The Mischief of Impositions, Section 8
SECT. VIII. Philip. 3.15. Conſidered. How the Doctor rids himſelf of the danger of the Context. His ſecond Queſtion propounded, and anſwered like the former, that is, not at all: His Diſcourſe about Conſcience examined.
THe Author of the Diſcourſe was very apprehenſive that the Context would be urged againſt his interpretation of the Text, and therefore to ſave us a labour he has from thence formed an objection for us againſt his own Doctrine, which we thankfully acknowledge, and accept; whatever may be ſaid (ſays he) as to other Pleas, for their preſent practices, my Text (it ſhould have been the verſe before it) ſeems to afford the ſtrongeſt of all, that men are to be preſſed to go no further than they have already attained, and not to be ſtrained up to an Uniformity, beyond the dictates of their Conſciences; but to be let alone as the Apoſtle directs in the foregoing verſe, If any one be otherwiſe minded, he muſt be left to God, and that manifeſtation of his will, he will be pleaſed to give him.
This Objection to ſay truth is drawn up with as much integrity as we could well expect: For the Counſel for the Defendent is hardly to be truſted to draw up the declaration for the Plaintiff: One ſmall exception we have againſt his wording our Plea, and 'tis but a ſmall one: We ſay not, that men are not to be preſſed to go further than they have attained, provided they be only preſſed with ſuch Arguments as are proper for the conviction of Rational Creatures: For thus would our Bleſſed Savior have them preſſed, who was the grand exemplar of all moderation and meekneſs: Luke 14.23. Compel them to come in! foreign. And let tender Conſciences be thus compelled, and ſpare them not; we ſhall never complain of this force, this violence: But there is a more ſavage and ferine Method of Compulſion, like that of the Gentleman who courteouſly invied his poor Tenants to a Chriſtmas dinner by a Bum-bailiff, and Tickets of green-wax, which filled his houſe indeed with gueſts, but ſpoiled all the mirth of the Feaſt: A Hawk will never make a good ſign for a Dove-Coat: We would not have men preſſed and oppreſſed with Club-Logick, as a procedure unſuitable to the nature of Chriſtianity. And now we abide by the Objection; If God himſelf has given the Indulgence, what man has power to take off the Seal? or why ſhould the Church trouble it ſelf and others with doubtful Canons, when they that have not attained to ſatisfaction about them, have the condeſcenſion of God to plead for the ſuſpenſion of their own Acts, during ſuch diſſatisfaction.
Now this knot the Doctor will untie, or cut, or break. And the clearing of it (he ſays) will give a full anſwer to the ſecond enquiry, viz. what is to be done if men cannot come up to the Rule preſcribed?
But is not this very much about and about the Buſh? why ſhould he give himſelf the needleſs trouble to enquire ſo ſcrupulouſly what is to be done in caſe men cannot come up to the Rule, when the Apoſtle has already given us a ſhort, but plain anſwer to it? namely, that they are to be left to God for farther inſtruction. But the Doctor is not ſatisfied with this Anſwer, and therefore he will anſwer it in theſe particulars: Anſwer it? yes, juſt as he did the former queſtion, by ſpeaking never a word to it. Had he been pleaſed to have anſwered the Queſtion what is to be done? he ſhould have reſolved us, firſt, What means are to be uſed to reclaim them that cannot come up? whether fair or fowl? Chriſtian or barbarous? whether corporal penalties are to be ſuſpended, or the Diſſenters? whether they are to be left in Gods hands, or taken into the Gaolers clutches? Secondly, By whom this muſt be done, that is to be done? as what they are to do who are diſſatisfied? what courſe they muſt take to attain more knowledge of Gods mind and Will in that matter, that ſo they may enlarge their practice according to the improvement of their underſtanding? Let it not then be ill taken if we put a few queſtions about this Queſtion.
I. What muſt they do, to whom a Rule is preſcribed by Men about their worſhiping of God, who cannot come up to it? And ſurely if pride and intereſt had not muddied it, the Anſwer had run very clear: They ought to examine and try that Rule by the word of God, to beg of him inſtruction in any point wherein they may poſſibly be otherwiſe minded than he would have them: And in the mean time to forbear, for whatſoever is not of faith is ſin, that is, whatever a man does, and is not perſauded that it may be lawfully done.
II. What muſt be done by Church Governours, if men cannot come up to their eſtabliſht Rules? and thus much of the Anſwer is exceeding obvious.
1. That they had better ſit ſtill and do nothing, than riſe up, and do miſchief; Let 'em do no more harm than good, and let them be doing.
2. That if they muſt need have more work to do, let 'em be ſure they have a Commiſſion from God to do it, leſt while they do what they ought not to have done, and leave undone thoſe things they ought to have done, they make their ſins of Commiſſion greater than their ſins of Omiſſion. And,
3. They may do well, among all their doings to conſider whether Conſcience be not Gods peculiar, and ſo not within their precincts; out of their juriſdiction, and not liable to their citations, proceſſes, ſummons, and viſitations; if they will judge, let 'em be ſure they be competent judges: if they will be buſie, let 'em beware it be not in Alieno foro.
4. If they would know what they muſt do to others, let 'em firſt put the caſe what they would have done to themſelves? let them do no more at home, than they would have done to them ſuppoſing they were Proteſtants in Italy or Spain. It's very uſeful now and then for great men to put themſelves into poor mens circumſtances; (I do not perſuade 'em to change places with them, but to put caſes) ſuppoſe our Biſhops had been in Biſhop Ridley's caſe when his nearer approach to the fire had thawed his Epiſcopal Rigor, what would they have done? would they have magnified the mercy of their own mercileſs enemies for compelling them to walk farther than they had attained? or would they have called the Martyrs fools who upon their ordinary call preached the Goſpel, notwithſtanding that the laws had ſilenced them?
III. It had been much in anſwer to our expectation, and the Queſtion, if he had pleaſed to have revealed the great ſecret, what this preſcribed Rule is? and this would have been more pertinent, than a diſcuſſion of the principle of individuation, is to the ſixth commandement. As,
1. Whether this Rule be one preſcribed by God, it which caſe no mans ignorance will vacate the rule, though it incapacitate him at preſent to obey it; or by man, without direction and warrant from God, in which caſe, we need no ignorance to excuſe us, ſeeing power to command and obligation to obey, are Twins, both are born, live, and die together.
