Of Divorce for Adultery, Text (2 of 4)

Of Divorce for Adultery · Text (2 of 4)

p. 4514 As touching those other places of theirs, namely,Of those places that are for marying again that they also will help them litt…e. such as are for marrying againe (wherein consisteth al the residue of the strength that they hauehave, for this conceived opinion of theirs) they also are only two▪ both of them in the New Testament, and the words of Christ himselfe: & neverthelesse such, as when they are wel examined, I beleeue wil helpe them but little neither. Which that wee may the more orderly finde, I hold it best, first to see what considerations we hauehave, that may induce vsus to that perswasion then, to examine the places themselues, for the true sense and meaning of thē. Those considerations that now I speake of which may wel induce vsus so to think, that in these also they hauehave no sufficient groundworke of that their opiniō, are especially two: one, takēout of the iudgemēt of others therein; another, arising out of that which themselues hauehave set downe for that matter. That which is taken out of the iudgment of others, is,The iudgement of others against them that same that by other occasion before I touched, that the most part of men are against them herein: and yet hauehave those places as wel as they, and are as careful to leaue them vntouched (even at the ful) vntounto the sense that they ought to hauehave. Who being as they are, both equall in learning (for anie thing that yet we know to the contrary) and more in nū ber without comparison, may easilie induce those that stande indifferent (so long as the others bring not better proofes to the contrary) to doubt lesse danger in abiding with them, vntounto that resolution that being tried by long p. 44duplicate page p. 45duplicate page p. 46experience,Sect. 15. is much more likely to be lesse faulty: than, so quickly to turne vntounto others, to the imbracing of a latter iudgment, so lately (to speake of) sprung vp among vsus, and so newly broached vntounto vsus. By which kinde of reasoning albeit no certaintie bee to be concluded: yet neither may the probability be wel neglected. A certaintie cannot be thereon concluded, because neither as yet is it to be taken as proved by vsus, or granted by them (for some there are, that so much as they may, do leane to the contrary) that they hauehave the greater number against thē: neither, if they had, were that any certaine proofe that they were wrōg. Yet, on the other side, the probabilitie (for both) being so faire as it is, it leaveth so good a coniecture thereby, that such as take the contrary course, may finde themselues to be excluded frō all good hope that they are right: at least, that it is not a thing out of question.

Their own defects such as wel may make their iudgement suspected.15 That consideratiō that ariseth out of that which themselues hauehave set downe, is no more but this, that even their owne manner of handling this matter is such, as that divers defects appeare therein, both in weake reasoning: and in divers inconvenient speeches besides. As touching both which, before we come to exemplifie or to shewe wherein they do it, it shal not be amisse (especially to put away such evil surmises, as otherwise might arise hereon) more distinctly (yet briefly) to set it down, both how farre we may charge them with those defects: and how far we may thereby iustly conclude against them. As touching the former, we are not so farre to charge them, as though (vponupon the principles that they conceiue) they had no arguments to be regarded, or that orderly did conclude; nor that inconvenient speeches with them are so rife, as that therein only there is sufficient cause to cōdemne the matter p. 47it selfe: but that they do often vse such,Sect. 16. as are no good arguments indeed; and that divers times they hauehave inconvenient speeches likewise. But yet by their patience (now to take in the latter withal) they hauehave both these so much and so often, that thereby they may iustly breed suspition in others (even in as many as read with iudgment, & stand indifferent) that they are somewhat partial therein, & are carried not a little with some private affection whatsoever: that in vsing so often so weake collections, they doe plainly insinuate, their store of stronger was not so great; and that in adding such inconvenient speeches withall, others might iustly doubt, that then they were so far out of temper, as that they might overshoote themselues, even in that also that is in question.

16 Wherein these defects of theirs appeare,How weakly they reason, on the things here vntounto appertaining▪ evē the same that are in question, & appertaine to the substance of them. is now to be seene: and first how weaklie oft times they reason; then, what incōvenient speeches they hauehave besides. Those reasons of theirs that now I speake of, doe most of them depend either on the things herevnto appertaining: or, on the authoritie or testimonie of others concerning the same. The things herevnto appertaining, are either the selfesame that are in question: or else certaine others, of such a kinde, or so neere vntounto them, that from them they draw certaine reasons to these likewise. Of the selfe same that are in question, there are two sorts: one, that is of the substance of them; others, that are but accidentarie therevnto. That which is of the substance of them, is the nature both of adultery, & wedlock it selfe in this respect. Out of the consideration of which because they doe so vsually reason, therefore it shall bee good for vsus to note, both what reasons they are, and of what force wee may take them to be. The reasons that thereon they bring are p. 48such as bind all vponupon this, that the nature of Adulterie is such, as that it doth quite dissolue whatsoever band there was in marriage before: and that that was the cause, why Christ made his exception only of it. And so they reason, not only to take away an obiection that otherwise would bee strong against them: but also to expresse their owne opinion or iudgement therein.First to take away an obiectiō The obiection that otherwise would bee strong against them is that coniunction that God had put betwixt man and wife: wherevpon it is inferred by Christ,Mat. 19: 6.Matt 19:6 Quod Deus conianxit homo ne separet; that is, that which God hath coupled, let not man put asunder. For answer wherevnto, Erasmus first saith, that nullo negotio solvi potest. Hoc Deus coniunxit, quod rite coniungitur:1 Cor. 7. p. 499.1 Cor 7 hoc Deus dirimit, quod rite dirimitur. that is, That doubt, saith he, may easily be loosed. For that, saith hee, did God ioine together, which was rightly ioined: and that doth God himselfe put asunder, which is well put asunder. And Musculus after, following the same, answereth,In Mat 5. pag. 114.Matt 5 that illi non rumpunt coniugii vinculum; but that the adulteresse sua persidia iam ante adulterando ruperit: that is, that they, (who in such case put away their wiues,) doe not breake the band of marriage; but that the adultresse by her disloialty in committing adultery brake it before. To expresse their owne opinion or iudgement therein,Then to expresse their owne meaning therein. Ibid. both these and others, doe otherwise set downe that same for the truth of their doctrine for that point, For first Erasmus saith; (Divortium) Christus astringit ad vnam adulterii causam, non quoòd non sint alia flagitia adulterio sceleratiora: sed quòd adulterium tota ratione pugnet cum coniugio. Matrimonium è duobus vnum facit: eam copulam dissecat adulteriū. Musculus likewise, being to shew for what cause marriage may be dissolued,In Mat. 5. p. 11….Matt 5 saith, Vna causa est quam Deus p. 49ponit dicendo, Nisi causa stupri. Nam hoc crimine conjugalis fides dissoluitur. Againe, Excipit causam stupri, Pag. 113.significans tū licere &c. Quia, quod Deus conjunxerat, per adulterium dividit, mariti fidem obnoxiam sibi iam amplius non habet, &c. Nam nemo alterius improbitate, ius suum quod à Deo habet, &c. amittere debet. Againe, speaking of an adulterous wife Marito amplius non viuit, Pag. 114. P Martyr also: loc. c. m. clas. 2. c. 10 sec 71. …n Ma… 5:31. In Mat. 19.Matt 19sedei cui perfida & adultera adheret. M^r Calvine likewise, Meritò abijcitur mulier, que perfidè coniugium violauit: quia eius culpa, abrupto vinculo, libertas viro parta est. Againe, additur tamen exceptio, quia mulier scortando se quasi putridum membrum à viro rescindens, eum liberat. Gualter also,In Mar. 10. pag. 21. b.Mark 10 being of the same minde maketh his reason to be, for that the adulteresse coniugii vinculum perfidè dissolvit, or otherwise seeth not, but that adulteris & scortatoribus coniugii dignitas patrocinabitur, quod Deus vt istis vterentur, instituit. Last of all, Beza answering an argument, that so it might come to passe,In lib de Repud. & divor…. pag. 110, 111. that one man should at once hauehave more wiues: Respondeo, saith he, in hoc argumento esse petitionem principii. Praesupponit enim id ipsum, de quo quaeritur: manere nempe vinculum matrimonij etiam post divortium. Concedo igitur vni viro non licere plures vxores habere: sed addo, vxorem esse des…sse, quae propter adulterium se à viro separavit. And anon after,Pag. 12. Coniugii vinculum abrupit, quisquis factus est scortationis membrum. And after that, Concludo igitur, Pag 113.adulterio abrumpi non tantum vsum, sed vinculum: quod nisi voluntate innocentis rursum coalescit, integram esse eidem innocenti, si continere nō potest, novas nuptias inire. &c. And lastly, Convictus adulterii, Pag. 116.maritus esse desinit. The effect of all which, concerning the matter that now we speake of, is no more but this, that (in the iudgement of all these) by the adultery of either of the parties, the bond of matrimonie that was betwixt them, is now p. 50dissolued, and broken againe. Which if now we may a little examine (notwithstanding that so great men hauehave so resolutely overruled the same already) it seemeth much rather vntounto me,Which iudgement of theirs is further examined, & the band of marriage further cō sidered. that the band of marriage is of that nature, that it is not in the power of either of the parties, nor of both together so to breake it, that now it bee to stand as altogether brokē betwixt them. For there are, if we mark, two sorts of bands wherewith they are bound the one to the other: one sort, that concerneth those parties themselues, that so doe ioine themselues together; the other, that concerneth certaine others, that ioine with them in that action likewise. Those that concerne the parties themselues, are two: one, of the husband; the other, of the wife. For though they both doe concurre in time, so neere as may bee: yet, both some little difference there is, such as it is (the one going a little before, and the other following somewhat after) and well they may bee severally considered, as distinct things in themselues; as when ships doe grapple together, and not by the grapple of either of them, but when each of them doe fasten their grapple on other. Those others that ioine with thē therein, are, God himselfe, and his vicegerents on earth among vsus: both which doe ioine in that action with them; and, when first they hauehave so tied them (and that, with a several band for either) then doe they tie them also with other bands besides, even with one severall band for either of them.4. Bands. And so commeth it to passe, that every party that is marryed, is, by the vertue of that marriage, bound fast to the other in foure severall bands: one of his owne; the second, of his yokefellow; the third of the magistrate, or of the Government vnderunder which they liue; and the last, of God, or of his holy ordinance. Wherevpon me thinketh p. 51that whatsoever it is, that may bee thought to bee of force to dissolue the band of matrimonie, had need to be such, as wherein the whole interest of all these parties, and of every of them, is to concur in full, and lawfull consent: or else, whatsoever is, or can be done, by either of those inferior parties, neither is it, neither cā it be of such force as to dissolue the whole band, which was knit not only by themselues (and by either of them, for their part severally) but also by others that are their superiors, and whose leaue first they must hauehave. Or otherwise, that it were in effect no better, but as if one should reason affirmatiuely from the part to the whole: that seeing one of the bands is by one party broken (and but so far neither as that party may) therefore the whole band is broken betwixt thē, and now as loose as ever they were. Which how vitious it is, we may (as I take it) much better perceiue in some other such like, wherein we are not as yet by preiudice so forestalled, nor our affections so blinded neither: in that band that is betwixt the Master & the servāt. For though the servant doe behaue himselfe as il as may be, and directly against the nature of his service, either generally or specially in that which more properly is cōmitted vntounto him; and whereby himselfe hath so far deserved vtterly to bee cast off: yet, if either the Master hauehave absolutely takē him into his service, and to doe for him without exception, & not only for better, but also for worse, and much rather if God doe require, that as yet he cast him not off, or if but the lawes doe not allow him so to doe, in all these cases we may see some bond of duty, so farre as yet remaining and standing in force betwixt them, as that it were hard for any to iustify, that after such a lewd part of the servāt, now there were at all no band of that duty remaining betwixt p. 52them. And the lesse there is to be said against it, but that in such sort a man might so reason against divers coniunctions besides (as of that which is betwixt Parents and children, and of that likewise that standeth betwixt the Prince and the