Catholic Theology Plain Pure Peaceable, Section 15
SECT. XV. Of the ſufficiency and efficacy of Grace.
§. 1. I Have ſaid ſo much of this before as that, leſt I be tedious by repetition, I muſt be but brief. *Malderus againſt the Synod of Dort and 1. 2. q. 111. art. 3. dub. 8. beſtirs himſelf with ſpecial induſtry to tell what Gratia efficax is: And he concludeth that it is afflatus gratiae praevenientis, & ſub genere gratiae excitantis; & quae non respuitur cum respui poſſit; rather praeparans voluntatem quam adjuvans: rejecting Valentia who placeth it in the Habit of Grace cauſed by excitation; and à Lorca who takes it to be adjuvant; and thoſe that make it co-operant; and thoſe that place it in praedetermination phyſical; of which he confuteth four opinions, p. 502. and ſaith Probabilior ſententia eſt quae negat omnimodam gratiae infallibilitatem, adeóque efficaciam ſumi poſſe ex ſola reali aliqua differentia, conſiderata ex parte gratiae praevenientis. And that Juſt and unjuſt have effectual grace, and therefore it differeth not from ſufficient really. And he reſolveth all per ſcientiam mediam, that Grace is effectual becauſe ex propoſito convertendi Deus it a hominem trabit ſicut aptum novit ut ſequatur & certiſſime ſecu…urum: and ſo that Grace i… effectual er natura ſua and not ſo called only ex eventu.I. By ſufficient Grace is meant that which is neceſſary to the effect, and without which it Cannot be, but with it, it may be, though it ſometimes be not.
§. 2. That there is ſuch a ſufficient Grace not alwayes effectual to mans act, is before proved by Adams Caſe. And that no man hath ſuch now for any means or duty in order to his recovery, as Adam had to ſtand when he fell, is not to be aſſerted or received. And that no prepared ſoul hath ſuch ſufficient Grace to believe, that yet believeth not, is a thing that is paſt our reach to know.
§. 3. This ſufficient Grace conſiſteth in a Power to the act: when the Indiſpoſition of the natural power, is ſo far altered, or repreſſed, as that by the means and helps vouchſafed by God, the act is Morally poſſible to be done. For he that truly can do it, all things conſidered, is well ſaid to have ſuch neceſſary grace.
§. 4. But God of his bounty uſually giveth men more than ſuch a meer moral poſſibility, by many additional helps and urgencies to the act, which I mentioned before.
§. 5. But by [ſufficient] is not meant [As much as is uſeful; yea or needful to the Aſcertaining of the Event, much leſs to the meliority of the act.]
§. 6. II. The EFFICACY of Grace relateth to the effect: And by the effect it muſt be deſcribed. Efficacy is Aptitudinal, which is the force and fitneſs of the Efficient Cauſe: Or Actual, which is Efficienty it ſelf.
§. 7. Aptitudinal efficacy is 1. In God; 2. In the means: And 1. In Gods Abſolute Power; 2. In his Ordinate Power.
§. 8. 1. Gods Abſolute Power is Omnipotency, or Infinite; and therefore was aptitudinally efficacious to make a world before it was made.
§. 9. 2. Gods Ordinate Power is the ſame Eſſential Omnipotency denominated from the Connotation of thoſe effects, which he hath decreed to produce, according to the limited aptitude of ſecond Cauſes and means, or the diſpoſition of the recipient, or at leaſt, as limited in the effects by his meer free will.
§. 10. In theſe reſpects, though ſtill Gods power in it ſelf be Omnipotency, yet in the limited way of operation, it is various, 1. As Gods Will quoad terminos is various, 2. And as the means are various, 3. And as the Receivers capacities are various. To one, the ſame operation ex parte Dei & mediorum (though not from the ſame Decree) is abundantly efficacious, and to another not.
§. 11. And thus God ſo limiteth the effect of his Power, as that it ſhall be effectual ſometime on a Condition to be freely performed by man receiving it, even by a former help, and not abſolutely.
§. 12. Therefore all that is Aptitudinally efficacious, is not actually efficient of every effect to which it was thus apt.
§. 13. The aptitudinal efficacy of the means being of God, falleth in with his ordinate power, herein, and is not the thing in queſtion.
