Catholic Theology Plain Pure Peaceable — Richard Baxter

Catholic Theology Plain Pure Peaceable · Richard Baxter

The first Crimination.

1. They aſſert an Univerſality of Grace to all men, ſufficient to their Salvation.*Malderus, in 1. 2. Tho. q. 109. a. 10. dub. 1. pag. 464. mentioneth five degrees of ſufficient Grace: 1. That moſt imperfect degree by which Sinners may forbear a particular mortal ſin. 2. That of the Regenerate by which they are able to forbear all mortal ſin: but being infirm will not. 3. Adam in Innocency, who could eaſily have perſevered, but did not; when ſome Angels did by the ſame degree which others had that fell. 4. That of the Predeſtinate, who have Gods ſpecial cuſtody, before they are confirmed in Grace. 5. The Grace of Confirmation, of which there are five Opinions, (of which after.) Some Lutherans ſeem to go further in this than the Jeſuites or Arminians, and to deny the diſtinction of ſufficient and effectual Grace, ſaying that it is the ſame Grace that is effectual in one and not in another: but I think they differ but in words: So Gerhard, de lib. arb. c. 6. ſect. 1. Concedimus ſane ſpiritui ſancto converſionis opus aggredienti multos reſiſtere, con…ilium Dei adverſus ſeipſos ſpernere—& hac ratione ſua culpa gratiam converſionis a ſe repellere: ſed propterea ipſam Gratiam in ſufficientem & efficacem dividendam eſſe negamus, ſiquidem una eadem que Dei Gratia eſt, quae in credentibus operatur, & quae ab intredulis repellitur. And he ſuppoſeth all mens Wills to be bad, and without power to convert themſelves, and that God giveth them ſuch Grace as doth not phyſically conſtrain or neceſſitate them or determine them; but ſuch a ſuitable operation as they can reſiſt: And ſo that the efficacy of Grace is not from the Will, but from Grace it ſelf: but the inefficacy is from man: and the reaſon why any are converted, is from Grace: but the reaſon why any are not converted, is from their reſiſting that Grace; and ſo the Will of the Wicked is the differencing cauſe. Le Blank de diſt. Grat. in ſuffic. &c. 68, 69. Remonſtrantes non ideo Gratiam diſtinguunt in ſufficientem & efficacem, quod putent gratiam quam accipiunt illi qui increduli manent & in peccatis perſeverant non habere vim & efficaciam neceſſariam & praerequiſitam ad hoc, &c. ſed ideo ſolum grati… cujus ſu…t participes denegant efficacis n…men quod effectum ad quem deſtinatur in iis reapſe non producat propter impedimentum quod illi ponunt—utri que ergo docent gratiam hanc ſatis virium habere ad ipſos convertendos—nihil ergo pejus h…t in parte ſentiunt Remonſtrantes illis qui Lutherani dicuntur: Ac proinde cum Reformati horum communionem non refugiunt, ſed ultro cos ad pacem, &c. Magna eſt bonitas Dei in dandis bonis corporis & anim…: major eſt bonitas Dei in remittentis peccata magna & multa: maxima in patientia, &c: Strigel. Loc. 60. pag. 301. Carbo Compend. Tho. 1. q. 21. a. 4. Opus divinae juſtitiae ſemper p…ſupponit opus miſerecordi…; & in ea …undatur tanquam i… prima radice quia ne procedatur in infinitum deveniendum eſt ad aliquid quod ex ſola bonitate divinae voluntatis d…pendeat.

I hope you have no malignant deſire to extenuate Gods Grace, but are willing to acknowledge it to be as great and large as indeed it is, if you can diſcern the proof.

God best knoweth how to honour himſelf.

Quest. 1. Do you think that all the World, or all that ſhall periſh, yea or any part of the World is under the meer Curſe of the Law of Innocency, as violated by Adam, without any remedy or mercy.

I think they are without real Remedy, though not without all Mercy; for a delay of puniſhment is mercy.

Queſt. 2. Do you think that they are only under the Curſe of that Law as the Devils are, without any poſſibility or offers of a remedy; or that they are alſo ſtill under the Covenant-Offers of Life, upon condition of Innocency.

I cannot ſuppoſe God now to offer a man Life, on condition he be no Sinner, whom he knoweth to be a Sinner: For ſuch an Offer is equivalent to a ſentence of Death, or denial of Life. Nor can I ſay that they are as deſperate as the Devils, becauſe they know not the deſperateneſs of their caſe.

Quest. 3. Do you think all the difference between them and Devils lieth in delay and ignorance of their miſery? Then the moſt ignorant and preſumptuous of them is the leaſt miſerable, though the moſt ſinful; which cannot be?

Queſt. 4. But do you think that no Me…cy is to be offered …o ſuch?

Yes: becauſe we know not who are Elect, and who not.

Quest. 5. Are we to offer men mercy only as Elect? or rather as Sinners and miſerable, under a Law of Grace? and as Subjects of God obliged by that Law to accept it?

We offer it to all Sinners, that the Elect may receive it.

Quest. 6. Are none but the Elect under a Law of Grace, as the rule of their Duty, their expectation and of Judgment?

Others may be under the Obligations of it, but not under the G…a…e of it.

Remember then, 1. That they are not lawleſs. 2. That they are not under that meer violated Law of Innocency, [Be innocent and live.] 3. That they are under the Obligations of the Law of Grace.

Queſt. 7. Is there any of them that are not bound to uſe certain means appointed of God, in order towards their own Salvation?

They are bound to intend their own Salvation, and with that intention to uſe ſome means: But God intends it not.

Quest. 8. Doth God command men on pain of damnation to any vain endeavours, or uſe of means?

He commandeth it not in vain: for it ſhall make them unexcuſeable. 2. They are not to judge their endeavours vain, becauſe they know it not. 3. But in the iſſue all will be in vain to them.

Queſt. 9. Would it be in vain to them, if they really did the utmoſt that common Grace enableth any men to do?

It is not properly Grace to them, and ſo not common. 2. It would be in vain to them.

Queſt. 10. Is that vain which bringeth a man into the neareſt preparation for ſpecial Grace, and neareſt to the Kingdom of God?

To the Elect it is not vain: Nor to others for their ſakes: Nor to others, as to the leſſening of their pains in Hell: But as to their Salvation it is.

Queſt. 11. Who would it be long of (or be reputed the Cauſe) if it be in vain.

Of themſelves, who are born in ſin from Adam, and are Unbelievers.

You ſuppoſe it impoſſible for them to believe, and impoſſible for them not to be the Children of Adam. They made not themſelves, and you ſuppoſe that for want of Grace they cannot believe.

Queſt. 12. When Death ſhall acquaint them with the impoſſibility that they were under, do you think, 1. That it will be the way of glorifying the Juſtice of God in Judgment, to have the World know that he condemneth Sinners meerly becauſe he will condemn them, for that which they never had any more true power to avoid, than to make a World? 2. Or will their Conſciences in Hell accuſe them or torment them for that which they then know was naturally impoſſible, and cauſed by God.

We know not how God will glorifie his Juſtice, or how their Conſciences will torment them. It may be they ſhall then be as ignorant of the neceſſitating cauſe as now.

1. Do you know it now, and ſhall not they know it then? 2. God telleth us the contrary, That all hidden things ſhall be brought to light, and that God will juſtifie his own proceedings, by proving that mens deſtruction is of themſelves, that every mouth may be ſtopped, and all the World be guilty before God: And he calleth it his Righteouſneſs in judging, to give to every man according to his Works: and that mens Conſciences ſhall then excuſe them or accuſe them, when God ſhall judge the ſecrets of their hear…s, (and not when he ſhall torment them, by deceiving them,) Rom. 2. 2 Theſſ. 1. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10. Matth▪ 25. & 7. 23, 24. 2 Tim. 4. 8, 9. Rom. 14. 10. Gen. 18. 24, 25.

Queſt. 13. Do you believe that none but the Elect have now any real mercy, beſides a delay of their future miſery, and hopes of its abatement.

