A Treatise of the Nature and Use of Things Indifferent, Treatise
A TREATISE OF THE NATVRE AND VSE OF THINGS INDIFFERENT.
TENDINGE TO PROVE, THAT THE CEREMONIES IN PRESENT CONTROVERſie Amongſt the miniſters of the goſpell in the Realme of England, are neither in nature or vſe Indifferent.
Iohn 18.23.
IF I hauehave ſpoken euell beare witneſſe of the evell, but If I hauehave spoken well why ſmiteſt thou mee.
Math. 5.11.
Bleſſed are yee when men reuil you and perſecut you & ſay all manner of euel againſt you for my ſake falſly, Reioyce and be glad for great is your reward in heauen for so perſecuted they the prophets that were before you.
Printed 1605.
THE PRINTER TO THE Reader.
A Copy of this Treatiſſe by the prouidence of God cōming into my hand: I thought it behoofull for my Countrimen, that they ſhould be made acquainted with it, that by meanes thereof they might receaue ſom lyght of the truth for which ſo many ſuffer. The author whoſoeuer hee is hath litle cauſe to be offended with it, The paines he hath taken in it, doth perſwad me that he cannot but deſier the ſame in it ſelf though daunger & want of meanes might hinder him from publiſhing it, But howſoeuer (good reader) accept it as a teſtimonie of my vowes for the good of my Countrey, the weale whereof ſhall euer poſſeſſe me, though I cannot poſſeſſe it.
Farewell.
A TREATISE OF THINGES Indifferent.
CAP. 1. Of thinges Indifferent ingenerall.
A Thing Indifferent (in the largeſt extent of ſence) is any Mean between two Extreames.
2 Extreames (properly) are the vtvttermoſt bounds and limitts of any thing being in direct oppoſition one vntounto the other.
3 To be a Mean between two Extreames, is ſo to be ſeated between thē as that it ſtand equally affected to either, inclinnyng no more to the one, then to the other.
4 Hence the Latins call: things indifferēt, Res mediae. (Midle matters) And that by reaſon of that analogie & proportion that is between them, & thoſe things that in phiſicall or Mathematicall Dimenſions poſſeſſe the midle place in any line, figure or bodie: For, that is properly called the midle of any thing, that in poſition being as neere as can be, to both extreāes, inclineth no more to the one then to the other, but is a like equally diſtant from both.
5 And they are therfore called, things indifferent, becauſe in their relation to thoſe extreames between which they are ſeated, and vntounto which they are referred, they ſtand indifferently diſpoſed and affected to either, whence of the Greeks they are called Adiaphora, vntounto which our Engliſh terme doth preciſly anſwere. For as that is iuſt the midle of a line that leaueth on both ſids ſo much to either extreame, that there is in reſpect of it no difference between the one and the other: but vntounto, it both are equall & a like: So thoſe things are called indifferēt properly, that without any difference, doe equally agree vntounto, or diſſent, from thoſe extreames, vntounto which they hauehave reference & relation.
6 By all this it may appeare that things Indifferent, are not ſuch, ſimply, in thē ſelues & of themſelues conſidered, but as they are compared, and hauehave relatiō to the ſaide oppoſite extreames, as the Center in a circle, conſidered in it ſelfe, and by it ſelfe, is not the midle of any thing, but only as it hath reference to the oppoſite extreames in the Circumference: from any of which it is equally diſtant, and in that reſpect only is it called the mean or midle of ſuch a figure.
7 The very eſſence therefore of a thing indifferent, conſiſts in that equall and indifferent reference and relation that it hath to ſome two oppoſite terms or extreames, vntounto which either in ſence or reaſon it is compared, and by which onlye it is meaſured. So that it is in the number of thoſe things that in ſchooles are called relatiues, all which hauehave only but an accidentall being. The ſubiects therof being variable, according to the diuers references and reſpects that they hauehave vntounto diuers things. For as a man ſimply conſidered in himſelfe, is nether huſband, Father, nor Maſter, but onelyonly in reſpect of Wife, Child and Seruant. And as the ſame man in diuers reſpects may be a father & a ſonne, a maſter and a ſeruant: So nothing is in & of it ſelfe indifferent, but only in relation & reference to ſome oppoſit extreās: And thoſe thinges which in ſome ſuch reſpect may be indifferent, in ſome other reſpect may be Extreames.
