The Wonderful Workmanship of the World, Discourse · Chapter 7
The vii. Chapter. The ſubiect of the knowledge of Naturall Philoſophie, is a creature viſible and that can bee ſeene: and firſt how farre and in what reſpect the worlde is a certaine vniuerſalitie vntounto them all.
S.
I HaueHave alredy learned what natural Philoſophie is, and how manifolde, from whence alſo it is to bee learned, likewiſe what is the truthe and certentie of this knowledge, and what bee the endes therof: I praie you wade now more deepely into the matter, and declare vntounto mee what is the obiecte of this ſcience, about whiche it is buſied.
M.
I wyll doe ſo, and that willingly.
S.
Then tell mee, what is the matter of this arte and knowledge?
M.
A creature, and not eueryevery one, but that onelyonly whiche maye bee ſeene, that is to ſaye, the ſame which maye bee perceiued by ſome one, or by all our bodily ſenſes.
S.
Howe prooue you this?
M.
Eſpecially by two places of holy Scripture, whereof the firſt is in ye 1. chapter to the Romanes, and 20. verſe, where Naturall thinges are called viſible creatures, and are diſtinguiſhed from thoſe things which in the ſame place are tearmed, vnuiſible. The other place is in the Epiſtle to the Hebrewes, the 11. chapter, and 3. verſe, where the ſame thinges are called, ſuch as may bee ſeene. Althoughe that whiche is written in the booke of wiſedome the 7. chapter, the 17. 18. and 19. verſes, and the 13 chapter, and 2. verſe, may expound and confirme the ſame, if it bee ioyned to the places aboue recited.
S.
Declare theſe thyngs more at large.
M.
This therefore it is, whiche I ſaie. Not eueryevery thyng whiche ſubſiſteth, and whiche the Greekes dooe call, his ſumthing, doeth apperteine to the handlynge of naturall Philoſophie. For God ſubſiſteth, who hath not onelyonly ſome beeing, but the ſame alſo moſte true and an abſolut ſubſtance: and farther, I would adde alſo, if I maie bee ſo bolde ſo to ſpeake, a nature alſo, (for what ſhall let mee to ſaie with S. Peter in his 2. Epiſtle, the 1 chapit. and 4. verſe. The diuine nature, or, The nature of God?) the declaration and diſcourſe cōcernyng whiche, is to bee ſought by an other Arte, and whiche is of more price and dignitie than this is. For God is the Creator and maker of thynges, & not a creature and made. And the force and nature of creatures, is onelyonly conſidered of in this ſcience and knowledge.
S.
Yea, but is the knowledge of eueryevery creature conſidered of herein?
M.
No, not ſo. For Angelles are a kinde of creatures, but they belōg not vntounto natural Philoſophers, although, it bee cōmonly ſaied by all men that thei hauehave nature, and this kinde of phraſe alſo is vſually found among the Fathers, to wit, The nature of Angels. Of which nature therfore Moſes entreated not in al that whole fyrſt chapter of Geneſis, although in the ſame hee hauehave moſt breifly comprehended the whole matter of Naturall Philoſophie.
S.
But in the ſame firſt chapter he hath intreated of darneſſe, which thinge ſurely can not bee ſeene, and yet it belongeth to this ſcience.
M.
You iudge well for indeede it belongeth to the ſetting foorth of the nature of things, but by accident, as they call it, for neither the meanes of gatheringe togither the lighte, neither of other the firſte thinges coulde bee plainely declared, vnleſſe they were ſette foorth by their contraries, or priuations. For darkeneſſe, as it is a meere priuation, doth not properly of it ſelfe beelonge to this art: but ſo farre foorth as it poſſeſſeth an vſe and place in the nature of thinges, and hath declared the power of GOD to bee the greater in the creation of this worlde, it is very well mencioned of by Moſes. Of all which matter, wee will ſpeake more hereafter.
S.
Gather therefore nowe togither ſuch thinges as you woulde, and what you hauehave proued.
M.
Since then, neyther God, neither the Angels, doe appertaine to the Naturall Philoſophers, and to this our preſent diſputation: it remaineth, that the matter of this knowledge and ſcience bee ſaide properly to be that creature which may bee ſeene, and hath a place as S. Auguſtine ſpeaketh, and hath a body, and is ſubiecte vntounto our ſenſes, all, or ſome of them.
S.
But the Philoſophers, almoſt all of them, are of another opinion: For they thinke that ye ſubiect & matter of this Art, is that thing which is mouable in that reſpecte that it is Moueable, not in reſpecte that it is created, or ſubiect vntounto our ſight.
M.