§. 14. The effects in reſpect to which Grace is called efficacious are, 1. The Giving of the Means themſelves. 2. The firſt Impreſs on the ſoul. 3. The altering of the ſouls Diſpoſition. 4. The production of the act. 5. And of the Habit. And it muſt be ſome of theſe effects which are called efficacious or inefficacious to others. So that by that time the ſtate of the Queſtion is truly opened, this which Dr. Twiſſe ſaith Arminius durſt never ſpeak out his opinion of, and which he and others make to be the very heart of all theſe Controverſies, perhaps will appear to be nothing.
§. 15. For what is that Grace whoſe efficacy you enquire of … Is it Gratia operans or operata? The efficient cauſe, or the effect? If it be Gods Gratia operans, it is either the Prime Cauſe or the ſecond Cauſes. If it be the Prime Cauſe, it is Gods eſſence only; Even his Eſſential Power, Vaſquez. in 1 Tho. … 19. diſp. 8c. p. 5… … [Voluntas libera De…, … eſſentia Divina ſignificata per modum actus vitalis & affectus eliciti, cum revera ſit ipſamet ſubſtantia Dei; includit tamen habitudinem etiam qúandam rationis ad res futuras, quae liber… Deo convenit, ſient etiam res libere futurae ſunt: Cum enim haec relatio conſurgat ex fundamentis non neceſſaries, … ex rebus ipſis, & obj… futuri…; ipſa etiam habitud… …re Deo convenit; non intrinſicè, ſed extrinſec… ſolum denomination…; quam Deo convenire, & non conve…ire, …on eſt abſurdum. Ergo cum Velle liberam Dei non ſolum includat eſſentiam, ſed cum tali respect…, …ti-…ſ… libera Volunt as poſſ… D…o adeſſe, & abeſſe, ni…il ſequitur abſurdi, quod divina ſimplicitati & immutabilitati repug…et.] This little is all that they can tell us, what Gods free Volition of extrinſick effects is. And can you tell us any more? Bradwardine denying in God any executive power beſides meer Volition (though he call him o… nipotent antecedently to his ſelf-knowledge and Volition) doth make Grace …x parts D… to be nothing but his Will, that we ſhall do the act, and be ſuch and …ch.Intellect and will. And is that the Queſtion [Wherein conſiſteth the efficacy of Gods eſſence?] Why it conſiſteth in it ſelf if you mean Aptitudinal efficacy; It is Gods eſſential Virtue. If you mean Actual efficiency, that ſpeaketh the effect; of which more anon. So that about Gods eſſential efficacy there is no Controverſie.
§. 16. But if you ſay that It is his Potentia quà ordinata and not quà eſſentialis vel abſoluta that you enquire of the efficacy of; Remember that the word Ordinata or Limited ſignifieth no alteration in Gods Power at all, but only An effect which as Limited and ordinate, from whence the Power cauſing it is extrinſecally ſo named. Gods eſſential Power is never limited but Infinite; and to be Ordinate, is but to have ordinate effects. So that ſtill either the Controverſie muſt be of Gods eſſence, (which is paſt Controverſie,) or of ſome ſecond cauſe, or ſome meer effect.
§. 17. And if you transferr the Queſtion to the efficacy of ſecond cauſes, 1. You will deny your ſelves, that means and ſecond cauſes have any power but from God; 2. And that the very nature of thoſe cauſes is ſufficient to the aſcertaining of the effect, becauſe they cauſe moſtly morally… And it is one of the accu…ations againſt the A…minians (right or wrong) that they lay all on moral ſuaſion or cauſality. 3. And ſecond cauſes are ſo numerous, and unknown to us, that we are uncapable of judging well of their efficacy. 4. But it is I think agreed between you, that the force of Means or ſecond cauſes in Converſion is not ſuch as neceſſitateth the will. Or if ſome of the Schoolmen and Jeſuites, which with their Scientia Media do joyn Gratiam per congruitatem mediorum efficacem, do make this efficacy to be the chief cauſe of the effect, yet they deny it to cauſe neceſſarily; at leaſt alwayes, when the effect followeth. And what if we add, that objects effect not as ſuch? And therefore this queſtion de efficacia cauſarum ſecundarum, muſt extend to ſome ſecond effective Agents, and not only to objects as ſuch, nor to thoſe that preach, preſent and offer objects, as ſuch: And what that Agent Cauſe muſt be, under God, by that time you are agreed, you will find that they are new Controverſies that will there riſe up before you. And yet I think that if we will needs wrangle about the efficaciouſneſs of any cauſe foregoing the firſt effect it ſelf on the ſoul, it muſt be of the efficacy of ſome or all theſe ſecond cauſes, or we muſt queſtion whether God be God? For I can find nothing elſe to queſtion.
