Catholic Theology Plain Pure Peaceable — Richard Baxter

Catholic Theology Plain Pure Peaceable · Richard Baxter

The eighth Crimination.

They make mans Free-will, and not Gods differencing Grace to be the cauſe that one man by Faith doth differ from another that hath Remonſtr. Synod. ubi ſupra. [Si quaeratur quae ſit cauſa cur hic convertitur, non autem ille? Reſpondemus, hic conv…rtitur quia Deus bunc non apponentem novam contumaciam convertit: Ille non convertitur quia novam contumaciam opponit: Quaeres, cur hic opponit novam contumaciam, alter nons Reſpondemus, Hic opponit quia oppo…ere vult: Ille non opponit quia a gratia movetur ne opponere velit: Quaeres, annon ille qui non opponit novam contumaciam & per conſequens convertitur, majorem …abebat gratiam, quam qui opponit, & per conſequens non convertitur? Reſpondemus, Antecedentem & praevenientem gratiam aequalem eſſe poſſe: ſed coopelantem hab…t prior, & non poſterior.no Faith. Contrary to Paul's ſuppoſition, who made thee to differ? Tilenus could not anſwer Camero to this charge.

I doubt here again is a Controverſie about words. I will ſpeak to you as to one that would know the truth. 1. De re, as to the Controverſie. 2. As to the meaning of the Text.

I. Let us here conſider, 1. What it is to Differ 2. What are the cauſes of ſuch difference?

I. To DIFFER is nothing but to be diſſimile, unlike. Diſſimilitude or Difference is a Relation. This Relation (as Ockam truly and largely ſheweth) is nothing extra intellectum, beſides its fundamentum, ſubjectum & terminus, the Abſoluta.

II. Difference then being a Relation is the diſſimilitude of divers perſons compared. Here the natural numerical difference of perſons, and abundance of other differences are preſuppoſed. And it is the Difference between a Believer and an Unbeliever, the Penitent and Impenitent as ſuch, that we have to conſider of. Now here are two Subjects differing, and in each one, if not two differences from the other: So that here are two, if not four ſeveral Relations of diſſimilitude between them. 1. Paul is a Believer; by which he differeth 1. From Nero as a Privative Unbeliever. 2. As a Poſitive Unbeliever. On the other ſide Nero 1. as a privative Unbeliever: 2. and a poſitive, differeth from Paul. Now every one of theſe Differences or diſſimilitudes have a ſeveral cauſe. 1. The fundamentum of both Paul's differences from Nero are hi… own Faith; and the Termini are Nero's Privative and Poſitive unbelief. 2. The fundamenta of Nero's difference from Paul are his Privative and Poſitive unbelief, and the Termini are Paul's Faith to both.

Now if the queſtion be, what doth Conſtitutive make Paul differ from Nero, it muſt be anſwered Paul's Faith and Nero's unbelief. For diſſimilitude reſulteth from the one compared with the other. And if both had been Believers there had been no difference. And ſo were this the queſtion, there were no difficulty in it at all.

But the meaning of the queſtion is not of the conſtitutive cauſe of the diſſimilitude, or the fundamentum, but of the efficient cauſe of that fundamentum, or elſe of the diverſifying Diſpoſitiv Receptiva. Now ſuppoſing that Faith and Unbelief are the conſtitutive differencing cauſes; the efficient cauſes of both muſt be ſought as the Ratio diſcriminis, and not of one only.

Queſt. 1. What is the cauſe (efficient) of Nero's unbelief? Anſ. His own will or wicked heart.

Queſt, 2. What is the efficient cauſe of Paul's Faith? Anſ. 1. The Principal efficient is God by his Spirit. 2. The meritorious cauſe is Chriſt. 3. The chief miniſterial efficient is Chriſt as giving the Spirit to work it. 4. The Inſtrumental efficient is the Goſpel. 5. The Immediate efficient is Paul: For it is he that believeth, and not God. Is there any one that denieth any of this?

I doubt they think that mans will is more the cauſe than the Spirit; becauſe they ſuſpend the Spirits ſucceſs upon mans will.

