Commentary on Romans, Biblical exegesis 1 · Chapter 2 · Section 3 · Subsection 30 – Subsection 32
Quest. 30. What the lawe of nature was before and after mans fall, and wherein they differ.
In the lawe of nature, there are two principall things, first the vnderstanding and iudgement, in apprehending and conceiuing these naturall principles touching our dutie toward God and our neighbour: the other is in the will and affection, in giuing assent and approbation vntounto those things so by the vnderstanding conceiued: In both these there was greater perfection in the naturall light which Adam was created with, and that which is now remaining in his posteritie.
1. Concerning the vnderstanding: whereas the obiect thereof is either touching mysticall and diuine things apppertaining vntounto God, or morall and ciuill duties. 1. In both these the mind of man is naturally obscured, that it doth not so clearely see, what is good or euill in morall duties, much lesse in spirituall, as Adam did in the creation… for there are some mysteries concerning the Godhead, as of the Trinitie, of the creation of the world, and of the end thereof, of the power and omnipotencie of God, and such like, which Adam in his creation had a perfect knowledge of: but now such things by the light of nature cannot be attained vntounto: they are reuealed by grace: as our blessed Sauiour faith, this is life eternall, that they knowe thee to be the onelyonly verie God. 2. as some things we knowe not at all, by nature, which were infused to Adam: so these principles that remaine, are but darkely and obscurely now reuealed in nature, which were manifest to Adam, both in spirituall things, and morall duties: that as the Apostle saith, by this light of nature, they could but grope after God, Act. 17.27. 3. An other defect in the vnderstanding is, that men by great difficultie and labour now attaine vntounto these things, which Adam had infused without labour, whereof the Preacher speaketh, when he saith, He that encreaseth knowledge, encreaseth sorrowe, Eccles. 1.18. 4. Curiositie is an other fault in the vnderstanding, when men are caried away from seeking after things profitable, and are tickeled with a desire, to search out hid and mysticall things, to high aboue their reach: as our parent Eue, when she began to listen to the serpents suggestion, was tempted to desire some accession and encrease of knowledge more then they had: therefore the Apostle would hauehave euerie one vnderstand according to sobrietie, Rom. 12.4. 5. Now our vnderstanding is ouercast with a vanitie of mind, which breaketh out into idle, vaine, and vnprofitable thoughts, which was not in Adam: who before his fall, should hauehave beene occupied in nothing els, but in the meditation of God, and good things: according to which patterne, Dauid desireth that the meditations of his heart, might be acceptable vntounto God, Psal. 19.14. 6. Adam had the knowledge of good by experience, of euill by contemplation: But after his fall he had an experimentall knowledge of euill, which now remaineth in his posteritie: And these differences there are betweene Adams naturall vnderstanding, and ours.
2. In the will of man by nature, there are these defects and infirmities which Adam had not. 1. In spirituall and morall good things, the will hath no inclination at all, sauing in some ciuill things: but to will that which is good it hath no free will or power at all without grace: as the Apostle saith, 2. Cor. 3.5. We are not sufficient of our selues to thinke any thing. 2. in generall the will consenteth to that which is good, but it fayleth in particular: as by nature man knoweth that it is euill to steale, murther, committ adulterie, and yet when it commeth to a particular act he approoueth and followeth the contrarie: as S. Paul saith, Rom. 7.19. I doe not the good thing, which I would, but the euill which I would not, that doe I: But Adam both in generall and particular did knowe what was good, and might if he would himselfe, hauehave giuen consent thereunto. 3. Mans will is so froward by nature and peruerse, that when as naturally euerie one desireth to be happie, yet he willingly committeth those things against his intendment, which make him vnhappier: as a thiefe stealeth to keepe himselfe from famine, and so from miserie: and thus, ut miser sic, malus fit, & ideo miserior ect, quia malus est, least he should be miserable, he becommeth euill, beeing so much the more miserable, because he is euill. And by this meanes, it falleth out, that he becommeth that which he intended not. 4. Further whereas the law of nature is, that a man should not offer that to another which he would not hauehave done to himselfe: yet now this naturall light is obscured with selfeloue, that a man will not hauehave wrong done to himselfe, yet he will wrong an other. 5. The lawe of nature is, that the reason should gouerne, and the affections should be subiect to reason: thus was it in Adan, so is it nowe: for the lust and concupiscence often preuaileth, and swayeth against reason. 6. the lawe is constant and vnchangeable: and the will of man following the light of nature altreth nor, but now the will of man is mutable and changeable. 7. And whereas by the light of nature onelyonly that which is good should be desired: now the will is carried to followe things apparently euill, as most notorious vices, of adulterie, drunkennesse, pride, and such like: which by custome men delight in, as Augustine saith, peccata, qumvis magna & horrenda, cum in consuetudinem venerint, aut parua, aut nulla esse creduntur, sinnes, though great and horrible, when they are growne into custome, are thought either to be no sinnes, or verie small, Enehurid. c. 80. And in these particulars it is euident how farre the naturall light now remaining, is declined from that perfection, which it had in the first creation of man.