Cap. 2. Of things more commonly called Indifferent.
1 Though things indifferent may in that former generalitie, ſpread themſelues to any mediocritie whatſoeuer. Yet Cuſtome the miſtris of all ſpeach, and language, hath reſtrained & limitted the name, to ſuch things only, as are a Mean between good and euell. So that (to omitt what in rigorous proprietie of ſpeach may be comprehended vnderunder the name that is giuen vntounto them) In commen vſe of ſpeach, a thing indifferent is onelyonly, any mediocritie, between good and evell.
2 The proper Extreames therefore of things indifferent, being good & euell, they cannot (retaininge the nature of their indifference) communicate or pertake of either, for whatſoeuer ſtandeth equally affected to good and evell, cannot in that affection, hauehave in it, either good or evell: It being imposſible, that either of the extreames ſhould be foūd in the Mean, without diſtruction of the nature thereof.
3 Whatſoeuer then voyde of all euell,(a)ſuch they ſay are our Ceremonies. For thoſe things are good that are decent, orderly: & meāes of edification. participateth but the leaſt meaſure of good: or voyde of all good, pertaketh but theb)Such wee ſay▪ and hauehave proued the Ceremonies to be. leaſt degree of evell, cannot beare the name of a thing indifferent, For there can be noe indifferencie in that, which inclinneth more to the one extreame, then to the other.
4 A thing indifferent therfore being a mean, between good & evell, it isSo are not theſe ceremonies ſo ſeated between them: that it is as far remooued from Good, as a thinge not euill, can be, and as far remoued from evill, as a thing not Good can be, and as neare vntounto Good and evill, as any thīg can be, that is neither good nor euill. So that whatſoever is Indifferent, is neither good nor evill, whatſoeuer is either good or euill, is not Indifferent, whatſoever is not Indifferent is either good or evill.
5 Things indifferent, being equally devided from good & evill, are in like manner, deuided from all the properties of either, For eueryevery propertie being vnſeperable from that ſubiect, from the nature whereof it ſpringeth, noe one, can be communicated to any thing but vntounto that, vntounto which the ſubiect it ſelfe communicateth it ſelfe, Yf therfore the propertie of any extreame, be found in a thing indifferent, the extreāe it ſ…lfe: is to be ſound likewiſe therein. Which to imagin, is as abſurd, as to looke to find the Circumference of a Circle in the Center.
6 No indifferent thing therefore as it is an indifferent thing,dBut they ſay that the Ceremonies in controuerſie hauehave: For that which is a grace and ornament to Good, maketh the better. hath power to make any thing good or evill, better or worſe: For it is the property only of good & evill, either to make or increaſe good or evill in any thing.
7 ThateBut ſuch are the ceremonies incō trouerſie. which doth more hurt or good, then ſome things that are good or euell, is not indifferent, but either good or evill: for nothing but Good, can exceed in goodnes that which is good, and nothing but evill, can exceed in hurt, that which is evil.
8 WhatſoeuerfThis doe the Ceremonies incontrouerſie: worketh vponupon any affectiō of man, ſtirring vp in him, louelove, hatred, delight, ſorrow, zaele, mallice, envie, Ielouſie, hope, feare &c. cannot be apprehended as a thing indifferent, by him in whom theſe pasſiōs are wrought. For it is the propertie only of thoſe thīgs that preſent themſelues as good or evil, to begett and moue ſuch pasſions in the ſoule of man. For it is imposſible that a thing indifferent apprehēded as a thing indifferent, ſhould beget any thinge in the ſoule of man but Indifferencie, and a Stoicall apathie or ſenceleſnes: So that whatſoeuer agAs our Prelates doe the Ceremonies man intirely loueth & delighteth in, admireth, commendeth, perſueth with zeale, cōmaundeth with authoritie. Whatſoeuer alſo a man ſhall abhorre, condeme, forbid, puniſh, perſecute, he cānot in any ſinceritie affirme, that he iudgeth that thing to be indifferent, but to be in ſome degree either good or evell.