I do: For all things are to be judged of by the end: And that is really no mercy, which is not intended to a mans happineſs, but his miſery. As Afflictions are no evils to the Elect, becauſe they are intended and work together for their good.

Is the offer of Chriſt and Life no mercy? Is all Gods patience and forbearance, as a means to lead them to repentance, no mercy? Is all the teaching, perſwading, intreating condeſcenſion of Chriſt, no mercy? See what error here you run into, and how contrary to Scripture, and to nature it ſelf?

1. You contradict Gods Word, which frequently calleth them mercies, Pſal. 145. 9. & 106. 7. 45. Neh. 9. 19, 27, 28, 31. Jon. 4. 2. Rom. 2. 4. Matth. 18. 33. Iſa. 63. 9. Ezek. 16.

2. You deny the chiefeſt part of mens duty; even to accept of mercy, to improve mercy, to be thankful for mercy, to be led by Gods good-neſs to Repentance, to uſe mercies as Gods Talents to his Glory, &c. If you ſay, They know not but they are mercies; you feign God to bind men to duty, but by deceit: It is as mercies, and not as that which for ought they know may be mercies, that they are to be valued, uſed, &c.

3. You excuſe men from the greateſt aggravation of their ſin: even ſinning againſt Mercies: How can they ſin againſt them that have none.

4. You feign Gods Juſtice to be ſtragely glorified, by damning men in Hell for ever, for ſinning againſt mercy, who never had any to ſin againſt.

5. You will make Conſcience juſtifie the Wicked, and condemn Gods Judgments in Hell, inſtead of juſtifying God, and accuſing themſelves.

6. You muſt accordingly conclude that you never ſhewed mercy to Child, Neighbour, or any but the Elect your ſelf, (becauſe it was all to end in miſery) or elſe that you were to them more merciful than God.

7. When man is made in Gods Image, and we muſt be holy and merciful as our heavenly Father is, you ſet all men ſuch a pattern of mercy and juſtice, as you would be loth your Prince or Parent ſhould imitate.

8. You expoſe Chriſt's moſt compaſſionate tears to reproach, when, Luke 19. he lookt on Jeruſalem and wept over it, as having had a day of mercy; and when Matth. 23. he ſaith, How oft would I have gathered thee as a Hen gathereth her Chick…ns under her wings, and ye would not.—

9. You teach all Gods Children in the World, to acknowledge no mercy, nor be thankful for any, till they are ſure that they are Elect. And how few have that aſſurance?

10. You injure the Lord Jeſus and his Covenant of Grace, while you ſay, that a conditional Gift of Chriſt and Life, Pardon and Salvation, even if they will but accept it, is no mercy to any that refuſe it; nor yet the blood that purchaſed it as ſuch.

11. You meaſure and denominate Gods great Mercies, according to mans vile abuſe: As if it were no mercy, what tendency ſoever in it ſelf it had to their Salvation, unleſs they accept it, and uſe it well, or if they reject it.

12. You are ſingular from almoſt all the Churches of Chriſt in the World: Contrary to the judgment of the ancient Churches, and of all preſent Chu…ches of Greeks, Abaſſines, Arminians, Papiſts, or Proteſtants: expreſly contrary to the Synod of Dort, and the particular ſuffrages of our Britiſh Divines there: except a very few men that by the heat of perverſe Diſputings againſt Amyraldus, the Arminians, &c. have been carried into ſuch extreams.

What mercy is it to a man to have Pleaſure here a while, and Torment in Hell for ever? yea to have Chriſt and Life offered him to make him more unexcuſable and miſerable.

In all this Diſcourſe, it is not the nature of the mercy in it ſelf that you deny, but Gods merciful Intents: It is your miſ-apprehenſions about Predeſtination, which you are vending all this while, and there is the Core of your miſtake, which we have ſufficiently ſpoken to already. You talk as if God decreed men to Sin, to reject Chriſt, to abuſe Mercies, to Impenitency, and conſequently to Hell for ſo doing; which is all falſe. God decreed no man to theſe, or any other ſin, nor to any puniſhment, but as for ſin by them committed againſt his holy Law, which he foreſaw, but willed not. Yea God decreed to ſet open the door of Grace▪ to Sinners, and to tender them mercy when they deſerved miſery, and to bring Life to the acceptance or refuſal of their own Wills, and to intreat and importune them to accept it: His end in giving them mercy, is not to make them miſerable, though conſequently he will their miſery for their ſin. Now you feign in your own erronious Imagination, that God firſt decreeth mens ſin and damnation, and then giveth them all which we call Mercies as a means thereto, and then denominate them as bad as you have feigned them to be by ſuch a… imagination. And you conceive of Gods Decree as that which doth tranſire in praeteritum, is paſt and gone, when to God all time is nothing, but eternity is one everlaſting inſtant.

When you have talkt all that you can for ſuch kind of Mercy, it will not ſatisfie a mans underſtanding, who believeth that moſt of the world ſhall be damned, and that God fore-knew this from eternity, and would not prevent it when he eaſily could. Mercy that ends in Hell is ſad mercy: He will have mercy on whom he will have mercy.

Even under the terrible Law at Mount Sinai, God proclaimeth his Name and Nature, As gracious and abundant in Mercy. This Glory of his which he ſhewed to Moſes, is more gloriouſly ſhewed to the World in Chriſt. And this you ſtudy perverſly to obſcure. And when you have contracted Salvation it ſelf out of our own brain, into a narrower compaſs than God in Scripture doth, (who in every Nation accepteth them that fear him, and work Righteouſneſs,) then you deviſe falſe Decrees and Intents, and father them on God to obſcure the reſt. And what do you by this, but ſeek to render God as little comely to his Creatures as you can. And if the love of God be Holineſs and Happineſs; If his Amiableneſs be his Goodneſs, even Himſelf; If it be Chriſt's great Work to reveal God in his Goodneſs, and by Faith to kindle holy Love. And if it be the Devils malignity and work in the World to counterwork Chriſt, and repreſent God as unlovely, judge whether you ſerve Chriſt or Satan, and whether it be not his chief work of enmity againſt God that you carry on?

But that you may have the true proſpect of Gods goodneſs in all this, you muſt remember that Gods Work as Creator goeth before his Work of Government, and his Work of Government in general before his Work of our Redemption; and his Work of Redemption and the Law of Grace before mens ſin and Judgment. And 1. If God that hath diverſified all lower Creatures as we ſee, did pleaſe in the Creation to make a rank of free-intellectual Creatures here on Earth, with power and help ſufficient to attain to an Angelical Glory, if they would not wilfully prefer the way of miſery, is there any want of goodneſs in making ſuch a World? Are they not nobler than Bruits that have no ſuch hope, though not than Angels that are confirmed.

2. And if he take pleaſure having made ſuch an Intellectual free Agent, to rule him morally by Laws, according to his nature, and to take it for his own great work to be his King or Rector in this ſapiential way: That which much deludeth men in this, and wrongeth God, is that theſe foundations in Nature are not well conſidered. The iſſue of all the Atheiſts and diſcontented Unbelievers Accuſations of God, is but this, That he made man but man, and nothing higher. A man is a mutable Intellectual free Agent, whoſe duty and happineſs is left much to his own chooſing or refuſing. And being ſo made, he is accordingly to be governed; And as God ſheweth his greatneſs of Power as Creator and Actor of the univerſal frame of Nature, ſo he hath choſen eminently to ſhew his Regent Wiſdom, in his *Cuſp. Peucer Hiſt. Carcerum againſt the Luth… rans, pag. 719. An in homine ocioſo, nihil agente, habente que ſe pure paſſive; aut ſicut truncus ad coactionem neceſſi…atis ſtoicae, afflatuſve an abaptiſtici, ſicut Flaciani ſomniarunt; aut velut brutum mutatione & converſione hominis phyſica aut hyperphyſica, qualem fieri fingit Chimera (that is, the Liber Concordiae) non ſine ſenſu quidem, ſed ſine motu, ut ſubjectum patiens & convertibile, eous que donec tantas accepit facultatis & virium quibus agere poſſit.moral Government of Men and Angels; And his wondrous Love, as the ſpecial Benefactor to the Veſſels of Mercy. Power, Wiſdom and Love (or Goodneſs) are never ſeparated; But each hath its eminent demonſtration. And the Omnipotent Father is moſt eminently glorified in his Power in the Creation, and ſuſtentation and motion of the Univerſe; ſo the Son who is the Wiſdom and Word of the Father (and the Father in him) is eminently glorified in his Wiſdom in the Regency of the Intellectual World, by a ſapiential way of Government by Laws and Judgment. And then ſteps up the phyſical Diſputer, and prophanely blaſphemeth this honourable Work of God, and calleth it moral Operation in contempt, and thinks that unleſs God move man to every Volition, as he doth the appetite of a Beaſt, if not as we move a ſtone, or ſhoot an Arrow, he doth nothing, and it is his reproach. And to ſay that he can or did make a Creature that can freely will or not comparatively, even by the Power and general Concurſe of God, they ſay is to feign him to make a God. And ſo both the Honour of God as Creator is denied him, and his Honour of ſapiential Government is vilified.

