Against Human Ceremonies in Gods Worship, Part 2 · Chapter 2 · Section 5
SECT. 8. & 9. Concerning Mr. BRADSHAW his argument, wherby he proveth our Ceremonies to be esteemed, imposed, and observed, as parts of Gods worship, viz. because they want nothing to true, or right worship of God, but only a right efficient cause, or author.
1. THe 8. section was neglected by the Repl. as conteyning nothing but affirmation on one side, and negation on the other. This omission (sayth the Rejoynder) was for advantage, because (forsooth) here the Def. his assertion was clearly set downe, namely, that our Ceremonies are not imposed, or observed, as proper, essentiall and necessarie parts of Gods worship.
But 1, If this had been a clear explication, yet seeing we meet with it, and handle it in a hundred severall places, before, and after, litle reason had the Rejoynder to suspect advantagious craft, in passing by the same termes in this one place. 2. Ther is no clearnesse at all in heaping up termes, without any explication of them. 3. When these termes, proper, essentiall, necessarie worship are now expounded, by the Rejoinder to mean nothing else but worship specially commanded of God, the sense is so absurde, that it was for his advantage, if they were omitted. For what answer is this: men appointing Ceremonies of their own making, doe not say that they are specially app…inted of God?
2. The argument was thus formed by the Repl. Those Ceremonies, which have the kinde, nature, and definition of worship belonging to them, so that they want nothing but a right author, to make them true worship, those are in their imposition and use, worship, and for want …f a right author, false worship. But our Ceremonies are …uche. Ergo. Here the Rejoynder first complayneth againe, that the terme Reall. is left out of the assumtion, into which it was put by the Def. But 1. who gave licence to the Def. for to put new termes into our arguments? It is not true, that he put any suche terme into the assumtion, but onelyonly mentioned in the title of this section. 3. Except suche a ridiculos sense be put upon this terme Reall, as was even now observed, of prop…r essentiall, ne…essarie, it may be understood both in the proposition, and in the the assumtion also. For if the kinde, nature, and d…finition of worship doe agree to our Ceremonies then they are not onelyonly verball worship, in some fashion of speache (as the Rejoynder distinguisheth, but reall worship.
3. VponUpon occasion of that scorne which was cast on the authors of this argument, viz. that this learning never saw print before, as the Def. thinketh, Mr. Bradshaw was named, as a man not to be slighted for his learning, who had longe since put in print, without receyving any printed answer, unto it, or the booke wherin it was conteyned. To this diverse thinges are rejoined, not worthy any answer, but that they tende to the disgrace of a godly learned man, whose memorie is worthy of all honour. 1. Mr. Bradshaw is ranked amonge discontented persons. Which imputation if it be understood of distentment for want of preferment, or great living, could hardly have lighted upon any man in England, whose course and conversation would more beat it off then Mr. Bradshaws did, in the consciences of all indifferent men that knew him.
2. His tracts of indifferencie, and worship are styled litle Pamphlets, suche as doe creep in the darke, and are hard to be seen of men that walked by day light. This is (up and down) the language of great prelates, when Goliah-like, they confute their adversaries with scorning of their litle stature, and ignoble state. But the Def. or Rejoynder might have put that litle pamphlet into the belly of a whale, by setting it forth with a large confutation, in folio, and so also have helped it from creeping, to some kinde of riding on horsebacke.
Neyther is it harder for day-light men, to see suche treatises, though thrust by their commaund into dark corners, then it is to open their mouthes for to aske after them, and then their eyes to looke on them. Howsoever, if this be a sufficient answer, then what shall become of many litle bookes for instruction, and helpe, dispersed by good men amonge the Papists, where publicke authoritie doeth make thē to keep thē selves in a litle cōpasse, & to creep in the darke, for fear of being apprehēded by the inquisitours day-light walkers? Mr. Bradshaw was made for accurate, short, & mere logicall fashion of writing. So muche appeareth out of other treatises of his: as that of Iustification. For to have drawen forth him unto large wordy discourses, it had been as hard, as to confine wordy men, unto the accuratenesse of mere logicall dealing.
3. Because the learning of this argument was derided by a Bishop, the Repl. doubted not to aequal Mr. Bradshow, for his skill in framing of an argument, unto any of the Bishops. To which the Rej. answereth, that this is no more praise to him, thē it is for a Carpenters boy, to drive a pinne as well as his Maister. Which might be admitted for true, if ther be any Bishop, that may in this kinde of learning be Magister ejus. Howsoever, it is not to the purpose, except the Maister carpenter, may deride his boy for driving a pinne, which is as well driven as he himself can drive any.
