A Dangerous Plot Discovered, Chapter 10
CHAP. X. The Doctrine deliuered in the former Chapter is argued.
THere be three things in it inquirable.
1 Whether this propoſition, A ſinners Iuſtification conſiſteth alſo in grace infuſed, be true or not?
2 Whether that ſame propoſition conſenteth with the Church of Rome or not?
3 Whether it diſſenteth from the Church of England or not?
I hauehave ſet downe Mr. Mountagu his doctrine touching this point, which containeth many propoſitions, and becauſe it might appeare how farre he agreeth with the Church of Rome, I bring but one of them to be diſputed: becauſe if this be foūd falſe & againſt the doctrine of the Church of England, then all the reſt will be found falſe likewiſe: and I deſire to contract the diſputation vntounto the narroweſt ſcantling.
That that firſt propoſition is falſe, doth manifeſtly appeare by the anſwers made vntounto the diſputations of Thomas, Vega, Soto, Bellarmine, Suarez, Vaſques, and others that doe maintaine the ſame. To declare it in this diſputation to be falſe it is needleſſe, becauſe there is nothing brought to proue it.
That he conſenteth with the Church of Rome in eueryevery one of his propoſitions is manifeſt to the full. The reading of the doctrine of the Church of Rome ſet downe alſo in the former Chapter will ſhew it. And that not onelyonly in the Iuſtice that doth concurre vntounto Iuſtification, and all other things which depend thereupon, but alſo in the nature and being of the remiſſion of ſinnes, as ſhal be declared no. 23 &c. Which muſt be obſerued, becauſe it is a matter of great importance: it is little obſerued, and maketh vp his agreement with them, and his diſagreement with the Church of England in eueryevery part and parcell of this point, teaching in all things as they doe; in nothing as the Courch of England doth. That he doth diſagree from the Church of England, the very reading of the doctrine of them both, ſet downe in the laſt Chapter will declare. Our Church placeth our whole Iuſtice, and adequate nature of Iuſtification in remiſſion of ſinnes, he placeth it alſo in grace infuſed. It maketh remiſſion of ſinnes one thing, he another; as ſhall bee ſhewed hereafter no. 26. &c.
Notwithſtanding all which euidence, he laboureth in his Appeale, pag. 168. and 188. to perſwade the world; that,
He conſenteth not with the Church of Rome, nor diſſenteth from the Church of England.
But all his labour is in vaine, the contradictory will proue true, as this diſcourſe will declare.
He pleadeth for himſelfe two things.
Firſt, by grace infuſed hee meant and intended onelyonly concommitanter, that is, grace concurreth with remiſſion of ſins in a iuſtified man, pag. 168. 169. & 170.
Secondly, in that deſcription hee went not punctually to worke, but deſcribed Iuſtification at large, for that act of God of remiſsion of ſins, and the neceſſary and immediate concomitance vntounto, and conſequence vponupon that. Appeale, pag. 172. 178.
He chargeth ſuch as do not vnderſtand that propoſition in this ſenſe, with ignorant or wilfull miſtaking his meaning, or obſtinate refuſall of ſatisfaction. Appeale, pag. 168. 172.
I anſwer; All this is a faire ſhew put vponupon a foule cauſe, a meere pretence without ſhew of truth. I will make it appeare, firſt by my anſwers to the argumēts he brings to proue hee meant thus. And then by proofes from the things themſelues. This was not his intent, but his words muſt be vnderſtood as they lie without interpretation.
His firſt argument, p. 168. is to this effect.
I did attribute grace infuſed to Iuſtification ſecondarily,
Therfore I intēded grace infuſed is in a iuſtified man.
I anſwer; This reaſon is reaſonleſſe: There is no ſhew in the Conſequence, the word ſecondarily cannot lead your Reader to thinke you meant ſo, neither doe you ſhew how it ſhould.
Againe, your owne words doe proue you meant not that, by the word ſecondarily: but that grace infuſed doth conſtitute Iuſtification in a ſecond notion: For if Iuſtification be a motion between two termes, the one of ſinne wherein a man was; the other of grace whereto a man is brought, and that is the firſt, this the ſecond, then grace doth conſtitute Iuſtification in a ſecond notion; but you teach the firſt, Gagge, pag. 143. and 141. therefore you muſt be vnderſtood to meane the laſt.
In the next place he telleth vsus; that his purpoſe was to let the Papiſt know that we taught, that a man iuſtified is ſanctified alſo.
I anſwer; This proueth not that hee meant to ſay that grace infuſed is in a man that is iuſtified, but ſuppoſeth that he did meane ſo, and ſheweth why hee did meane ſo, therefore it is nothing to the purpoſe. Beſides, it is vtterly falſe, he had no purpoſe to ſay any ſuch thing; for the queſtion then in hand, was whether faith only doth iuſtifie: wch could not yeeld him any occaſion to ſay Grace was in a iuſtified man, they being two things eueryevery way diſtinct and without the ſhew of affinity. Againe, neuer any Papiſt liuing did write or ſay that we denie a iuſtified man to be ſanctified alſo, therefore you had no occaſion thus to ſay.
In the laſt place, pag. 171. he hath theſe words,
If a iuſtified man bee alſo ſanctified, then might I allow one common word to containe & expreſſe both the parts.
I anſwer; 1. This ſuppoſeth he meant as hee pretendeth, & ſheweth the reaſon why hee comprehended two things diſtinct in nature vnderunder one name; but proues not that hee meant to ſay as hee pretendeth. 2. He beſtoweth much labour, and ſpares for no coſt to proue the firſt part of this reaſon, but to no purpoſe; for that was neuer denyed by any man in the Church of England, nor in any other Church that ioyneth in faith with it. But the conſequence is vtterly falſe, for theſe two parts are not eſſentiall vntounto that whole which you call Iuſtification. Therefore when you make one word to containe thē both, the ſentēce is vntrue, diſagreeable to art, and a monſter in nature. He is vnskilfull that puts a childs-ſhooe vponupon the foot of Hercules, that addeth to the ſtatue of a man the limmes of a beaſt, and iuſt ſo doe you in this place, if you comprehend remiſſion of ſins and ſanctification vnderunder the name of Iuſtification. And this is his whole plea touching the firſt part of his excuſe, (and this too much too) for of three things two of them are wholy beſides the matter, and voyd of truth in themſelues, the third diſproued by his owne plaine teſtimony.
In the behalfe of the ſecond part of his excuſe, hee ſaith, page 172.
Iuſtification is taken in Scripture ſtrictly for remiſsion of ſinnes, and largely for that act of God, and the neceſſary, & immediate concomitance vntounto, and conſequence vponupon that, &c, and the like doth Caluine, Perkins, Beza.