Accuſe not men by ſuſpicions and doubts without proof; yea contrary to their own profeſſions. Your crime of uncharitableneſs is not theirs; nor doth it follow that they are faulty becauſe you are ſuſpicious. *Alliac. Camer. …. …. q. 12. B. D…us nullum praedeſtinavit ant praedeſtinat (accipiendo predeſtinationem ſecundo modo) propter aliquod bonum aut aliqu…m cauſam praeviſam in praedeſtinato quia non ſtat aliquem noviter aliquod bonum habere, quin Deus prius voluerit & a… …terno, &c.You may read Corvinus to Tilenus expreſly aſſigning the efficiency of all that Grace that maketh us to differ, principally unto God. Some of them only ſay [man cannot effect, (or convert himſelf) but he can reſist: and ſo require no more of man to his converſion but not to reſiſt: yea not to reſiſt in an obſtinacy and high degree. Others of them require of man alſo an actual concurſe of his will by his power received, with the concurſe of God: But they make God here incomparably the chief efficient; not only as to Priority of operation, but as to his cauſation of the effect. And they uſe to illuſtrate it ſome time as Scotus by the ſimilitude of two drawing at a Ship, ſometime by a Father, that ſhould bid his Son lift at a heavy weight, and reſolveth to put to 900 degrees of the force himſelf if his Son will but endeavour, and put forth one degree. In this caſe, if the Son will not put forth that one which he can do, and ſo the event fail; it is not by the Impotency nor abſolute unwillingneſs of the Father. And if the child do put forth that one degree, will you ſay that he doth more to the effect than the Father that doth 900 parts; and that only becauſe that the Father would not do all himſelf? But this carrieth us from the matter in hand, and is after to be ſpoken to.

But if you make ſo many things go to make the difference, the queſtion, who made thee to differ? muſt have a long anſwer.

Not as Paul meant it, but as our troubleſome Contenders uſe it, in Even thoſe that found the infallibility on ſcientia media, make congrous Grace ex propoſito convertendi to be the cauſe of the difference. So Malderus 1, 2. q. 111. a. 3. p. 517. Quod hic credat prae alio, indubie venit de miſericordia Dei, ipſum ſi… vocantis ut accomodet aſſenſum; miſericordia inquam qua nos in C…riſto elegit, Totum eſt miſerentis Dei ipſe vocat, ipſe facit …t vocatus veniat; ipſe …t currat; ipſe nolentem praevenit, ut velit; volentem ſubſequitur n… fr… fira velit, vi ſua Gratia it a ſibi aptat liberum arbitrium; ut a n…llo d…ro corde reſp…t…r, quod dici…s provenire ex …o quod meris, in…abilibus & occultis modis noverit Deus ita hominis …over ſenſum ut accomodet aſſenſum—Fatemur Dei omnipotentiam & Dominium quod habet in voluntates hominum▪ manifeſtari in gratiae eff…catia.—Et conſenſus homi…is eſt don…m Dei, deſcendens a Patre luminum▪ …llumque conſenſum De… vult & …acit, quia facit …ominem virib… grati… …acer…. Ye… he yieldeth to …radwardines Doctrine, ſuppoſing him only to intend neceſſitatem quandam conſequentiae, neceſſarium eſſe hominem libere velle ill…d ipſum quod Deu… cuju… omnipotentia▪ quaecunque voluit facit) praevoluit ipſum ville libere. Item, gratiam efficacem der… intuit… meritorum Chriſti, non tantum quatenu… eſt▪ ſufficiens…ſed etiam quatenus eſt e…i…ax dum ſeeundum propoſitum ….—…m cura D… non eſt aqualis do omnibus.another ſenſe, the anſwer muſt be ſuited to the queſtion. And here note that really it is the ſtate of both parties compared, and not of one of them that conſtituteth the diſſimilitude as is ſaid: And the efficient cauſes of both ſtates, are the cauſes of the difference. And ſo truly the cauſe of Nero's unbelief, and the cauſes of Paul's Faith (which are many as aforeſaid) all ſet together are the cauſes of the differences; or rather all make up one cauſe of it. This no Logician can deny. But yet in vulgar ſpeech we uſe to ſay that that perſon or thing is the cauſe of the difference, 1. Which is the cauſe of the ſingularity. 2. Or which cauſeth the ſtate of the ſecond perſon compared, ſuppoſing the ſtate of the firſt perſon to be already exiſtent. And ſo you will find yet ſeveral ſenſes of the queſtion.

Explain it by ſome inſtances.

