Truth and Falsehood, Book · Chapter 24
That wee hauehave not of our ſelues free will or power to deliuer our ſelues from ſinne. CHAP. 24.
THE PROTESTANTS
OVr nature then being thus corrupted, and our ſinne hanging ſo faſt on, Heb. 12.1.as before I hauehave taught in the three laſt chapters: we muſt needes confeſſe that when we would doe good, Rom. 7.21.euill is preſent with vsus. The light of our vnderſtāding is ſo darkened, that not only A natural man perceiueth not the things of the ſpirit of God: 1. Cor. 2.14.but euen the beſt men, hauehave great need continually with the Prophet Dauid to pray:Pſal. 119.12.34. O Lord teach me thy ſtatutes, GiueGive me vnderstanding. As for our affections, they are ſo froward, that they wil not be ſubdued to the ſpirite of God, but doe rather follow, the flattering follies of inticing ſinne. Chriſtes yoke we account too ſore, his burden too heauy, ſo that if wee will come to Chriſt to ſerue and obey him we cannot vnleſſe the father draw vsus. Ioh. 6.44. Luc. 18.17.And if with the prodigall ſonne, we woulde but thinke to returne to our father againe,… . Cor. 3.5. yet we are not ſufficient of our ſelues to thinke any thing (that is good) as of our ſelues. So that wee muſt pray,Pſalm. 80. Pſa. 139.24. Pſal. 175. Pſal. 67.28. not only, that God will Turne vsus, but alſo that he will leade vsus in the way for euer. And ſtaie our ſteps in the path, that our feete ſlide not, and confirme (euen vntounto the end) that which he hath begun in vsus: acknowledging the beginning of all good, the continuance and ending in the ſame, to be from him only,Pſal. 119.36. who only can Incline our heart vntounto his teſtimonies, Pſal. 51.15.and open our lippes, that our mouth may ſhewe forth his praiſe, Pſa. 119.133 Phil. 2.13.and direst our ſteps in his word. For it is God that worketh in vsus both the will and the deede, of his good pleaſure. Which will to doe good, when he of his greate mercy hath wrought in vsus, by his ſpirit of regeneration, wee confeſſe to be good but a free will it cannot be. Becauſe that although To will be preſent … ith me, yet I finde no means … performe that which is good. Free therefore, that is to fry able to performe the good that it wo… d, it is not, but willing it may be, … nd ready to obey ſincerely.
THE PAPISTS
BVt the Church of Rome will not heare of it, that Adam by his tranſgreſsion robbed both himſelfe and vsus, of this free will to good, they will not hauehave it quite loſt or extinguiſhed. It needeth,Concil. Trid. Seſſ. 6. can. 5. ſaie they, but to be ſtirred vp, Ibidem. ca. 5.& holpen, and then we maie conuert our ſelues to iuſtifie our ſelues, Andra. Orth. expl. li. 4.and hauehave in our owne libertie ſome part of our ſaluation. Yea this corrupt eſtate of man euen before his regeneration,Andra. Orth. expli. li. 4. they compare to a man who is ſo hindered by fetters that he cannot goe but coulde goe well enough if hee were not fettered: Euen ſo man hauing theſe bondes looſed wherein he was tied, hath as free a will to doe good, as euer had Adam before he fell (for as I hauehave ſaide it needeth but to be ſtirred vp & holpen.Andra. ibid.) Yea they are not aſhamed to affirme, that partly free will and partly grace, are the efficient cauſe of applying the minde to goodnes, diuiding and parting that woorke, which God only doth challenge to himſelfe, betweene God and man. If then we wil beleeue them, mans free will is not loſt. No, he hath by nature ſtrength to doe wel, and freedome of will to pleaſe God: were it not that the corruption of nature, were as it were fetters, to hinder him in his holy obediēce S. Paul belike ſaid not truely when he ſaid we were dead in ſin.Eph. 2.5. We were but aſleepe, ſay they. And what neede we be born againe,Ioh. 3.3. as Chriſt teacheth vsus we muſt be. It is a needeleſſe matter ſay they. It will ſerue the turne if our old, euen our owne will bee but ſtirred vp and holpen. So that that renuing whereunto the Apoſtle ſo much exhorteth vsus, is more then needeth. Yea our willes being ſo ſtirred vp & holpen, if we giuegive credite to that they teach,Concil. Trid. Seſſ. 6. cap. 6, Bellar. de gra. li. arbit. li. 3 cap. 3. Iohn. 6.44. are frankely and freely mooued to good. What ſhoulde wee then care for that drawing without which no man can c… me to Chriſt?… And yet God ſaith he muſt take away our … hearts, he muſt giuegive vsus a h… of fleſh, a ſoft heart that may receiue his graces … e a new … , & a new ſpirit for that old will not ſerue the turne.