2. Whether this preſcribed Rule, be ſuch as is ſubſervient to ſome other Rule preſcribed by God, or no way uſeful to that purpoſe? We freely grant, that whatever is neceſſary to reduce any Command of God into Act, and Exerciſe, may be, muſt be the matter of ſuch preſcribed Rules; whatever ſerves true decency and order, whatever tends to edification, to peace, or the glory of God, may be fit matter for a Rule, but rules about things no ways neceſſary to theſe ends, come not under humane determination.
Theſe things, or ſomewhat like theſe, might have offer'd at an Anſwer to the Queſtion; but let us hear the Doctor, who, the Reader muſt obſerve, is not anſwering to the Queſtion, but to the Objection, which he would perſuade us will give a full Anſwer to the 2d Queſtion, but no man believes it.
§ 1. Then, This (ſays he) can never juſtifie men in not doing what they lawfully may do. This, What? why, that men are to be preſſed to go no farther than they have attained. This will not juſtifie men! I believe it will not, it was never intended to juſtifie them, but to reſtrain their acting, to excuſe 'em in ſuſpending their own Act till farther ſatisfaction; but it will not juſtifie them! Before what Judge, before whoſe Tribunal will it not juſtifie them? It will not juſtifie them before God, if through ſupine negligence in ſearching into the Will of God, about Sin and Duty, lawful and unlawful, they underſtand not the Bounds of their Chriſtian liberty, and yet even here the ſame God who condemns their ſinful ignorance, will not have them to give ignorant obedience: But what is this to mans judgment? who knows nothing more or leſs of mens negligence than they ſhall tell him? But what if he has uſed all due means to obtain ſatisfaction in the matters preſcribed, and yet cannot be ſatisfied but that either the things are ſinful that are commanded, or the Authority incompetent by which they are commanded, will not this juſtifie him neither? Then he muſt be condemned by men, but God will ſo far juſtifie him, that he ſhall not be condemned for acting no farther than his own light directs him.
This Propoſition of the Doctors he confirms by a Reaſon: For (ſays he) the Apoſtle makes Communion neceſſary as far as 'tis lawful, and that upon the general obligation that lies upon all Chriſtians to do what in them lies, for preſervation of the Peace of the Church. This Rule of the Apoſtle! I find indeed he lays down a Rule that we ſhould walk as far as we have attained, but no Rule that we ſhould walk up to the lawfulneſs of the things, but to what we have attained of their lawfulneſs; lawfulneſs is not the meaſure of our walking in this caſe, but knowledge. Things may be in themſelves lawful, but it only ſo, and no more, and a Chriſtian has not attained to ſatisfaction of their lawfulneſs, if he walks ſo far as he has attained, he fulfils the Apoſtles Rule, and pleads the benefit of the other to be left to God's inſtruction. But this is the Doctor's method to confound what is lawful objectivè, and what is ſo ſubjectivè, as if the Apoſtles Rule had been, ſo far as the things are lawful in themſelves, ſo let us all walk; when as he only requires us to walk ſo far as we have attained to ſee their lawfulneſs: And both the Apoſtles Rules do ſuppoſe that ſome things are in their own nature lawful, which are not ſo diſcerned by every Chriſtian, in which piteous caſe, he commands them to be left to God.
But ſtill he judges, that the Apoſtles Rule makes Communion neceſſary as far as 'tis lawful. I cannot help that! nor do I ſee that the Apoſtle intends to ſpeak any thing of the Communion of Chriſtians among themſelves; for ſuch Communion may be had and maintained under very great variety of apprehenſions and practices: if Churchmen would once learn to preach up Love, inſtead of Hatred; and preach down Perſecution, inſtead of Conformity to their own little Niceties. Now to make his Reaſon carry a fairer face of probability, the Doctor has cleverly corrupted his Text, as he has all along perverted the ſenſe, and reads it thus: As far as ye have attained walk by the ſame Rule, Do the ſame things; which looks very fairly to and favorably upon, our dearly beloved Uniformity; but he that rides of a trotting Horſe, will never ſpie ſmall faults. Do the ſame things; i. e. Let not one Miniſter preach with an Hour-glaſs, when another has none: nor one read Service in his Gown, when the other wears the Surplice. Let not one Chriſtian ſtand at Prayer, when his Neighbor kneels; but let every man do juſt the ſame things that another does, upon pain and peril that ſhall fall thereon: And all this goodly gear hangs on a Peg that is not worth a Pin, viz. the rendring foreign, Do the ſame things. When all the Apoſtle commands amounts to no more than this, That we ſhould do as he did, walk as far as we have attained, and preſs toward the mark, the ſame mark he aimed at, and leave others to him who delights in mercy, more than ſacrifice of his own appointment, much more than in Ceremony of mans appointment; and infinitely more than in Cruelty, which men have invented to ſhew their wickedneſs, but he has forbidden to demonſtrate his holineſs.
Now what pretty ſport would this make the Reader, if the Doctors Anſwerer were in the humor; Let us all do the ſame things! Very good! Will then they do as we do? not for a world! Muſt we do as they do? By what authority? Ne audiantur haec verba ego dico, aut tu dicis, ſed quid dicit Dominus? No more then of this, what they, or we ſay, or do, but what has God, the impartial Umpire, determin'd between us? Is what they do nearer the Rule? we will do it with them. If our practice come nearer the Rule, are they willing to become conformable to that Rule, though they be Nonconformiſts to that Rule which is more remote? Now all the fat is in the fire, and that will make a terrible flame!
Theſe Reaſonings the Doctor thinks to blow away with the breath of his mouth, and would perſuade us that we have attained already to a ſatiſfaction of the things preſcribed by their Rule, and therefore ought, in purſuance of the Apoſtle's Rule, to walk up to what is ſo preſcribed. I dare ſay, (ſo he goes on) if most of the Preachers at this day in the Separate Meetings were ſoberly ask'd their judgments, Whether it were lawful for the People to join with us in our Publick Aſſemblies, they would not deny it. But there's more cunning in theſe words, than every one is aware of.
1. I cannot tell what the Preachers at this day would anſwer, if they were ſoberly askt the Queſtion; but I doubt they never intend to do that, who put the Queſtion. A ſober Queſtion, deſerves a ſober Anſwer; and I have heard of a ſober, and compaſſionate Enquiry, that has been anſwer'd with more ſobriety, and compaſſion, than it deſerved: But the Queſtion now, is Snick or Snee? Turn, or Starve? Conform, or Hang? Uſe the Croſs, or bear the Croſs? And ſo we once heard the Doctrine at a Viſitation Sermon, That in vain had the Parliament made Laws to turn the Presbyterians out of their Livings, if men did entertain them in their Houſes, and at their Tables.