Subiect) the more heed should bee taken, that no such gap should be opened to any, as wherby the looser sort, whē they should get their desire in this, should cast about to obtaine the like in other things also of greater consequence. In which respect I do so much the more marvell that M^r Calvine, so iudicious a man as he was, & being in so good a way vntounto this consideration, as that time also he was, when he did set downe that iudgement of his, as before is declared: yet notwithstanding did not take the advantage or benefitof either of them, so as herein hee easily might. For in that place before recited, his words that goe immediatly before, are these: Sanctius est cōiugij vinculum, quā vt hominū arbitrio vel potiùs libidine solvatur. Tamet si enim mutuo consensu sese conjungūt vir & vxor, Deus tamen nodo indissolabili eos astringit, ne postea liberum sit discedere. Additur tamen exceptio, Nisi obfornicationem. Merito enim abijcitur mulier, &c: that is, The bond of wedlocke is a thing more holy, thē that it may bee dissolved when men themselues wil, or rather when their lust doth moue them vntounto it. For although man and wife doe ioine themselues together with mutual consent: yet doth God (farther) tie them togither with a knot that cannot be loosed, that afterward they hauehave no liberty to part in sunder againe. And hitherto wel: but then he addeth, yet, saith he, an exception is added, Vnlesse it be for fornicatiō. For the woman is iustly cast óf who disloialy hath broken wedlocke, and so forth, as before. Wherein we see that he noted two distinct bonds in the parties thēselues by mutuall p. 53consent, or that the man had bound himselfe to his wife, and the wife likewise to the man; then also, that God (aboue them both) had likewise ioined them togither never to part: and yet notwithstanding in the end he alloweth the bond to be (wholy) broken by one party onlie, following therein the iudgement of others, and vponupon perswasion, that such must be the meaning of those words of Christ, which afterward I trust to shew may rather hauehave some other meaning. Againe, put case that there were no band but one, even that alone wherewith the adulterous wife since, had before tied her selfe to her husband. Even in this case also me thinke it were harde for any to holde, that such lewdnes of hers, had altogether broken whatsoever band of mariage there was betwixt them: for that in such case it is so generally held by al, that whatsoever lāds the wife brought with her, they stil are the husbands, even by the vertue of that bond that was betwixt thē. Whereas otherwise when the bond is dissolved by death indeed, thē (if he hauehave no farther interest) he is to part with them likewise. So in such case the bond may in some sense bee accoūted to be broken indeed but rather, in respect of divers benefits that by her marriage shee might otherwise claime, than that the bond in it selfe should stand as brokē, vntounto them both generally, or to set them as loose, or as free to marrie againe, as they were before. And so doth Erasmus himselfe afterward interpret one of those his speeches of that kinde.Nat. Bedda For whē he is reproved by Natalis Bedda for that he said, I am vxor esse desijt, quae se miscuit alteri viro, that is, Shee doth now cease to be a wife, that hath committed adultery with another, his answere is this,Supputatione… Beddae. 22. Agnoscebat vulgatissimum tropum Bedda, sed captabat ansam calumniandi. Sic filium esse negamus, Tom 9. pag 472.qui degenerat à paternis p. 54moribus, qui meruit abdicari, & tamen manet naturae vinculum. Sic episcopum esse negamus, qui indignus est hoc nomine, & tamen manet consecratio. Sic Christianum esse negamus qui moribus est impijs, & tamen non tollitur baptismus. Ita mihi dicta est vxor esse desijsse, quae se fecisset indignam vxoris nomine: that is, Bedda himselfe woulde not hauehave denied, but that we vse so to speake, but hee desired to picke out some occasion of slaunder. So do we deny him to be a son, that doth degenerate from his fathers waies, who hath deserved to be cast of: and yet the bond of nature remaineth. So do we deny him to be a Bishop, who is vnworthie of that name: and yet his consecration abideth. So do we denie him to be a Christian, that is of a wicked behaviour: & yet is not his Baptisme abolished. In such sense did I saie that shee ceased now to be a wife, who (by her own lewd demeanour) had made her selfe vnworthie to be so taken. And therevpon bringing somewhat such like, both out of Chrysostome, and out of Ierome, he concludeth: ut igitur est vir non vir, vxor non vxor, ita est conjugium non conjugium: that is, As therefore a man is not a man, a wife not a wife, so is marriage no marriage. Which interpretatiō of his owne words though himselfe, by that occasion, did afterward so plainly giuegive, yet others that followed him (with out any stop) in that manner of speaking, did frame their iudgement also thereafter, and so gaue in their resolution, and not after this latter qualification of his: a thing, in my iudgement, vntounto the purpose that now we are in, right worthy the marking. And thus for them all. One thing more in one of them there is, that needeth to bee warily taken, or else may easily breede a further error: namely, that Erasmus by those words of his, may seeme not to allow, the ioining together of man and wife, to be of God, p. 55but only whē it is orderly done.Sect. 17. For out of it there might be a gap opened for men, to reason shrewdly for the dissoluing not only of marriage, and but for adultery: but also of all other societies, and subiections, almost; and for lesse trespasses, and lighter indignities, then adultery also. So that, for this first argument of theirs, that, if here ether partie commit adultery, then is there no further any band of wedlocke standing betwixt them, I trust it appeareth, that it is not so cleere, but that as yet some question may be conceiued of it.

17 Those that are but accidētary therevnto,How weakly they reason in suck things as are but accidentary. are partly some abuses going before: but especially, divers inconveniences following after. The abuses going before are such as are already touched among the former reasons: namely, whensoever marriages are, either one way or other, so disorderly made,Sect. 7. Vpō abuses as that thereby occasion is giuen of so deep discōtentmēt, that to require the band of wedlock thereon to be broken, may seeme to be a iust request. And disorderly may mariage be made, when as it is made betwixt such, as in whom there can be no sound election at all, as in children and fooles: or betwixt those, that, though they bee such as might soundly chuse, yet notwithstanding do so plainely bewray themselues to be carried away with ambition, covetousnesse, or inordinat lust, that thereby they make it cleere, that therein they follow no sound advise. In which cases, and in such like, it is very true, that great disorder is committed, and that the same is ri…e amongst vsus. But yet if Erasmus, as before I noted, or any other would thereon conclude, that in reason some ready way should be had among vsus for divorce and marrying againe, for the better amendment of those abuses, or that the Apostle himselfe were not vnlikely to beareIn 1. Cor. 7. pag. 504.1 Cor 7 p. 56with vsus further therein, then now wee will allow that hee doth: this were no doubt but a weake collection, and in no wise to stand for any sound reason to vrge vsus vntounto it. The inconveniences that follow after, are most of them noted to be in the parties themselues that are so vnequally knit together:VponUpon incō veniences. but one, that cōcerneth others also. Those that are noted to bee in the parties themselues, are of two sorts: some, that doe concerne them both indifferently; others, that concerne but the innocent or faultlesse persō only. Those that doe concerne both, are all such evils, as vponupon such marriages are wont to vex both the parties so ioined together, which indeed are many and greate. Of which Erasmus Videmus autem, Ibid 492.saith he, tot hominum millia infoelici coniugio sibi cohaerere cum exitio vtrius que : qui fortasse disiuncti servari possent. that is, That we see many thousāds that cleaue together in their vnlucky wedlock to the destruction of them both: who, it may be, if they were sū dred againe, might so be saued. And therevpon he inferreth, that if it might be done citra iniuriam divini praecepti, that is, without any breach of Gods commandement, then were it at least to bee wished: and his reason is, because it is Apostolicae pietatis, omnium saluti quantum licet consulere, & infirmis etiam Ecclesiae membris sua cura succurrere. that is, appertaining vntounto Apostolike piety, so much as may be to endeavour the salvation of all, and especially to be helping vntounto the weake members of the Church. Those that cōcerne the innocent parties, are such as more specially haunt them. For whome it is, that elsewhere he reasoneth, that tales saepe existunt causae, vt crudele videatu… non succurrere periclitanti: Ibid. p. 496.that is, that oftimes there are so iust causes, that it may seeme to bee no lesse then plaine cruelty, not to helpe one that is in so manifest danger. p. 57Wherevnto the more to moue vsus, he addeth, Christus nō gravatur ob vnam oviculam lustratis omnibus obambulare, quam humeris reducat: & nos gravabimur experiri, si qua multis pereuntibus succurri possit, praesertim quum Christus salutis sit author, & humanae leges non aliter valere debeant, nisi quatenus ad salutem conducunt hominum? that is, Christ thinketh not much, for one sheepe only, to goe vp and downe, every where seeking, that hauing found it, he may bring it home againe, even on his shoulders; and shall we thinke much to assay, whether any way we may be able to helpe those that are ready to perish: especially, when as Christ is the author of safety, and mens lawes should bee of no further force, but so far as they tend to the good of men? And a little before, somewhat more plainely,Ibid. p. 495. Iam nemo poterit inficiari, saith hee, leges Christi multo aequissimas esse &c. Wherevpon he inferreth, An igitur aequum videtur vt maritus cum vxore flagitiis operta, quibus nec causam dedit, nec mederi possit, cogatur vivere, cum qua vivere non sit vivere: aut si divertat, compellatur omnem aetatem orbus, destitutus, ac velut eviratus degere? that is, Now there is no body that can deny but that the lawes of Christ are most vpright &c. But then, may this be accoūted to stand with any equity or right, that the husbād should be compelled to liue with a woman that is so marvelous ill, when as he never gaue any iust cause of that her lewdnesse, neither ever was able to make her better, with whome to liue is to be accounted no life at all: or if he leaue her, that then hee should be compelled all his life long to liue out of hope of propagatiō, without his helpe, and as it were to be turned out even of his very manhood it selfe? Beza likewise, if the woman after divers pardons doe yet offend againe,Derepu…. & divor…. pag. 113. in such case quid iniquius, saith he, quam innocentis, quivratur p. 58netum quidem rationem habere? that is, What is more vniust, then even thén also not to hauehave anie care of the innocent partie? That inconvenience that cōcerneth others also,Ibid. is in like sort noted by Beza: that if divorce for adulterie & mariage againe were so far restrained, it would make both harlots more bolde & ready to offend; & those that had the wrong, quietly to put it vp, and not to seeke the punishment of it. Now, of what force these reasons are, may soone be espied of any that will a little marke them: both that which standeth vponupon the abuses going before; and those others that stand vponupon the inconveniences that follow after. For as touching that which standeth vponupon the abuses going before, as I hauehave noted so much already, that if so we should vse it, it would be but a weake reason to vrge any to be of that opinion: so in it selfe it is cleere indeed, that the abuses themselues were to bee amended, and by force of good lawes, or by good government to be taken away; and that no such liberty is to bee graunted for redresse thereof, as may not stand by vndoubted warrāt of the word of God. So that, if they suppose this to be such which now they do vrge, thē though they do require no more then iustly they may generally; yet therein they mis…e, that first they take such holde of this liberty, before they hauehave found it to be, by the word of God allowed vntounto them. The like may be said of the first sort of inconveniences also, such as concerne both the parties indifferētly: and of the last likewise, which were such as concerned others withal. But for the middle fort, such as concerne the innocent parties (which seeme to bee the strongest of all) although it cannot be denied, but that their case is hard and much to be pittied withall: yet, as themselues do grāt that they cast no further to helpe them, then it may stand p. 59with the written worde (and so are therein,Sect. 18. but only so weake, as in the other) so is it further to be cōsidered, that even those inconveniences of which they would so gladly ease the innocent parties, may be either so iust chasticements, or so needfull exercises for them, that we are not so much to cast, how to ease them therein (by taking of that burthen from them) as to incourage them, patiently to beare those crosses of theirs, and to teach them, that it is their duties so to do. So, for these reasons we are to suspēd our iudgements awhile, vntil we see these two things: first that such liberty (of divorce for adultery, and marrying againe) doth vndoubtedly stand with the word of God; then, that those other inconveniences (as they are called) are no such things as of duty should be sustained. Otherwise it is very cleere, that these reasons also doe nothing hold.