…Maiſter Bellarmines firſt argument whereby he will p… e that man hath free well, is … in effect. We … not of … but of well, ſo that we may chooſe whether we will … or not, therefore we hauehave free w… ll. It is fal… that he ſaith we … not of neceſſity but of well. For although that were … Adam, in reſpect of his ſinne that it was ſimply voluntary, for I ſpeake not of Gods eternall decree: yet by reaſon of that corruption that we h… from him,Rom. … .23. and cleaneth vntounto vsus, Wee are ſo led capt… e vntounto the law of … e, and hauehave in vsus ſuch a fountaine of … ,… that we may truely ſay w… th the apoſtle, we are carnall and folde vnderunder ſinne. And th… s neceſſity of f… ing is in vsus, by reaſon of that frowardnes of our will. Which although it be ſo reformed in the regenerate, that they hauehave a will to doe well: yet becauſe the old man will dwell with vsus, euen ſo long as we carry this mortal body: and the new man w… ll neuer be wholy put on, vntill the old man be put off: there will euer be in vsus a rep… ing againſt good, & rea… s to euil. So that although it be true in ſome reſpect, that we ſinne of will, becauſe we are very reader & willing thereto, yet is our will drawen with the cordes or chaines of iuſt and concupiſcence that it cannot but ſinne. And therefore Saint Paul doth very aptly call concupiſcence A law in the members, becauſe of the neceſſity of obeying it.
And therefore on the contrary I may t… … .Rom. … .1… . The godly are led captiue vntounto the law of … : therfore they c… not chu… whether they will ſinne or … : but becauſe of … corruption they … ſinne.
H… s ſecond argument is th… .… If there be o… free will … made, then … … e… no point for reward or puniſhment. Firſt, for the puniſhment of the worked, we do confeſſe … o… that they hauehave free will to do euill, and alſo iuſtly de… e the puniſhment that is lawe vponupon the… . Thus farre then … agree. And alſo for the other part which concei… eth the godly, … as true, that if you take away free will, you take away the reward that the worke might merite or deſerue. But we pleade Gods promiſe, not o… deſeruing, his mercy not our … , … s ſhalbe ſhewed by Gods grace hereafter. For we know, that as heere we hauehave … good thing in vsus, but that wee hauehave receiued it of has … grant: ſo heereafter wee ſhall hauehave no glorie,1 Pet. … … . but of he… onelyonly … cy, Who hath kept vsus by his power vntounto ſaluation through faith. And therefore, although we … e … full, and ſo can not deſerue the reward that wee looke for, yet God is faithfull, who h… h pro… ſed: and therefore it is a right… s thing with him to giuegive vsus reſt with him. Thus then may I reaſon. The reward of our good workes is not giuen in any reſpect of our free will: therefore if free will be taken away, yet that reward is not taken away.
His third argument. If it were not for fire will,Arg … all ſhould be good, or all ſhould be bad: yea, and that all a… ke good or euill. Which argument is anſwered by experience it ſelfe, and therefore needeth no long confutation. For themſelues will confeſſe, that i… the Infidels there is not free will, but a ſeruile will. And yet amongſt there ſome were better, ſome worſe. Yea ſome among them came ſo neare being good,Iob. 3. 3… . that ſome Papiſts thought they might be ſaued. And yet free will they could not hauehave, becauſe the Sonne hath not made them free.
Arg. 4 ca. 17 De corrept. & grat. cap. 2His fourth argument. Take away free will, and in vaine are exhortations, rebukings, praiſes, diſpraiſes, commandements, councils, admonitions &c. Which argument S. Auguſt. anſwereth for vsus: They are, that men may know what they ſhould do. And as he writeth of the Lawe, that it is neceſſary to be giuen, although it cannot be kept: ſo wee may anſwere of theſe things that maſter Bellarmine ſpeaketh of.De perfect. iuſtit. contra Celeſt. His wordes are theſe: Why ſhould not this perfection bee commaunded vntounto men, although no man in this life attaine vntounto it? For a man ſhall neuer runne well, that knoweth not which way to runne. And how ſhoulde that bee knowen, if by no precepts it ſhould be ſhewed? Thus then I reaſon. Saint Auguſtine ſaith, that precepts muſt be giuen although they cannot be kept: therefore although man hauehave not free will to perfourme that is commaunded, yet commaundements are neceſſarie.In Cantic. ſerm. 50. And Saint Bernard ſaith, God doeth by that meanes humble vsus. As for other vſes of admonitions, I will not now ſpeake of them: for I truſt this is ſufficient for anſwere to the argument. Which alſo is an anſwer vntounto his fift argument which is this. Arg. 5 ca. 18In the ſcripturs many things are forbidden