Catholic Theology Plain Pure Peaceable, Conference 8 · Accusation 3
The third Crimination.
C.
They make Grace to be but a moral Operation or ſwaſion, and ſeem to deny that phyſical operation which is eminently Grace: or at leaſt take it to be but a phyſical uſe of moral means; And indeed I doubt whether ſome of them confeſs any other Grace than the Goſpel and other means of Grace? And ſo the Spirit muſt work only on the Preacher, or on the ſound of words, if he work not immediately and phyſically on the heart.*The untruth of this common Charge appeareth in the following citations. Vocatio iſta tum externa eſt tum interna: externa per ministerium hominum verbum proponentium: Interna per operationem ſpiritus ſancti illuminantis & cor afficientis ut attendatur iis quae dicuntur, fideſ que verb… adhibeatur: ex utriuſ que concurſu efficacitas vocationis exiſtit. Iſt a diſtributio non eſt generis in ſpeci…s, ſed totius in partes, hoc eſt totalis …ocationis in partiales acti…nes, &c. Armin Diſput. Privat. Theſ. 42. Sect. 10, 11. Remonſt. Synod. art. 3. 4. p. 15, &c. Si quaeratur ex nobis an Dei convertentis actio tantum moralis ſit, ſuadendo, proponendo, invi…ando, Reſpondemus, Pluſquam moralem eſſe, & ſi excitantem ſpectemus gratiam dicimus in ipſam voluntatem quo que potentiam ſupernaturalem inſundi diſtinctam ab illuminatione: ſi vero co-operantem, dicimus cam phyſicam vocari poſſe, & realem ac propriam habere efficientiam.] Note here their plain profeſſion of phyſical and infuſed Grace. [Si quaeratur an praeter mentis illuſtrationem & …ffectuum excitationem, & voluntatis invitationem nihil faciat Gratia per modum principii vel antecedenter ad converſionem, Reſpondemus facere, Id. ibid.
B.
Still I fear that you are guilty of ſtriving about words to no profit, but ſubverſion of the peoples Charity.
1. Moral hath uſually three different ſenſes. 1. Moral is as much as Reputative; As he that concealeth or encourageth a Traytor or Murderer, or defendeth not the aſſaulted, is, ex lege morum, reputed and judged as guilty of the Treaſon or Murder. And thus cauſa moralis is uſually but cauſa ex lege morum reputata.
2. Moral is oft taken for Ethical, or that which is ex genere moris, either Good or Evil, Virtue or Vice, which contain all morality.
3. Moral is oft oppoſed to meerly natural (forced, bruitiſh, &c.) and meaneth the action of a free Agent as ſuch. In which of theſe ſenſes, or what other do you take it.
C.
I mean the firſt, that God doth but operate ut cauſa moralis per modum proponentis objectum; which Dr. Twiſſe ſaith is but in genere cauſae finalis, and ſo is but operatio metaphorica.
B.
It's pity that Chriſt's Diſciples muſt be troubled with ſuch uncertain arbitrary notions, without neceſſity. But what remedy: 1. I know no Law that forbiddeth me to diſſent from Dr. Twiſſe, or you in Logick or Phyſicks. I do not believe that objectum qua tale is cauſa finalis: And no wonder; For 2. I hold that to be no proper cauſe which you call commonly cauſa finalis; And inſtead of advancing each Object to the dignity of a final cauſe, I take down the final cauſe to the order or rank of the prime Object of Volition or Intention. To be optimum is the Ratio objectiva primaria, it being moſt ſuitable to the Will. To be medium ad optimum is the Ratio objectiva ſecundaria. Bonum qua tale non agit in voluntatem, ſed voluntas in bonum cognitum: Though the cognitio boni doth dirigere voluntatem. When it is commonly ſaid, [Ob finem amatum volo medium, the prepoſition deceiveth us, as if the cauſalitas ſinis were upon the Will: But it meaneth no more but that the Aptitude of the means, ad finem, is the Ratio bonitatis, and ſo the Ratio objectiva medii: I will or chooſe it, becauſe it is apt or conducible to the end or chief object; that is, That it is Goodneſs for which I will it. Which ſpeaketh no more but Rationem objectivam. 3. And all objects of the intellect and will are cauſes indeed of the act in ſpecie; but what cauſes, Receptive and Terminative, ſuch as we muſt call Material (ſo far as an act may be ſaid to have matter) of which more anon.
And if the object be no other than a material or receptive cauſe, conſtituting the act in ſpecie, then the propoſer of the object, who operateth but in ſubſervience to it, can be no other than a preparer and offerer of the matter. But how great a hand this receptive cauſe hath in the mutations and diverſities in the world, is little conſidered by the moſt.
2. But I pray you tell me, How many, and whom do you find that hold that God doth no more but proponere objectum? I remember none.
