Catholic Theology Plain Pure Peaceable, Section 8
SECT. VIII. What that Operation of God on the ſoul is, which is the ſubject of our many queſtions: (as Whether it be equal on all? Whether it be reſiſtible? Whether it be moral or phyſical? Whether it be ſufficient, when it is not effectual? &c.) And what the various opinions about it are, and how uncertain they are.
YOU may think this ſhould have come firſt; but for ſome reaſons I have reſerved it to this place.
§. 1. I think the Ignorance of this in a great meaſure is common to all mankind: But the Ignorance of mens Ignorance, and preſumptuous contending about what we underſtand not, pretending (even to triumphant ſcorn of diſſenters) that we do underſtand it, is the very life of moſt of our contentions about theſe points.
§. 2. My own judgement is, that our own Intellection and Volition in the body, are Acts that take in ſo much of the ſenſe, imagination, and corporeal ſpirits, into that of them which we perceive and denominate, as that we cannot tell how far the Acts even of our own ſeparated ſouls will differ from theſe which we here perceive, and from perception call Intellection and Volition. And much leſs do I know the difference between Gods Vital-activity, Intellection and Volition, and ours. Some likeneſs there is, or elſe ours were not his Image: But all Schoolmen and Divines agree, that the names are not Univocal, and that it is not the ſame Thing in God as in man, which theſe names ſignifie; And that no man can have a formal conception of them. I am ſatisfied that a glow-worm or the fire in a flint, yea or in a ſtick or clod, is incomparably liker the Sun, than Man's poor Life, and Intellection and Volition is like to Gods. And if ſo, how unfit are we unneceſſarily to diſpute of theſe acts of God with curioſity? or at all ſo as implyeth a nearer likeneſs? The Lord knoweth that I would with reverence withdraw from this conſuming fire, and no further meddle with it, than the Glorifying of God, and the pacifying of the contentious, and the healing of diviſions, and calling off the preſumptuous, doth require.
§. 3. *The great difficulty is, what it is which we muſt conceive to go between Gods eſſence and mans act or inclination given▪ Dr. Twiſs accuſeth the Jeſuits for denying Intellection and Volition to be inſtantaneous Acts, ſine motu: And yet his friend Alvarez holdeth the Divine Act antecedent to be properly motio, and would have his predetermination ſo deſcribed quâ praeviâ motion… actuali, cauſis ſecundis praeſert…m liber is inharente, illas applic…t …d operandum, &c. But it is either God or an effect of God which he calleth motio: If an effect, it is ſo called as it is in the receiver. And what motio▪ antecedent to mans Act, can be imagined in man, when motion is an Act, though every Act be not motion? Therefore they voluminouſly diſpute de non ente, or of they know no… what. If we muſt have a diſtinct conception of it, I think, Vi… impreſſ…, fitter.By [Divine Action or operation] muſt be meant, 1. Either ſomething in God, or ſomething cauſed or Created by him. 2. If cauſed or created, it muſt be either ſomething in the ſecond Cauſes, or ſomething in the Recipient ſoul. I think the diſtribution is ſufficient.
§. 4. I. In GOD, there is nothing but GOD: His Life, Knowledge and Will are no accidents, but his eſſence: And therefore invariable, and no ſubject for any of theſe queſtions. To ask whether Gods Eſſential Knowledge, Will and Activity, be equal or unequal, phyſical or moral, &c. is to dote.
§. 5. But yet this Knowledge and Will of God is tranſient or terminated Objectively, when it is not ſo Effectively. And ſo God is ſaid to know things differently, as they differ; and to will things differently, as they are different objects: But this ſpeaketh truly nothing New or various in God, but only a Relative and ſo denominative connotation of his ſimple eſſence, from theſe objects, whoſe diverſity giveth divers names to Immutable, moſt ſimple Unity. Of this all Schoolmen (for ſubſtance) are agreed, however the Thomiſts, Scotiſts and Occamiſts differ about the notions of Ratio ratiocinata, formalitas, & denominatio extrinſeca.