18 Those other things that are of a kind,How weakly they reason, vponupon other things whēce they draw reasōs to this. or so neere vntounto these, as that out of them they draw certaine reasons for these likewise, are divers: some of them such, as from which they reason, as from the like; and some others such againe, as from which they reason, as from the lesse vntounto the greater. Those that are such, as from which they reason as from the like,As from the like. are most of them taken out of the opinions or practise of men: but some of them also, out of the word of God it selfe. Of the former sort are those, whereof Erasmus bringeth reasonable good store: as namely, that the opinion of Iohannes Andreae is,In 1. Cor. 7. pag. 494.1 Cor 7 matrimonium, antequam intercesserit copula, posse dirimi, non solum ob professionem vitae monasticae, verum etiam sola Romani; pontificis authoritate: that is, that espousals, before the parties hauehave laine togither, may bee dissolved againe, not only for the professiō of the monastical life, but p. 60also, even by the authoritie of the Bishop of Rome alone, without any thing els.Ibid▪ Againe, out of Hostiensis, Augustinus, and Pope Lion, quod lapsus in haeresim dirimat matrimonium, etiam consummatum: & ita dirimat, ut jus sit ei qui perstiterit in fide, alteri jungi: that is, that to fal into heresie, dissolveth matrimonie, even consummate also: and dissolveth it so cleane, that it is lawful for the party that abideth in the faith, to marrie an other. Thirdly, that Zacharias the Pope, dirimat matrimonium ob rem habitam cum sorore vxoris:Ibid. that is, doth break of the bond of marriage, if the husband hath had to do with his wiues sister: and farther grā teth leaue to the wife, if she did not consent, to marrie againe. Lastly (so farre as I thinke needful to alleadge at this present) that Hostiensis making a question, an Ecclesia possit hodie statuere, Ibid. p. 495.ut altero fidelium prolapso in haeresim, possit alter conjugum transire ad nova vota, definit posse: that is, that setting the question, whether the Church may at this day take order, that if one of the parties that are married fal into heresie, then may the other marrie againe, hee resolveth, that the Church may so do. And then, having shewed by those and such like, what opinions there hauehave been, not vnlike (as he taketh it) in matters of marriage, to that which he moveth, he is bold to goe vntounto others also that are farther of:Page. 496. as that the Apostles, to pacifie the Iewes, tooke order with the Gentiles, for certaine of those ceremonies to be observed of the Christiās in Antioche; that the Bish: of Rome maketh other Bishops thā the Apostle alloweth of; & that the Church hath of late (to speak of) determined of divers matters, that were left at more libertie before, as Transubstantiation, the proceeding of the holy Ghost from the Sonne also, the Conception of the blessed Virgin,Pag. 497. and that the holy Ghost is of the same substance p. 61with the Father and the Sonne. Al which he alleageth to this ende, to shew that it is no new thing in the Church of God, as they see occasions to arise, so to take farther order in divers matters, than by those had been taken that were before them: and so would insinuate, that in that matter also they might do well to take such order as he cōmended, if so be that the word of God would beare it, as he was perswaded it would. Of the latter divers particulars are likewise alleaged, out of that same part of the Sermon of Christ in the Moūtaine (wherein also we hauehave the first speech that Christ did vtter concerning this matter) out of which both he, & some others besides, doe reason for the opinion they hold in the matter that now we speake of: both, of the liberty that our selues do take in other such like speeches of Christ; and of the perfection of those things that Christ doth there cōmend vntounto vsus. Cō cerning the liberty that ourselues doe take in other such like speeches of Christ, he saith, that whereas he forbiddeth vsus to sweare, to be angry, to reproach, to presume to come with our offering to God before that we are at one with our brother, to go to law, to requite displeasures, & to resist evill, and doth farther command vsus to louelove our enemies, to deserue wel of them that deserue ill of vsus, and to pray for them that curse vsus, first saith, quum eodem in loco plura doceat, quae purè germane que Christianis digna sunt, Ib. pag. 498.cur in ceteris omnibus recipimus interpretationem, in uno divortio tam rigidi sumus, ut magis etiam astringamus verba Christi: that is, When as in the same place he teacheth many things which simply and plainly concerne the dutie of Christians, why do we in al things else admit of some interpretation, and yet are so crabbed in this one point of Divorce, that we do even farther restaine those words of p. 62Christ? Concerning the perfection of those things that Christ doth there cōmend vntounto vsus, reasoning otherwise, on it than others do, he saith likewise, Christus haec locutus est, Pag. 499.non turbis, sed discipulis, id que in monte, depingens purissimam illam sui corporis partem quam appellat regnum coelorum cui nullis sit opus legibꝰ: that is, Christ spake these things not to the multitude, but to his Disciples, & that in the moūt, painting forth that most pure part of his bodie which he calleth the kingdome of heaven, wherevnto there wil bee no need of lawes. And by & by after, Pone talem populum qualem Christus optat, nec repudio fuerit opus, nec jurejurādo. Quod si ob infirmos quos in tanto numero plurimos habet Etclesia, nemo vetatur legibus jus suum persequi; nemo vetatur vim à capite repellere; nemo vetatur jurare modò ob rem, & ne pejeret; nemo cogitur bene mereri de male merentibus: cur vnum hoc de divortio promiscue exigimus ab omnibus? That is, Admit such a people as Christ wisheth, and there shall bee no neede either of Divorce, or of swearing But if for the weake, whome the Church hath in so greate abundance, no body is forbidden to seeke his right by law; no body is forbidden to defende himselfe from violence; no body is forbiddē to sweare, so there be cause, and that he forsweare not; no man is compelled to deserue wel of those that deserue ill of him: why do we exact this matter of divorce so generally of all? Others there be, that because Christ taught such perfection there, do therevpō gather, that if a man put away his wife for adultery, and marrie another it may not in any wise be called in questiō, for that it is allowed there, where things of so great perfection are taught. Those that are as from the lesse vntounto the greater,A… frō the lesse vntounto the greater are such as these. Because that Chrysostome giveth in the reason why the Iew is suffered p. 63to put away his wife, ne invisam occidat, that is, least that vponupon his hatred of her he also slay her, therevpon hee reasoneth,Annot. in 1. Cor. 7. pag. 502.1 Cor 7 Itáne prodesse debet apud Iudaeos flagitiosa sua malitia, & apud nos non proderit marito sua innocentia? That is, Shal the Iew hauehave that benefit of that wicked malice of his, and shall not an husband among vsus hauehave like benefit out of his vndefiled and honest dealing? The like againe (and one straine farther) a little after, Saltem hoc apud nos detur infoelici innocentiae, Ib. pag. 505quod apud Iudaeos datum est perversae maritorum acerbitati, quod Paulus indulget vidius intem… perantibus, ne quid admittant sceleratius. that is, At least, let that be graunted that we also may hauehave our miserable innocency so farre releiued, as the Iews had their perverse crabbednes borne with, and so far as S. Paul himselfe bearethwith intemperate widdowes, least they commit some further evill. Of what force these reasons of his are if now we examine, first as touching the opinion of those others (for such like matters as he presupposeth) that he brought in, the reason is sufficient to stop the mouths of those that so hold: but not to establish that point of doctrine it selfe. That the Apostles themselues, and the godly Fathers after, determined more plainely of divers things, then those that went before them had done, they had the word of God for them therein, and then not to bee reproued by any: but their doing therein may be no argument to moue vsus to determine of this, but only so farre (which appeareth not yet) as we may accoūt, that we hauehave the word of God to beare vsus out in it. But whereas he shuffleth in (among the rest) divers things that they determined & did against the word of God, we ought to be so much the more wary in suffering our selues to be led thereby, whenas the reason is of that nature, as buildeth on falshood, as well as p. 64on truth. As for the liberty that we take in those speeches of Christ, we take none (in any doctrine that thereof wee hold) but such as standeth by good warrant of the word of God in other places, and then can that be no sufficient reason to moue vsus, to do the like in this, for which (as yet) we finde in the word no warrant at all. And, though much be to be attributed vntounto him: yet in this it may be doubted, that himselfe vnderstood not those places; else that never he would hauehave so reasoned on them. The perfection that Christ might seeme thereby, to commend vntounto vsus, was not to that ende so laid open by him to shew in how many things wee must be spared for our weakenesse sake; but plainely to shew vsus, how wee ought to endeavor our selues to walke in that holy calling: and then doth it leese the force of the reason for which he brought it. Neither doth Christ therein teach vsus so absolute perfectiō in those points, but that some others also there are, of an higher degree then those, of which he speaketh no thing at all. As in his first example of doing murther, though hee forbid divers other braunches of that evil roote, yet neither doth he recite but a very few of them (to speake of) in comparison of the rest: neither doth hee speake any thing of the contrary vertues, or great care that we ought to hauehave of the safety and good estate of others, which notwithstanding are by the commandement also required. And so likewise in all the rest. So his purpose was not there to teach all perfection; but to giuegive them to vnderstand, that he was so far from setting them loose from that strict rule of life which the law prescribed vntounto them, that he did require much more of them by vertue thereof, thē they did thinke they were bound vntounto: and that doth hee content himselfe briefly to shew, by those few examples. In which p. 65sense if we take it, then shall we soone espy,Sect. 19. how weake also that reason is of those others. Those that are taken, as from the lesse to the greater, carry their owne weaknesse with them so plaine, that no body need (as I doe take it) any further to shew it: being able to shew, if need were, that one of them hath such a wem or gawl in it besides (that censure of his, of those his widdowes) that there is no reason why it should be (in this light that now wee hauehave) of credit with any.