I anſwer; This ſuppoſeth that he did deſcribe Iuſtification largely, when hee ſaid, Iuſtification conſiſteth in remiſsion of ſinnes, and grace infuſed, but proues it not: therefore it is nothing to the purpoſe. But let it be ſuppoſed, he can proue it at ſome other time, and goe on with him to examine what he bringeth: I ſay it is vtterly falſe, the Scripture doth neuer take the Iuſtification of a ſinner any other wayes but one; you bring no proofe that it doth, & your word is not ſufficient: when your proofs come, you ſhal hauehave anſwer: for the authority of Caluin, &c. I need not much weigh in this queſtion, becauſe I know your ſelfe accounts it worth nothing. Caluin ſaith no ſuch thing. The laſt thing he pretendeth is, that
His intent was to confute the Gagger.
I anſwer; This hath no force to proue, that
Therefore I deſcribed Iuſtification, as comprehending Sanctification, when I ſaid it conſiſteth in remiſsion of ſinnes, and grace infuſed.
For ſo to deſcribe it, is not the way the confute, but to be confuted: firſt, becauſe that deſcription is falſe: ſecondly, in it you agree with the Gagger in an Article of his Faith, decreed by the Councell of Trent.
Moreouer, your antecedent is falſe: you had no ſuch intent: For the thing to be refuted, was Faith onelyonly doth not iuſtifie, ſo ſaith your aduerſary, which you might hauehave refuted without relation to the nature of Iuſtification; for he muſt proue (at leaſt) that ſomthing elſe beſides Faith doth concur to Iuſtification, or confeſſe he ſayd not truely. It was not required on your part to proue all other things were excluded; therefore there was no need or occaſion of making a deſcription of Iuſtification. But ſuppoſe there had beene good reaſon why you ſhould hauehave made a deſcription of Iuſtification, yet the making of this deſcription, doth argue your intent was not to refute the Gagger, but to eſtabliſh and confirme the Gaggers poſition; for if Iuſtification bee as you hauehave deſcribed it, then without all doubt, more things are required to Iuſtification beſides Faith: and Bellarmine doth diſpute iuſt after the ſame manner, de Iuſti. lib. 1. cap. 18. Laſtly, vponupon this deſcription of Iuſtification, you proceed, and ſay, man is the ſubiect thereof, and that thereunto there are required certaine preparations to the purpoſe; the firſt wherof you ſay is knowledge of God and his Law, &c. that is indeed aſſent vntounto the Law of God, which is Faith, according to the Councell of Trent: for you doe not ſpeake of ſuch a knowledge of the Law, which is without an aſſent to the truth thereof. You proceed, and teach that Faith is the roote and originall of the reſt of the preparations: iuſt as the Councell of Trent doth, which proues your intent was to iuſtifie, and not to refute your aduerſaries poſition.
If notwithſtanding all this, you will ſtill affirme your meaning to be ſuch, as is ſet downe no. 4. and plead your owne authority for the proofe thereof (as beſt able to declare what you meant) then firſt your meaning is not expreſt by your words: ſecondly, the whole courſe of your Doctrine ſaith one thing, and your intent is another: thirdly, your meaning was without reaſon to guide it: fourthly, the Doctrine that caryeth your meaning, doth deſtroy what you meant to build: but you will deny all theſe foure, therefore you muſt confeſſe you had no ſuch intent.
After he hath thus declared what his intent was in this deſcription, he goeth on, pag. 174. to ſhew what his intent is touching the nature and adequate being of Iuſtification, which hee proclaimeth in theſe words;
Be it knowne vntounto you; that, I beleeue
Iuſtification is (in ſtrictneſſe of termes: Not regeneration, nor renouation, nor ſanctification. But)
A certaine action in God, applyed vntounto vsus:
Or, A certaine reſpect, or relation,
Whereby wee are pardoned and acquitted of our ſinnes,
Eſteemed righteous before God; And
Accepted by him in Chriſt vntounto life euerlaſting.
I anſwere; If this proclamation had been publiſhed by an authority ſufficient to compell vsus to hauehave aſſented thereunto, then had it beene poſſible, that you had giuen ſatisfaction: but for want of that, you muſt giuegive vsus leaue to touch, to handle, to ſearch, before we take. Thus therefore I proceed:
This great adoe is about nothing: you tell vsus now what you doe beleeue when you writ your ſecond Booke. Wee inquire what beleefe you did expreſſe by your writing in your firſt Booke. Let this fault be remitted, we will reſt ſatisfied with this, if there be ſufficient cauſe why, but alacke there is no ſuch matter. And thus I ſhew it:
You did not beleeue that Iuſtification is as now you pretend, for if you had ſo beleeued, you would hauehave expreſſed that beleefe, becauſe your intent was to refute the Gagger, as you profeſſe. Appeale page 173. Now this beleefe had been an eaſie and ready way to hauehave refuted him, ſeeing that the queſtion there diſputed was, whether,
A man is Iuſtified by Faith onelyonly:
As is euident by the 18. Chapter of your firſt Booke; and it would neceſſarily follow: That a man is iuſtified by faith onelyonly, if Iuſtification bee as you now deſcribe it: which I take as granted without further proofe: and Bellarmine by implicaiton, confeſſeth no leſſe, de Iuſti. lib. 1. cap. 18. Adde quod.
Againe, if you had then beleeued Iuſtification is as you deſcribe it now, then your thoughts in all likelihood would hauehave now beene orderly digeſted: but here is nothing but confuſedneſſe, and thus I ſhew it:
1 Firſt, you deſcribe by a negatiue, which Art forbids.
2 Secondly, you place the Genus in two things, viz.
action.
reſpect, or relation.
If you would expreſſe one thing by thoſe diſtinct termes, then you intend a thing impoſſible: for an action is an em…nation from a worker, Reſpect and Relation (as it is here vſed) importeth an adiunct vntounto a ſubiect. If your meaning bee, to expreſſe two things diſtinct in nature, by theſe diſtinct termes, then you… deſcription is ridiculous: I need not ſhew how.
3 You ſay it is an action in God, which ſignifieth an action immanent, which is falſe; Iuſtification is an …ction tranſient, and your ſelfe confeſſe it, when you ſay, Iuſtification is by Faith, and made in an inſtant, G…gge page 146. which doe import actions wrought vponupon the creatures in time. You alſo tell vsus, this action i… applyed vntounto vsus, which ſignifies an action tranſient, which is contrary to the former; and ſo you ſay, and vnſay, with one breath.
4 You ſay, pardon of ſinnes is by a reſpect or relation in God. Which ſentence is wholly without ſenſe, For reſpect, or relation, hath not any force, by which an effect ſhould be produced; neither can it bee conceiued what you meane by Reſpect, or Relation, or how pardon of ſinnes, ſhould flow from, or depend vponupon, that Reſpect or Relation. And ſo much for the Genus.
5 You place the ſpeciall nature of Iuſtification in three things, viz. Firſt, Remiſſion of ſinnes: ſecondly, Eſteeming righteous: thirdly, Accepting to eternall life, as vntruly, and vnreaſonably, as the former: for theſe three are really diſtinct; and, therefore cannot concurre ioyntly together vntounto the primary and formall being of Iuſtification. Indeede eſteeming righteous is an act of GODS vnderſtanding, and called Intuitiue knowledge, which ſuppoſeth the thing already in being. Iuſtification is the act of Gods will, from whence it receiueth being. Acceptation to life, ſignifies an act of God willing eternall life vntounto man, (as Vaſquez hath truely obſerued:) which belongs to Predeſtination, and not to Iuſtification? Laſtly, Iuſtification is a motion from one poſitiue to another. But Eſteeming righteous, and Accepting to life, is not ſuch: therefore not eſſentiall to Iuſtification.
