A Dangerous Plot Discovered, Chapter 8
CHAP. VIII. The point of Free-will, ſet downe in the former Chapter, is debated.
IN this point, as in the former, three things are to be inquired of;
1. Whether the propoſitions delivered by him be true, or not.
2. Whether thoſe propoſitions conſent with the Church of Rome, or not.
3. Whether thoſe propoſitions diſſent from the Church of England, or not.
Of the ſecond and third, we hauehave his ſentence in his gagg. p. 107. & Appeal. p. 83. where he ſaith;
The particulars in this point of Free-will, controverted betweene the Church of Rome and ours, are of no great moment.
And in his Appeal. from p. 84. to 95. he indevours to proue; That
The Church of Rome and our Church, doe agree in the particulars delivered by Mr: Mountague, & ſet downe in the precedent Chapter.
To which, I anſwer, howſoever it be with our Church (for of that hereafter) from hence it doth neceſſarily follow; that,
He conſenteth with the Church of Rome in thoſe his prepoſitions, ſet downe in the laſt Chapter.
Becauſe he will not deny to conſent to thoſe things, which in his judgement the Church of England conſenteth vntounto. And that indeed he conſenteth fully with the Church of Rome, will appeare by the ſight of the doctrine on both ſides, ſet downe in the Chapter going before. What it ſaith of the nature, vſe, remaining, cauſes, manner of working, effects, adjuncts, objects of free-will, the ſame ſaith he: he comes not ſhort one word; ſo that it ſeemeth little better, then a tranſcription out of the Romiſh faith, and opinion, taught amongſt them.
That he diſſenteth from the Church of England, a little labour of mine is required to ſhew it; It is his taske to ſhew his agreement therewith, for he vndertooke to defend the doctrine of the Church of England, therefore he muſt ſhew, that the doctrine which he defendeth, is the doctrine thereof.
But that he cannot doe, except he proue the Church of England doth conſent with the Church of Rome; and (it ſeemes) that he himſelfe perceived ſo much, therefore he laboureth, Appeal. p. 84. &c. to proue their conſent by this argument:
Whitaker, Chemnitius, Mollerus, Perkins, S…ecanus, Hemingius, Willet, the Helvetian Confeſsion, the Confeſſion of Saxonie, do agree with the Church of Rome. p. 87.
Therefore there is no difference between our Church, and the Church of Rome.
Which argument is not barely alledged; but accompanied with all due Circumſtances. Firſt (for the credit thereof, that it might not come barely without authoritie, he telleth vsus. p. 95.
1. He examined this queſtion between them and vsus of freewill, with as great diligence as he could. p. 95.
2. He thought thus before, and ſo he thinkes …ow. p. 84.
3. He confirmes the antecedent, by laying downe certaine points of free-will, maintained by ſome one that ſide▪ which he calleth the moſt moderate amongst them. p. 90. and confeſt by thoſe of ours. p. 87.
4. He interprets the concluſion, and ſayth, he meanes by that Church and ours, moderate and temperate men on either ſide. p. 83.
I anſwer; If his intent be not to proue the agreement between the Church of Rome, and the Church of England, but between ſome profeſſors of Divinitie on either ſide, then all his labour is in vaine: for the queſtion he ought to proue, is touching the agreement, not of private opinions in the Churches, but of the Churches themſelues, which two differ much, as himſelfe affirmeth. Appeal. p. 134. This being publike and authoriſed, that not ſo: and he profeſſeth in his Epiſtle before his Appeale, his reſolution is to leaue private opinions, as Irchius to ſhift for themſelues, and defend the doctrine of our Church, publikely and vniverſally reſolved on; but according to his words alledged, that is not his intent, therefore all this argument is one of his Ireehius, neceſſary to be diſbanded, and ſent away to ſhift for it ſelfe, that our Mother the Church be no more troubled with it, yea, to be ſent as a vagabond to the pariſh where it laſt dwelt, not ſuffered to paſſe without due correction; and is his owne advice in his ſaid Epiſtle before his Appeal.
But I will ſuppoſe that he ſpeakes of the agreement of the Churches themſelues, and anſwer accordingly.
The antecedent is falſe, ſome of theſe that he nameth on the part of the Church of England be ſtrangers. We are not bound vntounto them; no Law directeth vsus; our Church doth not compell vsus to be bound vntounto them, which is his owne plea, Appeal. p. 70.
Thoſe of our Church whoſe agreement he alledgeth, are much iniured by him. It is notoriouſly falſe that he ſaith; They are as farre from agreeing with the Church of Rome in the point of free-will, as Maiſter Mountague is from—As I can and will moſt evidently declare, if need be, but there is no place for that now; for it is beſides the preſent queſtion.
The conſequence is alſo falſe; theſe men you name of our church, are not the church of England, no more then one handfull is the whole harveſt; a few trees the whole Forreſt: neither is their doctrine the doctrine of the Church of England; for her doctrine is propoſed in Synods, confirmed by Law, commanded and eſtabliſhed by Act of Parliament, as appeares by your owne deſcription, Appeal. p. 111.
If that be ſo I yeeld: If that be not ſo, why doe you inferre our Churches agreement from their agreement?
Theſe ſores will not be healed with your owne proteſtations, ſee your diſputation:
I examined the queſtion with diligence.
That they agree is my confirmed thoughts.
Therefore they doe agree, and that agreement is the agreement of the Church of England.
Thus hauehave we done with the Vanguard, & the maine battell of this diſputation, the Rere approacheth next in this order.
They that doe not acknowledge this agreement, 1. Doe not reade ſo much as their owne Proteſtant Writers. 2. In their Pulpits they brawle at the ſhaddow of their owne fancies. 3. Abuſe the ſimple Credulitie of the vnlearned. 4. Make themſelues ridiculous to the Papiſts. 5. Harden the Papiſts in their ſuperſtition. 6. Miſtake ignorantly that which they doe not vnderſtand. 7. Traduce confidently and virulently. Appeal. p. 88.