19 The authority or testimonie of others,How weakly they reason frō the authority of …thers▪ & first of God whereon certaine of their reasons rely, is either of God: or else of men. Of those that rely on the authority or testimony of God, that is, vponupon the written word, they hauehave two sorts of reasons that are but weake: one sort, by mistaking of the Text it selfe; an other, by gathering amisse thereon.First by mistaking the Text. Mistaking of the Text is (in this matter) a common slip almost with them all: and then, if they ground any reasons thereon, needs must they be of smale importance. And first, Erasmus hauing conceaved, as we saw before,Erasmu… ▪ that the law did plainely allow the husband to put away his adulterous wife (if she were very bad therein: for so hee limiteth his iudgement thereof) he vrgeth further (as in that place also was declared) that it is not added there (fuisse) hoc datum duritiae cordis, Annot. in 1. Cor. 7. pag. 505.1 Cor 7praesertim quum ex sensu naturae non possit sciri quod nos interpretamur ▪ that is, that it was graunted for the hardnesse of their harts, especially when as that which we doe gather thereon (meaning as I take it, that which we hauehave learned of Christ, that it was but for the hardnes of their harts) cannot be gathered by sence or nature. And immediatly he addeth further, Et si concessum est duritiae cordis, uti que licet, quod concedit Deus: praesertim si nullo signo declaret eos peccare, qui permisso vtantur. that is, And if it be p. 66graunted but for the hardnesse of their harts; yet is that lawfull, that God hath graunted: especially if hee doe no way declare that those doe offend that vse the liberty that is permitted. In which notwithstanding hee doth not so rest, but that he taketh hold of an other help withall, adding therevnto as followeth▪ Verum haec utcun que habeant, ita conceditur, ut tamen impunt sit marito duxisse quam velit, nec vetantur utcun que repudiatae nubere. Inter dum enim hoc licere dicitur, quod Lex non punit: that is, But howsoever these things be, it is so far granted, that there is no punishmēt for the husband that (in such case) marrieth (another) whom he will, neither are these that are divorced howsoever, forbidden to marry againe (it may bee notwithstanding his meaning herein, that men are not forbidden to marry such as are any way divorced; but the other I rather thinke to be his meaning. Then he proceedeth) For sometimes that is said to be lawfull, which the Law doth not punish. And so doth he reason before likewise vponupon that supposall of his,Ib. pag. 499 that such a liberty was by Moses graunted vntounto them. Cur, quum idem si… morbus, non idem admovetur remedium? that is, What reason is there that, when we need that helpe as much as they it should not be graunted to vsus as much as to them? Musculus likewise in such sort mistaking it, doth neverthelesse build somewhat vponupon it. Moses, … Mat. 19.Matt 19saith he, permiseret libellum repudit Judaeis: ex hoc permissu passiu… repudiabaentur vxore…, that is, Moses had permitted a bil of divorcement vntounto the Iewes: by the means of that permission of his, it grew to be a common thing among them, for husbands to divorce their wiues from them. And so mistaking another besides, neverthelesse he maketh it the chiefe part of the ground of his opinion, that there is no divorce, but where the parties may marry p. 67againe. For hauing that point in hand, that in the Church there is no other divorce by law allowed,Ib. pag. 11▪ but that uter que maneat incōingatus, aut reconciliētur, that is, that each party abide vnmaried or bee recōciled, hee inferreth, that Christ spake de nullo ficto, sed vero divortio, per quod potestas dabatur denuo cum alia cōtrahendi conjugiū, &c. Nullū enim aliud divortiū noverāt Iudaei, &c: licuisse autē dimissae alteri nubere, vel hoc testimonij sufficiat, quòd sacerdoti praecipitur in lege, ne dimissam ducat: quae lex supervacanea esset, sifas non esset repudiatae denuo nubere: that is, of no counterfet, but of the true divorce, by which power was given to marry againe with another. For the Jewes knew no other divorce. And that it was lawfull for her that was divorced to marrie againe, this one testimony onlie may be sufficient, that cōmandement was givē in the Law, that a Priest might not marrie a divorced woman which law had beene superfluous, if it had not beene lawfull for a woman divorced to marrie againe. Which also (among others) is the collection of Kemnitius himselfe, for the lawfulnes of this libertie of Divorce and marrying againe,Exam. par. 2. in Sam. 7. pag. 285. against a contrary determination set downe thereof by the Councel of Trent a litle before. But hereof this little taste may be sufficient, for that the chiefe part of the groundworke of their opinion doth rest thereon (for that which they hauehave in the Olde Testament to build vponupon:) which was a great part of the inducement that led them vntounto it. Concerning which, & al such like, it is cleere inough in it selfe, that mistaking the Text whereon they grounded, the opinion that they conceiue thereon must needs bee but weake, and needeth nothing els to discover the weaknes of it, but only to shewe that they mistake the Text it selfe.Sense of nature aperilous giud herein. But in Erasmus we hauehave some things else to note besides. First that in these things p. 68he rested somewhat on the sense of nature: as perilous a guide in the matters that now we speake of, as (of those that are of some credit) a mā could lightly otherwise hauehave chosen. For being by nature so much given as we are to the lusts of the flesh (and to hauehave variety therein) and to be avenged of such displeasures as are done vntounto vsus (especially such, as touch vsus so neere, as now we speake of) wee are not to looke for any other, but that we may be as easily blinded in this, if we leane to our owne iudgement therein, as in any thing else that can lightly befal vsus. So that, in this especiallie, he should not hauehave rested anie thing at all on the sense of nature, but hauehave fought some better guid, whom he might more safely hauehave followed. Then also, how readily he taketh hold on that permission, even onlie for that it was permitted (not regarding how farre, not howe) though himselfe doe finde none other, but that it was only for the hardnes of their hearts: a sufficient burn; to hauehave discredited the vse of that libertie to all that are godly, or that hauehave any reasonable care, even of their honestie before mē. And yet whereas he doth so readily take such hold thereon, it may seeme to argue, that his store otherwise is but weake. Lastly, that after a sort abandoning these, if they should not be thought meete to serue, he taketh hold of an other almost as weake: namelie, that because there was no punishment set down for it in the Policie of Moses, therfore it was after a sort, or in some sense permitted vntounto them. And yet is it sufficiently knowne vntounto al; that as in al other Policies whatsoever, even so in that of Moses also, there be divers things that are vnlawful, which there hauehave no punishment at al devised for thē: and therefore that we are not so to reason, that seeing it is not punished there (as neither it was to hauehave manie p. 69wiues) therefore it is no offence to doe it.Sect. 20. For although such a reason might best hold from thence, of any other Policie in al the world besides: yet even that also woulde faile vsus herein, if anie should rest so far vponupon it.

