An End of Doctrinal Controversies, Chapter 13
CHAP. XIII. Of the Universality and Sufficiency of Grace.
§. 1. IT was not only the Nature of the Elect, but of all Mankind, that Christ assumed in his Incarnation.
§. 2. It was not to Adam only, as the Father of the Elect, but as the common Father of Mankind (lapsed) that God made the Promise, or conditional Law, or Covenant of Grace, Gen. 3. 15. And so renewed it with Noah.
§. 3. It was not the sin of the Elect only, but of all Mankind that were the occasion of Christ's sufferings, (called by some, An assumed meritorious Cause, because by his consent they were loco Causae meritoriae.)
§. 4. It is not to the Elect only, but for all the World (as to the Tenor of it) that Christ hath purchased, and given a conditional Pardon of sin, and a conditional Donation of Life eternal in the Covenant of Grace, both of the first and second Edition: That is, the conditional Grant is Universal; Whoever believeth shall be saved: Though the Promulgation of it may have many stops.
§. 5. It is not to the Elect only, but to All, that Christ hath commanded his Ministers to proclaim this Law or Covenant, and offer the Benefits, and require their Consent, as far as the said Ministers are able.
§. 6. It is not only to the Elect, but to all Mankind, that many Mercies procured by pardoning and reconciling Grace are actually given, which were forfeited (or not due) by reason of sin against the Law of Innocency.
§. 7. These Mercies given to all Mankind after sin, and contrary to desert, are not given by Gods Mercy alone, without respect to the Blood and Merits of Christ: But his Blood and Merits are the Cause of them, as truly as of the greater Mercies of the Elect. And they that say, That God doth give all these Mercies without a Saviour's Merits, as the Cause, prepare the way for Infidels to inferr, That then he might have done so by the Mercies of the Elect.
§. 8. All these actual Mercies given to mankind, contrary to Merit, are a degree of Promulgation of the Law of Grace, telling all the World, That God doth not now rule and judge them meerly by the Law of Innocency, but upon Terms of Mercy (as is aforesaid)
§. 9. Hereby it is signified to all the World, that God is as he proclaimed his Name to Moses, Exod. 34. 5, 6, 7. The Lord, the Lord God, merciful and gracious, long-suffering, and abundant in goodness and truth, keeping mercy for thousands, forgiving iniquity, and transgression, and sin, and that will by no means clear the guilty (by false judging:) and that the World have no cause to despair of forgiveness, as if they were *Though this be said before, a new Case here causeth me to repeat it.under the remediless (or unremedied) Sentence of Damnation.
§. 10. There are no People on Earth that are not obliged to the use of some means appointed them to be used for their full Pardon and Salvation, else Despair would be their Duty, and they should not be judged Sinners for neglecting any such means. And were they not bound to do any thing for their own Salvation, their Sin and Misery that neglect so to do, would be far less than it is.
§. 11. Therefore all People have some such Means, that have a tendency to Recovery and Salvation afforded them by God.
§. 12. They that say, That all the Mercies of the Non-elect, are no Mercies, because through mens Sin, they end in their Misery, do perversely extenuate Gods Mercies and Man's Sin, and teach Sinners falsely to plead in Judgment, That they never abused, or sinned against Mercy, which God and their own Consciences will easily confute.
§. 13. In the Controversie, Whether Christ died for the Elect only, or for all Mankind, it seemeth to me, that we little differ about the matter, but only strive about ambiguous Words; even about one Syllable [for.] If to die [for] signifie [for their sins,] under the reason of a Cause of Christ's Death, so (as Paraeus doth) we must all grant, that Christ died [for] all.
2. If (for) signifie [eorum loco] in their stead, so the Phrase hath yet great Ambiguity, and will require a great deal of distinguishing for its due Explication: The various kinds and degrees of Benefits to which the Intention is limitted, do leave the word liable to various Sences. Christ died so far in the stead of all Mankind, as to suffer Death (by his voluntary sponsion) as a punishment deserved to themselves by sin, to free them all from it, on condition of their suitable acceptance of his Grace. But if by [for] be meant (in the civil person of all men, as representing them) the Word is still among Lawyers and all Writers, ambiguous. In a large sence he may be said to (persenate or represent) another who doth it but secundum quid, and not simpliciter, in parte aliqua, vel in tantum & ad hoc, and not in omni, vel ad omne. And if any will so far stretch the Phrase, and because Christ suffered in the common Nature of man, will say that he suffered in every man's Person; or because he had a special purpose of saving his Elect, will thence say, He died in the person of Peter, Iohn, and every elect Sinner; I will not strive against mens Phrases, if they will explain them soundly: But in strict Sence, as Representing a man, or doing it in his Person, signifieth, that Christ so died (and merited) in several mens Persons, as that the Law or Lawgiver doth take it to have been in sensu civili, their own suffering, and doing, and meriting, or to all intents, purposes, and uses, all one to them, as if they had so died and merited themselves:] thus Christ neither died, nor obeyed for any man (as shall be hereafter proved.)