9 The omisſion of that is indifferent, the commisſion whereof is indifferent: and that whoſehSuch is the omiſſion of our cerem…n…es ſaid to be and that in a high degree. omisſion is evel, is certainly good.
10 All the former premiſes conſidered this muſt needes follow. ThatITo commaund our ceremonies, is to commaund as the… ſaye, a great good yea, a publicke common good. to commaund a thing indifferent is to cōmaūd noe good, to for bid a thing indifferent, is to forbid noe evell.kBut to vſe the ceremonies is to doe much good, if they edifie the ſoule. To doe a thing indifferent is to doe no good. To forbeare a thing indifferentlNone are more ſpitfully intreated then thoſe that forbeare theſe ceremonies, and therefore ſure their in they doe much euell: is to doe no evell. And therefore to puniſh for a thing indifferent, is to puniſh for no evell.
Cap. 3. Of thinges indifferent in ſpeciall.
1 The eſſence of things indifferent, conſiſting in a meere and equall priuation of Good and Evell, there cannot be giuen any true kindes or degrees of thē, For all priuattiues conſidered in them ſelues are of the ſame nature.
2 Though their be no true kindes of them, yet they may be varied according to the diuerſitie of thoſe extreames with which they are compared. And therefore may be diſtinguiſhed accordinge to the commen diſtinctions of good and evell.
3 That Good that hath not an Evell oppoſite vntounto it in the ſame kinde, cannot be the extreame of any thing indifferent, & therfore cannot varie, diſtinguiſh, or denominat a thing indifferent. as if their be not an oppoſit colour vntounto white, then it is imposſible to imagine: how white ſhould be an extreame, to any other colour, or any other colour a mean vntounto it.
4 That which is properly a mean, muſt agree with the extreames in althinges in which the extreames doe agree: for example, If blacke and white be both of them colours: that which is properlie a mean between blacke and white, muſt be a colour alſo, for it were abſurd to call any thing but a colour, a mean between blacke and white: ſo that the mean followes the common natures & qualities of both the extreames, for as it is ſaide before, That only is a mean that is not only equally diſtant from two extreāes, but withall is as neere to both as may be, which cannot be verified of that mean that ſhall not be found to agree with the extreams in thoſe things wherin the extreames doe agree within them ſelues, and therefore things indifferent follow their extreames. As therfore that cannot be an extreame that hath not in the ſame kind an oppoſite, ſo that can be no medium to any extreams, that doth diſſent from them in that wherein they ſhall accord and agree. So that that denomination and predication that belonges to both extreames, belongs alſo to their mean. The mean between two oppoſite Qualities is a Qualitie: betweene two ſubſtances, a ſubſtance, between two actions, an Action: between two goods, a Good, betweē two evills, an Euil, betwen two quantities, a quantitie &c.
5 Hence it will followe, that noaAll ſubſtances therefore are indifferent only by accident, in reſpect of ſome vſe ſubſtance (as it is a ſubſtance) can be called thing indifferent, becauſe that ther is a no ſubſtance that is evill as it is a ſubſtance. For an indifferent ſubſtāce, muſt needs (if ther were any ſuch) be a mean between a good and an evill ſubſtance. Yf then there be no evill ſubſtaunces, it cannot be imagined how there ſhould be any indifferent.
