Catholic Theology Plain Pure Peaceable, Conclusion · Section 2
§. II. Alvarez his Epitome in Twenty Propoſitions, conſidered.
BUt that all this may more plainly appear, I will recite the Twenty Concluſions, which Alvarez in his Epilogus giveth us as the ſumm of all his Book (one hundred twenty one Diſputations:) And I ſhall tell you how far they are all to be conſented to.* Thus Bradwardine concludeth his Book with thirty ſix errors, and as many verities, which he would have the Church, eſpecially that of Rome, determine. But leaving out the moſt unſavoury parts or expreſſions of his own judgement, Whether God be the chief neceſſitating Cauſe of all ſin, is none of them.
I. Free-will in lapſed nature cannot without the help of grace do a moral work, which by co-operation of the ſupernatural End ſhall be truly good, and a work of Virtue; ſo as that by the doer it be referred to God beloved ſimply above all, as to the ultimate natural End.
Anſw. It is granted, (and more) that though all natural men have one ſort of Grace given them, yet, I think, this cannot be done without ſpecial ſaving grace.
II. Man by the ſole ſtrength of nature cannot aſſent to all ſupernatural myſteries propounded and explained to him, as revealed of God, or becauſe revealed of God ſo as the formal reaſon of his belief is Divine revelation.
Anſw. It's true: He muſt have commoner grace to believe them dogmatically and uneffectually; and ſpecial ſaving grace to believe them practically and ſavingly.
III. Not only faith it ſelf, but alſo the firſt beginning of faith proceedeth from the help of grace, and not from the ſtrength of Nature only.
Anſw. Very true.
IV. The free-will of man in lapſed Nature cannot without the help of Grace Love God above all ſimply, even as he is the author of Nature.
Anſw. It's true.
V. Man in lapſed Nature without the help of Grace, cannot fulfill all the precepts even of the Law of Nature, nor overcome any great difficulty and temptation, even for any little time, which it is neceſſary to overcome, for the keeping of that Law.
Anſw. True: Therefore they have ſome Grace that do it.
VI. There is no Law, nor ever was made by God, of his giving the actual helps of preventing grace, to them that do all that is in them, by the ſole faculty of nature: nor hath Chriſt merited or would have any ſuch Law.
Anſw. True: For he giveth ſome common grace to all men antecedently, without any condition on their part: And though he give to thoſe that uſe their common grace to the utmoſt (or near it) ſufficient encouragement to go on and hope that ſuch endeavour ſhall not be in vain as to the obtaining of peculiar grace, yet de nomine vel definitione, Whether this encouragement ſhall be called a Law, or a Promiſe, or neither, we contend not.
VII. God by his helping grace floweth into free-will by premoving it that it may co-operate, and alſo truly-efficiently together with the ſame free-will cauſeth its pious operation.
Anſw. It's true: But all adjuvant grace produceth not the ſecond effect, which floweth from both Cauſes, (of which before and after.)
VIII. When God by his exciting Grace, ſtriketh and toucheth the hearts of men, he doth not expect that the will by its innate liberty, begin its motion, by Conſenting: But God by adjuvant grace effecteth, that it freely and infallibly Conſent.
Anſw. It's true of all that do conſent: But God hath a degree of exciting and adjuvant grace, which are Neceſſary and give the poſſe Velle, which cauſe not the act, through mans defect: And though God expect not that effect, as one that is deceived, yet he commandeth it, and requireth it of us. But exciting and adjuvant Grace are all one on Gods part: And if you will difference the ſame things as connoting divers effects, you muſt denominate it more fitly from the effects, by words that notifie the difference.
IX. Adjuvant Grace and Free-will are not Partial Cauſes of ſupernatural Conſent, as two drawing a Boat, ſo as neither is premoved by the other, or maketh it co-operate with it.
Anſw. True: For God premoveth the will of man, though through mans fault it be not ever effectual. And though Gods will and mans be two Cauſes of the ſame effect, the term Partial is ſcarce fit, while man hath his whole power and activity from God.
X. Scientia media is not to be aſcribed to God,—But all preſcience of the future co▪operation of the will, even from the foreſaid Hypotheſis, preſuppoſeth in ſigno rationis the free decree of Gods will, by which abſolutely (or granting that Hypotheſts) he will in us and with us effect that operation if Good, and permit it if Evil.
Anſw. Here come in your preſumptions of things unknown or falſe. 1. That God knoweth future contingents, and conditionals is certain: But I think this ſcientia media unfitly named, and an unneceſſary diſtribution, and inſufficient to the Jeſuits ends.
2. And your fiction of ſigna rationis, and the neceſſary antecedence of a decree of Gods, to his knowledge of every Volition of man, is a more ungrounded and perillous figment, which you have not proved. It ſeemeth a denyal of Gods Omniſcience or perfection, that he cannot know an act future as future, but only as decreed to be ſo.
3. You deceitfully talk of permitting evil while you plead for the irreſiſtible predetermining premotion of the will by God to every evil act with all its circumſtances: Is that but Permitting?