§. 6. II. If it be the operation of the ſecond Cauſes, ex parte operanti…n, and ſo of God by them, that we diſpute of, the diſputes would have the eaſier deciſion. But this is denyed by the Dominicans, and another Infuſing Immediate operation is made the ſubject of theſe Controverſies.
§. 7. III. It remaineth therefore that it is only the effect as in the ſoul-receiving, which we diſpute of. And if ſo, this muſt be remembred, that we dream not of any Controverſie about Gods Action, as ex parte agen…is, in Him, or between him and the ſoul.
§. 8. In mans ſoul, we know of nothing, but 1. The ſubſtance in the firſt notion as anſwerable to Matter in bodies. 2. The form, which is a Threefold Virtue or faculty in One; viz. The vital Power, Intellect and Will: which is at once Virtus, Vis & Inclinatio naturalis ad proprias actiones. All theſe are but Inadequate conceptions of the ſame ſimple eſſence, and not compounding parts. None of this is the thing in queſtion, for the ſoul is preſuppoſed to be a ſoul. 3. The Accidental and mutable Diſpoſition of the faculties to the Acts. 4. The Impreſſions of ſ…periour Cauſes (God and means) in moving to the Acts. 5. The Acts of the ſoul themſelves. 6. The Habits. I know of no more.
§. 9. I. Though All Habits are diſpoſitions, yet all Diſpoſitions are not Habits: And before Habits, the ſoul may be many wayes prediſpoſed to the Act: As 1. By former acts of another ſort, which yet conduce to this. 2. By other habits that are preparatory. 3. By deliverance from many Internal and External Impediments. 4. And laſtly, By the Divine Impreſs it ſelf in the inſtant of Nature, though not of time, before the Act. For God ſo diſpoſeth the ſoul to act.
§. 10. This prediſpoſition, is ſometime but a Moral Power, that is, in ſo low a degree, as containeth only the Neceſſary power to the act, with which alone it is ſometime done. And ſometime beſides this Moral Power, it containeth ſome further degree of accidental Inclination, or propenſity to the Act. And theſe degrees are various, in various inſtances and ſ…bjects.
§. 11. II. When God moveth the ſoul to believe or repent, we muſt conceive that in the inſtant antecedent to the Act, the ſoul receiveth ſome Impreſs or Impulſe from the divine eſſence by which it is diſpoſed or moved to act *A…xilium praevium non appellatur à nobis Forma Voluntatis impreſſa: quoniam hoc nomen ſignificare videtur qualitatem, conſtituentem potentiam in act… primo: ſed proprio vocabulo dicitur motio Actualis, qua Deus vere efficienter facit ut liberum arbitrium operetur actum liberum determinatum cum vera & expedita facultate qua poteſt illum non operari ſi velit. Alvarez de Auxil. disp. 23. p. 108. M…tio is the proper notion, he thinks, between God and the Act or Habit of man, as aforeſaid; but unaptly, I think, ſo conceived by him.. And though ſpirits (eſpecially God) move not by ſuch contact and impreſs as things corporeal, yet in an unconceivable manner, ſome ſpirit, ſome ſpiritual Impreſs, Influx, or motion muſt be Received, by which faith is cauſed. And this Impreſs and the Diſpoſition to the Act, cauſed by it, perhaps are really the ſame.
§. 12. III. The Act it ſelf by this, and by the ſoul diſpoſed and excited, is next cauſed: not given as pre-exiſtent, but given by cauſal efficacious ſuſcitation of the pre-exiſtent faculty or power.
§. 13. IV. The Habit, which is a Promptitude to facile acting, is cauſed by all the forementioned cauſes conjunct, and not by any one alone, viz. by God, and his Impreſs on a ſoul ſome way pre-diſpoſed, and by the ſoul it ſelf further diſpoſed and excited by that Impreſs. But of Habits more anon.