It is an excellent Work of the Creator to make a free Agent in his own Image. And it is a ſuitable and excellent Work as his King, to appoint him his end, and means, and work, and rule him by perfect Laws and Judgments. In all which alſo he acteth as a Benefactor, while he freely offereth him ſo glorious a Reward, to which as Rector he would lead him. And in that Relation will not be wanting unto him in any thing, which perfect Regiment requireth.

*Of all this, if the Reader pleaſe to peruſe a very ſmall book which I have written, called A Vindication of Gods Love, he may ſee more than I muſt here ſay. But contrarily ſaith Bradwardine, li. 2. c. 3. p. 614. [Quam facile poſſet Deus ſi veilet, tollere obicem ſive actum? Hujuſmodi quo que obex ponitur a Deo antecedenter: Quommodo ergo vult Deus conferre buic gratiam in quo parat obicem gratiam repellentem? Vel ſi Deus non dat gratiam propter obicem reſiſtentem, & ipſe Deus ſcienter & praecedenter cauſat hunc obicem quomodo ipſe Deus non eſt cauſa non acceptionis gratiae ſalutaris?] I can hardly believe that they that thus take Sin and Hell to be nothing but the fruits of Gods good will, do believe that either of them are ſo bad as Scripture doth deſcribe them, or ſo much to be hated or feared.3. Conſider alſo that Divine Love (the third Principle) as it hath its common demonſtration and glory in the Works of the Omnipotent Creation, and in the Works of ſapiential Regiment, ſo hath it alſo its peculiar eminent demonſtration on the Elect in their Grace and Glory, or in their Holineſs and Glory begun and perfected. And it doth not follow that becauſe this Love is eminently glorified on a peculiar treaſure, therefore there is no Glory in Gods other Works, or no reaſon for them. O that men had the wit to be humble, and confeſs that God is wiſer and better than they, till they can come to more Wiſdom to underſtand the Methods and Reaſon of his Works.

As God hath his Honour in making Stars as well as the Sun, and Earth, as well as Stars, and Beaſts, as well as Men, and Serpents and Toads as well as Birds, and Clay as well as Gold; ſo hath he his Honour in making a World of mutable defectible Intellectual free Agents (Men) as well as in making the confirmed Angels; and in gracious ſapiential Government of them all, as well as in his extraordinary Beneficence and Love to his Elect.

4. And you muſt not feign the damnation of the Wicked themſelves to be any ſuch ſtate as is inconſiſtent with the goodneſs of God to caſt a Sinner into: We know not perfectly what Hell is: But as we know that it is the extreameſt humane miſery, ſo we know that it is not at all worſe than mens ſins deſerve; And that when we come to Heaven, we ſhall be perfectly ſatisfied of the Juſtice of God in mens damnation.

And though I ſay not melius eſt peccatori miſerum eſſe quam non eſſe; yet I will ſo far accord with worthy Dr. Twiſſe, as to ſay that melius eſt peccatores miſeros eſſe quam non eſſe: Becauſe elſe God would rather have annihilated them. For God doth that which is beſt: And his Wiſdom, and Will, and Glory are fitter Rules of Meliority, than the Will or Intereſt of Sinners.

And it ſeemeth by the Devils Kingdom, and Converſation in the Air and on the Earth (while yet they are in Hell, and reſerved in Chains of Darkneſs) that their Hell is a ſtate conſiſtent with all that voluntary miſchievous negotiation which they do. And it's like that though they have no Joy, yet their Wills have ſome pleaſedneſs in the miſchief which they do, as an angry and malicious man hath in revenge.

And we have no reaſon to believe that the Hell of the damned is any worſe or more violent or irrational than the Hell of the Devils, when they muſt go to that which was prepared for the Devils, Matth. 25.

But if I ſhould but open to you the plain evidence of this truth, how much of Hell conſiſteth in their ſin it ſelf, in which undoubtedly they are voluntary (though neceſſarily ſo, by their own doing and deſert,) it might tend yet more to the abatement of all diſparaging and unbelieving thoughts, of the Glory of Gods gracious ſapiential Regiment of the World.

And to ſay that God could have made man better, and given him more Grace, is but as to ſay that he could have made Toads to be Larks, and Beaſts to be Men, and Men to be Angels: And what if he did not?

5. And I again repeat what I have oft ſaid, that all this Earth is but a point next inconſiderable in the vaſt Univerſe; And immeaſurable ſpaces of thoſe ſuperior parts of the Creation are like to have proportionable Inhabitants for glory and number: And we know that we are come to an innumerable Company of Angels, Heb. 12. 23, 24. And for ought we know God may have millions of bleſſed Spirits, for one miſerable wicked Soul. Therefore we muſt not talk againſt that which we do not underſtand.

And if the Saints ſhall judge (wicked) Angels, and the World, (judging being uſually put for ruling and puniſhing) we know not what hand we ſhall have our ſelves in the execution of Gods Wrath upon them, and how far they ſhall be as Slaves to Saints.

You have ſaid that (I confeſs) that tendeth to reconcile us all to Gods Providence; But whether it will reconcile our own differences I doubt. How is that Grace ſufficient to all men for Salvation, which never telleth moſt of a Christ, or of Salvation at all?

*Janſen. de Grat. Chriſti, l. 2. c. 27. Non quaevis Gratia ad quoſvis effectus inferendos ſufficit: ut quidam imaginati ſunt ſed potestates operationum difficultati attemperand… ſunt.B.

You miſtake your Adverſaries. They hold not that all men have ſufficient Grace to Salvation: But ſufficient to help them nearer to Salvation. I tell you again, no Saint hath Grace ſufficient to his full Salvation, till he is fully ſaved: Otherwiſe what need he any more? Some indeed call it mediately ſufficient to Salvation, but that's but lis de nomine.

If it be ſufficient, what need they any more to that which it is ſaid ſufficient for? And yet more would do that which is not done. But no man ſhould deſire more than is ſufficient.

All this is a Game at words: *Blank de diſt. Grat. &c▪ Theſ. 77. Quod Thomiſtae recentiores affirmant illos in quibus gratia non eſt efficax ad converſionem nihilo minus gratiam ſufficientem ad …am haber…; id vero Reformati cun Janſenio negant m…ra logomachia eſt ſiquidem, &c.By [Sufficient] they mean only neceſſary help, without which the act cannot be done, and with which it can and may be done: They do not mean all that is needful ad cert… eſſe, or ad melius eſſe. Therefore I uſe rather to call it All neceſſary help or Grace ad eſſe.

I pray you yet make it plainer to me, what that neceſſary or ſufficient Grace is, that we may judge of it.

Grace is taken either for the Favour of God, or for his Gifts. And ſo either for free Gifts without merit in point of commutative Juſtice: And ſo all that God giveth to any Creature, muſt needs be Grace. Or elſe for that which is given contrary to commerit (of evil). And ſo all is Grace which is given to Sinners.

Grace is either, 1. Efficient-principal. 2. Efficient leſs-principal. 3. Objective. 4. Or ſubjective, which is the effect.