20 But now, if we come to consider,Then by gathering amisse thereon: but therein only of a couple of them. how farre they hauehave gathered amisse vponupon those several Textes that they hauehave vsed, what others may thinke, I know not, but, for my selfe, I cānot but marvaile at many things that I finde therein. Which kinde of gathering when I also had gathered, as needful to bee commended vntounto the farther consideration of the learned, I found them in number to bee so many, & to proceede from so many great personages also, that I thought it sufficient for the matter, and meetest also in some other respects, to take but some few of them (leaving the rest vntounto the search of those that desire to looke farther into them:) and therein also, not to deale with al those or many of them that so are minded, but only with some few, & such as the equity of the cause it selfe shal most desire to be called vntounto such triall. In which respect. I hauehave thought good to resolue on Erasmus for the one, and on M^r Beza for the other: because that (of those that are extant, and yet I hauehave seene) those two hauehave of set purpose discoursed thereof, and most largely handled the same. And in these also to omit al such collections, as elsewhere by occasion may passe them, while principallie they intend some other matter, I meane to deale but only with those (and but with some of thē neither) that belong vntounto the chiefe and principal points of the matter that is in question: namely, how they gather their opinion or iudgement therein; and how they answere such Obiectiōs as may be alleaged against it. And first as touching Erasmus, Erasmus.although he professe no more but only to propoūde p. 70it, and to commend it to the farther consideration of the learned, and to that end more largely sheweth, both that divers before hauehave beene of that minde, or at least inclinable vntounto it; and that such like things they hauehave in dayly allowance among themselues: yet doth he plainely enough professe, that (for his part) he is of that minde himselfe; and laboureth also to take away such obiections as seeme to be of force against it.First for his owne opiniō herein. As touching the former of them, the truth is, that as there is none of them all, that do build this opinion of theirs on any other Text besides (excepting those which they did mistake, of which I hauehave spoke before) but only on that exceptiō which Christ vsed two severall times, namely, in the fift, and in the nineteenth of S. Matthew: so he also (for that his opiniō) goeth no further but only to it, and therevpon buildeth that which he hath thereon conceiued. But those words of Christ doth he account to make so plaine for hispurpose, that because we allow not on such divorce to marry againe, hee chargeth vsus that in divortio tam rigidi fimus, ut magis etiam astringamus verba Christi. Annot. in 1. Cor. 7. pag. 498.1 Cor 7that is, That in divorce we are so hard or greivous, that we do further restraine those words of Christ. And his reason is, Etenim quum ille reliquerit marito unam causam repudiandae coningis, nos cam multis mo…is astringimus. that is. For whereas hee left to the husband one cause for which he might put away his wife, wee doe many waies restraine the faine.Pag. 499. And after againe, Iudaei quod Moses …eri…serat de libetto repudi… sic interpretabantur, quasi ma…veis jui effet qualibet lecit de causa reijcere coinge &c. Id Christus astringit ad unam adulterii causam. that is, The Iewes did so interpret that which Moses wrote of the bill of divorce, as though husbands might put away their wiues for any cause though never so smal. That did Christ p. 71restraine only vntounto the cause of adultery. And by and by after, Ergo suis Christus unam dunt axat causam indulget divortij. that is, Therefore Christ alloweth vntounto his but only one cause of divorce. And in these (so far as yet I hauehave found) is his iudgement most plainely declared. In which it is good to note those two things: first that he buildeth for that matter on no other Scripture, but only on that exception; then, that hee so taketh that exception, that thereon he inferreth, that for adultery Christ himselfe alloweth divorce. If he build vponupon no other Scripture but only on that exception, thē our busines lying within lesse roome, & neerer vntounto vsus, we may so much the sooner find how it holdeth together that he gathereth thereon. If he so take the exception, that thereon hee gathereth, that Christ alloweth the husband to put away his wife for adultery, thē, either must the place it selfe be of that nature that it can hauehave no other sense but it: or, if it may hauehave some other besides, thē is he to shew what reason he hath why the place should rather be taken as he would hauehave it, then as others hauehave taken it heretofore. Whereas therefore it is evident (by the iudgement of most men, in the Church of God, who did otherwise take it) that the place may hauehave another sense, and yet himselfe, hauing shewed no reason which may stand for any iust proofe, that the Text must needs be taken in that sense that he would hauehave it, doth neverthelesse so enter vponupon it, and will hauehave that to be the meaning of it hence is it, that for any thing that yet I doe see to the contrary, hee can hardly avoid the reproofe of a forcible entry, or to looke for so much curtesie at his adversaries hands, as first to graunt him, that that shall be the sense of the place. And then hauing gotten so much for divorce, that in such case the husband may vse p. 72the benefit of it, that is to put away his wife if so she hauehave sinned, then will himselfe inferre the other also (that then he may lawfully marry another) only by telling vsus plainely, what divorce it is that he meaneth. For he saith Divortium interim appello, Ib. pag. 498.not that, quo dirimitur domestica consuetudo, manente coniugij vinculo, but verum, & quale solum illa novit aet as, qua licebat, à repudio prioris, alteram dacere. Whereby he giueth vsus to vnderstand, that he meaneth such divorce as altogether breaketh the bād of marriage, and not such as standeth by law all Christendome through (almost) if there bee no other cause but adultery only. Which two if we lay together, namely, that Christ alloweth divorce in case of adultery, and then, that the divorce must also be such as giueth free liberty to marry againe, the collection that he maketh on those wordes of Christ must needs be this, that Christ alloweth those that be his, to put away their wiues for adultery, and to marry againe: an opinion that is, notwithstanding al his submissions and protestations before and after, more boldly avouched; then it is with any of his proofes that yet I hauehave found, or (as I am persuaded) ever shall, strongly confirmed.Then, for his defense against others. As touching the latter, that is, how, for his defense, he gathereth vponupon those places that doe seeme to make against him, we are first to note, that some there are with which at all he doth not meddle, and yet are of special importance against the opinion that he conceiued: & then further we are to consider how he gathereth his defense out of those that he vseth. If some there be that hee medleth not with, and yet are of special importance, then may we account, that his defense is so much the weaker: and those places that now I speake of are those two, the one of Deuteronomie, the other of Malachie, that I shewed p. 73before to bee most likely to bee mistaken, in which the Hebrew in them both, & the Septuagint also in the latter of them, do so frame those Texts to speake, as that to one that would hauehave cleered the questiō of the doubts thereof, those also had beene as needefull to bee answered, as not many others more. Those that he vseth, are certain of those speeches, which (concerning this matter) were vttered by Christ: and certaine others of the Apostle S^t Paul. Those that he taketh of Christ are three:Out of the words of Christ. two of thē in effect but one; but the other, a severall one by it selfe. Those that are in effect but one, are those two so well knowne places, in the first and nineteenth Chapters of the Gospell by S. Matthew. Where Christ doth so much restraine the liberty of divorce, restraining it vntounto adultery only, as these men take it. Out of which how hee gathereth for his defense, is a thing very specially worth the marking. For hee doth not now gather, as the residue do, vponupon the advantage that is supposed to lie in the Exception; but out of the whole restraint generally: gathering, that the doctrine which was there delivered, did draw so neere vntounto the perfection of true Christianity, that if wee should exactly apply it vntounto our liues, to make it a rule vntounto vsus, we had need to vse some favorable interpretation of many things therein; or that wee had some dispensation to avoid the strictnes of it. For the former he saith,Pag. 498. Verùm quum eodem in loco complura doceat quae purè germané que Christianis digna sunt, cur in caeteris omnibus recipimus interpretationem, in vno divortio tam rigidi sumus, vt magis etiam astringamus verba Christi? that is, But seeing hee teacheth many things in that place which may right well become Christians indeed, how commeth it to passe, that in al the rest we content our selues with (some favourable) interpretation, p. 74and only in divorce we are so austere, that wee doe even further restraine those words of Christ. And anon after, when he hath shewed how much we restraine, as he doth take it, those words of Christ, comming to that course againe that he may giuegive in some examples of it, he further addeth, Hac igitur una in parte tam mordicus tenemus summum, Ibid.quod aiunt, jus, in caeteris quamvis recipientes interpretationem. Vetat inibi, Ne juremus omnino: vetát que multò severius quàm divortium, & pluribus verbis inculcat: & tamē ob tres drachmas juramus passim, sic excusantes, Non est jurandum temerè. Cur non item, Non est divertendum temere? Vetat ille irasci: Mox subijcimus, Temere. Vetat ille compellare quenquam contumeliosius: nos etiam colaphos impingimus, deni que occidimus, & excusamus, Non laedendi sed castigā di animo &c; that is, Therefore in this point wee doe so strictly cleaue vntounto the vttermost that may seeme to bee vrged thereby, receauing any interpretation in the rest. He there forbiddeth, to sweare at all. And with greater severity he forbiddeth that, then he doth divorce, & with more words doth beate vponupon it: and yet for the worth of a shilling we commonly swere, excusing our selues, that we are not (indeed) to sweare rashly. And why not as well, that a man, may not leaue his wife rashly? He forbiddeth to be angry: and we by & by adde (the meaning to be, that wee doe it not) rashly. He forbiddeth to reproach any: yet we even beat, and slay also: & then excuse our selues, that we doe it but to chastice him only, and not to hurt him. And so forth bringing divers other such instances or examples besides: and so concluding on them likewise. For the latter he addeth likewise,Pag. 499. Si ut conditus erat homo, perseverasset, nullum erat futurum inter vllos divortium. Christus revocans suos ad pristinam innocentiam, non vult divortium, p. 75quia non vult duros corde: & tamen Paulus indulget humanae fragilitati, relaxans saepenumero Domini praeceptum. Cur non idem facere possit Romanus Pontifex? that is, If man had continued as first he was made, there would thē hauehave beene no divorce among them. Christ calling back those that were his to that former innocency, will hauehave no divorce, because he will not hauehave them to be hardharted: & yet Paul beareth with the infirmity of man, releasing ofttime the Lords commandement. Why may not the Bishop of Rome do the same likewise? By which, I trust, it may sufficienly appeare, that he rested not on that supposed allowance of divorcing for adultery, but (over and besides that) accounteth the residue of that prohibition of divorce so streight, as that it were needfull for vsus, either to hauehave some favourable interpretation for it; or at least to be dispensed with all for some part of it: and yet that in either of those his gatherings he hath one speciall slip besides. For in the former, when he pleadeth for such favorable interpretation, the only force of his reasoning standeth, as it were from the like, or else from the lesser vntounto the greater. Which hee endeavoreth to confirme vntounto vsus by all those examples that there he bringeth, of which I recited but a few of them: shewing, that seeing we doe in such sort interpret them, as that wee doe not account our selues to be tied to the letter of thē (as indeed we doe for the cheifest of thē, & those that giuegive credit (that which he seeketh) vntounto the rest, & so may doe by good Divinity; the rest being none of our interpretatiō of them, but only the fruits either of the ignorance of those daies, or of the corrupt affections of flesh & blood) we should in like sort, if not much rather, interpret that of divorce likewise, as his own words