And here becauſe almoſt all our ſeeming difference dependeth on the queſtion, What it is that is between Gods eſſence and mans act, which is the cauſe of our Act, or may be called grace (ſufficient or effectual, more or leſs, &c.) I ſhall tell you how Alvarez handleth the queſtion, and thereby further ſhew you, that it is a thing unſearchable, and paſt mans knowledge, and though I ſatisfie my ſelf with calling it an Impulſe or Impreſs, or a Received energie or force or Influx, yet theſe are but general notions, and tell us not as to a diſtinct formal conception, What it is; And you ſhall ſee that the boldeſt diſputers know no more.
Alvarez de Aux. l. 3. diſp. 19. p. 77. tells you that there are theſe ſeveral opinions of it, (What is the previous motion by which God moveth and applyeth ſecond cauſes to operate?)
I. Some Thomiſts hold that It is a Quality, not permanent, but by way of tranſient diſpoſition with operation: Cabrera 3. p. q. 18. ar. 4. dub. 1. Conc. 4. n. 58. For it muſt be ſome Virtus, and that muſt be a Quality: Imperfect ſupernatural acts, as attrition, fear of hell, &c. are before habits, and have only ſuch tranſient virtues or qualities, &c.
II. Others hold contrarily that Gods motion is nothing beſides his own will or eſſence and mans act, being ſimultaneous; Their reaſons I omit.*So Bradwardine and many others. And this would cut ſhort moſt of our preſent Controverſies if it would hold. Dr. Twiſſe ſaith Vind. Grat. li. 2. p. 2. Crim. 3. c. 15. §. 9. p. 348. Probabile eſſe nullam motionem à Deo recipi in Voluntatem; ſed quia Deus velit Voluntatem creaturae Velle aliquid, neceſſe eſt ut velit. Ratio haec eſt, cujus ſolutionem mihi expediat Arminianus aliquis: Sola Dei Voluntate factum eſt ut Mundus crearetur. Quis enim influxus Dei poteſt fingi praecedaneus qui occuparetur circa nihilum, &c.
III. Others hold that Gods previous motion is ſomewhat received in ſecond cauſes in order of nature before they operate: and when they are asked, What it is, they ſay, It is really the very operation of the ſecond cauſe (e. g. man) it ſelf, as it proceedeth from God—And ſo that Gods premotion and predetermination of our Will is not really diſtinct from the actual determination by which the will determineth it ſelf, but is the ſame; The ſame act being of God and man. (So that they make this motion to be ſomewhat received before we act; and yet nothing but our act; which is abſurd.)
IV. Other Thomiſts hold that It is ſomewhat really diſtinct from our operations: and that is, Quoddam complementum virtutis activae, quo actualiter agat. (And he that knoweth what predicament this complementum belongeth to, and what it is, let him take this opinion for more than a meer complement.)
