The Existence of God and the Immortality of the Soul, Chapter 4
CHAP. IV.Chap. IV▪
The vanity of Epicurus's Opinion of the Worlds original discover'd, from the visible order in all the parts of it. Chance produces no regular effects. The constant natural course of things in the world proves that 'tis not framed nor conducted by uncertain Chance. The World was not caused by the necessity of nature. In the search of Causes the mind cannot rest till it comes to the first. Second Causes are sustain'd and directed in all their workings by the first. The Creator though invisible in his Essence, is visible in his effects.
BEfore I proceed to the other Head of Arguments, I will briefly show the vanity of those Opinions that attribute the production of the World to Chance, or to the sole necessity of Nature.
'Twas the extravagant fancy of Democritus, and Epicurus after him, that the original of the World was from the fortuitous encountring of Atoms, that were in perpetual motion in an immense space, till at last a sufficient number met in such a conjunction as form'd it in this order. 'Tis strange to amazement, how so wilde an Opinion, never to be reconciled with Reason, could finde entertainment. Yet he left a numerous School, many followers tenacious of his Doctrine, the heirs of his Frenzy. 'Tis very easie to shew the vanity of this conceit, that supposes all, and proves nothing.
That these particles of matter should thus meet together, 'tis necessary they move: now from whence is the principle of their motion,Cum in rerum natura duo sint quaerenda, unum quae materia sit ex qua quae que res efficiatur, alterum quae vis sit quae quid que efficiat, de materia disseruerunt Epicuraei vim & causan efficientem reliquerunt. Tul. de fin. lib. 1. from an internal form, or an external Agent? If they will be ingenuous and speak true, they must answer thus, from whence soever they have it, they have it: for if they did not move, their Opinion cannot proceed a step further. But supposing their motion to be natural, what powerful Cause made them rest? how are they so firmly united? have they Hooks that fasten, or Birdlime or Pitch or any glutinous matter, that by touching they cleave so fast together? They must grant something like this, otherwise they cannot unite and compound, and then the Epicurean Opinion is presently dissipated. Supposing them triangular, circular, square, or of any other regular or irregular figure, yet they can make no other compound then a mass of Sand, in which the several grains touch without firm union. So that 'tis very evident whether we suppose motion or rest to be originally in the nature of matter, there must be a powerful Efficient to cause the contrary. Besides, by what art did so many meet and no more, and of such a figure and no other, and in that‖Si sensu carent nec coire tam disposite possint, quia non potest quicquam rationale perficere nisi ratio. Lactant. just order as to form the World, a work so exact that by the most exquisite skill it cannot be made better. Add further; how could these minute Bodies without sense, by motion produce it? this is to assert that a Cause may act above the degree of its power.
Can we then rationally conceive that a confused rout of Atoms of divers natures, and some so distant from others, should meet in such a fortunate manner, as to form an intire World, so vast in the bigness, so distinct in the order, so united in the great diversities of natures, so regular in the variety of changes, so beautiful in the whole composure, though it were granted, that one of their possible conjunctions in some part of Eternity were that we see at present? Could such a strict confederacy of the parts of the Universe result from an accidental agreement of contrary principles? 'Tis so evident by the universal experience of Men, that regular Effects are caused by the skill of a designing Agent, that works for an end, that upon the sight of any such effects, there is not the least shadow of a suspicion in the mind, that it proceeded duplicate page duplicate page from blinde and counselless Chance. If we should hear one make a plea for a Cause, with such reasons as are most proper to convince and perswade his Judges to decide for him, can we doubt whether he understands what he speaks, or casually moves the organs of speech? And yet if he did move them by Chance, one of the casual motions equally possible with any other, would be that he perform'd at present. If a thousand brass Wheels were thrown on a heap, would six or eight meet so fitly, as by their conjunction to organize a Clock, that should distinguish the hours? or, is a skilful hand requisite to joyn them, and direct their motion? And did the Planets, those vast bodies, by Chance ascend to the upper part of the World, and joyn in that order, as to measure the time exactly for so many past Ages? Who ever saw a dead Statue form'd in the veins of Marble, or a well proportion'd Palace, with all Rooms of convenience and state, arise out of a Quarry of Stones, without a Sculptor to fashion the one, and an Architect to frame the other? Yet Marble and Stones are more dispos'd to make a Statue, or a Building, that are the materials of them, and only require skill and workmanship to give them form, than Atoms mixt together are to make the World. Indeed*Fama est, & habuisse fertur, non arte, sed sponte naturae, ita discurrentibus maculis, ut musis quoque singulis sua redderentur insignia. Pliny faintly tells a story of a fabulous Ring of Pyrrhus, in which an Agat was set, distinctly representing not by Art, but pure hazard, Apollo with his Harp in the midst of the nine Muses. The first Reporter was defective, that he did not oblige us to believe, that the sound of his Harp was heard in consort with the Muses. It would have been a fine Miracle, and the belief as easie that a Stone might be a Musitian, as a Painter.