1. As to the cauſe of ſingularity. If one man be born an Ideot or a Monſter, when we ask, what made him differ from other men, though really the cauſes of the diſſimilitude be to be aſſigned on both parts; yet we mean only on his part, why is he not like others. So if one Child be unlike to all his brethren, or one Scholar in the School be much better or much worſe than all the reſt; or if one in a Family be ſick, he that asketh, what maketh him differ? doth mean, what made him ſick? &c.

2. And ſo as to Posteriority of State, if you ſuppoſe one of the diſſimiliar parts pre-exiſtent, and ask what maketh the other to differ from it? as if you ask why the Scholar writeth not like his Copy? why the Son is ſo unlike to the Father? why this age is ſo unlike the laſt? &c. We mean only what cauſeth the difference ex parte ſubſequente.

Apply it to the caſe in hand.

If you ask, what made the difference between the Devils and the perſevering Angels? In the full and proper anſwer you muſt aſſign the reaſon on both parts: But according to the uſual ſenſe of the queſtion, you muſt ſay [The wilful ſin of the Devils made the difference.] For the equal ſtate of uprightneſs went before the difference.

So if you ask, what made the difference between the world after the fall, and before it? vulgarly, we muſt ſay, ſin; becauſe that came laſt.

So if you ask, what made the difference between Noah and the world? between Lot and Sodom? Anſ. Indeed, that which made one part ſinful and the other righteous. But according to the vulgar ſenſe of the queſtion, it was the Righteouſneſs of Noah and Lot, and the cauſes of that righteouſneſs.

So what made the difference between Judas and the eleven Apoſtles? Anſ. Judas his wilful ſin and Wickedneſs, (though indeed the cauſe is on both ſides.)

So what maketh the difference between Believers and the Unbelieving world? Really, the unbelief of the world, and the Faith of Chriſtians with their cauſes: But it's like the ſpeaker meaneth only ex parte credentium: And then the cauſe of their Believing is the cauſe of their differing.

But now, if it hold true that God giveth a ſufficiency of Grace ut cauſa univerſalis ex parte donantis (antecedently to mens accepting or rejecting) equally, then if one ask, what maketh the difference? you would underſtand him (why have not unbelievers Faith, as well as others? And then the anſwer would be, wilful reſiſting, or refuſing Grace, or the moral ſpecial indiſpoſition of the Recipients makes the difference; or elſe all would be alike believers.

But note, that we ask not [What maketh the difference between Believers and unbelievers?] but do particularize the ſubject, and ask, [what maketh the Believer differ from the Unbeliever?] or what maketh the unbeliever differ from the believer?] It is then ſuppoſed that we mean only ex parte nominata. And thus in the vulgar ſenſe the queſtions, [what maketh the believer differ from the Infidel?] and [what maketh the Infidel differ from the believer] muſt have various anſwers.

I understand you thus in brief: 1. You ſay that conſtitutively it is Faith that is the difference on Paul's part, and unbelief on Nero's. 2. The cauſes of the ſaid Faith and unbelief, are the cauſes of the difference: (As the cauſes of the whiteneſs of one wall; and of the blackneſs of the other cauſe their difference.) 3. That to ask (why the Believer differeth from the Unbeliever?) is but to ask [why he is a Believer when the other is not?] 4. Here you ſay the two Relations of diſſimilitude in two ubbjects make the queſtions two in one, viz. 1. Why or whence is Paul a Believer?] 2. Whence is it that Nero is an Unbeliever?] 5. You ſay that Nero is an Unbeliever through his own wilfulneſs, and illdiſpoſition reſiſting Grace (Satans temptations concurring.) And that Paul is a Believer from many conjunct cauſes: 1. Gods Grace by his Spirit. 2. Chriſts Merits. 3. Chriſts donation of that Spirit. 4. The means by which he worketh. 5. The concurſe of Pauls will. To which efficients you add in moſt a competent Receptive diſpoſition in genere cauſ… materialis, both paſſive and active. 6. You ſay that in all this Gods Grace is incomparably the greater cauſe than man's will. 7. But yet not the ſole cauſe, and that ſome free-not-neceſſitated concurſe of mans will, in the uſe of ſuch Power as he hath, is a condition ſine qua non ut diſpoſitio Gratiae receptiva, ordinarily. 8. But that God is not tied to this, but may extraordinarily do otherwiſe. 9. But that this *Ruiz. de praedif. tr. 3. d. 18. p. 222. Reſp. diſpoſitiones proximas & pro…ertionatas ad gratiam n…il ob eſſe quidditati gratiae, quoniam ex prima radice naſcuntur ex prima gratia, quae abſque ulla diſpoſitione quaſi creata eſt a Deo ſine materia. At pugnabit cum quidditate gratiae quaelibet diſpoſitio etiam remota. ſi ab illa ſumit initium gratia ita ut prima gratia detur intuitu talis diſpoſitionis. I… not this enough?pre-requiſite diſpoſition, and the concurſe of mans will is only the uſe of a power freely before given of God, with all neceſſary helps to uſe it. 10. And therefore that God is from firſt to laſt the firſt cauſe of all that's good in man, though not the only cauſe; and that of himſelf man can do nothing. Have I not taken your meaning right.

