receiveth Grace, Life, Righteouſneſs, Chriſt, Heaven. For it underſtandeth both in the ſame way, receiving them per modum objecti. 2. And thus it receiveth not the very thing it ſelf Eſſentially, (though it underſtand the thing it ſelf) but only as is ſaid, the ſpecies or action of it, &c. (except you will ſay as Sir Ken. Digby, and the Lord Brook, that the thing underſtood is really in the underſtanding, and become one with it) Now according to this ſence, you would not make faith to receive Chriſt or his Righteouſneſs at all, but only the ſpecies or Idea of them. 3. And how oft hath Bellarmine been called Sophiſter for ſuppoſing, we mean ſuch an apprehenſion? Therefore I will not dare to think that you mean this. 4. And if you did, yet I have ſhewed how uncertain it is, that this intelligere is only or formally pati. 2. But if you mean not this ſimple apprehenſion (as ſure you do not) then how is it poſsible to imagine the underſtanding ſhould be paſſive in it? Did ever man that writ of Philoſophy once think that the ſoul did componere, dicidere, ratiocinari, judicare, patiendo & non agendo? I think no man. When Tolet diſputeth utrum ixtelligere ſit pati? he ſaith, Advertendum eſt quod ſermo eſt de apprehenſione; nam de compoſitione & Jud elo non eſt dubium apud omnes. Tol de anima. p. 166. I will not therefore ſuppoſe you to differ in your Philoſophy from all men. What Act of the underſtanding you will make to be part of Juſtifying faith, I know not: For I find Divines are very little agreed in it: But the moſt make Aſſent to be the only Act of the underſtanding (though ſome add notitia) and of them ſome make it Eſſential to juſtifying Faith: and others but as a common prerequiſite Act. Now if it were Aſſenſus Noeticus, yet it is impoſsible it ſhould be formally a Paſsion: but much more impoſsible when it is Aſſenſus dianocticus vel diſcurſivus, as is moſt evident it is, and our judicious Rob. Baronius truly teacheth, Philoſ. Theol. An…il. Exerc. 3. Art. 16.

Moſt Divines place the chief Eſſence of Faith in fiducia: but then they are as ill agreed what to mean by fiducia. Pemble would fain perſwade us that to Believe the Truth of a particular Promiſe, is to truſt on the performance of it to me; and that the Aſſent of Faith which is given to ſuch a Promiſe, is properly called fiducia or Truſt. But this is grounded on his ſingular opinion, that Truth and Goodneſs are all one, &c. Baronius, pag. 232. tels us of a four-fold fiducia: The firſt he makes to be but a confident Aſſent to the Truth of the Promiſe, and a firm ſure Perſwaſion of the Remiſsion of my own ſins and of my Salvation. The ſecond is a Reſting on Gods Goodneſs alone, &c. He placeth the juſtifying vertue only in the firſt, which yet containeth but partly Aſſent (which we plead againſt the Papiſts uſually not to be the juſtifying Act) and partly a particular Perſwaſion or Belief of Pardon, which is properly no Faith, but that commonly called Aſſurance. Now this kind of fiducia is but the Aſſent we have ſpoken of, and is beyond all diſpute no meer Paſſion, but an Act of the Underſtanding.

2. But moſt Divines make that fiducia which is an act of the Will to have the chief hand in this work of juſtfiying: though Baronius is ſo confident that it is not an act of Faith, but an Effect and Conſequent, that he takes it for a thing ſo manifeſt, that it needeth no proof, p. 234. And Dr. Downam hath brought not a few, nor contemptible Arguments to the ſame purpoſe againſt Pemble, Append. to Covennat of Gr. Yet though we have found it in the Will, yet it is hard to find what act of the Will they mean. If it be an Elicit Act, it muſt firſt either reſpect the End, and then it is either velle intendere vel frui: But ſure fiducia is none of theſe: and if it were, it is more ſure that at leaſt the two firſt are not Paſſions; and I think not the laſt, though it be nothing to the preſent point: Or elſe 2. It muſt reſpect the Means; and then it muſt be Eligere, Conſentire vel Ʋti (in which joined to Aſſent, I take juſtifying Faith to conſiſt): But it is both evident that none of theſe is fiducia, and if they were, that none of theſe are paſſions or paſſive. So that hitherto we are to ſeek for this Paſsive Faith.

Or elſe it is an Imparate Act; and then we are in a wood to ſeek among ſo many that there is little hope of finding it. The Truth ſeems to me to be beyond diſpute, that fiducia is no one ſingle Act (though one word) but a compoſition of many implying or containing the Aſſent of the underſtanding, the Election of the Will, eſpecially much of Hope and Adventurouſneſs in the Iraſcible of the Senſitive, together with a ſuſpenſion of ſome acts. And if we are juſtified by this Recumbency or Fiducia, I ſhall believe we are juſtified as well by Hope as any thing; for that takes up moſt here, as Dr. Downam ubi ſupra proveth. And who ever ſaid that in all or any of theſe the Soul is Paſſive and not Active? Indeed Hope and Venturouſneſs are Paſſions, but in another ſenſe (as Keckerm. and Tolet ubi ſupra have well opened; its in reſpect of their quaſi materiale.) I am content to ſtand or fall by the vote of Philoſophers, giving you 100 to one, whether the Formality of theſe motions of the Will lie in Paſsion or Action? And if they are Acts. whether they can be the Subjects of Paſsion; and ſo be paſsive Acts? So that yet I cannot find out your paſsive Faith.

3. But yet further, if Faith be paſsive Phyſically, let us find out firſt what is the Agent? 2. What the Action? 3. What the Patient or Object? 4. What is the Terminus ad quem?

1. I doubt not but it is agreed that the Agent is God: for it is he that juſtifieth. 2. The terminus or res motu facta is two-fold. 1. Juſtification in ſenſu legis, commonly called conſtitutive Juſtification (paſsive.) 2. Publique Juſtification by plea and ſentence at Judgement (paſsive) 3. The Action muſt be therefore two-fold, or two Actions according to the two-fold Terminus. Yea in the former we may (if we accurately conſider it) find out a two-fold Action and Terminus, though the difference be narrow: In which we are to conſider, 1. Of the Inſtrument: 2. Add the nature of the Actions. 1. The Inſtrument is the word of Promiſe or Grant in the Goſpel (for if you know any other way of Gods juſtifying, or any immediate Act of God herein which is Tranſient, I would it were revealed what Act it is.) Herein I have Mr. Rutherford ſaying as I, over and over againſt the Antinomians. 2. The Action therefore can be no other then a moral Action, as a Leaſe or Bond, or written-Law may be ſaid to act. Now the Goſpel performeth to our firſt Juſtification a two-fold Action. 1. It doth as a Deed of Gift beſtow Chriſt and his Merits on men, ſo it be they will Believe. This Action doth not immediately and directly conſtitute them Righteous: for Righteouſneſs being a Relation, muſt have its Foundation firſt laid: This Act therefore of Donation (which ſome call Imputation) doth directly lay the Fundamentum, whence the Relation of Righteous doth immediately ariſe (when the Condition is peformed) per nudam reſultantiam without any other Act to produce it. And this is moſt properly called Juſtificatio conſtitutiva activa. 2. When the Goſpel hath by Gift conſtituted us Righteous then next in order it doth declare or pronounce us Righteous, and vertually acquit us from Condemnation. This is by the like ſilent moral interpretative Action only as the other. (And perhaps may be moſt fitly called the imputing of Righteouſneſs, or eſteeming us Righteous, as Piſcator.) And for the latter Juſtification at Judgement, the Action is Chriſts publique pleading, and ſentencing us Acquitt: which is an Action both Phyſical and Moral in ſeveral reſpects. 4. Now if we enquire after the Patient, or rather the Object of theſe ſeveral Acts, we ſhall quckly find that the Man is that Object; but that Faith is any Patient here, is paſt my apprehenſion. For the firſt Act of God by the Goſpel [giving Chriſt and his Merit to us,] it is only a moral Action: (Though the writting and ſpeaking the Word at firſt was a Phyſical action, yet the Word or Promiſe now doth moraliter tantùm agere:) And therefore it is impoſsible that Faith ſhould be Phyſically paſsive from it. For Paſsion being an effect of Action, it muſt be a Phyſical proper Action which produceth a phyſical Paſsion. I will not ſtand to make your Aſſertion odious here by enquiring what Phyſical effective Influx, Contact, &c. here is, which ſhould manifeſt Faith to be phyſically Paſsive. I know in the Work of effectual vocation the Soul is firſt paſsive: but that is nothing to our Queſtion, whether Faith be paſsive in Juſtification. Do but tell me plainly quid patitur fides, and you do the Buſineſs.

But what if you had only ſaid that Faith is morally paſſive, and not phyſically? I anſwer. It had been leſs harſh to me, though not fit, nor to the point. For 1. Gods Juſtification nor Donation of Chriſt, is not properly of, or to Faith; for then Faith ſhould be made righteous and juſtified hereby; but to the perſon, if he Believe. 2. Beſides if you ſhould confeſs only a moral Paſsiveneſs (which is ſomewhat an odd phraſe and notion, and is but to be the Object of a moral Action) it would ſpoil all the common arguments drawn from the phyſical nature of Faith, and its ſole excellency herein in apprehending, receiving, &c. and thereby juſtifying. And you would bring in all other Graces to which the ſame Promiſe may as well be ſaid to be made. 3. The Truth I have and further ſhall manifeſt to be this; that as it is not to faith or any other act that Righteouſneſs is given, but to the perſon on condition he Believe; ſo this condition is no paſsion but an action, or divers actions. This will fully appear in the Theological Reaſons following. In the mean time I need not ſtand on this, becauſe you expreſs your ſelf that Faith is phyſically paſ…ive. Indeed you add [or hyperphyſically:] but though I meet with ſome Philoſophers, that uſe in ſuch caſes to give [hyperphyſice] as a tertium to overthrow the ſufficiency of the …iſtinction of phyſice & moraliter, yet I ſuppoſe that is none of your meaning who know that even Intellectus dum efficit intellectionem, & voluntas volitionem, ſunt cauſae phyſicae, ut Suarez. 1. Tom. diſp. 17. §. 2. p. 260. and ſo Schibler, and many more: yea and that our Divines conclude that Gods action on our ſouls in converſion is firſt Phyſical: which yet may be as truly and fully called hyperphyſical as our Faith.

Now for the ſecond action of the Goſpel, [declaring or pronouncing the Believer righteous, and ſo de jure acquitting him;] It is much more beyond my reach to conceive how faith can in reſpect of it be paſsive: For 1. Beſides that it is a moral action as the former, and ſo cannot of it ſelf produce a phyſical paſsion. 2. It doth not therein ſpeak of or to faith, pronouncing it juſt, and acquitting it, but of and to the Believer. So that if Faith were phyſically paſsive in the former, yet here it is impoſsible. 3. If you ſay that it is phyſically (or morally) paſsive in regard of the latter full Juſtification by ſentence at Judgement, you would tranſcend my capacity moſt of all. To ſay faith is the Patient of Chriſts judiciary publique ſentence, is a ſentence that ſhall never be an article of my Faith: and is ſo groſs, that I conjecture you would take it ill if I ſhould take it to be your meaning: therefore I will ſay no more againſt it. Now you know that this is (as you ſay in your Lect.) the moſt compleat Juſtification; and which I moſt ſtand upon: and therefore if your arguments fail in reſpect of this, they yield me almoſt all I expect.

Next I will tell you my Reaſons Theological why I believe not that juſtifying faith, as ſuch, is paſsive. 1. All Divines and the Scripture it ſelf hath perſwaded me, that Chriſt and the Promiſes are the Object of this Faith: but a Paſsion hath no Object, but a ſubject, &c. Therefore according to you Chriſt, &c. is not the object of it; which is contrary to all that I have heard or read.

2. I have read Divines long contending which is the Act of juſtifying faith, qua talis. And ſome ſay one, and ſome another; but all ſay one, or other, or many. Now you cut the knot, and contradict all, in making it (at leaſt quatenus Juſtificans) no Act at all, but a Paſsion: unleſs you will ſay it is a paſsive act, which I dare not imagine. And doubtleſs theſe Divines ſhew by their whole ſpeech that by Actus Fidei, they mean Actus ſecundus vel Actio, and not Actus primus vel entetativus vel accidentalis, ſive ut informans, ſive ut operativus, ſed ipſa operatio.

3. I am truly afraid leſt by entertaining this opinion I ſhould ſtrike in not only with the Antinomians (who cannot endure to hear of any conditions of life of our performing, but even with the Libertines, who tell me to my face, that man is but Paſsive, and as the ſoul Acts the body, ſo Chriſt in them moveth the ſoul to Good, and Satan to evil, while they are meerly Paſſive, and therefore the Devil ſhall be damned for ſin who committeth it in them, and not they; for who will bite the ſtone or beat the ſtaff, or be angry at the ſword? &c.

4. Elſe you muſt depreſs the excellent grace of faith below all other, in making it meerly Paſsive while others are active: For doubtleſs life and excellency is more in Action then Paſſion.

5. If believing be only ſuffering, then all Infidels are damned only for not ſuffering, which is horrid.

6. Scripture frequently condemneth wicked men for Action, for Rebellion, Refuſing, Rejecting Chriſt, Luke 19.27. They hate him and ſay, we will not have this man reign over us, &c. and this is their unbelief. If they reſiſted the Holy Ghoſt only Paſſivè & non Activè, then it would be only an ineptitudo materiei, which is in all alike at firſt, and ſo all ſhould be alike rejecters.

7. If to believe be but Pati, then it is God and not man that ſhould be perſwaded: For perſwaſion is either to Action or forbearing Action; and God is the Agent: But it is in vain to perſwade any to be Paſsive, except it be not to ſtrive againſt it. This therefore would overthrow much of the uſe of the Miniſtry.

8. And then when Chriſt ſo extolleth doing the will of God, and doing his Commandments, &c. you will exclude juſtifying faith, as being no doing.

9. Is it credible, that when Chriſt cals faith Obeying the Goſpel, and ſaith, This is the work of God, that ye believe on him whom the father hath ſent; and calls it the work of faith, 2 Theſ. 1.11. and ſaith, God giveth to will, (that is, to believe) and to do, &c. that all this is meant of meer Paſsion? I undertake to bring forty places of Scripture that ſhew faith to be Action.

10. It ſeemeth to me ſo great a debaſing of faith, as to make it to be no vertue at all, nor to have any moral good in it. For though I have read of Paſſio perfectiva in genere entis vel naturae, and conducible to vertue; Yet am I not convinced yet that any Paſsion as ſuch, hath any moral vertue in it. Indeed Paſsion may be the quaſi materiale, but the vertue is in Action. Yea, even in non-acting, (as ſilence) the vertue lies formally in the actual exerciſe of the Authority of Reaſon, and ſo obeying God in cauſing that ſilence. Sure if men ſhall be all judged according to their works, and according to what they have done, &c. then it will not be becauſe they did either Pati vel non pati. And thus you have ſome of my reaſons why I cannot believe that Believing is paſsion, nor ſhall believe it I think, till Credere be Pati, and then I may whether I will or no, becauſe pati vel non pati are not in my choice.