2. If the Preachers in the Separate Meetings would thus anſwer the Queſtion, I ſhould much queſtion their wiſdom; for no wiſe man will anſwer a Queſtion, before he underſtands it: But is it lawful to join in the Parochial Aſſemblies? It may be lawful, and it may not be lawful: It may be ſo, to join with ſome Aſſemblies, and yet not with all: In ſome parts of Worſhip, not in others: It may be lawful to ſome perſons who judge it lawful (ſuppoſing it ſo to be) when yet 'tis not ſo to others, who have not attained to ſuch a judgment.
3. I have a confidence contrary to his, That if moſt of the Preachers in the Separate Meetings were asked their judgments (whether ſoberly, or madly) about the lawfulneſs of joining with the Parochial Churches in all the parts of Worſhip, or in any Excluſive to their joining with other Aſſemblies, where the Goſpel Rule is more ſtrictly obſerved, they would flatly deny it; and let theſe Men be brought to the Poll, I queſtion not but they will carry it; and I ſuppoſe that though the Doctor preacht in the Chappel, he never took the Poll of the Nonconformiſts in Guildhall.
4. Let the Queſtion be put, Whether the People may lawfully ſeparate from thoſe Churches whereof they are regularly Members, and from thoſe Paſtors under whoſe Miniſterial conduct their own free Election has placed them, to join ordinarily and conſtantly with any other particular Churches, and they, according to Reaſon and Scripture, will anſwer in the Negative.
And now the Doctor has ſuppoſed what he pleaſes, let him but now infer and ſurmiſe what he pleaſes too, and the day is his own.
(1) He infers, If the Miniſters judge it lawful, why do they not preach it in their Congregations?
Anſw. 1. They do not preach it, becauſe they do preach it; that is, ſo far as they judge it lawful, they either preach it, or print it; or partly preach, and partly print, as the Doctor did by his own Diſcourſe or Sermon.
2. Some do not preach at all, becauſe Chriſt has found them other, and better work to do, than to preach up Ceremonies, wherein they themſelves not being ſatisfied, are very unfit to give ſatisfaction to their people: And if we ſhould tell the people how far they are bound to comply with an eſtabliſht Rule, at that rate the Doctor has anſwer'd the Queſtion, we ſhould leave the people as wiſe as we found them.
(2) The Doctor falls a gueſſing what ſhould be the Reaſon they do not preach this Doctrine to their people; why they keep it ſuch a ſecret in their breaſts.
1. He conjectures it may be for fear they ſhould have none to preach to▪ a vain conjecture, ſince they that preach moſt often, and open how far it's lawful to Conform, have the moſt numerous Congregations.
2. He conjectures it may be leſt they ſhould ſeem to condemn themſelves, whil'ſt they preach againſt Separation in a Separate Congregation; that cannot be it, for they that are locally ſeparated from all Congregations, may conſiſtently preach againſt Schiſmatical Separation from any.
3. He conjectures it may be They fear the reproaches of the People? Nor that neither! for they that judge their duty ſo to preach, ſo to write, do it without reproach of the more temperate, and fear not the reproach of them that are otherwiſe. But why do not our Diviners, and gueſſers at other mens corrupt intentions preach againſt the Notorious Crimes of thoſe that are their hearers? are there none but Diſſenters there to be railed at? have they none that live in open Adultery? none that are Common Drunkards, that for time of need could piſs out a ſcare-fire? Is it for fear they ſhould have none to preach to? or for fear they ſhould have no Pulpit to preach in? or be ſilenced, and not permitted a Tongue to preach? or is it leſt they ſhould Condemn themſelves, whilſt they preach againſt the crimes of others? or do they fear the reproaches of the people, that they are half preſbyterians, ſemi-fanaticks▪ parboyled puritans? I think its time for men to have done with theſe evil ſurmiſings, we have ſomthing more concerns us to judge of, than other mens hearts: when the Doctor Preacht to his auditory in Gods Name, yet he ſhould not have ſtept into Gods throne; but have left the thoughts, and intents of the heart to him, before whom they are open, and Naked.
I ſhall not here call over the Doctors particular inſinuations, which are ſo ſubtilly laid, that they do the miſchief, and inſtil all the poyſon of a falſe accuſation, but yet eſcape before men the charge of it: only I take notice of one thing; Is it not (ſaies he) as plainly written by St. Paul, If I yet pleaſe Men, I ſhould not be the Servant of Chriſt; as, Woe be unto me if I preach not the Goſpel? It is ſo with equal plainneſs by the Apoſtle, and with equal impertinency by the Doctor and with equal juſtification of the Nonconformiſts: for they dare not pleaſe men to the diſpleaſing of Chriſt, both which they would do, by ſacrilegious Deſertion of their Miniſtry: but Chriſts diſpleaſure is not to be compenſated by mens good will, nor his love to be forfeited for fear of incurring their ill will: And on whoſe ſide the temptation to men pleaſing moſt lies, the impartial world will judge though we be ſilent.
§ 2. His ſecond particular is this: If the bare diſſatisfaction of mens conſciences do juſtifie the lawfulneſs of ſeparation, and breaking an eſtabliſht Rule, it were to little purpoſe to make any Rule at all: And to ſpeak my mind freely, unleſs the Rules that have been made in ſome Countries were to better purpoſes, I know not to what purpoſe they were made at all; theſe Rules have made the world ſo irregular, and unruly: What their purpoſes were that made the Rules, I ſhall not enquire, but what we ſee or may ſay; the event of them for many Centuries has been nothing but either blind obedience in the moſt, or neceſſary ſeparation in the reſt: And much better that all theſe Humane eccleſiaſtick rules had never been made; than to be made of ſuch ſinful materials as muſt divide us, ſuch dubious things, as will perplex us, or by ſuch perſons whom God has not authorized to Command us. But his propoſition I muſt except againſt upon theſe following grounds.
(1) I ſhall not ſay, It is no diſtinct propoſition from the former, being only a Reaſon of it; nor that he might have found in his own diſcourſe twenty more propoſitions if this may ſtand for one; but onelyonly make my exceptions.