4. The Rejoynd. raiseth up a report, without shewing from whome he receyved it, that Mr. Bradshaw reversed his owne opinion of thinges indifferent. Which untill it be some other way confirmed, then by an adversaries bare telling, and that in a humour of disgracing his person, it must be accounted a mere tale. But he had good reason to reverse his opinion (sayth the Rejoynder) because against all reason and sense, he resolved that ther is nothing indifferent.
If this were so as it is related, reason would perswade to some recantation. But it is onelyonly the Rejoynder his telling againe, without any shew of proof.
I, for my part, can finde no suche wordes in Mr. Bradshawe his treatise, neyther any thing from whence suche a raw sentence may be reasonably collected. He concludeth in deed cap. 3. that ther is no absolute indifferent thing. 1. e. evereway, as well in order of nature, as of morallitie. He affirmed also cap. 7. ther is nothing actua…ly indifferent, which is not potentially good or evill, and cap. 8. ther is no action of mans will so indifferent, but the doeing therof, by some circumstances, may be evill. Ther is no action that a man can doe, by the power of his will, that is meerly and absolutely indifferent. These passages come the neerest to that which is here fathered upon the treatise: in all which this cruditie appeareth not: ther is nothing indifferent. Nay the harshest of these assertions, may be found not onelyonly in litle Pamphlets made by Carpenters boys, against learning and sense, but in great volumes, written by those that goe for very learned, and sensible in suche matters as this is. Thomas Aquinas, in the great booke, called his Summe, prima secundae, q. 18. ar. 9. hath this conclusion:Humanū actū …ndividuo consideratū ex deliberata ratione procedentem, vel bonum esse, vel malum, necesse est. It must needs be that every individuall act of man (proceeding from deliberate reason) is either good or bad. And all (or allmost all) those which have written upon that place, doe confirme, and defend the same, who yet were men, that in questions of suche a nature, did not usually write against all learning and sense.
4. At lenght, we have leave given, to examin the Argument it self: but with this remembrance, that is not like to be very sound, which all this while came into no mans head, ti…l Mr. Bradshaw rise up. But who tould the Rejoynder that it never came into any mans head before? though if that were true, the soundnesse may be likely enough.
Many reasons have been in other mens heads, which never came to the knowlege of our Def. and Rejoynder. And he is immediatly tould, that it is for substance in every one of our Divines, which hath written of worship: because they all, teaching that the common nature of worship required no more, then that it hath the honoring of God for the direct ende of it, they adde, that if this be according to Gods commandement, it is true worship, if not, false. And the Def. was urged to shew one instance to the contrarie. The Rejoynder is made, 1. by repeating over the emptie termes, of in it self proper, essentiall, reall, necessarie, etc. Which have been so often discovered to be nothing but termes, that it were an idle tedious buisinesse, for to insist upon them againe. Yet some few thinges may be observed, as proper to this place.
First we are tould here, that it is essentiall to proper essentiall worship, be it true or false, that it tende of it self, and immediatly, to the honour of God. So then we have the common nature of proper worship, as it is common to true and false worship. Now adde unto this that which is added, pag. 125.126. that this worship, if it be required of God, is true, if not, false. Now this being granted, our wholle Argument is granted, so farre as it concerneth proper worship. For by this confession of the Rejoynder it is plaine, that the institution of God doeth not make a thing proper worship, but onelyonly true proper worship, and the want of it doeth make proper worship false.
And this is all that we intende in this Argument, for which also we are twitted with new learning by the Def. pag. 185. where also he affirmeth that Gods institution doeth distinguishe essentiall worship from accidentall, and therin he is mainteyned by the Rejoynder as by and by we shall see.
But how can these thinges stand together Gods institution is first the specificall difference, wherby essentiall worship is distinguished from accidentall, and yet the specificall difference also wherby true essentiall worship is distinguished from false? Can any one thing be a specificall forme of diverse effects, or difference of diverse subordinate thinges, suche as essentiall, and true essentiall worship are? Can ther be ore and the same difference, betwixt a living and a livelesse creature, and also betwixt a reasonable and unreasonable living creature.
It is in the second place observable, how the Rejoynder seeketh to convey, or (to speak playnely) steal away from us, that which he had given. Divines (sayth he) doe distinguish proper worsh…p, from that which is after a sort so called, by immediat ende, and per se.