6 The like may be ſaide of allbAs alſo of all artificiall which imitate natures. created ſpecies and kindes of things coſidered not only in their ſubſtances, but qualities and diſpoſitions. For the voyce of God pronouncynge them all to be good: none of them are evell, and if none of them be evell, none are indifferent. For indifferent created things, can hauehave no place: either reall, or imaginatiue, but between a created Good: and a created Evell. There is therefore no Creature of God: nor noe created propertie or qualitie of any creature: that is by creation a Thing Indifferent.
7 Alſo vponupon the ſaid groūds it apperes, that there is noeBAnd therefore there cannot be made an abſolut and perpetuall law concerning any thing vnderunder the name of indifferent, for a law bindeth onlye to good and puniſheth for euell, and therfore to imagine a law that bindeth to the doinge of a thing indifferent when that thing indifferent turns evel… as the moſt indifferent thing may, then the force of the law ceaſeth. abſolute Indifferent thing: becauſe their is no thing in nature either abſolutly good, or abſolutly evell: It being imposſible that any thinge ſhould be an abſolute Mean, whoſe extreames are not abſolute, for where one extreame is abſolute and the other not abſolute: the Mean cannot be abſolute, for if it be, it enclineth more to one extreame then the other, which is to diſtroye the nature of a thinge indifferent.
CAP. 4. Of the firſt diſtinction of things indifferent.
1 Things indifferent therefore, being to be diſtinguiſhed according to thoſe diſtinctions of Good and Evell that are equally commen to them both, we are in the next place diſtinctly to propounde the ſame, and by them accordingly to diſtinguiſh the other.
2 Firſt therfore Good & Euell is ſuch, either in appearance onelyonly, or indeed alſo. Whence arriſeth the firſt diſtinction of things indiferent, for accordinglie ſome thinges are indifferent in appearaunce onelyonly, ſome indeed.
3 A Thing indifferet in appearaunce onelyonly, is that which is a mean betweene that Good and Euellacōſider whether the miſticall …ts of an Id…latrous religion & worſhip, be not at leaſt an evell in appearaunce & ſheew, and therfore cannot be ſo much as in appea aunce indifferent. that is in ſheew and appearance onelyonly. For that appeareth to be indifferent, that being Good or euell indeed, appeareth or ſeemeth to be neither.
4 A thing indifferent indeed: is that which is a Mean between thoſe thinges that are in truth and veritie Good or evell. So that ſuch an indifferent is voyde of all true good,bIf our Ceremonies were ſuch. The Deuill and Antich ſt & all ſuperſtitious and lewd perſons would not ſo much dote vponupon them, and the h…tes of ſo many learned and godly men wold not burn againſt them as they doe and evill.
5 As that which is good in appearaūce onelyonly, is indeed either euill or indifferent, and that which is evell in appearaunce only, is indeed either good or indifferent, and that which is indifferent in appearaūce only, is indeed either good or evill, So that which is indifferent indeed, is in truth, neither good nor euill.
6 AscIf Turciſme, Iudaiſme. Pag …iſme▪ and the groſeſt Idolatrye that euer was amongſt the Heathen were eſtab…iſhed by that lawe and authoritie that theſe Ceremonies are, any poynt or percell therof might bee mainetained by the ſ…me or the like g…oūds. That M. Hooker Couel…, W…lkes, mainetaine the Indifferencie of …es ceremonies And their is noe Arti. of faith and …ligion, but (by the ſame method that the S…veo… vſeth againſt the Diſcipl…ne of other reformed Churche…) it may be traduced and oppugned a… moſt odious gro…ſe, and impious. the groſſeſt evill may by meāes of ſome counterfeit or ſhadow caſt vponupon it, be in appearaunce, the greateſt good, and the greateſt good may be diſguiſed, and in ſheew transformed into the greateſt evill: So with much more facilitie may either of them by the wit of man hauehave caſt vponupon thē the formes of things indifferent.
