A Treatise of Justification, Book 6 · Chapter 5
CHAP. V. Of the Subject of justifying Faith.
§. I.
NOw I come to the Subject, that is, both the parties,The Subject of faith. to whom it belongeth; and the part of the Soule wherein it is. As touching the parties in1. The parties. whom it is, the Papists hold. First, that it is common to the godly with the wicked. Secondly, that it is common to the Elect with the reprobate. The former is the same in substance with that, which I have already handled, whether true faith may be severed from charity and other graces: the negative part of which question, I have proved, and consequently of this, that justifying faith is not common to the godly with the wicked. As touching the second, whether it bee common to the Elect with the Reprobate; Bellarmine aDe justi…. li. 3. cap. 14.propoundeth the Romish tenet to be this, fidem & justitiam non esse propriam elector…m, & semel habitam amitti posse: that faith and justice is not proper to the Elect, and that it being once had, it may be lost; which is the very question of perseverance, whereof I have written a full treatise against Bellarmine, proving that true justifying faith is proper to the Elect, and that being once had it is never lost, either totally or finally.
§. II. Now as touching the part of the soule, wherein justifying2. The part. faith is seated, Bellarmine and many other Papist… hold, that it is seated in the understanding onelyonly: and of us they report, that we hold it to be seated in the will onelyonly: which they doe report against their owne knowledge; knowing that wee hold faith to bee a perswasion of the minde and an assent, and finding fault with Calvin, for defining faith to be a kinde of knowledge, as it is indeed that kind of knowledge which we have by report or relation from God, grounded upon the infallible authoritie of God the relator: and finally, not being ignorant, that we hold the proper object of faith to be the truth. But we hold, that it is seated both in the understanding and in the will: and my reason brie…ely is this, because it is a voluntary assent, and is so defined, not onelyonly by some of the ancient Fathers, but also by the ancient Philosophers, who as Thcodore… bTherapent. li. 1. pag. 18.reporteth doe define it to bee foreign a willing assent of the soule. Th…refore, to beleeve is an act, both of the understanding, and of the will. Of the understanding, as it is an assent: of the will, as it is voluntary. Even as liberum …rbitrium, as it is arbitrium, belongeth to the understanding; and as it is liberum, to the will: not that we seate it in two divers parts of the soule, but onelyonly in the mind, that is the reasonable or intellectuall part, though it worketh upon the affections also. For the better understanding whereof, wee are to know, that when the holy Ghost is pleased to worke the grace of faith in the soules of any of the elect, which ordinarily he doth cRom 10. 14, 17by the ministery of the Gospell, he openeth their hearts as he did the heart of Lydia dAct. 16. 14.to assent to the Gospell: which he doth, first, by illuminating their understanding; and opening the eyes of their minde, that they may rightly conceive and judge of the doctrine of salvation: and secondly, by opening, as it were, the eares of the mind, and enclining the will to affect and embrace, what the understanding hath judged and approved to be true and good. The understanding therefore approving, and the Will (which is intellectus extensus, and ordinarily followeth the judgement of the practick understanding) embracing the doctrine of the Gospell, which promiseth salvation by Christ to all that beleeve: the mind, which containeth both these faculties, being thus opened by the holy Ghost, doth williugly assent to the doctrin… of the Gospell concerning salvation by Christ. Faith therefore is a voluntary assent of the mind to the promise of the Gospell; unto which, the acts of both the faculties of the mind concurre; of the understanding, to judge, that the thing propounded to be beleeved, is true and good. I meane, that the promise is true, and the thing promised good: of the Will, to accept and to embrace that for true and good, which the understanding hath judged to be such. Out of both which ariseth the voluntary assent of the minde, which wee call faith. This faith thus wrought by the holy Ghost, (the Spirit of regeneration) being lively and effectuall, worketh upon the heart and affections; which also being renewed by the holy Ghost, readily follow the willing assent of the minde, both to affect Christ, to desire to bee made partakers of him, to love him, and torest upon him for salvation: and also to dis-affect and to detest those things, which are repugnant to the Doctrine of the Gospel; the chiefe whereof is Sinne.