Be it so: this doeth not contradict any thinge here in question: and it hath been expounded before, in the head of worship. The Divines of Saxonie, and Wit…enberge, Vrsin also, and Zanchie are alledged for the same purpose, 1. e. nothing to the purpose, Of Vrsin and Zanchie, enough hath been spoken in the former section. As for the other, see how they agree.
It was required, that one of our Divines should be named, who handling the common place of worship, doeth not distinguish true worship from false, by this, that one is appointed of God, and the other not.
He bringeth in some Lutherans not fully consenting with our Divines, neyther treating on any common place of worship, but onelyonly writing a breif confession, teaching a difference betwixt lawfull rites of order, and proper worship, which we never doubted of. He taketh hold of those terms immediately, & of itselfe, by which (saith he) these divines distinguish proper worship from that which is after a sort so called.
But it is more probable of the places cited, that they rather distingu…sh worship (by those terms) from mere rites of order and decencie, which they doe never call worship, after a sort. Beside, of our Ceremonies, it hath been shewed, that their immediate end, is to honour God: in which respect also, the Rej. himselfe ranketh them under the head of immediate worship.
As for per se, or of it selfe, it may meane also as muche as ex opere operato, the mere work wrought. In which sense some Divines pronounce generally of all externall worship, that of it selfe, and in it owne nature, it doth not please God. Perkinse, in his Cases, lib. 2. cap. 6. Howsoever, to shew how the authors of these confessions did not esteem significant Ceremonies Crosse, Surplice etc. to be matters of lawfull order, those words of the Wittenberge Confession doe sufficiently declare. It is not lawfull for Bishops, to thrust upon the Churche, the Ceremonies of the olde law, etc, where come in the words quoted by the Rejoynder and immediatly after, these: Neyther is it lawfull, eyther to restore the olde Ceremonies of the law, or to devize new, to shadow forth the trueth allready layd open, and brought to light, by the Gospel: as in the day light, to set up candles, to signifie the light of the Gospel, or to carry banners and Crosses, to signifie the victoríe of Christ thorough the Crosse. Of which sort is all the furniture of Massing attire.
VponUpon suche groundes as these, the Rejoynder concludeth thus: Therfore the institution of God alone is that which maketh the same things to be worship truely, and really, which without suche institution, were no suche reall worship, though doen to the same ende, and in the same manner. But I know not how the terme truly, and then againe suche worship came into the question. Wee stand upon this, that Gods institution of worship, doeth make true worship, and denie onelyonly that it maketh that worship, which otherwise, or without suche institution, were no worship at all. How can then the Rejoynder be excused in confounding true worship, with reall worship in this conclusion? Now take away this intruded truely, and then let any man tell me, how this conclusion can be reconciled with those his principles of concerning worship, pag. 125? Any action doen to the honoring of God immediatly, and in that act it self, is proper immediate, externall worship of God. If God requires it not, then that worship is false. And even now: suche an act is proper worship of God, be it true or false. Proper and Reall to him are all one: and yet granting some proper worship to be false (for lacke of Gods institution) he denieth it to be reall worship, if it wante Gods institution: as if Gods institution did make that reall proper worship, which for wante of that institution is false worship.
This wilde conclusion is further confirmed by a reason out of Tilenus, which is answered before, in the head of Worship, and by one example out of Fenner, whome the Rejoynder is pleased to call our owne Maister. Where, I will not say, what kinde of men may (by like reason) beproclaimed his owne Maisters, but onelyonly desire him to consider, what reason he had, to avouche, that to hold the Ceremonies unlawfull, is a new tenet lately broached, contrarie to that which was helde in Queen Elizabeths days, whenas he accounteh Mr. Fenner our Maister in this doctrine, who had to doe in the first infamous silencing of Ministers for Ceremonies, in the beginning of D. Whitgifts Dominatinon? But what is that which is brought forth out of our own Maister? Nothing but this: that after publick worship, the people are to use a reverent gesture, as bowing downe the head before the Minister. Wherupon the Rejoynder demandeth, whether this adoration be essentiall, necessarie worship or no? and in what sense this respect of the Minister be by him called worship of …od? To which I answer 1. that I doe not finde it by him called worship of God at all 2. that it were a great absurditie for him to call a respect of man, worship of God, as the Rejoynder doeth. 3. that the adoration spoken of Neh. 8.7. from whence he tooke that observation, was proper essentiall externall worship. In this therfore nothing is founde to purpose.