Yes, ſo far as you have recited it?

But methinks yet you anſwer not the great queſtion, which Camero baffled Tilenus with. It is not why Paul believeth? Nor why Nero believeth not? as ſingly conſidered: But comparatively, why Paul believeth rather than Nero? Speak to that.

Camero and Tilenus were great and excellent wits. But if you can forgive the Truth, I muſt add that which they ſaid nothing to, which will prove that a few degrees more of acuteneſs, might have ſhortned or better ended their diſpute.

It is the Comparatio perſonarum that is now the ſubject of that Controverſie: why this man rather than that as compared? Here then we are to conſider, 1. The Comparabilitas. 2. The Ipſa Comparatio.

1. The queſtion as to the firſt is, either 1. Whether there was antecedently any ſuch ratio comparandi in them, as might be a reaſon or motive to God himſelf, quoad actum ex parte agentis, why he ſhould decree to give, or actually give Faith to one man rather than to another? 2. Or elſe whether there were any ſuch difference antecedent as might be Ratio diſcriminis ineffectis, the reaſon why one received or had Faith, and the other not.

II. And then quoad actum comparandi, the queſtion is, whether God in his Decree or mind did truly compare the perſons antecedently, and ſay (not only [I will cauſe this man to believe] and ſay [I will not cauſe that man to believe] or, not ſay [I will.]) But alſo ſaid [I will cauſe this man to believe rather than that.]

To theſe ſeveral queſtions then I anſwer. 1. Negatively to the firſt: For Gods acts ex parte agentis are his eſſence; and as he hath no cauſe, but is the cauſe of all things, ſo thus far nothing in the world is a cauſal reaſon or motive to God. He willeth becauſe he willeth, or rather without cauſe.

II. To the ſecond, There are in the Creatures different capacities, for terminating God… will and action objectively, and accordingly denominating his Volitions and Actions variouſly: And ſo this queſtion muſt be divided into three. 1. Whether always. 2. Whether ordinarily. 3. Whether ſometimes there be an objective ratio comparabilitatis and of preferring one before another, as to the effect of believing? or why Gods operation ſhould effect Faith rather in this man than in that? To which I anſwer.

Ad primum, 1. There are nearest Reaſons in the immediate aptitude of the receiver. Such as is the higheſt degree of preparing Grace in one, which another hath not. And there are remote reaſons or aptitudes. As e. g. A man of great learning, wit, and zeal, or ſome other remote aptitude, will be a fitter perſon for Gods work than another, when he believeth. 2. It is not known to any mortal man, what different aptitudes in both theſe kinds, God the only heart-ſearcher ſeeth, which no man can ſee: And therefore this queſtion cannot certainly be anſwered as to both ſorts.

3. But as far as our blind eyes can reach, it ſeemeth moſt probable to us, that God doth not always effect Faith according to the degrees of receptive aptitude of either ſort. Becauſe we ſee that ſometimes he ſuddenly calleth very great ſinners, and alſo ſome that are ſilly and little ſerviceable in the world. But yet what ſpecial aptitudes God may ſee in them we know not.

Ad ſecundum, Qu. I anſwer, That it is Gods ordinary way to give Faith according to the firſt ſort of prediſpoſition alone (were there no difference in the laſt) that is, To thoſe that have the higheſt degrees of moral preparation, or Common Grace, I take to be a certain truth. 1. Becauſe in all Gods Works we ſee that he operateth by degrees in order, and, on prediſpoſed matter, and that efficit juxta diſpoſitionem recipientis. 2. But ſpecially becauſe he hath himſelf appointed a courſe of means for the obtaining of his ſpecial Grace, to be uſed by all men: And he cannot be thought to do all this in vain; nor to ſet men on doing their part in vain. And all practical Divines who preach ſo much for the ſouls preparation, are of this mind, that ſuch preparation is the ordinary prediſpoſition.