Now if the effects of Art are not without an Artificer, can the immense Fabrick of the World be other than the work of a most perfect Understanding? Who fixt the foundations of the Earth? who laid the beautiful Pavement we tread on? who divided and adorn'd the Chambers of the Spheres? who open'd the Windows to the light in the East? who encompass'd it with the immense vault of the starry Heaven hanging in the Air, and supporting it self? Could artless Chance build it? No man unless totally deserted of Reason can possibly have such a fancy. Let Reason judg how could the World be otherwise then 'tis, supposing it fram'd by a designing Cause? all things are dispos'd divinely, that is, by perfect Wisdom, as publick necessity and ornament require. What the Psalmist observes concerning the Heavens, is equally true of all the other parts of Nature, Their line is gone out, to signifie the exactness of their proportion. If this be the effect of Chance, what is the product of Design? Can Reason distinguish between things artificial, wherein the felicity of Invention appears, and things rude not done by rules in the works of the Hands, and can it not discover the manifest prints of Wisdom in the order of the Universe? How much more Skill is evident in the frame of the World than in all the effects of humane Art, so much the less folly would it be to attribute the most curious works of Art, than the production of the World to Chance.
Add further; The establisht order of the parts of the World is an argument that excludes all doubt, that 'tis govern'd and was at first fram'd by unerring Wisdom. For, if they were united by Chance, would they continue in the same manner one day? Is it not most likely that one of the innumerable possible combinations should succeed, different from the same tenor of things that is but one? especially if we consider that the parts of the World are never at rest: The Heavens, the Elements, mixt bodies are in perpetual motion. If Chance rul'd, is it within the confines of probability, that the Sun that runs ten or twelve thousand Leagues every day, should be now in the same part of the Heavens, where it was in former years in such a day, when there are so many other places wherein by Chance it might wander? Would the Stars keep a perpetual course regularly in such appearing irregularities?
Nec quicquam est tanta magis mirabilemole,
Quam ratio, & certis quòd legibus omnia parent;
Nusquam turba nocet nihil illis partibus errat.
Manil. lib. 1. Astrom.
Or would the sowing of Seed in the Earth certainly produce such a determinate sort of Grain? for the other possible mixtures are so vastly numerous, that it would be ten thousand to one but some other thing should spring up than what does. According to this Hypothesis, it would be greater folly to believe that the natural course of things should be the same this Year as in former times, than to assert that a Gamester should to day throw the Dice in the same order, and with the same points uppermost as he did yesterday. 'Tis evident therefore, that the Epicurean Doctrine having not the least shadow of Reason, had never been receiv'd with applause but as 'tis joyn'd with impiety.