He doth father this confuſedneſſe vponupon other men, and expreſly nameth Mr. Perkins for one, Appeale, page 174. but it will not excuſe him: for Mr. Perkins writ a comment (as himſelfe there alledgeth) wherein it was meet for him to vſe amplifications for cleereneſſe, and vnmeet to be tyed vntounto the exact vſe of Art: becauſe that is obſcure: but Mountagu is a Diſputer, and therefore muſt auoid ſtragling. Beſides, Mr. Mountagu deſpiſeth Mr. Perkins with no ſmall degree of ſcorne, as is manifeſt by what he writeth of him in his Appeale page 270. therefore it is plaine, in this deſcription he was not guided by Mr. Perkins his authority. Wee may conclude this Deſcription is his owne, it hath not Mr. Perkins for ſhelter.
6 Thoſe ſuperfluities being pared off, your ſentence is this;
Iuſtification is remiſsion of ſinnes.
You doe not beleeue, that, Iuſtification is remiſsion of ſinnes; for if you doe, then doe you not beleeue, that there is an increaſe and augmentation of Iuſtification by the increaſe and acceſſe of Gods grace: for remiſſion of ſinnes admits no increaſe, and augmentation, much leſſe by a new acceſſe of Gods grace, which appertaineth to Sanctification, and not to Iuſtification. But you doe beleeue the conſequent, and doe profeſſe it in your Appeale, page 168. 169.
If it be anſwered, remiſsion of ſinnes is increaſed by daily receiuing remiſsion of new ſinnes, and by increaſe of grace, and good deedes, viz. by declaring him to bee iuſt, that is already made iuſt. In which ſort hee writeth, Appeale, page 162. 169. 197. I reply, this anſwer doth not take away the force of my argument; for it is auowed onelyonly vponupon his owne word, hee doth not proue it to bee ſo, nor ſhew how it can bee thus, although there be very great need of both; for remiſſion of ſinnes doth take away the very being of ſinne that is paſt, as the Scripture ſpeaketh, ſaying; Thou art the Lambe of God that takeſt away the ſinnes of the world; which cannot admit any increaſe: becauſe, ſin being remitted, there remaineth nothing, and that which is nothing, cannot receiue any increaſe: neither can Gods act of remitting, receiue increaſe, himſelfe doth confeſſe it, Appeale, page 195. where hee ſaith, Iuſtification as it is the worke of God, is without Magis or Minus. The remiſſion of new ſinnes, doth not increaſe remiſſion of ſinnes, nor can poſſibly; becauſe, the ſinnes already remitted, are wholy taken away: the act of God remitting them, was extended vntounto the totall aboliſhing of ſinne; ſo is it with the act of remitting new ſinnes, whereby there is no place for increaſe: for, that which is ſo done already, that no more can be done thereto, that cannot be increaſed. The antecedent is the Doctrine of our Church; in the firſt Sermon of ſaluation, a little after the beginning; where it ſaith, wee are waſhed from ſinne in ſuch ſort, that there remaineth not any ſpot of ſinne. The ſame thing we finde, page 377. and 382. of that Booke following.
Neither can the declaring, that ſinne is remitted, increaſe the remiſſion of ſinne, which is no more, but as if you ſhould ſay, the tree is knowne by the fruit: as your ſelfe teach, Appeale, page 197. but to increaſe, is as much as when warm water is made hotter, by continuing on the fire, with an augmentation and acceſſe of that heat; as your ſelfe ſay, Gagge, p. 142. which two things doe much differ. Would Mr Mountagu ſay his riches were increaſed, if it were declared truely and fully what riches he hath? I hope he would not. In the like caſe he muſt ſay, the declaring, that ſinne is remitted, doth not increaſe remiſſion. If hee will goe on to maintaine that anſwer, then I conclude in his owne words, Appeale, page 185. Goe and befoole your ſelfe for oppoſing common ſenſe and reaſon.
When I had come thus farre, I ſuppoſed here had beene an end of his pretended excuſes; but when I went on to peruſe the reſt, I found he had ſpent many pages to proue againſt, or for, iuſt no body, Appeale, page 183. that
Such is the changed eſtate of men iuſtified, that they are alſo regenerate, that are iuſtified.
I ſay neither againſt, nor for: becauſe it was neuer a queſtion on foote by any parties in this world: for anſwer, I may returne him his owne words, Appeale, page 196.
In what place doe they ſpeake; God ſaue your honeſt credit, and name mee the place, quote the very words of the Authors, which are parties to that diſputation.
But this is impoſſible for him euer to doe. If it bee anſwered, he would neuer hauehave put himſelfe thus far into the eye of the world, to barke at the moone-ſhine in the water: hee alleadgeth Becanus, Appeale, page 169. whoſe words ſeeme to incline ſomewhat that wayes. I anſwer, ſomething is the matter indeed, but he hath not expreſt it. The reaſon why I will not determine, nor inquire after. I will proceed to ſhew what it is, and by that it will appeare, it ſerueth not his turne any thing at all.
The Church of England teacheth thus touching originall ſinne.
1 Originall ſinne, deſerueth damnation.
2 Originall ſinne remaineth in them that are regenerated.
3 Originall ſinne (although there is no condemnation for them that beleeue, yet it) hath of it ſelfe the nature of ſinne, Artic. 9.
Againe, in the firſt Homilie of Saluation, it ſaith thus:
4 They which ſinne in act, are waſhed from their ſinnes in ſuch ſort, that there remaineth not any ſpot of ſinne that ſhall bee imputed to their damnation.
The Councell of Trent decreeth, ſeſſ. 5. can. 5. in theſe words:
The grace beſtowed in Baptiſme, doth take away whatſoeuer hath the true, and proper nature of ſin, and ſin is not onelyonly raſed, and not imputed.
Out of this Doctrine on both ſides, they inferre againſt vsus, as if wee ſaid,
After remiſsion of ſinnes and iuſtification, a man remaineth a ſinner truely, and that hee is alwaies foule and vncleane.
As we may find in Bellarmine de Bap. lib. 1. cap. 13. and de Iuſti. lib. 2. cap. 9. and cap. 7. Secundo, Tertio, &c. and cap. 11.
VntoUnto which, ſome of the learned in the Church of England do anſwer as he alledgeth, Appeal, p. 169. &c.
We are farre from that opinion; for wee teach together with remiſsion of ſinnes wee doe receiue diuine grace, inabling man to forſake ſinne.
What is to be ſaid to the point it ſelfe, will come afterwards, when the nature of remiſſion of ſins comes to be ſhewed; no. 31. §. But how.