and commaunded, and without free will that were in vaine: which is all one with the fourth argument.De gratia & lib. Arbit. c. 2 But becauſe maſter Bellarmine doeth prooue this argument, and that very ſtrongly (as himſelfe ſaieth) becauſe ſaint Auguſtine vſeth that very reaſon to prooue free will, I muſt needes ſpeake a word of that place. Seeing therefore ſaint Auguſtine hath ſaid in the place alleadged in the former argument, that precepts are needefull though they can not bee kept: And now he ſaith, if there be not free will, precepts are in vaine. It ſeemeth that there were ſome amongeſt them, to whome he writeth, that thought that Gods grace did ſo worke in men, that they ſhoulde doe nothing at all themſelues (for he complaineth of ſome,Cap. 2. that when grace was defended, though free will was denied.) Therefore hee teacheth them, that although wee be made partakers of grace, yet we are not without: nay rather wee hauehave free wil. But what manner of free wil? HaueHave we that free will that hath power and ſtrength to doe good, and abſtaine from euil? No,In Enchirid. cap. 9. Saint Auguſtine confeſſeth that to bee loſt. Man not vſing well freewill, loſt both himſelfe and that. What then? A will freed from that bondage vntounto ſinne wherein it was. A will that nowe hath a louelove and liking of that is good, and not altogither delighting in euill as before it did. And indeed in vaine are exhortations to them that are not ſo freed from euil, that they hauehave at the leaſt a plkaſure in good things,. Well may exhortations and inſtructions be to their confuſion, but to their comforte they ſhall not bee. This then is is the meaning of that place, that God ſpeaketh to vsus in vaine in the ſcriptures, if we be, but as ſtockes and ſtones, not hauing ſo much as a delight therein, and hauing this willingnes, God muſt alſo by his grace inable vsus, or els we cannot fulfill our will. The ſixt argument is like the reſt.Arg. 6. ca. 1… . It hath no neceſſarie conſequence. God maketh promiſe vntounto vsus vnderunder condition that we ſhal obey him, therefore either we are able to obey, or els it is ſaith Maiſter Bellarmine, a mockery, and not a promiſe. Not ſo Maiſter Bellarmine. For in ſuch conditional promiſes, it is not declared what we can doe, but what we ought to doe, and what in reſpect of the excellency of our creation, may iuſtly be required of vsus, and what we muſt doe before we can be perfect. And becauſe Maiſter Bellarmine thinketh it ſo ſcornefull a thing, that God ſhouln make promiſe vnderunder ſuch condition cannot bee performed of vsus: I would he woulde conſider with himſelfe, where is the cauſe why we cannot performe it. Is it in good? No, for he requireth nothing of vsus, but that hee gaue vsus abilite to doe, if wee had kept vsus in that eſtate. Is it in our creation? No, we were made good. Is it in the lawe? But that is pure, iuſt, and holie. Is it then in our ſelues? Yea truely. For in Adam wee are all ſinners, and by ſinne robbed of that power to keep the law, and performe ſuch conditions, as once before we had.
If then the impoſſibility of keeping the conditions, is by our owne fault, God may iuſtly require of vsus that debt, which hee knoweth wee were able to pay, when firſt we became his debters. We ſee then, that it is neither a good argument, to ſay God promiſeth vponupon condition, therfore wee can perfourme the condition: (for the condition doeth but ſhew, what we ought to doe, or what marke we muſt aime at, yea, and what wee muſt doe in the end) neither abſurd that he ſhould require that of vsus now, which once we could hauehave performed, and might ſtill hauehave done, if wee had not our ſelues bin in fault. But thus wee might reaſon truely. God maketh vntounto vsus many and great promiſes if we obey him: therefore we muſt ſtriue to obey him, ſtriue (I ſay) by prayer, by meditating in Gods lawe, and by all godly exerciſes. And God would hauehave vsus indeede, by ſuch meanes to ſtirre vp our ſelues to attaine to the promiſes. And becauſe the promiſes belong but to the godly, and not to the wicked, we will eaſily confeſſe, that there is in them a willingneſſe to obey. But yet not free will, becauſe it is hindred by tentations without and within themſelues, and by it owne weakeneſſe. So that, be they neuer ſo willing, yet they can not obey, but euen as they are led by Gods good grace.In pſa. 109. enarratione. It is no great matter (ſaith Auguſtine) that God made his Sonne to ſhew the way, ſince hee hath made him the way it ſelfe, that thou mighteſt goe by him ruling thee, that goeth by himſelfe. For in deede wee can not walke alone in thoſe wayes, wee are as babes that cannot goe by themſelues.