And here they tell you that they ſpeak not of Gods ſimultaneous concurſe; for that Alvarez confeſſeth is nothing beſides Gods eſſence and mans act: But of his previous motion, which he ſaith, is ſomewhat more. So Ameſius Antiſynod. de Grat. c. 2. pag. 255. Satis eſſet apud omnes pios dicere Dei Velle ſine ulla Impreſſione intercedente certe poſſe efficere ut Voluntas conſentiat ipſius Vocationi. I now meddle not with the truth of this, and Twiſſes argument is eaſily anſwered; But I intreat the Reader to note into what all our controverſies are by theſe excellent men reduced, who yet moſt aggravate them. What now is the Gratia efficax ad credendum? Nothing beſides Gods eſſe but ipſa fides. Is faith effective of it ſelf? No. Is Gods eſſential will effective of it? Who ever denyed it? What place is there for Controverſies of ſufficiency and efficacy, when it is but Gods eſſence and the known effect of which they ſpeak, and hold not (as Alvarez doth) any motion or Impreſs made by God upon mind or will at all? Gods will then is effectual, quia vult effectum: and it is virtually ſufficient for whatever he willeth not, but could will. But then no man can poſſibly do any more good or leſs evil than he doth, becauſe no more or leſs is willed of God, which volition is the firſt neceſſary Cauſe of all things. And is not all their Volumes de Auxiliis Gratiae, and the ſeveral ſorts, previous, ſimultaneous, operating, co-operating, &c. meerly vain. when there is no ſuch thing as any Grace beſides Gods meer will, and the Act of man: And yet Dr. Twiſſe elſewhere ſaith that Gods Decrees do nihil ponere in objecto.(As if they differed in the nature of motion.) And he ſaith, that this is true both of ſupernatural acts which are from Infuſed habits, as faith hope, Love: and of Imperfect ſupernaturals as fear of hell and attrition, by which man is remotely prepared for Juſtification … which proceed not from ſupernatural habits, but from the ſpirits ſpecial impulſe, not yet inhabiting, but moving. And Alvarez thus concludeth—
I. That which God doth in ſecond cauſes, by which theſe act, is, Aliquid habens eſſe quoddam incompletum, per modum quò colores ſunt in aere, & virtus artis in inſtrumento artificis—It is Aliquid incompletum & tranſiens cum ipſa operatione. (Are you ever the wiſer for all this?)
II. Hoc ens incompletum praevium actioni cauſae ſecundae producitur in illa effective à ſolo Deo, & nullo modo dependet efficienter ex influx… ipſius cauſae ſecundae. And therefore herein the will is paſſive, though not in its own Act, (as he falſly affirmeth Luther to aſſert; for what can act and not be active?)
III. When ſecond cauſes, natural or ſupernatural, have by their inherent form, ſufficient Active virtue, per modum actus primi, proportioned with the effect, then Gods premotion is not a Quality but proprio vocabulo dicitur, Motio Virtuoſa, by which the univerſal cauſe maketh the ſecond actually operate, according to its proper mode: Therefore it is not a Habit or diſpoſition or natural power.
IV. Yea in Imperfect ſupernatural acts (as fear of hell) which go before habits, and by preventing grace are elevated to the acts, it is not a Quality, but Motio Dei virtuoſa by which they are done; and is of the ſame ſort with that which cauſeth acts from habits.
V. This previous Motion is Really diſtinct from the operation of the ſecond cauſe—and is not our act it ſelf; but is immediately from God. (Which he uſeth many arguments to prove.)
And can all this give any man a formal conception, what it is, which he calleth, aliquid incompletum, and Motio Virtuoſa? We know not what the Vis projectis impreſſa is in corporeals: And can we tell how ſpirits, and how the God of ſpirits maketh his Impreſſions? or what the word Impreſſion or Motion here ſignifieth? We know that we know it not if we know what we know and know-not. And why is it called Motio Virtuoſa? Virtus he maketh a quality: It is no quality, and yet Virtuoſa. Omnis motio eſt Actio. Is it Actio Increata? Then it is God himſelf; which he denyeth, and ſpeaketh of ſomewhat between God and mans Act. Is it Actio creata? Then it is a Modus Agentis, for ſo is every Action, as ſuch, as diſtinct from its effect in patiente. And if ſo, it cannot be modus Dei; for then it is Ipſe Deus: And if it be modus hominis, it is either homini… agentis vel patientis; If the firſt, then it is mans Action: If the ſecond, it is formally no action: For modus patientis is paſſio; though many would confound action and paſſion with ſaying after their Maſters, that Actio eſt in patiente, which is equivocation.
So that the plain truth is, that mans underſtanding can reach no further than to conceive, 1. That our ſouls are the termini of Gods Volition and Active power. 2. That though God act not on us by corporeal contact, yet we muſt call our ſelves Patients, and think of the Attingency of his Active eſſence with its effects, by ſome Analogie of Corporeal attingency, contact, and impreſſed moving force. But truly to know how God toucheth, moveth, operateth on any Creature and by what Impreſſions, or what there is indeed between Gods eſſence and mans Act, we know not at all. And if Chriſt had never ſaid, Joh. 3. [ſo is every one that is born of the ſpirit] our own experience might have told us that we know it not.