I. Grace as the principal efficient, is either Gods meer Benevolence or Will to give. 2. Or his Act of Collation, as ex parte agentis. Both theſe are really one, and God himſelf, though differently denominated, and diverſly conceived of by us. God operateth per eſſentiam.

II. Grace as the leſs principal efficient, is all thoſe means which have an Aptitude to effect (and ſo are apt to be efficients) or actually do ſo; As Chriſt, the Goſpel, the Miniſtry, outward Mercies, Afflictions, &c.

III. Objective Grace is thoſe means which as Objects are appointed for man himſelf to act upon towards his own Salvation. As a Chriſt to be believed in and accepted, An offered Glory, a certain Promiſe, &c.

IV. *The School-men have ſo many ſorts of Grace as confoundeth themſelves: when they have agreed, partly, 1. Of exciting Grace. 2. And of infuſed habits. 3. And of Concurſe. 4. They are all to pieces about Gratia adjuvans per modum principii, what It is. Malderus tells us of four Opinions (in 12. q, 111. a. 3. dub. 2.) 1. That it is nothing but the infuſed Habit it ſelf. 2. That it is but gracia excitans: 3. That it is quaedam qualitas infuſa tranſiens cum ipſo actu. 4. That God himſelf immediately ſupplieth the abſence of a habit and defect of power to acts ſupernatural. He accounteth the caſe too difficult to be confident in: but inclineth to this▪ that this concomitant Grace giving power to ſupernatural acts before the habits, called by them Adjuvant Grace, is quaſi formalis terminus ſeu effectus gratia excitantis & praevenientis & ſecundum rem non differre: Yet excitation is it ſelf taken for an effect, and this effecteth this power in queſtion. But in the juſtified he ſaith, the Holy Ghoſt, beſides habits and powers, dwelleth. Will you lay any great ſtreſs on ſuch nicities as theſe, paſt humane reach, and ſo confeſſed by the ſubtileſt Contenders? Per peccatum non miunitur inclinatio naturalis ad bonum per ſubtractionem, ſed per oppoſitionem impedimenti quod ne que tollit ne que minuit radicem inclinationis: cum enim peccatum non diminuat ipſam naturam rationalem, minuere non poteſt radicem naturalis inclinationis ad bonum quae identificatur cum natura: ſolum ergo minuitur bujuſmodi inclinatio ex parte termini quatenus, viz. per peccatum p…nitur impedimentum pertingendi ad terminum unde quamtumvis in in…initum multiplicantur peccata non poteſt totaliter deſtrui inclinatio naturalis ad bonum rationis, Alvar. de Aux. li. 6. diſp. 45. p. 210. Ita Aquin. 12. q. 85. a. 2. ad …. & 1. p. q. 48. ar. 4. ad. 3. Peucer Hiſtor. Carcer. reproveth the Lutherans, Concordia 2. quod non diſtinguunt inter vocationem generalem ſeu univerſalem, communem omnibus, & vocationem efficacem, pag. 724.Subjective Grace is that effect which is wrought on mans Soul, as the beginning of his recovery or healing, and having a tendency to more.

Now tell us which of theſe it is that is ſufficient.

I. Undoubtedly there is no inſufficiency in God. All that he willeth to do, he doth: And if he will no more, his Will is not to be called inſufficient as to more, but null as to that Object: And we affirm no other proper Will of God, but ſuch as is fulfilled.

II. Gods means which wicked men enjoy are the ſame that the godly enjoy, and are ſufficient ex parte ſui, but not ex omni parte, that is, for as much as concerneth their own Office. So Chriſt's antecedent Preparations, his Satisfaction and Merits are ſufficient. The Covenant of Grace is ſufficient: The preaching of the Goſpel is ſufficient in its kind, &c.

III. The objective Grace is ſufficient; that is, God as he is to be believed in and loved, revealed in the Word and in his Works: Christ to be believed in; the Precepts to be obeyed, the Promiſe to be trusted, &c. And though it be doubtful to many whether Amyraldus and his Fellows were in the right, that thought that the foreign, and other objective Grace be qua objective, ſufficient to all Heathens for Salvation; yet none can doubt but it is in ſuo genere, ſufficient to all thoſe good and holy acts which thoſe perſons may immediately exerciſe about them. And indeed he that loveth God but as the light of Nature, hath taught Heathens, or may teach men that he ſhould be loved, if he be damned, muſt be a damned Saint in the love of God. But who do ſo love him, is another queſtion.

IV. Subjective Grace is either Power, Act, or Diſpoſition or Habit.

1. This Power is the very thing preciſely which they meant by neceſſary or ſufficient Grace. All men have true power to draw nearer Salvation, and do better than they do, though not immediately to do all that is neceſſary to Salvation. And he that can do it if he will, and alſo hath power to will it, is ſaid to have ſufficient Grace, which if he uſe not, the fault lieth in his wilfulneſs.

2. The Act, nor the juſt Diſpoſition or Habit they have not. But that is their own fault, who had thoſe Means, thoſe Objects, and that Power by which they could and might have attained them.

Is any one ever converted by this ſufficient Grace, or not? If not, fruſtra fit potentia, &c. If yea, then it is effectual Grace.

Now you have brought the Controverſie to the parting point, where the two Parties uſe to part: (As you may ſee in Dr. Sanderſon and Dr. Hamond's Letters.

I will firſt anſwer your Conſequences. 1. Non frustra fit talis potentia, though it never act. For 1. It attaineth other good ends, though it attain not their Salvation. 2. If one of a thouſand ſhould not uſe their power, or if a thouſand to one do uſe it, that varieth not the caſe: For it is ſtill as much vain to that one man, as if no one uſed it. But 2. So far as it is vain, that is, to their own Salvation, they make it vain themſelves, and muſt blame themſelves.

3. I aſk you whether you think not your ſelf, that 1. All wicked men by common Grace; 2. And all godly men by ſpecial Grace, have power to do more good and forbear more evil than they do? If ſo, Do you hold that all that power which they never uſe to any of thoſe omitted acts is vain? If not, why ſhould this in queſtion be accounted vain?

But to the great difficulty it ſelf, I anſwer, 1. You muſt not foreſtall the Truth by any of theſe falſe ſuppoſitions.

1. That there is any man to whom God giveth a meer Power, neither diſpoſed, nor provoked to the Act. For 1. Mans natural faculty it ſelf, beſides natural power, hath all theſe aptitudes to the Act. 1. Man hath ſelf-love, and a deſire of felicity, and an unwillingneſs and fear of Hell and Miſery, and of all that he knoweth doth tend to it as ſuch. He can ſeek for Glory, Honour and Immortality, Rom. 2. And therefore God thus argueth with men, Ezek. 33. Turn ye, why will ye die? And 1 Pet. 3. 10. He that loveth life, and would ſee good days, &c. as making uſe of a common principle.

2. Man hath reaſon to underſtand what is told him of Good and Evil in ſome ſort, and Nature containeth a Law written in the heart, Rom. 3. by which the Heathens did much of that which was written in the Scripture.

3. Man hath a Conſcience to accuſe and excuſe.

4. He hath miſery and neceſſity to move him: which may be known to him by common light and experience.

5. Sin, as ſin is in common diſgrace in the World: And Nature teacheth Mankind to diſtinguiſh moral Good and Evil; ſo that the worſt do not love and own ſin as ſin: And did not Satan hide it with ſome vail of goodneſs, he could not draw them to it. Even thoſe that murdered Chriſt, did it on a falſe pretence that he was a Sinner.

6. Mans nature hath an enmity to Devils, and a fear of them. And therefore will fly from evil ſo far as they perceive the Devil in it (for the moſt part.) For he is their known Enemy.

7. Laſtly, All do known that they muſt die, and that this World will ſerve them but a little while; And they have great experience of its vanity and vexation: And Nature teacheth moſt, and the Goſpel much more, that mans Soul is immortal, and therefore that there is a Reward for the Good, and Puniſhment for the Bad hereafter.