OnelyOnly thus much ſufficeth to ſet downe the true ſtate of the queſtion betweene the Church of Rome, and the Church of England in this point, which hee harpeth ſo much vponupon; which doth alſo euidently ſhew, that this point hath nothing to doe with faith vntounto Iuſtification, neither could it hauehave lengthened out his foggy and miſtie pretences brought to excuſe himſelfe from agreeing with the Church of Rome, and diſagreeing from the Church of England in this point. Wherefore I leaue it, and proceed.
So confident is he in this fancied victory, that from thence he inferreth in the ſame page 183. a diſputation in theſe words;
If they meant no otherwiſe then thus, as I conceiue they did not, I ſee no reaſon to diſſent from them.
There can be no fitter anſwer to be giuen hereunto, then to returne you your owne words, Appeale, …ag. 184.
You cite no words, name no place, ſend me to no text, page, nor particulars, by any direction, that I may know where to finde, what you intend; a meere tricke of iugling companions. Marry I finde ſome things in the Councell of Trent, which I dare ſay will not downe, nor digeſt with you, a… oppoſing your conceit, or rather dreame, or wilfull peruerting the meaning of the Councell; the which, becauſe I hauehave a fit time. I will not let it alone till another.
Where you ſay [If they meant] your meaning is, to refer vsus to the decree of the councel of Trent: where
It maketh Iuſtification to bee the pulling of vsus out of the power of darkneſſe, and the tranſlation into the Kingdome of Chriſt. Seſſ. 6. cap. 3.
And where it doth inſinuate the deſcription of the Iuſtification of a ſinner, that it is a tranſlation from that ſtate wherein man was borne, into the ſtate of grace, cap. 4.
That you referre vsus hither, or vntounto no other place in the Councell, I take for granted.
Where you ſay if they meant no more but thus, your purpoſe is to ſend vsus to your owne words a few lines before: viz.
He that is iuſtified is alſo regenerate.
Now we hauehave the true ſenſe of the antecedent part; I let paſſe the conſequence of your propoſition, and come to your aſſumption, which muſt bee ſet downe in theſe words.
But the Councell of Trent in theſe places, Seſſ. 6. c. 3. and 4., &c. meaneth no more but that, a iuſtified man is alſo ſanctified.
Which aſſumption is wanting and in ſtead thereof you bring vsus the proofe of it in theſe words:
As I conceiue they did not.
Now all parts of the argument are ſet right, I anſwer to it:
The aſſumption is falſe, yea ſo odiouſly falſe, as that a man would not expect ſuch a falſhood to fall from the pen of a man that vnderſtands chalk from Cheeſe, or that had conſcience to declare the truth, when hee vnderſtood it. This might be made to appeare by diuers paſſages in the Councell of Trent: but I will content my ſelfe onelyonly with theſe three.
1 Sanctification is by grace infuſed.
Iuſtification it ſelfe is ſanctification.
Therefore Iuſtification it ſelfe is by grace infuſed.
The propoſition and aſſumption are the words of the Councell of Trent, cap. 7. In which, 1. it ſpeaketh of the ſame Iuſtification whereof it had ſpoken in the 3. and 4. Chapters. 2. By Iuſtification it ſelfe, it meaneth the quidditie, eſſence and being of Iuſtification: both which are manifeſt of themſelues, they need no proofe. And that ſanctification is formally and intrinſically by grace infuſed, is likewiſe as certaine.
2 The onelyonly formall cauſe of Iuſtification, is the very being thereof.
Grace infuſed is the onelyonly formall cauſe of Iuſtification.
Therefore grace infuſed is the very being of Iuſtification.
The propoſition is a principle in nature, and agreed vponupon for truth, therefore may not be queſtioned.
The aſſumption is the expreſſe words of the Councell of Trent, in the 7. Chapter.
3 If grace infuſed doth not concurre to the being of Iuſtification, then it is by remiſsion of ſins onelyonly, excluding grace infuſed.
But the being of Iuſtification, is not by remiſsion of ſinnes onelyonly, excluding grace infuſed.
Therfore the being of Iuſtification, is by grace infuſed.
The conſequence of the propoſition is ſo neceſſary, that it cannot be queſtioned.
The aſſumption is the words of the coūcel, c. 7. cā. 11.
What credit of truth is wanting in the aſſumption, he will ſupply by the proofe thereof; which forſooth is his owne conceit: he conceiued, they meant not otherwiſe than thus, therfore you muſt cōceiue ſo to.
VntoUnto which I might returne anſwer in his owne words, Appeale, pag. 178.
Shall I bring proofes to Anaxagoras for the ſnow is white? Who would not ſuffer himſelfe to bee perſwaded ſo: nay, becauſe he was otherwiſe by preconceit perſwaded, he ſaid, it did not ſo much as ſeeme white vntounto him. Your opinions are your owne, you will opine what formerly you hauehave thought, ſo doe for me, and there an end.
But I cannot ſo let it paſſe, becauſe you keepe not theſe conceits at home; but ſo much are you filled with them, that you muſt needs vent them, or burſt. And you cannot bee contented with that: but you raile and reuile ſuch as diſſent from you; and (more then ſo) wee muſt now come to an agreement with the Church of Rome, in the point of Iuſtification, that hauehave diſſented for many ages, till M. Mountagu his conceit ſprung vp in the world.
Therefore, vntounto his conceit, I oppoſe the reſolued iudgements of all the Schoolemen, that hauehave liued in the Church of Rome, till the Councell of Trent, all agreeing in this one ſentence,
Grace infuſed, is eſſentiall vntounto Iuſtification.
And ſhall we thinke, the Councell of Trent, would determine againſt thē? Surely no: Beſides, the Councell of Trent hath framed the decree out of Thomas, who was the firſt that brought the body of Diuinity into a compleat order: Peter Lombard, Richard, Altiſiodore, Albert, and Alexander, (the Predeceſſors of Thomas) not attaining thereunto, yet conſented with him, in this thing.
Since the Councell of Trent, all on that ſide without exception, doe vnderſtand the Councell of Trent to place the primary and proper being of Iuſtification, in grace infuſed.
I might amplify this bold and preſumptuous act of his (daring to oppoſe a multitude of learned men for ſome hundred yeares, deliuering their iudgments ſingly, and afterwards decreeing the ſame in a Councell ioyntly; and laſt of all, the ſame decree ſo interpreted and defended vniuerſally) but I leaue it, and conclude in his owne words, Appeale, p. 248.
You vnderſtand not the ſtate nor depth of the queſtion; but ſcumme vponupon the ſurface, and gibberiſh you cannot tell for what.
And thus much is enough (and too much) to hauehave ſaid touching his excuſe ſet down no. 4. Now I come to proue he did not meane as hee pretended there: but he meant to make grace enfuſed eſſentiall to Iuſtification: In which alſo I wil content my ſelfe with ſome arguments, and let the reſt paſſe: The firſt whereof I frame thus,
1 That wherein Iuſtification conſiſteth, is eſſentiall thereunto; not an accident to a iuſtified man.
But in grace infuſed (according to him) Iuſtification conſiſteth.
Therefore grace infuſed) according to him) is eſſentiall to Iuſtification. &c.
2 EueryEvery terme of that motion which is called Iuſtification, is eſſentiall vntounto Iuſtification.
But grace infuſed (according to him) is one terme in this motion, which is called Iuſtification.
