An End of Doctrinal Controversies, Chapter 2 – Chapter 3
CHAP. II. The Doctrines about which they chiefly disagree, enumerated.
§. 1. THE forementioned causes of Divisions in general, do operate among Christians, 1. About Church-Government; 2. About God's Worship, and 3. About Christian Doctrine in particular: All which are turned into the matters of our Discord. The two first I intend not to meddle with in this Discourse: And as to the third, the Controversies about Doctrine which most trouble the Churches, are, 1. About God's Decrees and His Will in general. 2. About his Foreknowledge. 3. About Election in particular. 4. About Reprobation. 5. About his Providence and Predetermination of all actions in general. 6. About his causing or not causing Sin. 7. About Natural Power and Freewill, 8. About original Sin. 9. About Redemption by Christ. 10. About the Laws and Covenants of Innocency, Works and Grace. 11. About Universality and Sufficiency of Grace. 12. About Man's Power and Freewill since the Fall, to obey the Gospel. 13. About effectual Grace, and how God giveth it. 14. About the state of Heathens that have not the Gospel. 15. About the necessity of Holiness, and the state of moral Virtue. 16. About the necessity of Faith in Christ where the Gospel is made known. 17. About the state of Infants as to Salvation. 18. About the nature of Saving Faith. 19. About the nature of Pardon and Justification. 20. About the Imputation of Christ's Righteousness to Believers. 21. About the manner how Faith justifieth us, and how Faith is imputed to us for Righteousness. 22. Of Assurance of Justification and Salvation, and of Hope. 23. Of Good works and Merits, and how far we may trust to any thing in our selves. 24. Of Confirmation, Perseverance, and of danger and falling away. 25. Of Repentance, late Repentance and the Day of Grace, and the unpardonable Sin. 26. Of our Communion with Christ's Glorified Humanity, and with Angels and glorified Souls. 27. Of the state of separated Souls. 28. Of the Resurrection and Everlasting Life.
Of each of these I shall shew the pacifick Truth which must unite us, and shew how far all the Reformed Churches are therein agreed; and whether the Papists are or will be agreed with us, I shall referr to their own consideration.
CHAP. III. Of God's Will and Decrees in general.
§. 1. THE Will of God] signifieth either, I. His own Essence, and that, 1. under the notion of a Power or Virtue analogically to the Faculty in Man; or 2. under the notion of an Act, as it is considered only ex parte agentis without the effect. II. Or the said Essence as related to the Effects or Objects, and thence denominated. III. Or the Extrinsick Objects and Effects themselves, called his Will, because willed by him.
§. 2. These later are, I. His Works of eminent Power (with Wisdom and Goodness) viz. Creation, Preservation and Natural Motion, by God as sons naturae. II. His Works of Eminent Wisdom (with Power and Goodness) viz. ORDER, and specially Moral Government; the parts of which are, 1. Legislation, Antecedent to man's actions; 2. Retribution, by Judgment and Execution, consequent to them: especially by the Redeemer in the way of Grace. III. His Works of Eminent Love or Goodness (with Power and Wisdom) especially Glory begun and perfected.
§. 3. By [God's Decrees] is meant his Volitions of what shall be; which are but his Will considered as in such acts: Now concerning all these sences of God's Will.
§. 4. I. God's Will in it self considered is his Essence, and not any Accident in God.
§. 5. II. Yet esse & Velle are not Conceptions of the same sence or importance; but are distinct inadequate Conceptions of the same God: And so is also Intelligere.
§. 6. III. As Posse & Agere are not really two things in God, so his Will as a Power, Faculty or Virtue, and his Will as an Act or Volition in himself, are not two things; but two inadequate Conceptions of that which is simple Unity in God; for Man's narrow mind can no otherwise know him.