§. III. Now that the act of the will doth concurre to faith, andTestimonies, that to beleeve is an act of the Will as well as of the Vnderstanding. that faith, which is an habit of the minde, is seated as well in the will as in the understanding, is a thing testified by the Fathers, and confessed by the Schoole-men and by the Moderne Doctors of the Romane Church. And first for the Fathers: eStromat. lib. 5. p…g. 251.Clemens Alexandrinus, saith, that faith it the willing assent of the soule, and so Theodoret doth define it, fTherapeu…. l. 1. pag. 16.foreign.
Ambrose, gIn 2 Cor. 1. 24.Fides non necessitatis, sed voluntatis res est. Faith is a matter of will and not of necessity: therefore the Apostle saith, not that wee domineere over your faith, for dominion is cause of necessity: and againe, … to beleeve, or not to beleeve, it is an act of the Will.o …n Rom. 4.
Augustine iDe bono persever. l. 2. cap. 16.Grace therfore preventeth or goeth before faith: otherwise if faith prevent it, then also the will preven…eth it, quia fides sine volu…late …on potest esse, because faith cannot be without Will.
Againe, kDe Spirit. & litera cap. 31.what is it to beleeve but to consent that the thing is true which is said? consensio autemutique volentis est, and consenting undoubtedly is of him that is willing. Every lIbid. c. 3….man when he willeth, beleeveth; & cum credit, volens credit, and when he doth beleeve, hee doth willingly beleeve.
Voluntate mIbid. c. 33.utique credimus, verily we beleeve with our will.
nEpist. 23 de Baptism. parvulorum.Fides in credentium voluntate consistit, faith standeth in the will of the beleevers.
And writing upon Ioh. 6. 44. oIn Ioan. tract. 26.What say we here brethren, if we be drawne unto Christ, then wee beleeve against our wills. No, saith hee▪ A man may enter into the Church, nolens, against his will, hee may come to the Altar nilling, hee may receive the Sacrament, nilling, credere non potest, nisi volens, hee cannot beleeve unlesse hee bee willing.
And lastly, pDe predestin. sanct. lib. 1. c. 5. in sine. Schoole-men.in the elect the will is prepared of the Lord, that therefore belongeth to faith, qu… in voluntate est, which is in the will.
§. IV. Bonaventure: qIn Sent. 3. dist. 23. art, 1. q. 2. in res…l.it were not virtuovs to beleeve, if it were not voluntary ipsum velle credere est essentiale ipsi fidei, to beleeve willingly is essentiall to faith it selfe. VntoUnto the being of the vertue of faith, with the act of reason or understanding concurreth the act of the Will.
Faith rIbid.never should be a vertue, though it did enlighten the understanding never so much, if it did not also rectifie the will.
Thomas Aquinas sIn Rom. 10. lect. 2.writing on Rom. 10. 10. Signanter autem dicit, corde creditur, id est, voluntate, he …peaketh remarkeably, men beleeve with the hearr, that is, with the Will. For all other things which appertaine to the outward worship of God, … potest, a man may doe them nilling: sed credere non potest nisi volens, but none can beleeve that is not willing: for the understanding of him that beleeveth is not determined to assent unto the truth by necessity of reason, as of him that hath science, but by the Will.
Againe, t2. 2. q. 2. art. 1. ad. 3 um.Intellectus cred…ntis determinatur ad unum, non per ratione…, sed per voluntatem.
Credere uIbid. art. 9. c.est actus intellectus assentientis veritati divinae ex imperio voluntatis à Deo motae per gratiam.
Credere *2. 2. q. 4. art. 2. c.est actus intellectus, secùndum quod movetur a voluntate ad assentiendum: procedit autem huj…smodi actus à voluntate & ab intellectu.