do plainly declare. But now the truth is p. 76that that interpretation of ours which we giuegive of the rest stādeth by authority of the word of God, & that by other Scriptures we are forced so to take thē (as when there we are forbiddē to sweare at al, & yet elsewhere are taught to sweare by God, & that it is a part of the worship that we must do him:) and that the interpretation that he woulde hauehave vsus to make of the other, is not such as any other Scripture doth lead vsus vntounto; but such as al other Scripture directly crosseth as we do take it, and trust to make plaine ere we hauehave done. And then, if we hauehave Scripture for the one, but not for the other, howsoever that motion of his may savour well of great humanitie: yet wel maie wee doubt, that such stuffe would be but seelie Divinitie. In the latter likewise, besides that he chargeth S. Paul to dispence ofttimes with the Lordes commandement (which would be hard for him to proue,) and thē he seeth no reason, but that the B. of Rome might do so also (wherein he spake according to the manner of those daies, or els but offereth somewhat to ride him) he may seeme to gather, that Christ did no farther restraine divorce vntounto his, neither himselfe had anie farther meaning, but so far as their hardnes of hearts shoulde bee also abolished, that thereby they should not stand in need of that help to their infirmitie: which course if in other things also we should attēpt, sooner should we shew our selues to endeavor, rather to make our corrupt inclinatiō a rule to interpret the Scriptures vntounto vsus; than to allow, that the Scriptures should be a rule vntounto vsus, whereby to amend, or to call to the checke, whatsoever ill waies there are in our owne corruption. That which is a several one by it selfe, is that same that in the 19 of Matthew Christ also vttered, that it was not for man to put asunder, that which God hath coupled togither. p. 77Concerning which he saith, Porrò quod obijcitur ex eodem loco, Quod Deus conjunxit, homo ne separet, Ib. pag. 499.nō magno negotio solvi potest. Hoc Deus conjunxit quod rite conjungitur: hoc Deus dirimit quod rite dirimitur. That is, Furthermore, that which is obiected out of the same place, that vvhichwhich God hath coupled togither, that let no man put asunder, may soone be answered. That (only) hath God coupled togither, that is coupled aright: & that doth God (himselfe) breake a sunder that is wel put a sunder. In which course also he then in such sort proceedeth, that although he wel provideth that he wil hauehave no divorce to bee made by the parties themselues, nor by anie but onlie such as are in authoritie for those matters: yet he plainely sheweth, that he would hauehave it to bee done for more causes than for adulterie, and yet that it also should be Gods doing too. Quod male, saith he, cōglutinavit pueritia, quod vinum, quod temeritas, quod inscitia, quod male per lenas ac lenones, Ibid p. 500.suos Diaconos conjū cerat diabolus, hoc per suos Ministros recte dirimit Deus ▪ that is, that that which childhood, which excesse in wine, which rashnes, which ignorāce had coupled togither, that which by harlots and bawds his owne proper Deacons the Divel had ioined, those doeth God by those Ministers of his rightly put asunder againe.Ibid p. 499. To which ende also he tolde vsus a little before, that neither among the Gentiles, nor yet among the Iewes marriages were accounted to be of force, without the cōsent of the parents or the principal friends vntounto them appertaining: & tamē apud utros que ali quo modo dirimi poterat matrimoniū. Apud Christianos facilime coit conjugium, & semel initum nullo pacto potest dissolvi: that is, & yet with thē both, marriage might some way or other bee dissolved among thē. But among Christians marriage is most easilie made, and p. 78yet when it is made, then is there no waie to vndoe it againe. In this therefore (pleading for so great a liberty to divorce, as hee doth) hee hath not only no Scripture for him, but now also even the most of those, that (in these daies of ours) are for divorce and marrying againe, flatlie against him: & so, his gathering herein not only in truth, but also to them, who only shoulde hauehave the benefit of it, sufficiently weakened. Those that he taketh out of S. Paul, are three likewise:Out of S. Paul. but the first two of them, in effect, but one; and the third a several place by itselfe. The first two are, the one, out of the seventh likewise of the former Epistle vntounto the Corinthians. Hom. 7:2, 3, 4.To the former of them, that sheweth the woman to be bound to her husband so long as he liveth,Ibid. p. 502. his answere is, Non hîc agit Paulus de divortio, sed similitudinem adducit Iudaeis exipsorum lege, qua doceat ac persuadeat, antiquata jam Mosi lege per evangelium, non amplius illos teneri legis caeremonijs, quū Christo novo sponso nupserint. Nec est necesse similitudinem aut parabolam quadrare per omnia, &c: that is, The Apostle doth not here speake of divorce (which notwithstanding himselfe doth but saie, & not proue) but he bringeth vntounto the Iews a similitude out of their owne law, by the which hee may teach and perswade, that the Law of Moses being now abolished by the Gospel, they are no more bound to the ceremonies of the law, being now married to Christ their new husbād. Neither is it needful that a similitude or parable should in all things agree, a thing that is not in this required: and yet must the thing it selfe be true, if anie thing shalbe proved thereby. To the latter of them (much like to the former) he answereth likewise,Ib. pag. 503. Ne hîc quidem Paulus tractat materiam divortij, sed adhortatur pro illorum temporum statu, ut quae liberae sunt à conjugio, praesertim vidus (nam ad harū causam p. 79videtur redire) abstineant à cōjugio, &c: that is, Neither here doth Paul treate of the matter of Divorce, but he exhorteth, as the estate of that time required, that such women as were free from marriage, especially widdows (for he seemeth to returne to them againe) would abstaine frō marriage, to the end they might be freer from worldly affaires, &c. Which assertion of his, besides that he hath not proved it, maketh little for him, for that though the Apostle did not to that end speake it; yet nothing letteth, but that so it may be applied. That which is a several place by it selfe, is out of the selfe same chapter also vntounto the Corinthians, where the Apostle requireth in the name of the Lord, that the wife depart not from her husband, and that the husband do not put away his wife: which, as himselfe saith, is locus omnium difficilimus, that is, the hardest place of them al. Concerning which his best answere is,Ibid. p. 503. that S. Paul there doth not treate de gravibus flagitijs, quae crimen adulterij vel aequent, vel superent etiam: sed de levioribus offē sis, ob quas, apud Graecos potissimum, crebra fiebant divortia: that is, not of grievous crimes which were as great as adulterie, or greater rather, but of the lighter offences, for the which especially among the Grecians, there were oftē divorces made. Alleadging also a testimony out of Iuvenal, of one that had, by such dealing, eight husbands in fiue yeares. And the reason that he bringeth, why hee taketh it that the Apostle spake but of lesser offences, he gathereth out of the reconciliation that there is mentioned: which notwithstanding prooveth it not; but leaveth it only on the credit of his owne iudgement. Which belike himselfe did somewhat perceiue, because hee rested not therein, but tooke hold of some others, and those also as weake as it: one, of difference of the sex, pleading that he gaue that p. 80lesson but only to womē (which while he doth,Sect. 21. he letteth slip a scape or two;) the other, his owne ghesse, what the Apostle would hauehave set downe for such matters, if the case had beene put vntounto him, as it is with vsus. And when yet he doubteth that this his answere will not content all, but that some may happily vrge that the Apostle did not there meane to exclude the cause of Adultery, for that, it seemeth, he had no more to say but this, Cur non excipit quod excipit Dominus? Imò cur addidit, quod non addidit Dominus, Maneat innupta? Cur viro prohibet ne dimittat, cui permittit Christus, ut dimittat adulteram? that is, (altogether reasoning, if you marke it, on that which is in question among vsus, and yet grounding thereon as if it were either proued by him, or by vsus granted vntounto him) Why thē did not the Apostle except, which the Lord himselfe excepted? And more then that; why did he adde, which the Lord added not, namely, Let her abide vnmarried? Why doth hee forbid the husband to put any away, when as Christ himselfe alloweth to put his wife away, if she be an adulteresse? And thus much to shew, how Erasmus hath gathered, both for his conceiuing of that opinion at the first: and for the cleering of it besides, of those obiections which he saw might be made against it.

M. Beza how hee likewise doth gather amisse.21 M^r Beza wrote long after Erasmus, when as the motion that he had made was now considered vponupon by many, and condescended vntounto by some: and he wrote so purposely of it, that if there be any thing that may rightly be gathered for it, we may hope to finde it in him; and, if that shalbe sufficient to confirme that point of doctrine vntounto vsus, that then we shall finde nothing at all, that wilbe wrong or hardly gathered. Here therefore it shalbe good to consider, what he hath found, either whereon to build p. 81that opiniō of his, or to defend it against those Scriptures that are against it. What he hath found, for the grounding of his owne opinion therein,First in establishing his own opinion. we may sufficiently gather out of that which himselfe setteth downe for that matter. For,De Repud. & divo…t. pag. 109. after that first he hath sundred certaine other things from the question that he hath in hand, which owise might hauehave cūbred him very much therein, he plainly inferreth Adulterio igitur coniugium, rectè & bona conscientia, dirimi posse affirmo, expressis hac de re Christi verbis. that is, Therefore I affirme, vponupon the expresse wordes of Christ, that rightly and with a good conscience, marriage by adultery may be dissolved: as resolute, and as plaine an asseveration, as at any time needeth; and therefore likely enough to hauehave some special good ground worke whereon it is grounded. Which, by his quotation in the margent, himselfe doth shew to be those very words that before we spake of, and which are in question betwixt vsus, & that they are those expresse wordes of Christ, Mat. 5:31, & 19:9.Matt 5:31Matt 19:9that hee did meane. Howbeit those are they, that, as touching the sense of them, are altogether in question betwixt vsus: and by what right may he then account them so expresse or plain on his behalfe, when as hee knoweth that that is plainely denied vntounto him. Which because he could not but know, that therein he was contradicted by many, therefore hee addresseth himselfe immediatly to proue, that that must be the sense of those his words: and needfull it is, that we doe well marke the force of his reason. Quum enim, saith he, videret Christus Legem de lapidandis adulteris latam (ut & alias pleras que ) contemni, cavere tamen conscientiis voluit: ideo que , interrogatus, an, ut facere plurimi solebant, quavis ex causa divortij libellum tradere liceret, sic respondit, ut non tantum negaret id fas esse quavis ex causa, verumetiam exprimeret, p. 82nulla id ex causa nisi ob adulterium licere: quibus verbis nihil planius aut magis perspicuum dici potest. Ita que nullus adhuc est, quod sciam, inter Christianos, seu veteres seu recentiores inventus, qui non concesserit, probato adulterio, fas esse innocenti nocentem dimittere: sed pleri que excogitata distinctione inter separationem à thoro, & dissolutionem ipsius conjugalis vinculi, quod rectè prius constituerant mox evertunt, qúā novi conjugij potestatem separatis non concedunt. Cujus sententiae quum etiam Augustinus ipse fuerit, necesse est imprimis ostendere, quam firmis rationibus omnia contraria argumenta doctissimi Theologi nostra memoria diluerint. that is, For whē Christ did see that the law of stoning adulterous persons to death (as divers other good laws besides) were not regarded; yet would he provide for the conscience therein: and therefore being asked, whether as many did vse to doe, it were lawfull for every cause to giuegive a bill of divorcement, he so answered, that hee did not only deny, that for every cause it was lawfull so to doe, but also did plainely set down, that it was lawful for none other cause, but only for adultery: then the which, nothing can bee more plainely, or perspicuously spoken. And therefore is there none found as yet, that I knowe of, among Christians, either of olde or of late, which hath not allowed that adultery being proued, it is lawfull for the innocent party by divorce to put away the offender: but divers of them, hauing devised a distinction betwixt the separation from bed, and the dissolution