But if by [for] is meant [for mens benefit or good] so it is yet ambiguous, and liable to a threefold sence, viz. 1. Intentionally, 2. Aptitudinally, 3. Eventually, for their good. And, 1. Intentionally, the Controversie either speaketh of Christ's Divine Nature and Will, or of the Humane: Concerning the former, the Question is the same with that about Election, or Gods Decrees, which is before spoken to, viz. How far God decreed good to all men by Christ's Death. As to Christ's Humane Nature and Will, it will prove but an arrogant unprofitable Question, Whether Christ as Man, kn…w the Names of every individual person in the World, or of every one of the Elect, and had a distinct Intent to save every one of those by Name that are saved: It's better let such Questions alone. 2. And [Aptitudinally,] there is no question but there is that in Christ's Sufferings and Obedience, Sacrifice and Merit, which is in its moral Nature adapted to the Good and Salvation of all, and hath that sufficiency thereto, which would accomplish it, if it were duly accepted and improved.
3. And as to the Event, we are agreed, viz. That some, and not all are saved by Christ's Death and Merits; but that all have great Mercies, which are the fruits of these, though many wilfully turn them to their Sin and Misery.
§. 14. By all this it appeareth, that it is a most unfavoury thing for men called Divines to dispute hotly, That Christ did or did not die and merit for all, and bitterly revile their Adversaries in the Controversie, without ever explaining that one ambiguous syllable [FOR], or telling men what they mean. And when it is well explained, we scarce know how to differ.
§. 15. For few will deny but that Christ suffered, not immediately because Man sinned (as if Suffering were due to him meerly because we sinned) but because he undertook so to do, and was obliged so to do by the Law of Mediation: But remotely he suffered, not only because the Elect had sinned, but because all Mankind had sinned. That is, The Conditional Pardon and Mercies given to all Mankind, are such as Christ's Sacrifice and Merits must be congruously the Causes of, as well as the actual Pardon of Believers.
§. 16. But if the stress of the Controversie be laid on Christ's personating or representing this man or that, by that time this (humane, invented, ambiguous, unscriptural) Phrase is explained, either we shall be …ound to be all of a mind, or else some will run into an intolerable errour about [Christ's dying and meriting in our civil person, and our dying and meriting by his natural person]; or else they will dispute themselves into a Wood of Uncertainties, and be lost about the sence of a word that cannot be sufficiently explained.
§. 17. And they that will lay the stress of the Controversie on the Aptitude or the Event, must be men of some singular Conceits, and not of the common judgment of the Reformed Churches, the Lutherans, the Iesuites, or the Dominicans, if they will disagree; for here we are commonly agreed.
§. 18. But as far as I can discern, most Contenders lay the Controversie upon the point of Divine Intention, Purpose or Decree: viz. Whether Christ as God did purpose to justifie and save all men by his death? or else, Whether he purposed to do good to all men by his death? Which Purpose is nothing but God's eternal Will or Decree. And why then do they make two Controversies of Election and Redemption, when they mean the same in both? And here methinks there cannot easily be a difference. For (in a few plain words) whatever good Christ giveth to any, that he from Eternity decreed to give them: But we are agreed that he giveth not Salvation to all men, and yet that he doth give many and great Mercies to all men, and especially, that he hath given to the World (and not only to the Elect) an express conditional Pardon of Sin, and conditional Iustification, Reconciliation▪ Adoption and Right to Glory: And sober Divines had rather say that this universal conditional Deed of Gift, is the effect of Christ's Sacrifice and Sufferings, than that God giveth it to one part of Men for Christ's death, and to the other part not for his death, but as without it. And we are agreed, that Christ doth give to some such special Grace, as shall and doth infallibly prevail with them to repent and believe, and also actual Pardon, Justification, Adoption and Salvation.