Boldly then tell our Church-diſtracting wranglers, that contend about the nature, ſufficiency, efficacy, reſiſtibility of this Act of Grace, that they know not the very ſubject of their diſputes. And ſhall we ſtill fire the Church by ſtriving about words that profit not but ſubvert the hearers, and tend to the increaſe of ungodlineſs?
Yea and ſhall bold blind zeal uſe the Reverend names of God, and his precious Truth to colour and countenance theſe pernicious contentions? I grant that the nature of Grace, and the concord of it with Free-will may be ſoberly treated of. But when men have followed the controverſie beyond the ken of humane underſtanding, and there will proceed to build great Fabricks upon unknown ſuppoſitions, and perverſly contend for them againſt Love and peace, they do but ſerve Satan againſt God, under the colour of his ſacred truth and name.
And I think it not amiſs here to tell you what Alvarez ſaith to this Queſtion (de Aux. l. 12. diſp. 118. p. 481.) An Concordia liberi arbitrii cum gratia p…ſſit demonſtrari naturali ratione (vel, cum Infallibilitate Praeſcientiae, Providentiae, & praedeſtinationis Divinae?) Where he tells you that one opinion of ſome Catholicks is, that [It is certain by the doctrine of faith that man hath Free-will, but it cannot be proved by natural reaſon.] The ſecond opinion is contrary, that [It is not only evident to natural reaſon that man hath free-will, but alſo the concord of it with the infallibility of Divine preſcience and providence may eaſily and clearly be made out by Scientia Media:] which is the Jeſuites way.
But the third opinion which he defendeth is, that [Free-will may be evidently known and proved by natural reaſon alone: But how the actual uſe of it conſiſteth with the infallibility of the preſcience, providence and predeſtination of God, and with the efficacy of the helps of grace; cannot be perfectly known or comprehended by natural light alone, and therefore the reaſon of it muſt be Believed and the underſtanding captivated to the obedience of Faith.]
Where note, 1. That though he ſay [perfectè] he proveth that it cannot be known by that which is below a perfect knowledge. 2. And that he denyeth not only a practical ſaving knowledge, but a proper theoretical or dogmatical knowledge.
For this he citeth thoſe words of Cajetan at large (in 1. p. q. 22. art. 4.) which many others cite and commend, [In ignorantia ſola quietem invenio, &c.]
And there is no man beſides Alvarez higher for the Dominicans way of Abſolute predetermination, than D. Bannes who is of Cajetans opinion (in 1. p. q. 23. art. 5. & 2. 2. q. 10. art. 1.) [Siquis non intelligit quomodo uſus liberi arbitrii ſit liber, & nihilominus ſit effectus jam praedefinitus à Divina providentia, oportet eum credere—& Primum omnium debuiſſet credere quod aiunt ſe non poſſe intelligere: Credimus enim Catholicum myſterium Trinitatis, etiamſi non intelligamus.]
And Alvarez citeth Calvin (lib. de aetern. Dei praedeſt. cont. Pigh. p. 136.) ſaying [Siquis hoc mentis ſuae captu ſuperius eſſe excipiat, idem de me fateor. Sed quid mirum, ſi modulum noſtrum imcomprehenſibilis & immenſa Dei majeſtas exſuperet? Atqui tantum abeſt ut pro carnis ratione explicandum ſuſcipiam ſublime iſtud reconditúmque arcanum, ut quod initio praefatus ſum aſſiduè in memoriam redire velim, deſipere qui plus ſcire appetunt, quàm Deus revelaverit. Quare nos potiùs docta ignorantia delectet, quam intemperans & ebria plus quam Deus permittit curioſitas.]
What Auguſtine confeſſeth you may ſee a little in Alvar. ib. p. 482, 483. but more in himſelf often.