It is true. But therein they erre doubly. The fyrſte errour is, that foraſmuch as the ſignification of Motion is verie large, accordinge to their owne opinion, that it may alſo bee extended to the Angels, ſince manye times alſo they moue from place to place at Gods commaundement, and indeede are fallen from theire fyrſt originall, (hauinge ſuffered no ſmall chaunge not onelyonly of their place, but alſo of theyr nature:) ſurely the diſputation concerninge them were a parte & that proper of the ſcience of Naturall Philoſophie, which notwithſtandinge they doe very ſtoutly, and that alſo verily & in deed dency. And this is theyr firſt erroure. The ſecond is that the knowledge of Naturall Philoſophie doth not beelonge vntounto the thynges which wee ſee, if ſo bee any of them bee vnmouable, as thinges that neither periſhe nor are changed. Which, ſince it hath hapned vntounto man for ſinne after his creatiō & perfect nature: truely, according to their opiniō neither ſhould mā before hee had ſinned, for the moſt part of him hauehave ben a ſubiect of natural Philoſophie, neither ſhoulde the treatie of him hauehave appertayned to Naturall Philoſophie. Which thing, howe vntrue it is, it appeareth out of the ſayinge of S. Paule: who will hauehave althings that may bee ſeene with our eies, to belong to this our knowledge, & to the ſcience of Naturall Philoſophie, and to bee a ready and apte meane and degree, to the knowledge of GOD. It appeareth alſo by the ſame place, that the nature of man, while hee was pure and had not yet ſinned, is by Moſes reckoned amonge Naturall thinges. It appeareth moreouer, out of ſundrie Pſalmes, that Man and the nature of man, as it was firſt created by God is moſt truely numbred among the kindes of Naturall thinges: as in the 8. and 104. and 139. Pſalmes. the 13. 15. and 16. verſes: and alſo in the 148. Pſalme. To conclude, they that make The mouable bodye to bee the ſubiect of this ſcience, what other thinge go they about, but to teache that there bee two ſubiectes of one Art, to wit, the bodie, and his motion? when as indeede one arte ought to hauehave but one ſubiect.
S.
Why then doe Naturall Philoſophers define and determine thoſe thinges which they call Naturall by Motion eſpecially?
M.
Firſt, bicauſe al their knowledge is gathered, as they tearme it, from that which is latter, not from that which is fyrſt. For things then began to bee knowne when they were once extant, and by meanes of mans tranſgreſſion were made mortall, that is to ſaie, were by GOD appointed vntounto miſerie and deſtruction. For when they were deſtitute of Gods woorde and light, they perceiued not nor ſaw, what manner ones they were firſt created. Wherefore, when they began to bee buſied in theſe naturall things which are now corrupted, they perceiued their great and perpetuall chaunges, ebbinge and flowinge, and inconſtancie in abidinge in one eſtate, and they iudged that Natural things ſhould bee ſuppoſed of accordinge to that their owne condition. Moreouer, ſeeing that Motion and chaunge may moſt eaſilie and generally bee noted in all theſe things which wee ſee, and which are in this worlde: it was an eaſie matter to diſtinguiſh and determine Naturall thinges by their motion. There is motion truely in all naturall thinges, and alſo in other which are not Naturall, as in Angels: where by it cummeth to paſſe, that Natural thinges cannot properly bee ſeparated and diſcerned from things not Naturall by Motion.
S.
Why do you call a thing, Natural, bicauſe of it owne nature it maye bee ſeene and perceiued?
M.
Bicauſe, foraſmuch as God hath created two chiefe kindes of thinges to his owne glorie, as S. Auguſtine teacheth verie often, the one is viſible thinges, the other is inuiſible, which is to bee ſeene in the 1. chapter of Geneſis, Moſes in his treatice of Naturall Philoſophie, hath cōprehended and handled but one kinde, to wit, of viſible thinges onelyonly, and thoſe things onelyonly doth the Scripture acknowledge for the Natural thinges. Wherefore Naturall thinges are to bee defined, as wee hauehave ſaide, in that they bee viſible. As for inuiſible thinges, and ſuch as cannot bee ſeene, whether they moue or moue not, they are reuoked & reduced to another kinde of Art as thinges that are not Naturall. And to confirme this my ſayinge, I coulde alleage the aucthorities almoſt infinite of the auncient Fathers, S. Baſile. S. Chriſoſtome S. Ambroſe. S. Auguſtine, but what ſhoulde that neede in ſo euident a matter?
S.
I vnderſtande theſe thinges: and as I perceiue, this is your iudgement and opinion, that all thoſe things are properly the matter and ſubiect of the Art of Naturall Philoſophie, whiche are the creatures of GOD, and ſubiect to our ſenſes, and maye bee beeholden, or ſeene.