Therefore grace infuſed (according to him) is eſſentiall to Iuſtification.
3 If a man bee iuſt when he is changed from ſinne to grace, then grace is eſſentiall to Iuſtification.
But (according to him) a man is iuſt when hee is changed from ſinne to grace.
Therefore (according to him) grace is eſſentiall to Iuſtification.
If any except againſt the conſequence of the propoſition, becauſe the terme changed, may bee referred vntounto the terme Iuſt; as a thing that doth follow a Iuſt man, and ſo doth declare that a man is iuſt already, before he is changed.
And indeed I doe find this argument for ſubſtance in his Appeale, pag, 174. and this exception in his Appeale, pag. 185. where he ſaith,
I doe not make this change the ſame with Iuſtification in the act; but an incident, inſtant, neceſſary conſequent, thereupon.
From which anſwer hee inferreth againſt him that vnderſtandeth his words, in any other ſenſe; that he is
1 No Scholler, or Divine; but one at oddes with his owne little, or franticke wits, Appeale, p. 176.
2 An oppoſer of common ſenſe, reaſon, well knowne and confeſſed diuinity on all hands: therefore a foole.
3 A man that doth not vnderſtand himſelfe, nor him, pag. 185.
VntoUnto his foule, and vgly imputations, inferred vponupon his anſwer; I ſay nothing: the Prophet Dauid in the 52. Pſ. v. 2. 3. 4. 5. will giuegive him his leſſon for that.
To the exception it ſelfe, I anſwer; It is very manifeſt, that he did make this change from ſinne to grace, eſſentiall vntounto the act of iuſtification. The phraſe and manner of his ſpeaking in this point; and the thing it ſelfe, doth euidently declare it.
For 1. The like phraſe he vſeth when he ſaith, a ſinner is then iuſtified, when he is made iuſt: which can be vnderſtood no otherwiſe then as if he had ſaid, he is iuſtified at the inſtāt when he is made Iuſt, and by vertue of his being made Iuſt. 2. To iuſtifie (according to him) is to make Iuſt; and to make iuſt, is to be tranſlated; and the word tranſlated is the ſame wth the word changed; therfore (according to him) to be changed is to be iuſt, or iuſtified. 3. If to be changed doth ſet out a man already iuſt, and doth not ſignifie his being iuſt, then his purpoſe was to proue that ſome men are iuſt, and not to deſcribe Iuſt…fication. But he doth deſcribe it (as himſelfe profeſſeth) Appeale, pag. 173. and indeed ſo he muſt, or elſe he ſaith nothing to the purpoſe. 4. If the word changed do ſignifie ſanctifying grace, which alway goeth with Iuſtification; then hee muſt ſay a man is not iuſtified, till he be ſo changed. For hee referreth being iuſt, to the time when hee is changed: but hee will confeſſe that a man is iuſt, or iuſtified, before he is ſo changed, & doth declare ſo much, Appeale page 172. where he maketh ſanctification a conſequent vponupon iuſtification, and page 174. he ſaith, Iuſtification is not ſanctification.
My laſt argument in this point I frame thus:
4 If God onelyonly iuſtifieth, becauſe he onelyonly createth a new heart, then to create a new heart, is to iuſtifie.
But (according to M. Mountagu) God onelyonly iuſtifieth, becauſe he onelyonly createth a new heart: For,
Hee ſaith, God onelyonly iuſtifieth, who alone createth a new heart within vsus: In which ſentence hee bringeth the latter act of creating, to proue the former of iuſtifying.
Therefore (according to Mr. Mountagu,) to create a new heart, is to iuſtifie, and conſequently, grace infuſed, is eſſentiall to iuſtification.
He bringeth the ſubſtance of this argument, in his Appeale, page 188. and 192. as an obiection made againſt him, but torne in pieces, that the ſtrength therof, and the weakeneſſe of his anſwer thereto, might be concealed.
He anſwereth vntounto it, three things.
1 God onelyonly doth iuſtifie, pag. 188.
2 God only doth create a new heart within vsus, p. 192.
3 Faith iuſtifieth inſtrumentally, p. 193.
Hee annexeth proofe for them all:
And concludeth, if this bee Popery, I confeſſe I am a Papiſt, p. 191. And am content to paſſe for a Papiſt, p. 194. & complaineth againſt the obiectors, with his wonted bitterneſſe, page 189. 190. and 191.
I anſwer, this plea is idle: no liuing man did euer deny any of his three propoſitions; nor did charge thē to be Popery; (at leaſt,) The argument which he anſwers vntounto, hath no ſuch thing (as the Reader may ſee.) A worthy diſputer, that either knowes not, or cares not what he ſpeakes vntounto. The fire cannot but burne, nor he forbeare his rayling, therefore he muſt not be blamed for it.
I argue againſt both his Expoſitions, ſet downe, no. 4, thus:
When he ſaid Iuſtification conſiſteth alſo in grace infuſed, hee meant to ſay, grace infuſed was alwaies in a iuſtified man, and by iuſtification, he vnderſtandeth the whole ſtate of a man reconciled to God, or neither of them: For,
He pretendeth both, and both muſt be true, or neither true. He that is found falſe in one thing, deſerues not to be truſted in any other.
But he did not take that ſentence in both theſe ſenſes. I proue it: Firſt, for he ſaith, Appeale p. 169. I profeſſed at firſt to take Iuſtification onelyonly in this acceptation, viz. For the declaration of the act of Iuſtification vponupon man by the liuely fruits of a true faith, and for abſolution. Which is but one of the ſenſes, (at moſt) and ſeemes to be the firſt: now if he meant onelyonly the firſt, or but one of them, his owne pen muſt giuegive the verdict, hee meant neither of them in deed and in truth. Secondly, if he make grace infuſed, accidentall to a iuſtified man, or in him that is iuſtified, declaring him that-hee is iuſt, then he did not deſcribe Iuſtification, as compre…ending Sanctification; for vntounto this Iuſtification, grace infuſed is eſſentiall and conſtitutiue; and therefore if you meant the firſt, you meant not the ſecond. Thirdly, if in that ſentence hee intended to deſcribe Iuſtification, as comprehending Sanctification alſo; then he intended not to ſay, grace infuſed, is accidentall to Iuſtification, or a iuſtified man: for vntounto this iuſtification, and man iuſtified, grace infuſed is eſſentiall, making full and compleat the worke of ſanctification, ſo as if hee meant the ſecond, he did not meane the firſt.
I proue againſt either of them ſingly.
If when you ſaid, Iuſtification conſiſteth in grace infuſed; you meant to ſay a iuſtified man hath grace infuſed, then both thoſe ſentences doe expreſſe the ſame thing.
But that they doe not. As the very ſight and reading of them will manifeſt.
In the firſt ſentence, iuſtification conſidered in it ſelfe, and without any perſon receiuing the ſame, is ſaid to conſiſt in grace. In the ſecond ſentence, not Iuſtification in it ſelfe, nor with the partie receiuing it; but the partie iuſtified, conceiued otherwiſe then as he is iuſtified, is ſaid to poſſeſſe or inioy grace infuſed, together with his iuſtification.
