Gods Arraignment of Hypocrites, Religious tract 1 · Chapter 2 · Part 2
II. Part. Of the clearing of Gods euidence, Theſe things haſt thou done.
Theſe] This word points out their ſpeciall ſinnes, and is to limit a more generall to his ſpecialls; which are theſe, theeuery, adultery, euill ſpeaking, deceit, falſe witneſſe, ſlaunder, & profanation.
Things] This is an ambiguous word; firſt, it ſignifies the beeing of any thing: ſecondly, it ſignifies any qualitie in that being: thirdly, any action proceeding either from the beeing or qualitie of any creature: fourthly, it ſignifies any ſinne, either in the qualities, as vitious habits, or actions, as tranſgreſſions, in thought, word, or deed: fiftly, miſerie: it is here taken in the fourth ſignification for ſinnes; becauſe as actions proceed frō the being and qualities of eueryevery creature, ſo the being or quality beeing infected, the action prooues bad and ſinfull. But here ariſeth a great difficultie, whether the action be the ſubiect of ſinne, or the effect? It ſeemes to bee the ſubiect: for a ſinfull action is expounded, ſinne in the action, & ſo the ſubiect, an action; which is a thing ſhould bee put for ſinne, his adiunct, which properly is nothing. But vnderunder the correction of the learned, I iudge no action to be the ſubiect of ſinne properly: …tions no ſubiect of ſinne.my reaſons are theſe, which I bring moſt willingly, becauſe in my apprehenſion it notably cleares God, in working in ſinfull actions.
Reaſon. 1. from puniſhment in…d.That which is properly the ſubiect of ſinne, may bee puniſhed: but actions cannot bee puniſhed: for ſinfull actions a man is puniſhed: therefore it is the man that is the ſubiect, and his ſinful action is the meritorious cauſe: therefore when God is ſaid to puniſh ſinne with ſinne, it is to bee vnderſtood, ſinfull action with ſinfull action: therfore to conclude that God is the author of ſinne, is a fallacian of compoſition and diuiſion: for it is one thing to bee the cauſe of ſinne, and an other the cauſe of a ſinnefull action: for the ſinne is not in the action, but in the agent, and therefore in man alone, but the action is common to both: as for example, I caſt a glaſſe againſt the ſtone wall, the ſtone wall breakes the glaſſe, ſo doth the hand that saſt it: but the one is a blameable cauſe, the other vnblameable: ſo man ſinning, caſts himſelfe by his owne free will againſt the law of God, which beeing ſtronger then man, breaks him in peices: Here the lawe and will of God wrought in this ſinfull action; God and his law moſt iuſtly, man by his own free will moſt vniuſtly: the action therefore from both; but the ſin onelyonly did ſticke in the nature of man, and ſo made him for his part in the action culpable and guilty of Gods wrath: & therfore the action hauing no ſinne inherent in it properly, may be handled of God without ſinne.
Reaſon. 2. from the obligation of the law.That which is bound to the lawe, is properly the ſubiect of the breach of the law: now men and angels are only bound to Gods law, & therefore men and angels may only be tearmed the ſubiect; their actions therefore onelyonly as belonging vntounto them are ſinfull, that is, flowing from ſinners, and ſo are their workes: ſo that mans nature worketh, and ſinne, and God: mans nature worketh, and hath God working in it, and ſo the action is good: againe, God beſide his general influence & concourſe with his creature, hath a ſpeciall worke in the action which concernes himſelfe; and that is likewiſe good, yea, and verie good; for it is the laſt end of the creature: but the other cauſe which is ſinne, cleauing ſo faſt vntounto our nature, qualifies our nature to doe ſinfully. The ſunne-beames comming thorough a red glaſſe ſhines on the oppoſite wall, with the tincture of the colour of the glaſſe; now the queſtion is, whether the red colour be onelyonly in the glaſſe, or likewiſe in the ſhining? ſurely, it ſeemes that the whole colour remaines ſtill in the glaſſe, and rather dimmes the ſhining, then infects it: ſo the beames of Gods wiſedome, ſhining through our corrupt ſoules, ſeemes to be an action tainted with ſinne; but ſurely the corruption ſtickes in our ſoules, and onelyonly hindred the bright beames of Gods glorie, from appearing in our actions.