I anſwer, I come to diſpute, therefore I will ſpeake herevnto ſo farre as it concernes the matter in hand. I liſt not to change words with him, though (perhaps) I could pay him with intereſt, therefore to the point.
All thoſe heavie and bitter accuſations, are not given abſolutely, but with reference vntounto, and inference vponupon the agreement, of the Church of England, with the Church of Rome, in the point of Free-will, if he hath proved that he thinkes, he may affirme theſe. Whether he hath done that or no, I will leaue to the judgement (I will not ſay) of him that is of the meaneſt capacitie, but of Mr: Mountague himſelfe, who muſt giuegive ſentence againſt his owne proofe, or els vndergoe the heavie ſentence of all men that ſhall read my anſwer. What I might anſwer to the reſt, I am not farre to ſeeke, but becauſe it doth tend to ſtrife, and not to edification, therfore I hold my peace, God is the reprover of ſuch evill language, and revenger of ſuch wrongs, to whom I leaue it, and proceed to that which remaines appertaining to this argument, which I find thus written:
If you with your new learning (for old you hauehave little or none) can teach me more than yet I know, I will yeeld and thanke you for ſuch inſtructions. Appeal. p. 90.
I anſwer; What is become of Mr: Mountague his diſputing? What is become of his Logick, or where was his Caution? Why man? Oh, he had to doe with poore Divines, ſilly men, of no performance. He might ſay what he would, they muſt take it for good, therefore he put this ſentence vponupon them, of purpoſe to gull them, and it ſeems ſo in very deed, for it doth neither affirme, no… deny, proue, nor diſproue, but becauſe every drop of old learning is honorable, as age it ſelfe is, … will make the b…ſt of it. If an Aſſumption, and a Concluſion be added, we ſhall know his …rrand, which he may (yea muſt) doe one of theſe three wayes.
1. But I will not yeeld, nor thanke you for ſuch inſtructions.
Therefore you cannot teach me more then yet … know
Or after this ſort:
2. But you cannot teach me more then yet I know. For Your learning is new, old you hauehave little or none. And mine is old, for the courſe of my ſtudies was never addreſſed to moderne Epitomizers, I went to inquire of the dayes of old, and hitherto I hauehave not repented me of it. Appeal. p. 11.
Therefore I will not yeeld &c.
I may diſpute alſo from hence, a third way: Thus
3. But you can teach me more than yet I know.
Therefore I will yeeld and thanke you for ſuch inſtructions.
If he will diſpute the firſt way, the Syllogiſme is true: but every boy in the Schools will laugh at him, for the aſſumption is folly, and the conſequence of the propoſition is madneſſe, no man (well in his wits) would ſay, I will not yeeld, therefore you cannot teach.
If he diſputeth in the ſecond manner, his Syllogiſme is falſe, and concludes nothing; every poore Sophiſter knows that. But in this manner he muſt be vnderſtood, for his proofes doe lie directly for the confirmation of this aſſumption, and cannot otherwiſe be applyed.
But let it be as he will (for the forme) the aſſumption is a blaſt of vaine-glory, the anſwer is readie; Let him that putteth off his armour boaſt, and not he that putteth it on. If you had lead Cauſabon in triumph, I would hauehave adviſed you to brag of glory, and ſtay at home: but becauſe you hauehave not, I come not ſo farre.
The confirmation of your aſſumption, is an apple of the ſame tree: but (the beſt is) if you touch it, it falls to powder. But I pray, tell me, how doe you know all their learning is new, hauehave they no bookes of the old? HaueHave they no guts in their braines, to make vſe of ſuch bookes? no tongues in their heads to impart their learning to others? Or doe you know, they hauehave none by any ſpeciall teſtimony from their own mouths, or your owne illumination? Is it true indeed, is your learning all old? HaueHave you ingroſt all the books thereof? Does wit keepe her Common-wealth in your breaſt? Then happie man are you; but thrice vnhappie the world, from whom the old learning is ſequeſtred, and that into a corner, yea into a cloſe corner, out of which it cannot get (I am ſure yet it hath not gotten.) I might goe on, to ſhew the inſufficiency (if not folly) of this Confirmation, of your Aſſumption; but I proceed to the next.
If you will diſpute in the third ſort, you make a true Syllogiſme, but then behold your ſtaydnes (a man of confirmed reſolution I will warrant you.) He change? no ſuch matter, even now you found him triumphing in the victory: now you find him Capitulating vponupon conditions of peace. Even now you found him inſulting over his captivated adverſary: now you ſee him creeping and fawning vntounto him over whom he inſulted; and doe you know what manner of one he is, to whom he ſpeaketh? If you doe not, he will tell you, and you muſt beleeue him, for old learning cannot deceiue you: this he is, A poore Divine, ſhort ſighted, ſlenderly travelled. He knowes Fenners divinitie, if you put him out of that, he is as blind as a Beetle &c.
But howſoever the game goeth, this he ſaith (and tie him to his word, you ſhall find him either better or worſe then you make of him)
If you will teach me, I will yeeld and thanke you too.
And becauſe you ſhall ſee he is not in jeſt, he repeats his promiſe againe, with an addition, Appeal. p. 95. in theſe words;
If you can make it appeare, that there is any ſuch materiall difference between the Church of Rome (in the point of free-will) and the Church of England, then I will turne over a new leafe, euen in this Article oppoſing the church of Rome as farre as any &c.
I anſwer; it muſt be here obſerved, that he confeſſeth his agreement with the Church of Rome, els vntounto what can he yeeld? What leafe can he turne over? How can he oppoſe the Church of Rome in this Article of Freewill, more then he does now? So that he cannot hereafter deny that he agrees with it in this point of Freewill.