Arg. 7. & 8. His ſeuenth argument, as alſo the eight argument, is (in a manner) the very ſame with the firſt, ca. 20. & 21. Deut. 30.14.and neede not be anſwered againe. But yet I will touch that place of Deuteronomie, whereupon he eſpecially reſteth for the ſtrength of the ſeuenth argument: and for interpretation whereof he inueieth againſt maſter Caluine. Moſes ſaith, or God by Moſes: The word is neere thee, euen in thy mouth, and in thy heart. By which words maſter Bellarmine ſaieth Moſes telleth vsus, that this woord is eaſie to keepe: and therefore, that we hauehave free will. M. Bellarmine is but too bolde in a bad cauſe, and too ready to ſpeake more than hee can prooue. That which he had ſaid before, This commaundement is not hid from thee, Verſe 11.neither farre off: he prooueth in this place, becauſe it is in their mouth and heart, ſo that they need not ſeeke far to get it. The Chalde paraphraſe can finde no free wil in theſe words. Chriſ. expounds theſe words of the cōmandement, that it is eaſie to be had without trauell by ſea or land,Chryſoſt. in Rom. ſer. 17. not once dreaming of the eaſines of performing or doing it: but moſt plainly ſaith Theophilact: VponUpon the Romanes the tenth.Gods commaundement (O thou Iew) is before thy eies, neither ſhalt thou need that thou mayeſt find and inioy it, either to clime vp in to heauen, or go down into the deepe. It is at hand, and nearer vntounto thee: Beholde, it is euen in thy mouth, and in thy heart: For God by his lawe hath ſhewed thee all things. How impudently ſoeuer therefore maſter Bellarmine dare affirme, that Moſes ſpeaketh there of the eaſineſſe of keeping Gods lawe: yet the circumſtance of the text, and the iudgement of the Writers alleadged eſpecially of Theophilact, is flat againſt him.Rom. 10.8. And to that end doth the Apoſtle ſaint Paul apply it alſo to his purpoſe, ſpeaking of iuſtification by faith.
Arg. 9 His ninth argument conſiſteth of two places of ſcripture. ca. 22The firſt is out of that talke which God had with Caine, before he killed his brother Abel. Gen. 4.7.Alſo vntounto thee his deſire ſhall bee ſubiect, and thou ſhalt rule ouer him.
But that this may be an argument for freewill, maſter Bellarmine and others contend, that it ſhould be read. The deſire of it ſhalbe ſubiect vntounto thee, and thou ſhalt beare rule ouer it. And ſo they prooue that ſinne ſhall be ſubiect vntounto Cain and he ſhall beare rule ouer it: Therefore he had free will. That manie of the fathers doe expound theſe words ſo, it cannot be denied. But not what they ſay is only to be regarded, but how they proue it: yea the Ieſuites that wrote,In dialog. 2 the cenſure of Colen will be therein my warrant for they hauing condenmed ſome of the auncient fathers to hauehave ſpoken hardly, becauſe they accounted the workes of infidels, how good ſoeuer they ſeemed, to be but ſinne, doe then fall to trie how their proofe will warrant their doctrine. So muſt I heere examine vponupon what ground the fathers doe thus expound it. And this I need not feare to do. For themſelues giuegive me leaue to examine that they ſay. If then ſaint Hillarie hauehave giuen vsus a true rule to interprete the ſcripture, when he ſayeth,Lib. 9. de trinit. The vnderſtanding of that which is ſpoken, muſt be looked for of the wordes that go before, or of thoſe that followe, Let vsus ſee what interpretation is to bee gathered out of the circumſtances of that place: that wee may with the Church receiue the fathers, but not with the fathers forſake the faith of the Church, In Commonitor. contra haereſ.as Vincentius Lirinenſis warneth vsus. Firſt then, euen in reſpect of the verie Grammer, if the relatiue in both places muſt agree with the antecedent, then this worde (It) which is the relatiue in both places as they would hauehave it, or rather his or him, as we ſay, being of the Maſculine Gender, which themſelues cannot denie, the worde (Sinne) which is of the Feminine Gender, cannot bee the antecedent to thoſe Relatiues, although it goe next them, which maiſter Bellarmine vnlearnedly affirmeth. And therefore that tranſlation, and interpretation of the place, ſtandeth not with the rules of Grammer. Secondly, the circumſtances of the place, teach vsus ſo much. Cain is angrie that his brothers ſacrifice is accepted of, and his not: Therefore when God hath queſtioned with Cain of his anger, hee bringeth this as an argument to pacifie him, becauſe that Cain being the elder brother, ſhould ſtill hauehave the prerogatiue of the elder brother: and Abell ſhould bee ſubiect vntounto him. And that this is the plaine and natural ſenſe of the wordes, I proue by ſundrie reaſons. Firſt, becauſe in the former Chapter, God ſpeaking of the ſubiection of Eue vntounto Adam, as they cannot but confeſſe,Cap. 3.16. vſeth the ſelfe ſame wordes there, that are here vſed. And therefore by all likelihoode hee ſpeaketh of the ſame matter alſo here, that there he did, howe Abell ſhould be vnderunder his elder brother. Conferre the wordes together, you ſhall ſee them agree.