3. The third Queſtion is, Whether faith be paſsive in its inſtrumentality?

And I think that is out of doubt, if my former arguing have proved that faith is not paſſive at all: or if I next prove that faith is no phyſical inſtrument. But yet if I ſhould grant both that faith is paſsive, and that it is an Inſtrument, yet muſt I have either more or leſs Logick before I can believe that it is paſsive in its inſtrumentality.

My reaſons againſt it are theſe. 1. Every Inſtrumental cauſe is an efficient cauſe: but all true efficiency is by action: therefore all inſtrumentality is by action. That cauſalitas efficientis eſt Actio; & haec eſt forma per quam denominatur efficiens; quia agens & efficiens ſunt idem, &c. I have been taught ſo oft and ſo confidently that I believe it. (For oportet diſcentem credere): and that by Philoſophers of no mean eſteem, as Suarez Tom. 1. diſp. 18. §. 10. Javel. Metaph l. 9. q. 16. Conim. Colleg. Phyſ. l. 2. q. 6. art. 2. & 7. Scaliger. Exerit. 254. Aquinas, Ruvio, Porrece, Melancth. Zanchius, Zabarel, Pererius, Schibler, Stierius, Gu. Tempell. in Ram. with many more. And if there be no ſuch thing in rerum natura as a Paſsive inſtrument, then faith is none ſuch. I know Keckerm. Alſted. & Burgerſdicius do talk of a Paſſive inſtrument; but I think in proper ſpeech it is a contradiction, in adjecto and ſay as Schibler Metaphyſ. l. 1. cap. 22. Tit. 7. p. 319. Niſi Actionem propriam haberet Inſtrumentum, efficiens non eſſet; & proinde paſsivum inſtrumentum quod Keckerm. vocat, revera inſtrumentum non eſt. Et ut Idem, Topic. cap. 2. num. 34. Inſtrumentum totum hoc habet quod ad cauſam efficientem adjuvantem (ad quam referimus cauſam inſtrumentalem) requiritur. Ratio enim communis illarum eſt haec. Deſervire operationi principalis agentis per ulteriorem operationem. Et Idem, Topic. cap. 2. num. 6. Quer. An efficientis Cauſalitas, Actio? Reſp. Ita ponitur in Theor. 36. & ſentit it a h…die Maxima pars Logicorum & Metaphyſicorum. Vide ultra pro confirmatione ad nu. 9. Sic etiam cap. 3. num. 136. So that if moſt Logicians judge that there is no paſſive inſtrument, and conſequently that faith is no paſsive inſtrument, then who is more ſingular, you or I? For ſure, Nihil eſt falſum in Theologia, quod verum eſt in Philoſophia. I deny not but the ſoul in believing is both Paſsive and inſtrumental, but in ſeveral reſpects: as if Camero's way ſhould hold of infuſing grace into the will Mediante actione intellectus, then the intellect would be Paſsive or receiving grace into it ſelf, and an inſtrument of conveying it to the will: but then it would be no Paſſive but an Active inſtrument: and the action of God on the Paſsive intellect and of the intellect on the will, are two Actions with diſtinct effects.

2. Though there were ſuch a thing in the world as a Paſsive inſtrument, yet that faith ſhould be ſuch, and that phyſical, I dare ſay is either an unfit aſſertion, or elſe I am of a ſtupid apprehenſion. For there muſt be found in it (if it were ſuch) theſe four requiſites. 1. There muſt be a phyſical paſsion or reception. 2. A phyſical efficiency. 3. This efficiency muſt be patiendo, non agendo. 4. And it muſt be ſuch an efficiency as is proper to inſtruments. I may not ſtand to enquire exactly into all theſe. 1. The firſt I have confuted already, and ſhall add this much more. 1. What doth faith thus receive? 2. How doth it receive it? 3. Whence? Or from what Agent and Act? 1. Is it Chriſt himſelf that is phyſically received by faith? 1. Who dare ſay ſo, but the Ʋbiquitarians, and Tranſubſtantiation men? and perhaps not they. Chriſt is in Heaven, and we on earth. A multitude of blaſphemers, Libertines, and Familiſts, I lately meet with that dream of this but no ſober man. 2. And indeed if Chriſts perſon were thus received, it would not make a man righteous, or juſtifie him. As all our Divines ſay, his being in the body of Mary would not have juſtified her: Nor did the kiſſing of his lips juſtifie Judas; nor eating and drinking in his preſence juſtifie thoſe that muſt depart from him for working iniquity, Matthew 7. If we had ſo known Chriſt, we ſhould know him no more: It was neceſſary to his Diſciples that he ſhould go from them; we muſt not have the Capernaites conceit of eating his fleſh. Yea, to talk of a phyſical receiving by faith, is far groſſer: For the mouth was capable of that phyſical contact, which faith is not. 3. And then this will not ſtand with their Judgement, that blame me for making Chriſt himſelf the object of juſtifying faith, and not the promiſe directly. 2. If you ſay that the thing received is Chriſts righteouſneſs, (as moſt do that I read) I anſwer, 1. Righteouſneſs is but a relation: And therefore a thing which is naturally uncapable of being of it ſelf phyſically apprehended. This is paſt doubt. 2. If it be phyſically received, then either as a principle and quality, or as an object. Not the former: For ſo we receive our firſt, (and after) grace in ſanctification; but none ever ſaid ſo in juſtification: Nor indeed can that righteouſneſs which is formally but a relation, dwel in us as a principle or quality▪ If we receive it as an object, then by an Act: Or if the ſoul were granted to be paſsive in reception of an object, I have ſhewed that, 1. It is but in apprehenſione ſimplici: None pleadeth for more: But faith is not ſuch. 2. And ſo it would receive Chriſt no otherways then it receiveth any object whatſoever it thus apprehendeth. 3. And this is not to receive Chriſt or his righteouſneſs, but the meer ſpecies of it according to your own Philoſophers, (and if righteouſneſs be but a relation; and a relation, as Durandus, Dr. Twiſs, and many another thin be but Ens Rationis, then the ſpecies of an Ens Rationis is a very curious Web) Knowledge (as D'Orbellis ſaith in 2. ſent. Diſ. 3. q. 3.) is twofold, i. e. ſenſitive and intellective; and each of theſe twofold, Intuitive and Abſtractive. Intuitive knowledge is indeed de objecto ut in ſe praeſens; quando ſcilicet res in propria exiſtentia eſt per ſe motiva: Exemplum de ſenſitiva eſt, ut viſus videt colorem: (yet this is but Recepiendo ſpeciem, non rem) and this is not it in queſtion): Exemplum de intellectiva eſt, ut viſio Divinae eſſentiae à beatis: This is utterly denyed to be at all by Doctor Stoughton, Camer▪ and other ſolid Divines, againſt the School-mens judgement: And if it be, yet doubtleſs as we know not how, ſo it is not ſuch as faiths apprehenſion, which we enquire after, Cognitio Abſtractiva eſt quando ſpecies rei movet ad cognoſcendum rem ipſam, & hoc ſiveres ſit in ſe praeſens, ſive abſens, ſive exiſtat ſive non: Exemplum in ſenſitiva eſt, ut phantaſia imaginatur colorem: Exemplum in intellectiva eſt ut intellectus cognoſcit quidditatem coloris medicante ejus ſpecie. So that if it be either of theſe, it were at the utmoſt but a paſſive reaception of the ſpecies, and not of Chriſt or his righteouſneſs.

2. By what phyſical contact faith doth receive this? might be enquired: and 3. By what phyſical act of the Agent? to neither of which queſtions can I imagine what tolerable anſwer can be given, in defence of this cauſe.

2. And if faith be a paſſive phyſical inſtrument, it muſt have a Phyſical Efficiency? and what is that? to juſtifie? why, even God himſelf in this life doth that but by a Moral Act (by his word) and not by a phyſical, (as to particulars.)

3. But that which driveth me to the greateſt admiration is, How faith ſhould Efficere patiendo! If I ſhould rip up this, or require a demonſtration of it in reſpect to the juſtification at judgement, yea, or in this life, yea or of any effect, I ſhould lay ſuch an odium on it from its abſurdities, that in dealing with you, modeſty doth forbid me to inſiſt on it. 4. The fourth requiſite will be enquired after in the next Queſtion ſave one.

The fourth Queſtion is, Whether other Graces may not be as properly called phyſical paſſive Inſtruments as Faith, is your ſenſe?

And I doubt not but they may, (though its true of neither) For 1. If there be no phyſical reception of Chriſts righteouſneſs imaginable but that which is per modum objecti, and if other gratious acts have Chriſts righteouſneſs for their object, as well as that which you call faith: then other Acts do receive Chriſts righteouſneſs as well as ſaith: but both branches of the Antecedent are true, therefore the conſequence, the bare knowledge or ſimple apprehenſion of Chriſts righteouſneſs per modum objecti may better pretend to this, then recombency or affiance: Yea, and love it ſelf more fitly then affiance may be ſaid to receive or embrace its object (which is not therefore falſe neither becauſe Bellarmine hath it: and you know he brings Auſtines plain words, affirming love to be the hand by which they received him, &c.) I confeſs if I firſt renounce not the concurrent Judgement of Philoſophers, I cannot approve of the common Anſwer which our Divines give to Bellarmine in this, viz. [That Faith receiveth Chriſts Righteouſneſs firſt to make it ours, but Love only to retain it, and embrace and enjoy it when firſt we know it to be ours:] For though this ſay as much as I need to plead for, acknowledging Love to be as properly a phyſical Reception for retention, as Faith is for firſt Poſſeſsion, yet if affiance be taken in any proper ordinary ſence, it cannot thus hold good neither: for ſo Affiance muſt ſignifie ſome act of the will in order of nature after love, or at leaſt not before it. I acknowledge that ſo much of Faith as lyeth in the underſtanding is before Love in order of nature; ſicut ipſe intellectus eſt ſimpliciter prior voluntate, ut motivum mobili, & activum paſſivo, ut Aquin. 1. q. §. 2. a. 3.2. and 12. q. 13. a. 1. C. For as he, Intellectus eſt primum motivum omnium potentiarium animae quoad determinationem actus, voluntas verò quoad exercitium actus, Aquin, 12. q. 17. a. 1. C. But for the acts of the will toward Chriſt, I could give you (but to avoid tediouſneſs I muſt forbear) at large the Teſtimony of Aquinas, Tolet, Gerſon, Camero, Ameſius, Zanchius, Rob. Baronius, Bradwardine, Ravio, Viguerius, &c. That Love is not only the firſt of all the Paſſions, but even the firſt motion of the Will towards its Object, and little or not at all different from Volition, diligere being but intenſive velle. I have much more to ſay to this, which here I muſt pretermit. But ſtill I ſpeak not of Love as a Paſsion, but a true cloſure, as it were of the will with its Object as Good: and expect love to be proper to the ſenſitive, and ſtrange to the intellective ſoul; we muſt make it the ſame with Velle: For Amor & ga…dium in quantum ſignificant Actus appetitus ſenſitivi, paſsiones ſunt; non autem ſecundum quod ſignificant Actus appetitus intellectivi, inquit Aquinas. 1. q. 2. a. 1.1.

The fifth Queſtion is, Whether Faith be any Inſtrument of our Juſtification?

Anſwer, Scotus gives many ſences of the word Inſtrument, and ſo doth Aquinas, Schibler, and moſt Philoſophers that meddle with it: and they give ſome ſo large, as contain all cauſes in the world under God the firſt cauſe; In ſo large a ſence, if any will call faith an Inſtrument of Juſtification, I will not contend with him; though yet I will not ſay ſo my ſelf, as judging faith to be no kind of cauſe of it at all; but in the proper ordinary ſence, as an Inſtrument, ſignifieth Cauſam quae influit in effectum per virtutem inferioris rationis, as Suarez, Stierius, Arniſaeus, &c. Vel Inſtrumentum eſt quod ex directione alterius principalis agentis influit ad produce…dum effectum ſe nobiliorem, ut Schibler, &c. So I utterly deny Faith to be an Inſtrument. But I will firſt queſtion whether it be a phyſical Inſtrument. 2. Whether a moral? 1. And for the firſt, I have done it already: for ſeeing our acute Divines have ceaſed to lay any claim to it as an active Inſtrument, but only as a Paſsive; therefore having diſproved what they claim, I have done enough to that. 2. Yet I will add ſome more: And 1. If it be a phyſical active Inſtrument, it muſt have a phyſical active Influx to the producing of the Effect; but ſo hath not Faith to the producing of our Juſtification. Ergo &c. The Major is apparent from the common definition of ſuch Inſtruments: The Minor will be as evident, if we conſider but what Gods Act in Juſtification is, and then it would appear impoſſible that any act of ours ſhould be ſuch an Inſtrument. 1. At the great Juſtification at Judgement Chriſts act is to ſentence us acquit and diſcharged▪ and doth our Faith activè, ſixae influere ad hunc effectum? Doth it intervene between Chriſt and the effect? and ſo actively juſtifie us? Who will ſay ſo? 2. And the act by which God juſtifieth us here, is by a Deed of Gift in his Goſpel (as I Judge) Now 1. That doth immediately produce the effect (only ſuppoſing Faith as a condition.) 2. And it is but a moral Inſtrumental cauſe it ſelf, and how faith can be a Phyſical, I know not. 3. Nay the act is but a moral act, ſuch as a Statute or Bond acteth, and what need Faith to be a phyſical Inſtrument?

2. My ſecond Reaſon is this: It is generally concluded, that Tota inſtrumenti cauſalit as eſt in uſu & applicatione; It ceaſeth to be an Inſtrument, when it ceaſeth to be uſed or acted by the principal cauſe: But faith doth moſt frequently ceaſe its action, and is not uſed (phyſically) when we ſleep or wholly mind other things: Therefore according to this Doctrine, faith ſhould then ceaſe its Inſtrumentality; and conſequently either we ſhould all that while be unjuſtified and unpardoned, or elſe be juſtified and pardoned ſome other way, and not by faith. All which is abſurd; and eaſily avoided by diſcerning faith to be but a Condition of our Juſtification, or a Cauſa ſine quae non.

3. If Faith be a phyſical Inſtrument, then it ſhould juſtifie from a reaſon intrinſecal, natural and eſſential to it, and not from Gods meer ordination of it to this office by his Word of Promiſe: but that were at leaſt dangerous Doctrine: and ſhould not be entertained by them who (truly) acknowledge that it juſtifies not as a work; much leſs then as a Phyſical reception which they call its Inſtrumentality. The conſequence of the Major is evident, in that nothing can be more intrinſecal and eſſential to faith (this faith) then to be what it is, viz. a Reception or acceptance of Chriſt or his Righteouſneſs: therefore if it juſtifie directly as ſuch, then it juſtifieth of its own Nature.

