A Treatise of Justification, Book 6 · Chapter 13
CHAP. XIII. Bellarmines second principall argument, that faith doth not justifie alone, because being severed from Love, &c. it cannot justifie.
De justis. lib. 1. cap. 14.§. I.
BELLARMIN… second principall argument is this:Faith being alone doth not justifie, ergo it doth not justifie alone. If Faith be severed from Hope and Love and other virtues, without doubt it cannot justifie: therefore faith alone doth not justifie. Answ. If the meaning of his consequent be this, therefore that faith which is alone doth not justifie: I grant the whole: for though faith doe justifie alone, yet that, which is alone, s…vered from Charity and other graces doth not justifie, as heretofore hath beene shewed. But though true justifying faith be never alone, but is alwayes accompanied with other graces, yet it justifieth alone: though it never be without other graces, yet it justifieth without them, &c. his consequence therefore I deny: which hee laboureth to prove thus: If the whole force of justifying were in faith alone, insomuch that other virtues though present, conferre nothing to justification: then faith might justifie as well in the absence, as in the presence of the rest: but that it cannot doe: therefore the force of justifying is not wholly in faith, but partly in it, and partly in the rest. Answ. This consequence also I doe deny, and doe referre you to the similitude of the eye heretofore propounded, which though it be not alone, yet doth see alone: and though whiles it liveth it cannot be severed from the other parts of the body, yet it seeth without them against which similitude Bellarmine might as well argue after this manner. If the whole force of seeing were in the eye alone, insomuch that the rest of the members being present, conferre nothing to the act of sight: then the eye might see as well in the absence as in the presence of the rest. But every body knoweth the inconsequence of this proposition. For though to the act of seeing other members doe not concurre with the eye, as any causes thereof; yet to the true being of the eye their presence is necessary, for it cannot be a true living organicall eye and instrument of sight, that hath not union with the other parts, and is not animated by the same soule. Even so I answere concerning faith: that although to the act of justifying other graces doe not concurre with faith, as any causes thereof: yet to the true being of faith their presence is necessary. For it cannot be a true lively justifying faith, which is severed from all other graces of Sanctification, and is not wrought and made effectuall by the Spirit of regeneration.
§. II. Now he commeth to prove the antecedent of his argument, viz. that conditionall proposition: if faith may be separated from hope and love and the other virtues, witho…t doubt it cannot justifie. But he unskilfully troubleth both himselfe and his reader with his conditionall proposition, which as it is not fitly made the antecedent of an Enthymeme: so is it not easily concluded. An Enthymeme is an unperfect Syllogisme, which is to be made up or perfected by adding that part of the Syllogisme which is wanting. In this Enthymeme, though the antecedent be a conditionall proposition; yet the proposition or Major of the Syllogisme, which also is conditionall, is wanting, and ought thus to be supplyed:
If faith alone doth justifie, then it may justifie being severed from hope and love and other virtues.
But it cannot justifie being severed from hope and love and other virtues:
Therefore faith doth not justifie alone:
In stead of this simple or categoricall assumption, he assumeth hypothetically, if faith be severed from hope and love and other virtues then without doubt it cannot justifie.
This assumption he endevoureth to prove by three arguments, but to no purpose. For though w…e doe constantly hold, that faith doth justifie alone: yet wee deny that faith being alone and severed from all other virtues, doth justifie either alone or …t all: and therefore to that faith, which is alone, we attribute lesse than the Papists themselves. But he will needs prove it: first, because faith according to our doctrine doth justifie relatively, and consequently faith and justice are relatives: ther fore where faith is, there must needs b… j…stice (he m…neth justice inherent) for one relative cannot be witho…t the other. This, saith he, o…r adversaries will admit willingly, who teach that by every sin… faith is lost.
§. III. Answ. We doe indeed teach that faith doth not justifie,Our answere. as it is an habit or gift inherent in us, or in respect of its owne worthinesse, but relatively, or in respect of the object which it doth receive. As the hand which receiveth the almes, releeveth the poore man in respect of the almes, which it doth receive. And yet I doe not conceive that therefore the hand and the almes be relatives. But we confesse, that justifying faith is not without his object: yet that object, by apprehen…ing wherof it … justifie rel…tively, is not righteousnesse inherent (as here Bellarmine against his owne conscience doth suggest) but the righteousnesse of Christ by which wee are justified: betweene which, and faith there is such a relation; that as justifying faith is called the faith of Christ, or faith in Christ, faith in his bloud: so the righteousnesse of Christ by which wee are justified is called the righteousnesse of faith. And further I confesse, that whosoever is justified by righteousnesse imputed, is also in some measure just by righteousnesse inherent, though he be not justified before God thereby. But whereas he saith, that wee will easily admit this argument, that where faith is, there is also inherent justice, and consequently that justifying faith cannot be severed from other virtues, because wee teach, that by every sinne faith is lost: I doe much marvell at his impudency: for though he and his consorts doe wickedly teach, that by every act of infidelity faith is lost: yet wee are so farre from granting, that faith is lost by every sinne, that we confidently hold, that true justifying faith is never totally or finally lost, by any sinne whatsoever that is incident to the faithfull and regenerate man. Some indeed have taught that by hainous offences, which doe vastare conscientiam, waste the conscience, faith is lost: yet that is farre from saying, it is lost by every sinne.