2. And as depraved Nature it ſelf hath certainly all theſe advantages for good; ſo God addeth by his Works and Word many vehement Motives, Perſwaſions, and urgent Exhortations, Examples, Mercies and Corrections: And all theſe may give the Soul much more than a bare power to many good acts: For many ſuch are really done by bad men; And to others they are almoſt perſwaded, when they diſobey.

2. You muſt not ſuppoſe, that juſt the ſame degree of means or help is neceſſary to one man as to another; or to the ſame man ever at ſeveral times. For one mans Soul may be more undiſpoſed and ill diſpoſed than anothers: And the ſame mans more at one time than at another. And temptations and impediments may be greater at one time, and to one man than another. Experience aſſureth us, that leſs teaching will inform one mans underſtanding than anothers.

Have not all men the ſame degree of Original Sin? What can be ſaid more of any than is ſaid of all, that they are dead in ſin?

1. The ſame word [Dead] may be uſed of all, if it were words only that you plead for. But that word proveth not that all are equally either guilty or corrupted. For though Adam's ſin be the ſame to all, yet I have before told you (and ſhewed you beſides Scripture, Auguſtine's judgment for it) that there is alſo a participation of Guilt of nearer Parents ſins by Infants; And conſequently of Pravity: Were it but the ill temper of body which many Drunkards and Adulterers convey to their Children, experience telleth us that it doth much in hindering the Soul. And all are not equal in this derivation of Original Sin.

2. And Adam's ſin, with all other being pardoned to faithful Parents, is in them pardoned to their Infants dedicated to God; And we have reaſon to think that where the Guilt is pardoned, the Vice is not equally tranſmitted as to others that are not pardoned in their infancy.

3. And it is not only Original Sin, but much additional Pravity, and particular habits of ſin, contracted by practice, which is the impediment of Converſion.

4. Yea, and actual ſin it ſelf, which temptations ſtir up, as well as thoſe habits.

5. And alſo the great guilt which all thoſe acts and habits do contract, by which Gods Grace is yet more forfeited. All theſe are a great diſparity, and ſhew that more Grace is neceſſary to ſome than others.

Well! Go on with your Anſwer to the main Question?

My Anſwer is, that▪ if you will not turn Vorstians, but will receive the common metaphyſical School Divinity about God, (to deny which, is commonly called Blaſphemy by all Parties) I do not yet ſee any place for a diſagreement. For the Queſtion, [Whether the ſame meaſure of Grace which we call meerly ſufficient, is ever effectual?] is meant either, 1. Of Gods Agency or Influx as it is Agentis. 2. Or of the Means. 3. Or of the Objects. 4. Or of Effects in the Soul.*Malderus in 1. 2. q. 111. a. 3. d. 8. Omnis gratia excitans eſt efficax & rata reſpectu ſui effectus formalis quo homo excitatur, & quem ſine conſenſu libero in homine ponit: non enim poteſt gratia pulſare, quin home pulſetur. And that exciting Grace is always ſufficient Grace, to the Act to which it exciteth, ſee his Reaſons, ibid. pag. 462.

And 1. It is plainly the firſt that the moſt Contenders mean, upon a falſe ſuppoſition. They think that God puts forth one degree of ſtrength to one effect, and another degree to another effect; and ſo that ex parte Dei operantis, there is a different Operation (in kind or degree) to the producing of different effects: which is blaſphemy in the Judgment of the Philoſophical Divines: For though we are fain to uſe the name of Act and Influx, yet it is nothing but Gods own Eſſence (in Power, Wiſdom and Will) by which he produceth all effects. And (to ſay) that Gods Eſſence is divers in kind or degrees, is contrary to his Simplicity and Immutability. And if all Gods Operation (from the creation of the World to the moving of a Feather, and from the converting of Saul to the leaſt gracious action of a Saint,) be done by the ſame kind and degree of power, and there be no difference at all in God or his Agency, but only as in paſſo in the effect, then the very ſuppoſition of your diſpute, and the Subject being nothing, you may ſee how wiſely you have long troubled the World.

But it is unconceiveable that there ſhould be variety in the Effects, when the Cauſe hath no difference at all in its agency ex parte ſui.

*Aureolus in his Quodlib. 2. art. 2. pag. 13. (who hath many ſingularities) confidently maintaineth that there is ſome cauſal Action of God (e. g. in creation) between his eſſence and the effect: becauſe poſita cauſa ponitur effectus: but God did not create from, &c. and ſaith, This Action is not God, and yet no part of the Univerſe. But 1. It is utterly unintelligible what that ſhould be: For Action is virtutis alicujus actio; and that virtus is ſubſtantiae virtus: Vis or Actio creata ſubſiſt not of themſelves: Therefore an Action that is neither God, nor yet a Creatures Action is unintelligible. 2. And the difficulty will recur upon his own way: For either that middle Action is one or many, eternal or in time: If one and eternal, his own Arguments aſſault it: why then is the Effect temporary and multifaricus: If it be many Actions and temporary, it is all one for one eternal God to cauſe many temporary Creatures, as to cauſe many temporary Actions. Therefore when all is done, we muſt ſay that Omnia ſunt ab uno: Though how we cannot comprehend. 3. And Gods Eſſence is an infinite power in Act, intimately preſent with every effect: no other intermediate action need to be imagined.How now! Did the Calviniſts ſo much ſtir up King James againſt Vorſtius, and condemn him in the Synod of Dort; and now muſt we plead againſt you as Vorſtians? Did not one God, without any diverſity in himſelf, make all the variety of Creatures in the World? Can he not unica volitione velle plurima? And ſo unica actione plurima efficere? All multitude proceedeth from perfect Unity.

But Gods Influx or Action ſeemeth to be ſomewhat elſe than his Eſſence.

You muſt mean ex parte Dei, or you ſay nothing: And if ſo, it muſt be ſome Creature: For beſides the Creator and the Creature there is nothing.

Action is not Res, but modus agentis. And ſo it may be in God.

Some indeed make the three Perſons to be three Modes in God, which yet others deny: But otherwiſe it is commonly taken for blaſphemy, to ſay that God who is moſt ſimple and immutable, hath any true mode diſtinct from his ſimple Eſſence, much more that his Eſſence hath diverſity of modes. And if you will deny this, we muſt make a whole new method of Divinity, and ſuch as will moſt accommodate the Arminians.

But to ſay that God doth Influere vel agere, and to ſay that he is God, are not words of the ſame ſignification.

True: For they are different Conceptions that narrow-minded man muſt have about God in whom there is no difference. We have our general conception of Eſſence, and Perfections, and Relation, which we expreſs by the Name GOD; And we have one more particular, yea our modal conceptions and expreſſions: And to expreſs the one, is not to expreſs the other. But that proveth no diverſity in God.

If Actio be in Paſſo, then it is not God, but a Creature.

That old ſaying is but de nomine actionis. Doubtleſs there is of created Agents a certain modus by which in Action they differ from themſelves; not-agent and agere ſignifieth ſomewhat diſtinct from the effect, which is it that is in Paſſo, and is called Paſſion. And if it be only quid creatum, or the effect that you mean, we will after ſpeak of that: But now the queſtion is of the efficient Cauſality.

By this rule we must ſay that ex parte Dei, to will Peter's Salvation and Judas his Damnation, are all one.

So all Philoſophical Divines affirm: ſave only that the ſame Will unvaried in it ſelf, is variouſly related and denominated ab extra from the diverſity of Objects and Effects.

At leaſt then we may here denominate Gods Operations on ſeveral Souls, as various from the variety of Effects.

You may and muſt do ſo: But then remember that the queſtion is but de nomine, and that you confeſs that there is no real diverſity in all Gods Operations on mens Souls on his part, no not in degrees.

II. And then as to the means, though for my part I think that a great diverſity is cauſed by their diverſity, yet you your ſelves will not conſent, that the queſtion about ſufficiency and efficacy be there laid. 1. Becauſe it is a moral operation: and you think that ſome other phyſical operation cauſeth the difference. 2. Becauſe many that live under the moſt excellent means are not converted, when ſome are that had far leſs. 3. Becauſe you ſuppoſe no means ſufficient of it ſelf: and no means inſufficient when God will work by it.