§. 18. It remaineth then that the queſtion, Wherein the efficacy of Grace conſiſteth, muſt be meant of Gratia operata, even of the effect it ſelf. And then either you mean, that this effect is efficacious to it ſelf, or to ſomething elſe. The firſt is ſuch a contradiction as is not to be imagined, (that you ſhould think that an effect is its own cauſe, and ask How doth faith, e. g. cauſe it ſelf?) Therefore there is nothing left, but only to queſtion, How the firſt effect of God on the ſoul in its converſion is efficacious of the ſecond?
§. 19. And here 1. Some of you will grant that as motion cauſeth motion by contact of bodies, ſo the firſt effect on the ſoul can cauſe the ſecond. And others of you will deny it, and ſay that Gods Actions being diverſified only by the diverſity of effects and objects, that which cauſeth the ſecond effect is to be denominated a ſecond Action, and not the ſame numerically which cauſed the firſt; no nor ſpecifically if the effects ſpecifically differ. And ſo as ſcholaſtick wits here exerciſe their curioſity, without reſpect to Arminianiſm or Calviniſm, you will here fall into notional Controverſies in the way.
§. 20. 2. But granting that the firſt effect is that efficacious Grace which muſt cauſe the ſecond, how ſhall we know what the firſt effect is, and what the ſecond? Gods Grace like the Sun is ſtill ſhining though we are not ſtill receiving it: When it worketh but the commoner ſort of effects, theſe tend to more and more. The firſt Gracious effect may be forty years before Converſion. But this is not your meaning: But I ſuppoſe you will ſay that it is the firſt ſpecial effect or gratia operata, that is proper to the ſaved, which you mean. But to paſs by, that Auguſtine, Proſper, Fulgentius (much more their predeceſſors) held that ſincere faith, Love, holineſs, Juſtification, preſent right to Life if they ſo dyed, are not proper to the ſaved, but that ſome loſe all theſe, If you ſay but [proper to the Juſtified or Sanctified or Converted,] or, it be the firſt effect which is proprium Juſtificandis which you mean; Are we agreed what that is?
§. 21. Either the firſt effect on the ſoul, or the firſt Gratia operata, is the Act of faith it ſelf, or ſomewhat antecedent. If the Act (as many ſubtilly maintain) then it were a fooliſh queſtion to ask, Whether the Act of faith be Effectual to cauſe it ſelf, and How? Therefore it muſt be ſomewhat antecedent, or we can find no matter for our Controverſie de efficacia Gratiae ad credendum.
§. 22. If ſomewhat antecedent to the Act, it is either a Diſpoſition, or Infuſed Habit, or an Impreſſion, Impulſe or Influx which is neither Diſpoſition nor Habit.*Dico 1. Non certo conſtare ex divinis literis eſſe hujuſmodi Habitus ſupernaturales. 2. At (baptizatis) infunditur Gratia …o ſenſu quod efficiuntur D…o grati & conſortes divinae▪ naturae, & renati. 3. Conceditur Dei adjutorium ut credamus, velimu…, diligamus, per inſpirationem & infuſionem ſpiritus ſancti. 4. Dei adjutorium deſuper infuſum eſt omnino neceſſarium ut credamus, diligamus, &c. & non tantum ut facilius credamus. Medina in 12. q. 51. p. 282. See many definitions of a Habit confuted in Medina 1. 2. p. 271. and that, which he reſteth in is Ariſtotles, Qualitas quâ rectè vel malè afficimur.