One observation is added further by the the Rejoynder, namely, that diverse of our Divines doe make this part of the defini…ion of proper worship, that it be according to the commandement of God. To which I answer, that suche difinitions are to be understood of true and lawfull worship, even as those definitions of an oath, which require the true God to be sworne by, are to be taken of right and lawfull oathes onelyonly, because swearing by false Gods, is swearing, as all worshipping, of false Gods, is worship, though both unlawfull.
In the next place, answer is tendered to this reason of Mr. Br. The bare ratifying of the present use of any thing, cannot make it true and lawfull worship, if it had not be…ore some nature of worship in the use of it. The force lieth in this, that bare ratifying or authorizing of any thing to have that use which it had before without suche authoritie, doeth not change the physicall entitie, essence, or use of it, but onelyonly the authoritie, or legalitie of it. The instances brought by the Rejoynder to the contrarie, may have some shew, but have no force to that purpose. 1. The sole stampe of the King, makes that current money, which was not money at all before, but onelyonly used by way of bartery. In which comparison, he utterly mistaketh and varieth the qualitie wherin it consisteth. For on the one side, it standeth thus: If God should command and us to use our Ceremonies, after the same manner that we have used them, without his commande, they should be parts of Gods proper outward worship. On the other side it standeth thus: if the Kinge commande that peice of mettall to be used for current money, which before was not used so, but onelyonly for bartery, it should be current money. Here is no similitude, because no proportion of qualitie.
2. As the sole word of God, made living creatures of those that were not living, before, so sayth the Rejoynder the sole institution of God, makes that action to be true worship, which was before no reall worship at all, though used to the same ende, and in the same manner. But 1. the creating word of that which was not before in being, differs so muche from that ratifying word which presupposeth the being of the thinge ratified, that here is not so muche as a shew of proportion. 2. This is a direct contradiction to that which the Rejoynder teacheth, pag. 125. If any thinge be doen to the honoring of God immediatly and of it self, which God requires not so to be doen, it is proper immediate externall false worship. For hence it immediatly followeth, that nothing can be doen, to the same ende with true proper worship, but it must be proper worship, eyther true, if it be required of God, or false, if not so required. 3. The place of Sacrifice, before God had determined the particular place, though used to the same ende, and in the same manner, was not in it self any part of reall worship to God: and yet after Gods determination, it was. I answer. There was a great difference in the manner, wherin the place determined (so as it was) ought to be used. For ther was speciall mysteriall signification to be observed in the one, which was not in the other.
Otherwise, I see not what more reall worship ther was in Iacobs place of sacrifizing at Bethel, upon Gods speciall determination, Gen. 35. then in Abrahams sacrifizing at Hebron, without any suche speciall determination of God, Gen. 13.
When all other Essays faile, the Repl. himself is brought in as guiltie of contradiction, because he affirmeth these two thinges: the institution of God doeth distinguish true wo…ship from false: and yet it doeth not alter the common nature of worship. For (sayth the Rejoynder) it is as if one should say: the reasonable soule doeth distinguish man from creatures that have not understanding: and yet it doeth not alter the common nature of the creature. But the Repl. had answered this before, if the Rejoynder would have attended unto his wordes, as they are by himself set downe, pag. 189. alter the common nature of worship, that is, make that worship, which otherwise, being used to the same ende, and in the same manner, without Gods institution, were no worship at all. In which wordes he plainely expressed, that by altering the common nature of worship, he meant nothing lesse, thē making true worship of false, but onelyonly creating or making the common essentiall nature of worship. And certain it is, that the reasonable soule (as it is reasonable) doeth not make the common essentiall nature of a living creature, for then ther could be no living creature, without a reasonable soule as the Rejoynder affirmeth, ther can be no proper worship, without Gods appointment.
5. Against the Def. his invention of indifferent worship, it was excepted (to passe by repetitions) that no Scripture, Divines, or good reason doeth acknowledge any suche worship. The ground is, because in Scripture, all worship is eyther approved as good, or condemned as evill: all Divines doe distribute worship into true or false: and they have reason so to doe. To this the Rejoynder opposeth nothing but the contrarie assertion, grounded upon examples. 1. So farre (sayth he) as we may call the particularities of externall disposition, in the m…nner of worship, respectively t… their ende, worship, so farre may we call them indifferent worship: as kneeling, standing, bowing, or prostration, the place, and houre of worshiping, singing of this or that Psalme.