Ad Qu. 3. I anſwer, That at leaſt ſometimes it is ſo, is paſt queſtion with any ſober man. For it is a contradiction, to call it preparing Grace, or Diſpoſition; and yet to ſay that by it no man is made ever the more receptive or nearlier capable of Faith or ſpecial Grace. So much to the two queſtions de Comparabilitate.*Mark what Bannes himſelf ſaith of Common Grace, in q. 23. pag. 274. [Pie credi poteſt quod omnibus venientibus ad uſum rationis Deus opem. aliquam ferat ſupernaturali quodam auxilio ſecreto inſtigante ad operandum bonum. 2. Si vera eſt opinio Thomae, &c. neceſſe eſt dic…re quod omnis qui juſtificatur, receperit gratiam praeparantem ſaltem prius natura quam praeceptum naturale adimpleverit. 3. Quotieſcunque aliquis pec…at ſpeciale peccatum contra ſupernaturale praeceptum, vel fidei vel p…nit…ntiae, &c. neceſſe eſt ut ille de facto receperit aliquam divinam inſpirationem illuminantis Dei dut vocantis aut incitantis ad fidem, &c. Immo neceſſe eſt hominem tangi aliqua ſupernaturali inſpiratione ut nullam …abtat excuſationem. Poſſibile eſt ſe…undam legem ordinariam quemlibet dum eſt in hac vita ſalvari. D…us paratus eſt dare omnibus quamdiu ſunt in h…c vita auxilium quo fiant potentes converti, immo & auxilium ſpecialius quo converta…tur ſi velint. I cite this, becauſe for his Doctrine of Predetermi…ation, Proteſtants much value Ban…es (a boaſting Author, who thanketh God that their King burneth Proteſtants.) Indeed the Dominio…s commonly confeſs ſufficient Grace which is not effectual.

III. But as to the third queſtion, Whether God Actually in his mind thus Compare men, and prefer one before another, and ſay, I will cauſe this man to believe rather than that? I anſwer, 1. There is no Act in God but his Eſſence, which is invariable, and indiviſible. 2. But becauſe his operations as terminated and productive ad extra are various, and have objective material cauſes of their diverſity in the recipients; therefore we uſually thence denominate Gods volitions as various. And ſo when we ſee that one man hath Grace given him to believe, when another hath not, we hence ſay that God mentally and by Decree preferreth one before the other: when the difference is not at all in God, not his Act ex parte agentis, but only of and by God in the Recipients.

But come yet nearer the heart of the caſe, and tell me plainly, 1. Whether the difference of Effects be more from the will and action of God, or from mens different Receptive diſpoſitions. And 2. Whether all theſe different Receptivities be not of God.

Order bids me begin with the latter. 1. The different Diſpoſitions are of two ſorts, Good and Bad. God is not the cauſe of the Indiſpoſition or illdiſpoſition of any. And as to the good diſpoſition or Preparation of Souls, no doubt but he is the principal Cauſe of it all: but not the ſole Cauſe, nor (always at leaſt) the neceſſitating Cauſe; but oft giveth men that neceſſary help by which they might have been prepared for more, when yet they are not through their wilful reſiſtance or neglect. For few men will deny that men have ſufficient uneffectual Grace for ſome preparatory acts, though not for faith.