4. It is to me a hard ſaying, that God and Faith do the ſame thing, that is, Pardon and juſtifie: and yet ſo they do if it be an Inſtrument of Juſtification: For eadem eſt Actio Inſtrumenti & principalis cauſae, viz. quoad determinationem ad hunc effectum, ut Aquinas, Schibler, &c. I dare not ſay or think, that Faith doth ſo properly, effectively juſtifie and pardon us.

5. It ſeems to me needleſs to feign this Inſtrumentality, becauſe fruſtra fit per plura quod fieri poteſt per pauciora.

6. Yea it derogateth from the work; for as Scotus ſaith, (in 4. diſt. 45. q. 1. pag. (mihi) 239. D.) Actio ſine inſtrumento eſt perfectior quàm actio cum inſtrumento.

7. And this Doctrine makes man to be the cauſa proxima, of his own Pardon and Juſtification. For it is man that believes and not God: God is the cauſa prima, but man the cauſa proxima credendi, and ſo of juſtifying, if Faith be an Inſtrument Or at leaſt man is a cauſe of his own Pardon and Juſtification. Yea faith being by Divines acknowledged our own Inſtrument, it muſt needs follow that we juſtifie and forgive our ſelves. Dr. Ameſius ſaith, (Bellar. Enervat. To. 4. li 6. p. (mihi) 315.) Plurimum refert: quia ſicut ſacramenta quamvis aliquo ſ…nſu poſsint dici Inſtrumenta noſtra, &c. proprie tamen ſunt Jnſtrumenta Dei: ſic etiam fides quamvis poſsit vocari Inſtrumentum Dei, quia Deus juſtificat nos ex fide & per fidem, proprie tamen eſt Inſtrumentum noſtrum. Deus nos baptizat & paſcit, non noſmet ipſi: Nos credimus in Chriſtum, non Deus. Whether faith may be a moral Inſtrument, I ſhall enquire, when I have anſwered the next queſtion: which is, Q 6. If faith were ſuch a Phyſical Paſsive (or Active) Inſtrument, whether that be the formal direct reaſon of its juſtifying? and whether (as it is) it do juſtifie directly and primarily, quatenus eſt apprehenſio Chriſti, juſtitioe, vel Juſtificationis. And this is it that I moſt confidently deny, and had rather you would ſtick to in debate then all the reſt: for I ground many other things on it. I affirm therefore, 1. That faith juſtifieth primarily and directly, as the condition on which the free Donor hath beſtowed Chriſt, with all his benefits in the Goſpel-conveyance. 2. And that if it were a meer Phyſical apprehenſion it would not juſtifie; no nor do us any good. 3. And that the apprehenſion called the receptivity which is truly its nature, is yet but its aptitude to its juſtifying office, and ſo a remote, & not the direct proper formal cauſe.

Theſe three I will prove in order. 1. And for the firſt it is proved. 1. From the Tenor of the juſtifyn…g Promiſe, which ſtill aſſureth Juſtification on the condition of Believing. [He that believeth] and [whoſoever believeth] and [if thou believe] do plainly and unqueſtionably expreſs ſuch a condition, upon which we ſhall be juſtified, and without which we ſhall not. The Antinomians moſt unreaſonably deny this. 2. And the nature of Juſtification makes it unqueſtioinable: for whether you make it a Law-act, or an act of Gods own Judgement and Will determining of our ſtate, yet nither will admit of any intervening cauſe, (eſpecially any act of ours,) but only a condition. 3. Beſides, Conditions depend on the will of him that beſtoweth the Gift, and according to his Will they ſucceed: but Inſtruments more according to their own fitneſs: Now it is known well, that Juſtification is an act of Gods meer free Grace and Will, and therefore nothing can further conduce to Gods free act as on our part, but by way of Condition. 4. And I need not ſay more to this, it being acknowledged generally by all our Divines, not one that I remember excepted, beſides Mr. Walker, that [faith juſtifieth as the condition of the Covenant] Mr. Wotton de Reconcil. part 1. l. 2. cap. 18. brings you the full Teſtimony of the Engliſh Homilies, Fox, Perkins, Paraeus, Trelcatius, Dr. G. Downam, Scharpius, Th. Matthews, Calvin, Aretius, Sadeel, Olevian, Melancth. Beza: To which I could add many more: and I never ſpoke with any ſolid Divine that denyed it,

2. Now that a phyſical apprehenſion would not juſtifie, as ſuch, is evident. 1. Elſe Mary ſhould be juſtified for having Chriſt in her womb, as I ſaid before. 2. Elſe juſtification, as I ſaid, ſhould be aſcribed to the nature of the act of faith it ſelf. 3. You may ſee what is the primary, formal reaſon why faith Juſtifies, by its inſeparablility from the effect or event; and which is the improper remote cauſe by its ſeparability. Now ſuch a phyſical apprehenſion may be (as ſuch) ſeparated from the effect, and would ſtill be if it had not the further nature of a condition. We ſee it plainly in all worldly things. Every man that takes in his hand a conveyance of land, ſhall not poſſeſs the land. If you forcibly ſeize upon all a mans evidences and writings, you ſhall not therefore poſſeſs his eſtate. If a traytor ſnatch a pardon by violence out of anothers hand, he is not therefore pardoned. (But more of this under the next). 4. And for your paſſive faith, I cannot conceive how it ſhould (as paſſive) have any Moral good in it (as is ſaid,) much leſs juſtifie us. And ſo when God ſaith that without faith it is impoſſible to pleaſe God we ſhall feign that to be juſtifying faith, which hath nothing in it ſelf, that can pleaſe God: and how it can juſtifie that doth not pleaſe, I know not. I know in genere entis the Divels pleaſe God: They are his creatures; and naturally Good, as Ens & bonum convertuntur: but in genere moris, I know not yet how pati quatenus pati can pleaſe him. For it doth not require ſo much as liberty of the will: The reaſon of Paſſion is from the Agent: As Suarez diſ. 17. §. 2. Secundum praeciſas rationes formales loquendo, Paſſio eſt ab Actione: & non è converſo. Ideoque vera eſt & propria haec cauſalis locutio, Quia agens agit, materia recipit. Now ſure all Divines as well as the free-will-men, do acknowledge, that there can be no pleaſing worth or vertue, where there is not liberty. And Suarez ſaith truly in that (T. 1. diſp. 19 pag. (mihi) 340.) Addimus vero hanc facultatem quatenus libera eſt, non poſſe eſſe niſi Activam: ſeu è converſo, facultatem non poſſe eſſe liberam, niſi ſit activa, & quatenus activa eſt. Probatur ſic. Nam Paiſſo ut Paſſio non poteſt eſſe Libera patienti: ſed ſolum quatenus Actio à qua talis Paſſio provenit, illi eſt libera: Ergo Libertas formaliter ac praeciſe non eſt in potentia patiente, ut ſic, ſed in potentia Agente. (Vide ultra probationem.)

5. Yea I much fear leſt this Paſſive Doctrine do lay all the blame of all mens infidelity upon God, or moſt at leaſt: For it maketh the unbeliever no otherwiſe faulty then a hard block for reſiſting the wedge, which is but by an indiſpoſition of the matter: and ſo Originall indiſpoſition is all the ſin. For as Aquinas ſaith, Malum in Patiente eſt vel ab imperfectione, vel defectu agentis, vel indiſpoſitione Materiae. 1. q. 49. a. 1. c.

3. My third propoſition is, that the Receptivity or apprehenſion which is truly of the nature of faith, is yet but its aptitude to its Juſtifying office, and ſo a remote and not the direct proper formal reaſon: And this is the main point that I inſiſt on: And it is evident, in all that is ſaid already: and further thus, If faith had been of that apprehending nature as it is, and yet had not been made the condition in the gift or promiſe of God, it would not have juſtified: but if it had been made the condition, though it had been no apprehending (but as any other duty,) yet it would have juſtified: therefore it is evident that the neareſt, proper reaſon of its power to juſtifie is Gods making it the condition of his gift, and its receptive nature is but a remote reaſon: 1. If faith would have juſtified, though it had not been a condition, then it muſt have juſtified againſt Gods will, which is impoſſible: It is God that juſtifieth, and therefore we cannot be a cauſe of his Action. 2. It is evident alſo from the nature of this moral reception, which being but a willingneſs and conſent, cannot of its own nature make the thing our own, but as it is by the meer will of the donor made the condition of his offer or gift. If I am willing to be Lord of any Lands or Countreys, it will not make me ſo: but if the true owner ſay, I will give them thee if thou wilt accept them, then it will be ſo: therefore it is not firſt and directly from the nature of the reception, but firſt becauſe that reception is made the condition of the gift. If a condemned man be willing to be pardoned, he ſhall not therefore be pardoned: but if a pardon be given on condition he be willing or accept it, then he ſhall have it. If a poor woman conſent to have a Prince for her husband, and ſo to have his poſſeſſions, it ſhall not therefore be done, except he give himſelf to her on condition of her conſent. If it were a meer phyſical reception, and we ſpoke of a poſſeſſion de facto of ſomewhat that is ſo apprehenſible, then it would be otherwiſe: as he that getteth gold or a pearl in his hand, he hath ſuch a poſſeſsion: But when it is but a moral improper reception (though per actum phyſicum volendi vel conſentiend… ), and when we ſpeak of a poſſeſsion in right of Law, and of a relation and Title, then it muſt need; ſtand as aforeſaid. Donation, (or Imputation) being the direct cauſe of our firſt conſtitutive juſtification, therefore conditionality and not the natural receptivity of faith, muſt needs be the proper reaſon of its juſtifying. This is acknowledged by Divines: Ameſius ſaith, (Bellarm. Enervat. T. 4. p. (m…hi) 314. Apprehenſio juſtificationis per veram fiduciam, non eſt ſimpliciter per modum objecti, ſed per modum objecti nobis donati: Quod enim Deus donaverit fidelibus Chriſtum & omni …cum eo, Scriptura diſertis verbis teſtatur, Rom. 8.32. 2. And that if any other ſort or act of faith, as well as this, or any other grace would have juſtified, if God had made it equally the condition of his gift, is alſo paſt all doubt. 1. Becauſe the whole work of Juſtifying dependeth meerly on Gods free Grace and will and thence it is that faith is deputed to its office. 2. Who doubteth but God could have beſtowed pardon and juſtification on other terms or conditions, if he would? 3. Yea who doubteth but he might have given them without any condition, even that of acceptance? Yea though we had never known that there had been a Redeemer, yet God might have juſtified us for his ſake. I ſpeak not what he may now do after he reſolved of a courſe in his Covenant: But doubtleſs he might have made the Covenant to be an abſolute promiſe without any condition on our part if he would, even ſuch as the Antinomians dream it to be. And me thinks thoſe great Divines, that ſay with Twiſſe, Ch…mier, Walaeus, &c. that God might have pardoned us without a Redeemer, ſhould not deny this eſpecially. 4. And doubtleſs that faith which the Iſraelites in the firſt ages were juſtified by, did much differ from ours now, whatever that doth which is required of poor Indians now; that never heard of Chriſt. 5 And God pardoneth and juſtifieth Infants, without any actual reception of pardon by their faith.

2. And me thinks they that ſtand for the inſtrumentality of faith above all ſhould not deny this; for (according to my Logick) the formality of an Inſtrument is in its actual ſubſerviency to the principal cauſe: and therefore it is no longer cauſa inſtrumentalis then it is uſed: and therefore whatſoever is the materia of the inſtrument, or whatſoever is natural to it, cannot be its form: Now to be a reception or apprehenſion of Chriſt, is moſt eſſentially natural to this act of faith, and therefore cannot be the form of its inſtrumentality. For as Scotus ſaith ( …n 4. ſint. diſt. 1. q. 5. Fol. (mihi 13. H.) …ru mentii…n…it…s p…aeceda naturaliter uſum ejus ut inſtrumentum. And what is the … or Aptitude of faith but this? And as Scotus ibid. ſaith, Nullum inſtrumentum formaliter eſt ideo aptum ad uſum, quia al quis utitur eo ut inſtrumento: but it is an Inſtrument quia al quis utitur, &c.

3. And if the reception were the moſt direct, proper cauſe, (eſpecially if the phyſical reception) then it would follow, that juſtifying faith …as ſuch) is the receiving of juſtification, or of Chriſts righteouſneſs, but for the receiving of Chriſt himſelf, or that the receiving of Chriſt would be but a preparatory act which is I dare ſay foul and falſe Doctrine, and contrary to the ſcope of Scripture which makes Chriſt himſelf the object of this faith; and the receiving of him (John 1.11, 12.) and believing in him to be the condition of juſtification; and the receiving of righteouſneſs, but ſecondarily or remotely. Ameſius ſaith (ubi ſupra) hic tamen obſervandum eſt accurate loquendo, apprehenſionem Chriſti & juſtitiae ejus eſſe fidem juſtificantem, quia juſtificatio noſtra exurgit ex apprehenſione Chriſti, & apprehentio juſtificationis ut poſſeſſionis noſtrae praeſentis, fructus eſt & effectum apprehenſionis prioris. So in his Medulla he makes Chriſt himſelf the object of juſtifying faith.

4. Alſo if the ſaid reception were the immediate proper reaſon why faith juſtifyeth; then it would follow that it is one act of faith whereby we are pardoned (viz the reception of pardon) and another whereby we are juſtified (viz. the Reception either of righteouſneſs or juſtification:) and there muſt be another act of faith for Adoption, and another for every other uſe according to the variety of the Objects. But this is a vain fiction, it being the ſame believing in Chriſt, to which the Promiſe of Remiſsion, Juſtification, Adoption, Glorification, and all is made.

Alſo it would contradict the Doctrine of our beſt Divines, who ſay, …s Alſte dius, Diſtinct. Theol. C. 17. p. 73. that Chriſt is our Righteouſneſs in ſenſu cauſali, ſed non in ſenſu formali. I conclude this with the plain Teſtimony of our beſt Writers. Perkins vol. 1. pag. 662. In the true Gain, ſaith: And leſt any ſhould imagine that the very Act of faith in apprehending Chriſt juſtifieth: we are to underſtand that faith doth not apprehend by Power from it ſelf, but by vertue of the Covenant. If a man believe the Kingdom of France to be his, it is not therefore his: yet if he belive Chriſt and the Kingdom of Heaven by Chriſt to be his, it is his indeed: not ſimply becauſe he believes, but becauſe he believes upon Commandment and Promiſe. (that is not properly as an Inſtrument, but as a condition) For in the tenor of the Covenant God promiſeth to impute the Obedience of Chriſt to us for our Righteouſneſs if we believe. Is not this as plain as may be? So Bullinger Decad. 1. Serm. 6. p. (mihi) 44. We ſay faith juſtifieth for it ſelf, not as it is a quality in our mind, or our own work: but as faith is a gift of Gods grace, having the promiſe of righteouſneſs and life, &c. Therefore faith juſtifieth for Chriſt, and from the grace and Covenant of God.