§. 7. IV. God doth operate or effect immediately by his Essence; and not by any Action of his, which is between his Essence and the Effect: Whether you call it his Agere, Intelligere or Velle, or all conjunct by which he effecteth, it is nothing besides his Essence which is so called: For there is nothing in rerum natura, but God and the Creature, and the Creature's Actions: And A…r…ol…s, that stiffly argueth that God's Creating Action is neither God nor the Creature, but a middle thing, doth satisfie no mans Understanding, and is commonly rejected: and he can mean with sence nothing but God as Agent, vel in hoc modo; as a Creature in motion differeth modally from the same qui… sant: But God hath no Modus which is not Himself, though not an adequate Conception of himself. You must not conceive of God as of a Creature, which first by self-motion altereth it self (or is moved by another) and then moveth another thing: But God diversifieth things without diversity, and changeth things being himself unchanged.
§. 8. V. As to the Controversie, Whether God make and move things only Volendo (as Brad…ardine and many others say) or also Executive agend…, by excited Power? Quoad re… both are true; because Power and Will in God are really the same: But as to our Conception and Expression, it is a fuller expression to say that he doth it by Will and Power, because our Conception of m…er Volition is as of quid immanens which doth not efficiently go forth of it self, but command in Man the executive Faculties; and so conceiving of God after the manner of men, Volition is not an adequate conception of his causing Efflux, without Active Power: But they that conceive of Volition as transient and potently efficient, do mean the same thing, and really differ not from others.
§. 9. VI. God's Will as it is his Essence hath really no parts, no division, no change, no priority or posteriority, but perfect Simplicity and Eternity.
§. 10. VII. God's will as it is himself hath no Cause but is the Cause of every Creature: And to ask a Cause of the first Cause is absurd.
§. 11. VIII. All the effects of God's Will ad extra, have their divers natures, orders and seasons, priority, posteriority or simultaneity, which we may sobe…ly enquire after.
§. 12. IX. God's will, though but one, as related to the objects and effects, may by us be diversly denominated: And so we distinguish of his Creating will, and his Redeeming will, his will to Save, and his will to Damn, his will to save Peter, and his will to save Iohn, and so of all the rest of the Objects. In all which we mean not a Diversity of Essences or Faculties in God, or Acts ex parte agentis, really differing; but only one and the same Will diversly conceived of and denominated by reason of the diversity of objects or effects to which it is related, and so by Connotation the Will it self is thus distinguished.
§. 13. X. This distinction and denomination of God's will hath extrinsick Reasons, which some call Causes, from the various termini; as the same Light shining into several Rooms; the diversity being real only ex parte recipientis. And so God's Will may be said in this Sence to begin and to end, to have diversity, priority and posteriority of Acts; which are all to be judged of by the Order of the Objects.
§. 14. XI. The great question which the Schoolwits trouble themselves with, and Vasquez, with abundance more, pronounce unsearchable and past our reach, is, What is the Cause that God's Will is terminated thus or thus, on this Object rather than on that? To which I take the boldness to answer for the ending of that Dispute.
By [the Reason of Termination] you must mean either, 1. The Reason of the Being of that Object or Terminus rather than another: or 2. The reason of the Relation of God's Will to that terminus rather than another, and so of the denomination: or 3. The reason of the being of that Act of God so terminated.
1. For the first, the cause of all the effects of God's Will, is his Will it self: And so of all the diversities effected.
2. The reason of the Relation of God's Will to those effects, and so of the connotation and denomination, is the Will and the Effect as from which the relation doth result.
3. And the Being or Act of the Will thus terminated, is God's essence, which hath no Cause. And what would you have more?
§. 15. But this satisfieth not Men that still think of God as of themselves, but they go on still and ask, What is the Cause that God's Will … to make this World or Creature rather than another? or to give the first grace rather to one than to another? that his Will is terminated rather on Peter than Judas in election? &c. But I must but call you back to consider again distinctly of what was answered before. 1. The Cause of all the effects of Creation, &c. is God's Will: 2. The cause why his Will is related to that effect à posteriore is the position of the effect with God's Will. 3. The cause why God hath such a Will is not to be asked, for God's Will hath no Cause. And if you add, But what is the cause that, à priore, his Will is thus related and denominated as decreeing this or that? I say, A priore, there is nothing in God's Will but it self, which hath no Cause: we dream of priorities and posteriorities and varieties in him, when we think of the following effects; But when there was nothing but God really to terminate his will, there was no ground for any real relation and relative difference; And to talk of Relationes rationis in God himself as to non-existent Creatures, and ask the cause of them, is …ash presumption; while we know that there was nothing in God but God, who hath no Cause. And the question respecting nothing but what was eternally in God himself, whatever you will call his Essential Will fore-related to the future Creature, you must needs say, that it had no Cause.