1. This propoſition like moſt of the reſt, is of an uncertain ſound. Firſt we know not what myſtery there lies in, or may lurk under that Term Bare diſſatisfaction. For this word has haunted us all along through the diſcourſe; Barely Congregational, p. 30. Bare ſuſpending Communion. p. 20. Barely relating to acts of worſhip. p. 17. And now at laſt Bare diſſatisfaction. If he means no more than ſuch diſſatisfaction, as has no fair reaſon for it, that perhaps will not juſtify any man, in any thing he does, or does not: but there is a diſſatisfaction, well cloath'd with decent, and Comely preſumptions that the thing it's diſſatisfied about is unlawful, and it may be with probable arguments too, though it wants ſuch demonſtration, cui non poteſt ſubeſſe falſum. And this will juſtifie if not poſitive ſeparation, yet ſuſpenſion of a mans action in poſitive Communion.
2. If bare diſſatisfaction will juſtifie our not acting▪ (which is all we plead bare diſſatisfaction for) there is another thing that juſtifies our Communion with other Churches where we may enjoy the Ordinances of Chriſt without ſuch diſſatisfaction: and that is the Command of God, which has made it our expreſs duty to walk in the ways of Gods appointment. So that if diſſatisfaction tye us up from joyning in one place; peremptory Command will enjoyn us to joyn in ſome other.
3. This eſtabliſht Rule, that fills up both pages of his Sermon, is an equivocal term; for ſuch a Rule may be lawful, or unlawful according to the matter of it: If the matter of it be things unlawful, there needs no diſſatisfaction of conſcience to juſtifie ſeparation from it, or the violation of it, the will of God has already determined that point: If it be lawful, and conſcience be diſſatisfied about it; conſcience will tie up from acting according to it, though not oblige to act againſt it
(2) His Propoſition is tardy too, in reſpect of the Reaſon he gives to back it. Becauſe (ſays he) it is impoſſible to make any [Rule] which ignorant and injudicious men ſhall not apprehend to be, in ſomething or other, againſt the Dictates of their Conſciences. But let knowing and judicious men make the Rules, and there will be leſs cauſe for ignorant and injudicious men to break 'em: They that will make Rules about indifferent things, had need have more than an indifferent Judgment, more than an ordinary Wiſdom to accommodate them to the meaſure of Knowledge of thoſe for whom they are made: And in this caſe Rules ſhould ſhould not be made as men make Tobacco-Pipes and Glaſſes, on purpoſe to be broken. Tradeſmen indeed cannot live if their Wares were Immortal; but are Church-men more afraid their Tickney-Rules and China-Canons ſhould be preſerved than broken? It were better the whole Fry of Apparitors, Summoners ſhould ſtarve than live upon the new-made Sins of the people. But ignorant men will apprehend theſe Rules againſt their Conſciences: Let then Rules be made for the knowing and wiſe, and leave the poor ignorants to live and grow wiſer, rather than knock 'em o'th' head becauſe they want Brains. But thus it was, thus it ever will be, whileſt men will be eſtabliſhing their own Rules of Severity, and neglect the Rule of Charity given them by the Spirit. Rom. 14.3. Let not him that eateth, deſpiſe him that eateth not, nor him that eateth not, judge him that eateth; which was a Rule made upon as good Advice as any of thoſe made by any Church at any time ſince.
Let then the Doctor pleaſe himſelf with his ſeeming Advantages from the Papers of accommodation, we need ſay no more than,
1. That the Caſe is hugely wide between what the Committee, or Sub-Committee there required of their Diſſenting Brethren, and what the Biſhops now require of the people in order to an Union.
2. That his Inferences are not fairly drawn from their Expreſſions.
3. The Aſſembly and their Committees were but men, ſubject to the like Paſſions with their Brethren, and therefore,
4. That we are not obliged to vindicate every expreſſion which in heat or haſte dropt from their Pens, nor to be concluded by their Determinations, which, with what has been before obſerved upon this ſubject, is enough to blunt the edge and break the back of the Doctor's Arguments drawn from their Conceſſions: And yet I cannot forbear a particular examination of ſome of them, for a taſte of the reſt.
(1) Though Tenderneſs of Conſcience may juſtifie Non-Communion in the thing ſcrupled, yet it can never juſtifie Separation: That is, he that has the Church-dores lockt upon him muſt ſtand there cooling his Toes, and never addreſs himſelf to others that are open, for fear of Mr. Hales his Scare-Crow, Separation. But for Anſwer,
1. We produce Tenderneſs of Conſcience for no other uſe than to juſtifie Non-Communion in the things that are ſcrupled.
2. We produce the Authority of God to juſtifie our Obedience to all his Commands, Statutes, Judgments, and inſtituted Worſhip.
3. We produce plain reaſon from thoſe premiſes to juſtifie our Churches: For if tenderneſs of Conſcience will juſtifie us in Non-Communion, and God's Command juſtifie us to Worſhip him according to his Revealed Will, we muſt of meer neceſſity ſeparate from a Church where we cannot have all the Ordinances of Chriſt, to another where we can.
4. We ſay, The Doctrine of the Sub-Committee, viz. That ſuch tenderneſs of Conſcience as ariſeth out of an opinion (cui poteſt ſubeſſe falſum) which may be falſe, is not a ſufficient ground, &c. to juſtifie Separation; and that of the A. B. Laud's, who would have all Diſſenters produce ſuch Arguments for their Diſſent, require more Evidence than our Learned Doctor will allow for the Exiſtence of a Deity.
This Point, by the way, I ſhall a little examine, becauſe I find it aſſerted in ſome of the Doctors ſtaple-Diſcourſes: I ſhall not cite his Irenicum, becauſe he has put that Piece amongſt his Tracts that are to be retracted, and ſeems weary of his Weapon-Salve, and will now truſt only to his Weapon. His Rational Account is not yet amongſt his prohibited Pieces. Now, p. 178, 179. he thus expreſſes himſelf, It is a piece of great weakneſs of Judgment to ſay there can be no certain aſſent where there is a meer poſſibility of being deceived; for there is no kind of aſſent in the human underſtanding, as to the exiſtence of any thing, but there is a poſſibility of Deception in it. And p. 206, 207. he calls aloud to the Papiſts to come forth with their infallible Arguments to prove the exiſtence of a Deity, before they talk of an infallible way of proving the truth of Religion: And ſurely the Diſſenters are not more rigidly obliged to prove the lawfulneſs of their Separation, nor the ſinfulneſs of the Terms impoſed on them, by Arguments which cannot poſſibly be falſe, than all Mankind is to produce ſuch infallible Proofs for the exiſtence of the Godhead.