§. 23. 1. A proper Habit of faith it is not: Though Mr. Pemble ſingularly ſeem ſo to think, yet he meaneth but a ſeminal diſpoſition. And it's commonly held that the Habit is given by ſanctification, after the Act given in Vocation. 2. But if it were otherwiſe, the Habit is not alwayes ſufficient to aſcertain the Act. For holy men oft ſin againſt a Habit, and believers do not alwayes exerciſe it. Habits Incline per modum naturae, but do not certainly determine to the act. 3. And of a Diſpoſition it muſt be ſo ſaid much more.
§. 24. 2. And if it be an Impulſe or Influxus Receptus (as I think we muſt affirm) this is but a general notion, of which our underſtanding is very crude or ſmall. A meer Motus it is not: For (as was ſaid in the beginning) the Divine Influx is threefold, viz. From Vital-Activity (or Power,) Wiſdom and Love, to Life, Light and Love, in man. Now, as I ſaid, if there be no ſuch Impulſe, beſides the Life, Light and Love produced, our Controverſie is at an end: For theſe are not efficacious or efficient of themſelves. But if ſuch a different Impulſe there be, it's hard to know what it is in man. I conceive it beſt expreſſed by all theſe inadequate notions conjunct: 1. An inward urgency to this threefold act; which is called in the Schools, both auxilium, concurſe, and Influx: 2. By which Urgency the ſoul is more Diſpoſed to the Act (in hoc ordine) than it was before: 3. Which Diſpoſition containeth in it a Moral Power to that Act (ſo ordered) and ſomewhat more; even ſome Inclination to perform it. If any man can tell me better what that Divine Impulſe is which is antecedent to mans Act, I am willing to learn.
§. 25. Now if this be the queſtion, Whether this Divine Impulſe, which is the firſt effect of Gods ſpirit, be of its own nature efficacious to produce According to Janſenius the firſt Grace is Neceſſary Delectation or Love in act, before that which is free and full. And if ſo, then there is no grace cauſing this grace, and ſo none to be the ſubject of this queſtion, Whether it be more or leſs, ſufficient or effectual, operating or co-operating grace, which maketh one man love God initially rather than another? For it is no Grace, b… Gods eſſential will; this Love be the firſt Grace, and no received Impulſe antecedent to it.our Faith, Love, &c. as the ſecond effect, I anſwer, 1. Sometimes Gods Impulſe is ſo Great, as propriâ vi, doth change mind and will and overcome reſiſtance, and procure our act. 2. Sometimes it is ſo ſtrong as that it prevaileth againſt the contrary ill-diſpoſition, ſo far as to give man a Moral Power to the Act, with ſome Inclination, which yet contrary habits and temptations do overcome, and the Act doth not follow, which yet was not for want of Power to have done it: And this is called ſufficient Grace. 3. We have great reaſon to believe that as in ſome Inſtances Gods greater Impreſs is the chief differencing Cauſe, ſo in other Inſtances an equal Impulſe of God on unequally diſpoſed ſubjects, doth produce the Act of faith, &c. in one of them, which it produceth not in the other, through the incapacity of the recipient. 4. Therefore there is a double degree of efficacy or Vis, One which only ſo far moveth and helpeth the will, as that it can do the act, and ſometime doth it without more: Another which is ſo ſtrong as that the ſecond effect alwayes followeth it. 5. But whenever the Act of faith is produced (by force or Impulſe more or leſs) God is the firſt and principal cauſe of it, and man but the ſecond, and the praiſe of it is accordingly due. And I think this deciſion accommodateth both ſides of our contenders.
§. 26. The foreſaid Impulſe or firſt effect, is only the work of God (and the means) and not ours: But the Act of Faith, Love, &c. is Gods work and ours; and ours as Free-agents. Therefore that Impulſe of God which is Aptitudinally efficacious on ſuppoſition of mans due reception and ſelf-excitation, is oft not Actually effectual for want of that Voluntary Reception and ſelf-excitation.
§. 27. As to the various effects of Grace fore-mentioned, 1. As to the preparation of Means and Gracious medicine (Chriſt, the Covenant, &c.) Grace is efficient of it ſelf, and doth it.
2. As to the firſt Impulſe or Impreſs on the ſoul, God certainly effecteth it, in ſome degree, wherever his ſpirit worketh on the ſoul.
3. Some Urgency, and ſome degree of diſpoſition to the act, is conſtantly contained in this Impulſe. And uſually it giveth a moral power to the Immediate Act-required.