I will not here write over againe, that which hath been declared about these thinges in the head of Worship. But in breif thus: 1. The question is not, what this or that may be called, by a Rhetoricall trope, but what it is in the nature of it. 2. Respect to the utmost remote ende, doeth no more make matters of order, time, and place, worship, thē it maketh worship of eating, & drinking, and whatsoever we doe to the honor of God, 1. Cor. 10.31.3. In place, and howre, or in the election of one Psalme, before another, ther can no worship be placed, except we will make one worship to be worshipped by another, when it is timed, placed, and chosen. 4. Ther is no speciall worship in one of the gestures named that is not in the other. Neyther is any of these gestures so indifferent, as that it may be lawfull, to forbid, or refuse any of them, generally, and for all occasions, nor yet so, as that by circumstances (without any law or canon) they may become necessarie. These examples therfore serve not the turne they were brought for.
2. Ther is also (addeth the Rejoynder) an arbitrarie choise of essentiall Divine worship, as when we will pray or read, etc. where in respect of this libertie of choise, the kinde of worship is indifferent in some respect. Of which assertion I know not what to say: Necessarie worship is in some respect indifferent. Certainely that respect must make a worship, distinct from that necessarie worship wherof it is a respect: or else, as (by the Rejoynder his doctrine) all thinges in respect of their relation, are Ceremonies, and in respect of their utmost ende, worship, so all thinges, or at least all human actions, are also in some respect arbitrarie and indifferent. Ther is no ende, or bottom in suche reasons. The trueth is, that this when which is here spoken of, is one and the same thinge with houre which was mentioned in the former instance, and therfore needeth no new answer.
6. The Def. for proving of his assertion (that Gods institution doeth difference necessarie and essentiall worship, from indifferent and accidentall) did bringe in the instance of lambes for colour unspotted, which was necessarie and essentiall (as he affirmed) after the law, though before indifferent and accidentall.
To this it was first answered, that this law of offering lambes for colour unspotted, is no where exstant, and therfore that this instance was alledged eyther out of ignorance, or for want of due consideration. The Rejoynder being constreined to grant this exception to be just, turneth himself to those last words, eyther ignorance, or want of due consideration: and for them accuseth the Repl. of flying in the Def. his face, without Christian moderation. But if it be so great a crime, to impute eyther some ignorance or some inconsideratenesse (suche as no man alive is wholly free from) unto the Def. and if this be unchristian flying in his face, I am sure the Rejoynder hath gone beyoynd the face and stabbed deeper into our Vitals, in many passages of his Rejoynder.
As succedaneall instances to the former, which was found failling, the Rejoynder bringeth in diverse, out of the Leviticall, or Ceremoniall law, which were arbitrarie before the law, and necessarily essentiall after. To all which, the second answer to the failing instance, giveth direct satisfaction. As for those Rites, which are further alledged, out of the Legende of fabulous Rabbines, by Mr. Ainsworth, and ratified by the Rejoynder we regard them no more, then the Popish leaden Legendes. OnelyOnly the marginall conclusion out of these Instances is observable: The Repl. fallaciously supposeth, that all worship is onelyonly true, or false, not observing a subdivision of true worship, into substantiall, and circumstantiall.
For 1. what reason can he render, of that which he layeth upon the Repl. as if he had supposed all worship to be onelyonly true or false.
The Repl. never denied, but all worship is also good, or evill, internall, or externall, naturall, or instituted, etc.
2. The reason which he bringeth, is onelyonly from the subdivision of true worship. But that doeth not hinder a superdivision, or aequidivision, into common, and speciall, Ecclesiasticall, and domesticall, as Mr. Perkinse divideth in the place before cited. 3. That division into substantiall, and accidentall, cannot possiblie (with any reason) be more applied unto true then false worship, except the Rejoynder will say, that no false worship is eyther substantiall, or accidentall.
The seconde answer to the former instance (belonging to all those by the Rejoynder adjoined) is, that i… before the law, the same worship had been performed, with the same minde, that is, in the same manner, and to the same ende, it had been as essentiall worship, as after, though not so true, and lawfull.
The Rejoynder here first, observeth a contradiction to that which was formerly sayd sect. 6. worship doeth not varie, according to mens opinion. But if he understand the matter well, he shall finde both sayings well to agree. For though the want of some opinion doeth not varie the nature of worship, so as that the absence of this or that opinion, doeth make any externall worship, not essentiall: and yet it doeth so varie the nature of worship, as that the presence of some opinion, doeth (as an efficient, not as a formall cause) make some externall act essentiall worship. The Rejoynder his second observation is, that our Ceremonies are hereby discharged from will worship, and superstition, except it can be proved, the imposers, or users of them, doe holde, that God is better pleased with them, then without them, in themselves, or that they are as pleasing to him, as if he had commanded them.
