Catholic Theology Plain Pure Peaceable, Section 19
SECT. XIX. How God may be ſaid to Cauſe the Acts of ſin?
I Have ſaid of this alſo ſo much before, as that this Breviate here muſt ſerve.It is ill ſaid, [Profite… mur incunctanter, prorſus impeditum iri quod univerſi ſimpliciter Bonum eſt, ſi impeditetur peccatum: quoniam h… pact… impediretur pateſactio Divin… miſericordi… parcentis, & juſtitia vindicant is: Qu… quidem pateſactio; non minus univerſi Bonum cenſenda eſt, quam q…libet alia c… juſ…ibet Del proprietatis, in ipſo tanquam in ſpeculo rel…cent is.] Twiſſ. Vindic. Grat. li. 1. p. 1. pag. 133. It is dangerous to talk ſo boldly of theſe myſteries. Here ſeem to me many errors and confuſions. 1. It is falſe that God could not make known to the world that merciful nature which now pardoneth ſin, and that Juſtice which now puniſheth, if there had been no ſin. His Laws▪ Promiſes and Threats do antecedently make them known. And God could cauſe bleſſed Spirits to know all his perfections before there was any ſin. 2. Gods Holineſs and Goodneſs is called Mercy and Juſtice by extrinſick denomination, and connotation of ſin and miſery. And if his Holineſs and Goodneſs had been known as preventing all ſin and miſery, men will think that he hath not proved that this had been Evil in the Univerſe, or leſs Good. 3. Poſita Divina Volitione as the rule of Good, it followeth I confeſs, that it were evil not to have that will fulfilled. But I deny, that God willeth ſin or its exiſtence. Therefore it is not Good becauſe not Volitum à Deo. It is ſufficient, that it is not ſo far evil as to be Abſolutè Nolitum; but only evil, 1. As prohibitum, 2. As hurtful to the ſinner, and to others. Methinks they that maintain that ſin is Privatio, ſhould not ſay, that it is Poſitivè Volitum à Deo. 4. All this dependeth on that curious queſtion, Could not God have made the World better than it is? or at leaſt as good with many alterations from what it is? They that hold the firſt, ſay that God freely made things no better than they are: But had there been no Devils, no Sin, no Toads, no diſorder, the world had been better, that is, a perfecter demonſtration of Gods perfection. But they that are more modeſt, ar… content with the latter, and ſay, that God freely made things as they are, and not neceſſarily. But it had been neceſſarily if no other way had been as good. And that if God had pleaſed to ſhew his Goodneſs by preventing all ſin, it had been as Good, and no loſs or diſparagement to the Univerſe. 5. And he doth through all his Books beg the queſtion, Whether a meer occaſion be a conducib…e medium and ſo good? If he will ſtretch the word Medium ſo wide as to extend it to a meer evil ſin… quo non, or preſuppoſed, which hath not the leaſt cauſality, efficient, material, formal or final, I will not ſtrive for a word. But conducibile noteth ſome kind and degree of Cauſality, which ſin hath not to the glorifying of God: It is the deſtroying of ſin, that God is glorified by: Where the malum amovendum is not the bonum conducibile, but the ill ſtate of the matter, without which God had not glorified himſelf by this Act, but by ſome other as well.
§. 1. It muſt be well conſidered, that God made mans Nature before he made any poſitive Laws for him: And that the Law of Nature it ſelf, is in order of Nature after Nature though not in Time: Man being firſt conſiderable as Man, before he be conſiderable as obliged to duty. And alſo that the Law, both Natural and Poſitive, is before mans obedience and ſin. So that as man is firſt in order of Nature Man, and then Gods Governable Subject, and then (in order of Time) obedient or diſ…bedient; ſo God is firſt his Creator, and then Natur… Motor, and then his Governour by Legiſlation, and then his Gracious Helper, and laſtly his Judge and Rewarder.
§. 2. Therefore as Natural Being (ſubſtance and faculties) and Natural Motion are antecedent to Morality; ſo Gods cauſation of both theſe is antecedent: and therefore to be Creator, Preſerver and Motor is not to be the Cauſe of ſin, or of Virtuous acts, as ſuch.