4. To permit is Nothing: no act of God; but a non-agency: not to hinder. And how prove you, that God muſt of neceſſity have a Poſitive Decree, for every Nothing or non-agency? Is not the not-willing or notdecreeing to hinder a lye, e. g. (ſuppoſing natural concurſe,) or to make more worlds, enough to the production of that lye by an ill inclined nature? or to the not-being of more Worlds? We are in the dark, and God is infinitely above us, and theſe tremendous myſteries are not to be ſo preſumptuouſly handled by unproved aſſertions.
XI. There is on our part no Cauſe, Reaſon or Condition aſſignable, for which Gods ſupernatural providence, in compariſon of this or that hath the formal reaſon of predeſtination, or retaineth the common reaſon of providence: but predeſtination is to be reduced into the ſole free-will of God.
Anſw. Moſt of this is about meer words. The word Predeſtination connoteth various effects and objects: and ſo is called various Acts. There is no efficient Cauſe in the Creature of any act of God: But there are objects without which Gods Acts have not their ſpecial denominations; and theſe objects are the termini, and called Material Conſtitutive Cauſes of thoſe various acts as denominated various, ſpecially or numerically: And ſo Gods Decree or Will to Juſtifie and Glorifie man, hath ſomething in the object as a neceſſary condition of it *That is, of that object., which is not … the object of his decree of giving faith; And that hath ſomething in its object, which is not in the object of the decree of giving a Redeemer to the World, or making the World, &c. if you will at all diſtinguiſh Gods decrees by their objects, or effects: But if not, there will be no matter for any Controverſie.
And Predeſtination is an ambiguous word: If it be taken for All Gods fore-decreeing, or all about man, or all of Good to us; then our Being is the firſt effect of it in us, and the making of the World a preparatory effect, &c. And ſo, no doubt, the firſt effect ſuppoſed us no men, before, and therefore no condition in us. But if you take Predeſtination for Gods decree of Giving us Grace and Glory only, then it is preſuppoſed that we are lapſed ſinners.
And the decree of damning men is exerciſed only on them as foreknown damnable ſinners; And the decree of penal denying Grace or faith to ſinners for ſin, ſuppoſeth them ſuch puniſhable ſinners: But the bare Negation of a Decree to give faith to one to whom the abſence is no privation, is unfitly called Reprobation, (though men may talk at their own rates;) And we grant that ſome ſuch no-decrees have no condition in the objects, for they have no objects: e. g. If you will feign that God decreed from eternity, to give me no faith before the Creation, or before I was born; or to give Innocent Adam no faith in a Saviour as dying for him▪ this were no reprobating act. But when God hath given men a Saviour with his common grace to believe in and accept, here if he deny them neceſſary grace to believe, it is a penal act. And note that Chriſt and Common grace as abſolutely given to mankind, and offered to individuals, ever goeth before mens accepting or refuſing him: And no man to whom he is offered, refuſeth him for want of neceſſary help, till by ſin againſt that grace he forfeit it.
XII. God by an abſolute and efficacious decree of his Will, antecedently to the preſcience of the future good uſe of free-will, predetermined all good acts, which are done in time, ſpecially thoſe by which the predeſtinate come to eternal life.
Anſw. The ſubſtance of this ſeemeth true: only 1. Whether you fitly denominate a decree efficacious from eternity, which effecteth nothing till the Time, I leave to them that diſpute of words.
2. You preſumptuouſly determine Gods Decrees to be antecedent to his preſcience herein; when they are neither before nor after one another.
3. If by predetermining you mean more than predecreeing or prevolition, as if mans will was predetermined, when it was not determined, or determined before it had a being, you ſpeak contradictions. But Gods own will was eternally determined (if we may ſo ſay of that which was never undetermined) to give all the grace that he giveth in time, and to cauſe all the good acts that he cauſeth, as he cauſeth them.
XIII. The Co-operation of free-will with the gifts of grace, is in the predeſtinate, an effect of predeſtination; and efficiently proceedeth from God making us by the help of grace freely to co-operate; and conſequently dependeth not on the ſole and innate liberty of the will.
Anſw. I think ſo too.
XIV. We muſt neceſſarily diſtinguiſh of a twofold help of Grace; one ſufficient, by which man may be converted to God, or work piouſly: The other effectual, by which God effecteth that he be actually converted, and act piouſly.
Anſw. Hold to that, and contradict not the terms in your deſcription, and all's well.
XV. The effectual help of preventing or preoperating grace moveth mans free-will to act, not only by perſwading, alluring, inviting, or other morally attracting, even inwardly; but alſo efficaciouſly and truly effecting, that the will moved and excited of God determine it ſelf and act well.
Anſw. We know what mans perſwading and moral operations are (a little): But the difference between theſe interiour acts of God named by you no man knoweth. You cannot prove that his Interiour ſwaſion is not truly efficient of the act: nor know you how God pro…ureth our determination, as to the mode of his interiour operation. Your arbitrary names have no ſignification of your true formal conceptions of the matter. This Controverſie therefore is vain.
