Aphorisms of Justification, Thesis 26 – Thesis 29
THESIS XXVI.
(1) NEither can our performance of the conditions of the Gospel in the most proper and strict sence, be said to merit the reward: seeing there is nothing in the value of it, or any benefit that God receiveth by it, which may so entitle it meritorious; neither is there any proportion betwixt it and the reward. (2) But in a larger fence, as Promise is an Obligation, and the thing promised is called Debt; so the performers of the Condition are called Worthy, and their performance Merit. Though properly it is all of Grace, and not of Debt. (1) Rom. 4. 4, 10. & 5. 15, 16, 17. Hose. 14. 4. Mat. 10. 8. Rom. 3. 24. & 8, 32. 1 Cor. 2. 12. Rev. 21. 6. & 22. 18. Rom. 11. 6. Gal. 5. 4. Eph. 2. 5, 7, 8. Gen. 32. 10. (2) Mat. 10. 11, 12, 13, 37. & 22 8. Luk. 20. 35. & 21. 36. 2 Thes. 1. 5. 11. Rev. 3. 4, &c.
EXPLICATION.
IN the strictest sence he is said to Merit, who performeth somewhat of that worth in it self to another, which bindeth that other in strict justice to requite him. This work must not be due, and so the performer not under the absolute soveraignty of another? for else he is not in a capacity of thus Meriting. It is naturall Justice which here bindeth to Reward. All that we can merit at the hands of Gods naturall Justice is but these two things. 1. The escape of punishment in that respect or consideration wherein our actions are not sinfull: or the not punishing of us in a greater degree then sin deserves: (Though indeed it is questionable whether we are capable of suffering more.) 2. Our actions thus deserve the honour of acknowledgment of that good which is in them; yea, though the evil be more then the good. As a merciful Thief that gives a poor man half his mony again, when he hath robbed him, as he deserveth a less degree of punishment, so that good which was in his action deserveth an answerable acknowledgment and praise, though he dye for the fact.
But this is a poor kinde of meriting, and little to the honour or benefit of the party: And is more properly called a less desert of punishment, then a desert of reward.
2. The second kind of Merit, is that whereby a Governor, for the promoting of the ends of Government, is obliged to reward the Obedience of the Governed: That when Disobedience is grown common, the Obedience may be encouraged, and a difference made. Among men even Justice bindeth to such reward; at least to afford the obedience the benefit of protection and freedom, though he do no more then his duty: But that is because no man hath an absolute soveraignty de jure over his subjects, as God hath; but is indebted to his subjects as well as they are to him. If our obedience were perfect, in respect of the Law of Works, yet all the Obligation that would lie upon God to reward us (any further then the foresaid forbearing to punish us, and acknowledging our obedience) would be but his own wisdom; as he discerneth such a Reward would tend to the well-governing of the World, working morally with voluntary agents agreeable to their natures. And when we had done all, we must say, we are unprofitable servants; we have done nothing but what was our duty. Therefore this Obligation to reward from the wisdom of God, as it is in his own brest known to himself alone, so is it drawn from himself, and not properly from the worth of our Works, and therefore this is improperly called Merit.
3. The third kinde of Meriting is sufficiently explained in the Position: where the Obligation to reward, is Gods ordinate Justice, and the truth of his Promise: and the worthiness lieth in our performance of the Conditions on our part. This is improperly called Merit: This kinde of Meriting is no diminution to the greatness or freeness of the gift or reward: because it was a free and gracious Act of God to make our performance capable of that title; and to engage himself in the foresaid promise to us; and not for any gain that he expected by us, or that our performance can bring him.
THESIS XXVII.
1 AS it was possible for Adam to have fulfilled the Law of Works by that power which he received by nature; (2) So is it possible for us to perform the Conditions of the new Covenant by the (3) Power which we receive from the Grace of Christ.
EXPLICATION.
(1) THat it may be possible which is not future. A thing is termed possible when there is nothing in the nature of the thing it self, which may so hinder its production as to necessitate its non-futurity: Though from extrinsecall Reasons, the same non-futurity may be certain, and in some respect necessary: And all things considered, the futurity of it may be termed impossible; & yet the thing it self be possible. So it was possible for Adam to have stood: And so if you should take the word [possible] absolutely, and abstracted from the consideration of the strength of the Actor; even the Commands of the Law are yet possible to be fulfilled▪ But such a use of the word is here improper: it being ordinarily spoken with relation to the strength of the Agent. (2) But in the relative sence the Conditions of the new Covenant are possible to them that have the assistance of grace. I intend not here to enter upon an Explication of the nature of that Grace which is necessary to this performance; my purpose being chiefly to open those things wherein the relative change of our estates doth consist rather then the reall. Whether then this Grace be Physicall or Morall? Whether there be a Morall Suasion of the Spirit, distinct from the Suasion of the Word, and other outward means? Whether that which is commonly called the Work of Conscience, be also from such an internall suasory work of the Spirit? How far this Grace is resistible? Or whether all have sufficient Grace to beleeve, either given, or internally offered? with multitudes of such questions, I shall here pass by; Referring you to those many Volumes that have already handled them. All that I shall say of this shall be when I come to open the Nature of Faith. See Parkers Theses before mentioned.
THESIS. XXVIII.
THe Precepts of the Covenants, as meer Precepts, must be distinguished from the same Precepts considered as Conditions, upon performance whereof we must live, or dye for non performance.
THESIS XXIX.
AS all Precepts are delivered upon Covenantterms, or as belonging to one of the Covenants, and not independently; So have the same Precepts, various ends and uses, according to the tenor and ends of the distinct Covenants to which they do belong.
EXPLICATION.
THerefore it is one thing to ask, whether the Covenant of Works be abolished? and another thing, whether the Morall Law be abolished? Yet that no one Precept of either Morall or Ceremoniall Law was delivered without reference to one of the Covenants, is very evident. For if the breach of that Command be a sin, and to be punished, then either according to the rigorous threatening of the old Covenant, or according to the way and justice of the new. For the Law, as it was delivered by Moses, may be reduced in several respects to each of these Covenants, and cannot constitute a third Covenant, wholy distinct from both these; and therefore Camero doth more fitly call it a subservient Covenant, then a third Covenant. For either God intended in that Covenant to proceed with sinners in strict rigor of Justice, for every sin; and then it is reducible to the first Covenant: Or else to pardon sin upon certain conditions, and to dispence with the rigor of that first Covenant: And then it must imply satisfaction for those sins; and so be reducible to the second Covenant: (For I cannot yet digest the Doctrine of Grotius and Vossius, concerning satisfaction by sacrifice for temporall punishment, without subordination to the satisfaction by Christ:) Or if it seem in severall phrases to savour of the language of the severall Covenants, (as indeed it doth;) that is because they are yet both in force; and in severall respects it is reducible to both. So that when we demand, whether the Morall Law do yet binde, the question is ambiguous, from the ambiguity of the term [Binde.] For it is one thing to ask, whether it binde upon the old Covenant terms? another, whether upon new Covenant terms? and a third, whether as a meer Precept? Here a question or two must be answered.
1 Quest. How could the Precepts delivered by Moses (when the old Covenant was violated, and the new established) belong to that old Covenant?
2 Quest. In what sence doth the Decalogue belong to the new Covenant?
3 Quest. Whether the Precepts of the Gospel do belong to the Decalogue?
4 Quest. Whether the Precepts of the Gospel belong also to the old Covenant?
But all these will be cleared under the following Positions, where they shall be distinctly answered.