M.
You ſaye true.
S.
Nowe therefore, define euerie one of theſe, to the end that this whole diſputatiō may proceed in order and methode.
M.
I will doe ſo.
S.
What is a creature?
M.
It is euerie thinge which is neither of it ſelfe, neither hath bene euer, but was once made, yea and that by GOD. Thus doe the learned ſaye, and that truely in my iudgement.
S.
But S. Paule to the Romaines, the 8. Chapter, and 20. verſe, ſeemeth to hauehave taught otherwiſe, to wite, that a creature is that thinge which is ſubiect to vanitie, corruption, and ſeruitude by reaſon of ſinne: which deffinition alſo S. Hillarius followeth in his booke of the Trinitie.
M.
You remember it well. Howbeit S. Paule doeth not in that place define what a creature is generally, and of it ſelfe, but what it is now after ſinne, and ſo farre foorth as was thē neceſſarie for the argument which hee had in hande. Wherfore, hee had reſpect then vntounto one kinde of creatures onelyonly: Neither doth Sainct Paule define a creature by it owne true nature, but only by the qualitie and accident which indeede is in it, and which hapned vntounto things after they were created, that is to ſay, after they were once made creaturs, but as hauinge nowe loſt their full and perfect nature in parte, by reaſon of mans tranſgreſſion. Which alſo may bee anſwered vntounto him, whoſo ſhall obiect againſt vsus the ſayinge of S. Auguſtine in his booke againſt Felicianus, the 7. chap. A creature is the ſubſtāce of eueryevery corruptible thinge, made by the will of God, out of that which is not yet, or was not ſumtime, ſo far as the nature of the thing wil permit.
S.
You thinke then, that it maye otherwiſe bee defined more commodiouſly and more truely, generally what a creature is.
M.
Yea verily: For neither ſhould the bleſſed Angels bee truely called creatures, neither wee our ſelues, (if ſo bee that Adam had continued in his firſt ſtate of integritie) hauehave bene truely tearmed creatures, if the latter definitions were reteined: for wee ſhoulde hauehave beene incorruptible, and without all vanitie. Finally, the fleſhe of our Lorde Jeſus Chriſte ſhoulde not rightly be called a creature, as it is oftentimes called by S. Auguſtine, and the trueth it ſelfe beareth record, that it was a creature. For of it owne ſelfe it might hauehave beene voide of all infirmitie, bycauſe it was free from ſinne and corruption, neither was it ſubiecte to death for it owne ſinne: although notwithſtandinge wee confeſſe, that Chriſt died in the fleaſh. Wherfore, whoſoeuer ſtubburnly impugneth y• whiche wee ſay, ſhall fall into all maner of abſurdities. So that thys which wee hauehave alreadie alleaged, and which wee folowe in this place, is the moſt true and ample definition of this woorde, creature.
S.
Nowe then by your definition, is that to bee called a creature, I meane the eſſence of the thinges themſelues, and alſo their vertues and properties, togither with their accidents? as for example, in a man ther is a certayne eſſence, which conſiſteth in the body and ſoule: there is in him alſo a vertue & property whereby hee reaſoneth, woorketh, feeleth, mooueth & walketh. There are moreouer certeine accidentes which are exiſtinge and vnſeperable partes in eueryevery particulare man, whiche doo diſtinguiſh & ſeparate the ſame man, makinge hym to differ from other particulare perſons of the ſame kinde, whiche in the Schooles are called indiuiduall Conditions. Theſe are alſo neceſſarie and exiſting partes vntounto the ſame particulare perſons whereby they liue, as place, time, coloure of the face, ſtature of the body, with other ſuch like: whiche by reaſō of their eſſence, Logicians call accidents. Wherefore I demaund this queſtion of you, whether you cōpriſe vnderunder the name of a creature, thoſe three kindes of thinges, to wit, the eſſence of the thing, the propertie, and accident, which, as you ſee, are diſtince one from another?
M.
Yea truely. For whatſoeuer was by GOD firſt ingraffed within thinges, or by courſe of nature is ioyned vntounto them, or whatſoeuer was by him created in this great vniuerſalitie of all thinges, whether it bee a ſubſtāce, or called an accident, I tearme a creature. Although Moſes hauehave onelyonly or ſpecially handled and entreated of thoſe kindes of thinges whiche are ſubſtances, and ſo in deede are called, which onelyonly I confeſſe principally and of them ſelues to belong to a Naturall Philoſopher. And whatſoeuer hath not proceeded from him, but is made by the art of man, or by him wrought, or by his miſcheiuous or peruerſe will added, that I call not a creature of GOD, no not a creature at all. For there can bee no creature, but that which is made by God, who is the onelyonly creator.