But if this muſt be the queſtion, it muſt be remembred that you grant, 1. That means are but ſufficient for their own part, and not ad omnia: and therefore ſuppoſe ſomewhat in the perſon (diſpoſition or uſe) to make them effectual. 2. And that God is the Author of means: and that in themſelves they are the ſame oft to good and bad. But 3. That the diverſity of mens diſpoſitions maketh the ſame leſs ſuitable to one, which is now ſuitable and conſequently more effectual to another. So that here is the ſame Grace oft times as in the means, made various by variety of Reception. And ſo that which you are to ſay of God herein is this, that when ſome wicked Parents have more vitiated their Poſterity than others, and when ſome wicked men by their practices have more vitiated themſelves, yet God doth not always give them a greater proportion of gracious means *Proteſtant Divines do commonly conjoyn the operation of the Spirit and Word as well as Papiſts, and in ſome caſes more. Thom. docet q. 22. de Ver. a. 8. Deum inclinare Voluntatem ad aliquid app…tendum, eam …fficaciter & phyſice praedeterminando, non ſolum immediate, ſed etiam mediate aliqua entitate, recepta in voluntate: & ex mente D. Tho. Deus movet om…s cauſas ſecundas, & eas appl…a' ad ſuas operatio…, ita ut etiam quando … …t voluntatem, aliquid …imit in illam per mo… tranſeuntis.] Alva…ez de Aux. diſp. 23. p. 114.and helps than to others, but leaveth them under the common helps which convert the more prepared Souls. Not that God always doth ſo: For oft times to his Elect he doth as he did by Paul, or the Eunuch, vouchſafe them extraordinary means. For as a Benefactor he is free, and may do with his own as he liſt, and may make Veſſels of Mercy and Honour of them that deſerved worſt. And the caſe of the Tyrians and Sidonians, compared with theirs of Capernaum and Bethſaida, doth prove, that leſs means are proportionable to ſome as being leſs ill-diſpoſed, when greater to others may be uneffectual.

III. And then as to objective Grace, it being the ſame God, the ſame Heaven, the ſame Chriſt, and the ſame Promiſe which is ſet before all that have the Goſpel, this cannot be the Controverſie. Though the revealing means be divers with many, ſo is not the Object, nor the Means to all.

IV. All that remaineth then to be queſtioned, is the Effect which is ſubjective Grace: whether that Grace in one man which is but ſufficient, be efficient in another? or in the ſame man at ſeveral times. And here by this ſubjective Grace is meant either, 1. The vis impreſſa. 2. Or the Power. 3. Or the Act produced. 4. Or the Diſpoſition or Habit.

The two latter are ſhut out of the queſtion; which is not whether the Act or Habit be ſufficient and effectual, but whether the Grace be ſo that is to cauſe them.

Whether this vis impreſſa be always cauſed by means with Gods Power ſet home (as the impreſs of a Signature by the Arm and Seal) or be cauſed immediately by God, without any proper means, the word being but a Concomitant, and not mediate Operator, is made a Controverſie by ſome: But he that well conſidereth the Scripture here abouts, and the experience of man, will be likelier to think that it is God by means that ordinarily maketh the impreſs on the Soul, and that the ſame impreſs is the effect of both, though extraordinarily God can do without means. For 1. It is moſt likely that God ſhould work on man moſt agreeably to his nature, and to his ſubject ſtate under God his Governor. 2. And Chriſt himſelf as our Teacher and Example, and all his Goſpel, are appointed to this uſe. 3. The Miniſtry and Ordinances are appointed to the ſame end; And Miniſters commanded to fit their teaching to that end. 4. No man can prove that ever any came to actual Knowledge, Faith or Love, but by ſome means. Experience telleth Gods Servants that he worketh by them. 5. The moſt apt and powerful uſually have beſt ſucceſs; and thoſe proſper moſt in Grace that uſe means beſt, and thoſe ſpeed worſt that uſe them leaſt. 6. God ſtrictly commandeth the uſe of the means as means for that end, that his Grace may be wrought by them. 7. God promiſeth his bleſſing on the means: Act. 26. 17, 18. 1 ſend thee to open their eyes, &c. Rom. 1. 16. The Goſpel is the Power of God to Salvation. 2 Tim. 4. 16. Thou ſhalt ſave thy ſelf and them that hear thee. Jam. 6. laſt. He that converteth a Sinner, ſaveth a Soul from death, &c. 8. When God forſaketh a Nation, by taking away the means, he uſually forſaketh them as to further Grace. 9. The Devil ſeemeth to know this by his earneſt oppoſition to a holy powerful Miniſtry, and other means throughout the World; ſo that we may ſay with Cypriam, Epist. 69. ad Pupian. Ut etiam qui non credebant Deo Epiſcopum Conſtit…enti, vel Diab…lo credebant Epiſcopum proſcribenti.

But whether it be by means or not, it muſt be ſomewhat different from Gods own Eſſence, which is imprinted or communicated. And to get a formal conception of it, what it is, if it be not the Power, Diſpoſition, Act or Habit, is paſt mans reach. Whatſoever it is, this is certain, 1. That God doth not give an Act as a thing pre-exiſtent; but giving Faith is but cauſing us to believe, or do that act our ſelves, which was none till we performed it. 2. That quoad effectum diſpoſed Power and Act alſo, are more than Power and Diſpoſition without the act. 3. Undoubtedly Dr. Fairfax, Of the Bulk, &c. of the World, pag. 5. 6, 7, &c. [Though God be the Maker of every Being that is phyſicaly ſo, it follows not that he is ſo of every Being that is morally ſo: It is enough that God is the Maker of the Power to do evil (which being good, may ſpring from him,) &c. [All that God doth towards ſin, is to leave us to our ſelves, to bring it forth if we will: and inſtead of driving on to it, as a fellow-helper or procatarktick cauſe, he draws from it, and towards the good, with unſpeakable endearments of wooing, and drives from it by forbidding the Evil with all that earneſtneſs of threatning, which may beget in man the utmoſtneſs of dread: Nor is he any nearer the phyſical cauſe of it, than to give that good power which is not the cauſe at all, as it looks towards him: for by giving this power he is at the ſame time the evil is done, as much the cauſe of the good that is not done: therefore he is not the cauſe at all. Beſides, this power is not only good, but alſo needful: For though the the perfection of the Will in the next life, will not be in a wavering alike towards Good and Evil, but only in a ſelfwillingneſs to Good; yet in this life I think it mainly does and muſt. For this is a life of doing or believing, as it looks on to reward in that to come: and that is a life of rewarding as it looks back to doing or believing here, &c.] [Hence we may anſwer the old foreign? For …s ſin is a moral thing, &c. unbounded Wiſdom and Goodneſs having …aid out endleſs happineſs as a reward for Obedience, and endleſs wretchedneſs as puniſhment for ſin; without this Obedience there could be no Heaven: without Sin no Hell. And without a power, not to do in both, there could be neither: So then, that God may have leave to make man happy for holineſs, man muſt needs have power to make himſelf wretched for ſin: That evil ſhould always flow from evil in a chain of Breeders is a great miſunderſtanding.] Object. Then man may thank himſelf too for all the good he does that Being, as much of him as the other, &c. Anſw. It follows not: For 1. Of all the good that man doth, God is ſtill the moral Cauſe, egging on to it by all, &c. 2. And the ſame Almighty Hand that barely upheld while Sin was done, doth over and above further the thing that good is by enlightning the Mind, renewing the Will, healing the ſpring in man of that all which inbred Sin hath brought upon it; and in a word, making it every way more it ſelf, God muſt be more an Owner than man; And thence the thing done falls in with the Divine Will, becauſe it flowed from Divine Goodneſs. [That which is good in man by way of Off-ſpring, being ſo in God by way of Well-ſpring.] Ibid. p. 10.the ſame degree of impreſs, or influx, or force, which cauſeth one man to believe or act, is not ſufficient to cauſe any other worſe diſpoſed man to believe or act: nor the ſame man when he is more ill diſpoſed and hindered. 4. If we put the caſe of men equally diſpoſed, it is impoſſibly to prove that any two men in the world are equally diſpoſed; Nay it is moſt probable that they are not: Their minds having far greater variety of thoughts to cauſe a difference, than their countenances have of particles, making the wonderful diverſity which we ſee. Nor is the ſame man long equally diſpoſed. 5. Men equally diſpoſed (if ſuch there were) may have unequal impediments without, and in their bodies, and temptations, which may cauſe them to need unequal help of Grace. 6. The ſame individual Impreſs which cauſeth no more than a Power, cauſeth not the Act alſo; For that is a contradiction; to cauſe the Act and not to cauſe it. 7. But a leſs degree of impulſe or help may cauſe the act in one, when a greater degree cauſeth it not in another. 8. A wonderful difference therefore is made in this as well as in …ll other diverſities in the World, by the diverſe receptive diſpoſitions of the Patient. Which made Johan. Sarisberienſis (in Nugis Curial.) and many School-men to liken God (with ſome acknowledged difference) in his Operations to the Sun, which by one invaried efflux of motive, illuminative and calefactive power, cauſeth innumerable varieties of effects, as all the particular Creatures have various Natures and receptive Diſpoſitions. 9. But all good diſpoſition or preparation is of God; But by ſuch ways of operation as we are ſearching after. But all ill diſpoſition is from our ſelves. 10. To conclude, God giveth men ſometimes as much power to Will or Act, when they do not, as they have when they do. But (uſually) not an equal prediſpoſition, ſome having more indiſpoſed themſelves; which is to be changed by contrary acts. But whether de facto men equally enabled, prediſpoſed, helped and hindered, do yet without any cauſe but their own free-will it ſelf act or will variouſly, is a queſtion that theſe Controverſies need not come to: That ſuch (were there ſuch in the World) could do it, I take for granted, what-ever they do.