2. Some attribute the rise and course of things in the World to the sole necessity of Nature. To this it may be replied.
1. 'Tis true, there is an evident connexion of Causes and Effects in the Celestial and Elementary World, whereby times and seasons are continued, and the succession of mutable things is preserv'd, so that Nature always consuming, remains intire. Though all vegetive and sensitive beings dye, yet the species are immortal. For the living are brought forth to succeed in the place of the dead. But the inquiring mind cannot rest here: for 'tis impossible to conceive a train of Effects one caused by another, without ascending to the first Efficient that is not an Effect. For nothing can act before it exists. The order of Causes requires that we ascend to the Supream, which derives being and vertue to all the intermediate. Thus Nature produces things from seminal Causes, that depend on things already in being. The Seed of Flowers and Trees suppose the Fruits of the Earth before growing, but the first Tree could not be so produc'd. To fancy an infinite succession of Causes depending one upon another, without arriving to a first, can only fall into the thoughts of a disordered mind. How came this Horse, that Lion in Nature? 'Tis by generation from another, and that from another, and so infinitely. How came this Man into the World? 'Tis because he was begotten by such a Father, and he by another, and so infinitely. Thus Atheism that rejects one truly Infinite Cause, is obliged to admit an Infinity in all things, an Incomprehensibility in all things. 'Tis therefore evident the efficient principles in Nature are from the sole power of the first and independent cause. They could not proceed from themselves; and that a most wise and powerfull Being is the original of all things is as evident. Is it conceivable that the insensible Mass that is called Matter, should have had an eternal being without original? whereas there is not the least imaginable repugnance in the Attributes of the first and highest Being, in whom all those Perfections concur, which, as proper to the Deity, are form'd in the mind in the idea of it, as his spiritual Nature, Eternity, Immensity, Wisdom, Omnipotence, &c. of which 'tis equally true, that no one either absolutely or relatively considered, involve a contradiction, that make it impossible for the Supream Being to possess it; Is it not perfectly inconsistent to attribute to Matter the lowest and most contemptible of all Beings, the highest and most noble Perfection, an Independent Existence? One may assert it in words, but not seriously without the utter deserting of Reason. Man incomparably excels this Matter, he understands it, and that understands not him, yet he has a derived being in time. 'Tis therefore necessary that that should have some cause of its being. But supposing the self subsistence of Matter from Eternity; could the World, full of innumerable Forms, spring by an Impetus from a dead formless Principle? Tis equally impossible that a blind Cause casual, or fatal, should give being and order to the Universe.
Besides, all subordinate Causes are sustained in their Beings and Powers by fresh influences from the first, and directed in their operations. To attribute the manifold Effects in the World to Second Causes working in a blind manner, without an Universal Intellectual Mover, that disposes, tempers, and governs them, is as unreasonable, as to attribute humane Works to the common Instruments of Art, without the direction of the Understanding that uses them. The Hand or Pencil has not skill to do any thing, but as it obeys the Mind, that gives it the impression of Art, and regulates its Motion. The Earth knows not the various Fruits that spring from it, nor the Sea its living Productions. And the Sun, though a more specious, is not a more intelligent and artificial Agent. Nature under another name is the ordinary Power of God, that by its intimate concourse with Second-Causes produces and supports things. And 'tis one of the considerable Wonders of his Providence, that the stream of perishing things, always emptying, is always full; there being a supply from the Fountains of continual Productions, of what is lost in the dead Sea: so that the World is always the same, and always new.
And from what hath been argued, we may judge how unreasonable it is to doubt whether there be a Principle in Nature of excellent Wisdome, because not seen in his own Essence: for if Reason compel us to acknowledg that the works of Art wrought by manual Instruments, proceed from an unseen mind that directed their motions according to the idea framd in it self, we ought more strongly to conclude there is a ‖foreign. Gal. de Opifice hominis.Divine Mind though invisible to mortal eyes, that contriv'd at first, and with knowledg performs all the works of Nature. To deny the Existence of a Being not subjected to our outward Senses, is equally of no force in both the instances. By the same Reason St. Austin confounds the Atheist objecting that he could not see the Deity. To whom he propounds this question, That since his Body was only visible, and not his Soul, why should it not be buried? And upon the reply, That the*Vnde scio quia vivis, cujus animam non video? Vnde scio? Respondebis, quia loquor, quia ambulo, quia operor. Stulte ex operibus corporis agnoscis viventem, ex operibus creaturae non agnoscis creatorem? quickning presence of the Soul was evident in the actions of Life perform'd by the Body; he truly infers, if a vital principle imperceptible in its self is discover'd by vital actions, the Deity, though by the perfection of his Nature undiscernable to our senses, is clearly seen by the light of his effects. And those who are wilfully blind, if God should by any new sensible effects make a discovery of himself, yet would remain inconvincible: For the arguments of his presence from extraordinary effects, are liable to the same exceptions pretended against the ordinary.