C.
What ſay they leſs when they call it Moral ſuaſion, when ſuadere is but proponere objectum?
B.
So then, your accuſations are your own Inferences, and not their words. But do they not commonly tell you of an inward ſuaſion by the Spirit (and Conſcience) as well as an outward by the word?
C.
Yes they do ſo; but that inward is but ſuaſion ſtill.
B.
But are you ſure that by ſuaſion they mean nothing but propoſing the Object to the Intellect, and by it the Will.
C.
What elſe can they mean, if they ſpeak congruouſly?
B.
As far as I can underſtand them they moſtly differ not from the Synodiſts at all, in their meaning; (much leſs do the School-men and L…therans, who uſe not the word [ſuaſion] ſo much as they.) For the thing that they mean is 1. That Gods Spirit worketh on the Intellect by objective means, (though not only propounding that object, but alſo aſſiſting and exciting the mind.) 2 That by the apprehenſion of the Intellect, the wills object is offered to it: And as Camero copiouſly pleadeth the act of the will is ever excited by the act of the Intellect. (Or indeed the object is ſo aptly preſented, as that the will ſhall or may either by Natural or Gracious Inclination excite it ſelf, ſuppoſing Gods aſſiſtance.) But that the will is not moved, to any but an Apprehended Good. 3. And that God doth this work on the will in a ſweet connatural manner; like as an effectual perſwader doth, not forcing the Will, but preſerving its liberty: and as the Arminians ſpeak, not irreſiſtibly, or by neceſſitation, leaving the act to be contingent. 4. But withal, it is moſt certain, that God operateth on the Mind and Will it ſelf, and not on the Preacher of the Word only. 5. But no mortal man knoweth how; nor is able to comprehend his way of operation.
11. But next tell me what you mean by Phyſical, which is the other branch of your diſtinction?
C.
What ſhould I mean but Natural, by Real Contact, attingency or influx on the Recipient?
B.
1. God is above Nature, and not included in your Phyſicks: How then do you call his operations Phyſical, ex parte agentis. No Phyſicks pretend to treat of God.
2. Contact and proper attingency belongeth to Bodies: But God is not a Body; and therefore the Contact or Influx by which he operateth, is utterly unknown to mortal man, any farther than that it is by his Eſſence.
3. God is immenſe and eſſentially every where; and therefore ſuch a Metaphyſical Attingency or Contact, as may be ſpoken of him, he hath to all things in the world; and therefore muſt do all that he any way doth in ſuch attingency.
C.
Explain it and reſolve it your ſelf, if you like not my Explication.
B.
Gods operations are called Phyſical or Moral, 1. In regard of God the Agent. 2. In regard of the means or ſecond cauſes. 3. Or in reſpect of the effect.
I. In reſpect of God the Agent they are not properly either Phyſical or Moral, but tranſcendently they are above both; for they are his Eſſence The Papiſts who are moſt for meer moral operations in this Controverſie, yet have ſuch ſtrange opinions about the phyſical operations of Sacraments (e. g. Baptiſm on Infants) as that they make them to be inſtruments of Miracles, the Miracle being firſt wrought upon them (e. g. the water, and then on the receiver. Yea they ſeem to make God to operate miraculouſly with every Sacrament.and Will, which is the tranſcendent Head of all operations and cauſes, Phyſical and Moral.
II. As to the Means or ſecond Cauſes, thoſe acts of God that have no ſuch means or cauſes are not here concerned: And as for all thoſe that have ſuch means, no doubt but they are to be called both Phyſical and Moral: for Morality is but Modality or Relation, ex rerum ordine. And all Order, Mode and Relation, is Alicujus entis ordo, Modus & Relatio. And e. g. preaching the Goſpel, is ſuch an act of a Phyſical and Moral Agent, as is it ſelf both Phyſical and Moral. Man is quaedam natura, and yet Intellectual and Free: And his act is quid phyſicum in genere entis; and yet quid morale in genere moris, & imputanda juxta l…egem morum.
III. And as to the Effect, it is no doubt, both quid phyſicum (for Faith is actus realis) and quid morale: For it is morale bonum, & ita reputanda. And will any Arminian deny any of this, that underſtandeth words? Where then is your difference in this?
C.
But when you diſpute about Pre-determination, you can ſay it is not Phyſical: what mean you by it then?
B.
We marvail that men ſhould ſay that God phyſically pre-determineth the Will to all acts of ſin in the ſpecifying circumſtances, when as he pre-determineth it not really to them at all, either phyſically or morally. So that it is here a Real efficient motion of God to the evil act, which we deny.
C.
And it is a Real efficient motion of God, to the act of Faith and Repentance which we aſſert, and mean by the word Phyſical.
B.
And this your Adverſaries will not deny: and ſo you are in this agreed.