I accept of your offer, I looke for your performance, when you hauehave received the condition which I now tender vntounto you.
In the firſt place, I will ſet downe what the Church of Rome meaneth by the word Grace, ſo often vſed in this and the other queſtions following, which the Reader muſt obſerue; becauſe the knowledge thereof doth ſerue abundantly to the vnderſtanding of the preſent queſtion of Free-will, ſet downe and diſputed in the 7▪ and 8. Chapters: ſo doth it alſo ſerue no leſſe for the vnderſtanding of the queſtion of Iuſtification in the 9. and 10. Chapters: and of the queſtion of Falling from grace, in the 11. and 12. Chapters; ſo as he that doth not vnderſtand and obſerue what they ſay touching Grace, ſhall hardly know what is true or falſe in theſe qu…ſtions.
The ſence of that word Grace, we may …ake from Thomas, who hath deſcribed it, 1. 2. q. 110. art: 1. C. by 4 properties, viz. 1. It is a certain ſupernaturall thing. 2. It is the gift of God. 3. It is in man. 4. It draweth man aboue the condition of his nature, vntounto the participation of the divine good.
Now that this Grace might be the more diſtinctly knowne, he doth divide it 1. 2. q. 111. ar: 2. C. Into actuall and habituall: he calleth it actuall, becauſe it moueth mans mind vntounto good: he calleth it habituall, becauſe it remaineth in man, by the way of a forme, and is the beginning of all ſupernaturall actions.
I ſay, this is the doctrine of the Church of Rome, becauſe it is received by all their learned, and rejected by none of them: yea, the Councell of Trent hath it, ſeſſ. 6. cap. 5. 6. 7. where it ſpeaketh of Iuſtification it ſelfe, and the preparations therevnto.
The doctrine of the Church of Rome in the point of the concurring of Gods grace and mans will in the converſion of a ſinner vntounto God, is comprehended in theſe 15. propoſitions.
1. Grace ſignifies a helpe, comming from God, a created being, ſupernaturall to man, remaining in him, leading him vntounto eternall life.
2. Grace is either actuall or habituall; this doth finiſh mans ſanctitie, that begins and continues it by degree… vntounto the finiſhing of ſanctitie, and is called a preparation thereto.
3. Actuall grace is preventing, exciting, operating, all of them expreſsing the firſt motiō of grace. And ſubſequent, adiuvating, cooperating all theſe, expreſsing a ſecond motion of grace.
4. The preparation to ſanctitie, conſiſteth in certaine actions, viz. 1. faith. 2. feare. 3. hope. 4. louelove begun. 5. hatred of ſinne. 6. contrition. 7. purpoſe of a new life.
5. VntoUnto theſe prepratory actions, grace and mans will doth concurre.
6. Grace preventing &c. doth worke therevnto without mans will, it being onelyonly paſsiue, moved and not a mover.
7. By grace preventing &c. mans will is made able to be willing vntounto the doing of thoſe prepratory acts, if it will.
8. VntoUnto the actuall doing of thoſe prepratory acts, there is required an aſſent, purpoſe, cenſent, reſolution, or determination of the will, before it be applyed vntounto the working of them actually, and in the thing.
9. Grace cooperating &c. worketh not without the concurrence of mans will.
10. Grace cooperating &c. ſtandeth ready to ioyne with the will of him that is prevented by grace. Suarez. opuſc. 7. num. 43. & opuſc. 1. lib. 1. cap. 17. num. 10.
11. Grace cooperating &c. doth concurre with mans will in caſe it conſenteth, reſolveth, and determineth, that it will beleeue, feare, hope, &c. before it be applyed vntounto actuall working of them. In caſe where it doth not ſo conſent, &c. grace doth doth not cooperate.
12. The actions of faith, feare, hope, &c. are produced by the ioynt concurrence of mans will and grace cooperating.
13. VponUpon the producing of faith, feare, hope, &c. the habit of grace is immediately infuſed.
14. The infuſion of the habit doth follow the ſaid actions infallibly in the event.
15. That infallibilitie floweth from the ordinance of God, and the diſpoſition that man hath therevnto by the doing of the ſaid actions.
It may be, ſome will require me to proue theſe propoſitions to be the doctrine of the Church of Rome. I anſwer, I am not to ſeeke for that, I am readie to doe it, vponupon the leaſt call; but here I forbeare it, becauſe it is familiarly knowne to be theirs, ſo as the proofes would be needleſſe and tedious, therefore I proceed in my Courſe.
The point of Free-will in queſtion, concerneth the 8. propoſition, the reaſon of the doubt ariſeth thus;
If mans will muſt aſſent, reſolue, determine to beleeue &c. before it be applyed to actuall beleeving &c. And grace preventing &c. worketh it not: then it is doubtfull from what roote or principium that conſent &c. firſt ariſeth, and from whence it floweth.
But mans will muſt reſolue, &c. the 8. and 11. propoſition ſaith it.
And it flowes not from grace preventing &c. ſo ſaith the 7. propoſition.
Therefore it is doubtfull of what, and from whence that determination of the will firſt floweth.
This doubt, both the Church of Rome, and Mr: Mountague with it doe reſolue, by the doctrine delivered by them both, ſet downe in the precedent Chapter, on this manner;
The will doth aſſent, conſent, and determine &c. of it ſelfe, out of that inbred libertie, which is in the will it ſelfe: and this libertie conſiſteth 1. in an indifferency, and indeterminatenes vntounto doing or not doing, to the doing of this, or the contrary therevnto. And 2. in a dominion over his owne actions, to doe as he pleaſeth.
That their doctrine ſet downe (as is before ſaid) doth yeeld this anſwer, they that are acquainted with the writings of the learned in the Popiſh Church will witneſſe with me: and … doe make demonſtration thereof on this wiſe;
If man aſſenteth freely vntounto the grace of God exciting, and can reiect the inſpiration which he receiveth, then that aſſent &c. proceeds out of the will it ſelfe, and the indifferency and dominion over his owne actions, to doe or not to doe, to doe this, or the contrary, as he pleaſeth.