Reaſon. 3. from the ſole nature of an effect.That which is onelyonly an effect, can neuer be a ſubiect: nowe the motion is onelyonly an effect, and can no otherwiſe be conſidered: and therefore is alwaies ioyned with his cauſe: as a ſinfull action, is in ſenſe and reaſon, the action of a ſinneful man, that is, whereof ſinnefull man is the cauſe. Hence beeing an effect, it muſt needes exiſt or ſtand out by many cauſes, and therefore according to eueryevery cauſe hath his ſpeciall affection: ſo a ſinfull action hath one reference vntounto man, an other vntounto God, and yet may ſtand out of both. Chriſts death had many cauſes, and all ſubordinate cauſes were according to Gods determinate counſell; the action was ſinfull, yet the ſinne did inhere in Pilate, Herod, and the accurſed Iewes.
Reaſon 4. from the nature of goodnes.That which is ſimply good, cannot bee the ſubiect of ſinne: now actions are of this nature; the reaſon is, becauſe cauſes giuegive beeing vntounto things, and therefore are abſolute, as cauſes: now motion hauing no other being, but that which it receiues from cauſes, Cauſa cuius vi res eſt. This vis muſt needs be Gods.and cauſes producing that by a motiue force in themſelues, which force is from God, cannot any wayes leaue in the effect an euill inherent, but onelyonly in themſelues, which wanted true force whereof the effect ſhould hauehave exiſted: hence we call ſinne rather a deficient cauſe, then an efficient cauſe. Rom 6.12. Rom. 7.5.Indeede ſinne in vsus is ſaid to raigne, and hauehave force in our members, and ſo ſinne with his ſubiect, is exceeding powerful: but it is by turning Gods created force the wrong way, euen as a wheele ſet a running wrong way, is carried with as great force, as when it runne the cleane contrarie: ſo mans nature ſet a rebelling againſt God, turnes Gods created forces againſt himſelfe: that the force is put into the action, it is Gods, but that it was put in by the hand of a rebell, it became ſinfull, yet God will acknowledge his owne force in the action, and turne the fault and crime to the proper owners. That the Iewes and Pilate laid hands on Chriſt, it was Gods created force in them, but the abuſe of it is their owne, and takes vp a proper habitation in their miſerable ſoules: then cauſation beeing a created force, and motion onelyonly acknowledging the ſame, well may the motion be Gods, and yet no cauſe at all of ſinne.
Reaſon. 5. from priuation.Sinnes are properly the priuation or want of action: and therfore though they may bee both in one ſubiect, yet neuer can the one be the ſubiect of the other: for ſo ſhould deadly enemies become louing freinds, and the worſt kind of oppoſites be reconciled: for I am ſure that priuation, though he be no being, yet he denies a beeing in the ſelfe ſame ſubiect which is capable of it. Blindnes is a worſe not being, then not ſeeing; for not ſeeing may be in a ſtone, which is neuer the worſe for it: but blindnes can be no where but where ſight may be, and therefore the eye is much worſe for it: if then ſinne bee the priuation of an action, it can neuer bee in an action, but alwaies againſt an action.