Therefore by the firſt ſentence, you did not meane the ſecond.
2 If by this ſentence, Iuſtification conſiſteth in grace infuſed, he meant to deſcribe Iuſtification, as it comprehendeth the whole ſtate and condition of a man regenerate & reconciled to God, then he agreeth fully with the Church of Rome, which taketh it ſo. For,
It deſcribeth Iuſtification to be A tranſlation from that ſtate, in which man was borne a Sonne of the firſt Adam, into the ſtate of grace, and adoption of the ſonnes of God, Councell of Trent, ſeſſ. 6. cap. 4. And more fully it ſaith, Iuſtification it ſelfe, is not onelyonly remiſsion of ſinnes, but alſo ſanctification and renouation of the inward man, by a voluntary receit of grace, and gifts, from whence a man is iuſt of vniuſt, a friend of an enemie, and heire according to the hope of euerlaſting life, cap. 7.
But by that ſentence, he meant ſo to deſcribe, &c. (as is before ſet downe, no. 7, Wherein alſo he placeth his confidence, Appeale page 172. to giuegive ſatisfaction if any will be taken.
Therefore when hee ſaith, Iuſtification conſiſteth in grace infuſed, he agreeth with the Church of Rome.
Now at the laſt we are come to a finall concluſion, touching the conſiſting of Iuſtification in grace infuſed; wherein after many turnings, windings, and ſhiftings; now this waies, then that waies; ſome vntounto the matter, ſome beſides the matter: we are come by his owne direction, and the euidence of the thing it ſelfe, vntounto this concluſion, that hee agreeth with the Church of Rome.
In the next place we muſt inquire
Whether hee agreeth with the Church of Rome, and diſſenteth from the Church of England, in aſſigning of the nature of remiſſion of ſins.
Touching which, thus he ſaith: Both forgiueneſſe of ſinnes, and grace infuſed, are the act of Gods ſpirit in man.
To the ſame effect the Councell of Trent decreeth in theſe words.
Grace beſtowed in Baptiſme, doth take away whatſoeuer hath the true and proper nature of ſin, ſeſſ. 5.
Theſe ſentences of the Councell, and Mr. Mountagu, doe fully agree. He ſaith, the ſpirit, It ſaith, grace; He ſaith, the ſpirit in man, It ſaith, grace receiued; Hee ſaith, remiſsion of ſinne, is the act of the ſpirit; It ſaith, grace taketh away the true and proper nature of ſinne: all which words are of the ſame value and ſignification.
All the Interpreters of the Councell, doe extend this decree, vntounto all ſinnes: (as well perſonall as originall) and that vponupon good reaſon, as I ſuppoſe. Likewiſe what the Councell ſaith of grace beſtowed in Baptiſme, They apply alſo to the habit of grace receiued out of Baptiſme: becauſe it is the ſame habit which is receiued by Baptiſme, & without Baptiſme: which doth make their agreement cleare to the full.
Moreouer; the moſt common opinion of the Expoſitors of the Councell, doe further ſay, as Bellarmine doth, de Iuſtific. lib. 2. cap. 16:
Habituall grace, hath foure formall effects, the firſt whereof is to purge ſinne.
And thereby they make remiſſion of ſinne a phyſicall worke of grace: as when one pinne is driuen out by another, or one colour is blotted out by another. Some others, (but they are not many) are of opinion, that grace doth remit ſin by the way of merit: but the firſt opinion is moſt agreeable to the Councell of Trent, which in that decree cannot bee vnderſtood of taking away ſinne by the way of merit: becauſe habituall grace beſtowed vponupon children, cannot bring forth workes; and no workes, no merits: beſides, if grace did merit remiſſion of ſinnes, then a man might hauehave grace for ſometime, and yet not hauehave his ſinnes remitted: For there may fall out ſometime after a man hath receiued grace wherein hee hath no opportunity vntounto the doing of a meritorious worke.
VntoUnto which opinion, Mr. Mountagu his words doe greatly incline: for he ſaith,
Iuſtification by grace, and remiſsion of ſinnes, is the act of Gods ſpirit. Which is as much as if he had ſayd, in what ſort grace doth make iuſt, in that ſort, grace doth remit ſinne; elſe he could not comprehend them both vnderunder one act: but muſt hauehave referred them vntounto two acts. Now, it is agreed vponupon by al, & Bellarmine hath it, in the place laſt alleadged; That, to make iuſt, is a formall effect of habituall grace. And accordingly to remit ſinne, is a formall effect of habituall grace.
Againe, he ſaith;
The ſoule of man is the ſubiect of Iuſtification.
In theſe words he ſpeaketh of the ſoule, not ſimply, as being the obiect of an outward worke: but as the ſubiect receiuing remiſſion of ſinnes into it; and how man ſhould receiue remiſſion of ſinne (by grace) into his ſoule, and that remiſſion not be a formall effect of grace, cannot poſſibly be ſhewed.
Laſtly, if in his opinion, ſinne doth expell grace formally, then he muſt be of opinion, that grace doth expell (which is to remit) ſinne formally.
But he hath the firſt: Appeale, p. 173. where he ſaith,
The propertie of thoſe ſinnes, that are more eminent, notorious, enormious, is to waſt the conſcience.
Where, waſting the conſcience, muſt ſignifie the putting away of grace; for what is there in the conſcience that can be waſted by ſinne, but grace? and the act of waſting, muſt be a formall act; becauſe, ſinne is conceiued in ſuch a caſe to reſt and remaine in ſtead of grace.
Therefore hee muſt be conceiued, to be of opinion, that, remiſſion of ſinne, is a formall effect of grace.
By this (I hope) it doth appeare, that hee agreeth fully with the Church of Rome. But to auoyd all ſcruple, it is requiſite that I remoue one obiection, which may be made after this manner:
Hee placeth remiſsion of ſinnes in the pardon, and not-imputation of ſinnes, Gagge page 143. and in abſolution therefrom, Appeale pag 169.
Therefore he maketh not remiſsion of ſinnes a formall effect of grace.
I anſwer; hee may ſay both, and yet agree with them: for, although the Councell of Trent, ſeſſ. 6. can. 11. and cap. 7. hath but implyed (not expreſly decreed) this manner of remitting ſinnes: yet all the Interpreters by one conſent doe teach both expreſly; except onelyonly Gabriel Vaſquez, in 1m. 2ae. diſp. 204. per tot: yea, he muſt hold the latter: though he doth hold the former; for pardon, &c. is required alſo vntounto the perfect doing away of ſinne, as Thomas teacheth, 3. part, q. 22. art. 3. C. And Suarez proueth at large, de grat. lib. 7. cap. 13. and 14.
And thus much (I hope) is ſufficient, to ſhew his conſent with the Church of Rome. I come now in the next place, to ſhew his diſſent from the Church of England in this point of remiſſion of ſinnes.
What the Church of England hath decreed in the point, I will ſet downe, and then apply it. It ſaith,
Good workes cannot put away our ſinnes, Artic. 12.