So that there muſt be ſpeciall heed taken that we admitt not of all things as indifferent indeed that preſent themſelues to vsus vnderunder that name and ſhape: Florentines can diſguiſe & collor any thīg. and it is now a dayes the common excerciſe of the greateſt wittes of the world. to tranſforme good into Euill, Euill into good, and both into Indifferent ſo that in theſe dayes ſcant any thing is as it appeares or appeares as it is.
Cap. 5. The 2 diſtinction of things Indifferent
1 Good and Euill is eytherSome of our … Divins think all external things Indifferent: which ſheews that they that talke moſt o… them, know leſt what they are. Internall or Externall, accordinge to which difference ariſeth a ſecond deſtinction of Things Indifferent.
2 An Externall Indifferent is whatſoeuer hath in it nether inward good norbWhat inward hurt and evill is in theſe Ceremonies they beſt know, that are beſt acquainted with the ſtate of their flocke. Euill
3 An Internall Indifferent, is whatſoeuer hath in it, neither inward good bWhat inward hurt and evill is in theſe Ceremonies they beſt know, that are beſt acquainted with the ſtate of their flocke.nor evill.
4 SomethingcThe Doctor of Oxford aske what hurt can a wiſe man ſee in a ſquare Cap & a ſurplice. Inded their is no outwarde hurt or euill in it, but it muſt be conſidered wether their be not any inward hurt theirin, for if it can be proued that by them, the ſoules of many are poyſoned with ſuperſtitious conceits then it is apparent that they hauehave inwarde hurt in them. Externall Indifferent may hauehave in it internall good or Euill & ſomethinges internally Indifferent may hauehave in them outward Good or Euill
Chap. 6. OF the 3. diſtinction of things Indifferent.
1 Thirdly Good and Euill, is either of it ſelf or by accident: which alſo make the 3 diſtinction of things Indifferent.
2 An Indifferent by accident is a meane between thoſe Extreames thataIf it can be proued that theſe Ceremonies are but evill by accident, (they being not good of themſelues) it is enough to argue that they are evill and not indifferent. For if many things that are good in themſelues, be to bee for borne, when by ſome accident they doe hurt▪ much more ought a thing in different when it hurteth, though but by accident are Good and Euill by accident and not of themſ…lues: for that muſt needs be only accidentally indifferent, whoſe Extreāes (by which it is limited and defined) are but accidentallie good or Euill: ſo that whatſoeuer is Indifferent onelyonly in relation of ſome accidentall good or Euill is Indifferent not of it ſelſe but by accident
4bErgo their is no thing abſolutely Indifferent (as our Divines of ſtate dreāe) but …y ſome circumſtaunce of time, place, perſon, vſe: it may be either ve…y good, or very evill. There is nothing ſo good of it ſelfe, but it may be made Euill by accident, nothing ſo euill of it ſelf but it may become good by accident. Nothing ſo good or Euil but it may become Indifferent by accident, nothing ſo Indifferent of it ſelfe but it may become Good or Euill by accident.
5. VntoUnto this head may be referred, ſuch things as are Indifferent by compariſon for as ther are ſome things good ſimplie that are Euill in compariſon. & ſomethings Euill ſimplie that are good in compariſon▪ ſo alſo there is ſome good and Euill, that in compariſon with others is Indifferent.
Cap. 7. OF a 4. Deſtinction. of things Indifferent.
8 THings are Good or Evill either Actually or Potentially. dA poſſibilitie of evill in a thinge indifferent, maketh it evill and worthy to be remoued Nature teacheth to prevent evills, and … a man cannot doe in prevention thereof, then to leaue of a thing in it ſelfe indifferēt which doth no good & may doe hurt.So are alſo Things Indifferent.
2 A thing actually Indifferent, is that which hath in it neither actuall good nor hurt.
3 A Thing Potentially Indifferent, is that which in act doth either hurt or good, though in po…ſibilitie it may doe neither.
4 There is nothing actually Indifferent but is potentially good or (a) euill, Their is nothing potentially, onelyonly indifferent but it is actually either good or euill. Th…rfore their is nothing abſolutly Indifferent.