§. 19. Therefore in this sence Christ died for all, but not for all alike or equally; that is, He intended good to all, but not an equal good with an equal intention. Whatever Christ giveth men in time as the fruit of his death, that he decreed from Eternity to give them. And whatever he never giveth them, he never decreed to give them. What he giveth them absolutely, he decreed to give them absolutely. And what he giveth them but conditionally, he decreed to give them but conditionally. Therefore being agreed of the fact and event, we must be agreed of the Intention or Decree, and what needs there more?
And by this time you may answer their Objection that say, Why not a common and conditional Election, as well as a common and conditional Redemption?
Ans. Neither of them are conditional as to the Act of God and Christ: There is no act of ours the Condition of God's decreeing ex parte Dei, but only of the thing decreed; nor of Christ's Death or Intent, but only of the benefit: That a conditional Act of Grace, or Deed of Gift of Christ and Life to all Mankind in common (in the tenor of it) should be made, was both decreed by God and purchased by Christ. But, 1. This is not the whole of God's Decree or Christ's Purchase and Intent. 2. And this is not to be called Election, as it signifieth a choosing of some from among the rest: Common Redemption and the Decree of Common Grace, both antecede that which is properly called Election, in order of Nature in esse objectivo; that is, God decreeth to give Faith and Salvation effectively to some of them that had common Grace.
§. 20. The old Solution which Schoolmen and Protestants have acquiesced in, is, That Christ died for All, as to the sufficiency of his death, but not as to the efficiency of their salvation: Which is true, but must be thus explained: Christ's Death and Obedience were not only sufficient but effectual as to their first effects; that is, They effected that which is commonly called, Satisfaction and Merit; and hence and from the Covenant of God they were also effectual to procure the Covenant of Grace as of universal tenor, and therein a free pardon of Sin and gift of Right to life-eternal to all, on condition of due acceptance: This conditional Gift of Christ and Life is effected: And this efficacy of the antecedent Mercies, must either be called part of the sufficiency of Redemption, as to the consequent Mercies (viz. Actual Pardon and Salvation) or else an efficiency beyond the sufficiency, antecedent to the said special efficiency. That Christ's Death hath effectually procured the Act of Oblivion or conditional Gift of Life to all Mankind; but it doth not effect the actual salvation of all: To the universal Grace it is both sufficient and efficient; but to the special Grace and actual Salvation it is sufficient to All (as after shall be opened) but not efficient, (which is by the Refuser's fault and forfeiture.)
§. 21. When we say, that either Christ's Death or Grace is sufficient to more than it effecteth, the meaning is, that it hath all things on its part which is absolutely necessary to the effect, but that somewhat else is supposed necessary to it, which is wanting.
§. 22. As there is a common Grace actually extended to Mankind, (that is, common Mercies contrary to their merit) so thereOf Sufficient grace. is such a thing as sufficient Grace in su… genere, which is not effectual. So that though it be disputable in what cases this is found, and what not, yet that there is such a thing is past dispute.
§. 23. By sufficient Grace here I mean such without which Man's Will cannot, and with which it can perform the commanded Act toward which it is moved, when yet it doth not perform it; and this without any other degree of help than that which procureth not the act. So that it is not all that is useful to the effect, nor all that is necessary to easie or prompt performance, or to the infallible ascertaining of the act, nor to the melius esse only that we speak of; but so much as is necessary ad esse, and efficient of the true posse: When you can properly say that a Man can do this, you say that he hath all that is of necessity to the doing of it.
§. 24. Iansenius himself is so far from denying this Grace called Sufficient, that he asserteth that by this, improved by free-will, (without such special Grace, as of it self, giveth the Act as well as the Power) the good Angels stood when the bad ones fell, and Adam stood till the time of his Fall: And so that such a thing there hath been.
§. 25. And seeing God is still the same, and man's will the same in its natural faculties, and God seemeth to us to delight in Constancy, it is very improbably imagined, that God did for so short a time Rule Angels and Men by such a Grace, as he would never after make use of in the World; and that Man's free-will did for so short a time do its Duty by that Sufficient Grace, and never after do any one act by the like Grace, in any one to the World's end.