But man aſſenteth freely to the grace of God that exciteth, and can reiect the inſpiration which he receiveth.
Therefore the aſſent and determination to beleeue &c. ariſeth firſt of, and floweth from the will it ſelfe, and that indifferency and dominion that it hath &c. So Suarez diſputeth. opuſc. 1. lib. 1. cap. 17. num. 7. &c. & lib. 3. cap. 12. num. 11. & 12. ſee Alvares. diſp. 89. num. 1. & 2.
The conſequence of the propoſition ſuppoſeth; That
1. Mans will hath naturally freedome and libertie.
2. The freedome of mans will conſiſteth in an indifferency and dominion &c.
3. The freedome of mans will, & the free vſe of that facultie remaineth in that man that hath grace.
4. Man hath free-will in ſuch actions as belong to his ſalvation.
5. Mans free-will remaineth after preventing grace, &c.
All which propoſitions, wee find ſet downe in the ſix firſt propoſitions of Maiſter Mountague, in the former Chapter: and ſome of them expreſly in the three firſt propoſitions of the Church of Rome, and the reſt in the two laſt propoſitions of the Councell of Trent, ſet downe alſo in the former Chapter.
The aſſumption containeth Mr: Mountague his 7. and 8. propoſitions, and the two laſt propoſitions of the Councell of Trent, ſet downe alſo in that laſt Chapter. By which diſcourſe the doctrine of the Church of Rome in this point, and the dependance that one part thereof hath of another, is layd out clearly, and to the full, ſo alſo is the agreement of Mr: Mountague with them declared to be, without queſtion. The neceſſitie of the conſequence will appeare. num. 8. Laſtly, &c.
It may be, ſome will deſire to know the reaſon why the Councel of Trent, did ſatisfie this doubt by decreeing the nature or qualitie of the aſſent; and not the root or fountaine from whence that aſſent did flow and ariſe.
I anſwer; this queſtion is not demanded without reaſon, for the Decree of the Councell doth reſolue the doubt by conſequence, and not immediately, and therby goeth (as it may ſeeme) a way which is farther about, and more obſcure. To ſatisfie the demand is eaſie. 1. The nature of the thing it ſelfe required that courſe, for the faculties themſelues of mans ſoule, are ſo farre removed from our knowledge, that in themſelues they cannot be judged of: But all the knowledge we hauehave of them, is by the effects which doe flow from them,
Againe, the courſe of the divine Revelation required it, for it is ſilent & ſaith nothing of the facultie it ſelfe: but ſaith enough (at leaſt as they ſuppoſe) touching the act. And this it ſeemeth was the reaſon of this Decree; for in the fift Chapter of that ſixt ſeſſion, it ſayth theſe words; Turne vntounto me, doe admoniſh vsus of our libertie. Where it doth argue, the nature of the facultie, by the nature and qualitie of the act of the will.
Laſtly, the Councell doth not indeed and in the thing, take that way which is more obſcure, but rather that which is more cleare and more certain. For the nature and qualitie of the act doth argue, & ſet out the nature and qualitie of the facultie, from whence it floweth by neceſſary inference and abſolute certaintie. A neceſſary effect, cannot flow but from a neceſſary facultie. Every man will grant, the neceſſitie that is in the ſight of the eye (when all circumſtances doe concurre) can ariſe from no other facultie, but ſuch as is determined and neceſſitated vntounto ſeing. The eye ſeeth the viſible object (and cannot chooſe but ſee it) where all other circumſtances doe concurre, becauſe the eye it ſelfe, or facultie of ſight by creation is apted, fitted, and diſpoſed vntounto ſeing, and hath not in its libertie to ſee or not ſee, when a viſible thing is obiected thereunto, and all other circumſtances doe concurre. The ſame may be ſaid of thoſe actions which proceed from their next efficient cauſe, contingently and freely. Of which every man will ſay, I did this with that freedome and libertie, that at the very moment when I begun to do it, and alwayes before, it was in my power not to hauehave done it, or to hauehave done the contrary therunto. Therfore the facultie from whence this act floweth by creation, is not apted, fitted, or neceſſitated vntounto the doing of actions of this kind, and reſtrained from actions of all other kinds. But in it ſelfe is indetermined vntounto actions of any kind, remaineth indifferent vntounto doing or not doing, to the doing of this, or the contrary. Hath dominion over actions of every kind, to doe or not doe; to the doing of this or the contrary, as it pleaſeth without the reſtraint or guidance of any ſuperior, extrinſecall, or previall worker, leading and limiting the ſame vntounto this, rather then vntounto that. In ſo much, as if mans action of conſenting &c. had beene ſo free, as the Councell hath decreed it to be, then it is moſt true that it had firſt proceeded from a facultie no leſſe free. Thus much ſhall ſuffice, to ſet downe the doctrine of the Church of Rome touching this point.
And that Mr: Mountague maketh mans will it ſelfe, the firſt roote or foundation of this ſupernaturall conſent, it doth manifeſtly appeare by other teſtimonies, proper to himſelfe, which doth argue it on this manner; If man receiveth grace, preventing and cooperating vntounto the worke of his ſalvation, and no other then the firſt roote or foundation of that ſupernaturall conſent, muſt needs be the will it ſelfe. For out of preventing grace, it cannot proceed, for that ſerveth and worketh no further, but to make man able to conſent if he will, and cooperating grace worketh nothing, but where man hath conſented, and is ready to joyne in the worke with it. But Mr: Mountague ſayth, vntounto the worke of our ſalvation, we hauehave received grace, preventing, cooperating, Appeal. p. 94. 104. And doth no where acknowledge any other. Yea, more then ſo, the next worker vntounto preventing grace (according to him) is man himſelfe. gagg. p. 110.