Actus xIbid. art. 2. ad … um.fidei dicitur consistere in credentium voluntate: in quantum ex imperio voluntatis▪ intellectus credibilibus assentit.
Gabriel Biel, yI… Sent. 3. dist 23. q. 2. art. 1.the act of faith is to beleeve, which is an act of the understanding, assenting to the truth, proceeding from the command of the will, qui… nullus credit nisi volens, because no man beleeveth that is not willing▪ as Saint August…e zIn I…an. Doctors of the Rom. Church.teacheth.
§. V. Cardin all Contarenus aDe justif.actus fidei quam vis sit elicitus ab intellectu, est tamen imperatus à ….
Salmeron bIn Rom. 10. 10.Paul saith, men beleeve with the heart, to exclude fayning, with which many come to baptisme; and to shew, that faith which justifieth is commanded by the will: to note the difference of forced faith such as is in Devils, and was in those men, who beleeved in Christ, compelled by the miracles, but Christ cIoh. 2. 23.did not concredit himselfe to them, for such a faith doth not justifie. For as science is begotten by virtue of demonstrative reason: so faith is not demonstrated, but is undertaken by the virtue or power of the will captivating the understanding unto the obedience of Christ, who doth infuse it: wherefore Augustine tract. 26. in Ioan. other things saith hee a man may doe against his will, but none can beleeve, but he that is willing.
§. VI. Thus have I proved against Bellarmine, that to beleeve is anWhether the Vnderstanding be commanded by the Will. act of the will, as well as of the understanding; and that the seat of faith is neither the understanding alone, nor the will alone, but the mind which comprehendeth both. Howbeit, I cannot altogether subscribe to the judgement of the Schoole-men, and other learned men, whether Protestants or Papists, who teach, that the understanding is commanded by the will to assent unto divine truthes and that it doth credere ex imperio voluntatis. For I doe not conceive, how the will, which is intellectus extensus and followeth the judgement of the practike understanding, in so much that it willeth nothing, but what the understanding approveth and judgeth to be willed; how it, I say, should command the understanding. Neither doth their reason satisfie; which is this: that the understanding of man, in matters pertaining to Science, is determined to one thing by the evidence of the thing, or necessity of reason, not by the Will: but the understanding of man in matters belonging to faith, which sometimes surpasse the capacity of humane reason cannot be determined to any particular, either by the evidence of the thing, or by necessity of reason, both which are wanting in the objects of faith, which are things hoped for and things not seene. And therefore, say they, there can no assent bee given, unlesse the understanding be commanded by the will to assent. But I answere, as the ground of knowing things by Science is the evidence of the thing or necessity of reason: so the ground of beleeving things is the authority of God speaking in his word, which is infallible, and in certainty surpasseth the grounds of Science, and by it the understanding is determined to such particulars, as it conceiveth to be revealed of God. As therefore in things of science, which the understanding doth judge to bee evident, and of necessary truth, the will doth readily embrace them, following therin the judgment of the understanding: and so the mind which containeth both faculties, doth willingly, and yet necessarily, assent therto, moved therunto by the evidence of necessary truth: so in matters of faith, which the understanding, though it comprehends them not, yet doth judge infallibly true, moved thereto by the authority of God revealing those truthes; the Will, as I conceive, being captivated by the understanding, and submitting it selfe to the judgement thereof; the mind doth willingly, and yet necessarily assent to such truthes revealed by God, moved thereunto by the infallible authority of God speaking in his Word. Which in certainty of truth doth farre surmount all grounds of science: and doth captivate the understanding; and it the Will. Why therefore the assent to divine truthes which are grounded upon a most certaine and in…allible soundation, which perswadeth the understanding, should more proceed from the Will, than the assent to humane sciences, I cannot conceive, or why the Will should command the understanding in them, more than in matters of science.