Reaſon 6. from action and paſſion, which ſeeme to differ but in reſpect of the agent and patient; and therefore the patient ſhould ſin more then the agent, ſeeing the action wherein lies the ſinne, is moſt properly in the patient, but frō the agent.The action from the worker, is a paſſion in the receiuer; and therefore if ſinne were in the action, it ſhould goe along with it to the patient; yea rather ſhould it be in the patient then the agent, ſeeing the action reſts moſt in the patient. Hence murther ſhould rather be the ſinne of the patient, then the agent, ſeeing the action of murther as it is from the agent, ſo moſt properly is in the party ſlaine: and therefore the murtherer ſhould be the murthered, which is againſt reaſon. It is plaine then that ſinne abides in the murtherer, & the action is good: let this therefore be obſerued that God may be iuſtified, euen in ſinnefull actions, yet no cauſe of ſinne, becauſe ſinne alone reſts in the boſome of fooles, and will not ſtirre one iotte out of that ſubiect: it is therefore dangerous to defend, that an action is the materiall cauſe of ſinne, for ſo ſhould ſinne not onelyonly be ſaid to be in the action, but of the action, and then I know not how God ſhould worke the action, and bee freed from ſinne, for cauſa cauſae eſt cauſa cauſati. The words then are thus to be expounded, Things, are here put for actions, by a metanomie of the cauſe for the effect, for actions proceed frō things; then actions for the ſinnes which are committed by ſinnefull things; and ſo the action is an effect of the ſinnefull man, and is put for his cauſe, which be ſinnes in the things.
Neither is this any newe opinion, Motus, modus actionis.for all agree that the motion is good, onelyonly the manner of doing is euill. Now examine the point well, and we ſhall alwaies find the manner in the doer, and not in the thing done: and therefore the euill is properly in the doer, and not in the thing done; onelyonly it is ſaid to be in it, in that regard that an euill cauſe wrought it; and ſo the motion is both Gods and mans, yet not both of one manner of working. Mans fall was an action; therefore Gods and mans, but man wrought it one manner of way, and God another: now all learned men knowe that the manner of any thing, makes it not many, as one cauſe may beget & preſerue, be alone and with others, worke by it ſelfe and by accident: and therefore no neede to multiply the action. Effectuum relationes omnes ſunt ad cauſas ſuas; ſeparatas, concurrentes, concauſas, & ſimul ac ſimiliter agentes: that is, the relations and reſpect of all effects, are to their cauſes, whether they be ſeparate, concurring, concauſing, or together and in like manner working: if to ſeparated cauſes, then the effects obtain their names from the manner of the cauſe, by which theſe effects exiſt: if neceſſarily they come forth, then of neceſſarie cauſes they are called neceſſarie effects. And here by the way obſerue, that the decree of God, and mans free will in his fal are rather ſeparate, then concurring cauſes: and therefore, if you pleaſe, Gods decree may be called, a neceſſarie cauſe of his owne effect: but mans free will was another manner of cauſe, and therfore being a contingent cauſe, his fall was cō tingent: obſerue this againſt we come to the difficulties that ariſe out of Gods ordering of ſin. So then in ſeparate cauſes, if neceſſary, then neceſſary effects; if contingent, then contingēt effects: but if many cauſes concurre to produce one effect, then this one effect can neuer be ſaid to be contingent and neceſſarie: for ſo one nature ſhould be contradictorie to it ſelfe, & therefore if the principal cauſe of mans ſinne be contingent, as who dare denie it, ſeeing it came from mans (though free) yet mutable will: & therefore that Gods decree ſhould either neceſſitate the cauſe, or the effect, is impoſſible: for ſo a contingent cauſe ſhould become a neceſſarie cauſe; and a neceſſarie effect, ſhould be the ſame with a contingent effect: ſo then Gods decree though it make his owne effect neceſſarie, yet concurring with mans fall, works in ſuſtaining, ordering, limiting whatſoeuer ſhall be done, but without all violence or coaction of his nature. For the third, concauſes which are abſolute in their working, and neither will, nor can be fruſtrated, alwaies produce a neceſſarie effect; as the firſt cauſe, and the ſecond, not only concurring, but concauſing, each of them for their full power and freedome that which they work, cannot but produce that which they intended: therefore God the firſt cauſe, concauſing in mans fall, his owne good pleaſure; and man for his freedome in the ſelfe ſame effect, concauſing his owne will, could doe no other but produce vntounto himſelfe a miſerable effect; but vntounto God, who made this ſerue his own will, a glorious conſequent, to manifeſt a greater good, then otherwiſe the world ſhould euer hauehave conceiued: and therefore giuegive euerie effect his right in his cauſe, but wrong no cauſe for the effect, becauſe that which you may charge one cauſe with all, was proper to another.