§. 26. It's true, that such Grace will not serve our turn to do that now in our lapsed state, which Adam could have done in Innocency (no, nor will all our effectual Grace yet reach it) that is, to have continued sinless: But it is incredible, that no common Grace of God now is as sufficient to the performance of the least good act (which is good but secundum quid) as Adam's was to the fulfilling of all God's Law; and that the best unregenerate man is not able to do any better than he doth, or forbear some Evil that he doth, as well as Adam to have forborn all.
§. 27. At least, to the Regenerate such a Grace must be acknowledged: For though of the rest Iansenius will say, They do no good, because they love not God and goodness (and on the like reasons others will say, That the Regenerate do no good, because all hath sinful mixture or imperfection); yet he will not say so of the godly: And must we believe that no godly man can do any more good than he doth? and so, That he hath no meerlysufficient Grace to any one act in all his life?
§. 28. The Controversie about sufficient Grace is the same in the true meaning of it with that of the Power of Mans Free-will. For when by sufficient Grace we mean nothing but the enabling a Man to the act, or giving him Power to do it, the stress of the Question is, Whether Man hath truly any Power to do more than he doth? For if he have such a Power, Grace hath given it him, if it be for a Work that Grace is needful to. So that indeed were it not for Custom and Expectation, this Question should be handled under that of the Power and Liberty of Man's Will.
§. 29. No man hath at the present Grace sufficient for his Salvation, if he have longer time to live: Because the Grace or help of the present hour is not sufficient for the next, but there must be continual Supplies from God; supposing that we distinguish of Grace by the distinct numerical acts and hours for and in which we need it: But if you distinguish of Grace by the species of Acts for which it is needful, and not by the numerical acts, then it may be truly said, that the same Grace (in specie) which a Believer hath to day, may be sufficient to his Salvation, or to his life's end.
§. 30. But if you speak de gradu, that Grace may be sufficient to one thing, which is not sufficient to another: And so, 1. An Infidel may have Grace sufficient to forbear some Sin, or avoid some Temptation, or use some means that tendeth to Faith and Repentance, who hath not Grace sufficient to believe and repent unto Salvation. 2. A man may have Grace sufficient to enable him to believe and repent unto Justification, and yet not have at that instant Grace sufficient to enable him to love God above all as God, with a fixed habitual Love, and to live an holy life (for the Spirit and Sanctification are promised on condition of Faith and Repentance). 3. A sanctified man that is yet but weak, may have Grace sufficient to live to God a holy life at present, and yet not have Grace sufficient for greater trials of Duty and Temptation: And therefore Augustine and all his Followers still say, That the Grace of Perseverance is a Gift over and above the Grace of meer Sanctification in the weakest degree.
§. 31. By all this it is evident, that he that disputeth of the sufficiency of Grace, must first distinctly tell us,
1. Whether he mean extrinseck Grace, or intrinseck.
2. If extrinseck, Whether he mean it comprehensively of all extrinseck Grace together, or only of some particular part of sort.
3. If the latter, Whether he speak of the sufficiency of Christ's Death and Righteousness, Sacrifice, Merit, Intercession, &c. or of the sufficiency of the Gospel-Covenant or Promise; or of the sufficiency of Preaching, Praying, and other means; or of the Scripture-Records, &c.
4. If he speak of intrinseck Grace, Whether the Question be of Sufficiency ex parte Dei agentis, (which none must question); or ex parte effecti.
5. If the latter, What is the effect whose sufficiency he questioneth? 1. Is it a Grace or Power to do some more common good, use some means, forbear some evil, as the Unregenerate may do? 2. Or is it a Power truly to repent and believe? 3. Or to love God habitually, and live holily? 4. Or to overcome greater Temptations, and persevere?
6. And he must tell you whether he speak, 1. De specie, whether the Grace or Power sufficient to this sort of Acts or Duty be sufficient to another, or to all. 2. Or de gradu, Whether this degree be sufficient against a greater degree or sort of Temptation. 3. Or as men use to distinguish Grace and Help by numerical Acts and Hours, Whether the Grace of this Hour and Act be sufficient for the next, or for all? The sence of all these Questions is distinct.
7. But his last and greatest difficulty will be, to tell you truly and plainly what is that Grace which is the subject of his Question, of its sufficiency in the general nature of it, and as related to the thing which it is called sufficient to.
