An End of Doctrinal Controversies, Chapter 7
CHAP. VII. Of God's Providence, and predetermining Premotion and Miracles.
§. 1. THE word (Providence) is variously used by Writers: Sometimes as comprehending God's fore-knowledge and decrees themselves: Sometimes as comprehending all his Works: Sometimes as comprehending all his works which follow the Creation: And sometimes as signifying only his effective disposal of Persons and Things in Motions, and Alterations, as dictinct from Legislation, which only maketh Duty and Right.
§. 2. In CREATION God Glorified his Three Essential Principles or Attributes: 1 His Omnipotency eminently in giving BEING to all things. 2. His Wisdom eminently in the ORDER and Composure of all▪ 3. His Love or Goodness eminently, in the GOODNESS and Wellfare of all: For he made them Good, and then Rested: Yet so as that all these Attributes were glorified in each part of the Effect.
§. 3. From hence a posteriore he is in the one Relation of CREATOR Related triply to the World, and specially to the Rational part: That is, 1. As the MAKER of things, (which is Creator in the narrow sence). 2. As ORDINATOR. 3. As BENEFACTOR. And thus he is the Author of NATURE.
§. 4. From this fundamental Relation of CREATOR, and the nature of the Creature made (and continued by Conservation, which is a continued Creation or Efficiency) there resulteth a threefold Right and further Relation to God. 1. A Ius Dominii, or Right of PROPRIETY, and so he is our OWNER, and may do with all things what he will, and must be the disposer of Events. 2. His Ius Imperii (including Doctrine) or Right of Government; which to things meerly Natural is Natural Government, and to Moral Agents it is Moral Government, by Doctrine, Laws and Executions: And so he is our KING or RULER. 3. His Ius Amoris ut finis; or Right to be the end of all, and by the Rati… nal Creature to be chiefly Loved, and absolutely for Himself, as the Best and most Amiable, and so he is our ultimate END: Where LOVE is considered not only as an act of Obedience to a Rector as all other duties are; but eminently as it is the final perfective Act of man, closing with the final Object, and so above the common nature of meer Obedience.
§. 5. All God's after-works and all our Duties to him must be observed as respecting all these Relations of God to us, and our answerable Relations to him: For therein is the Nature, Order, and Harmony of them discerned to be Glorious: And unskillful confounding them is a spoiling and prophaning or dishonouring of them. And thus the various acts of Providence must be set each in its proper place.
§. 6. God being the fons naturae, and having settled the frame of Nature (or created Beings and second Causes) in a fixed state and order, in which one thing is united to another, and adapted to its proper work in concurrence with the whole, we must not expect that God do ordinarily violate this his established Course: For his Works shall shew somewhat of his Constancy, and Experience telleth us, that really thus He doth.
§. 7. But we must not dream that God is involuntarily tied to his own Work, or hindered by second Causes, or the course of Nature, from doing what He would; but His free-will delighteth it self in this Constancy and ordered Course of Nature, and use of second Causes, which have still all their being, force and order continued by Him.
§. 8. And the number and operations of second Causes are so unknown to us, that when things seem Miracles to us, it is hard for us to say, that God useth no second Cause in effecting them. But it is enough to the use of Miracles to know that their extraordinary production hath an answerable extraordinary use and signification of God's Will.
§. 9. And no doubt but Nature and all its parts are absolutely in the Power and Government of God's Will: And He can and doth turn things up and down as He pleaseth, without making any breach in his established Order: If the Husbandman can turn the course of Rivers to water his Grounds, by meer Impediments and Receptivities, without any alteration of the natural motion of the Water; how much more must we ascribe to God, in using Nature without overthrowing it?
§. 10. It is Atheistical or absurd to set God and Nature in opposition, competition or separation; and to say as some Philosophers, [This or That natural Causes can do without calling in God as the Determiner.] Whereas natural Causes are nothing, and do nothing but by God: And there is no less of God in the effects of Nature, than if He did the same himself alone: In Him we Live and Move, and Are.