Thou] This word hath relation to 16. ver. but to the wicked ſaid God: thou whoſe heart is full of hypocriſie, worſhip vngodlineſſe, conuerſation vnrighteous, and euerie action an impudent lying before God and man.
Done] Doing is to be limited: for generally it ſignifies to doe well or euill; but the ſecond is meant, done amiſſe; whether in omitting true reformation, or committing vile abhominations againſt the ſacred lawes of God; both are iudged of God in this place: Gods law is caſt at the backe, and therfore all good duties omitted; the contrarie performed in profanation, adulterie, the euerie, deceit, ſlander, &c.
Held] When it is taken for holding to worke, Plowing. Meditation. Labouring.it properly ſignifies plowing, hence meditating, and thirdly any kind of labouring: the ſecond ſignification is a metaphore: hence Sampſons prouerbe, they plowed with my heiffer: the third is a Synecdoche. A ſecond head of ſignifications is to hold from worke: and then it ſignifies, either to omit, Omit. Remit. Ceaſe.wholly to paſſe it ouer, or elſe to remit, to hold backe ſome of the whole: thirdly wholly to ceaſe; which all of them may be applyed: Firſt, I omitted wholly from calling of thee to an account, and therefore thou thoughteſt that all reckonings were made vp betwixt thee and me. Secondly, I remitted thee many offences, for which thou neuer was thankefull vntounto me. Thirdly, a long time hauehave I ceaſed from my anger, and therefore as in my mercies thou ſcantedſt me as a nigardly, and pinching giuer, ſo now in thy ſinnes thou haſt beene exceeding liberall, and large, taken my hands, and armes as bound vp in a cloth, and cannot be pulled out to ſtrike thee withall.
Tongue] The word beeing giuen to reaſonable creatures, Firſt, ſignifies as dumme: Thou thoughteſt that I was tonguetied, alas, didſt thou neuer heare me in my word? Secondly, deafe, thou thoughteſt I could not here thy mouth giuen vntounto euill, thy tongue to forgerie, deceit, curſed ſpeaking, ſlaunder, &c. Thirdly, blind, that I had no eyes to ſee thy ſecret hypocriſie. Qui tacet conſentire videtur.Fourthly, ſilent, as one conſenting with thee. Fiftly, ouerſeeing, as one winking at thy ſinnes. Sixtly, ſparing, as neuer meaning to call thee to account. But there is one ſignification more, and that is to thinke a ſecret; and therefore O hypocrite, it might be that God all this time was thinking a ſecret againſt thee. To hold the tongue is put for ſilence, which is a Metanomy of the cauſe for the effect: now the Lord can properly be ſaid neither to hold the tongue, foreign.or keepe ſilence: therefore a third thing is meant, by a metaphor drawne from men keeping ſilence, to wit, clemency, gentlenes, patience, forbearing, long ſuffering, bountifulneſſe, and a large time to repent. The iuſtice of God as it burnes more remiſſely againſt ſinne, is called anger; as more ſharpely, wrath; in ſentencing, iudgement; foreign. What is merciemercyin executing, reuenge: now in all theſe God vſeth merciemercy, which is a compaſſion toward his creature offending: and this is double, either gentleneſſe, or bountifulnes: gentleneſſe, gentleneſſe,whereby in his iuſtice hee remembreth mercy, and this appeares in his patience, patience,and longanimitie: patience whereby he moſt gently ſuffereth ſinners, & deferreth his puniſhment: longanimitie whereby he expecteth long time repentance: longanimity,his bountifulneſſe, bountifulnes.whereby he is rich in goodnes, powring forth his good gifts vponupon his ſinful creatures, notwithſtanding their ſinnes: and in all theſe appeares this which the Prophet hath ſaid, I held my tongue.