of the band of marriage it selfe, doe by and by overthrow that, which rightly they did allow of before, seeing that they doe not graunt liberty to marry againe, to those that are in such sort sundred. Of which opinion seeing even Augustine himselfe was, it is specially needfull to shew, with how strong reasons the p. 83most learned Divines in this age of ours, hauehave clean wipt away all the arguments of the contrary side. And so, hee presently setteth in hand to answere those Obiections, that hee thinketh to stand in the way of that resolution. But first let vsus see what proofe it is hee hath brought for his owne. Forsooth that Christ, for that hee saw that the law for stoning adulterous persons to death was despised, purposing to provide for the conscience before God, he therefore &c. What hauehave wee here, but only his owne ghesse, that that was the purpose and meaning of Christ? Which if it were not, as then wee hauehave herein no proofe at all: so if it bee no more but doubtfull; for that hee might as likely hauehave some other meaning (which after I trust wil easilie appeare) yet then also this coniecture of his may not iustlie stand for any sound proofe neither, although for his worthines otherwise his iudgement may be had in special reverence. And it is not to be denied, but that that which he bringeth in immediatly after, of so general a cōsent of al, in the allowance of Divorce for adulterie, doth much make for that iudgmēt of his at the first sight; but then there is to be considered withall, both that they mistooke those places of the Old Testament, which they thought to allow of Divorce for lesse matters;Deut. 24. c.Deut 24 and that yet they did not allow of such divorce for adultery, as might dissolue the bond of marriage. For if they did so far mistake those places aforesaid, as that then they made no question, but that by the word of God divorce was allowed for lesser matters, then they might easily be of opiniō, that there was no doubt, but that much rather it was allowed for the greater: and in that they were so loath to allow, that even for it also the bond of marriage shoulde stand as broken, it may seeme thereby, that although they p. 84had in minde those wordes of Christ, aswel as these, yet how plaine so ever M^r Beza doth account thē, they could not finde that so they might take them. Now that S. Augustine was of that minde too, that doth weigh so much against him, as the credit of his iudgment standeth with any. Whether therefore wee may be bold to account, that here among these plaine and resolute speeches wee hauehave any proofe whereon to stay our cōsciences before God, or whether nothing could be spoken with greater perspicuitie, when as so many (and so quicke of sight) could never so finde it, that do I refer vntounto others, & thinke it needful to be pondred of such, as any way hauehave occasiō to vse the benefit of sound iudgment therein. But belike M^r Beza did not meane much to confirme, that to be the sense of the words of Christ that he had gathered (for that hee thought that matter cleere enough in it selfe) but hastned rather to answere such Obiectiōs as he found to be made against it. And so are wee also to see, how he contenteth himselfe therein. The Obiections therefore that himselfe acknowledgeth to be brought against it,Then, in answering to certai…e Obiections. are halfe a score: where of the one halfe are brought out of the worde of God; the other, out of other reasons besides. As for vsus, it shalbe sufficient to take the assay only of those that are taken out of the word of God: and those are the verie same (and none other) that Erasmus before had brought, both for the places of Scripture out of which they are taken, & for the order & disposing of them; and, excepting the first, for the matter also. These therefore are likewise taken, some of them out of the words of Christ: & some of thē, out of the Apostle S. Paul. And so belike wee hauehave al this while found nothing more in effect in the worde of God for this matter, than Erasmus had found at the first, when p. 85hee made the motion of it. Those places that are of the words of Christ are three:Out of the words of Christ. but the first two are heere also ioined togither in one and so do both stand but for one, & the thirde for another by it selfe. Those two places of Christ that make but one, are those former places out of the 5. and 19. Chapters of S Matthew: but the Obiection that M^r Beza gathereth, is not like that which Erasmus gathered before, but varieth from it. For whereas Erasmus gathered out of the austeritie or strictnesse of the whole, but that one way or other the strictnes of it was to be mitigated vntounto vsus, M^r Beza, on the other side, out of the libertie that he supposeth to be given by the one part of it, answereth an Obiection that out of another part of it is made against them. As touching the Obiection hee saith, Primùm opponunt …lli istud Christi dictum; Qui repudiatam duxerit moechatur. Nam certe si penitus solutum esset vinculum, moechari vir ejusmodi non diceretur: that is, First they obiect that saying of Christ, He that marrieth her that is divorced, committeth adulterie. For truely, if the bond of marriage were cleane broken, such an one should not bee said to commit adulterie. VntoUnto which his answere is, Exceptionem priori membro additam, in posteriori quo que esse repetendam: that is, that the Exception that is added vntounto the former member of the sentence, is to bee repeated againe in the latter part of it. But this is no more but only saide: the proofe doth follow immediatly after, in this manner; Nam si qui dimittat uxorem extra causam fornicationis, facit ut ea moec…etur, consequitur eum qui uxore propter adulteriū repudiata aliam duxerit, non facere ut ea moechetur. Ex quo tur sum colligitur, id quod subijcit, apud Matthaeum de repudiata, non nisi repetita ex priore membro exceptione intelligendum, quoniam Dominus alioqui sibi cōtradixisset: that is, For p. 86if he that putteth away his wife, without the cause of fornication, maketh her to commit adulterie, it followeth (saith he, but let others iudge, whether it doe so or not) that hee, which putting away his wife for adulterie doth marrie an other, doth not make her to commit adulterie. Out of which againe it is gathered, that that which is there added concerning her that is put away, is not to be taken but with the Exception that is in the former member, because otherwise the Lord shoulde contradict himselfe, or in one part of the sentence should go against that which he setteth downe in another. Which proofe of his though he do somewhat further backe against one thing that is in that place obiected besides: yet this is all the proofe that hee hath for this very point that nowe wee speake of. But, if we marke it, me thinke it wil soone shew it selfe to be a strange kinde of proofe. For, admit that the Exceptiō that now we speak of, must needs imply (which notwithstanding wee doe not graunt, but avow it to bee the thing that lyeth in question betwixt vsus) that for adultery a man might lawfully put his wife away: yet doth it not so necessarily follow that every one might so doe; or, that no case might be such, but that, if the wife committed adultery, then might her husband lawfully divorce her from him. For it is sufficient for the truth of the proposition (even in that sense takē) if any case be such, as that for adultery it may lawfully be done. As, though we may truly say (as the Scripture also in many places, in effect and meaning, doth, though not in the same tearmes) that God had no peculiar people for those daies in all the worlde, except the seede of Abraham, or out of that stock or race of his: yet doth it not follow, that all those were of that fellowship; but only, that he had none other besides. Whereas p. 87therefore that exception may bee satisfied with any particular (that, for adultery, as the case may bee, it may bee allowed) and yet he inferreth a generall vponupon it, saying that he, that putting away his wife for adulterie, marrieth another, doth not commit adultery (for though the proposition, in those tearmes, be but indefinite, yet is it an vniversall by nature) hence doth it follow, that his proofe is of no better force, then an argument may bee that is taken from a particular vntounto a generall, or frō the part vntounto the whole: as, God for a time had no people in all the world to bee his peculiar people, but only the seed of his servant Abraham: ergo, all the seed of Abraham were of his peculiar people. And therefore it is so much the more strange that Beza inferreth, that otherwise Christ had contradicted himselfe: as though it were any contradiction to say, that for adultery the case might bee such, as that the husband might lawfully put away his wife for it; and yet, that in some other cases he might not. His other Obiections, as they are the same that Erasmus had gathered before: so are they by him sent lightly away with the selfe same answer that Erasmus before had giuen them. For vntounto that other, of the words of Christ, that no man should part those whom God hath coupled together, whereas Erasmus before had said, that such were not parted by man but by God, Beza saith likewise, Concedo totum illud argumentum sed nego divortij propter adulterium authores esse homines, &c: that is, I graunt, saith hee, that whole argument: but I deny that men are (to be accounted) the authors of that divorce that is for adultery. So that, thus far, and so in the very answere it selfe that they made to this obiection, they both agree. But then in the confirmation of it they vary, M. Beza quite giving over that course that p. 88Erasmus is in, and betaking himselfe to another. Erasmus building vponupon disorders that were commonly committed in making of marriages; and M. Beza, vponupon that law of God that adiudgeth adulterers to death, and vponupon that exception of Christ. Wherein whether M. Beza hath bettered his course or not, that I leaue to bee decided by others that will: but sure it is that therein he liketh not of that of Erasmus; in that himselfe hath taken another. For as touching that of Erasmus he saith plainly, that he doth not assentiriijs qui putant Magistratibus licere novas divortiorum leges condere. that is, That hee doth not ioine in opinion with them, who thinke that Magistrats may make new lawes of divorcements. And the proofe that he wil hauehave for his opinion in this (namely, that, not mē, but only God must be thought to be the author of that divorce that is for adultery) is no more but this; Quum Dominus jam olim adeo expresse voluer it adulterio matrimonia dissolvi vt etiam adulteros morte punier it: & postea rursum Christus consulens conscientijs propter Magistratuum negligentiam; adulterium acceperit, quum de divortio non licito dissereret. that is, seeing that the Lorde in times past, did so plainely declare that he would hauehave (even the band of) matrimony to be dissolued by adultery, that hee punished those that so offended even with death: and after againe Christ providing for our consciences, hath for the Magistrates negligence therein, excepted adultery, when he treated of such divorce as was not lawfull. Concerning both which we plainely see the latter of them to hold no further, that that same exception of Christ may bee found to serue his purpose, which is the thing that is in question betwixt vsus, and seeing himselfe knew that so it was, it may seeme that he doubted of the other also, when as hee went about so p. 89hardly to help it in this. And the truth is, that in the other his reason holdeth but very weakely, that seeing God ordained that adulterers should be put to death, therefore the husband, if his wife hauehave that way offended, may account himselfe loosed now from the band of marriage that was betwixt them: because, as it is a generall rule with all the learned, so Erasmus himselfe his owne partner hath set it downe in plaine tearmes, that, in his iudgement, dispicere quodagat is qui loquitur, that is, to consider what is the intent or purpose of him that speaketh,Annot in. 1. Cor. 7. pag. 503.1 Cor 7 is praecipua clavis ad intelligendam mysticam Stripturam, that is, the chiefe key to open vntounto vsus the secret sense of Scriptures. And then it is plaine, that in that law the meaning of God was not, to shew when the married might accoūt themselues to bee loosed of that band wherewith they were tied the one to the other: but how Magistrates should in such case execute his iudgements among their people. Againe, whosoever would so resolutely set down that the band of mariage were so cleane dissolued betwixt man and wife, only for that, when either of the parties are found to hauehave committed adultery, they ought by the law of God to die, they had need to be further advised, first as touching this presēt crime that now we speake of, whether that ought to be the determination of all estates for life generally (as when one hath that way deserued death, he that is in reversion should then account the right of the thing to be his, whether that