Aphorisms of Justification, Thesis 1 – Thesis 6
THESIS I.
GOd hath first a Will of purpose, whereby he determineth of Events: what shall be, and what shall not be, de facto; Secondly, And a Legislative, or Preceptive Will, for the government of the Rationall Creature: whereby he determineth what shall be; and what shall not be, de jure, or in point of duty; and in order thereto, concludeth of Rewards and Punishments.
EXPLICATION.
THis distinction of the Will of God into his Will of Purpose and his Will of Precept, is very commonly used by Divines, and explained by some, especially Doctor Twisse frequently, and Doctor Edward Reignolds, in his Sermons on the Humiliation dayes, on Hos. 14. Yet is not the exceeding necessity and usefulnesse of it discerned by many, nor is it improved accordingly by any that I have read: It is near of kin to the common distinction of Voluntas signi, & Beneplaciti, but not the same: The Tearm [signi] being more comprehensive, yet (in my judgement) lesse proper and convenient then this [Legislative Will, or voluntas Praecepti:] As the old verse shews, Praecipit ac prohibit, permittit, consulit, implet. Two of these Acts, to wit, Permission and Operation, fall under the Will of Purpose, as they are the effects and revelation of it; but not under the Legislative Will: And indeed the Schoolmen by their Voluntas signi, do intend not other Will, but the same which they call Beneplaciti, whose Object is event, as it is uncertainly represented to us by those five signes: And because they are such uncertain signes (the contrary to what they seem to import; being frequenly certain;) therefore they tell us that this is but metaphorically called the Will of God; viz. by a speech borrowed from the manner of men, who signifie their Will by such kinde of Actions; see Aquin. sum. 1a. 1ae. Quest. 19. Art. 11. 12. And Schibler. Metaph. of this.
But that which I call the Legislative or Preceptive will, hath another object, viz. not event but duty; and is Metonymically rather then Metaphorically called Gods Will, it being the effect and revelation of his reall unfeigned will. For God doth not seeme to Will that this or that shall be our duty, and so speake after the manner of men (according to the sense of their Voluntas signi) but hee willeth it unfeignedly,
Neither is this Distinction the same with that which differenceth Gods revealed Will from his secret. For his revealed Will containeth also part of the Will of his purpose, and all the will of precept: The meere prophesies, and also the promises and threatnings, so far as they point out future event, are the Revealed part of the Will of Gods purpose. Tilenus himselfe in his conference with Camero seemes to approve of this Distinction; where he distinguisheth of Gods Will according to its Object, viz. vel quod ipse vult facere, vel quod a nobis vult fieri: If in this last branch he speake not de officio & of this preceptive will, rather then de eventu and of the will of purpose, then he can meane it onelyonly of a conditionall will of purpose.
As we use to distinguish betwixt the legall will of the King publickly manifesting our duty in the Laws, and his personall private will; so must we do here.
The necessity of this distinction is so exceeding great, that but little of the doctrinall part of Scripture can be well understood without it. The verity of it is also unquestionable: for none but the grosely ignorant will deny, that Event and Duty, Purpose and Law, are truly distinct, or that both these last are called in Scripture and common custome of speech, The Will of God.
And therefore it is a sencelesse Objection, that wee hereby make two wills in God, and those contradictory. For first, we only make them two distinct Acts of one & the same will: whereof that of purpose is lesse revealed, and doth lesse concern us, yet is most properly called his will, as being such as in man we call the Elicite Act of it: but that of precept is all revealed and doth more concerne us; yet as it is in his Law it is onelyonly Metonymically called his Will, as being only the discovery of his Will properly so called.
And 2ly Contradiction there is none; for they are not de eodem; they have to do with severall Objects; To Will that it shall be Abrahams duty pro hoc tempore to sacrifice his son; and yet that de eventu it shall not be executed, are far from contradictory. To Will that it shall be the Iewes duty, not to kill Christ, and yet that eventually they shall kill him, is no contradiction. To will that it shall be Pharaohs duty to let Israel go; and yet that in poynt of event hee shall not let them go, is no contradiction. Indeed, if God had willed, that he shall let them go, and he shall not eventually, or that it shall be his duty, and it shall not; either of these had been a contradiction undoubted.