This being therefore fully proved, that faith juſtifieth properly and directly as the condition on which God hath made over Chriſt and all his benefits in the Goſpel, the two great points oppoſed in my Doctrine do hence ariſe unavoidably. 1. That this faith juſtifieth as truly and directly as it is the receiving of Chriſt for Lord, and King, and Head, and Husband, as for a juſtifier, for both are equally the conditions in the Goſpel. But if the phyſical Inſtrumental way were ſound, then it would juſtifie only as it is a receiving of Juſtification or Juſtice. This is the main concluſion I conteſt for. Yield me this, and I will not ſo much ſtick at any of the reſt. 2. And hence it follows, that Repentance, forgiving others, love to Chriſt, Obedience Evangelical, do ſo far juſtifie as the Goſpel-promiſe makes them conditions; and no further do I plead for them.

7. My laſt Queſtion was, Whether now your Doctrine or mine be the more obſcure, doubtfull and dangerous? And which is the more clear, certain and ſafe?

And here I ſhall firſt ſhew you yet more what my Judgement is, and therein whether Faith be a moral Inſtrument.

I think that conditio ſine quâ non, non poteſt eſſe efficiens, quia hujus nulla eſt actio; nec id ad cujus preſentiam aliquid contigit c…tra illius actionem: nec materialis diſpoſitio eſt Inſtrumentum, &c. ut Schibler, Top. c. 3. pag. 102. Even the Goſpel-Promiſe, which is far more properly called Gods moral Inſtrument of juſtifying or pardoning, is yet but ſomewhat to the making up that fundamentum, from whence the relation of juſtified doth reſult. And the Fundamentum is called a cauſe of the relation which ariſeth from it without any act, but what went to cauſe the foundation, even by a meer reſultancy, as D'Orbellis fully in 1. ſent. diſt. 17. q. 1. But to call a condition in Law an Inſtrument, is yet far more improper. The Law or Promiſe therefore I will call a moral Inſtrument: the condition which we muſt perform, I will not call a moral Inſtrument, either of the Act which God performeth, or yet of the effect which floweth from that act immediately. Yet if any will ſay that it is properly and principally a condition, and that it ſo juſtifieth; and yet that it may be called an Inſtrument moral in an improper ſence, as it is a condition firſt, or elſe in regard of its receiving uſe, will ſtretch the word Inſtrument ſo wide, as to apply it to it; I will not contend for a word, when we agree in ſence. And thus Mr. Wotton yieldeth as with an ill will to call it an Inſtrument, proving it firſt to juſtifie as a condition. But I am loth to give it any proper cauſality in juſtifying.

And now let us ſee whoſe ſence is, 1. More obſcure. I avoid and abhor all vain niceties in ſo fundamental a point as Juſtification is; therefore I ſay plainly but [That faith is the condition on which God hath beſtowed Chriſt and all his benefits in the Goſpel] What woman cannot underſtand this at a word? But your Doctrine, what Oedipus is able to unfold? for my part, it is quite paſt my reach; and moſt that I converſe with, are as ſilly as my ſelf. Can every poor man or woman reach to know what a paſſive Action, or a paſſive Paſsion, or a Paſsive Inſtrument is? and how we receive Chriſt, as a man takes a gift in his hand? or to ſee through all the difficulties that I have diſcovered here in your Doctrine? Even they that raiſe queſtions, what one act of faith doth juſtifie, whether of the Ʋnderſtanding or Will? Whether Aſſent or Affiance, &c. Do ſeem vainly and hurtfully curious to me: much more thoſe that reduce all to an unconceivable pat… : I plainly therefore aſfi…m, that faith is not any phyſical receiving, (as the hand doth receive money, as you would afterward make me believe the Aſſembly m…ns) but a Metaphorical moral receiving: and that it is not by any one act of the ſoul (much leſs a Paſſion) but by the whole ſoul, Underſtanding and Will: the former beginning, the later conſummating it, (as Dav…nant ſoundly.) And let us trye by common ſpeech, which of theſe is the more plain and probable ſence. Suppoſe a Prince will redeem a Turkiſh condemed ſlave, and ſend him word [I have bought thee, and if thou wilt receive (or take) me for thy Redeemer, Deliverer and Lord, and for the future wilt ſerve me and be thankfull, I will actually ſet thee free. Here it would ſure be a ſilly thing to fall a queſtioning, what the Prince means by the word [Receive or take] Whether it be an act of this faculty, or that? Whether this or that act? Or whether it is meerly Pati? Though we are too wiſe to underſtand this now, I warrant you the fooliſheſt ſlave would ſoon underſtand it: and know that to receive or take the Prince for his Redeemer, is to believe him, and conſent, and thankfully accept of him as he requires, and of deliverance by him: And he that ſhould ask him, Whether it were the bare act of affiance, or whether gratitude or love were included in the term? would ſeem but ſimple to him. If a Prince will deliver a condemned woman from death, and offer with all to marry her, and give her himſelf, and all he hath, on condition ſhe will receive or take him for her husband, (and accordingly be a faithfull wife to him till death) He that ſhould here ſtep in, and raiſe profound Scruples, and enter difficult diſputes, whether this receiving were an act of the Underſtanding or Will? Whether Affiance, Recombency, Aſſurance, &c. or whether a Paſsion? would be well judged rid…culous; when every man knows at the firſt word what it is for the woman to receive or take a man for her Husband, even gladly and lovingly to conſent and accept the offer, and with all her heart deliver up her ſelf to him accordingly. So if a King of another Nation, that hath right alſo to this, but not poſſeſsion, ſhould ſend to us, to charge us to receive him for our King; what a hard word is this to underſtand? or doth it ſignifie any one act? or the act of any one ſingle faculty that the people of the land muſt perform? Oh how too learned Divines (or too unlearned) have puzzled and amazed poor ſouls, and muddyed the clear ſtreams of the Doctrine of Chriſt, in this ſo weighty and plain a point of juſtification? In a word, Sir, I know there is never a one of my Hearers can underſtand your Doctrine of inſtrumentality Active or Paſſive, nor have they the Logick neceſſary thereto, and therefore I will not ſpeak to them in ſuch a language. Even while I untye your knots, I am thought a Barba…i…n, and not underſtood; how much more if I ſpoke what I underſtand not my ſelf nor am able, though I ſet my wits on the tenter?

2. And then let us ſee which is the truer and certa…ner, your Doctrine or mine. And 1. I have ſaid ſomewhat already to weaken the credit of yours. 2. And more from what is laſt ſaid it is unlikely to me to be true becauſe of the obſcurity; for I believe God hath ſpoke plainer in fundamentals, and not laid folks ſalvation upon that which none but Scholars of a better or worſe judgement then I can underſtand. I know there is that kind of difficulty in Divine things which requireth the ſpiritual illumination of the underſtanding: but not ſuch in foundation points that neceſſarily requireth ſo much humane learning. 3. Your way hath not one word of Scripture for it: Where doth Scripture ſay (in phraſe or ſenſe) that faith Juſtifieth as an inſtrument; or that it is ſuch? Active or Paſſive? Or that it is this or that only Act?

But now for the Doctrine I teach. 1. Neither your ſelf nor any ſolid man denyeth it (that faith is a condition and ſo juſtifieth:) and that it is a Moral receiving, and by the whole ſoul, eſepcially the hearty conſent, and acceptance of the will, moſt Divines teach, as I could ſhew but for waſting time. 2. I prove it further, that it is but this plain Moral recep…ion, thus. As Chriſt is offered, ſo he is received (therefore the Aſſembly ſay [as he is offered in the Goſp…l]: But Chriſt is offered Morally in the Goſpel, and not Phyſically; therefore he muſt be ſo received. 3. Rejicere eſt no…le; Ergo, reci…ere eſt velle. To reject Chriſt is the condemning ſin of infidelity: but that lies in an unwillingneſs to have him to be their Redeemer, Saviour, and eſpecially Lord: therefore receiving Chriſt is a willingneſs, conſent or acceptance of him for Redeemer and Lord, Joh. 1.10. His own received him not; What is that but they refuſed him? and not that they wree not Paſſive phyſical receivers of Juſtice, Luke 19.27. Theſe mine enemies that would not I ſhould reign over them, bring hither and deſtroy, &c. Then willingneſs of his reign is part of that faith which juſtifies: Even willingneſs of his Reign, as well as to be pardoned, juſtified and ſaved from Hell by him; (or elſe few among us would periſh; For I never met with the man that was unwilling of theſe.)

3. And then it will eaſily appear, Whether your Doctrine or mine be the more ſafe. 1. Yours hath the many inconveniences already mentioned. It maketh man his own juſtifier, or the cauſa proxima of his own Juſtification, and by his own Act to help God to juſtifie us: for ſo all inſtruments do help the principal cauſe. And yet by a ſelf-contradiction it maketh faith to be of no Moral worth, and ſo no vertue or grace. Yea, (I think) it layeth the blame of mans infidelity on God; Many ſuch wayes it ſeemeth to wrong the Father and the Mediator. 2. And it ſeemeth alſo to wrong mens ſouls in point of ſafety, both by drawing them ſo to wrong God, and alſo by laying grounds to encourage them in preſumption; For when they are taught that the receiving of Chriſts righteouſneſs, or of Chriſt for juſtification, or the confident expectation of pardon, or reſting on Chriſt for it, or a particular perſwaſion of it, &c. Is juſtifying faith, and when they find theſe in themſelves (as undoubtedly they may will this much, or elſe they cannot preſume), Is it not eaſie then to think they are ſafe when they are not? As I ſaid, I never yet met with the man that was not willing to be Juſtified and ſaved from Hell by Chriſt: and I dare ſay, Really willing: and but with few that did not expect it from Chriſt, and truſt him for it. Now to place Juſtifying faith only in that which is ſo common, and to tell the men that yet they believe not truly when they have all that is made eſſential to faith, as Juſtifying, is ſtrange. For knowing that the godly themſelves have fowly ſinned, and that no man can periſh that hath Juſtifying faith, how can they chooſe but preſume when they find that which is called Juſtifying faith undoubtedly in themſelves? And to tell them it is not ſincere or true, becauſe they receive not Chriſt alſo as King and Prophet, and yet that ſuch receiving is no part of juſtifying faith. This is to tell them that the truth of their faith lyeth without it ſelf (a ſtrange Truth) in a ſignal concomitant: and who will doubt of his faith for want of a concomitant ſign, when he certainly feeleth the thing it ſelf? Will not ſuch think they may ſin ſalva fide? When as if they were rightly taught, that juſtifying ſaving faith (as ſuch) is the receiving of Chriſt for Saviour, and Lord, and ſo a giving up themſelves both to be ſaved and guided by him, then they would find that faith in Chriſt and ſincere obedience to Chriſt have a little neerer relation; and then a man might ſay to ſuch a preſumer, as I remember Tertullian excellently doth, De poenitent. Operum pag. (mihi) 119. Caeterum non leviter in Domixum peccat qui quum amulo ejus Diabolo poenitentiâ renunciaſſet, & hoc nomine illum Domino ſubjeciſſet, rurſus …undem regreſſuſuo erigit, & exultatione ejus ſeipſum facit, ut denuo malus recuperata praeda ſua, adverſus Domin…m gaudeat. Nonne quod dicere quoque periculoſum eſt, ſed ad adificationem proferendum eſt, d…abolum Domino praeponit? Comparationem enim videtur egiſſe qui utrum que cognoverit, & judicato pronunciaſſe …um meliorem cujus ſe rurſus eſſe maluerit, &c. Sed aiunt quidam, ſatis Deum habere, ſi corde & animo ſuſpiciatur, licet actu minus fiat: itaque ſe ſalvo metu & Fide peccare: Hoc eſt ſalva caſtitate Matrimonia violare: ſalva pietate parenti venenum temperare; ſic ergo & ipſi ſalva venia in Gehennans detrudentur, dum ſalvo metu peccant.

Again, your Doctrine ſeemeth to me to overthrow the comfort of Believers exceedingly. For how can they have any comfort that know not whether they are juſtified and ſhall be ſaved? and how can they know that, who know not whether they have faith? and how can they know that, when they know not what juſtifying ſaith is? and how can they know what it is, when it is by Divines involved in ſuch a cloud and maze of difficulties? ſome placing it in this, act and ſome in that, and ſome in a Paſſive inſtrumentality, which few underſtand, (If any man in the world do.) For the Habit of faith, that cannot be felt or known of it ſelf immediately, but by its acts (for ſo it is concluded of all Habits, Suarez, Metap. T. 2. diſp. 44 §. 1. pag 332.) and inſtead of the act we are now ſet to enquire after the paſſion? and ſo in the work of examination the buſineſs is to enquire, how and when we did paſſively receive righteouſneſs, or juſtification, or Chriſt for theſe? which let him anſwer for himſelf that can, for I cannot.

But now, on the other ſide, what inconvenience is there in the Doctrine of faith and juſtification as I deliver it? As it is plain, and certain (ſaying no more then is generally granted) ſo I think it is ſafe. Do I aſcribe any of Chriſts honour in the work to man? No man yet hath dared to charge me with that, to my knowledge: and no conſiderate man I believe will do it. I conclude that neither faith nor works is the leaſt part of our legal righteouſneſs: or of that righteouſneſs which we muſt plead againſt the accuſer for our juſtification: which is commonly called by Divines, the matter of our juſtification. The Law which we have broken cannot be ſatisfied (nor God for the breach of it) in the leaſt meaſure by our faith or obedience, nor do they concur as the leaſt degree of that ſatisfaction: But we muſt turn the Law over wholly to our Surety. Only whereas he hath made a new Law or Covenant containing the conditions on our part of the ſaid juſtification and ſalvation▪ I ſay, theſe conditions muſt needs be performed, and that by our ſelves: and who dare deny this? and I ſay that the performance of theſe conditions is our Evangelical righteouſneſs (in reference to that Covenant,) as Chriſts ſatiſfaction is our legal Righteouſneſs (in reference to that firſt Covenant), or as perfect obedience would have been our legal righteouſneſs, if we had ſo obeyed. And for them that ſpeak of inherent Righteouſneſs in any other ſenſe, viz. as it is an imperfect conformity to the Law of works, rather then as a true conformity to the Law or Covenant of grace, I renounce their Doctrine, both as contradictory to it ſelf, and to the truth, and as that which would make the ſame Law to curſe and bleſs the ſame man, and which would ſet up the deſperate Doctrine of Juſtification by the works of the Law: For if men are righteous in reference to that Law, then they may be ſo far juſtified by it.