§. 3. God as Creator was not pleaſed to make all his creatures of one kind, nor of one degree of excellence: but in ſuch variety as is wonderful to our obſervation. Beſides the innumerable ſpecies of beings, and the innumerable parts of every compound being, the diſſimilitude of indviduals of the ſame ſpecies is admirable: ſo that no two faces are perfectly like, no nor no two Stones in the Street, no two Trees, Birds, Beaſts, &c. And therefore it is but conſonant to the reſt of his works, that MAN is neither perfectly like to Angels nor to Brutes: For as God made one ſort of creatures naturally determined to things ſenſible, and another ſort neceſſarily (though freely) determined to things ſpiritual; ſo it pleaſed him to make a middle ſort, endued with Reaſon and free-will, undetermined as to their choice, and able freely to determine their own Volitions, without any predetermining premotion of their Creator or any other. That ſo they might be fit ſubjects to be governed in this Life, by Laws and other moral means.
§. 4. God as Creator maketh ſubſtances, with their neceſſary Accidents, and as the Natural Orderer of them, placeth them in their natural order: and as Motor (or Actor) he cauſeth Action as ſuch; But as Moral Rector he cauſeth only the Moral Order▪ of Actions, as far as belongeth to a Rector (the reſt being preſuppoſed in Nature,) and leaveth it to man to cauſe the reſt.
§. 5. Seeing God is not to be blamed for making ſuch a creature as man (of a middle, defectible, undetermined Will, left to his free choice, with neceſſary helps,) it being part of the beauty of his works to be diverſified; He is not then to be blamed for any of the ſins of ſuch a creature, becauſe he ſupporteth his Being and his Active Nature, and is his firſt cauſe of Action.
§. 6. God could prevent all future ſin, if he abſolutely willed ſo to do, either by deſtroying the World, or diſabling the ſinner, or by withholding his Moving Influx, or by ſuch a change of his nature, as ſhould make him indefectible. But he that made man in this Middle ſtate, will ſo continue him, and not make a change in the frame of Nature, to fulfil our wills.
§. 7. No Act as an Act, no Vital Act as Vital, no Intellection, no Volition as ſuch, is Virtue or Sin; And therefore to cauſe it as ſuch is not to cauſe either moral good or evil.
§. 8. As God is Related to us as our Owner, Ruler and our chief good, (efficiently as our Benefactor, and finally as our End;) ſo to conſent to theſe Relations, and to the Duties of our correlations, and to Practiſe them, is the ſumm of all Moral Good; even Diſpoſitively and Actually, to be Reſigned and devoted to God as our Owner, to obey and pleaſe him as our Ruler, and to be Thankful to Him, and totally Love Him, as our Benefactor and our ultimate End. All Moral Goodneſs lyeth in this.
§. 9. By which it appeareth, that Morality conſiſteth in the due or undue ORDER of our actions and diſpoſitions, as they are a Moral Agent's related to God himſelf in theſe three Relations, and to his Actions therein, viz. his Diſpoſals, his Laws, and his Attractive final Goodneſs with his Benefits.
§. 10. In theſe, the Morality conſiſteth as ſimpliciter talis in all three inſeparably, (as Gods Relations are inſeparable and our correlations:) But the Relation of our Actions to any one of them, is Morality ſecundum quid.
§. 11. And among them all, our Action, (ſubmiſſion, reſignation, patience) to God meerly as our Owner, is Moral but in the ſlendereſt initial ſenſe. And our Actions as related to him as our Rector, are Moral in the fuller formal ſenſe, (And therefore by moſt accounted the only formal Morality, as being a relation to a Law): But yet our Actions as Related to God our Benefactor, Lover and End, are Moral in the higheſt, moſt perfective notion.
§. 12. It is not only ſub ration… obedientia as it is a thing commanded by a Law, that Love to God is Morally good, but alſo in that ſuperiour ſenſe, formally as it is the Love of God. And therefore Love is called the Law of Laws, and the fulfilling of the Law, not only as commanded by a Law, but as being the End of the Law, and the ſtate of perfection above it (as Chriſt is to the Law of Moſes;) and alſo as being a Law eminenter (ſomething greater) though not formaliter.
§. 13. But as there is an Order in theſe Relations, ſo is there in the Morality of our Actions as towards them: So that the Laſt ſtill includeth the reſt foregoing. All Love is Obedience; and all Obedience is ſubmiſſion to our Owner: But all Obedience is not Love, nor all Submiſsion or Reſignation, formal obedience to a Rector: Though they muſt all concurr, and not be divided, when they are formally diſtinguiſhed.
§. 14. I have thought it neceſſary (though I be guilty of ſome repetition) to open here the Doctrine of formal Morality (Virtue and Vice,) becauſe we cannot underſtand how God is vindicated from being the Author of ſin, till we know what ſin is; which we cannot do till we know what Virtue is; which we cannot do, till we know what Morality is: And alſo becauſe the Schoolmens moſt ſubtile elaborate enquiries into this point (eſpecially de natur… peccati) are generally too little ſubtile or accurate, as comparing it with this little, you may perceive.