But I have largely explained and more fully improved this Distinction under the Dispute about Universall Redemption, and therefore shall say no more of it now.
THESIS II.
First, Praedestination, Election, Reprobation, or Preterition. Secondly, the Covenant betwixt the Father and the Son. Thirdly, the absolute Promises of Regeneration and perseverance. Fourthly, the fulfilling of those Promises by differencing Grace, are all in the series under the Will of Gods purpose.
EXPLICATION.
IT is of very great use to understand which of these Wills every one of Gods particular words or works do fall under.
1. That Predestination, Election, and Reprobation, are under this Will of Purpose only, is undoubted.
2, Divines use to mention a Covenanting between the Father and the Son about the work of Redemption: It is called a Covenant but improperly, speaking after the manner of men. Properly it is but the Decree of God concerning Christs Incarnation, his work, and his sufferings, and the successe of these, and what God will further do thereupon. This therefore falls under this Genius, and so doth the Fathers giving the Elect to Christ, which is but part of this.
3. Those promises of taking the hard heart out of us, and giving hearts of flesh, one heart, a new heart, and of putting his fear in us, that wee shall not depart from him, &c. are generally taken to be Absolute promises (for here is no Condition expressed or intimated) made to all the Elect and onelyonly them, as not yet regenerate; and so not to any either named or qualified persons. These are not therefore fulfilled upon condition of our Faith, or made ours by beleeving, as other promises are: For Faith is part of the thing promised, and the persons are unregenerate, and consequently unbeleevers when these promises are fulfilled to them. Therefore these Absolute promises are but meere gratious predictions what God will do for his Elect, the comfort whereof can be received by no man till the benefit be received, and they be to him fulfilled: Therefore as all meer predictions, so also these promises do fall under the Will of Purpose, and not of Precept.
4. So also doth the fulfilling of these to particular persons: the actuall chusing or calling of some while others are past by: The bestowing of that faith which is the condition of the Covenant: The giving of perseverance: And all the passages of speciall, effectuall, differencing Grace. The knowledge of this is of great use in expediting the Arminian Controversies, as you shall perceive after: Some parts of Scripture do in severall respects belong to both these Wills; such are some promises and threatnings conditionall, which as they are predictions of what shall come to passe, do belong to the will Purpose, but as they are purposely delivered and annexed to the commands and prohibitions for incitement to Duty, and restraint from Sin, (which was indeed the great end of God in them) so they belong to the Will of Precept: For the promise of Reward, and the threatning of Punishment, are reall parts of the Law or Covenant, so of History. All this is only a preparative to the opening more fully the nature of the Legislative Will, and what falls under it: For the Will of Purpose, and what is under it, I have no intention any further to handle.
THESIS III.
First, The Will of God concerning duty is expressed wholly in his written Laws. Secondly Which Laws are promulgate and established by way of Covenant, wherein the Lord engageth himselfe to reward those that performe its conditions, and threateneth the penalty to the violaters thereof.
EXPLICATION.
1. NOt but that much of Gods Will is also contained in the Law of Nature; or may by the meere use of Reason be learned from Creatures, and Providences: But yet this is nothing against the Scriptures sufficiency and perfection: For besides all the superadded Positives, the Scripture also containes all that which we call the Law of Nature; and it is there to be found more legible and discernable than in the best of our obscure, deceitfull, corrupted hearts.
2. All perfect compulsive Laws have their penalty annexed, (or else they are but meerly directive) but not usually any reward propounded to the obeyers: It is sufficient that the Subject know his Soveraignes pleasure, which he is bound to observe without any reward. Meere Laws are enacted by Soveraignty: Meere Covenants are entred by equalls, or persons dis-engaged to each other in respect of the contents of the Covenants, and therefore they require mutuall consent. These therefore made by God, are of a mixt nature; neither meere Laws, nor meere Covenants, but both. He hath enacted his Laws as our Soveraigne Lord, whithout waiting for the Creatures consent, and will punish the breakers, whether they consent or no: But as it is a Covenant, there must be a restipulation from the Creature; and God will not performe his conditions there expressed, without the Covenanters consent, engagement, and performance of theirs.