Nay, further by what I can gather from the Doctor, he ſeems to proceed upon ſuch principles, as plainly render it impoſſible by any certain Argument to prove the exiſtence of a Deity. Orig. ſacr. p. 230. where,
1. He lays down this for a principle: That the foundation of all certainty lies in the neceſſary exiſtence of a being abſolutely perfect; ſo that unleſs I know that there is a God, I cannot be aſſured that I know any any thing in a certain manner. Now then if all certainty doth ſuppoſe the exiſtence of a being ſo abſolutely perfect, I muſt, before I can know any thing certainly, conclude that there is an infinity of knowledge, wiſdom, power, and goodneſs in this God.
If then God be the firſt knowable, and that it's impoſſible to know any thing certainly, Except I firſt know ſuch a being as God, how ſhall we come to prove his exiſtence by ſuch demonſtration cui non poteſt ſubeſſe falſum? ſhall we demonſtrate a God A priori? what cauſe ſhall we find of him, upon which, and from which our demonſtration may be formed: without a cauſe, we cannot demonſtrate à priori; And ſuppoſing a cauſe, we ſuppoſe him to be no God: Shall we then proceed à poſteriori, from the Effects to the Cauſe? The Apoſtle would have gone this way, Rom. 1.20. And from the creation of the world, have demonſtrated his eternal Power, and Godhead; but the Doctor has ſhut the door, becauſe we muſt firſt know there is an inviſible God, before we can certainly know there is a viſible world.
2. How then will the Doctor prove there is a God? why, he tells us, Orig. ſacr. book 3. cap. 1. p. 367, 368, &c. We muſt have recourſe to an Idea: A ſettled and conſiſtent Notion of a being that is abſolutely perfect, not (as he ſays) that there is any ſuch connate Idea in the ſoul, but that there is a faculty in the ſoul whereby upon the free uſe of Reaſon, it can form within it ſelf a ſettled Notion of ſuch a being, which is as perfect as it is poſſible for us to conceive a being to be. Well then we muſt form a Notion of God from the Uſe of Reaſon: But ſeeing that all the proceſſes of Reaſon are from things known to unknown, or from more known to leſs known, where ſhall we place our engine? where ſhall we fix the firſt foot of the compaſs? where muſt Reaſon begin? muſt we begin with the perfections of the Creatures, to argue our ſelves into a belief of that God that made them, and therefore muſt need contain all their perfections in himſelf? this is that the Doctor has renounced; for we muſt firſt be ſure there is a God, before we can be ſure there is any thing elſe: I would begin with a Flie, an Ant, a Muſhrome, and from thence I would gradually climb up to the first Cauſe, but the Doctor forbids us; for we have no aſſurance that there is ſuch a Fly, Ant, or Muſhrome, till we are firſt aſſured of a God: Muſt we then leave this way of reaſoning, and ſearch for ſomething before God, Co-ordinate with God? the danger is, leſt that which is before God, ſhould prove the true God; or if any thing be Co-ordinate with God, there will be two Gods, or none.
Now this being once the judgment of the Reverend Doctor, and confirmed by him in his Dialogues, p. 269. where he appeals to his Orig. Sacr. for this very thing, I hope they will never more expect fuller proof for the warrantableneſs of our Nonconformity, than they require to prove the exiſtence of God; and let them beware, leſt whil'ſt they trample upon Conſcience, where God has his Throne, they do not fight againſt him that ſits thereon, and ſo bring Heaven and Earth about their ears.
2. Another thing collected is, That it's endleſs to hope to give ſatisfaction to tender Conſciences; and therefore they reſolve never to begin. And is it not as endleſs to give aſſent and conſent to the Impoſitions, for who knows where they will end? By the ſame Reaſon they have impoſed theſe, they may five hundred; but if the Diſtemper be endleſs, why ſhould nor the Remedy? The Apoſtle Paul gave ſatisfaction to tender Conſciences, without ever fearing it would be endleſs. Men are for endleſs wealth, but not for endleſs trouble. Can any man think the primitive Chriſtians had only a Leaſe of the Rule for Indulgence, during the Apoſtles Lives, and that they muſt Fine for it ſmartly, when the next Generation came up. How much better had it been to have been left to reſtraint, and abſolute will during the Apoſtles times, with a reverſion of liberty after their deceaſe; than that the 14th Chapter to the Romans, ſhould be like the Ceremonial Law, to expire with the Apoſtles, and be buried in their Gra…es? There will be honeſt miſtaken Souls to the worlds end, whom Chriſt thought not too bad to redeem; and whil'ſt there are ſuch, the Church, unleſs She will be a Shrew, or a Stepmother, muſt take a tender care of them: But if it be ſo endleſs to ſatisfie theſe erring Conſciences, leave 'em to God, he can do it; and he will either forbear them, in their ignorance, or give them knowledge, whom it might become thoſe men a little to imitate, who call themſelves his ſervants.
(3.) That Scruple of Conſcience is no protection against Schiſm. Who ſays it is? It's only a Prohibition to afford Communion in what we ſcruple: Except when the things ſcrupled, and not ſcrupled, are ſo blended together, that we cannot ſwallow what appears lawful, but we muſt gorge that with it which appears otherwiſe; which has been the policy of ſome modern Impoſers, ſo artificially to mix the certain and the uncertain, the queſtionable with the unqueſtionable, that theſe ſcrupulous Conſciences cannot enjoy that wherein they are ſatisfied, except they will venture at that about which they are not ſo; ſo are Private Bills ſtitch'd with the Publick ones, that the more uſeful may ſell the other, which few elſe would regard: So have I ſeen idle Maſters delight themſelves to ſee their Children play at Bob-apple, where the poor young Raſcals would have been glad of a Bit, but were always prevented by the Candle.
(4) That the Apoſtles, notwithſtanding the difference of mens judgments, did preſcribe Rules of Uniformity. Well, but mark their proof; Did not the Apoſtles bind the burden of ſome neceſſary things on the Churches, albeit there were in thoſe Churches gradual differences of light? And will the Doctor infer hence a power to bind unneceſſary burdens upon the necks of Diſciples, becauſe the Apoſtles impoſed ſuch as were neceſſary? The Argument then concludes; If the Apoſtles, who were infallible, had power to impoſe Neceſſaries, much more may the Prelates impoſe Unneceſſaries, though they be fallible. But of theſe things thus much.