Secondly, how impertinenly had the promiſe of free will, beene made in that place vntounto Cain, God hauing reiected his ſacrifice, and knowing his furie towards his brother, yea not any one circumſtance inducing thereunto. But thirdly their owne doctrine doeth ſtrongly confute them. For if they that are not regenerate (as Cain) hauehave the power of their will, by their owne confeſſion weakened, and ſo clogged that they cannot hauehave free wil to doe good, then this cannot be verified of ſinne, howe could God ſay that the luſt or deſire of ſinne ſhould be vnderunder him, or that he ſhould hauehave dominion ouer ſinne, being a graceleſſe, and cruel man. Yea, the euent did preſently declare, that hee was ſubiect to ſinne, and that ſinne got the dominion ouer him. So that I cannot ſee how they can be excuſed, from ſeeking to make God a liar, that affirme that God there promiſed that Cain ſhould ſubdue ſinne, the euent being ſo plain contrary. Which becauſe I know it to be farre from thoſe godly fathers, I will rather thinke, that they did but allude vntounto that place, then expound the words. And thus I truſt it is plaine, that neither the rules of Grammer, nor the circumſtances of the place, neither yet their owne doctrine of free will, can well ſtand with that interpretation that they doe bring. As for his ſecond authoritie which is out of Eccleſiaſticus, the booke it ſelfe, not being canonical,Eccle. 15.14, 15, 16. a neceſſarie argument cannot bee gathered out of the ſame.
And that man at the firſt had free will it can not bee denied, and of that eſpecially the place mentioned doeth intreat.De grat. & liber. arbit. lib. 5. cap. 23 Now certaine other arguments out of the ſcripture there are alledged, whereunto I will briefly make anſwer. The firſt out of Deuteronomie, where Moſes hauing ſhewed them, how he hath deliuered to them Gods word (in obeying whereof is life,Deut. 30, 19. and in contempt of it death:) hee then addeth, Therefore chooſe life, that thou and thy ſeede may liue. Wherin Moſes doth nothing elſe, but earneſtly ſtirre vp the people, to endeuour to the vttermoſt of their power to ſerue God: Not ſhewing what they can effectually applie themſelues vntounto, by the power of their will, but what they ſhould doe in reſpect of their duetie towardes God, or care of their owne good. As for that of Ioſue, Ioſue. 24.15.Chooſe you this day whom you will ſerue, When Ioſue, who had good experience of the frailtie of the people, and their readineſſe to ſerue other gods, had ſet before them the great mercies of God, in their mightie deliuerance and preſeruation from many perils, the more ſtrongly to tie them vntounto God, hee putteth them to this choiſe, not becauſe he would hauehave ſuffered them to hauehave worſhipped ſtrange gods, if themſelues would, (for that had beene contrarie to the dutie, that God required of him being a magiſtrate) but to this ende, that themſelues hauing made choiſe to ſerue God, might by this their owne voluntarie ſubmitting themſelues to God, bee vrged to ſerue him more ſincerely, as by the 22. verſe appeareth. And this choiſe alſo is rather what external profeſſion they would be of, which is a matter in our owne power, rather then of the inwarde affection, which is the thing in controuerſie betweene the Papiſts and vsus. For this we denie, and they ſhould proue, that wee are able by our free will to doe things that are truely good, and to eſchewe the things that are euill. And that this choyſe that they were put to, was what externall profeſſion they would be of, the wordes themſelues declare. Chooſe (ſayeth hee) whether ye will ſerue the Gods which your fathers ſerued, or the gods of the Amorites, I and my houſe will ſerue the Lorde. As if a man would ſay now, chooſe whether you will profeſſe the Goſpell or Poperie. His teſtimonie out of Eccleſiaſticus,Eccle. 31.10 Who might offend and hath not offended? or doe euill, and hath not done euill? I maruell bee ſo much commendeth, thinking it vnanſwerable. Whereas, if it proue any thing, it is but that which we neuer denied, namely that the wicked hauehave a free will to euill. Now that which he alledgeth out of ſaint Paul, is too abſurd: Neuertheleſſe he that purpoſeth firmely in his heart that he hath no need, but hath power ouer his owne will, &c. What are theſe wordes to free will. The power yt here he ſpeaketh of, is if he performe his purpoſe without inconuenience to his daughter, as may appeare not onelyonly by Primaſius, and Hierom, of this place,Primaſius. Hieronimus. Tho. Aquin. but alſo by his owne friend Thomas of Aquine, who ſheweth that then he hath power of his owne will, when hee knoweth his daughter, hath a purpoſe to continue a virgine. So that in effect, this is his argument. His daughter doth not hinder his will for keeping her a virgin: therefore hee hath free will in himſelfe to doe good, or eſchew euill. Of the ſtrength of which argument, let maiſter Bellarmines owne friendes conſider. His laſt place out of the ſcriptures is verie like this. As euerie man wiſheth in his owne heart, 2. Cor. 9.7.