Yet is it called frequently in Scripture (a Covenant,) as it is offered by God, before it be accepted and entered into by the Creature: because the condescention is only on Gods part; and in reason there should be no question of the Creatures consent, it being so wholly and only to his advantage. Gen. 9. 12 17. Exod. 34. 28. Deut. 29. 1. 2 Kings 23. 3 &c.
There are some generall obscure Threatnings annexed to the prohibitions in the Law of Nature; that is, Nature may discerne that God will punish the breakers of his Law, but how, or with what degree of punishment it cannot discern: Also it may collect that God will be favourable and gratious to the Obedient: but it neither knows truly the conditions, nor the nature or greatnesse of the Reward, nor Gods engagement thereto. Therefore as it is in Nature, it is a meer Law; and not properly a Covenant. Yea to Adam in his perfection▪ the forme of the Covenant was known by superadded Revelation, and not written naturally in his heart.
Whether the threatning and punishment do belong to it only as it is a Law, or also as it is a Covenant, is of no great moment; seeing it is really mixt of both. It is called in Scripture also, the curse of the Covenant: Deut. 29. 20. 21.
THESIS. IIII.
THe first Covenant made with Adam did promise life upon condition of perfect obedience, and threaten death upon the least disobedience.
EXPLICATION.
THe promise of life is not expressed, but plainly implyed in the threatning of death. That this life promised was onelyonly the continuance of that state that Adam was then in in Paradice, is the judgement of most Divines: But what death it was that is there threatned, is a Question of very great difficulty, and some moment. The same damnation that followeth the breach of the New Covenant, it could not be: no more then the life then enjoyed is the same with that which the New Covenant promiseth. And I cannot yet assent to their judgement, who think it was onelyonly that death which consisteth in a meer separation of soule and body: or also in the annihilation of both. Adams separated soule must have enjoyed happinesse, or endured misery: For that our soules when separated are in one of these conditions, and not annihilated or insensible, I have proved by twenty Arguments from Scripture in another booke. As Adams life in Paradise was, no doubt incomparably beyond ours in happinesse; so the death threatned in that Covenant was a more terrible death then our temporall death. For though his losse by a temporall death would have bin greater then ours now; yet hee would not have bin a Subject capable of privation, if annihilated; nor however capable of the sense of his losse. A great losse troubleth a dead man no more then the smallest. Therefore as the joy of Paradise would have bin a perpetuall joy, so the sorrow and pain it is like would have bin perpetuall, and wee perpetuated capable Subjects. See Barlow exercit. utrum melius sit miserum esse quam non esse? I do not thinke that all the deliverance that Christs Death procured, was onelyonly from a temporall death or annihilarion: or that the death which hee suffered was aequivalent to no more.
THESIS. V.
THis Covenant being soon by man violated, the threatning must bee fulfulled, and so the penalty suffered.
EXPLICATION.
WHether there were any flat necessity of mans suffering after the fall, is doubted by many, and denyed by Socinus. Whether this necessity ariseth from Gods naturall Justice, or his Ordinate, viz. his Decree, and the verity of the threatning, is also with many of our own Divines a great dispute: whether God might have pardoned sinne, if he had not said, the sinner shall die, may be doubted of (though I believe the affirmative, yet I judge it a frivolous presumptuous question. But the word of his threatning being once past, methinks, it should bee past question that hee cannot absolutely pardon, without the apparent violation of his Truth, or Wisdome. Some think that it proceedeth from his Wisdome rather then his Justice, that man must suffer: see Mr. Io. Goodwin of justif. part. 2. pag. 34.) but why should we separate what God hath conjoyned? However, whether Wisdome, or justice, or Truth (or rather all these) were the ground of it, yet certaine it is, that a necessity there was that the penalty should be inflicted: or else the Son of God should not have made satisfaction, nor sinners bear so much themselves.
THESIS. VI
THis penalty the offender himselfe could not bear, without his everlasting undoing.
EXPLICATION.
THat is, not the full penalty: for part of it hee did beare, and the Earth for his sake: and (as I think) all mankind doth beare part of it to this day. But the full penalty would have bin a greater and everlasting suffering.