Nor do I aſcribe to works any part of the office or honour of faith (Though that were not ſo dangerous as to derogate from Chriſt.) For I acknowledge faith the only condition of our firſt Remiſſion and juſtification: and the principal part of the condition of our juſtification as continued and conſummate. And if faith be an inſtrumental cauſe, I do not give that honor from it to works, for they are not ſo: Nay, I boldly again aver, that I give no more to obedience to Chriſt, then Divines ordinarily do, that is, to be the ſecondary part of the condition of continued and conſummate juſtification. Only I give not ſo much as others to faith, becauſe I dare not aſcribe ſo much to man. And yet men make ſuch a noiſe with the terrible name of Juſtification by works (the Lords own phraſe), as if I gave more then themſelves to man, when I give ſo much leſs.

And thus Sir, I have according to your advice, ſpent my ſelf (as you ſpeak) in aiming at that mark which you were pleaſed to ſet me. And now I ſhall proceed to the reſt of your exceptions.

My next anſwer to you was, that [If works under every notion are excluded (as you ſay they are) then repentance is excluded under the notion of a condition or preparative: But repentance under that notion is not excluded: Therefore not works under every notion. To this you reply, that [Repentance is not excluded as qualifying, but as recipient,] which what is it but a plain yielding my Minor, and ſo the cauſe: For this is as much as I ſay. If repentance be a work or act of ours, and not excluded under the notion of a qualification, (or as you elſewhere yield) a Medium ordinatum, and a condition, then works are not under every notion excluded. And that repentance is not recipient, how eaſily do I yeild to you? But do you indeed think that when Paul excludeth the works of the Law, that he excludeth them only as Recipient? and not as qualifying? If ſo, (as this anſwer ſeems to import, ſeeing you will not have me here diſtinguiſh between works of Law, and of Goſpel, or New Covenant) then you give abundance more to works of the Law then I do or dare: For I aver that Paul excludeth them even as qualifications, yea and the very preſence of them: and that the Jews never dreamt of their works being Recipient.

To my next you ſay, [Whether Paul diſpute what is our righteouſneſs, or upon what terms it is made ours it doth not much matter] But I think it of very great moment; they being Queſtions ſo very much different, both in their ſenſe, and importance. And whereas you think Paul ſpeaks chiefly of the manner, I think he ſpeaks of both, but primarily of the (quaſi) materia; and of the manner or means thereto, but ſecondarily in reference to that. So that I think the chief Queſtion which Paul doth debate, was, Whether we are Juſtified by our own works or merits, or by Anothers, viz. the ſatisfaction of a ſurety? which yet becauſe it is no way made ours but by believing, therefore he ſo puts the Queſtion, whether by works of the Law, or by faith? and ſo that he makes them two immediate oppoſites not granting any tertium, I eaſily yield. (But of that before.)

To the next you ſay, that [I cannot find ſuch a figure for faith Relatively in my ſenſe.] Anſw. And I conceive that faith in my ſenſe may be taken Relatively full as well as in yours▪ Doubtleſs acceptance of an offered Redeemer and all his benefits doth relate as properly to what is accepted (viz. by the aſſent of the underſtanding initially, and by the election and conſent of the will conſummately) as a Phyſical Paſſive reception or inſtrumentality can do. And alſo as it is a condition I make little doubt, but it relateth to the thing given on that condition: and that the very name of a condition is relative. So that in my ſenſe faith relateth to Chriſt two ways: Whereof the former is but its very nature, and ſo its aptitude to its office: The later is that proper reſpect in which it immediately or directly juſtifieth. Yet do I not mean as you ſeem to do, as I gather by your phraſe of [putting Love and Obedience for Chriſts Righteouſneſs]: For I conceive it may be put relatively, and yet not ſtrictly (loco correlati) for the thing related to: when I ſay my hands or teeth feed me, I do not put them inſtead of my Meat; and yet I uſe the words relatively, meaning my Meat principally, and my teeth ſecondarily: Neither do I mean that it relateth to Chriſts righteouſneſs only or principally; but firſt to himſelf. And I doubt not but Love to Chriſt and Obedience to him as Redeemer, do relate to him: but not ſo fully, clearly and directly expreſs him as related to, as Faith: Faith being alſo ſo comprehenſive a grace as to include ſome others. It is a true ſaying, that a poor woman that is marryrd to a Prince is made honourable by love, and continued ſo by duty to her husband: But it is more obſcure and improper then to ſay, ſhe is made honourable by Marriage, or taking ſuch a man to her husband, which includes love, and implyeth duty and faithfulneſs, as neceſſarily ſubſequent. I conceive with Judicious Doctor Preſton, that faith is truly and properly ſuch a conſent, contract, or marriage with Chriſt.

Next to your ſimilitude: you ſay [that I hold that not only ſeeing this brazen Serpent, but any other Actions of ſenſe, will as well heal the wounded Chriſtian.] To which I anſwer. Similitudes run not on all four. Thus far I believe that this holds. 1. Chriſt was lift up on the Croſs as the brazen Serpent was lift up. 2. He was lift up for a cure to ſin-ſtung ſouls, as the brazen Serpent for the ſtung bodies. 3. That as every one that looked on the Serpent was cured (an eaſie condition,) ſo every one that believeth Chriſt to be the appointed Redeemer, and heartily Accepteth him on the terms he is offered, and ſo truſteth in him, ſhall not periſh, but have everlaſting life. 4. That as the cure of their bodies came not from any natural reaſon drawn from the eye, or from any natural excellency or efficacy of ſeeing, above hearing or feeling, but meerly from the free will and pleaſure of God, who ordained that looking ſhould be the condition of their cure: So all thoſe Acts (uſually comprized or implyed in the word believing) which juſtifie, do it not from any natural excellency, efficacy or inſtrumentality, but meerly from the good pleaſure of the Lawgiver: And therefore the natural Receptivity of Faith (that is its very formal eſſence) muſt not be given as the proper direct cauſe of its Juſtifying: But that is, its conditionality from the free appointment of God.

But on the other ſide, 1. It was only one Act of one ſenſe which was the condition of their cure: but you will not ſay I believe that it is only one act of one faculty which juſtifieth: however I will not. 2. It was the Act of ſeeing which cured them, without touching, laying hold on, apprehending, reſting on, &c. But you will not ſay ſo of juſtifying faith. 3. The ſight, which was the condition of their cure, was no actuall reception of the brazen Serpent, but the ſpecies of that Serpent by the eye; and ſo the eye did no otherwiſe receive the Serpent, then it received every Object it behold, even the Serpent that ſtung them. But if you ſay, that our receiving Chriſt is but per ſimplicem apprehenſionem objecti, and that it is a receiving of his ſpecies, and ſo that we receive Chriſt no otherwiſe then we receive Satan, or any Object of Knowledge, I will not be of that opinion. 4. Their cure was ſimul & ſemel: but our Juſtification is a continued Act; as really in doing all our lives, as at firſt. 5 Therefore though one act finiſhed their cure, and there was no condition perſcribed as requiſite for the conſummation or continuance: yet when our Juſtification is begun, and we truly juſtified, there is further conditions preſcribed for its continuance and conſummation. To conclude, I am ſo far from ſaying, that any other Act will as well heal the wounded Chriſtian, beſides what God hath made the expreſs condition of his cure, that I flatly aver no other will do it. But whether he hath made any one ſingle act (or Paſsion) to be the whole of that condition, I have elſewhere out of Scripture ſhewed you, and you do not deny what I ſay.

My two laſt Anſwers to your expoſition of Pauls words, you are pleaſed to overpaſs; the laſt of which (the ninth) being the main that I made uſe of: viz. that Paul taketh the word Work… more ſtrictly, for ſuch working as maketh the Reward to be not of Grace but of debt: and in this ſence I diſclaim all works, not only (as you do) from being receptive, or inſtrumental, or effective, but from being concomitant: why you ſaid nothing to this my chief Anſwer, I do not know.

You next tell me that I cannot take the Aſſemblies definition in that ſence as they declare it, or the Scripture words, which are Metaphorical imply: for its the reſting of a burdened ſoul upon Chriſt only for Righteouſneſs; and by this Chriſts Righteouſneſs is made over to us; and its a receiving of Chriſt as the hand embraceth any Object, &c. Anſwer. That the word Receiving and Reſting are Metaphorical, I eaſily grant you; and wonder the more that you ſtill inſiſt on them, and inſtead of reducing them to more proper expreſsions, do here add Metaphor to Metaphor, till all your definition be a meer Allegory, when you know how much Metaphors do ſeduce. But for the Aſſemblies Definition. I embrace it unfeignedly in that ſence as the words ſeem to me moſt evidently to import, without uſing violence with them. But I perceive by this, that you will not think it enough in a man to ſubſcribe to national Confeſsions and Catechiſms in the obvious ſence, or that which he judgeth the plain proper ſence, except he alſo agree with you in the explication. Some think it not enough that we ſubſcribe to the Scripture, becauſe we may miſunderſtand it, and therefore we muſt ſubſcribe to national Confeſſions, as more explicate: (which I like well, ſo we add nothing to Gods word, nor thruſt our own Commentaries into the Text, or obtrude out own Doctrines upon men as Articles of their faith, or at leaſt, as the Biſhops did the Ceremonies, which they made indifferent in word, but neceſſary indeed:) But now I perceive the matter comes all to one in the iſſue; when you cannot make a definition of Faith in ſuch Language as is any eaſier to be underſtood then the Scripture: when you and I cannot both underſtand it: and I find that many are of Bellarmines judgement (Apol. c. 7. cited by Mr. Vines in his Sermon againſt Haereſ. pag. 50.) That a man may be an Haeretick though he believe the Scriptures, the three Creeds, and the four great general Councils. But for the ſence of the Aſſemblies definition, 1 I know not what you mean by the words [as they declare it:] If any private declaration, I am not to take notice of it, nor do I know what it meaneth, and could wiſh they would do, or might have done as Mr. Vines deſired in his Sermon, J…. 28. 1645. that is, [To ſecond their concluſions with the Reaſons and Grounds of them; which will do much to make them paſs for currant: ſeeing (ſaith he) the Gorgons head which ſtruck all dumb in former times, The Church, The Church, is not likely to have the ſame operation row in this ſeeing and ſearching age; for though men be willing to be ſubject to Authority, yet as they are men they will be ſlaves to Reaſon.] So that if there were any private expoſition, I would we had it. But if you mean only what is declared in the words of the Definition, I am moſt confident, though I never was in the Aſſembly, that I have hit on their ſence far neerer then you ſeem to have done: and I dare not think otherwiſe, leſt I be hainouſly cenſorious of ſo reverend an Aſſembly, which I am reſolved not to be. 1. Their very words are a receiving of Chriſt, and not immediately and primarily his Righteouſneſs, but himſelf; and in the confeſſion they ſay as I do, that it is an accepting, receiving and reſting on Chriſt. 2. And as Chriſt the anointed, which Name ſignifieth the Offices which he is anointed to, viz. King, Prieſt, &c. 3. It maketh it to conſiſt in no one act, but ſeveral, expreſſed in two phraſes: 1. Receiving Chriſt. 2. Reſting on him alone for ſalvation. 4. It expreſly ſaith, that it is a receiving of him, as he is offered in the Goſpel, and that is, not as a juſtifier only, but as a Lord and Prophet, and that as immediately as the other, and conjunct with it: for he is no where offered as a juſtifier alone; if he be, ſhew where it is. 5. And hence it is plain that they mean no Reception but moral, by Willing, Conſenting, Accepting (as they expreſly ſay in the confeſſion of Faith) For he is no otherwiſe offered to us in the Goſpel: He is not offered to our Phyſical Reception. It is not his perſon in ſubſtance that is offered to the Contact of our Spirits, much leſs of our fleſh; but his perſon as cloathed with his Relations, of Mediator, Redeemer, Lord, Saviour, &c. And can you receive a King, as King, (who is perſonally diſtant or inviſible) by any other Reception then I have ſaid? If we do receive a King into England, the only Acts of the ſoul are hearty conſenting, and what is therein and thereto implyed: though bodily Actions may follow: (which as to Chriſt we cannot perform.) I think verily this is the plain ſound ſence of the Aſſembly, and ſhall believe ſo, till the ſame Authority, that thus defined, do otherwiſe interpret their own definition.

And for your phraſe of [Reſting a burdened ſoul on Chriſt for Righteouſneſs] I doubt not as it intendeth Affiance, but it is as Perkins, Dr. Downam, Rob. Baronius, &c. ſay, a fruit Of faith ſtrictly taken, rather then faith it ſelf: but if you take faith in a larger ſence (as the Goſpel not ſeldom doth, and againſt which I am no adverſary) ſo Affiance is part of faith it ſelf. But that it is the whole of that faith, I ſhall never believe without ſtronger Arguments; where you ſay, [Its the receiving Chriſt as the hand embraceth any Object.] I anſwer. 1. I am glad you here grant Chriſt himſelf to be the Object. 2. If you mean, [as verily as the hand, &c.] So I grant it, if a moral receiving may be properly ſaid to be as true as a phyſical. But if you mean By a Phyſical Contact and Reception as the hand doth, &c. then I am far from believing that ever Chriſt or our Aſſembly ſo meant, or ever had ſo groſs a thought. Where you ſay, I take it not the in ſence as the Scripture words imply;] I anſwer. When I ſee that manifeſted I ſhall believe it. When it is ſaid John 1. He came to his own, and his own received him not: 1. Is it meant they took him not in their hands, or received not his Perſon into their houſes? the later is true▪ But 1. Only in a ſecond place; but their hearts were the firſt Receptacle 2. Elſe thoſe were no Unbelievers where Chriſt never came in perſon; And that had no houſes; 3. And that receiving cannot belong to us that never ſaw him, nor to any ſince his Aſcenſion. 2. Or is it the Intellective Reception of his ſpecies? I trow not: I have ſaid enough of that before. 3. Or is it a moral Reception of him as thus and thus related, volendo, eligendo, conſentiendo, diligendo (pardon this laſt, it is but the qualification of the reſt) & conſequenter fidendo? I think this is it. If you can find a fourth way, you will do that which was never done (to my knowledge) and then you will be a Novelliſt as well, as I.

For your next expreſſions, I anſwer to them, that you do truly apprehend that I am loth to ſeem to recede from others, (and as loth to do it, but magis amica veritas: And I cannot believe what my liſt, nor like thoſe that can.) By which you may truly know, that I do it not out of affectation of ſingularity (as he knoweth that knoweth my heart), nor intend to be any inſtrument of diviſion in the Church. And if my aſſertions are deſtructive of what others deliver, it is but what ſome men, and not what all deliver: Not againſt the Aſſembly, nor many learned Divines who from ſeveral parts of the Land have ſignified to me their Aſſent: beſides all thoſe great names that appear for me in print.