What Suarez, Hurtado, Mendoz. and other the moſt ſubtil philoſophical Divines confeſs commonly of the incomprehenſibility of theſe things, and the darkneſs and uncertainty of our conceptions, I have elſewhere partly cited; and any that readeth them may find.
Now all this being ſo notorious, and their ignorance commonly confeſſed, may I not confidently inferr, 1. That then (ſeeing all muſt be reconciled by Believing) we muſt have nothing obtruded on us herein, which is not to be proved by the Word of God. What the Word ſaith of Predetermination, of the manner of Gods operation on ſecond cauſes, and influx on ſouls, and of the nature of his firſt effect or Vis Impreſſa, &c. we will receive: But yet men muſt not ſnatch up a metaphorical expreſſion in one or a few Texts, and urge that againſt the frequent and plain expreſſions of the Scripture; of the ſpirits. Operation on ſouls, Chriſt himſelf ſaith (which is more than all forecited) [The wind bloweth where it liſteth, and ye hear the ſound thereof, but ye know not whence it cometh, and whither it goeth: ſo is every one that is born of the ſpirit.] But as for the operations of God by the word preached and other means, and the Holy Ghoſts operation by and with thoſe means, and the Holy Ghoſts indwel…ng and operating after in Believers, theſe are frequently aſſerted in Gods Word: And that all Chriſts members have his Spirit, regenerating, illuminating, quickning, ſanctifying them, both as he is in Covenant with them to be the ſanctifier of their ſouls, and as the Love of God and all his Graces are by him cauſed in us: all this is ſure.
But if men will go further with us, and give us as many diſtinctions of Gods Grace as Alvarez doth, and tell us that beſides God himſelf, one of them (ſimultaneous operation) is nothing but mans act; and another (previous motion) is ſomewhat elſe, but no man knoweth what, but may be named [motio Virtuoſa] though it be neither God nor a quality nor a humane act; And then will diſpute how much of this [ſome thing] this motio virtuoſa, will ſerve to ſuch an effect, and how much to another, and how and by what reaſon it is efficacious; and will build on his aſſertions ſuch a ſyſteme of conſequents, as ſhall make up the doctrines of a ſect or party, which ſhall ſet up with this ſtock to militate againſt the Love and unity of Chriſtians: this is the courſe that I oppugn.
Once more, Let the Reader note that the waies of reconciling Grace and Free-will, as Alvarez mentioneth them, are theſe four.
I. The Jeſuits way by ſcientia media, which I need not recite to the Learned, but think it meet to recite Alvarez words of their deſcription of Grace. [Supponunt gratiam praevenientem & excitantem eſſe formaliter actiones quaſdam vitales, quas Deus in nobis ſine nobis operatur: ſine nobis, inquam, libere co-operantibus, non tamen ſine nobis vitaliter & efficienter concurrentibus; & conſiſtere in illuſtratione & illuminatione Intellectus, atque excitatione & ſuaſione voluntatis: quae efficienter procedunt ab intellectu & voluntate, non quidem ut Libera, ſed ut Natura eſt: quamvis antecedenter dependeant à Voluntate ut Liberum arbitrium eſt, quatenus viz. ex ejus libertate fuit dependens, quod homo compararet notitias myſteriorum fidei vel eorum quae facienda erant, accedendo ad praedicatores, vel alio modo eos propriâ induſtriâ acquirendo, quibus notitiis Deus ſe inſereret, eas elevando ſuo ſpeciali influxu, ut ſupernaturales ſint, & quales ad ſalutem oportet; & ſic ſortiantur naturam gratiae praevenientis. Suppoſitâ ergo Illuminatione, quâ Deus illuminat Intellectum, & proponit Voluntati bonum, ut ſibi conveniens, affirmant, quod