&c. He ſpeaketh of the contribution to the Saints. You muſt (ſayeth ſaint Paul) giuegive willingly. Therefore ſayeth maiſter Bellarmine, you hauehave free will. Wee confeſſe that the regenerate hauehave a willingnes to do good, and eſchew euill, and this the apoſtle would hauehave in them. But doeth this prooue that they hauehave free will? And thus farre for their arguments for free will out of the ſcriptures. Out of the fathers maſter Bellar. bringeth many proofes. And although there be iuſt cauſe, to ſuſpect manie of them in this queſtion, becauſe they could not ſo eaſily forget that which in the ſchooles of philoſophy they had learned: yet that it may appeare that they hauehave not ſo generall a conſent as they bragge of, it is not amiſſe ſomewhat to looke into and to examine the proofes,Bellar. de grat. & lib. arbit. lib. 5. cap. 25. that out of them they bragge. But maiſter Bellarmine would make a man afraide to heare his crackes. Hee braggeth alwayes that his armour is of the beſt proofe that can not bee pearced, his arguments ſuch as can not be anſwered. And firſt commeth in Ignatius, Epiſt. de. mag.whoſe wordes are ſo vnanſwerable, that maiſter Bellarmine ſeeth no way but to denie the Authour. But let maiſter Bellarmine quiet him ſelfe, we will admit the authour. The effect of that he alledgeth out of the firſt place, is, that looke what men doe chooſe that they ſhal hauehave: and after, If a man do wickedly, he is a man of the diuell, ſo made not by nature, but by the will of his minde. Then let vsus ſee his argument: Looke what men doe chooſe, they ſhall goe into the place of that they chooſe, whether it bee life or death, ſo ſayeth Ignatius, therefore (ſaith maiſter Bellarmine men hauehave free will. The force of both his places is this, and the argument that can bee gathered out of the ſame: men hauehave will: ergo they hauehave free will. And are theſe his vnanſwerable arguments. That which hee alledgeth out of Dionyſius Areopagita, although hee make as great bragges of it, as hee did of the other: yet it neuer ſo much as mentioneth free will.De diuinis nominibus li. 4. cap. 4. part. 4. In deed he ſaith, If a man might not reſiſt ſinne, hee were leſſe to be blamed: But if hee that is good giuegive ſtrength, which as the holy Scriptures teach, doeth giuegive things conuenient ſimplie to euerie man, &c. That God giueth conuenient ſtrength to them which with humilitie ſeeke it, but what doth this gift of God prooue that wee hauehave free will. It rather ouerthroweth it. For if we hauehave not ſtrength but by his gift, then we hauehave it not in vsus, or by free will. As for Clement of Rome, becauſe himſelfe dare not ſpeake much for the trueth of that witneſſe, I let him paſſe. Then commeth in Iuſtine the Philoſopher and martyr, whoſe words for free will maiſter Bellarmine taketh to be ſo plaine, that he ſaieth maiſter Caluine neither doeth, nor can feigne anie thing, that will carrie any ſhewe of an anſwer. What neede we to feigne, Maſter Bellarmine, that hauehave the truth for our warrant. We leaue faigning to painters, poets, and papiſts, who louelove alwayes to make a ſhew of that that is not. If we conſider the occaſions why the ancient fathers did write in ſuch ſort, their meaning will bee pliane enough. And that may appeare by Iuſtinus Martyr here alledged. He ſaith, I grant.Apolog. ad ſenatum. Apol. ad An. That if men hauehave not free will to ſhunne euill and doe good, they are not to blame for that they doe, and deſerue neither reward nor puniſhment. Thus in effect hee ſaieth in the places alledged.
We neither denie the authour in this place to be Catholike, nor his woordes (in his ſenſe to be true. But becauſe there were ſome that beeing deceyued with that which the Stoikes taught, concerning that fatall neceſſitie whereby all things were done, as though man could not chooſe but do the euill that he doeth, and that he were by this fatall neceſſitie compelled thereto, in reſpect of the neceſſarie conſequence of cauſes, and thereby made man to hauehave nothing to doe in the workes that himſelfe did, but that hee were euen forced thereto without his owne will, as ſtone or wood is laide in the houſe, onelie at the pleaſure of the workeman, without anie diſpoſition in themſelues one way or other: becauſe (I ſay) that ſome hereby did denie all will or inclination in man to good or euill, as not onelyonly Simon Magus, and the Manicheis of whom maiſter Bellarmine ſpeaketh, but alſo the Bardeſaniſtes,Cap. 35. Cap. 6… . of whome Saint Auguſtine writeth in his Booke of heriſies, who aſcribed all mans conuerſation to deſtinie, and the Priſcilianiſts, who becauſe they make all their actions to bee ruled by the Planets, thinke that they ſin againſt their will, and therfore doth not Iuſtin onelyonly, but other of the godly fathers ſpeak ſo plainly as they ſeeme to doe in defence of free will. Not becauſe they thinke, that man hath ſuch ability being once renued by grace, that he can doe what hee will, as the papiſtes teach, but they only impugne theſe Stoicall opinions that affirme that man doth of neceſſitie euill or good. And that this is the meaning of Iuſtine the Martir