From whence doth follow, that in his judgement mans will it ſelfe is the firſt roote or foundation of our ſupernaturall conſent.
If he anſwer, he giveth to grace the power of ſuſtaining and vpholding. Appeal. p. 94. I reply, this helpeth not the matter, for to ſuſtaine, is onelyonly to preſerue man in his being, and alſo it belongeth to Gods generall providence, he doth ſo to all creatures; but we ſpeake of his ſpeciall providence, ordering man vntounto eternall life. If he ſay, he ioyneth the aſsiſtance of preventing grace vntounto mans will. I reply; this is to as little purpoſe as the former, for the aſſiſtance of that grace, is inſpiring, enlightning, exciting, as himſelfe yeeldeth. Appeal p. 94. and no more, as all men doe confeſſe, which belongeth to the vnderſtanding onelyonly, it extendeth not to the will. Beſides, although it did extend to the will, it can be firſt no roote to ſend forth that ſupernaturall conſent, vnleſſe it doth determine the will vntounto one object, and make it not onelyonly able to will, if it will, but alſo to will actually, & in the thing; ſo taking away the indifferency of the will, that indeed and in the thing, it becomes a conſenter, and hath not libertie to divert the vſe of his facultie therefrom; but this he will deny, and doth ſeeme to doe ſo. Appeal. p. 94.
I ſay, this is proper to him, becauſe the Councell of Trent addeth adiuvating grace vntounto theſe, and ſaith, Man doth prepare himſelfe by exciting and adiuvating grace, which is much leſſe then Mr: Mountague ſayth, and beareth a conſtruction farre more favourable, then his doth, in the vnderſtanding of the Dominicans (as they that read them doe know) ſee Alvares. de Aux. diſp. 95. num. 3. & diſp. 99. 2•. concluſio. In the next place, the doctrine of the Church of England, ſet downe alſo in the laſt Chapter, muſt be compared with the ſame doctrine of the Church of Rome, and Mr. Mountague; that the conſent and difference may be apparent. The Church of England doth fully conſent with the Church of Rome, in the doctrine thereof, ſet downe in this Chapter, num. 5. So farre as it concerneth the concurrence of grace and mans will in our ſanctification, and the markes thereof (called eliciated &c. imperated, in reſpect that they flow from the inward ſanctifying grace, and are wrought outwardly by the choice & command of the will.) Or by neceſſary conſequution and ſuppoſition. The onelyonly difference lyeth in the doubt propounded, num. 7. and in the libertie of mans will, taught by the Church of Rome, as aforeſaid, for the reſolving of that doubt.
Now the Church of England, ſatisfieth that doubt, on this wiſe;
The Predeſtinate to life, be called by Gods ſpirit. They through grace obey that calling. Arti: 17. vntounto which it doth diſpoſe them. Homilie, pag. 456.
Which is all one, as if it had ſaid;
They through grace, and the diſpoſing thereof, doe conſent, reſolue, determine, &c. to beleeue, feare, hope, &c.
For thereunto by grace, or Gods ſpirit, is man called and diſpoſed.
In which is alſo implyed; that,
The eliciated act of Conſenting &c. is not free: man cannot at the inſtant of eliciating that act, reiect grace, and diſſent from the Calling thereof.
Which ſentence, is inferred on this wiſe;
Every act ſo wrought by Gods ſpirit, as mans will is obedient thereto and diſpoſed thereby, is not free. For
The operation of grace, or Gods ſpirit, is determined to one.
But mans conſenting, which is obedience to the call of grace, &c. is an Act ſo wrought by Gods grace. So ſayth the Article and Homilie.
Therefore the act of conſenting is not free.
What it doth giuegive to mans will; our Church giueth to grace: that act which it maketh free; our Church maketh neceſſary.
In this doctrine and inference therefrom, the Church of Englād doth directly oppoſe the faith of the church of Rome, in ſuch expreſſe and manifeſt ſort, as hereafter there can no doubt be made, whether it doth diſſent therefrom or no, or wherein that diſſent ſhould lie; ſo that now nothing remaineth, but that Mr: Mountague ſhould oppoſe the Church of Rome, according to his promiſe, ſet downe num. 5. But (me-thinkes) I heare him ſay, this difference is not materiall, it importeth not any thing worthy of difference and diſſent, but proceedeth from minds tranſported with faction, therefore I am not yet tyed vntounto that promiſe.
I anſwer; he ſeemeth indeed to attribute the difference and oppoſition to the Church of Rome in this point of free-will, to ariſe from no other ground, but faction, Appeal p. 84. &c. But altogether vntruly, for the Church of England holdeth not a faction againſt the Church of Rome, but hath made a ſeparation for the avoyding of damnation, as hath beene declared, Chapter 6. num. 6. Neither was ſhee ſo ignorant, as to take a ſhadow in ſtead of a ſubſtance, nor of ſuch an idle head ſolemnly to determine and decree matters of no moment, to be matter of faith. But if any man ſhould be of that ill mind, that in any thing he could thinke ſo of her; yet in this point he could not doe ſo; for this faith of the Church of Rome is erroneous, therefore for it alone (let the matter it ſelfe be what it will be) muſt ſhee be oppoſed to the vttermoſt; becauſe ſuch a faith is an addition vntounto the Word of God, threatned to be puniſhed by eternall damnation.