§. 11. And it is no better in them that say, that God doth not operate proximately and immediately where Nature or second Causes work, but only remotely. As [immediately] signifieth [without any medium or second Cause] so God doth not then work immediately: But as it signifieth proximately, He doth: For an infinite being cannot be essentially distant from any Creature or Effect: Nor is it possible that the second Cause can be nearer to the Effect than God; who is as near as if he used no such Cause.
§. 12. And the Dispute, Whether God do proximately effect immediatione suppositi, or only virtutis, seemeth to have a false supposition, vi…. That God's Virtue is not his suppositum, and that the virtus divina may be where the suppositum is no… If by suppositum they mean God's Essence as Essence existing, and by virtus they mean his Essence under the formal notion of Power, Wisdom and Love, then they are but two inadequate Conceptions of the same simple Being, and therefore God thus ever operateth immediatione essentiae & virtutis essentialis. But if they mean, that God hath … virtus which is neither his Essence nor a Creature, we believe them not.
§. 13. The Controversie between Durandus and his Followers, and the Jesuites and Dominicans, about the necessity of a moving Concourse, besides the support of Nature, seemeth to me thus reconcileable.
1. God as he is fons naturae, is the Living God, the prime Active Principle, who by constant vital Activity is the Spring of all the Action in the World; and is not to be dreamt of as one that had made the World, and then left it to it self, and withdrew his hand and is fallen asleep.
2. But the Living God moveth not all things alike, but every thing according to its nature and place; for his Influx is received ad modum racipientium.
3. The Nature of some Creatures is essentially Active, and so inclined to act that they will act if their Nature be not by others, or want of concurrent Necessaries, hindered. Such is every Soul or living Principle, and Fire. And other Creatures are naturally Passive only ex se (or at least principally). So that for God to continue Fire or Souls or any naturally-active Principle, is to continue a nature essentially inclined to move or act.
4. It is supposed that these Natures are not solitary, but parts of the universe, and are continued with all necessary circumstant Beings and Objects; and that the whole frame of Nature and cooperating Causes are continued: e. g. That the Sun doth not stand still, while the Life of a Plant or Brute is continued.
5. All this being supposed by Durandus, Aureolus, a Dola, and all sober men, the Question debated is, Whether there be further necessary another immediate Divine Motion or Concourse to every motion of a Creature natural or free, besides all this aforesaid?
And, 1. Let it be consider'd, that God's Essence being but one, his Act, which ex parte agentis, is his Essence, is not distinguishable, saving ex connotatione effectus: And if this be all that is meant, That as ipse motus distinguitur a causis, so God's Will, Power and Agency may be distinctly denominated, 1. As from the second Causes; and 2. also from the Motion it self, as more than the Causes; this none can deny, nor is it a Controversie. But if the question be of the necessity of another distinct way of Divine Causation of the motus, besides that by second Causes before mentioned, they can prove no such necessity.
For is it mediate or immediate Causation or Efficiency which they mean? (we speak not of immediate as it signifieth proximate, which is granted, but as signifying sine causis secundis.) If it be mediate by second Causes that God must further concurr, those are natural Causes or some other: if natural, it's a contradiction to say, that Besides God's moving by natural Causes (which is granted) he must also move by natural Causes; as if Ide… were not Idem: Unless they will say it must be by some other natural Causes, which they do not, nor can assign; nor yet any other that are not natural.
But if they mean, that to every motion there must be an immediate operation of God to it witho… that which he doth by second Causes, even by God alone without any second Cause, I then ask, Doth God move any thing in the World by any second Cause or not? If not, then not by the Sun; not the Coach by the Horses, the Arrow by the Bow, the Stone by the Hand, the Pen by the Writer, &c. If yea, then is it the whole or part only of that motion which is made by second Causes and God by them? If the whole, habetur quaesitum: If part, how prove you that God cannot make the whole motion himself by second Causes, as well as part, but must needs leave the other part of the same motion to be done without second Causes.