by his owne wordes doth plainly appeare, becauſe in both the places alleadged by maiſter Bellarmine, he ſetteth himſelfe to reaſon againſt thē that would hauehave men thinke that all things were wrought by deſteny. Againſt the which, he on the other ſide reaſoneth, that if men had not will or choice in themſelues to doe things, we ſhould neither deſerue puniſhment for euil doing, nor hauehave reward for well doing. Thus hauehave I truely & faithfully deliuered vntounto thee (good reader,) the cauſe that maketh this and other of the ancient fathers eſpecially before Pelagius to write ſo plainelie for free will.De fide Or. thod. li 2. cap. 7. As alſo may wel be gathered out of Damaſcene. For when as yet there were none ſprung vp, that did attribute too much to free wil as afterward the Pelagians did; but there were on the contrary, many that did wholy take al wil from man: no maruel if they did wholy oppoſe themſelues againſt the daunger which they ſawe preſent before their eies. And therefore they did teach as they did, to whom alſo we giuegive our right handes of fellowſhip and conſent in doctrine,Gal. 2.9. What wee ſay of mās will. as Iames, Cephas, and Iohn, did vntounto Barnabas and Paul. For we alſo doe teach, that man though by his fal he loſt his freedome of wil, to him and his poſterity: yet his wil he loſt not, but ſtill had it, and hath it. Whereby very readily and willingly he runneth vntounto euil. But hauing his wil renued by Gods ſpirit, it is then good, ſo much as it is renued, it loueth good, and would faine do it,Ad Bonif. cont… a. 2. e… iſt. Pelag. lib. 1. cap. 18 and in that ſence wee alſo ſaie with ſaint Auguſtine, that it is free, that is, willing and readie: but yet not free, that is, not able to performe that good which we would, by reaſon of the infirmitie of our new man, the corruption of our nature, and the manifolde intiſementes and tentations whereby we are withdrawen from holy obedience. And now if the firſt fathers, did not ſo plentifully ſet forth mans weakenes, as they did his wil or power to do things, it is no maruell becauſe they neither knew Pelagians nor papiſtes, but them that erred in the contrary opinion.
And this being wel conſidered of, maie ſerue I truſt to anſwere to whatſoeuer they can alleadge out of the fathers for free wil: & may teach vsus, that they cal it free, not as it is able, but as it is willing, to do good & eſchew euil.De corrept. & gra. cap. 2. De gra. & libero arbitrio lib. 2. cap. 9. And therfore ſaint Auguſtine ſaith, Men are driuen, to the ende they ſhould doe, not that they ſhould doe nothing. And for this cauſe ſaint Bernard ſaith, That a man may not be called, or can indeed be good or euill, vnleſſe he be willing. And ſaint Ambroſe, or whoſoeuer wrote the bookes of the calling of the Gentiles, There is no kinde of vertue that may bee had, either without the gift of Gods grace, or the conſent of our will. But of an infinite number of ſuch like places, let theſe few be ſufficient, to teach vsus, that they ment not to extol the power of mans wil, but to lay the fault in man, if he refuſe the graces offered, and to ſtirre vp men willingly and readily to receiue them, and ſtedfaſtly to keepe, and holily to vſe them. And thus much generally, for the true vnderſtanding of all the teſtimonies of the fathers that are alleadged by maiſter Bellarmine, not only in his fift booke,Cap. 25, 26, 27, 28. de gratia & libero arbitrio: but alſo thoſe other that he hath in his ſixt booke, where he eſpecially handleth the queſtion of free wil,Cap. 11. in things appertaining to godlines. Whereas before he indeuoured to proue it in moral vertues. But becauſe that in the former, he did lay the foundation of that which in the ſixt he teacheth, and al belonged to that end. Namely, to the queſtion of free wil, which in this chapter I am to handle, therefore hauehave I thought good to anſwere in this one place whatſoeuer he ſaith tending to that end. As for his foure arguments out of the ſcriptures, which he bringeth in the ſixt booke,Cap. 10. the anſwere to them I truſt may be gathered of that is already anſwered. Sauing only that the firſt and third require a more ſpecial anſwere. For his ſecond argument in this ſixt booke, is al one with the fourth in the fift booke. And his fourth and laſt in the ſixt, is like the firſt in the fift booke. His firſt argument in the ſixt booke is taken eſpecially of the word Cooperarii, Worke men togither with God, for ſo the greeke word doth ſignifie, not Fellow-helpers, 1. Cor. 3.as the common latin tranſlation hath, as though God could not without vsus worke. Wel let vsus ſee his argument. We are workemen togither with God, therfore we hauehave freewil, ſay they. But we may more iuſtlie conclude on the contrary, therefore we hauehave not freewil as the papiſts teach, it ſelfe able to doe good, or auoide euill. For that is it that is in queſtion. We willingly confeſſe, that we being regenerate hauehave a willingnes to good, and a miſlike of euil, but we ſay that we cannot performe this our good deſire. And therefore ſeeing we cannot worke, but as workemen togither