Chap. 8. OF the 5. Diſtinction of things Indifferent.
1 LAſtly, Good and evill is either Corporall in reſpect of the body, or ſpirituall, in r…ſpect of the minde, In which reſpect, Things Indifferent doe alwayes vary.
2 A Thinge Indifferent in reſpect of the bodie is any ſuch thing that applyed to the bodie, doth it neither good nor hurt. As that which maketh a man neither rich nor poore, Strong nor Weake, bewtifull nor deformed, hungrie nor yet ſatisfied, ſicke: nor healthy. &c.
3 That may be GoodaCircumſtaunces of time & place doe alſo v…ry the things of th…s kinde exceedingly. For that in ſome tyme and ſome place is in different to ſōe bodie, that in an other place, and at another tyme is Good or euill. to the bodie in one reſpect that is evill in another et contra and that may be indifferēt vntounto it, in one reſpect, that is good or euill in another. Alſo that may be good or evill to one part of the bodie that is indifferent to another parte. And a thing may be indifferent to one, that is good or evill to another.
4 A thing Indifferent in reſpect of the minde or Soule, is whatſoeuer hauinge reference and relation to the ſoulebEither indeed or appearaunce of it ſelfe or accident: actually or potentially. doth it neither good nor hurt.
5 The Goods and Evills of ſoule: are either diſpoſitions, qualities, or habitsin the ſoule, or ſuch actions as proceed from them. As Thoughts, words, deeds. All which are called Morall. A Morall good: is whatſoeuer in Man or from man is agreable and correſpondent to the law of Nature, Reaſon, or the Diuīe Law of God revealed ſupernaturally in his word. VntoUnto this head are to be referred: all true wiſdome, knowledge, vnderunder ſtanding, prouidence, diſcretion, and all actions flowyng from the ſame. Alſo all Morall virtues, as, Iuſtice, Tempterāce, Holines, &c. With all the Actions proceedyng from them. All which are ſquared and ruled by ſome or other of the former Lawes. A Morall Evill is whatſoeuer is any wayes repugnaūt (whether in generall or perticular) to any of thos former Lawes. As Ignorance, Folly, Iniuſtice, intemperaunce &c. with all Actions proceedyng from them.
6 Thoſe things are in a Morall reſpect indifferant (whether they be Qualities, inclinations, Habitts or Actions) That hauehave in them (b) neither vertue nor vice. See ch…p. 8. ſ…ct …gent.Herein ſuch Actions of mans will are moſt frequent, that are neither commaunded nor forbidden in the word of God.
7 Ther is no Action of mans will: ſo indifferentcSo that (by M. Hookers …auor) a man may by takynge vp aſtr… or a …ſh. commit a Moral vice▪ For example if he ſhoulde vſe to d…e it in the time of p…a…e…. but the doing thereof (by ſome circumſtaūce) may be repugnaunt to the lawe of God and by conſequent be hurt full to the ſoule of man.
8 An Action that in ſome one reſpect vntounto ſome one ſpeciall lawe, is Indifferēt in reſpect of ſome other lawe may bee Good or Evill. As that action may be either Religious or Superſtitious, that hath in it neither Temperancie nor Intemperancie.