§ 3. Come we now to his third and laſt Propoſition, A wilful Error, or miſtake of Conſcience, doth by no means excuſe from ſin. Theſe things ſurely are oddly joined together; that a wilful Error, and a miſtake of Conſcience, ſhould be made the ſubject of one Propoſition: There may be a miſtake of Conſcience, where there's no wilful Error; wilfulneſs makes every Error double, obſtinacy being added to it; but a miſtake of ſimple ignorance, makes it not half ſo great, though it makes it not to become nothing: it may excuſe à tanto, though not à toto, and mollifie it a little, though not juſtifie it, nor nullifie it.
It will not excuſe from ſin! And yet p. 44. he moves this Queſtion, What Error of Conſcience doth excuſe a man from ſin, in following the dictates of it? If no Error will excuſe, why is the Queſtion put, What Error will excuſe? And if ſome Error will excuſe, why is the Propoſition laid down ſo looſely, and uncertainly? A wilful Error or Miſtake will not excuſe from ſin.
And upon this propoſition, he makes a caſe. If a man think himſelf bound to divide the Church by ſinful ſeparation, that ſeparation is nevertheleſs a ſin, for his thinking himſelf bound to do it: which is one of the wildeſt caſes that ever was put. For, 1. It may be juſtly queſtioned whether it be poſſible for a Man in his wits to think himſelf bound to divide the Church by ſinful ſeparation? A man may think himſelf bound to ſeparate; and that ſeparation may poſſibly be ſinful: but he cannot think himſelf bound to ſinful ſeparation. He that is bound is under a Law; He that thinks himſelf bound, thinks himſelf under a law: but it Implies a broad contradiction, for a man to think himſelf bound to ſin: becauſe that implies, that he thinks himſelf bound not to be bound; or under a law to be under no law. A ſort of men there are that think it lawful to tell a Lie, to avoid a great evil, to procure ſome great good. Yet none ever owned this principle that it was lawful to ſin, to procure the one, or avoid the other: but they pretend that to tell a Lie in ſuch a caſe under ſuch circumſtances is no ſin. 2. I very much queſtion whether ever any did think himſelf bound to divide a Church: he may poſſibly think himſelf bound to avoid it, but how ſhould ſuch a crotchet come in's head that he was bound to divide it: when the Church of England ſeparated from Rome, did they think it their duty, to make diviſions in it? 3. The inſtances that he gives are ſhort or wide of his caſe by many leagues: Paul thought himſelf bound to do many things againſt the Name of Jeſus: He did ſo, but not to do one thing that was ſin: The Jews thought themſelves bound in Conſcience to kill the Apoſtles: True! but yet they thought not themſelves bound to kill them ſinfully: they wanted not pretences to juſtifie the cauſe to the World, nor untemper'd mortar to daub over their own Conſcience; 'twas eaſie to ſay they were rebels againſt, traitors to the Emperor: An eaſie thing to cry out of hereſie, and ſchiſm, and ſects every where ſpoken againſt; nor wanted they a Tertullus who before the Magiſtrates and Judges could accuſe Paul for a peſtilent fellow, a mover of ſedition, and a Ring-leader of a ſect: ſo that all the world ſees and the poor diſſenters feel the Truth of what the Dr. ſays, men may do very bad things and yet think themſelves bound in conſcience to do them: 4. Its freely granted by all the world, that wilful error (that is, Interpretively ſuch, for no man can formally err wilfully:) does not excuſe from ſin: that is, what God has prohibited, no mans errour can make a duty; what God has commanded no mans errour can diſcharge him from obedience to it. Nor do we, or ever did we make Conſcience a ſtalking horſe for theſe ends.
And thus we have got through the three famous propoſitions, that ſhould have cleared up the objection, and ſo anſwered to the ſecond Queſtion: but what are we edified by all this diſcourſe? or how do we underſtand either what we, or Church governours muſt do, in caſe we, or others cannot come up to the eſtabliſht rule? men are not juſtifiable in not doing what they lawfully may do: well but if they ſee not that may be lawfully done which may ſo? muſt they be left to God or no? wilful error and miſtake will not excuſe from ſin: be it ſo! ſtill what muſt be done when men cannot come up to the eſtabliſht rule? I confeſs, I am juſt as wiſe as I was! but this is the Genius of the Sermon: He propounds an enquiry? p. 15. How far the obligation doth extend to comply with an eſtabliſht rule? He ſhuts one thing out of the Queſtion, then a ſecond thing out of the Queſtion; then excludes a third out of the Queſtion, and at laſt ſhuts the Queſtion out of doors, and it goes wandring up and down like a vagabond to this day: we never heard one rule to limit it: how far we are not bound; nor one aſſertion to explain it, how far we are bound, but as far as a man may conjecture by the Hum, and buz of the diſcourſe; we are bound to comply to the uttermoſt extent with every eſtabliſht rule: Again, p. 36. He enquires, what is to be done if men cannot come up to the eſtabliſhed rule? And he neither acquaints us, what we are to do: nor what the Magiſtrates are to do, nor what Church governours are to do, nor what the Rule is, nor who made it, but lays down a firſt, a ſ…cond, a third propoſition, and the Queſtion is gone for Jamaica, or Tangiere, and fare it well!
But yet under this laſt propoſition, there are ſome things contained which really deſerve our moſt ſerious Conſideration. As,
§. 1. He Infers from hence, that men ought not to reſt ſatisfied with the preſent dictates of their conſciences, for notwithſtanding them they may commit very great Sins. Much leſs then ought men to reſt ſatisfied with the preſent dictates of other mens wills, for notwithſtanding them they may commit very great ſins. Conſcience is more my rule then the dictate of of any Church: and if I ought not to reſt ſatisfied with that which God has made my next and immediate guide, I may the more lawfully examine their commands, which are more remotely ſuch. But I wonder what he would have men do? would he have us like the wandring Jew, ramble up and down for ſatisfaction, and never accept it? or to be always learning, and never coming to the ſtable and ſetled knowledge of the Truth! or proving all things, and never holding faſt that which is good? Muſt we be of the Pyrrhonian Religion, Academicks, Scepticks, Seekers? or ſhall we for two or three years be of no religion, that we may be more Impartial in our Enquiries which is the True? There is ſomething conſiderable in what the Dr. ſays, if he had made it out: If the Dictates of our Conſcience brand ſuch a practiſe for evil, which the generality of ſober, pious, and knowing Chriſtians recommend as lawful, or a duty. It will become us to be jealous, leaſt any baſe luſt have bribed our judgments to paſs a falſe verdict upon that practice; and ſo in many other Caſes, but in the mean time we muſt refrain, and not act contrary to our preſent ſentiments; and if there be any practice which appears to me to be a duty from the Scripture, in which I have found the preſence of God with me, and the bleſſing of God upon me thereby; I ſhall ſtudy to be more confirm'd in it, and reſt ſatisfied with my preſent dictates about it, till ſome remarkable thing awaken me to a jealouſie, that its not ſo clear a matter as I have ſuppoſed it.