The Controverſie is well known which Hobbes hath raiſed in the World, who ſaith, That to be free and to be willing is all one; and that every act of the Will is as truly neceſſitated by phyſical premotion, as the motions of any Engine are; And that we talk of liberty and contingency in the dark, not that there is any ſuch thing indeed, but when we know not the train of Cauſes, we uſe thoſe names, which ſignifie but our ignorance: And that the firſt Cauſe and other ſuperior Cauſes do by premotion as much neceſſitate each Volition, as the Archer doth the motion of his Arrow. And the Dominicans predetermination, and Camero's neceſſitation by a train of ſecond Cauſes is the ſame I think. But I think God hath made a very good uſe (by his over-ruling ordination) of the Doctrine of Hobbes, (learnedly and timerouſly, or cautelouſly ſeconded by Gaſſendus, and improved by Benedictus Spinoſa, an Apoſtate Jew in his Tractatus Politico-theologicus.) For the goodneſs and learning of ſuch worthy men as were Alvarez, Twiſſe, Camero, (in all other points moderate and admirably judicious) hath been the grand temptation to the Church to receive that Doctrine, which Hobbes and Spinoſa having plainly and nakedly propounded, is now deteſted by almoſt all good men. For from thence they have plainly inferred the ſubverſion of all morality as diſtinct from phyſical motion, and conſequently of all true Religion.

I deny not that I find my ſelf the Controverſie in it ſelf exceeding difficult; and that I have not been without temptations to their Opinion, nor yet am: And that indeed, all pretended middle ways between Hobbes, his Neceſſitation Phyſical, and true Free-will, are but fancies as far as I can perceive.

And if I leave true Free-will, I muſt turn to their neceſſitation. I confeſs their arguing is very plauſible; that there is no Effect without a Cauſe; and that when ever the Will chooſeth one thing, and refuſeth another, there is ſome antecedent Cauſe in the power, diſpoſition, or external things: and that the ſame Cauſe in the ſame ſtate and mode, having no difference in it ſelf, doth always produce the ſame effect: Otherwiſe the diverſity ſhould have no cauſe: And that the Will being in the ſame diſpoſition, and having all the ſame objects, helps, impediments and other circumſtances, will have the ſame acts.

All this is plauſible: But 1. If I receive it, I muſt let go almoſt all Religion (as well as Chriſtianity); of the truth of which I have a better proof than they can give for their Opinion. And we muſt not reduce certainties to the obſcureſt unſearchable uncertainties.

2. And in God himſelf their foundation is confuted: For he that is the firſt Cauſe eodem modo ſe habens ſine ulla diverſitate, unicus plurima, immo omnia cauſat. Therefore their Principle is falſe.

3. And finding man made after the Image of God, not only as holy, but as man, (Gen. 6.) I have great reaſon to think that Free-will is part of his natural Image, and that as God is a cauſa unica plurimorum, ſo may Free-will be: And that as a God is cauſa prima entium, ſo Free-will may be a kind of cauſa prima (not actionis qua talis, but) of the comparative moral ſpecies of its own acts, (as chooſing this thing rather than that) which is no addition to real entity, but a wonderful mode of it, which man cannot tell whether he ſhould call ſomething or nothing.

4. I ſay therefore that here is no Effect without a Cauſe: Free-will may be the cauſe of various Effects, without a various prediſpoſition.

Doth not the Will act as it is diſpoſed to act?

That it acteth not always according to Habits, which are more than diſpoſitions, is certain by experience. For objects oft prevail againſt habits; and habits do not neceſſitate.

That is becauſe the Will is otherwiſe diſpoſed by ſome contrary ſtronger habits: As either by the habit of ſenſuality, or the natural inclination to felicity as ſuch: which may bear down weaker particular habits or inclinations.

No doubt but the Will is quaedam natura, and hath its natural inclination to good and felicity, which is its pondus and radical diſpoſition to its acts; from which every act is cauſed that is done. But I ſay not that ever it goeth contrary to theſe radical neceſſitating inclinations to goodneſs. But de mediis it may have inferior particular habits which it oft goeth againſt.

That is becauſe the Underſtanding conceiveth that another thing is beſt; and ſo it is neceſſitated by the Underſtanding.

The Underſtanding guideth, but doth not neceſſitate. That we Will rightly is cauſed by the Underſtanding (as that I hit the way is by my eye-ſight) but not that I exerciſe the Act it ſelf. Though we Will not without or againſt the laſt ſtrongeſt dictate of the practical Intellect; yet 1. Note that the Intellect hath divers perceptions at once (which is not commonly noted). It doth at once act a deep ſimple apprehenſion that e. g. bonum ſenſible is pleaſant, and good, and amiable; and that bonum ſpirituale which cometh into competition, is yet better, may be at the ſame time perceived, with ſo low, dull and weak an apprehenſion, as that the Will may tenaciouſly ſo adhere to the firſt ſimple apprehenſion by a ſtrong ſimple Volition, as that the ſecond weak comparate apprehenſion may not move it to Election. 2. For we find that it is not the objective truth of an apprehenſion which turneth the Will, without ſome anſwerable clearneſs and livelineſs▪ And as a Preacher that dreamingly ſpeaketh of great things uncontroulably, but coldly, moveth not the hearers, ſo is it with the Intellect it ſelf. And 3. The Will being principium exercitii can hinder the Underſtanding from perceiving truth, by hindering it from thinking of the evidence. 4. And the Will it ſelf can ſuſpend its own act, contrary to the underſtandings fluggiſh dictate. And not acting when it can (towards God, and true goodneſs,) is the beginning of all the diſorders of the Soul.

But ſaith Camero, &c. the Will is appetitus rationalis: And if it act againſt reaſon, it acteth not as a Will: And ſo alſo if it act without reaſon: Therefore it cannot forbid the Intellect to think (by nolition) unleſs the Intellect firſt ſay, Non cogitandum eſt. Nor can it chooſe but velle cogitare if the Intellect ſay cogitandum eſt: Otherwiſe the Will were a bruitiſh, and not a rational appetite.