But you tell me that [I may not build on ſome Homilitical popular expreſſions in any mans books.] Anſwer, Let me again name to you but the men I laſt named, and try whether you will again ſo entitle their writings. The firſt and chief is Dr. Preſton, who was known to be a man of moſt choice notions, and ſo Judged by thoſe that put out his books, and his credit ſo great in England, that he cracks his own that ſeeks to crack it. And his Sermons were preached before as judicious an Auditory (at leaſt) as your Lectures, and yet you defend your own expreſſions. Yea it is not once nor twice, not five times only, but almoſt through all his Books, that Dr. Preſton harpeth upon this ſtring, as if it were the choiſeſt notion that he intended to diſcloſe. Yea it is in his very Definition of faith as juſtifying; and Dr. Preſton was no homiletical Definer. I can produce the like Teſtimony of Dr. Stoughton: (two as great Divines in my eſteem as moſt ever England or the world bred.) Another is Mr. Wallis: Doubtleſs, Sir, no homiletical popular man in Writing: nor could you have quickly bethought you of an Engliſh Book that leſs deſerves thoſe attributes: His words are theſe. I aſſent not to place the ſaving Act of faith, either with Mr. Cotton (as his Lordſhip cites him) in the laying hold of, or aſſenting to that Promiſe, &c. nor yet in a particular application of Chriſt to my ſelf in aſſurance, or a believing that Chriſt is mine, &c. But I chooſe rather to place it in an act of the Will, then in either of theſe forenamed acts of the Ʋnderſtanding. It is an Accepting of Chriſt offered, rather then an Aſſenting to a propoſition affirmed. To as many as received him, &c. that is, to them that believe in his name. John 1. God makes an Offer of Chriſt to all (elſe ſhould not Reprobates be condemned for not accepting of him, as neither the Devils are, becauſe he was not offered to them.) Whoſoever will, let him come and take of the water of life freely, Rev. 22.17. Whereupon the believing ſoul replies, I will: and ſo takes him. When a Gift is offered to me, that which maketh it to be mine is my Acceptation, &c. If you call this taking of Chriſt (or confenting that Chriſt ſhall be my Saviour) a Depending, a Reſting or relying on Chriſt for ſalvation (if you ſpeak of an act of the Will) it is all one; for Taking of Chriſt to be my Saviour, and committing my ſelf to Chriſt to be ſaved, is the ſame: Both of them being but a conſenting to this Covenant, I will be your God, and you ſhall be my People, &c. And if you make this the ſaving Act of faith, then will Repentance (ſo far as it is diſtinct from Faith) be a conſequent of it: Confidence alſo, &c. Thus Mr. Wallis is clear, that the Nature of Faith is the ſame that I have affirmed, and in no popular Sermon, but in his Truth tryed. pag. 94, 95. And on theſe grounds he well anſwers Bellarmines Dilemma, which elſe will be but ſhiftingly anſwered. The next is Mr. Norton of New England, a man judged one of their beſt Diſputants, or elſe they would not have choſe him to encounter Apollonius: And will you call his very Definition of Faith in an accurate Catechiſm, an homiletical popular expreſſion? What then in the whole world ſhall eſcape that cenſure? His Words are: [Queſt. What is juſtifying Faith? Anſw. It is a ſaving grace of the Spirit, flowing from Election, whereby the ſoul receiveth Jeſus Chriſt, as its Head and Saviour, according as he is revealed in the Goſpel.] I ſubſcribe to this Definition from my heart. The next cited was Mr. Culverwell, not in any popular Sermon, but in a ſolid well approved Treatiſe of Faith, and not in common paſſages, but his very definition of faith, pag. 13.17. and after all concludes. pag. 19. [Thus we ſee that the very nature of faith, conſiſteth in the true Acceptation of Chriſt proclaimed in the Goſpel] The next I cited (about the Definition of faith) was Mr. Throgmorton, who in his accurate Treatiſe of Faith (and not in any popular Sermons) and that many times over, doth make Faith to be the receiving Chriſt for Prophet, and only Rabbi, to be his Diſciples, and as the only Way and Truth, and alſo as King, Head, Husband, Prieſt, &c. and by this we are made Partakers of him and all his benefits. pag. 6.29.31.82. &c. And for the great point that you ſtick at of Juſtification, I will repeat the words of two of thoſe Authors which I have named: And 1. Of learned Conr. Bergius, in whom you ſhall have the Teſtimony of the Auguſtane Confeſſion, Luther, Meutzer, &c. included, both about the nature and extent of Faith; about works Legal and Evangelical; about Juſtification as begun, and as continued, and the diſtinct conditions, and about the concurrence of Obedience, &c. Praxis Cathol. diſſert. 7. pag. 973. &c. §. 41. Nec tamen negat quiſquam fidem eſſe Obedientiam in ſano ſenſu ex Rom. 1.5. & 6.17. & 10.16, & 16 26. 2 Theſſ. 1 8. Act. 5.3 2. Heb. 5.9. 1 Pet. 1.2, 14, 22. 1. Fides eſt obedientia quatenus ejus actus proprius reſpondet praecepto Evangelii, Crede in dominum Jeſum, &c. Ideo enim, ut Calvinus a…t ad Rom. 1.5. nomine obedientiae inſignitur, quod Dominus per Evangelium nos vocat, nos vocanti per fidem reſpondemus. Et ſic fides, (ut loquitur Apol. Auguſt. Conf. in reſp. ad Arg. pag. 125.) eſt Obedientia erga Evangelium: quae cum Obedientia mandatorum legis minime confundi debet. Nam ut recte Meutzerus (in exeg Auguſt Conf. …ct. 4 cont. Phot. in. 15.) Quantum ab Evangelio Lex diſtat, tantum haec obedientia ab illa diſterminatur. 42. 2. Eſt etiam fides obed entia, quantenus per Synecdochen Metonymicam ſignificat totum cultum à fidelibus praeſti…um; radicem una cum fructibus, &c. Nota enim eſt conſuetudo ſermonis (ut inquit Apol. Conf. Auguſt. de impl. leg. pag. 87.) quod interdum eodem verbo cauſam & effectus complectimur foreign. Ita accipi poteſt fides, Heb. 13.7. and 12.1, 2. Rom. 1.8. 1 Theſſ. 1.8. Ier. 7.28. 43. Nec dubium eſt cum dicitur, hoc eſt mandatum ut credamus & Diligamus ▪ 1 John 3.23. ſicut in praecepto Diligendi & habitus charitatis & fructus atque Opera, ad quae habitus ordinatur, mandata ſunt: it… etiam in praecepto credendi & habitum fidei & fructus ejus nobis mandatos eſſe. Ʋnde cum ipſa etiam charitas inter fructus ſit fidei, ſit ut tota doctrina Chriſtiana aliquando verbum vel pradieatio fidei, tota Religio Chriſtiana, tota oeconomia novi Teſtamenti fides praecipue appelletur, Gal. 1.23. 1 Tim. 4.6. Gal. 5.6. and 3.23. So he proceeds and alledges Luther taking faith in that large ſenſe, including charity and obedience; and by Works, meaning actiones factas cum opinione meriti, & cum expectatione juſtificationis & vitae aeterne tanquam mercedis debitae Serm. de miſ. & li. de libert. Chriſtiana. Tom. 2. Wit. f. 4.5. & Tom. 5. com. in Zach. 2.8. & aed Gal. c. 2. f. 300. Et ultra p. 977. Cum dicitur [ſine operibus legis] excluduntur, 1. Opera facta…n veritate obedientiae legalis, ac meriti proinde per innocentiam, cui detur Merces citra remiſſionem peccati & imputationem ſecundum gratiam. Rom. 4.3. & ſ. Quia cauſatus eſt Apoſtolus toto capite 1 & 2. & ſ. Talem Obedientiam à nemine haberi, ſed omnes ſub peccato eſſe, &c. 2. Excluduntur etiam opera facta cum opionione verae obedientia legalis ac meriti per innocentiam; quia haec ipſa ſunt etiam peccata & mendacia merentia poenam, Phil. 3.7

3. Excluduntur etiam opera facta cum opinione meriti ſine obedientia, & innocentia legals aut ex qualicunque imperfecta aut particulari obedientia cui aliqualiter detur Merces citra imputationem ſecundum gratiam, &c. So that this is all the excluſion of Works, that he acknowledgeth: and ſhews that Bellarmine is driven to this, which he approveth. §. 44. Ex dictis hiſce tribus modis, primo modo excluduntur vera opera legis, ita ut non adſint, licet diberent adeſſe primo creationis jure; poſterioribus autem duobus modis excluduntur praeſumpta pera ita ut non debeant adeſſe ſed caveri potius; Et omnibus hiſce modis opponitur inter ſe Lex operum, per quam relinquitur gloriatio homini, & Lex Fidei, per quam excluditur Gloriatio, Rom. 3.27.

Afterwards, one ſenſe in which he ſaith Fides ſola juſtificat, is this, ſola eſt fides quaten us opponitur legis operum obedientiae; cujus veritas in nullo eſt hominum, opinio autem in nullo debet eſſe; & ſignificat contrà obedientiam legis Fidei, ſen praecepti, non de operando & expectando vitam ut mercedem debitam citra imputationem ſecundum gratiam; ſed de credendo in Chriſtum & accipiendo & Retinendo vitam gratiae, & expectando vitam gloriae, ut donum mere gratuitum per imputationem ſecundum gratiam in Chriſto, quem praepoſ…it Deus placamentum in ſanguine ipſius.

And afterward, Ex dictis facile intelligitur nibil his repugnare Auguſtinum, (qui praecipue nobis opponitur) cum docet, excludi tantum ab Apoſtolo opera facta ſine fide & ſpiritu Chriſti: (hoc eſt, ſine viva fide promiſſionis, & abnegatione meriti proprii, ſicut & Bellarm. ſupradocebat, excludi opera quibus id quod redditur eſt merces non gratia) opera vero facta cum fide & Spiritu Chriſti ad illam movente non excludi. Num neque nos ea excludimus, ne ſint, aut debeant eſſe; ſed diſtinguit etiam Lutherus opera legis & opera Chriſti in nobis per fidem operantis & viventis per omnia. Additque haec non poſſe magis omitti, quam ipſam fidem, nec eſſe minus neceſſaria quam fides; in li. de vot. mon. …. 2. Wit. f. 281.

But the chief thing I intend is in the next words. At quemadmodum caeterae actiones ſignificatae per fidem quaſi materiaiiter & Synecdochicè per ſe & directè non ordinantur ad amicitiam Dei & ſalutem proprie Efficiendam (as he miſtakingly thinks faith is) ſed vel ad fidem cui quequo modo proſunt, vel ad amicitiam Dei & ſalutem ſaltem non amittendam: ita neque Juſtificabunt & ſalvabunt proprie & directe. Proderunt tamen ad utrumque quatenus ſunt, 1. vel diſpoſitiones ad fidem, ut Pareus. 2. Effectus, &c. 3. Quatenus per illa excludimus & cavemus peccata & ingratitudinem, quae omnino vera cauſa amittendae Juſtitiae & ſalutis futura eſſent: qualem cauſam removentem probibeus appellare, & ad cauſas per accidens referre ſolent. Omnis enim arbor quae non, &c. (Here he ſpeaks only of the natural conducibility of works, and omitteth the moral conditionality; and ſo gives a cauſality per accidens to them, which is more then I do.) §. 54. & in hac fructuum comparatione, ſub notione proprie cauſae finalis (it was not then conſidered that juſtification is a continued Act) pertinentis ad non amittendum ſed retinendum gratuito data, ordo & reſpectus operum ad ſalutem ſimpliciſſimè, & commodiſſimè ad Scripturae filum explicari poteſt. 2 Pet. 1.10. 2 Joh. 8.

Accordingly before in this Type he makes the conditions to be 1. Acceptation: (that faith) 2. and retention: (this he ſheweth is alſo by Goſpel works) among divers allegations of his out of the Apol. Ʋrſin. Davenant, &c. I will add one out of Gualther in 1 Cor. hom. 28. Ʋt filius etſi haeres natus ſit, abdicatur tamen, & ab bereditate excidit, ſi ſe inobedientem & contumaciorem praebeat: ita nos quoque regni caelorum bereditatem, quae ex adoptionis gratia nobis debetur, minime quidem noſtris operibus meremur tandem vero noſtra contumacia amittimus, & noſtro magno merito abdicamur, ſi tantae gratiae iniqui ſimus aeſtimatores.

And he reconcileth Paul and James thus, ſ. 56. Deinque notandum eſt: alium eſſe loquendi & docendi modum contra Judaiſmum & contemptum gratiae: alium contra ſecuritatem & abuſum gratiae cum diſputatur praeciput contra Judaiſmum ſive Juſtitiam operum, uti Paulus in ep. ad Rom. & alibi facit; tunc docemur ſola fide Juſtiſtcare, hoc eſt; nihil in nobis placere Deo niſi per abnegationem meriti & acceptationem contra doni Evangelici. At cum diſputatur contra ſecuritatem, & docetur quid reſpectu amicitiae Divinae nobis agendum ſit (prout Jacobus in Epiſ. ſua fecit, & bodiè, vel maxime neceſſe eſt (we may truly ſay ſo) ut Dr. Toſſanus in ſua Cont. Pſendevangelicos diſputatione et alii prè ac prudenter j…mſridem monuerunt) tunc negatur ſolam fidem ſufficere, & praecipiuntur omnia quae quoquo modo proſunt: ſive diſponant ad filem, ſive in iis conſummetur fides, (ſicut quaevis res fine & effictibus ſuis conſummatur: arbor fructibus, potentia animae motibus corporis, non quod ad eſſentiam ſed quod ad uſum) ſive praeſens jam amicitia per illa firmetur ne diſſiliat, vel etiam augeatur quod ad effectus aliquos, & hoc modo quaſi impleatur.

And he concludes thus. § 58. Ʋno verbo: ſolà fide juſtificamur: hoc eſt: Nullo noſtro merito, ſive ipſius fidei, ſive alterius actionis praeter fidem. Probetur evidenter & catholice meritum quale à noſtris negatur, tunc etiam illud praeter ſolam fidem admiſſuri ſumus.

Lud. Crocius ſaith, (Syntag. l. 4. pag. 1123.) Fides etiam ſola juſtificat quatenus notat obedientiam quandam expectantem promiſſionem ut donum gratuitum; quomodo formaliter quidem conſiſtit in applicatione promiſſionis, quam tamen & pracedunt diſpoſitiones aliquae ad hunc ipſum fidei actum, & ſequuntur fructus: unde plures virtutes vel actus tum antecedentes tum conſequentes connotat; & opponitur illi obedientia quae non expectat promiſſionem tanquam donum omnino gratuitum, ſed ut mercedem propoſitam ſub conditione operis alicujus praeter acceptationem & gratitudinem debitam quae ſua natura in omni donatione quamvis gratuitâ requiri ſolet. Et hujuſmodi obedientia peculiariter Opus ab Apoſtolo, & Latinis propr è meritum dicitur. Et qui hâc conditione obediunt operantes vocantur, Rom. 4.4. and 11.6. Atque ſi it a hac propoſitio exponatur, ea quidem opera quae cum fide conſiſtere nequeant, id eſt, que fiunt cum fiducia & opinione meriti, prorſus excluduntur, ita ut non ſolum negentur juſtifica…e, ſed & adeſſe tam in juſtificate, quàm in juſtificando.

