The Wonderful Workmanship of the World, Discourse · Chapter 24
The. xxiiii. Chapter. Why there was darkneſſe vponupon the face of the ſame mole, and matter.
S.
BUt why was there darkeneſſe vppon the face of the ſame confuſed mole, and matter?
M.
Uerely, to the intent that the infinite vertue, wiſedome, and power of the true God might thereby the more plainly appeere, who out of ſo confuſed a male, and ſo many impediments concurring, hath ſo ſoone, and by his ſo greate force brought foorth ſo beautifull an order of all thinges, yea, when there was no meane at all exiſting, but rather the cō trarie, to diſtinguiſhe and ſet foorth the ſame with all: as S. Paule ſheweth in the 2. too the Corinthians, the 4. chapter, and 6. verſe: for all thinges are wount to bee diſtinguiſhed in the light. Wherfore, beeſides the confuſion of the mole, darkeneſſe alſo was an impedimēt vntounto God. How then did God woorke, and diſtinguiſhe theſe thinges, when there was darkeneſſe? Doubtleſſe by his greate and almightie power. For the darkeneſſe ſpecially augmenteth the horrour of ſo greate a confuſion, and doth cauſe that the diſtinguiſhing and diuiding of theſe thinges ſeemeth to bee a woorke altogether impoſſible. For, if ſo bee that vntounto that which is confuſed and intricate, darkeneſſe alſo bee added, all hope and meanes of opening and cleering the ſame is taken away: that whoſoeuer ſhall diuiſe in his minde the meanes whiche the Lord toooke firſt in hande to create & diſtinguiſh this world by, the ſame may cauſe it not onelyonly to ſeeme to bee a woorke full of difficulty, but alſo of great impoſſibilitie. And whoſoeuer ſhall behold the beautie and fourme of the world, as it is now diſtinguſhed, will iudge that this woorke was framed and made of principles and partes very wel digeſted and ordered, and that there was light firſt beefore there was any other thing made.
S.
Is there any iniury doone vntounto God, who being moſt wiſe, moſt good, moſt perfect, moſt beautifull, is ſayde notwithſtanding too hauehave created this firſt matter ſo confuſed, who both could, and as it ſeemeth; ought, euen in the very beeginning and at the firſte moment hauehave made it diſtinct and beautifull?
M.
Uerely the Manichees were deceiued in thinking ſo vnaduiſedly, and marking ſo fondly. Yea, and the Valentinians alſo their Patriarkes for this cauſe were deceiued. For, beeing led by their owne wicked thoughtes in this kinde of argument, they ſayd, that this world, and the firſt beginning therof, were the matter, fruite, and effect of a certein foule imperfection & ignorance in God, and not the woorke of a wiſe God or woorkman, whiche can not bee read without horrour and trembling. Againſt whom, Father Ireneus writeth cloquently and ſharply in his 2. booke, and 3. chap. But now that I may anſwere, and alleage that which belongeth to this queſtion: I ſay, that the Lorde, who made all thinges to the intent hee might make the ritches of his glorie and power knowne, would ſpecially reueale hymſelf in creatyng the world by this meanes and maner, and by vſing the ſame to that purpoſe. Wherefore, like as it was the parte of a moſte wiſe God, to finde out and chooſe the way that he thought moſt conuenient to reueale himſelfe: ſo is it likewiſe our duetie too allowe, reuerence, and adore the ſame that hee hath choſen. For faithe ought to bee the rule and leader of our mindes to vnderſtande theſe woorkes of God by, whiche vnleſſe wee followe, wee ſhall conceiue nothing holſomly or profitably in all this whole woorke of God, bee it neuer ſo wide and beautifull. For as it is writen in the 11. chapt. and 3. verſe to the Hebrues: By faith we vnderſtand that the world was made. And therefore wee ought not to followe the reaſon of our owne braines in defining theſe matters.
S.
But doth not this mention whiche is made of darkeneſſe, which was ſpread ouer the firſt matter, cōfirme Ariſtotles opinion concerning priuation, whiche hee maketh to bee the thirde beeginning of all naturall thinges, in his 1. booke of Phyſikes?
Fye, awaye with this Priuation, as a dreame or dotage, in reſpect of a beeginning of the world. For how can a Priuation, whiche is nothing, bee called the cauſe of a thing? as though a man would defend that fyre were the cauſe of cold. Moreouer, Ariſtotles Priuatiō ſticketh faſt infuſed in the matter: but the darkneſſe whereof Moſes ſpeaketh, was without the bodie of the matter, and brought no commoditie to the taking of a fourme, which Ariſtotles priuation doth: yea, the darkeneſſe rather tooke away al hope of receiuing fourme, ſo that Ariſtotles opinion is quite repugnant to Moſes.