And it would follow that no second Cause, no not the noblest in the World (as the Sun) and God as acting by it, hath and exerciseth à vis adequata to the smallest motion even of a Leaf: Whereas God in Nature maketh natural Power, with his own, as he is fons naturae, adequate to its Actions.
And let unbyassed Reason judge, Whether if a Rock should be held up in the Air, if God con…inue the natural Gravity of it, with all the rest of the frame of Nature, could not that Rock fall, without another motion of God which is without any second Cause, to thrust it down? If He continue the nature of Fire, was it not a greater Miracle, that it burnt not the three Witnesses, Dan. 3. than to have burnt them, or than its ordinary Action? Why else should there need ten thousand fold more natural Power to hold up the said Rock, or to quench a City on fire, or to stop a River, or the Winds; than to move them supposing natural Causes, if there need an Infinite Power moreover to the act, and none to the cessation? And by this Rule it would follow, that all Motion in the World is supernatural: For if God cause it ut sons naturae, he causeth it in the natural course: if he do not, it's all supernatural and miraculous.
Moreover, if all this satisfie not Disputes, if it be worth the Cost, they may try the Case thus: Supposing that God hath told no man his Secrets, when he will immediately move any thing without second Causes, and that no second Causes, nor his own Operation by them can move any thing without another immediate Motion, Let them cut down the Pillars, or undermine their Houses, and say that by meer natural Causes the House cannot fall: Let them set fire on their Houses, and say that by meer natural Causes they cannot be burnt: Let them drink Poison, and say, By meer natural Causes it cannot hurt us: Or let them cut their Flesh, &c. For God never told them, that he will immediately concurr, and then there is no danger.
Perhaps they will say, That Experience telleth us that God doth usually concurr with them: I answer, And is not that because he worketh by them? What Experience or Reason have you, that God should still work immediately with▪ them, and yet not by them? We can prove that He worketh as the first Cause. But if you will prove that He doth it not as the first Cause moving the second Causes, but by immediate concomitancy, let us hear your proofs.
Lastly, let it be noted, that when they that affirm all Motion to be by immediate concomitant Concourse or Predetermination, do pretend that they do it lest God's Causality should be denied or extenuated, it is a meer deceit: For all are agreed, that there is no less of God in the Operations done by second Causes or Nature, than in immediate Operations without second Causes (such as God exerciseth on the first created Motor, and how else he please) God is as much in one as in the other.
§. 14. For the understanding of the nature and use of miraculous acts of Providence, it must be considered, 1. That God that made the World of Natural Agents, and things Passive, moved by the Active, is not to be feigned without good proofs, to alter any of the Works which he hath made, which we see he continueth in the course that he made them without any mutation of their Natures.
§. 15. God can change, and cross, and use as he pleaseth the Actions of Natural Agents without changing their natures and inclinations. One Natural Agent or moved Passive, may be resi…ed and turned back or overcome by another; …nd yet there may be nothing but natural moti…n in them all: A stronger Stream may drive …ack a weaker. A Canon may cross the ordi…ary motion of the Air: As a great Dog may …aster a little one, or a Woolf devour a Lamb, …nd a Bird a Worm or Fly; and yet there be …one but natural and sensitive motion. So God …an dry up or stop the Red Sea or Iordan; and …y Winds carry Caterpillars to and from Aegypt, and such like, and by one natural …otion overcoming another. It's hard for us …n most Miracles to say that God doth more than this.
§. 16. But it is certain that God hath a rank of free Agents that act arbitrarily, and that these have a great measure of power over natural and necessary Motions: As man is a free Agent and driveth his Sheep to what Pasture he pleaseth, and guideth his Horses and Oxen in their way and furrow to do his will by their natural and sensitive necessitated motion, and as a Miller can make the natural course of the Wood and Water and Mill-stones, and Horse, all to serve his intention, without changing the nature of any one of them, so much more can God and free Agents under God, attain their freely chosen ends, by Ordering and not Changing Natural and Sensitive Movers.