§. 15. From all this it is plain; 1. That God as the meer Author and Motor of Nature, doth not cauſe us to Obey or Love him. And therefore that theſe muſt be cauſed by another ſuperadded operation.
§. 16. Yet when we Obey and Love him, the Generical Nature of the Act is from God as the God of Nature, viz. as it is Intellection, Volition, Action: But that theſe Actions are ſo duly ordered as to be thus terminated on God and things commanded, is otherwiſe cauſed: For though the Generical nature of Action, Intellection and Volition as ſuch, be ſeldom found but in ſome Moral ſpecies, and that be never found but in ſingular acts; yet can one cauſality procure the Generical nature, and another the Specifical, and another the ſingularity▪ in the ſame action. As the Sun is the Generical Cauſe, and the Virtus Seminalis the ſpecifying, and the Individuatio ſeminis the Individ…a…ing, of Plants, Animals, &c.
§. 17. As God is the God of Nature, ſo he hath ſetled Nature in ſuch a conſtant courſe of motion, as that we have ſmall reaſon to expect that he ſhould there make any ordinary mutations▪ And therefore (as the Sun aforeſaid) he doth by his Generical Influx concurr▪ with all Specifying and Individuating Cauſes, according to their ſeveral natures or receptivities.
§. 18. They therefore that ſuppoſe that God as the Cauſe of all Action, muſt (of natural neceſſity ad eſſe) by phyſical efficient premotion predetermine every Act natural and free, to its object compared with other poſſible objects, and that in all its modes and circumſtances, do confound Nature and Morality▪ and leave nothing for God to do in cauſing Holineſs, but what he muſt needs do to cauſe all action that is cauſed, (allowing the difference of the ſecond effects, … yea, but what he doth in cauſing every ſin: (For his Pracept is not with them the Cauſing predetermination.)
§. 19. Jeſus Chriſt▪ and his Goſpel with all the fore deſcribed frame of moral means, and the Spirit▪ to co-operate, are the proper ſecond cauſes▪ by which God as RECTOR will on his part ordinarily cauſe Moral Good; and hinder Moral Evil; and by which as our Lover and End he will draw mans ſoul to himſelf in Love.
§. 20. God as Rector (though he vary his Laws in ſome things to ſeveral ages and places, and promulgate the ſame Goſpel, with inequality, on ſeveral accounts, yet) according to the reſpective Laws that they are under, dealeth with all men in a certain equality, which is called Juſtice: that is, His Laws antecedently to mans acts make not difference, and as Judge he maketh none, but what mans different actions require according to the ſaid Laws and Juſtice. But yet as Owner and as Benefactor he is free (not againſt, but) above his Laws, to make many inequalities, which are no injuſtice; they being not acts of formal Government: and ſo he may do with his own as he liſt. And thus though God give all their due according to his Law of Grace, yet he giveth to his Elect, ſuch proportions of Grace, as he gave them no antecedent Right to by his Law: (or at leaſt to many of them, paſſing by the controverſie now, whether he do ſo to them all.)
§. 21. God could cure and ſanctifie all men, if it were his Abſolute will; but he doth not, and will not; being no way obliged: And he will be no loſer nor ſufferer by the creatures ſin.
§. 22. Gods abſolute will is as fully accompliſhed by mans free acts, as if they were all neceſſitated and Natural: And mans actions are as free, as if God had made no Abſolute Decree of their futurity (as in Good he hath done, if we may ſo aſcribe futurity to his Decrees.)
§. 23. It ſeemeth that all ſin beginneth in the wills omiſsion of what it was able to have done. Even when Adams appetite was to the forbidden fruit, and ſome think that this was the firſt part of the ſin, it ſeemeth that it was rather in the Wills not reſtraining that appetite when it could have done it: And then poſitive ſins do follow thereupon.
§. 24. There is more Brutiſhneſs in ſin, and conſequently more privative and leſs poſitive faultineſs of the Reaſon and Will, than many do conſider (which Paul partly meaneth, Rom. 7.) For it is certain, 1. That a paſſion, e. g. anger or fear, may be forced on a man ſuddenly as …n a Brute, without Reaſon. (As if you come behind one and affright him, or ſtrike him ſuddenly: no Reaſon raiſed that paſſion, and conſequently no Rational Will.)
2. It is certain that this paſsion without Reaſon can cauſe deſpotically a corporal motion▪ as the fearful will ſtart, and run, and the angry ſtrike without any reaſon or rational will, but as a Beaſt doth.