§ 2. But the Doctor is afraid (and ſo am I) that the common miſtaking the Caſe of an erroneous Conſcience hath done a great deal of miſchief among men. I wiſh he would ſtate it better then, next time, leſt the next Edition alter the Title, and call it the Miſcheif of Miſtating the Queſtion! But where does the miſcheif on it lie? Oh, the Queſtion is generally put, How far an erroneous Conſcience doth ohlige! and if they that propound it in thoſe terms, anſwer it as the Doctor did the other, How farr we are bound to comply with an eſtabliſht Rule? It had better never been ſtated nor ſtarted than thus anſwered.
To come a little nearer to him! Is the Doctor ſure the Queſtion is thus generally put. How farr an erroneous Conſcience doth oblige? I am very confident, its oftner put, whether it do at all oblige or no? And they generally determine in the negative, Conſcientia erronea, ligat, ſed non obligat. It ties a man up from acting, or may urge him to act, but can neither oblige him to do what God has forbidden, or to omit what God has made a duty. The former becauſe we take the voice and countermand of Conſcience to be Gods voice, and he that is prepared to act againſt that dictate, though it be not the voice of God, yet ſhews he was really prepared to have acted againſt it, if it had been ſo: And though it be the will of God we ſhould do what he has commanded, yet 'tis not the will of God, we ſhould do it with a reluctant, and tergiverſating Conſcience: The latter becauſe there can be no power ſuppoſed to be given by God againſt his own Laws, Nor King, nor Keyſar, nor Kirk, nor Conſcience can make that lawful which God has declared ſinful, nor render that indifferent which God has made a duty.
And therefore after all this oſtentation of Caſuiſtical learning, the Nonconformiſts are perfectly unconcern'd, further than to clear up what he has perplexed in this matter, and in ſhort they ſay, 1. That A miſtaking Conſcience will tie up the Perſon from acting, with this difference, that where the thing is a duty, which Conſcience dictates to to be ſinful, he ought to refrain his act, but yet is not guiltleſs in the ſight of God: but if the thing be in it ſelf indifferent, Conſcience does not only lay an imbargo upon him and commands him not to ſtir one ſtep, one foot further, but will juſtifie him in the Aporetick poſture, againſt any power on earth, to whom he never gave a power to perplex Conſcience ſo far as to make that ſin, which in it ſelf is indifferent, and Conſcience judges ſinful. 2. They ſay, that where Conſcience dictates any thing to be ſinful which God has made a duty, though this erroneous Conſcience will not diſcharge the ſoul from the duty, yet the meaſure and degree of that ſinful forbearance is to be taken from, 1. The diligence or negligence which the miſtaken perſon has uſed to procure ſatisfaction in the mind of God in that perticular. 2. From the frame of the heart towards God in other caſes, and particulars, as whether he makes Conſcience of obeying God in thoſe things, which he knows to be duties. 3. From the continuance in that omiſſion: for the affirmative precept of God, which has made doing the thing my duty, though it alwayes obliges yet does not oblige alwayes to be doing it; and therefore a Conſcience, which chains me up from duty for a day or week, when perhaps in that revolution, the duty may not recur, is not of ſuch guilt, as that which fetters me up from acting for ſuch a time, wherein the duty has offered it ſelf frequently to my obſervance: I ſay 'tis not of ſuch guilt. I dare not ſay 'tis of no guilt; becauſe the ineptitude of the ſoul to have done it, if it had recurred in that ſeaſon, may be culpable.
3. They ſay an erroneous Conſcience can never make that to become either lawful or a duty, which God has declared to be ſinful: Becauſe the Authority of God is greater than that of Conſcience, and can never in any Caſe be ſuperſeded by it. And becauſe negative Precepts alwayes bind, and bind to forbearance at all times and in all Caſes (except there be a relaxtion in the Law it ſelf, which in ſuch Negatives, whoſe matter is not of its ſelf, and in its nature evil, there may be) ſo that what God has made ſin, ſo far as he hath ſo made it, the ſoul is tyed up for ever from doing it.
4. They ſay that an erroneous Conſcience may ſo perplex and entangle the Soul with its interfering dictates, either urging it to refrain as ſinful, what God has made a duty; where to refrain is ſinful, becauſe God has made it a duty; and to act is ſinful becauſe Conſcience repreſents it as unlawful; or preſſing to act where God has declared it to be ſin; in which Caſe to act muſt needs be ſin, becauſe God has prohibited it: and to refrain is ſinful, becauſe Conſcience tells the Soul it muſt act: And I know not what ſuch a miſerable Creature may expect, Except firſt, That God may pity it, though erroneous, if ſincere; For ſincerity is more in the ſight of him who deſires truth in the inward parts than Orthodoxy: and he ſees the general frame of the heart to be upright, becauſe it would omit nothing which it takes to be duty, though in the application of the general frame of heart to this or that particular practice it may be out moſt wretchedly. 2. That men ought exceedingly to pity an erroneous Conſcience, both becauſe they may need the ſame commiſeration, they may be tempted, they are of the ſame frail Conſtitutions, and obnoxious to the like infirmities, but eſpecially if that errour do viſibly ariſe from an evil Conſtitution of body, being naturally melancholick, or from evil education, where the Errour has been ſuckt in with the Mothers milk, or the general prevailing of ſome erroneous principle in the Age which has tinctured and miſled Conſcience, ſeeing its much more eaſie to ſcoffe, jeer, and revile at an erroneous Conſcience than to direct, inform, and heal it. And none are more unmerciful cenſurers of a miſtaken Conſcience, than they that never knew the worth of a truly tender Conſcience of their own.
When therefore the Doctor tells us. That Conſcience alters not the Nature of good and evil in things, that what God hath made a ſin, or a duty remains ſo, what ever a mans Conſcience doth judge concerning them: He brings us no new diſcovery; no extraordinary revelation, but that common doctrine of all Caſuiſts; all the fault of it is, That its impertinent to the matter in hand, for he is or ſhould be inquiring what Power Conſcience may challenge about an eſtabliſht Rule of Mans making, and ſuch for which they have neither general nor particular warrant from God ſo to make.