§. 17. We so little know what Arbitrary Free Agents that are invisible Spirits God hath set over this Passive World, and what power he hath given them to use Natural Agents as they themselves freely will, that it greatly disableth us to resolve all the Difficulties of the Cause of Sin and Misery, and about the nature of Miracles. But it is a clear truth that it is by such Free Arbitrary Agents primarily that natural Agency is crost and overcome in Miracles, the one Natural Agent be employed to resist another, (as to quench the heat of Fire, to stop the course of Winds and Water, &c.) Yet it is some voluntary free Agent that thus useth natural Agents against each other. Scripture tells us, that God useth Angels as Rulers and Protectors of lower Agents: And that there is a kind of a war between these and Devils: And how far the prevalent Wills of good and bad Angels or voluntary Agents may be the Cause of Evil, or be the Actors of Miracles, by setting one moved Agent against another, and yet all but Natural motion that is caused by these free Agents, Mortals do not know; and therefore should not be peremptory in judging.
§. 18. But though we know not that in Miracles God useth not second Causes, some natural and some free in waies unsearchable to us, yet may we be assured by Miracles of his will and attestation: when we find that things are done quite out of the way of his ordinary Providence in the uncontrouled confirmation of some prophetical Revelation: For God is the Governour of the rational World; and his moral Government must be by the intelligible signification of his will de debito, what shall be due from us, and to us: And if Miracles be used to deceive us, they cannot be done without him, whatever second Cause there be: And if he should use them (tho' by second Causes) to deceive us, we are utterly remediless, and therefore guiltless. And God that …ath neither impotency, ignorance nor badness, cannot need a Lye to govern Man, when he hath …de it part of his Image, on Man, and needful to Mens Justice to each other to hate Lying.
§. 19. A Miracle controuled by contrary Evidence, is no notification of God's Attestation: It may be permitted for several good ends: For God by controuling it giveth us sufficient remedy against Deceit. And there are two waies by which a Miracle may be controuled: First, by greater conquering Miracles used for some contrary Doctrine or Cause; so the Aegyptian Magician's Miracles were controuled by Moses. Secondly, when it is some unquestionable Truth or Duty or Word, that is already better proved, which that Miracle pretendeth to contradict. As if a Miracle were done by a Deceiver, to prove that there is no God, no Life-to-come, or against Mercy or Justice, or to disprove Christianity; the greater Miracles which have confirmed the Gospel, and the evident Light of Nature, which proveth the Deity and Life-to-come, and the Duty of Love and Justice, do controul such deceiving Miracles. (Therefore a Servant of Christ may most comfortably suffer Martyrdome for his testimony to the Deity, Christianity, the Life-to-come, or Charity and Justice against Malice and Persecution and Cruelty, which even a Miracle would not justifie; more than for a disputable Opinion.)
§. 20. It's a great Question, How a true Prophet might be known antecedently, before his Prophecy was fulfilled. And it's of great moment to consider, the difference between a Legislative Prophet, and a meer particular Message. Moses and CHRIST, the Legislators, confirmed their Laws and Word by multitudes of uncontrouled Miracles: For Life and Death lay upon mens Obedience or Disobedience to them: And if a Prophet did reprove any Sin against that Law, the Miracles that confirmed the Law did justifie them. But if it were but a Prophecy about some other temporal Event (as Ieremy's of the Captivity) it needed no Miracle; for it was but a temporal Suffering that followed the not believing them.
The Law of God, which should here be handled, I shall speak ofPardon the disorder of not handling the Law before Sin: It is for young Readers sake, who would have all God's Laws opened together, … give Light to each other. afterward.