The matter it ſelfe is alſo of great moment in it ſelfe. Our Church doth giuegive all the honour of our ſalvation (in the event & in the manner of working) vntounto God; theirs doth devide it between God and man, and giues onelyonly this honour to God, that he maketh man 1. able to begin to tread in the way vntounto ſalvation; and 2. ſupplyes mans defects, and joynes with him in the progreſſe it ſelfe: but he leaveth vntounto man and the inbred libertie, that is in the created facultie of his will, to begin and produce the firſt act, or to make voyd the beginning and poſſibilitie alreadie wrought by grace, and to prevent, reiect, and foreſtall the offer and operation of the ſecond ſupply and power of grace, regulating both the firſt and ſecond worke of grace. If man will conſent vntounto, & obey the firſt worke of grace, then the ſecond does joyne with him, and therupon he goeth on indeed in the way to heaven. If man refuſeth to conſent vntounto, and obey the firſt worke of grace, then the whole worke thereof ceaſeth & comes to nothing, and the work of the ſecond grace never commeth on; beginneth not at all.
The worke of mans ſalvation ceaſeth, he is where he was, as if grace had never wrought vponupon him. Now that this is iniurious vntounto God, is ſo manifeſt that it needs not be proved, ſeeing the greateſt ſhare of mans abilitie, to doe thoſe things that ſhall lead him to heaven, is given to man himſelfe: the leſſer vntounto God. That man may be ſaved, it is of God, who beginneth and joyneth with man, vntounto the doing of that which he could not doe of himſelfe. But that this power is brought vntounto act, is attributed to man himſelfe, and the onelyonly libertie of his own will. Grace doth nothing by any effectuall efficiency vponupon the will, determining the ſame to God, or reſtraining it from the contrary.
To conclude; ſeeing that I hauehave performed the condition of your promiſe at num. 5. If you can make it appeare &c. I doe now expect the performance of your promiſe, which you made in theſe words;
I will 1. yeeld; 2. Thanke you for your inſtructions; 3. Turne over a new leafe. 4. Oppoſe the Church of Rome in this Article as farre as any.
Every honeſt man will be as good as his word, and ſo (I hope) will you.
In the laſt place, thoſe 10. propoſitions taught by Mr: Mountague, and ſet downe in Chapter 7. muſt be examined, whether they be true or no.
The firſt of them, begins thus;
Free-will is in vsus ſubſiſting, not in Title onelyonly.
This propoſition in the termes wherein it lyeth is true, for by the facultie of the will, and the electiue and free power thereof, man is really diſtinguiſhed from all other creatures. What ſhall be ſaid to it in his ſence, ſhall be declared, num. 16.
The ſecond, beginneth thus;
Free-will is a power &c.
The firſt branch of this deſcriptiō of free-will is true, and cannot be denyed. The ſecond branch that placeth it in a facultie of doing freely, and in an abſolute dominion over his own actions &c. is vtterly denyed, by reaſon he is not able to proue it. He beſtirres himſelfe to proue the firſt branch of his deſcription, or the firſt propoſition (according as he will be vnderſtood) by experience, and the authoritie of Scot. Appeal. p. 99. But of this ſecond branch, he hath not a word, which argues he can bring none for it, ſeeing this doth need it more then that. Secondly, if man hath this freedome and dominiō, then God hath leſſe charge, providence, and government over the actions of men, then over any other created effects; for in them God is the onelyonly principall efficient of the worke: they are inſtruments to worke in ſubordination vntounto, and by the force of him. But man is hereby made a principall efficient of his workes; ſuperior, or (at leaſt) equall vntounto God by giving vntounto him freedome, and abſolute dominion over himſelfe, to doe as he will.
God made man, and gaue him his being, he yeeldeth him his concourſe, whereby he doth ſuſtaine him in his being. All this while God is no efficient of mans actions, except very remotely. Man by his being hath a dominion over himſelfe, and freedome to doe as he will, hereby he is an efficient next and principall vntounto his owne actions, if not the onelyonly efficient; for mans actions hauehave relation to the force of man in the doing of them, but they hauehave no relation vntounto God at all. The effect may ſay, by mans power I had my being, and by Gods power man had his being. But it may not be granted, that God hath no providence over mans actions, or leſſe providence then over the actions of other creatures; for the Scripture is plaine, and full to the contrary. Thirdly, there is no neceſſitie why this freedome and dominion ſhould be given to the will, for as much as the properties given to the will, in the other part of the deſcription, is enough to make it a free facultie. Which I ſay not of my ſelfe: I learne it from Suarez. opuſc. 1. cap. 1. num. 2. And he ſayth, that many graue and ancient Divines, yea, Thomas, and ſome of the Fathers are of that Iudgement. At leaſt Mr: Mountague ought to cōtent himſelfe with that libertie of the will, and not to ſtriue for this dominiō, becauſe the church of Rome doth forbeare to call that by the name of freewill, leaſt it ſhould agree in manner of ſpeaking with the hereticks of this time; as Suarez avoucheth in the place laſt alledged.
The third propoſition, hath theſe words;
That libertie was &c.
I anſwer; If by libertie you meane the vſe of the facultie in ſupernaturall actions, then the propoſition is falſe; for, man by ſinne loſt grace, as you truely teach, gagg. p. 108. And without grace, mans will is not capable of doing ſupernaturall actions, which for their eſſence, firſt, and ſpecificall nature, are beyond the abilitie of the force of the Created facultie, and which cannot be done without the grace of God, as Suarez teacheth. opuſc. 1. lib. 3. cap. 1. num. 1. 2. 3. And proveth, cap. 15. num. 20. And in this ſence, we muſt vnderſtand thoſe Divines which teach the loſſe of free-will by Adams ſinne. Therefore the Councell of Trent (and Mr: Mountague with it) purſue their owne ſhadow, when they decreed as againſt an adverſary, when indeed they had none. Which is further confirmed thus; If libertie be taken to ſignifie the facultie it ſelfe, then that third propoſition is granted, and that vponupon the ſame reaſon himſelfe alledgeth out of the Councell of Trent, gagg. p. 108. Adam by ſinne loſt not his nature.
The fourth, fift, and ſixt propoſitions, containe thus much;
Mans free facultie, and the free vſe thereof, is in him that hath grace.