Ad. Q. 2. I told you that the difference in the effects, reſulteth from the Cauſes in both Subjects, and not in one only: That which maketh one a believer, and the other an unbeliever, maketh them differ. And I have told you what theſe Cauſes are. But further; I ſuppoſe as aforeſaid, a certain eſtabliſhed order and degree of univerſal help, external and internal, by Chriſt to the Soul, as the Sun affordeth to inferior Bodies: This ſtabliſhed order of Grace, univerſally affordeth ſuch a degree of Divine Influx and help, as will cauſe faith in a prepared Soul, and will not cauſe it in ſome much unprepared Souls: (For if as little help would ſerve the unprepared as the prepared, to what uſe is preparation, & quomodo recipitur ad modum recipientis;) In this caſe now the efficient of Grace is God, and not Man; but *That even Jeſuits confeſs in their way of ſcientia media that the Ratio diſcriminis why one perſon rather than another hath Grace is from God, initially and principally, and not from any beginning in man. See Ruiz proving it at large in all his Tract. 3. Diſp. 18. 19. De Praedeſt. exordio. So that this is no difference between us. Yea, more he maintaineth that ante fidem ni…il eſt diſpoſitionis, meriti aut impetrationis. Sect. 3. Diſp. 19. 24. And one would think that this ſhould ſatisfie even the Antinomians. But he meaneth only that this diſpoſition is not always neceſſary. He that will in brief ſee what the Schoolmen ſay of preparative Grace, may find abundance of them cited by Ruiz ibid. d. 21. per totam, and what nature can do in preparation. Greg. Armin. in 2. d. 28. q. 1. a. 1. ſpeaketh moſt like the Reformed. Aug. de bono perſever. c. 8. Sed cur Gratia Dei non ſecundum merita hominum datur? Reſp. Quia deus miſerecors eſt. Cur ergo non omnibus? Et hic reſpondeo, Quoniam Deu… juſtus Judex eſt.the Ratio proxima of the difference in the event and effects is the Diverſe diſpoſition of the Recipients. But here, mark well, that it is not the good diſpoſition or preparation of one party, that is, the only, and I think, not the chief reaſon of the difference; but the Privative and Poſitive indiſpoſition of the other party, is as much, if not, the chiefeſt reaſon. If one man ſhut his eyes againſt the light, when another doth not, the Ratio diſcriminis why one man differeth from another in ſeeing and not ſeeing, is on both parts, but principally on his part that ſhutteth his eyes; becauſe the other doth but what he was made to do, and all living creatures ſhould do: But the other abſurdly croſſeth nature. So that under an univerſal Influx and help, the ſaid Influx is the efficient of the action or effect; but the diſpoſition of the Recipients are the Occaſions and Reaſons to be aſſigned of the various effects; but eſpecially the incapacity of the defective party. As the reaſon why the Sun doth make a Tree bear fruit, and not a dead ſtock, is becauſe the Tree is an apt recipient of its influx, but the ſtock or ſtone is not.

2. But, (Note) that in caſe that God operate not by ſuch an univerſal Influx only, but alſo by ſuperadded ſpecial or extraordinary degrees of particular Grace, which by a difference from the univerſal Influx or degree, is peculiarly apt to procure the effects, here the ratio diſcriminis is principally to be aſcribed to that ſpecial Grace, and not to the preparations on the Soul.

Tell me then, what you think, whether God works by ſuch an univerſal Grace, or by ſuch a ſpecial Grace. 1. How far doth he work by univerſal Grace? 2. Is that univerſal Grace ever effectual of it ſelf, on prepared Souls? 3. How far doth he alſo uſe the ſpecial particular Grace which you mentioned?

I. To your firſt Qu. I anſwer, 1. God in the beginning made mankind upright in Adam and Eve, and made no difference as to the preſent caſe.

2. Eve having firſt ſinned, did make a difference between her ſelf and Adam, which God made not, nor altered firſt his univerſal Grace.

3. Adam next (without Gods alteration) by Sin did difference himſelf from himſelf (as he was before).

4. God then ſet up a new univerſal Grace; even Chriſt with the new Covenant, and Recovering means, to give out univerſal help ſuited to his Covenant and means; to be the Giver of the Spirit, and the Light of the world (we cannot have time now to open the difference, between Chriſt's adminiſtrations before and after his Incarnation). There was at firſt an univerſal ſufficiency in this Recovering help of Grace.

5. Cain (that could have done otherwiſe) wilfully ſinned againſt this univerſal Grace and Covenant: and ſo made a difference between him and the reſt of mankind, when God made none.

6. Whether Abel did offer his acceptable Sacrifice by this ſame univerſal Help alone, or by any ſpecial extraordinary Grace ex parte mediorum vel Influxus primi recepti, is a thing unknown to us, becauſe unrevealed.

7. The Poſterity of Cain (as of Adam at firſt) becauſe Seminally in him, and perſonally from his very guilty eſſence, were juſtly deprived of ſome of that Grace, both Subjective and Objective which Cain had deprived himſelf of. Their natures were more vitiated, and ſo they were made leſs Receptive and more diſpoſed as to the univerſal means and Influx. And by his ſeceſſion from the holy ſeed, he was deprived of much outward means: And having forfeited the Spirit, he had leſs alſo of its helping Influx: And thus he and his poſterity made themſelves to differ, as if a Generation of Sinners ſhould be born bl…nd, while the Sun ſhineth as it did before.