ſtatim abſque ulla libertate oritur merè naturaliter in voluntate motus affectionis ad bonum ſibi propoſitum: quo motu allicitur & quaſi invitatur ad amandum illud bonum, & imperandum potentiis executivis, ut illud exequantur, ut v. g. ad imperandum intellectui ut aſſentiatur rebus fidei propoſitis & explicatis. In his ergo duobus motibus, viz. in illuſtratione Intellectus & affectione voluntatis à Deo elevatis ſuo ſpeciali influxu, conſiſtere aiunt gratiam praevenientem & excitantem. Liberum autem arbitrium his duobus motibus gratiae praevenientis adjutum & excitatum, liberam habet poteſtatem imperandi aut non imperandi aſſenſum fidei: Quod ſi voluntas fidem amplecti velit, actumque credendi imperet intellectui, influente ſimul nutu gratiae praevenientis quam habet, elicit in ſeipſa actum ſupernaturalem, qu… fidem amplecti vult, quó que aſſenſum imperat intellectui; ſimúlque Intellectus motus imperio illo ſupernaturali voluntatis, illuſtrationéque divinâ adjutus, elicit actum ſupernaturalem aſſentiendi revelatis, & Gratia excitans ſeu praeveniens novo influxu, quo unà cum libero arbitrio influit in ſupernaturalem actum fidei, ſortitur rationem gratiae adjuvantis, cooperantis & efficacis. Si autem voluntas pro ſua innata libertate fidem nolit amplecti, gratia excitans & praeveniens manet intra limites gratiae ſufficientis, nec eſt efficax, quia voluntas non voluit fidem amplecti, cum potuiſſet.
II. The ſecond is Durandus's way [Nullum eſſe neceſſarium Divinae voluntatis concurſum ad actiones ſecundarum cauſarum, ſed ſa…is eſſe quod Deus eas produxerit in eſſe, & ipſas naturas, earúmque virtutes poſtmodum conſervet.] But this is a partial recitation, for this ſuſtentation of their Active Virtues is the ſame with an Univerſal Influx or Concurſe to action as action, which Bellarmine is for. Read of this Ludov. à Dola.
III. *So Malderus in 1. 2: q. 111. a. 3. dub. 1. [Hic Dei concurſus quod attin…t ad identitatem realem ex parte termini (nam ex parte principii eſt ipſe Deus, aut Dei voluntas) eſt ipſa actio Cauſae ſecundae quatenus eſt à Deo. Nihil ponit in ipſa Voluntate, ſed eſt influxus D…i in actionem ſeu effectum.] So many others.The third he ſaith, is attributed to Greg. Arim. Scotus and Gabriel, (great Wits, if any.) Cooperationem Divinam ſe tenere ex parte effectus, non Cauſae, h. e. Con…urſum Dei non determinare Voluntatem noſtram, nec aliquid in illam imprimere aut operari, ſed immediate influere in effectum, eumque producere illo ipſo momento quo à voluntate noſtra producitur: Ergo Deus non determinat Voluntarem nec Voluntas Deum: Nam uterque concurſum libere adhibet, & ſi alter no… concurrere, opus non fiet, ſicut cum duo ferunt ingentem lapidem—Et licet ſimul operentur, tamen Deus operatur quia Voluntas operatur, non contra: (But this is partially recited, and it is true only of the effect: And his confutation is that then Graetia eſt pediſſequa▪ Voluntatu: And why ſaith he not, God is pediſſequus hominis, becauſe he judgeeth men according to their works?)
I have otherwiſe opened the matter than is expreſſed here of any of theſe. But can the ſober Reader think that the IVth way (which is that of the Dominicans predetermining premotion of all acts good and bad) is ſo much ſurer than theſe three, as that he dare venture on that ſuppoſition to cry down his Brethren as enemies to the Grace of God, and to his Providence, who would gladly aſcribe all to both which belongeth to perfection, and are only afraid to deny Gods holineſs, and the Chriſtian Religion, by reſolving all ſin and damnation into the meer Will and Love and Irreſiſtible Omnipotent efficiency of God?