§. 32. For, by Grace he meaneth, 1. Either somewhat ex parte Dei agentis, 2. Or ex parte effecti, or, 3. Quid medium; 1. Grace, as it is in God the Agent; 2. Or as it is in Man the Recipient; 3. Or as it is somewhat between both.
§. 33. I. Grace, as it is in God, is nothing but his Essence, not as Essence, but as an essential Power, Intellect and Will denominated by Connotation from the effect: This is commonly agreed on: God doth operate per essentiam, and not by Accidents.
§. 34. II. If they mean any mediate thing between God and the Effect, either they speak of the first effect or a second, and so on: If they speak but of secondary effects, and the meaning be only whether one effect be a sufficient Cause for another, they mean either an outward or an inward Grace or Effect. If an outward, then the sence of the Question is, Whether some other Work of God be sufficient to move the Will of Man? And then it must be told what other Work you mean: Whether an Angel, or the Planets, or the Word or Preacher, or an outward Mercy or Affliction, or what it is? But if you speak of the very first effect, then the fancy is almost proper to Aureolus among the Schoolmen, to think that there is something from God antecedent to the Creature and Motion, which may be called Action or Energy, or Efflux, which is neither the Creator nor a Creature, neither Cause substantial nor Effect, but Causation: As if some Beam of Virtue or Force went from God to produce every Creature and Motion, which is neither God, nor the Creature, or Motion. But this is commonly and justly rejected, as feigning a third sort of Entity between God and the Creature, which it passeth the wit of Man to conceive of what it should be.
☞ And if God do immediately per essentiam, cause that middle Entity, or Action, or Force, which he saith is no Creature, why may he not as well immediately per essentiam, cause the Creature and motion it self? This therefore cannot be the thing meant by Grace in this Question.
To question the sufficiency of God's Essence is intolerable: To question the sufficiency of a mediate divine Efflux or Action, which is between God and the Creature and Effect, is to dispute in your Dream of a Chimera, an unproved, and a disproved, and commonly-denied Entity. To dispute of the sufficiency of Angels, Scripture, Sermons, &c. to work Grace, is not the thing commonly intended in this Controversie of Grace: Each several sort of means may be sufficient in its own kind and to its own use; but no one of them is sufficient to the effect. But if you will put the Question as of All together, it must be so explained.
§. 35. III. The Grace therefore meant in this Question can be no other than either some effect on the Soul, as tending to a further effect, or the aforesaid comprehension of necessary extrinseck means. If the former be meant (as it is by almost all Schoolmen and Disputers of this Case) then, 1. It must be enquired, Whether such a thing be? and, 2. What it is if it be?
§. 36. 1. Bradwardine, and some that go his way, do deny the being of any such thing as we now dispute of; and say, That God's essential will, as a will, is the immediate Efficient, and the Act of Man is the Effect, (e. g. Faith,) and because God willeth that Act, it doth immediately exist, as the World did, by his creating will: And so here is no place for the Dispute of Sufficient Grace: For God's Will is certainly sufficient to cause what he will cause: And Man's Act either is existent or not: And there is no Grace antecedent to it, to be called insufficient, unless you will vainly say, that Gods essential Will is sufficient to nothing but what he preduceth, which is a Dispute unfit for sober men.
§. 37. 2. But because the contrary Opinion is far more common, that there is an inward Grace (e. g. to believe or consent) antecedent to our Act, whose sufficiency is questioned, it poseth the Wits of all the Schoolmen (much more is it above many Contenders that never so much as studied it) to say, what it is. The Notions of Alvarez (who calls it motus) and of Vasquez, and others I have elsewhere considered, and here pass by: And I have shewed, that I take it to be so far past man's reach, as to be unfit for hot Contention. But so far as we may conceive of it, it must be in this twofold notion: 1. As it is some Divine Impress on the Soul, which is Analogus to the Vis impressa received from the Mover in the Patient in corporal Motion. 2. That this Impression received, doth in primo instant…, put the Faculty into such an immediate Ability to the Act, or such a state of Disposedness to the Act, as may be called a Moral Power (the natural Faculty being supposed) and puts the Will in such a state as to the act of Consent, as that it can do it, but is not necessitated to it, nor actually determined, but can forbear. And this is called sufficient Grace. 3. And in the next instant when the Will doth consent, God and Man are both Causes or Agents, and the Grace is effectual by both Causes, God the first, and Man the second.