§. 16. But if the question go further, Why God willeth not other Creatures, or other effects, and so his will is not effectively terminated on such; it is after to be fullier answered; and now it is enough to say, that Nothing hath no Cause.
§. 17. And when we say, that God's will may be denominated as divers, prior and posterior, and changeable as related to Objects that are such, this is to be understood only of those acts which are to be denominated by Connotation of what is divers and mutable, ex parte termini, still remembring that ex parte Dei there is really no diversity or mutation. And therefore such denominations are given of God's will chiefly as related to existent Objects, which are his Acts called Love and Hatred, or Complacency and Displacency: e. g. we may say that [God is displeased with Paul or Manasseth unconverted] and [he is pleased with them when converted] the change being only in them. Yet the same denomination may be used also of God's purposing Will. As, e. g. we may say, that [before Christ's Incarnation, God had this Decree; I will send my Son to be incarnate, and die for Man's redemption.] But now it is not fit to say that God hath yet such a Decree, when the thing decreed is past: nor a Decree that He will create Adam and the rest of the World, which is created.
§. 18. But whoever liketh or disliketh any of these modes of Speech, must still remember that Controversies about them are not about any real change in God, (which all deny) but only about the connotative and respective denomination of his Will from the changeable Creature. And while that is confessed, sober men will not be forward to fall out about it.
§. 19. Suffer not the Quaerist to confound the three forementioned Sences of [the Will of God,] and you may resolve almost all the ordinary questions about it, as is before intimated, without any more ado. As, e. g.
Qu. Is God's Will resistible?
Ans. 1. God's Will, as it is his Essence, cannot come into the Question, as not being passive, and so not properly resistible. 2. As God's Will is taken for the objects and effects of his will, many of them are resistible: As his Commands when they are violated are resisted morally; so one effect of God's will, or one Creature moved by him naturally, may resist another. 3. If the question be only whether the respective Termination of God's will, and the Denomination of it as thus or thus terminated, can be resisted? I answer, 1. Not by any resistance upon the Essential will of God so terminated. 2. Not by making God to be willing and not willing of the same thing in the same respect at the same time; for that is a contradiction; and were to make the same Object to be and not to be at the same time, Contra necessitatem existentiae. 3. Not by preventing or destroying any Object or Effect which God's will so produceth, as that no Creature hath power to hinder. 4. But when he will cause one sort of motion, and himself cause a greater contrary motion, or enable a free Agent so to do, this contrary motion resisting the other motion, which was the effect of God's will, his will is denominated as resisted respectively. The same may be said of Passive Resistance.
§. 20. So if the Question be [Whether God gave any Conditional Will?]
Ans. 1. There is no place for the Question about God's Essential Will in it self. 2. Many Objects of God's will and effects are antecedently conditional. 1. Quoad …ormam, as his conditional Promises. 2. Quoad …ventum, as when he suspendeth any Right, or Benefit on a condition to be done by a free Agent; as, e. g. [Adam shall live if he sin not, and die, if he sin.] But here Conditionality implieth no uncertainty as to God's Knowledge. 3. Therefore if the Question be only, whether …b objecto any Will of God may be relatively or connotatively called Conditional, 1. Remember that the Question is but de nomine. 2. The same will of God may be called Conditional, as quid conditionale is the Object of it; and also Certain and Absolute, as the same thing is to him certainly future, which yet was in the Order of Causing, conditionally future. But this supposeth the certo futurum, to be quid volitum; and not Sin, which is certo futurum and non volitum.