3. It is certain that it is the office of the Will to Rule this paſſion, and theſe motions.
4. And that it muſt have due information from the underſtanding, that ſo to do is good, and beſt.
5. If this information of the underſtanding did never miſs of determining the Will, then man would never ſin, but when the underſtanding failed of its neceſſary office, before the will: which would reſolve all ſin into the will of God as much as if he directly moved the will to it by neceſſitating, unreſiſtible predetermination. For the Intellect as ſuch hath no Liberty, but is neceſſitated by objects, further than it is under the Empire of the Will. And the Objects and Intellect are made by God.
6. Therefore it followeth that there is a certain meaſure of Intellec…l true apprehenſion, according to which the will can excite and determine it ſelf (without …y thing which it hath not) and yet can forbear. And that this not-willing what and when it ſhould, is the beginning of all ſin.
§. 25. God is no Efficient or Deſicient cauſe of this firſt Omiſsion of the will: For efficient it hath none: And deficient God is not, who gave man power to have done it. But man is the deficient Cauſe.
§. 26. Mans not believing, not knowing, not loving, not obeying, not deſiring, truſting, fearing, &c. being the far greateſt part of the ſins of his life *Which made the worthy Biſhop Uſher dye with theſe words, as his laſt, [But Lord, in ſpecial forgive my … of omiſſion.], we ſee by this are not at all of God.
§. 27. Though multitudes of poſitive Acts of ſin do follow ſuch omiſſions, (and go before ſome of them;) yet they being not ſinful as Acts, but as Diſordered (againſt the Rule and End, and upon undue objects, and eſpecially comparatively▪ preſerring the wrong object before the right) it ſeemeth that in their firſt inſtances they are all Omiſsive, and Poſitive in the ſecond only: which maketh the Schoolmen ſo commonly ſay that ſin is a Privation.
§. 28. Yet the Moral formal Relation of ſin, is not only Privative, but a Poſitive Diſobedience or Diſconformity: And ſo as Quid Morale formaliter—ſin hath as much Relative being as Duty hath, viz. 1. As contra Legem ſignificantem, 2. Contra Voluntatem Dei ſignificatam; 3. Et contra J… Divini Dominii Imperii & Amoris.
§. 29. If any be unſatisfied in this, it is certain that in the Velle hoc prohibitum potius quam hoc imperat…m, there is no more phyſical entity, than in the Velle imperatum, no nor than there is in the Velle indefinitely conſidered as on any object. Or if any deny that, it is certain that there is no ſuch addition of Entity (it being but ordo modi) in any ſuch ſinful Act from which as ſuch the formal obliquity or ſin reſulteth, but what man can do, and doth, without Gods cauſing the Act as ſo ordered and terminated. So that God is no way the cauſe of formal ſin.
§. 30. †Bradwardi… dealeth more plainly, and maketh Gods effectual Volition to be the total immediate cauſe that man ſinneth, though it be no ſin in God to do ſo▪ and ſaith that God willeth it for good uſes, (as the ſinner doth, or if he do not, it is becauſe God maketh him unavoidably do otherwiſe.)They that ſay, He cauſeth all that man cauſeth, and that as the firſt neceſ…itating or inſuperable cauſe; but yet is not the cauſe of the form of ſin, contradict themſelves; ſeeing that form is but a Relation, which reſulteth ipſo facto from its fundamentam and terminus, and nè per divinam potentiam cannot but do ſo; And hath no other cauſe but what cauſeth them.
§. 31. And they that ſay, that yet God is not the Author of ſin, becauſe he is under no Law, do but ſport with dreadful things. And they mean that God is the chief Cauſe of all mens ſins in the world, but not of any ſin of his own; which is none of the queſtion.
§. 32. God doth neither Cauſe the ſin, nor the futurity or exiſtence of it, as ſome vainly diſtinguiſhing, maintain: (eſpecially Dr. Twiſſe and Rutherford.) For (as Eſtius and others truly ſay) to cauſe the ſin, is nothing but to cauſe the exiſtence of it. And ſin as ſin, Dr. Twiſſe often ſaith, is not willed by the ſinner himſelf.
§. 33. So far as God Cauſeth not ſin, he willeth it not: and they that ſay that he Loveth and Willeth the exiſtence of it as a means to his glory, abuſe Gods Molineſs, and are confuted before, Par. 1.
§. 34. How God overruleth ſinners, and the effects of ſin, and procureth his own ends, not by the Means or Cauſality, but Occaſion of it, I have ſo largely there opened, that I muſt refer the Reader thither.