Secondly, againe, saith he, if faith doth justifie relatively, then it cannot be in a mans minde, but justice also must be there, and without love there is no justice. Answ. Without love there is no justice inherent, but that is not it to which faith when it justifieth hath relation, but that which faith having justified us bringeth forth in us as a consequent of justification.
Thirdly, moreover, saith he, if faith severed from all other virtues doe justifie alone, then it may also justifie being accompanied with those vices which are contrary to those virtues. But this cannot be imagined, that a man should be justified, and yet remaine a wicked man. Answ. If by vices he understand certaine vicious dispositions, which though they doe not reigne in the faithfull, yet remaine in them as their infirmities: I confesse, that justifying faith may and doth stand with such. But if he meane the contrary habits of sinne, which reigne in the hearts of the wicked and impenitent sinners; I professe, that justifying faith cannot stand with such. For where these doe reigne the man is wholly unregenerate: and where regeneration is not, there faith, which by regeneration is wrought, cannot be. It is therefore against the nature and being of a true justifying faith, to harbour in a soule unregenerate.
§. IV. To this argument he saith we answere, that they assume thatBellarmines proofes that faith may bee alone. which is impossible, viz. that faith may be alone: which I beleeve not to have beene the answere of any of our Doctors, for a man arguing foreign, may suppose that which is impossible, and yet the argument be of no lesse force. But our assertion that faith cannot be alone, which before I have made good in the second Chapter of this booke, and defended against Bellarmines objections, Chap. 3. hee laboureth aDe iustif l. 1. c. 14 § sed haec responsio.here to take away by three reasons: first by cavilling with Luther, and Calvin. First, bIn Gal. 2.Luther saith, that faith justifieth both before and without Charity. I rejoyne: it justifieth before, because in order of nature it goeth before: without, because, though Charity be present with it, yet it justifieth without it: even as the eye, though the eare be with it, yet seeth without it. Secondly, cAntidot. ad conc. trid. sess. 6. can. 28.Calvin saith, that the seed of faith remaineth in the greatest falles of the faithfull, and therefore without Charity. I rejoyne: Calvin saith no more than S. Iohn doth, d1 Ioh. … … ▪that the seed of God doth alwaies remaine in those that are borne of God: which seed of God is, as well the seed of Charity, as of Faith, and both the one and the other remaine in the greatest fals of Gods children; as wee see in Peter, in whom, though he fell most grievously, in denying and sorswearing his Lord, yet the seeds, yea the habits of faith and love did remaine, as I have proved eDe persever. c. 10. §. 7.elsewhere.
Secondly, saith he, because our argument assumeth, not that faith may be alone: but that if faith did justifie alone, it would doe so though it were alon…: this reason doth not confute our assertion, that faith cannot be alone, but taketh away that answere which he falsely, I thinke, assigneth to us. But this consequence of his, I have denied and disproved.
His third reason, which is but the second to disprove our assertions, if it bee true, saith he, that true faith is never alone, then it is because faith begetteth those other graces, even as a good Tree bringeth forth good fruit. And if this were so, then faith should goe before love and other graces, if not in time, yet in nature. But faith cannot be conceived to be in nature before justification, or justice infused, or those graces wherein justification consisteth, because these are relatives, as they say, God justifying and faith receiving justification: for relatives are simulnatura, &c. Answ. The relatives that we meane, are Christs righteousnesse imputed of God, and faith apprehending, or receiving it, which though they bee simul natura in respect of the one to the other, yet both of them are before the other graces in order of nature. But if justifying faith be before charity, and there be no righteousnesse without charity, then (saith he) the same man may be just, and not just at the same time. Answ. It followeth not. For though in order of nature faith be before love, 1 Tim. 1. 5. yet in time they goe together. Neither is that such an absurdity as he imagineth, that the same man, at the same time, should be a sinner in himselfe, and righteous in Christ: a sinner according to the Law, because he hath broken it; but righteous according to the G…spell, because in Christ he hath fulfilled the Law. Christ being the end of the Law fRom. 10. 4.to every one that beleeveth: Insomuch that every one that beleeveth in Christ, is reputed as if he had fulfilled the Law. Lastly because saith he, it is false which they hold, that faith cannot be severed from Charity and other virtues: and this he taketh upon him to prove in the next gDe justif. l. 1. cap. 15.Chapter: unto which I have fully hLib. 6. cap. 2. & 3.answered in the second question concerning the nature of faith.