The consequence of which heerby conclusion, no logician in the world can make good. Yet (taking out in themselves, as an intrusion) all the consequent part may be mainteyned. For if ther be any more good h…lde in the imposing and observing of them, then in the omitting of them, then God is better pleased with them, then without them. And that which is lawfully and justly commanded by men authorized therto, is as pleasing to God as if he had commanded it. Nay …t must be receyved, as commanded of God himself.
7. It was also by the Repl. brought into the Def. his remembrance, that matter, and forme doe usually make up the essence of thinges, and that to instituted meanes, a proper ende is also required, but a right efficient cause not so. About this, the Rejoynder sheweth himself perplexed. For 1. he answereth, that this notwithstanding, actions have as it were matter, forme and essence of accidentall, though not of essentiall worship.
Where he manifestly separateth the essence of worship, from essentiall worship, as if the essence of a man could exist without an essentiall man, 2. He gathereth from that which was sayd of respect to the ende, in institutiōs, that therby their assertiō, is cleared: viz. that Cer. respecting the honour of God mediatly, are not properly parts of Divine worship. As if here had been any mention or questiō, of mediatly, or immediatly, proper, or improper, and not onelyonly of essentiall. But for so muche as the Rejoynder would needs heer cite D. Abbot, for his terme immediatly, I would desire him to cōsider of the wholle sentence in that place pronounced by him, viz. Def. of Mr. Perk. pag. 844. Order and comlinesse (sayth the popish Bishop) is some part of Gods worship. But (sayth D. Abbot.) Who taught him this deep point of Philosophie, that an accident is a part of the subject, that the beautie, or comelinesse of the body is a part of the body? Order and comelinesse properly and immediatly respect men, and therfore can be no parts of the woship of God. If this be not a plaine refuting of the Def. and the Rejoynder their assertion, then none is attempted in all the Replie.
3. He in like manner concludeth, that every respect of the honor of God, doeth not make a thinge to be properly religious worship. As if the Repl. had ever spoken, or dreamt of suche a phantasie, except it were in the Rejoynder his name! His wordes are: beside the respect of the ende, is also required institution of means to an ende. What Paracelsian can draw so wilde an assertion, from suche a grounde as this?
8. It was (in the last place) demanded, whether, if the Temple of Ierusalem had been built, with institution of all the appurtenances, sacrifices, and observances, there used, without any Commandement of God, according as they were by his appointment, whether (sayth the Repl.) they had not been essentiall false worship, erected to God? The Rejoynder answereth: Yes no doubt, if we may call (as the manner is) essentiall disworship, essentiall false worship: eyther in respect of the thinges themselves, or in the opinion conceyved in their use. Now marke (all readers that have sense) how this Rejoynder (here in the conclusion of all) is constreyned to confesse, that to be true, which he hath hitherto striven against as false. 1. The Repl. his assertion was, that Gods institution doeth make that worship, which being used in the same manner and to the same ende, were otherwise no worship, or (as it pleaseth the Def. and Rejoynder to speake) no essentiall worship? The Rejoyn-hitherto hath contended against this, as against a great errour.
Now in the winding up of the wholle Argument, he confesseth, that some essentiall worship may be, without any institution of God. Certaynly, if this be so, then the institution of God, is not required to essentiall worship, neyther is it of the essence of essentiall worship, that it be instituted of God. 2. He affirmed before, pag, 125. that proper immediat, (or essentiall) worship are onelyonly suche thinges as God hath to that ende ordeyned Yet here he confesseth, that essentiall worship may be without any commande of God. 3. The Rejoynder before, made essentiall and accidentall worship to be a subdivision of true worship. Now he confesseth, that ther is an essentiall worship under the head of false worship. 4. He acknowlegeth, that in all the former senselesse assertions, he did not speake, as the manner of speache is.
That was therfore against the manner of speache, which the Def. & he used before. 5. He graunteth some worship to be essentiall, in respect of the thinges themselves, separated from mens opinion. Yet hitherto, he would have made us beleive, that opinion did varie the nature of worship, as sect. 6. If this be not a plaine yeilding, and granting of the wholle Argument, ther can be none, save onelyonly in plaine termes, to say, I yeeld.