8. The Holy ſeed that's not yet Apoſtate, have great ſubjective and objective Grace.

9. The ſeed of Cain are ſtill under the ſame Law of Grace, and univerſal conditional promiſe, that If they will believe and repent, they ſhall be ſaved: And they have ſome Means and ſome Help of Grace yet left them, which have an aptitude by degrees to bring them back again to God: And if they will not uſe that lower degree of Grace, by returning as they can, they forfeit that and further help.

10. But yet God hath beſides this Univerſal Grace, ſome ſpecial and extraordinary ways and degrees of Grace for ſome, according to his Good pleaſure. But this with the anſwer to your other two queſtions, will come in better anon, under the next head.

Having ſpoke to the matter, now ſpeak of the ſenſe of the Text, 1 Cor. 4. 7. and Rom. 12. 6. For who maketh thee to differ from another? and what haſt thou that thou didſt not receive? Now if thou didſt receive it, why doſt thou glory as if thou hadst not received it.

It is moſt evident, that Paul ſpeaketh of the Gifts or Excellencies themſelves primarily and of Differing from others, but as a reſultancy from thoſe Gifts: And he medleth not here with the queſtion, why others have not thoſe Gifts as well as they? and ſo why others differ from them. q. d. Are not all thoſe things of which you glory, the free gifts of God? And is it not by thoſe free gifts that you differ as more excellent than others? And ſhould you boaſt of that which is Gods free Gift, of which you are but Receivers? To paſs by the common anſwer that Paul ſpeaketh of Miniſterial Gifts, and not of ſpecial Grace, what Arminian can deny any of this, about the Grace of faith it ſelf. 1. He muſt confeſs that we have no Grace to cauſe faith, but what we have received; (For the Act which we performed is no otherwiſe to be ſaid to be received, but as we receive the gracious operation which cauſeth it). 2. He cannot deny that by this Received Grace and Faith, the believer in excellency differeth from unbelievers. 3. Nor that ſuch a Receiver hath no cauſe of boaſting, as if he had not received it. Who will deny this?

But they leave him to boaſt, that by his better preparation and diſpoſition, he was a fitter Recipient than another. And ſo all boaſting is not excluded.

1. In Paul's Caſe (of extraordinary Miniſterial gifts) there is leſs room for that much; becauſe they are not given ſo much according to preparations, as ſaving Grace is: For even ungodly men may have them.

2. The boaſting which is excluded, is a boaſting of our ſelves as againſt or without the glory of Grace, as if we had ſome excellency which we had not received. But our very Receptive diſpoſition was received by Gods Grace, even from his common preparing Grace: And that common Grace was freely given.

3. If by boaſting, you would mean, an acknowledgment of Gods grace, then all thankſgiving is boaſting. Or if a Rejoycing in the effects of that Grace as Received and improved by us, then Paul ſo boaſted often, yea and to the death rejoyced in this teſtimony of his Conſcience, that in ſimplicity and Godly ſincerity, and not in fleſhly wiſdom he had had his converſation in the world, 2 Cor. 1. 12. And that he tamed his body, and that he ſuffered for Chriſt, and that he had fought a good fight, 2 Tim. 4. 7, 8. If praiſing Gods grace in his Servants, and that holy uſe of it, in wiſdom, faith, love, obedience and patience, be boaſting, God ſo boaſteth of them and praiſeth them, even at judgment, Math. 25. Well done good and faithful Servant. And Scripture throughout ſo boaſteth of them. And we that muſt honour thoſe that fear the Lord, Pſal. 15. 4. muſt ſo boaſt of them alſo. But this is not the forbidden boaſting.

And as to Rom. 12. 6. 1 Cor. 12. Eph. 1. 6, 7, 8. and ſuch like its paſt queſtion that God freely diverſifyeth Offices and ſuch Gifts as he pleaſeth; and we know of no praediſpoſition to which, even ordinarily, he tyeth himſelf, as to many of them. But ſaving Grace is given more under a Law, and ſtabliſhed courſe of means, in the uſe of which we muſt be fit Recipients.

Catholic Theology Plain Pure Peaceable, Conference 8 · Accusation 8

p. 180The eighth Crimination.

The eighth Crimination.