9 Any action done by man that is not commaunded*Such are the Ceremonies in controuerſie: They are no where in generall or ſpeciall commaūded, no more then the ſhavē crown and holy water, & yet▪ they hauehave been and are the ſpeciall meanes and occaſion of the Sciſme of many hundred Browniſts Of much ſuperſtion in many 1000. ignorant proreſtants, & of confirmation of many infinits of wilfull, Papiſtes in their Idolatry, as is moſt evident. Alſo (yf it be a ſinne to diſlike our Lords ſpirituall) there is no one greater caus that moveth thoſe that the profane call Puritanes to doe it, then theſe Ceremonies, which if they might be freed from, as all other re…ormed Churches are. There is no other Ciuill obedience or ſubiection due vntounto them: that they woulde refuſe to performe, in as a lowe a degree as any other whatſoeuer. by God, either expreſly or by direct conſequent, that is a meanes either of it ſelfe or by accident of any hurt either to the bodie, or ſoule, of a mans ſelfe, or of his Neighbour, either by bringing evill into them, or nuriſhyng or increaſing evill in them, cannot beare the name of an Indifferent action For there is no indifferencie in that, which being not required of God. (and therefore is not Good) doth hurt (any wayes) a man: which muſt needs be againſt the lawe of God. For the ſome of the Lawe of God being the louelove of God and our Neighbour, And LoueLove aīming onelyonly at the Good of the loued. That action, that (beſids the law) doth any hurt to any, muſt either hauehave an exceeption in the lawe, or elſe be againſt it, and thē it cannot be indifferent.
10 Morall Actions whether virtues or vices, reſpect either God imediately, or our ſelues or our Neighbour, as is intimated before. So doe alſo all Indifferent Actions.
11 That Action is indifferent in reſpect of God, that doth neither advance nor obſcure the glorie of God. For this is the onelyonly Good or Evill we can doe vntounto God.
12 Ther is no Action that a man can doe by the power of his will, but either in it ſelfe or by accident, it doth either glorifie or diſhonor God, and therefore no action in reſpect of God, is merely & abſolutly indifferent,cSuch are the Cemonies and rites that are peculiarly acted in Divine worſhip, if they be good & lawfull. but thereby God receaueth ſome Honor or diſhonor.
13 All Actions of Religion (amongſt whichaWhat honor receaueth God by our ceremonies? It is certaine that Antichriſt receaueth great honor by them. thoſe are ſpeciall that are peculiarly done in Divine ſeruice) are (if they be as they ought to be) in a ſpeciall manner good, tending more directly to the glory of God, then any other Actiōs, th…refore no action of Religion, whether it be Morall or Ceremoniall, is indifferent but either good or evill.
14 No Action of Religion whether Morall or Ceremoniall(b)Such are our Ceremonies elſe they are not Indifferent. grounded onelyonly vponupon the will of man, and not vponupon the worde of God, can bring any ſpeciall glory to God, and therefore no ſuch Act can be an act of Religion, but of ſuperſtition, and therefore cannot be indifferent.
15 Ther being ſome myſticall Ceremonies of Religion Good: and ſome Evill. If ther be any myſticall Ceremonies indifferent, they muſt then in ſome ſpeciall and materiall poynt differ from the Evill, even as far as from the good. But there is no myſticall Rite of religion,(c)Crosſing in Baptiſme beinge no more commaunded nor no leſſe forbidden then breathinge vponupon the childe, or anoylynge, which are reiected as evill. It muſt needs com nearer to theſe, then it doth to Baptim which is commaunded. but doth come many degrees neerer to the Evil then to the Good. And therfore ther can be no miſticall Rite of religion indifferent.
16 An Evill Ceremonie of Religion being therefore onelyonly Evill becauſe it is forbidden of God: A good Ceremonie of religion is therfore onelyonly a good Ceremony becauſe it is commaunded of God: and that muſt be an indifferent ceremonie that is neither forbidden nor commaunded: But all ceremonies in religion that are not good, are evill, and therefore there are no indifferent Ceremonies of Religion.
17 As no man by his ſole will, can make that ceremonie good in divyne worſhipp that God forbiddeth to be done their in, or make that Evill that God commaundeth to be done therin. So can he not make that which is but indifferent to be Good: for he cannot make that to be cō maunded of God, that is forbidden of God, that (though it be not forbidden) is not commaunded: If therefore what Ceremonie of religion ſoeuer is good, be commaunded of God, and if every Ceremonie of religion ought to be good, & if whatſoeuer ceremonie is commaunded of God is not Indifferent. Hence it wil followe: that no Ceremonie of Religion is indifferent.