In which ſentence, there is a direct contradiction put, vntounto the Doctrine laſt recited out of Church of Rome, and M. Mountagu. The terme put away muſt ſignifie that putting away which is called remiſſion, and not ſatisfaction; for this doth make recompence for ſinne, but doth not put away ſin; which importeth, the deſtroying of the being, & remaining of ſin it ſelfe. By denying the puting away of ſinne to good workes, the meriting of remiſſion of ſinne by grace, and the effects therof is denyed: for otherwiſe then ſo, good workes are not fit nor able to put away ſin: and himſelfe ſpeaks thus of it, Gagg. p. 156.
Now foraſmuch as good workes are the fruits of a liuely faith (as the Article ſpeaketh) that is of the habit of grace; the remiſſion of ſinnes that it denyeth to good workes, it denyeth to the habit of grace, and therein it denyeth that remiſſion of ſinne is a formall effect, or phyſicall worke of grace; foraſmuch as the remiſſion of ſin can be no other effect or operation of the habit of grace but formall, and Phyſicall. The Homilie of Almes, pag. 329. teaches the ſame thing expreſly, which is a proofe ſufficient: that M. Mountagu doth diſſent from the Church of England, and no diſſent in a matter of this kind, can be greater then a contradiction.
Our Church doth teach poſitiuely, what remiſſion of ſinnes is; wherein it doth aſſigne a nature, contrary to that, which the Church of Rome and M. Mountagu doe giuegive vntounto it. If I make that appeare. I doubt not then to ſay: M. Mountagu diſſenteth from the Church of England. I doe it thus,
The true knowledge of the remiſſion of ſinne conſiſteth in the true vnderſtanding of theſe two things, viz. 1. what is meant by ſinne, which is ſaid to be forgiuen. Secondly, what act of God it is by which it is forgiuen.
Sinne, of which a man may be denominated a ſinner, may be conceiued two waies: firſt, for the act of ſin paſt: ſecondly, for the will of ſinning: as Thomas hath truely obſerued, 3. part. q. 61. art. 4. C.
The will of ſinning, is not the obiect of that act, which the Scripture calleth remitting: becauſe the will of ſinning, importeth an indiſpoſition vntounto good, and an aptneſſe to ſinne, remaining in the will, from whence the Scripture doth not denominate a man a ſinner: but from the act of ſinne.
The act of ſinne paſt, is the obiect of remiſſion, as is confeſſed on all ſides. The Councell of Trent hath decreed it Seſſ. 6. cap. 5. where it maketh ſuch as are turned from God by ſinne, the men that are iuſtified. So doth all the expoſitors of the Councell, with one conſent, make the act of ſin the thing remitted; and from which a man is iuſtified. Bellarmine hath it, de Iuſti. lib. 2. cap. 16. with whoſe teſtimony I will reſt contented, others may ſay the ſame thing; but not more, nor more cleerly then he hath done.
The Church of England teacheth it, in the firſt Homilie of ſaluation; where it nameth (a little after the beginning) ſinnes forgiuen, by the name of treſpaſses: and againe, ſins from which man is waſhed, and which are not imputed, it calleth ſinne in act or deed.
The act of God, whereby the ſinnes of man are remitted, is ſet out by the Church of England, by diuers titles, according to the courſe, and phraſe of Scripture: but of them all, one is the moſt fit, and of beſt ſignification for this preſent occaſion; viz. The not-imputing of ſinne: which it vſeth in the firſt Homilie of ſaluation, a little after the beginning, the words lie thus,
Man is waſhed from his ſinnes, in ſuch ſort, that there remaineth not any ſpot of ſinne, that ſhall be imputed to their damnation.
In which ſentence, waſhing away the ſpots of ſinne, (which is the act remitting ſinnes) is reſolued into the act of not-imputing; where it ſaith, ſo waſhed as not imputed. Hee muſt not deny this Homilie to be the Doctrine of the Church of England: for, hee doth auouch it to bee ſuch in his Appeale, pag. 190. and 194.
If it be ſaid, the Church of England doth aſſigne other acts of remitting ſinne, beſides this, in vſi…g other titles: I anſwer; though it do vſe other titles; yet not aſſigne any other act but this; for this doth extend as largely as them all, and they doe but …xplicate this: therefore wee may conclude, in the doctrine of the Church of England,
The not-imputation of ſinne, is the ſole and onelyonly act, whereby ſinnes are remitted.
Touching this act, ariſe…h all the difference betweene the Church of Rome, and our Church: with which Church of Rome, M. Mountagu conſenteth; both of them aſſigning ſuch an act of God, as doth really differ, and put a contrariety vntounto this.
The Church of Rome teacheth, 1. that ſinne is remitted by a created being, (namely) the habit of grace. 2. That remiſſion of ſinne is wrought in the ſoule of man. 3. That the manner how ſinne is remitted by grace, is formall and phyſicall, as a painter that couereth a thing deformed with beauty and good ſhape.
Our Church maketh, 1. the Creator directly and immediately the worker thereof. 2. It placeth the thing effected not in man; but in the outward eſtate and condition of man. 3. The manner of working to be meerly efficient, viz. God (out of his prerogatiue Royall) diſcharging our account; Not putting our ſinnes to our reckoning.
And thus much is ſufficient, to proue his totall agreement with the Church of Rome, and diſagreement with the Church of England in the nature of Iuſtification: and therewith I might put an end vntounto this whole point.
But I will goe a little further to the ſatisfying of the point propounded. no 12. &c. Wherein my labour will not be loſt, for that which I ſhall ſay, will ſerue aboundantly to ſhew, 1. how diuinely the Church of England hath determined in this point. 2. How little reaſon he had to depart from the doctrine of our Church in this point. 3. The great reaſon that euerie man hath to ſtriue for the doctrine of the Church of England in this point, as for the faith once deliuered to the Saints.
Againſt this doctrine of the Church of England, the Church of Rome (as may well be conceiued) doth thus diſpute,
If no other act doth concurre vntounto the remitting of ſinne, but the act of not-imputing of ſinne, then a man, after remiſsion of ſinne remaineth a ſinner; truely, and alwaies foule, and vncleane.
But a man, after remiſsion of ſinne, remaineth not a ſinner; truely, foule, and vncleane.
Therefore beſides the act of not-imputing of ſinne, there is required ſome other act, vntounto the remiſsion of ſinne, viz. The infuſion of grace, whereby the true, and proper nature of ſinne, is taken away, rooted out, and aboliſhed.
This argument is framed out of the 4. and 9. arguments of Bellar. de Bap. lib. 1. cap. 13. and alſo taken out of thoſe places of Bellarmine alleadged no. 13. the antecedent part of the propoſition is found de Bap. lib. 1. cap. 13. where he alledgeth a paſſage out of Chemnitius, containing the ſame doctrine which I hauehave cited out of the 9 Article, and the Homilie, at no. 13. out of which he inferreth, that we ſay, that ſinne is remitted, becauſe it is not imputed, and wee acknowledge not, that it is taken away.