1. The Will acteth by reaſon, when it cleaveth to that good which is ſimply apprehended by the Intellect. The ſimple apprehenſion goeth firſt; e. g. [That this Fruit offered Eve is good and deſirable]: This is true, and here the Will adhereth to it as good. Then ſhould the underſtanding think comparatively of a greater Good, and ſay [This is evil as forbidden and as it hindereth a greater Good:] And this it performeth not, becauſe the Will is here the beginner of the Sin: not perhaps by a poſitive nolition or forbidding the Intellect the comparing Thought; (for that it doth not without ſhew of reaſon) but by neglecting or omitting to excite the Underſtanding ad exercitium; which it is brought to in Adam and Eve, 1. By diverſion, being before taken up with the Creature. 2. By voluntary neglect or ſloth. For the Will can omit its act without reaſon, and yet be a rational appetite. And the beginning of the Sin may be this omiſſion of the Will, or its over tenacious adhering to ſenſible good, apprehended truly by the Intellect.

2. And we have not ſo much acquaintance with the faculties of our own Souls, as to be ſure that ſenſe, and paſſion, and phantaſie can do nothing immediately on the Will to help or hinder it. We find that the Will eaſily followeth Paſſion, and very hardly goeth againſt it.

3. Nay we are not certain, but there may be more bruitiſhneſs and leſs reaſon in many Sins, than moſt imagine; and that the violence of the ſenſitive appetite and paſſion, may not prevail both with the Will to forbear the excitation of the Intellect, and with the Intellect to omit its oppoſite Judgment, though neither Will or Reaſon in the firſt inſtant give conſent. There are ſome alſo that think that we are ſcarce ſure that the Will and the ſenſitive Appetite are two ſeveral faculties, rather than one between two guides. I ſay not as they: But this I will ſay, that I grow daily more confident, that they that make the rational and ſenſitive Soul in man to be two, and their Brethren, that without all ſhew of proof, magiſterially face us down, that the Soul at death puts off all ſenſe (becauſe it exerciſeth it not by the ſame Organs which were adapted to the Bodies uſe), do both of them hainouſly wrong the Church, and darken many Truths, and open the way to Infidelity.

But you cannot lay the beginning of ſin on the Wills omiſſion, to put the Intellect on the comparing thoughts; for the Intellect can underſtand againſt our Wills (as many know that which they had rather be ignorant of): And therefore needs not the Will ad exercitium.

The Intellect may be forced: But it is not ſo always: Things ſenſible, and near at hand, may force the Intellect: But things unſeen and distant muſt be voluntarily thought on, and ſtudied, or elſe they will not be underſtood.

If e. g. Eves Will had ſaid to the Intellect, [Cogita Comparative] either the Intellect muſt firſt have ſaid to the Will, [Comparative cogitandum eſt] or not: If not, then that Will would have been no rational Will. If yea, then the Will must have conſented, or elſe been unwilling against reaſon, and ſo be bruitiſh ſtill. Therefore Sin must begin at the Intellect.

1. The Intellect did not ſay [Comparative cogitandum eſt] not only becauſe it was not commanded ſo to ſay by the Will; but becauſe the Will was ſo entangled before by the ſimple Love of the Creature, as diverted the thoughts from the Creator. 2. Suppoſe the Intellect did ſay coldly [Comparative cogitandum est] the Will did neglect it; being not neceſſitated thereby, and ſo the Intellect went no further.

If the Will do velle bonum qua bonum neceſſario, it muſt needs neceſſarily velle bonum cognitum, and ſo muſt follow the Intellect.

It doth neceſſarily velle bonum quando vult, i. e. non malum; but it doth not neceſſarily velle hoc, vel illud bonum inter plurima: Nay though the Intellect ſay nothing againſt it, yea ſomething for it, the pre-engaged Will may neglect it. And yet poſſibly Eves Intellect did perform one comparative act which occaſioned her further ſin, viz. [If thou turn thy thoughts towards Gods prohibition, thou wilt loſe the pleaſant good before thee]. And this was true.

But if Eve's Will firſt over tenaciouſly ſtuck to the forbidden Creature, when the Understanding never ſaid, It muſt do ſo; In ſo doing it was not a Will, but bruitiſh Appetite.

The Underſtanding ſaid truly, [It is pleaſant and Appetible] and ſo the Will in its initial deſire ſinned not. But that it looked no further, and excited not the Intellect to remember, and it ſelf to deſire more to pleaſe God, was by an abuſe of its power and liberty of ſelf-determining, and ſo the ſenſible good prevailed, becauſe the ſuperior good was forgotten and neglected. And the Will may thus ſuſpend its act after an intellectual perception, without being bruitiſh, though it ſo …ar diſobey Reaſon its guide.

Theſe things are exceeding intricate and difficult, for all that you ſay.

They are ſo: *The ſame I ſay of objective and intellectual neceſſitation of the Will: ſaith H. Kipping truly, Inſt. Philoſ. Nat. li. 9. c. 10. pag. 416. Errant Scholae reformat… doctores qui aſſerunt voluntatem ad actum ſuum determinari a judicio intellectus, ita ut voluntatic libertas nulla ſit, conſtricta vero ſit ad intellectus ductum a quo ſemper determinatur, Joh. Camero, Mart. Schogkius, Hornbeck. Maccovius, Heerbord, Hos prolixe & bene refellit Epiſcopius.But forget not, that the great difficulty is between us and the Hobbiſts or Infidels, and Fatists, and not between the true Chriſtians among themſelves, as to our preſent Controverſies. I confeſs that the confuting of their Opinion, that [all Volitions are neceſſitated unavoidably by Gods Operation] is a far harder work than the reconciling of the Lutherans and Calviniſts, who go upon no ſuch Principles.

Tell me, Is this it that you would come to or not? If you once perſwade me that God cauſeth all ſinful Volitions as neceſſarily as he cauſeth a Tree to grow, and that man can no more avoid them, and that liberty of Will ſignifieth no more than velle, or not nolens velle, and ſo that God is the prime irreſiſtible cauſe of all Sin, as much as of all Good, ſo far as it is capable of a Cauſe.] I muſt needs next believe, 1. That God hateth not his own Work: yea that he loveth it. 2. That he hateth no man for it. 3. That moral Good and Evil is nothing in man, but ſuch as obeying or diſobeying (proportionably) in a Horſe or Dog. 4. Yea far leſs; becauſe man doth …ut as my pen which writeth as I move it, in reſpect to God: But ſo is not my Horſe or Dog to me. 5. And how then to judge of all the Scripture, the Miniſtry, of the Incarnation and Death of Chriſt, of the Duties of a Chriſtian life, of Hell, &c. it's eaſie to perceive, viz. That as God differenceth Men and Toads meerly becauſe he will do ſo; even ſo doth he the good and the bad in the World: and that Sin is no evil any way but to our ſelves: and that God is as much the cauſe of it as of Sickneſs; and is as well pleaſed with the Worlds Infidelity and Impiety, as with the Churches Sanctity; And that he will no otherwiſe damn men for Sin, than erbitarily to make ſuch baſer than others, as Dogs are than men; Benedictus Spinoſa hath given you the Conſectaries more at large.

O how heartleſly ſhould I preach and pray, how careleſly ſhould I live, if once you brought me to this Opinion, that all ſin is the unreſiſtible Work of God (ſo far as it is a work) as much as holineſs is?

If there be no middle between Free-will and this Impiety (as I confeſs I cannot diſprove your Conſectaries) it's time for us to turn our ſtudies againſt the common Enemies of all Religion and Morality, inſtead of contending with one another: ſpecially when they have ſo much to ſay.

And do you think they do well, and friendly by the Church, who take theſe mens part, and own their Cauſe in the foundation; and entangle poor Souls in ſuch intricate difficulties; when we that know not the leaſt of Gods Creatures, or the myſteries of any of his Works, do little know all the quick and intricate actions of our own Souls.

In a word, man hath more power to good than he uſeth, and that power is called ſufficient or neceſſary Grace to the act; though there be many difficulties which no one of either ſide can reſolve.

Catholic Theology Plain Pure Peaceable, Conference 8 · Accusation 1

p. 139The first Crimination.

The first Crimination.