Joh. Crocius de juſtifi. diſp. 13. pag. 67… Credenti facta eſt promiſſio, fide accepturum remiſſionem peccatorum: mendico & aegro non eſt facta promiſſio, ſi ille manum extendat, datum iri elcemoſynam; fi iſte pharmacum manu capiat convaliturum, &c.

Mr. Gataker againſt Saltmarſh ſhadows, &c. pag. 26.40, 41, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 53, 64. doth fully give as much to Faith, Repentance, Obedience as I do. Nor know I any reaſon why, (Johns) Baptiſm for the ſubſtance of it, ſhould not be an example to us alſo in theſe times, being the Baptiſm of Repentance unto Remiſſion of ſins, that is, if I miſtake not, Baptiſm obſigning remiſſion of ſins upon condition of Repentance. pag. 40. and pag. 41. He ſaith,[that pardon of ſin and ſalvation are propounded and preached upon condition of Faith, Repentance, and Newneſs of life, which are the conditions of the Goſpel: and yet may obey alſo be ſo termed as conditions of peace upon agreement unto, and performance whereof peace may be had, which otherwiſe cannot be obtained.] And he evinceth this by an Argument drawn from the definition or nature of a condition, thus, [That which is ſo propounded, as that being performed, life and ſalvation may undoubtedly be attained, and without which it cannot be had, may well be termed a condition: but ſuch are the things before mentioned; therefore they may juſtly be termed conditions] vid. ult. and p. 48. Suppoſe a King be content at the ſuit either of the parties themſelves, or any friend, to grant his gracious pardon to a company of notorious Rebels that had riſen up againſt him, &c. upon condition that they acknowledge their offence, and their ſorrow for it, with purpoſe and promiſe of living loyally for time to come; whether would you deem this to be free grace or no? &c. Were he not a moſt ungracious wretch, that having his pardon on ſuch terms granted and ſigned him▪ ſhould in regard of thoſe conditions deny it to be of free Grace? and whether they do not blaſpheme Gods free Grace, that deny it to be free Grace, if it be propounded on terms of Relief, Repentance and Amendment of life. Sir, Whatſoever you ſay to us, take heed how you tell Chriſt, that he doth not freely ſave you, if he will not ſave you unleſs you believe, &c.] In many more places, and more fully Mr. Gataker ſhews that Faith, Repentance, Obedience, are jointly conditions of Pardon, &c. Only he gives Faith a peculiar Receptivity, which I never denyed: And he yields to call it an Inſtrument, which ſo largely taken, I will not contend againſt. But ſtill I ſay that this Receptivity is but the aptitude of Faith in a ſpecial manner to this work of juſtifying: and the reſt are apt to be conditions in thir place, or elſe God would not have made them conditions. Even in regard of its natural aptitude and uſe [Humiliation, (as Mr. Vines ſaith, Serm. on James 4.8. pag.12.) though it do not properly cleanſe the hands, yet it plucks off the Gloves, and makes them bare for waſhing: and Godly ſorrow with its ſeven Daughters, 2 Cor. 7.11. are clenſing things.

Dr. Stoughton, Righteous mans plea for Happ. Serm. 6. pag. 32. Faith comprehends not only the Act of the Ʋnderſtanding, but the Act of the Will too, ſo as the Will doth embrace and adhere, and cleave to thoſe Truths which the underſtanding conceives: and not only embracing meerly by Aſſent to the Truth of it, but by cloſing with the Good of it: (What is that but loving?) taſting and reliſhing it. As faith in Chriſt is not only the Aſſenting of a mans mind that Chriſt is the Saviour, but a reſultancy of the Will on Chriſt as a Saviour, embracing of him, and loving, eſteeming and honouring him as a Saviour. The Scripture comprehends both theſe together, and there is a rule for it, which the Rabbins give for the opening of the Scripture, viz. Verba ſenſus etiam denotant affectus, as Jo. 17.3. This is eternal life to know thee, &c. It is not bare Knowledge the Scripture means, but Knowledge joined with affections.] You ſee Dr. Stoughton took Love to be full as near Kin to Faith as I do. Many the like and more full in him I paſs. I cited in my Append. Alſtedius, Junius, Paraeus, Scharpius, Aretius, Ball, &c. making Faith, & Obedience, & Gratitude Conditions of the new Covenant (& who ſaith not the ſame?) If all theſe be homiletical and popular, I much miſtake them; which yet I cite not as if no words might be found in any of theſe Authors that ſeem to ſpeak otherwiſe; but to ſhew that I am not wholly ſingular, (Though if I were, I cannot help it when I will.)

On the next Q. Whether a dying man may look on his Faith and Obedience, & Duty as the condition of the N. Cov. by him performed? You would perſwade me that I cannot think that I ſpeak to the point in this: but you are miſtaken in me: for I can miſtake more then that comes to: and indeed I yet think I ſpoke as directly to the queſtion in your terms laid down, as was poſsible: for I changed not one of your terms, but mentioned the Affirmative as your ſelf expreſſed it: If you did mean otherwiſe then you ſpoke, I knew not that, nor can yet any better underſtand you. Only I can feel that all the difference between you and me muſt be decided by diſtinguiſhing of [Conditions:] but you never yet go about it ſo as I can underſtand you. You here ask me, [Whether I think you deny a godly life to be a comfortable Teſtimony, or neceſſary qualification of a man for pardon?] Anſwer. 1. But the Queſtion is not of the ſignificancy or Teſtimony, nor yet of all kind of qualification; that is an ambiguous term, and was not in the Queſtion, but of the conditionality. 2. You yield to the term Condition your ſelf elſewhere, and therefore need not ſhun it. 3. Qualifications and Conditions are either phyſical and remote, of which I raiſe no queſtion: ſo the Eſſence of the ſoul is a condition, and ſo hearing the Goſpel is a natural Condition of him that will underſtand it; and underſtanding is a natural Qualification of him that will believe it: For ignoti nulla fides. But it is another ſort of conditions you know that we are in ſpeech of, which I have defined, and Mr. Gataker before cited: viz. Moral legal conditions ſo called in ſenſu forenſi vel legali: when the Law of Chriſt hangs our actual Juſtification and ſalvation on the doing or not doing ſuch a thing. Yet do I very much diſtinguiſh between the Nature and Uſes of the ſeveral Graces or Duties contained in the conditions; for though they are all conditions, yet they were not all for the ſame reaſon, or to the ſame uſe ordained to be conditions: but repentance in one ſence as preparatory to faith: and Faith. 1. Becauſe it honoureth Chriſt, and debaſeth our ſelves. 2. Becauſe it being in the full an Acceptation of the thing offered, is the moſt convenient means to make us Poſſeſſors without any contempt of the Gift; with other reaſons that might be found: So I might aſſign the reaſons (as they appear to us) why God hath aſſigned Love to Chriſt, and ſincere Obedience, and forgiving others, their ſeveral parts and places in this conditionality; (but I have done it in my Aphoriſms;) but then all theſe are drawn from the diſtinct nature and uſe of theſe duties Eſſentially in themſelves conſidered, which is but their Aptitude for the place or conditionality which they are appointed to, and would of themſelves have done nothing without ſuch appointment. So that it is one queſtion to ask, Why doth Faith or Works of Obedience to Chriſt Juſtifie? (To which I anſwer; Becauſe it was the pleaſure of God to make them the conditions of the Covenant, and not becauſe of their own nature directly:) and its another Queſtion, Why did God chooſe Faith to the Precedency in this work? To which I anſwer. 1. Properly there is no cauſe of Gods actions without himſelf. 2. But ſpeaking of him after the manner of men, as we muſt do, it is becauſe Faith is fitter then any other Grace for this Honor and Office, as being both a high honouring of God, by believing him (thats as for Aſſent) and in its own Eſſential nature, a hearty thankfull Acceptance of his Son, both to be our Lord (which is both for the Honor of God and our own good) and our Saviour to deliver and glorifie us: and ſo is the moſt rational way that man can imagine to make us partakers of the procured happineſs, without either our own danger (if a heavier condition had been laid upon us) or the diſhonour of the Mediator: either by diminiſhing the eſtimation of the favour (if we had done any more to the procuring it our ſelves) or by contempt of the Gift, (if we had not been required and conditioned with ſo much as thankfully and lovingly to accept it.) And then if the Queſtion be, Why God hath aſſigned ſincere. Obedience and Perſeverance therein to that place of ſecondary Conditionality for the continuance and conſummation of Juſtification, and for the attaining of ſalvation? I anſwer. Not becauſe they have any ſuch Receptive nature as faith, but becauſe Faith being an Acceptance of Chriſt as Lord alſo, and delivering and reſigning up the ſoul to him accordingly in Covenant, this Duty is therefore neceſſarily implyed, as the thing promiſed by us in that Covenant, and ſo in ſome ſence greater then the covenanting it ſelf, or the end of it: and Chriſt never intended to turn man out of his ſervice, and diſcharge him from Obedience; but to lay on him an eaſier and lighter yoak and burden, to learn of him, &c. and therefore well may he make this the condition of their finding Eaſe and Reſt to their ſouls, Mat. 11.28, 29. For, for this end he dyed, that he might be Lord, Rom. 14.9. And therefore when we are freely pardoned, & bought from hell, it is equal that Chriſt ſhould rule us, who bought us, and that his Covenant hang till the continuance of our Legal title to pardon juſtification, and glory, and ſo the full poſſeſſion of them upon this perſeverance in ſincere loving grateful ſubjection to him that bought us, and by him to the Father. And thus Sir, I have digreſſed and uſed many words on this, (which to you I think needleſs) not only becauſe I perceive that you acknowledge the conditionality of obedience in ſome ſenſe, but tell me not in what ſenſe, but leſt you ſhould not diſcern my ſenſe, who deſire to ſpeak as plain as I can, that you may truly ſee wherein we differ: And that I alſo may ſee it when you have as clearly opened your meaning of your term, [Qualifications.]

And for your Queſtion [Whether a godly man can think the Righteouſneſs of Chriſt made his by working, or only believing.] I anſwer, cauſally and efficiently by neither, I think, (though you think otherwiſe); I dare not ſo advance faith, and ſo advance man. I remember good, old, learned, ſolid Gatakers words to Saltmarſh (pag. 53,) It is your ſelf rather then any of us that trip at this ſtone, when you would have faith ſo much preſſed in the Doctrine of ſalvation, in regard of the gloriouſneſs and eminency of the grace it ſelf; which to aſſert, is not ſound: (ſic in Animadv in Lucium part. 1. §. 9. v. 7.) The righteouſneſs of Chriſt is made ours by Gods free gift; but faith and true ſubjection are conditions of our participation; and what intereſt each hath in the conditionality, and on what grounds, I have ſhewed. I fear you give too much to faith and man.

You ask [Is it repent, and Chriſts righteouſneſs by this is made yours?] Anſwer, It is oftimes, Repent and be forgiven; and repent and be baptized; and repent and believe, and be forgiven: but not efficiently by repenting nor believing: but on condition of both: though in ordaining them conditions God might intend one but as preparative or ſubſervient to the other; and not one equal terms, or to equal uſe immediately.

And when you ſay, [that the dying Chriſtian is directed to the Reſting on Chriſt, and e…ing the brazen Serpent, not to be found in any thing but a righteouſneſs by faith,] I never durſt entertain any doubt of this; it is no queſtion between us: only in what ſenſe it is called a Righteouſneſs by faith, I have ſhewed, even in oppoſition to Works in Pauls ſenſe, which make the reward to be of debt and not of Grace, Rom. 4.4. where you ſay [It is an Act Dependance not of Obedience that intereſts us in Chriſts Righteouſneſs] I anſwer▪ It is no one Act but many; It is an act of Aſſent firſt (and thence the whole hath the name of faith, it being ſo hard a thing to believe ſupernatural things, as it would have been to us to believe Chriſt to have been God when we had ſeen him in the ſhape of man, had we lived in thoſe times, when the Doctrine of faith came not with thoſe advantages as now it doth.) And then it is an act of willing, conſenting, electing, affecting (which three are but a velle Reſpectivum, and ſo in the act all one): in this in order of nature goes before any act which you can in any reaſonable propriety call Dependance: and I doubt not are far more eſſential to juſtifying faith: yet I am heartily willing to take your acts of dependance (for thoſe alſo are more then one) in the next place. But it confoundeth and abuſeth us and the Church in this controverſie, that many learned Divines will needs ſhun the ſtrict Philoſophical names of the ſeveral Acts of the ſoul, and overlook alſo the natural order of the ſouls motions, and they will uſe, and ſtil uſe the Metaphorical expreſſions, as apprehenſion (improper) dependance, relying, reſting, recombency, adherence, embracing, with more the like. I know Scripture uſeth ſome of theſe: but then it is not in ſtrict diſputing, as Joh. Crocius tels Bellarm. We may uſe apprehend figuratively, becauſe Scripture ſaith, apprehendite diſciplinans, and lay hold on eternal life: But this would quickly end diſputation, or elſe make it endleſs. Yet in the places cited, who knows not the ſame word hath different ſenſes? in the former being uſed for to accept and ſtoop to: in the later for an earneſt preſſing on, and endeavouring after as a runner to catch the prize. And they will be loth to ſay, theſe are all and each of them the juſtifying acts.

And where you add that its not an act of obedience. I anſwer, 1. I would you had firſt anſwered the many Scriptures to the contrary produced in my Aphor. 2. Its true of the firſt intereſt in Chriſt, (further then faith is called obedience) but not of the further continued and conſummate intereſt. 3. Doth not Chriſt ſay, Take my yoak learn of me to be meek and lowly, that they may have eaſe and reſt? Eaſe and Reſt? From what? Why from what they came burdened with? and that was ſure guile and curſe, and what ever is oppoſed to pardon and juſtification, Mat. 11. And Bleſſed are they that do his commandments, that they may have right to the tree of life, and may enter in, &c. Rev. 21.14. And he is the Author of eternal ſalvation to all them that obey him, Heb. 5.9. And Mat. 25. is who'ly duplicate page duplicate page duplicate page duplicate page and convincingly againſt you. And ſo is the ſecond Pſalm wholly, which makes ſubjection to Chriſt as King, the great part of the Goſpel condition. [Kiſs the ſon] conteineth more then Recombency, in my judgement: and yet no more then that true faith which is the condition of juſtification.