4. The Act of faith ſometimes followeth this Impulſe through its invincible force; And ſometime it followeth it through its ſufficient force, and the due Reception *Omne agens. requirit de neceſſitate aliquam dispoſitionem in ſuo paſſo: Maximè ſi illud pàſſum habeat diſpoſitiones action… illius agentis contrarias, ut patet de igne &c. Ergo cum Gratia non ſit minus inmo magis quam naturalis forma; Certum eſt quod Gratia requirit majorem diſpoſitionem in paſſo. Et voco illam dispoſitionem; Libertatem arbitrii ſui Deo ſubmittere, & ſe ad alteram partem declinare, ſcilicet ad volendum Gratiam recipere, & dolere de culpa commiſſa voluntarie & libere per attritionem, Brianſon in 4. q. 8. cor. 3. fol. 152. This is juſt the doctrine of our Proteſtant Preachers, ſuppoſing that Common Grace muſt make this preparation which the Papiſts grant.of the ſubject. And ſometimes it followeth it not at all, through the Recipients indiſpoſition.
5. The Habit of faith ever followeth a ſpecial Act, through the powerful operation of the Holy Ghoſt. But uſually it goeth not before the Act: Man hath not a fixed Habit to promptitude and facility of believing before he believeth, but after.
6. The Habit ordinarily procureth following acts, by the way of Inclination: but not neceſſarily nor alwayes. For by ſtrong temptations, Habits are oft born down.
§. 28. If the queſtion then be, Whence Gods Grace is Aptitudinally and Potentially efficacious (able and fit to effect?) It is becauſe God is God that he is Able; and his Impulſe is ſuch becauſe he maketh it ſuch.
And if the queſtion be, Whence Grace is Actually efficient of its firſt effect (the Impulſe?) It is becauſe God will ſo do; and his will hath no Cauſe, being the firſt Cauſe.
And if the queſtion be, Whence Grace is Actually efficient of mans faith? It is by its Impelling man to believe.
But if you ask, Whence faith it ſelf is; or of what cauſe is it an effect? I anſwer, of God as the firſt cauſe, and the Means as his Inſtrument, and of the Believer as a free ſecond Cauſe.
And if the queſtion be, Why ſufficient Grace which is Effectual ad Poſſe is not effectual ad agere? It is becauſe (being but ſufficient,) mans Indiſpoſition and wilful neglect or oppoſition, maketh him an unfit Receiver.
§. 29. There being nothing then but Gods eſſence (and the means) antecedent to the firſt effect on the ſoul, and that effect ever following where God worketh: and the ſecond effect being the effect both of God (by the firſt) and of man as a free agent, the queſtions, unde efficatia Gratiae, and unde effectus, are thus healingly anſwered.
§. 30. Obj. But the will of God is the firſt differencing and effectual Cauſe: And that not as it is his eſſence, but as it is terminated on the Creature and decreeth ſuch an effect.
Anſw. 1. It is no will but his eſſence which is ſo terminated or decretive. 2. That termination maketh no difference at all that's real in the will of God, but only in the effect or object. 3. What is the difference then between Gods will ſimply in it ſelf, and as willing from eternity a thing not yet exiſtent? None really at all. And that which is not yet, being Nothing; what Relative, Connotative and Denominative difference ſuch Nothings can make on the will of God, beſides the variety of imperfect notions in mans frail Intellect, let the wiſe conſider.
§. 31. From whence it is that School-divines after Auguſtine ſay, that with God there is no futurum velpraeteritum, no fore-knowledge or fore-decrees, properly, becauſe no difference of time, but only knowledge and will of things as preſent.
§. 32. Yet Gods Vital Activity, Knowledge and Will as he himſelf is the object of them, have a Greater diſtinction; becauſe to be ſelf-living, ſelfknowing and ſelf-loving are his Eſſential Acts on himſelf the eternal object (which made many Ancients account them the Trinity of perſons.) And alſo to Will an exiſtent Creature is an extrinſick denomination from exiſtence: But to will that which is not, (that man ſhall be, that he ſhall believe hereafter, &c.) as it is nothing really different from Gods eſſence, ſo it is but an extrinſick denomination of his eſſence, from nothing.