I anſwer; the free facultie and grace are both together in one man, and ſo farre this propoſition is true. 2. If the vſe of that free facultie be committed, vntounto the dominion and diſpoſe of the will it ſelfe: then the propoſition is falſe. It can never be proved, that the vſe of the free facultie of the will is left vntounto the diſpoſe and dominiō of the will it ſelfe, but the dominion and diſpoſe thereof, is reſerved vntounto the Lord God: and he ſayth no leſſe, when he promiſed to take away the ſtony heart, and giuegive a heart of fleſh, and to imprint his lawes therin. Let Mr: Mountague ſhew, where God ſaith to a man prevented by grace, I hauehave made thee able to doe holy workes if thou wilt. I commit thy ſelfe vntounto thy ſelfe, goe forward or backward as thou wilt; there I will reſt, I will take no further care of thee, nor hauehave no further command over thee; but this cannot be done, therefore I may conclude, the propoſition thus vnderſtood (and ſo he doth vnderſtand it) is falſe.
But if the vſe of the free facultie, be committed vntounto the Lord God, to diſpoſe of as he pleaſe, ſo as mans obedience vntounto grace that calleth, be given to grace (as the Church of England ſpeaketh, Arti: 17.) and the entitie of mans nature be vſed by grace onelyonly, as an inſtrument thereunto, then I grant this propoſition is true. The vſe of the free facultie is in him which hath grace. But in this ſence he cannot vnderſtand it; for then mans actions cannot be ſo free, as he pretendeth in the ſeventh and eighth propoſitions following.
In this ſence, free-will is meerly titular, having a name without the thing, as we vſe to ſpeake when a man inioyeth a thing, but hath no vſe of it; and in this ſence, our Divines hauehave ſayd true, who affirme mans freewill is in title onelyonly; ſo alſo is it moſt truly affirmed of them that ſay, mans will is a ſerving, not a free-will.
The ſeventh and eight propoſition, containeth thus much;
He that aſſenteth &c. aſſenteth freely, and can deny his aſſent if he will &c.
The word can, in this propoſition, doth ſignifie a power of vſing the free facultie with indifferency, in the very inſtant in which a man doth worke; and ſo Suarez doth vnderſtand it, opuſc. 1. lib. 1. cap. 1. num. 8. And ſo muſt the Councell of Trent be vnderſtood, ſeſſ. 6. cap. 5. For all other ſenſes thereof, are violent and extorted, not agreeing with the phraſe vſed by the Councell of Trent, nor their intent in decreeing.
If Mr: Mountague can proue this, let him take all for me. I will not oppoſe the Councell of Trent, and himſelfe (a Diſciple thereof) in this queſtion of free-will. If he cannot proue it, why doth he put himſelfe into Gods ſeat, by intruding and vrging Articles of faith. I am out of doubt, he cannot proue it; for Suarez hath attempted many things, and heau'd at it with both his ſhoulders, but all in vaine, it may be, Suarez hath no old learning, nor Logick ſo good as Ramus taught in Cambridge, no Metaphyſicks at all, but is ignorant in this queſtiō. He could Preach, Lecture, brawle, and prattle a little in a Pulpit, but diſpute he could not; ſet him to an argument, and you breake his braines; but be it knowne vntounto you, all theſe things are otherwiſe with Maiſter Mountague, therefore what Suarez could not, he can doe, and that you ſhall ſee in his gagg. p. 112. Thus he diſputeth.
In Mathew 23. and 37. there is an oppoſition of mans wilfulneſſe vntounto Gods will, God would, Iudah would not.
Therefore freely men renounce the Calling of grace, and freely runne.
I anſwer; the laſt branch of the concluſion, which ſpeaketh of running with Gods grace, cannot follow vponupon the Antecedent, becauſe mans will in ſinfull acts is an efficient after a different ſort, and in another manner, then it is in ſupernaturall actions. In them it is a principall efficient (that is, ſinneth of it ſelfe) in theſe it is a ſubordinate efficient, as your ſelfe teach, Appeal. p. 94. therefore ſinne doth flow from the will one wayes, and ſupernaturall actions another.
The firſt branch in the concluſion doth not follow vponupon the Antecedent, which hath not a word of freedome, libertie, or dominion in reſiſting, but barely chargeth them with the eliciated act of reſiſting. If it be replyed, that reſiſting is an act of the will, and every act of the will hath that freedome and dominion. I rejoynd; this reply is refuted already, num. 14.
Therefore it comes too late to take away my anſwer.
The Antecedent by the word Call, doth vnderſtand the Calling of God, and the inward calling by grace, otherwiſe there can be no ſhew of goodneſſe in the conſequence. If you would hauehave vsus beleeue, that our Saviour did ſpeake of that kind of calling, you ought to hauehave proved it, becauſe it may be vnderſtood of the outward calling by the Miniſtery of our Saviour; but becauſe you hauehave not proved it, your argument (at the vpſhot) is reſolved into your owne authoritie, and ſo is of no worth.
He ſaith in his gagg. p. 112. that many other places of Scripture doe ſerue this purpoſe, but he does not name nor vrge any in particular, therefore they can receiue no anſwer.
He hath two other Arguments by collection, and a third from Acts the 7. & 51. the words wherof be theſe Appeal. pag. 89. &c.
You reſiſt the holy Ghoſt.
In this argument he raiſeth his confidence, becauſe the very word reſiſt is vſed there. I anſwer; a poore foundation for confidence. It hath the ſame fault the former had: it affirmeth of reſiſting ſimply; our queſtion is of freedome in reſiſting, ſo it is nothing to the purpoſe. You vnderſtand it of the work of grace in the ſoule, but you proue it not: it may be vnderſtood of their reſiſting of the outward Preaching of the Goſpell, therefore we hauehave your owne authoritie, and no more; we hauehave no reaſon to thinke that God inwardly enlightned &c. all theſe perſons that are ſayd to reſiſt the holy Ghoſt.