§. 38. 2. The Pelagians and some others seem to think that God doth not operate immediately on mans Soul, as to proximity of Causation, but immediately on superiour Causes and Means (as Angels, Word, Objects, &c.) and that when all means are duly ordered, man may be said to be able in his meer natural powers for the Act, because those means are now Grace sufficient to excute it. And that when one Means of an hundred is wanting, it is insufficient Grace.
§. 39. We all confess, that God worketh by means, and we cannot name an Act on us, which he always or ordinarily doth without any means, or second Cause. And we acknowledge that there are gracious means, and that ordinarily these must have a sufficiency in their kind: But withal we must say, that God worketh immediately as to proximity of Causation, when he worketh not so immediately as without second Causes: And that whether by means, or without means (as he pleaseth) there must be such a Disposition communicated to a depraved, undisposed Soul, as shall be a moral power, and put it into an immediate capacity to consent (or act): And to dispute the sufficiency of the means, is one thing, and to dispute the sufficiency of this inward Disposition or Power, is another. And this must be the question.
§. 40. The common disputed question is, Whether all men have Grace sufficient to believe? which must be negatively answered; They have not. Those that never heard the Gospel, have not.
§. 41. But, 2. have all that hear the Gospel sufficient Grace to believe?
Ans. No: many of them are hardened by former sinning, so as to be set at a greater distance and enmity, than many Heathens.
§. 42. But, 3ly. All the World hath Grace (or merciful Help) sufficient to enable them to do less evil, and more good than they do, and to use some means better than they do, which tend to further Grace. And they that do not this, are justly denied further Help.
§. 43. 4. But the sticking difficulty is, Whether any men in the World have Grace sufficient to repent and believe savingly, who do not?
To which I answer, 1. The Question is of less moment than it's commonly made to be; seeing those are unexcusable who use not that Grace which was sufficient to their foresaid use of means, and less resistance to God's Grace: 2. But certainly to answer the question negatively or affirmatively, I cannot; as not knowing any more of Gods working on mens Souls, than he himself hath told us of. 3. But if we may conjecture upon Probabilities, it seemeth to me most likely, that there is such a sufficient Grace or Power to repent and believe savingly in some that use it not, but perish. For, 1. if Angels had, and used such a sort of Grace: 2. And if Alam had such a sort of Grace, and used it a while: 3. And if unregenerate men have such a grace for lower Acts, which tend to Faith: 4. And if the Faithful have such a grace to do more good, and less evil than they do: 5. It seemeth very improbable, that only to the fifth Instance (to repent and believe) none in the World should have such a sufficient grace.
§. 44. And though Iansenius seem very singular in denying that there is now any such sufficient grace of Christ in the World, which is not effectual either to believe, or to do any other good; that is, That Christ's grace enableth no man to do any more good than he doth; yet indeed it is most in two ambiguous Words, that Iansenius differeth from others, (though many unskilful Disputants suppose it to be much more material a difference) viz. 1. In one Syllable [GOOD.] For he will call nothing good in man's Actions, but Holy Love and its Effects; and so saith, That no unsanctified Man doth good, and therefore hath not Grace sufficient to do it. But moral [Good] is taken in three Sences (or Degrees) 1. Good, secundum quid, in a degree not predominant: See of this my Discourse of Saving Faith.And so Infidels and ungodly Christians have some good. 2. Good, secundum quid, vel imperfectum, but in a degree predominant. And so the Godly do good, though mixt with evil. 3. Good in perfection and unmixt with evil: and so none do good till they are perfected in Glory. (To say nothing of [essential simple Good per se, and independant;] for so none is good but God only.) And all this is the Effect of Grace.
§. 45. 2. But, saith Ian senius, there is some grace which is not grati… Christi, the grace of Christ; and such is all that cometh from meer fear without Love, which is a kind of providential preparatory grace, but not the grace of Christ. Ans. It is not that eminent and special grace of Christ: But to think that it befalleth men without Christ's procurement, and is not a commoner sort of Christ's grace, when all Power in Heaven and Earth is put into his Hand, and he is made Head over all things to the Church, is below a Christian Divine to imagine▪ and too injurious to Christ. But by all this it appeareth, that even Iansenius differeth from others more about the Names of [Good] and [Christ's Graces] than about the Matter.