Wherefore, the handie woorkes of men, their deuiſes and inuentions, which ſometime are very excellent, ſhall not beelong vntounto this arte: no not y• ſinne of man, but by accident, and in reſpect that by meanes thereof ther is a great alteration wrought in the fyrſt & pure nature of thinges, which at this preſent appeareth in all thinges, but ſpecially in man, who is the moſt beutifull woorke of God.
S.
Howe doe the Grecians tearme a creature?
M.
They call a creature Ktiſis: although the woorde amonge the Grecians ſignifieth not onelyonly the thinge that is created, but many times alſo the verie woorkinge of the creator, and ſometimes likewiſe the condition of the thinge created as it nowe is, and as wee ſee it.
S.
Theſe thinges I vnderſtande. But what meane you by this woorde viſible, when you ſaye a viſible creature was the ſubiect of Naturall Philoſophie?
M.
Not that onelyonly which maye bee comprehended by the ſenſe of the eies, as are ſubſtance, light, and coloure, (although this woord viſible ſeeme properly to ſignifie the ſame,) but what ſo euer elſe may bee knowne and perceiued by anye other ſenſe of the bodie, as by feelinge, hearinge, ſmellinge, and taſtinge: as ſmell, ſounde, ſweete, or ſoure, &c. And all bodily thinges are eſpecially tearmed viſible, for that our ſight is ye moſt certaine, moſt excellent, and moſt noble of all the ſenſes of our bodie: and for that alſo the actions of eueryevery lyuinge thinge, and the argumentes whereby we perceiue them to bee aliue, are chiefly gathered by ye ſence of ſeeinge, as moouing, and breathinge. Finally, that bodily thinges are more exactly diſcerned by the eye, than by taſtinge or hearinge: ſo that to ſaye, that a viſible creature is the matter and ſubiect of Naturall Philoſophie, is as much as to meane, that wee wold hauehave eueryevery creature whiche is ſenſible of it owne nature, to be the true & proper obiect therof: whether the ſame be bodies, as are the ſubſtaunces of thinges: or whether they bee not bodies, as are the vertues, properties, qualities, motions and actions, which vntounto all corporall thinges by nature and their firſt creation and beeginning either cleaue vntounto them without, or are engraffed in them within. All theſe kindes are, as I hauehave ſayd, naturall thinges, and created by God.
S.
I Underſtād theſe things. But tell mee now, by how many maner of meanes doeth a Chriſtian Naturall Philoſopher handle and conſider of theſe creatures?
M.
OnelyOnly twoo waies: the firſt, to wit, as they are all generally conteined in one, and all comprehended as it were, within the compaſſe of one bodie whiche incloſeth them all, which is called the world. Or elſe euerie one in his kinde, which are ſundrie, wherein the creatures are diſtincted, and ſeperated one from another. Whiche the particular Hiſtorie of the creation in the ſix dayes, ſetteth downe vntounto vsus.
S.
How prooue you that?
M.
In that the Scripture many tymes reciteth vntounto vsus all thinges created and viſible, vnderunder the name of the world: as in Iſay the 38. chapter, and 11. verſe: Iohn the 1. chapter, the 9. verſe; and the 9. chap. the 39. verſe. And many tymes the Scripture reciteth them diſtinctly and ſeuerally, thereby the more to ſet foorth the wounderfull wiſedome of God, as in the 104. and 147. Plalmes, and 8. verſe, and the 149. Pſalme. Wherfore wee muſte alſo entreate of them after both theſe manners, that ſutch thinges as may bee gathered & learned out of theſe creatures apperteinyng to the knowledge of God, and ſetting foorth of his glorie, according as the Scripture teacheth, may bee by vsus abundantly vnderſtoode, ſo that at the length wee may beecome perfect Chriſtian naturall Philoſophers.
S.
With whiche of theſe twoo Methodes muſt wee firſt beegin?
M.
Euen with that treatice, which propoſeth vntounto vsus all thinges generally comprehended in that one bodie, which is called the world.
S.
And why with that?
M.
Bicauſe, that way of teaching is more generall, and more eaſie. For whole thinges are better knowne than their partes: for a man ſhal with more eaſe beehold an whole houſe, than bee able too diſtinguiſhe or comprehend in his minde euerie part thereof. And moreouer, that whiche ſhalbee ſaied concernyng the whole world, wil open vntounto vsus the way and entrance too the handling of the particular kindes of thinges. For it ſhalbee as a foundation to the reſidue that ſhall enſue.