The next, concludeth thus;
In whom there is concupiſcence, he may reſiſt and rebell againſt the law of the ſpirit.
But in a man regenerate, there is concupiſcence.
Therefore a regenerate man may reſiſt the ſpirit of God.
I anſwer; This concluſion is nothing to the purpoſe; for our queſtion is of the preparation vntounto the habit and freedome in reſiſting; but this concluſion is of a man habituated, and of reſiſting ſimply.
If it be vnderſtood of reſiſting freely, then the propoſition is falſe. For Concupiſcence hath nothing to doe with freedome of will: this is a perfection given by Creation; that is a defection procured by ſinne.
His laſt Argument, is in theſe words;
If a man iuſtified, may fall away from grace, then he may reſiſt the grace of God offered.
But the firſt is the doctrine of the Church of England.
Therefore a iuſtified man may reſiſt the grace of God offered.
I anſwer; this concluſion hath the very ſame fault which the former had. Beſides, it ſayth grace is offered to a juſtified man, how that can be true, himſelfe muſt declare; for a juſtified man hath grace already, vntounto ſuch a man grace cannot be offered.
The conſequence of the propoſition is naught, loſing of grace, hath no affinitie with reſiſting of grace, that ſignifies the abſence of a thing inioyed, this the repelling & thruſting backe of a thing offered, but not received. The aſſumption is alſo falſe, as ſhall be proved. cap. 12.
His ninth propoſition, ſayth;
Man being drawne &c.
By mans running, he ſeems to vnderſtand a running by the force of the created faculty; for the words wil beare that ſence: and he ſayth further in the ſame propoſition, man doth run as his owne agillitie is; he ſayth further, gagg. p. 108. the whole queſtion in the point of free-will is concerning the force of the created facultie. In this ſence that ninth propoſition is falſe, and to be deteſted.
It ſeemes he perceived thus much: therfore in his Appeal. p. 91. & 94. he labours to cure that vlcer, by ſaying
Supernaturall actions, are true and reall operations of mans ſoule, but the ſoule is elevated & actuated to that height by grace, of which it is, that mans will is a ſubordinate agent vntounto grace.
Which declaration comes very ſhort, therefore I will adde a paſſage in Suarez, which doth expreſſe the ſame thing more fully, in his opuſc. 1. lib. 3. cap. 15. num. 20. he writeth thus;
Mans will cannot hauehave any connaturall power, which by its nature is a worker of a ſupernaturall act, either as a totall or partiall cauſe, but when the creature doth ſo worke, it worketh as an inſtrument of God, & although it worketh by his owne entitie, yet notwithſtanding, not out of a force naturall, but obedientall.
This addition I make by his owne authoritie, for he doth profeſſe in his Appeal. p. 90. that he takes the foreſaid explication from Pontificians. I anſwer; All this labour might hauehave beene ſpared, becauſe it helpeth the matter nothing at all. It makes it more obſcure then before. Every man can vnderſtand what you meane, when you ſay, the will doth worke by the naturall force, but when you ſay, the entitie of the will doth worke by a ſupernaturall force, elevation, and actuation, he will be to ſeeke of your meaning. Moreover, this explicatiō doth take away the free vſe of the free facultie, which you contend for, or leaue mans will to worke, by the naturall force of the created facultie, which is the thing you would thruſt off; and I ſhew it thus: This elevation and actuation, if by grace, is either a morall or a phyſicall worke; if phyſicall, then the will is determined vntounto one: the free vſe of the facultie is abridged and reſtrained; for this worke of grace is previall in nature and cauſalitie, and truely efficient vponupon the will, before it be applyed vntounto operation in the ſecond act. If it be morall, then the will doth worke of the naturall force therof, becauſe the morall worke of grace, is no more but a perſwaſion offered to the vnderſtanding, and reſteth there. It hath no influence vntounto, nor reflection vponupon the will, which is vncapable of Iudging of truth and falſhood: onelyonly it cannot will any obiect, but that which the vnderſtanding ſayth is good, which connexion between the vnderſtanding and the will, is naturall, no worke of grace. To conclude, two propoſitions may be inferred from this explication.
1. Man doth not produce ſupernaturall acts by the force of his created facultie.
2. Man hath no free-will in ſupernaturall acts.
You are at your choice; if you hauehave the firſt, you hauehave the ſecond, if you take the ſecond, you grant the thing in queſtion. If you deny the ſecond, you muſt deny the firſt, and thereby you defend a ſentence which Molina doth accurſe vntounto hell. de Concor. in q. 14. art: 13. diſp. 40. Noſtra itaque &c.
The tenth, and laſt ſayth;
Man being prevented by grace, he putteth to his hand to procure augmentation of grace.
I anſwer; to procure, may ſignifie the act of an efficient, either morall by the way of merit, or phyſicall, by the way of reall influence into the effect. In both theſe ſenſes, this tenth propoſition is falſe: and the Church of Rome hath decreed, ſeſſ. 6. cap. 8. the grace of Iuſtification cannot be merited; much leſſe will any be ſo voyd of pietie, as to ſay, man can compell God to giuegive him grace; but what ever his meaning be, here it muſt be obſerved, mans hand is the next cauſe of a ſupernaturall act, vntounto preventing grace, and the putting thereof forth is attributed vntounto man himſelf, which is a large doctrine of free-will, as I hauehave ſhewed in the former part of this Chapter, num. 4. Far exceeding the limits of the Councell of Tren…, ſeſſ. 6. cap. 5. 6. Which joyneth grace and mans will alwayes together in his preparation, and aſſigneth adiuvating grace between preventing and cooperating, which ſheweth his conſent with Arminius, in thoſe groſſe points which the Church of Rome durſt not Patronize.