with God, it is moſt euident and plaine, that our will hath not that power that the church of Rome teacheth it to hauehave, to be freely moued to good. And therefore wel ſaith S. Auguſtine, That we will, God worketh without vsus, De gra. & li. arb. t. cap. 17.but when we will, and ſo will that we alſo doe, he worketh togither with vsus. But without him either working that we may will, or working with vsus when we will, we hauehave no power to the good workes of godlines. And by this alſo appeareth the anſwere to the other argument which I ſaide was not before anſwered. We are ſaith M. Bellar. holpen by God in praier, or in any good worke, therefore we hauehave free wil. If we remember how they teach, that a man being once holpen and ſtirred vp by Gods grace, is afterwards freely able to doe good, hauing his wil thus reuiued, or rather vnfettered, a mā would not thinke M. Bellar. to be in earneſt in ſuch argumentes. Suppoſe you ſhould vndertake to beare a burden far heauier then you could carry, and another much ſtronger than you, taketh it vp, and beareth it you alſo laying your hands to the ſame, to helpe as you can. Wil you ſay you are able to beare it, becauſe your hand alſo touched it? Euen ſuch is our ability in keeping Gods commaundements. Or as children when they are firſt taught to goe. Their mother lifteth them vp that they maie put their legges forwarde, holdeth vp their coates that they be no hinderance to them, yea helpeth them to ſtep forward. There is nothing in the childe, but only that it would faine goe, but it hath not ſtrength to perform it. Is it now any reaſon to ſay, the child is able to goe, becauſe the mother doth thus helpe it. No no, ſeeing Gods helpe is ſuch that he worketh both to wil and to doe in vsus, let vsus giuegive glory vntounto him only, by whom we may doe al things, and without whom we can doe nothing.Philip. 2.13. Phil. 4.13. Iohn. 15.5. And we may iuſtly be aſhamed of ſuch fooliſh reaſons: God helpeth vsus, therefore we hauehave free will. We may perchance conclude thereupon that we doe ſomewhat, but how little it is that we doe, nay how we doe very nothing, without Gods good grace in the workes of Godlineſſe, in all this Chapter is I hope ſufficiently declared.
But nowe for the concluſion of this Chapter, I woulde gladlie knowe of them that ſo ſtiflie maintaine free will, howe they can cleare themſelues from the Pelagian hereſie, ſo hated of all the Godly, ſo often condemned by Councels, and ſo mightilie confuted by Saint Auguſtin in many of his bookes?Orth. explic. lib. 4. Andradius anſwereth this matter fully. They confeſſe, ſaith hee, our ſtrength to bee ſo weake (he ſpeaketh of them that made the cenſure of Colen) that vnleſſe it be made ſtrong by Gods grace, wee can neither doe nor will anie perfect good thing. But the Pelagians will grant thus much: And yet S. Auguſt. calleth them hereticks, & oftentimes enemies of the grace of Chriſt, yea new heretickes, enemies to the croſſe of Chriſt, ſuch as fought againſt, forſooke, yea perſecuted the grace of Chriſt. And yet I ſay they grāted aſmuch as the papiſts doe. Firſt they cōfeſſe that by grace they were holpen that they might become Gods children.Aug. ad Bon. li. 1. cap. 3. Yea that they were alwaies holpen by Gods grace in eueryevery good worke. And that grace helpeth euerie bodies good purpoſe.Cap. 19. Now let the reader iudge wherin the popiſh Pelagians,Lib. 4. cap. 6. differ from thoſe old condemned Pelagians. They ſeeme to be birdes of one neſt. What doth S. Auguſtine (out of whom I hauehave alleadged this confeſſion of the Pelagians) I ſay, what doth he think of their words? he liketh them wonderful wel. In ſo much, as doubtles, ſaith he, a man would thinke this were ſpoken like a catholicke.Ibidem. How then fel it out that ſtil he was accounted an hereticke, and his fauorites? S. Auguſtine although he could not miſlike much of that he ſaide, yet he could not but condemne their intent and meaning. And therefore when he had ſaid it was ſpoken like a catholicke, he addeth, If they would not thinke of merit in this their good purpoſe, to which merit reward ſhould bee giuen as of duty, not of grace. Now I pray you to what end doth the church of Rome defende this doctrine of free wil? Is it not that the doctrine of merits may follow? Yes I warrant you. That is it they ſo earneſtly contend for. For thereby they gaine both credit and coyne. So that they ſeeme then to agree in their words, and in their intent. Seeing therefore this doctrine of free wil, doth ſo conſpire with the Pelagian hereſie, and ſo diſſent from the word of God as hath beene ſhewed: let vsus ſay with ſaint Auguſtine, Thinking we beleeue, thinking we ſpeake, thinking we doe whatſoeuer we doe: Aug. de bon. ſeuerantiae. cap. 13.but concerning the true waie of godlines, and ſeruice of God: we are not ſufficient of our ſelues to thinke any thing as of our ſelues, but our ſufficiency is of God. And therefore we liue more ſafely, when we yeeld all to God, and commit not our ſelues in part to him, and in part to our ſelues, Ibidem. ca. 6.as the ſame ſaint Auguſtine ſaith els where.