§ 3. The Doctor informs us, That the moſt material queſtion in the Caſe of an erroneous Conſcience is: What error of Conſcience doth excuſe a man from ſin? which was ſeaſonably remembred, ſince p. 42. He layes it down as a Rule, That willfull errour or miſtake doth by no means excuſe from ſin. If a miſtake will by no means excuſe, I wonder what error or miſtake can do it? He anſwers by an approved diſtinction, between involuntary Error, cauſed by invincible ignorance; and willful errour, when the judgment is formed by paſſion, prejudice, intereſt: Now that which I ſhall take notice of here, is only the explication of his Terms and Notions.
1. An Error wholly involuntary, is when its cauſed by invincible Ignorance, or after uſeing the beſt means, for due information of his Conſcience: Thus the Doctor has determined; and thus we aſſume: But the Errors of the diſſenters (if they be errors) in not complying with the controverted matters, are wholly involuntary, cauſed by invincible Ignorance not being conſcious to themſelves that they have neglected the beſt or any good meanes for the better information of their Conſciences; They have read the Scriptures, they have ſtudied the controverſies, as they have been ſtated by learned men both in the beginning, and progreſs of the reformation; they have managed friendly, and unfriendly debates, conferences, diſputations with men of all perſwaſions; they have earneſtly prayed to God not to ſuffer them to be miſtaken in a matter of ſo great moment, they have implored his direction, what he would have them to do or ſuffer, and ſee no reaſon hetherto to alter their judgments or practiſes, and therefore hope the Doctor will become their ſecurity againſt wilfulneſs of error; and that their Act, though it may be a fault in its ſelf (which yet they do not beleive) ſhall not be imputed to them as ſin. And now whereas formerly they would have been content, that any Act of theirs, if erroneous, might have been pardoned in the number of their ſins of ignorance, upon a general repentance, though there had been ſome guilt in it; The Doctor has exceedingly obliged them, and to their ſingular comfort aſſured them, that their Act (ſo qualified as before) ſhall not be Imputed to them as ſin: So that things are ſomewhat better with them then they looked for, and they will returne the Doctor their humble and hearty thanks, for his good Doctrine, which makes them need no Abſolution, where there is no imputation.
I only adde, that whoever pleads for mercy and Indulgence to an erroneous Conſcience (if honeſt and upright) muſt be preſumed to do it Impartially, and can be no Intereſt of his own, for no man can Judge his own Conſcience to be actually Erroneous; which plea ought to be accepted with Readineſs by all the Sons of Men, ſince no man can be abſolutely certain but he may have at leaſt in ſome particulars an Erroneous Conſcience: Nor yet will this deſtroy the diſtinction of voluntary, and Involuntary Error; for though no Error is formally voluntary, yet may it be ſo by Interpretation: that is, though he that miſtakes in any point of Doctine, doth not, cannot willingly erre, yet may be have contracted that error by ſuch ſinful courſes, that God will charge the guilt upon him as if he had willfully run into any other ſin.
(2) Let us therefore in the next place, hear the Doctors explication of a wilful error of Conſcience. If (ſays he) they form their judgments rather by paſſion, and prejudice, and intereſt, than from the laws of good or juſt Rules of Conſcience; if they do not examine things fairly on both ſides praying for Divine Direction, if they have not patience to hear any thing againſt their Opinion: but run on blindly and furiouſly▪ they may in ſo doing act according to their Conſciences, and yet be in as great danger of committing heynous ſins as St. Paul and the Jews were: which Doctrine of his being true in the main as it lies in Theſi, will need the leſs of animadverſion upon it: yet muſt I ſay. 1. That his disjunctive; [If they form their judgements rather by prejudice, then from the laws of God or other juſt rules of conſcience] inſinuates a piece of their Modern Divinity, viz. that there are other juſt rules of conſcience, then Gods Law, which is a Notion we cannot admit of without better evidence: we would gladly know where thoſe other juſt Rules are to be found? muſt we ſeek them in Canons, and Conſtitutions Eccleſiaſtical? whether then are all ſuch or only ſome of them ſuch juſt rules? If onelyonly ſome of them: which are they? and by what characteriſtical marks may we diſtinguiſh them? but if all be ſo; then muſt we acquieſce in all the Canons, decrees, reſcripts and Rules that were ever made by any Counſel or convocation; and why then did not the Church of England reſt ſatisfied with thoſe rules, which were given her before the Reformation? 2. We muſt needs ſay, that if the Diſſenters do examine things fairly on both ſides, praying for Divine Direction and have had a world of patience to boot, to hear any thing againſt their Opinion, though never ſo weak in Reaſon, and ſtrong in paſſion; (which they profeſs before the ſearcher of all hearts they have done, and continue ſtill to do,) they muſt be diſcharg'd before all the world that ſhall take cognizance of their cauſe, and hear their pleas, of any wilful or voluntary error: And for the ſuggeſtion that they form their judgments from prejudice, paſſion, and intereſt; they dare not judge of other men, contenting themſelves to have averred their own innocency, when the temptation viſibly lies on the other ſide.
§. 4. For a Concluſion: The Dr. would apply the charge of a wilfully erroneous Conſcience to the Diſſenters. If men (ſays he) through the power of an erroneous Conſcience may think themſelves bound to make ſchiſms,— to diſobey Laws, to break in pieces the Communion of the Church, they may ſatisfie themſelves that they purſue their Conſciences, and yet for want of due care of inforcing themſelves — thoſe actions may be wilful, and damnable ſins. But we think not our ſelves bound to any ſuch wickedneſs; There are enow that think themſelves bound t do that without our aſſiſtance; enow beſides us to perpetuate the cauſe of our diviſions, and to entail contentions upon Innocent poſterity whoſe teeth muſt be ſet on Edge with the ſowre grapes their Fathers have eaten; but if any ſhall think themſelves bound through the power of an Erroneous Conſcience to make unjuſt Rules of Conſcience, when tis Impoſſible they ſhould make one de novo that is juſt, and thereby break the Church in peices, they may think what they pleaſe, that they are purſueing their juſt rights to impoſe upon other mens Conſciences, and ſatisfying their own, and yet for want of a due care to inform themſelves better in their duty, the extent of their power, and the ends for which it was given, be guilty in the ſight of God of willful and damnable ſins, as bad as thoſe of the Jews, who thought they did God good Service, when they perſecuted, and murtherd his faithful Servants.