But no word in your paper brings me to ſuch a ſtand as your next, where you ſay, And that is very harſh ſtill which you expreſs, to expect the Righteouſneſs of the Covenant of Grace upon the conditions fulfilled by your ſelf, through Gods workings.] Anſw. Truly it is quite beyond my ſhallow capacity to reach what you here mean to be ſo harſh: what ſhould I imagine? That there are conditions upon which the Tenor of the Goſpel gives Chriſt Righteouſneſs, you acknowldge: And that he that performeth them not, the Goſpel giveth him none of it: I know you confeſs theſe; And that we muſt needs perform them our ſelves, through Gods workings (i. e. both enablement and excitation, and co-operation:) I know you doubt of none of theſe; for you have wrote againſt the Antinomians: and Mr. Gataker hath evinced the ſottiſh ignorance or impudency of Saltmarſh, in denying Faith, Repentance and Obedience to be the conditions on which, performed by us, we muſt enjoy the things promiſed, Pardon, &c. or elſe not. Yea in this paper you yield to this conditionality. What then is the matter? Is it harſh when yet you never once ſhew the fault of the Speech? It muſt be either the falſhood, or the unfitneſs; but you have yet accuſed it of neither: and yet ſay it is harſh.

But the reaſon you intimate, becauſe Bellarmine hath ſome ſuch phraſe: which I never remembred or obſerved in him: and little do I care whether he have or no: If the Papiſts be nearer to us then I take them to be, it is cauſe of joy and not ſorrow: But ſure I am that Proteſtant Writers generally uſe the word Condition; and Wendeline ſaith, The Papiſts abuſe us in feigning us to ſay the Goſpel is abſolute; and ſaith, the Goſpel in each ſence is conditional. In one ſence Faith is the Condition; in another, Faith and Obedience, &c.

But here you come again to the Labyrinth and tranſcendent Myſterie of paſſive Faith: nay you enlarge the Myſterie yet more: 1. You ſay again, [Faith doth pati. 2. And yet Love doth agere. 3. Elſe you would yield that Bellarmine argues conſonantly enough, that Love would juſtifie as well as Faith. 4. Yet you acknowledge Faith an Active Grace: but only in this Act its meerrecipient.

Anſwer. I confeſs my reaſon utterly at a loſs in this; but yet if it were in my Bible (to me Intelligible) I would believe it as I do the Doctrine of the Trinity, and ceaſe enquiring. But I cannot ſo do by any Creature, to make him the Lord of my faith and Reaſon. 1. Whether Faith doth Pati, I have enquired already. 2. That Love doth Agere, I verily believe: and yet I have ofter heard Love called a Paſſion, then Faith: And as Keckeram ſaith, the Affections are more Paſſive then the immanent Elicit Acts of the Intellect and Will. And though as it is in the Rational ſoul, Love, (ſaith Aquin.) is no Paſsion, but a Willing (which cauſeth me to judge it ſo near Kin to Faith) yet as it is in the ſenſitive, it is a Paſsion. So that I am quite beyond doubt that phyſically love is more properly called a Paſſion then Faith. 3. Therefore for ought I know, it is no wonder if Bellarmine bear the Bell, and Papiſts be unconvinced, if you have no better Arguments then this; eſpecially if no body elſe had better. 4. But yet the Myſterie is far more unſearchable to me, that faith ſhould be Active in all other, ſave only this Act. What is this thing called Faith, which you make ſuch a Proteus, to be Active and Paſsive as to ſeveral Objects? Yea when it is acknowledged the ſame Faith, which receiveth Chriſt and Righteouſneſs, and the ſeveral promiſes, and reſteth on Chriſt for the Pardon of each ſin, for hearing each Prayer, for Aſſurance, Peace, Comfort, Deliverance from temptations, and dangers and ſin, and is thus uſefull through all our lives, for the fetching of help from Chriſt in every ſtreight, yet that this ſame Faith ſhould be Active in all the Reſt, and Paſsive only in One juſtifying Act. Oh, For the face of an Argument to prove this! Sure its natural Reception of one Object and another is in point of Paſsiveneſs alike: and its aſſigned Conditionality in Scripture, is of like nature as to each branch of the good on that condition promiſed. 5. And here alſo I perceive by your ſpeech you make it conſiſt in ſome ſingle act. And yet you never tell what that is; and how then can it be in ſeveral faculties, as Davenant, Ameſius, Joh. Crocius, Melancth. with moſt do affirm? 6. But yet the depth of the myſterie to me lies in underſtanding and reconciling your words, [Only in this Act its meerly Recipient.] Is this an Act too? and yet meerly Recipient? (which you make a meer Paſ…ive reception.) A meerly Paſsive Act is ſuch a contradiction in adjecto to my underſtanding, that I cannot welcome the notion thither; yea if you had ſaid leſs, that it is an Act in any Part or Degree Paſsive. I never knew that an Act could Pati; yet am I more conſcious of mine own inſufficiency then to contend with one of your knowledge in matter of Philoſophy; but I muſt needs ſay that your notions are yet ſo far beyond my reach, that poſsibly I might take the words as true upon the credit of one whom I ſo highly value, yet am I not able to apprehend the ſence.

The Joy in Heaven which you mention for a wandring ſheep, I think is meant of the firſt, or ſome eminent recovery to Chriſt, and not of every Philoſophical notion: ſure, Sir, if ſalvation hang on this Doctrine, as thus by you explained, I am out of hope that either I or ever a one in all this countrey ſhould ever come to heaven; except by believing as that part of the Church believes which is of your opinion: When I am yet apt to think, that ſiding with any party in ſuch opinions will not conduce to any mans ſalvation: For I am of Bergius his mind, that as it is not the Jew, the Pagan, or the Mahometan, or any Infidel, (privative,) that ſhall be ſaved, but the Chriſtian: ſo it is not the Papiſt, the Lutheran, the Calviniſt, the Arminian, that ſhall be ſaved (qua talis) but the Catholick. However I am in ſtrong hopes that a man may be ſaved, though he cannot underſtand how an Act can be a paſſive inſtrument; nor do I think that my ſubſcribing to that notion, would make any great rejoycing in Heaven.

I am ſorry you had not leiſure to anſwer the Queſtions, which were very pertinent to the buſineſs of my ſatisfaction, though not to your buſineſs.

That my explication of that plain, weighty, neceſſary point, how imperfect graces or duties can yet be the conditions of the New Covenant, ſhould ſeem a Paradox to you, I ſay, to you, makes me yet more poſſeſt with admiration; When you know that ſuch conditions there are (ſuppoſe it were but faith alone:) and you know your ſelf that this faith is imperfect. But I perceive we know but in part, and therefore muſt differ in part. He ſhall ſee whom God will enlighten. I had far rather you had fallen upon that point then on the term of Juſtification by works. If you would but grant me, that Juſtifying faith, as ſuch, is an Accepting of Chriſt for King, and Prophet as well as for a Juſtifier, and conſequently that it is a reſigning our ſelves to be ruled by him, as well as to be ſaved by him, I ſhall then be content for peace ſake to lay by the phraſe of Juſtification by work… ▪ though it be Gods own phraſe, if the Church were offended with it, and required this at my hands: (So they will be ſatisfied with my ſilencing it, without a renouncing it.) I have written thus largely, that I might not be obſcure, and to let you ſee, that though I have ſcarce time to eate or ſleeep, yet I have time and paper for this work, and that I make not light of your diſſent. The Love and Reſpect which you mention to me I do as little doubt of, as I do whether I have a heart in my breaſt: and your deſires of my reducing I know do proceed from your zeal and ſincere affections. That which I take worſt is, that you ſhould ſo deſire me not to take it ill to be called an erring ſhepherd: As if I did not know my Proneneſs to err, and were not conſcious of the weakneſs of my underſtanding: or as if the expreſſions of ſo ſincere love did need excuſe; or as if I were ſo tender and brittle as not to endure ſo gentle a touch: as if my confidence of your love were Plumea, non Plumbea, and would be blown away with ſuch a friendly breath! Certainly Sir, your ſharper ſmiting would be precious Balm, ſo it light not on the Truth, but me! I am not ſo unctuous, nitrous, or ſulfureous, as to be kindled with ſuch a gratefull warmth. My Intellect were too much active, and my affections too paſſive, if by the reception of the beams of ſuch favourable expreſſions, my ſoul as by a Burning-Glaſs ſhould be ſet on fire. I am oft aſhamed and amazed to think of the horrid intolerable Pride of many learned Pious Divines, who though they have no worſe Titles then Viri docti, reverendi, celeberrimi: yet think themſelves abuſed and unſufferably vilified, if any word do but acrius pungere, or any Argument do faucibus premere (witneſs Rivet and Spanhemius late angry cenſure of Amyraldus) Can we be fit Preachers and Patterns of meekneſs and humility to our people, who are ſo notoriouſly proud, that we can ſcarce be ſpoke to? My knowledge of your eminent humility and gentelneſs hath made me alſo the freer in my ſpeeches here to you: which therefore do need more excuſe then yours: And I accordingly intreat you, if any thing have paſſed that is unmannerly, according to the natural eagerneſs and vehemency of my temper, that you will be pleaſed to excuſe what may be excuſed, and the reſt to remit and cover with love, aſſuring your ſelf it proceeds not from any diminution of his high eſteem of you, and love to you, who acknowledgeth himſelf unfeignedly ſo very much below you, as to be unworthy to be called

Your fellow-ſervant RICHARD BAXTER. June 28. 1650. Kederminſter.

Poſtſcript.

DEar Sir, while I was waiting for a meſſenger to ſend this by, Maſter Brooksby acquaints me, that you wiſht him to tell me, that I muſt expect no more in writing from you. My requeſt is, that whereas you intimated in your firſt, a purpoſe of writing ſomewhat againſt me on this ſubject hereafter, you would be pleaſed to do it in my life time, that I may have the benefit of it, if you do it ſatisfactorily; and if not, may have opportunity to acquaint you with the reaſons of my diſſent. Scribunt Aſinium Pollionem dixiſſe aliquando ſe paraſſe orationes contra Plancum, quas non niſi poſt mortem eſſet editurus; & Plancum reſpondiſſe, cum mortuis non niſi larvas luctari: ut Lud. Vives ex Plinio, & Dr. Humfred. ex illo Jeſuit. 2. p. 640.

Alſo I requeſt that if poſſible you would proceed on ſuch terms as your Divinity may not wholly depend upon meer niceties of Philoſophy: For I cannot think ſuch points to be neer the foundation: Or at leaſt that you will clearly and fully confirm your Philoſophical grounds: For as I find that your Doctrine of a Paſſive Inſtrumentality of the Act of faith (and that in a Moral reception of righteouſneſs which is but a relation, yet calling it Phyſical) is the very bottom of the great diſtance between us in the point of juſtification: So I am of opinion that I may more freely diſſent from a brother in ſuch tricis philoſophicis then in an Article of faith: Eſpecially having the greateſt Philoſophers on my ſide; and alſo ſeeing how little accord there is among themſelves, that they are almoſt ſo many men, ſo many minds: and when I find them profeſſing as Combacchius in praef…ad Phyſ. that they write againſt their own ſenſe to pleaſe others, (& quod maximam opinionum in lib. contentarum partem non jam probaret) & Ariſtotelem non eſſe normam veritates, and wiſhing ut tandem aliquando exurgat aliquis qui perfectiora nobis principia monſtret: and to conclude as he, ſalſitatem opinionum & ſententiarum & ſcientiarum imperfectionem…jam pridem video, ſed in veritate docenda deficio. Et Nulli aut paucis certe minus me ſatisfacturum ac mihi ipſi ſat ſcio. And how many new Methods and Doctrines of Philoſophy this one age hath produced? And I am ſo far ſceptical my ſelf herein, as to think with Scaliger (ibid. cit.) Nos inſtar vulpis à Ciconia deluſae vitreum vas lambere, pultem haud attingere. But I believe not that in any Maſter point in Divinity, God hath left his Church at ſuch an utter loſs, nor hanged the faith and ſalvation of every honeſt ordinary Chriſtian, upon meer uncertain Philoſophical ſpeculations. I do not think that Paul knew what a Paſsive inſtrument was; much leſs [an act that was phyſically paſsive in its inſtrumentality in a moral cauſation.] You muſt give me leave to remain confident that Paul built not his Doctrine of juſtification on ſuch a philoſophical foundation, till you have brought one Scripture to prove that faith is an inſtrument, and ſuch an inſtrument; which can neither be done. Eſpecially when the ſame Paul profeſſeth that he came not to declare the Teſtimony of God, foreign: and that he determined not to know any thing among them ſave Ieſus Chriſt and him crucified; and that his ſpeech and preaching was not foreign) that ſo their faith might not ſtand foreign: & that he ſpoke the myſteries of the Goſpel foreign, 1 Cor. 2. I am paſt doubt therefore that to thruſt ſuch Philoſophical dictates into our Creed or Confeſſion, and make them the very touchſtone of Orthodoxneſs in others, is a dangerous preſumptuous adding to the Doctrine of the Goſpel, and a making of a new Doctrine of juſtification and ſalvation, to the great wrong of the Prophet and Lawgiver of the Church.

I was even now reading learned Zanchius proof that believers before Chriſt did by their faith receive Chriſts fleſh, or humane nature (as promiſed and future) as well as the Divine, and his heavy cenſure of the contrary Doctrine, as vile and unſufferable; which occaſioneth me to add this Quere, Whether that believing was a phyſical reception, when the object had no real being or did not exiſt? Or whether meer morral reception (by Accepting, Chooſing, Conſenting) as a people receiving the Kings Heires for their future Governours before they are born; or as we receive a man for our King, who dwels far out of our ſight; Or as Princes wives do uſe to take them both for their Husbands and Soveraign Lords, even in their own Native Countrey, before they come to ſight of the man; the match being both driven on and made, and the marriage or contract performed and imperfectly ſolemnized at that diſtance by an Embaſſador or Delegate? juſt ſo do we receive Chriſt, (whoſe humane nature is far off, and his Divine out of our ſight) to be our Saviour, Soveraign (by redemption) and Husband; even here in our native Country; the match being moved to us by his Embaſſadors, and imperfectly ſolemnized upon our cordial conſent, and giving up our ſelves to him by our Covenant: (but it ſhall be perfectly ſolemnized at the great Marriage of the Lamb.) This is my faith of the nature of true juſtifying faith; and the manner of its receiving Chriſt.

THE Reader muſt underſtand that after this, I had a perſonal conference with this Dear and Reverend Brother, wherein he ſtill owned and inſiſted on the paſsiveneſs of Juſtifying faith, viz. That it is but a Grammatical action, (or nominal) and a phyſical, or hyperpyhſical paſsion; which alſo he giveth us again in the Treatiſe of Imputation of righteouſneſs.

FINIS.

Of Justification, Letter 6

p. 251Poſtſcript.

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