XVI. The efficacy of the help of preventing grace, and the infallible connexion of it with the free co-operation of the will, is totally founded and taken as from its firſt root, from the Omnipotency of God, and from the abſolute and efficacious decree of his will, willing that the man whom he moveth be converted and work piouſly: nor doth this efficacy any way depend, no not as on a condition ſine qua non, on the future co-operation of the created will; though the free act by which man perſevereth depend effectively on his will moved by God.
Anſw. 1. I grant that all the good that cometh to paſs is fore-decreed by God. 2. But Gods meer will effecteth it not without his Power. 3. His power effecteth it not from eternity before it is effected. 4. You leave out one of the cauſal Attributes; The effect of Grace is as well from the Wiſdom of God, as from his Will and Power 5. Gods act dependeth not on mans will. But mans co-operation which is his own act, you muſt confeſs dependeth on his will as the effect on the neareſt efficient. 6. The non-efficiency of ſufficient Grace dependeth on the ſinners will. It was not meerly nor principally from an abſolute efficacious Decree or predetermination of God, that Adams will omitted his duty firſt, or committed ſin firſt. And if any run to the common ſhadow that ſin hath no efficient cauſe, and man only is deficient, I anſwer 1. He is the firſt Reputative Deficient (though not culpable, becauſe under no Law) who muſt be the firſt efficient of the contrary and is not: As if Adams body had never had a ſoul, God was the firſt Non-efficient Cauſe, that is, into whoſe will and non-agency the whole ratio defectus is to be reſolved. 2. Forget not that Alvarez himſelf ſaith, lib. 6. diſp. 45. p. 210. [Licet peccatum originale non ſit pro formali aliquid poſitivum ſed privativum; peccatum tamen actuale eſt pro formali aliquid poſitivum, & cauſat in anima habitum vitii—]
XVII. Suppoſing effectual Grace in free-will, it infallibly followeth, that free-will will conſent and act piouſly: ſo that theſe two are incompoſſible, that effectual Grace be in a man, and that he actually diſſent.
Anſw. True, becauſe it is not called properly effectual, unleſs either 1. Becauſe it effecteth, 2. Or as it cometh from an abſolute decree of effecting, 3. Or is of ſuch a nature and degree that it cannot but effect. And in all theſe caſes it is true.
But ſuch Grace may be eventually uneffectual, which had a ſufficiency ex parte ſui to effect.
XVIII. The gift of perſeverance, as ſuch, and the efficacy of it, dependeth not, no not as on a Condition ſine qua non, on the co-operation of our free-will, but on the abſolute decree of God, effecting mans perſeverance.
Anſw. This needeth no other explication or obſervation, but as aforeſaid. Only that the Jus ad gratiam quâ ad finem perſeveremus, is given on condition, in the Goſpel, from how abſolute a decree ſoever it proceed.
XIX. Effectual aid and a Power of diſſenting, are compoſſible in the ſame ſubject, and conſiſt in the ſame will.
Anſw. True: And remember that a true Power is that quâ verè poſſumus; and not that faculty which could do this or that if God will predetermine it, and otherwiſe cannot; no more than the Sun can ſhine without him. When God withholdeth the Influx neceſſary to action, ſuch a faculty is no true power as to that action in that State.
XX. By preventing Grace efficacious as aforeſaid, the Liberty of the will is not deſtroyed, nor the actual uſe of it hindered, but is wonderfully perfected and roborated.
Anſw. There is a Liberty that is perfected by ſome even neceſſitating Free-will in name is owned by you all: I ſay as Auguſt. Enchir. c. 105. Sic oportebat prius hominem fierl ut & bene velle poſſet, & male; nec gratis ſi bene, nec impune ſi male: poſtea vero ſic erit ut male velle non poſſit. Quia ordo praetermittendus non ſuit, in quo Deus voluit oſtendere, quam bonum ſit animal rationale, quod etiam peccare poſſit; quamvis ſit melius quod peccare non poſſit.predetermination of God: And there is an inferiour Liberty of Imperfect Viators, which ſome efficient Divine predetermination (feigned by you) would deſtroy. And if God did by that inſuperable premoving influx (which omnipotently moveth all things) predetermine all men and Devils to all the wicked Volitions and actions that ever were done, with all the circumſtances, and as reſpecting every object comparatively, ſo that no creature ever did nor can reſiſt ſuch a predetermination any eaſier than make a World, this were to deſtroy the true Liberty of that Creature, with his innocency and felicity: however you may at pleaſure put the name of Liberty on, and deny the name of Neceſſity to, ſuch an abſolutely neceſſitated Volition and act; and then may ſay, that they are premoved and predetermined to do the Act of all ſin freely (or conſtrained to do it without conſtraint,) and ſo the liberty of the will is eſtabliſhed. For I ſee not but cogere ad Volendum is as apt a phraſe, as cogere nolentem ad agendum; when a will formerly innocent is irreſiſtibly predetermined by phyſical efficiency, to all thoſe comparate circumſtantiate acts, which are forbidden in Gods Law, and that on pain of mans damnation.
But note how wiſely Alvarez left out the great difference, about predetermining to the acts of ſin, from this ſummary of his diſputations.