the Magistrate and laws doe neverthelesse spare him his life or not,) and whether, such as owe any other duty besides, as children to their parents, servāts to their masters, and such like, might likewise in such case be allowed to account themselues discharged of it: and then, as touching some others besides, when any p. 90men else hauehave deserued death, either by those lawes of God (as for blasphemy, prophaning the Sabbaoth, or whatsoever else) or else but by the lawes of the country wherein we dwel (though not against the law of God, yet further then it in those matters is wont to proceed) whether in such cases we were to allow that liberty; or otherwise, what reason we hauehave to be so resolute in the one, & so doubtfull in the other. These that are taken out of the Apostle S. Paul,Out of S^t Paul, are three likewise, but two of them (as in the others) in effect but one; the other, is of severall force by it selfe. These that are in effect but one, are those two before noted, the one in the seaventh to the Romans, that the wife is by the law bound to her husband so long as he liueth, the other out of the seauenth likewise of the former to the Corinthians, tending to the selfe same ende in sense or meaning. And as they are in effect but one, so doth he giuegive in effect likewise one answere to both: to the former,De Repud. & Divort. pag. 110. Atqui Apostolus ibi non agit de causis divortij. that is, But there the Apostle doth not treate of the causes of divorce: and to the latter, Respondeo, Apostolum ibi non agere de divorij causis. that is, I answere, that the Apostle doth not there treate of the causes of divorce. But though this in generall bee the substance of his answere to both: yet he proceedeth somewhat further in either of them. To the former he addeth, first that which he thinketh, the Apostle at that time meant; namely, that he did as it were but catch or pluck to himselfe, ex coniugio similitudinem, quatenus id argumento proposito conveniebat: that is, A similitude out of wedlock, so far as it agreed to the purpose that he had in hand. Then also, both that the Apostle doth speake there, non de matrimonio per adulterium soluto, sed de matrimonio constante, that is, Not of such matrimony as is p. 91dissolued by divorce, but of such as is still in force; and that a woman condemned of adultery may not bee said to bee vnderunder her husband, for that etsi adhuc is est superstes qui vir ipsius fuit, non est tamen amplius vir ipsius, nec ipsa potest esse simul mariti & adulteri caro, that is, Albeit he were yet liuing that was her husband, yet now he is her husband no more, neither can she be the flesh both of her husband & an adulterer. To the latter he addeth likewise, both that he teacheth widdowes there, soluto per mortem matrimonio, posse bona conscientia ad secundas nuptias convolare, that is, mariage being dissolued by death, they may with good conscience marry againe: and that therein he had respect but to the vsuall and ordinary cause, praesupposing, inter fideles quibus scribebat, vix alia ratione quàm morte matrimonia dissolvenda, that is, that amōg the faithful to whom he wrote marriage could hardly be dissolued but only by death. In the answere vntounto both which, what hauehave wee else to ground vponupon, but only his own opinion avouched againe; and here also but weakely confirmed? Hee saith the Apostle doth not here speake of the causes of divorce. Who saith that hee doth? What is that to the purpose, that of them he speaketh not now? By other occasion he speaketh that, which may shew vsus, how vnadvised we are in this. And why should hee speake of that which was not? We praesuppose that divorce was, by the law of God allowed vntounto them: and the latter Iewes, in the time of Christ, seeme much to be of the same minde also, though they might so say to some other purpose. But there was no such liberty giuen them indeed: and therefore we may not looke that the Apostle shoulde speake of it. And should we never suffer our selues to be better led, or our iudgements to be rectified by any Scripture, but only by p. 92such as specially treateth of the matter wee hauehave in hand? If Sathan might so far prevaile, by any special ones amōg vsus, he would not only depriue vsus of a good part of that direction that wee hauehave by the word of God: but also might hauehave an easie way therein besides, to bring in, and settle, many errors among vsus. When God spake to Moses out of the bush and said.Exod 3, 6.Exod 3:6 I am the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Iacob, was it his meaning then, to deliver the doctrine of the Resurrection? and yet doth not Christ even only out of it notably deliver the same vntounto vsus?Mat. 22:31, 32.Matt 22:31Matt 22:32 Deut. 25.4.Deut 25:4When God forbad the Israelites to muzzell vp the mouth of the Oxe that trod out their corne, was it his meaning then to teach men howe careful they ought to be to maintaine a Ministery among them?1. Cor. 9: 8-11.1 Cor 9:8–11 and yet doth not the Apostle wel apply it therevnto? But there were no end of such examples. In the former of them he addeth farther, that he doth but borrow a similitude thence, so far as belonged vntounto the purpose he had in hand. What then? Could his reason be good therein, vnlesse that same, from whence hee taketh the force of his reason, were sound it selfe. And if he cā thus put of his Readers, to say, that he doth speake of a marriage that stā deth in force, & by adulterie is not dissolved, doth it therefore follow, that marriage may be by adulterie dissolved? If it be resolved and set downe by him, that being founde guilty of adultery and condemned thereof, shee is nowe no more vnderunder a husbād, or that having committed adultery shee cannot be one flesh with her husband; hauehave wee here any sufficient ground at al to rest on, for the husband to account himselfe before God discharged thenceforth of al such duties, as by the reason of that his wedlocke hee was before bound vntounto? In the latter, was it so needfull a p. 93point to teach widdows in the Church of Corinth, after that the Gospel was now already received among them; & that had a great part of their light from so many of the ancient people of God conversing among them (with whom such marriages were very common, the Gentiles also being little behinde them therein) that this sentence of the Apostle, which otherwise woulde serue vsus marvelous wel to giuegive vsus sound direction in this, and in diverse such other matters besides, must so bee restrained to vviddowes only, that we, in this case, may not looke to hauehave any benefit of it? Truely it is good to care for widdowes, & it is a thing that is much commended vntounto vsus, not only in the word of God, but in all other good learning besides: but in al things there is a meane to be kept; & widdowes themselues (it is to be thought) wilbe content, that wiues also hauehave all their due. Or did he so restraine those words of his, vntounto that which was then most commonly vsed, that, for the matter now we speake of, he would not hauehave vsus to take so much of our direction thence? Or did the Apostle presuppose no farther on the behalfe of the faithful as touching their holinesse and constancie in wedlock, but only that hardly or scantly they accounted wedlocke to be dissolved among them but only by death: or, if of the two, may not a mā that is careful to finde the truth, rather doubt, that this is but an hard & a scant interpretation of this place of the Apostle? That which is of severall force by it selfe, is out of this chapter also of that Epistle vntounto the Corinthians, where the Apostle saith, that not hee,1. Cor. 7:1….11.1 Cor 7:11 Cor 7:11 but the Lord commandeth women not to depart from their husbands, and, if they do, to seeke to be reconciled againe, or to abide vnmarried: & that the husbands put not away their wiues. Wherevnto he saith, Respondeo, Ibid. p. 110.Paulum hic nō p. 94agere de divortio sed de dissidijs quae propter simultates inter conjuges interdum oriuntur: adeo ut interdum una pars ab altera secedat. Quod si evenerit, nō vult Apostolus ejusmodi discessione solvi matrimonium: that is, My answere is, that Paul did not here speake of divorce, but of such contentions or debates as arise sometimes betweene man and wife vponupon hart-burning among themselues: so that sometime they depart the one from the other. Which if at any time it come to passe, the Apostle will not, that by such departing, matrimonie be dissolved betwixt them. He proceedeth somewhat farther, I grant, to confirme his iudgmēt therein, I meane, that this must be S. Paules meaning: and so me thinke he had need in deed. For otherwise, besides that the Text it selfe doth not in appearācelead vsus to that cōstructiō (whatsoever it may do by implication, wherein we are to see anon how himselfe doth gather thereon) it seemeth to me, that, in either of the Apostles dealing in such matters, we hauehave a great likelyhood, that this should be no part of his meaning. For it had beene a very great & an intolerable disorder (and such as, not only the people of God, but evē all the heathen also generally, did ever detest, vnlesse it were some speciall od loose persons among thē, that now & then would not sticke to breake forth to such disorder) if that had beene in vse among them: and most likely then, that the Apostle woulde otherwise hauehave stormed against them, as he did for other matters, as for the variance that was betwixt them, & for those disorders, in partaking that holy Communion, both which hee might lay to the charge of many of them, and for suffering that incestuous person, though hee were but one. Whereas therefore the Apostle is wont to be so round when occasion was given him, and gaue so good experience of it even p. 95in this Epistle also in divers things els, it may rather seeme, that seeing it were such a disorder, so easily vponupon variance to breake of the bond of marriage betwixt them, that that was not the thing, that S. Paul there doth speake of, but some other thing that was more vsed & more tollerable also▪ and yet not to be allowed neither; as, for the woman so to depart, or for the husband to put her awaie, either for adultery, or at the least vponupon some great occasion or cause given whatsoever it was. Else I should hope, that among them, for any matter so apparantly so fowle, even among the heathē also, the Apostle should not hauehave neede to hauehave vsed the name of the Lord therein: or at least should thinke, as I said before, that he would hauehave set his instrument on some other tune, for a matter of lesse importance then it. Now the reason that himselfe alleageth, why he is persuaded that that is the sense of the Apostle, himselfe in this manner giueth in vntounto vsus. Hoc autem ita esse, manifeste indicant Apostoli verba, qui inquit in genere: Vir vxorem ne dimittito, & vxor à viro ne discedito. Quid si enim adulterio peccarit altera pars, annon innocenti licebit saltem à nocente discedere? Relinquitur ergo verum esse quod diximus, nempe, Apostolum de simultatibus & rixis, non de vero divortio loqui: quod mirum est Augustino in mentem non venisse. that is, But that this is so, the wordes of the Apostle doe most plainely declare, who generally saith, or speaketh to all indifferently, Let not the man put away his wife, and let not the wife depart from her husband. For what if either party shall commit adulterie, shall it not bee lawfull for the innocent party, at least to depart from the offēder? So it must needs be true that we said, namely, that the Apostle did not speake here of true divorce, but only of contentions and brablings: which it p. 96is marvel that S. Augustine did never thinke of.Sect. 22. Whether these words of the Apostle do so plainely proue it or not let others iudge; for betwixt vsus, I peceiue very well, that in no wise it can be decided. For what proofe hath it at all, but only which standeth on this principle, that the innocent party may in such case at least depart from the other? But what warrant any where hauehave we for that, either in the old Testament or in the new? In policie, I grant and for the hardnesse of our harts it may after a sort bee tolerated among vsus: and among the Iewes before: but where hauehave we otherwise any one authority for it, when it is rightly examined? Againe, as yet I see no cause to the contrary, but that a simple man might so strongly hold, that thē especially the innocēt party had more iust occasion to stay, thē to go, that I think it might cūber the most learned that is, to bring in any reasonable probability against it: and much more, to evince it indeed, So strong is the charge, that all married couples hauehave taken vponupon them, the one of the other; and so weake it is (setting our owne private affection aside) whatsoever it is, that as yet is brought to the contrary. And therefore I beleeue that himselfe did not wonder more, that S. Augustine never conceiued so much of it; then any indifferent one of his Readers will marvell that hee should make it so cleere a case as he doth.