And in his diſputation de Iuſti. lib. 2. c. 9. Praeterea, and cap. 11. Illud autem &c. the ſame thing is repeated: The conſequent part of the propoſition, and the inference thereof from that antecedent, is in de Iuſti. lib. 2 cap. 7. Secundo, &c. Tertio, &c. I hauehave aſſumed negatiuely the conſequent part of the propoſition; becauſe they deny the antecedent part of the propoſition: and as Bellarmine ſaith, in that place de Bap. lib. 1. cap. 13. The Councell of Trent Seſſ. 5. can. 5 decreed againſt it. The aſſumption it ſelfe, is their own doctrine; as will be confeſſed on all ſides. The proofe of the conſequence ſeemeth to be theſe two things;
1 The act of not-imputing, doth not take away ſinne. Confeſſed by our doctrine, no. 13. that ſaith, originall ſinne is in the iuſtified, and in it ſelfe is ſin properly, and the ſpots of actuall ſin doe likewiſe remaine.
2 By the remaining of ſinne (that in it ſelfe is damnable) a man is foule, vncleane, and a ſinner truly.
Now that I hauehave ſet their diſputation in true form, and order: I might ſay, If M. Mountagu will maintain his doctrine of remiſſion of ſinnes no 23, &c. then he muſt diſpute thus too, & be a worthy child to his mother, and a famous refuter of the Gagger: If he will not diſpute thus, he muſt reuoke that as falſe in it ſelfe, and a ſtranger to the Church of England.
VntoUnto this argument many Diuines doe anſwer as he alleadgeth, Appeale p. 169. In theſe words,
We are far from this abſurd opinion; for wee teach, with the action of God, remitting ſinne, concurreth another action of diuine grace, enabling man to forſake, and mortifie eueryevery greater ſinne, which God hath pardoned.
But, how fit this anſwer is, to giuegive ſatisfaction to any part of that argument; I leaue vntounto others to iudge: becauſe, 1. Bellarmine doth confeſſe no leſſe then is in that anſwer, de Iuſti. lib. 2. cap. 6. at the beginning. 2. It ſeemeth not fit to bee applyed to the conſequence of the propoſition; for that ſpeaketh of doing away of ſinne already committed: but this anſwer ſpeaketh of preuenting ſinne not yet committed, neither doth it appertain to the aſſumption, which doth not charge vsus with the holding of any opinion whatſoeuer.
Other Diuines doe anſwer otherwiſe; I will name one in ſtead of all: namely Doctor Abbot in defence of M. Perkins, of inherent Iuſtice, 2. part. p. 421. his anſwer is long, but I will contract it into (ſo ſhort) a roome as I may, vſing his owne words.
Wee ſay (ſaith hee) a man may bee formally iuſt in
qualitie.
law.
In courſe of law and iudgement, the forme of iuſtice is, not to bee ſubiect to crime, or accuſation; and he is formally iuſt, againſt whom, no action, or accuſation is lyable by law, in this ſort a man becommeth iuſt, by pardon and forgiueneſſe; becauſe pardon being obtained, the law proceedeth no further, and all imputation of the offence in law, is taken away, as if it had neuer beene committed: and this is the ſtate of our iuſtice in the ſight of God, our ſinnes are forgiuen vsus, and thereby no accuſation is liable againſt vsus.
Before I apply this to the argument, It muſt be obſerued, that, the word pardon in this teſtimony, is of the ſame value, and ſignification, with the word notimputing, vſed in the argument: for, by pardon, hee vnderſtandeth ſuch an act, as whereby the imputation of the offence in law is taken away, and to take away the imputation of the offence, is not to impute the offence. This anſwere lyeth againſt the conſequence, and the proofe thereof: affirming, that the act of not-imputing ſinne, doth take away ſin, and proueth that affirmation, which proofe I may diſpoſe thus,
Whereby we are made formally iuſt before God, that takes away all ſinne.
This propoſition is a manifeſt truth, agreed vponupon by all parties.
But, not-imputation of ſinne is that, whereby wee are made formally iuſt, before God: For,
By it, all crime, action, or accuſation and offence in law, is taken away, as if it had neuer beene committed, the law proceedeth no further; which is formall iuſtice in law, and our formall iuſtice before God.
Therefore the not-imputation of ſinne doth take away ſinne.
I might proceed further to ſhew the inſufficiency of the argument; but I forbeare ſo to doe, this that I hauehave ſaid is ſufficient to iuſtifie, and explicate the Doctrine of the Church of England touching the nature of remiſſion of ſinnes, and iuſtification, which is as much as I intended, and this place requires.
If Mr. Mountagu (notwithſtanding all this) will inſiſt and ſay, his words alleadged, no 23. &c. are forced beyond his intent, and that (in his iudgement) there is no other act in remiſſion of ſinne, but pardon, or not-imputation, he muſt looke vntounto it; for as Bellarmine affirmeth, de Iuſti. lib. 2. cap. 1. & 6, That opinion is proper to Caluine. If that bee true, (as it is moſt true,) how can hee thinke it is the Doctrine of the Church of England? For as himſelfe ſaith, Appeale, page 72.
The Doctrine of the Church of England, is not likely to be vponupon the party of a faction, that hath ſo long had a ſchiſme on foote againſt it, to bring in Geneuaniſme into Church and State, &c.
If it bee not the Doctrine of the Church of England, what doth it in Mr. Mountagu his Booke, that voweth to thruſt out all priuate opinions, as Irchins to their holes, where they were bred, and Baſtards to the Pariſh where they were borne, and to the whipping poſt according to law? and like a valiant and true Champion, to defend the Doctrine of his Mother, the Church of England. Therefore I may conclude, let him turne himſelfe which wayes he will, he ſhall finde himſelfe to agree, either with the Church of Rome, or with Caluine; if with them, then is hee a Papiſt; if with him, then doth hee take the courſe to bring in Popes into eueryevery Pariſh, as himſelfe inferreth, and which thing himſelfe curſeth with a heauy and bitter curſe, Appeale, page 44. I hope hee will be rather a Papiſt, then a Caluiniſt, curſed to hell with his owne mouth,
I ſhould now ſhew that this faith of the Church of Rome is erroneous, but hee hath brought nothing to proue it true, therefore I hauehave nothing to anſwer. The Councell of Trent in the decree already reported, no 23. ſaith, three things, viz. firſt, notimputation, doth not take away ſinne; ſecondly, ſinne is aboliſhed, and taken away; thirdly, the habit of grace doth take away ſinne. Bellarmine beſtoweth great paines to proue the ſecond, which was neuer denyed, de Bap. lib. 1. cap. 13. for the firſt he doth onelyonly ſay it; for the third he hath not ſo much as one place of Scripture to pretend for it: onelyonly de Iuſti. lib. 2. cap. 16. he offereth a proofe from the nature of ſinne that is remitted, which can proue nothing; becauſe it is as doubtfull as the thing in queſtion; by which it is manifeſt, the Scripture knoweth it not: and conſequently it is erroneous. If Mr. Mountagu thinketh not thus, let him produce the word of God for the proofe of it, and he ſhall hauehave anſwer, till then it muſt goe for ſuch.