31. Quest. Whether the light of nature, though much obscured, can altogether be blotted out of the minde of man.
Though the light of nature may be, and is much dimmed and ouercast by the corruption of mans preposterous affections, yet that is most true, which Augustine resolueth vponupon, legem scriptam in cordibus hominum, ne ipsa quidem delet iniquitas, the law written in the hearts of men, no not iniquitie and sinne it selfe can blot out: lib. 2. confess. c. 4. this conclusion may be further thus strengthened, and confirmed.
1. There are certaine generall principles and rules of nature, which doe reuiue and remaine in most wicked men: as eueryevery one desireth to be happie: neither is there any so carelesse of himselfe, but would attaine vntounto this ende, though he may be deceiued in the means: againe, eueryevery one by nature knoweth, that euill is to be auoided, and therefore he would not hauehave any wrong offered vntounto him by an other, because he taketh it to be euill: and he likewise knoweth, that good is to be desired, and therefore that which he would hauehave an other to doe vntounto him, he desireth so to be done, because he thinketh it to be good. These generall rules and principles of nature, none are ignorant of: but when they come to draw out particular conclusions, out of these generall rules, there they faile, either beeing blinded in their iudgement, or corrupted by euill manners and custome: whereupon it commeth that men take those things in their practise to be good and commendable, which are euill: as among the Germanes, as Caesar writeth, lib. 6. de bell. Gall. robberie was counted no fault: neither was the vnnaturall louelove of boyes, among the Grecians and Romanes, held to be vnlawfull, and infamous. 2. An other proofe hereof, that the light of nature is not vtterly extinguished, is by the force and working of the conscience, which is readie to accuse the offender, and to prick and sting his soule: as Cain by this light of his conscience was driuen to confesse, that his sinne was greater then could be forgiuen. 3. An other argument hereof, which the Apostle also toucheth here, is the practise of naturall men, who did performe diuers commendable things by the light of nature, agreeable to equitie: as appeareth by diuers politike lawes, and positiue constitutions of the Gentiles: by the which these two assertions and conclusions of Plato are found to be true: legem esse inventionem veritatis, that the law is the inuention of truth: that is, the law of nature: and, legē est imitationē veritatis, the law is the imitation of truth: that is, positiue laws grounded vponupon the law of nature.
32. Qu. Whether ignorance of the law of nature in man doth make any way excusable.
1. First, though the light of nature be now much darkned and obscured, yet thereby a man, notwithstanding this naturall darknes and ignorance, is left without excuse: as the Apostle saith, c. 1.20. to the intent, that they should be without excuse: and the equitie thereof thus further appeareth: the Prophet Dauid saith, Psal. 79.6. Powre out thy wrath vponupon the heathen, that hauehave not knowne thee: and S. Paul, 2. Thess. 1.8. in flaming fire rendring vengeance vntounto them that doe not know God: But Gods iudgement is most iust, he would not punish men without their fault: seeing then, that euen they which know not God, shall be iudged, it remaineth, that their ignorance is not without their owne fault: that is an excellent saying of Augustine, inexcusabilis est omnis peccator, vel reatu originis, &c. eueryevery sinner is inexcusable, either by originall guilt, or by voluntarie additament, whether we know, or be ignorant: for ignorance in them that would not vnderstand is sinne without doubt, in them that could not, it is the punishment of sinne: and so in both, non est iust a excusatio, sed iust a damnatio, there is no iust excuse, but damnation is iust, &c. epistol. 105. So both waies is the ignorant man left without excuse: for that perfect light of nature, which was giuen at the first to man, was lost by his sinne, so that this ignorance is the iust punishment of sinne: and that light of nature which remaineth, was by the Gentiles abused, that they would not vnderstand that, which nature reuealed.
2. Yet although the ignorance of the law altogether excuse not, as it serueth not the malefactors turne, to say he knew not the law of the Prince, against the which he hath offended; yet it doth somewhat extenuate the offence: for the faults committed by the ignorant, are lesse then those, which such fall into that hauehave knowledge, according to that saying of our blessed Sauiour, Luk. 12.47. The seruant that knew his masters well, and prepared not himselfe, neither did according to his will, shall be beaten with many (stripes:) but he that knew it not, and did commit things worthie of stripes, shall be beaten with few (stripes:) for vntounto him that is ignorant are wanting two things, knowledge, and a good will: but he that sinneth wittingly hath but one want, onelyonly good will and inclination: and the one hath both voluntatem facti & peccati, the will of the deede, and the sinne: but he that falleth of ignorance, hath onelyonly a will to the deed, not to the sinne, though the deede be sinne: see further of this matter 4. chap. 1. quest. 57.