18 Thus much of actions indifferent hauyng reference to God. Thoſe actions of man are indifferent in reſpect of a mans ſelfe, or his neighbour, that being committed, bring neither morall hurt nor good vntounto him ſelfe or them. For thoſe actions are Evill to the doer, and ſuch as hurt his ſoule: that are a meanes of bringing either vponupon himſelfe or vponupon his neighbour any evill forbidden. And thoſe actions are good to his ſoule, that are a meanes of affecting with any Good commaunded, him-ſelfe or his Neighbour.
19 Whatſoeuer therefore doeing a man no Good is a meanes either toeBut we ſhalbe readie to proue, that ſuch is the lawe that requires theſe Ceremonies. take frō a man any good thing that God hath freely graunted vntounto him, as life, health libertie, name, honeſtie, pietie, &c. Or to bring vponupon a man that evill: that God otherwiſe with houldeth from him, that cannot be indifferent.
20 All ſuch humaine lawes therefore, thatfMuch more thos Lawes tha… lay greater penalties vponupon the omiſi…i-of ſome Indifferent, then the omiſſion of the greateſt good: or comiſſion of the groſſeſt euill and as doe the Canons & lawes that requyre theſe Ceremonies. vponupon any penalties, binde m… to thoſe things that are confeſſed indifferent, which are ſuch things as God hath left to the free libertie of man to doe or not togThis hindreth not but that the Magiſtrat may and ought (yf it be for the good of the common weale) cōmaund fiſhe dayes, and ſuch lik, the neglect whereof, may doe much hurt, and the obſeruation much good, for in ſuch caſes eatinge of fiſh and fleſh is not a Thing indifferent, but that which men ſtand bound either to for beare to doe accordīg to the Civill Lawes of Magiſtrates. doe: is a deprivyng of mē of that libertie that God hath graū ted vntounto thē, & therfore ſuch a lawe is neither good nor indifferent, But evill to the ſoule of him that enacteth it, though not of him that obeyeth it. For it is no indifferencie in any man to take that away from a man that God hath freely given vntounto him.
21 All Morall actions, of men that are good or evill, are either private, or common and publike. The common and publicke, are either Domeſticall, Politicall, or Eccleſiaſticall. Actions alſo in their Indifferencie may vary accordinge to their diuers references to theſe.
22 A private Good or Euill action, is that which affecteth with good or Evill onelyonly a mans owne perſon that doth it, and which ſpreadeth not to the Good or hurt of any other (except ſecondarely & by accident) as he that eateth and drinketh) doth himſelfe onelyonly good properly: Though ſecondarely and by accident, he may, in that ſtrenght he receaueth, therby doe his family or the common wealth good.
23 That action is Indifferent in reſpect of a mans private ſelfe, that doth his owne priuate Perſon no wayes any good or hurt.
24 Thoſe Domeſticall, Politicall, Eccleſiaſticall actions, are good, or evill, that tend to the good or hurt of a family, cō mon wealth, or Church, and thoſe are indifferent, that being done doe bringe neither good nor hurt, or as much good as hurt vntounto any of the ſaide ſocieties.
25 That may be good, evill, or indifferent, to a private perſon as he is a priuat perſon, that is not ſo vntounto a Family, Cō mon wealth or Church, or vntounto him, as he is a member, of all or any of them.
26 That may be Indifferent to be done by a Familie, or the Commen wealth as it is ſuch, That is evill and not indifferēt, to be don by a Church. That may be indifferent to one member of a Houſe Church, or commenwealth, that is not Indifferent to another▪ that may be law full or Indifferent for the Church to doe in one place and at ſome one time, that is vnlawefull in another place and at another time
27 All which premiſes or the moſt of them being graunted, it will eaſilie appeare to any that can rightlie applie theſe principles and generall aſſertions that the Cerimonies in preſent controuerſie in our Church are not (as is pretended by the forces of them) meerly Indifferent▪ but either excellent parts of our religion or notorious parts of ſuperſtition.
FINIS.
APRILL. 12