Commentary on Genesis and Exodus, Theological treatise · Commandment 10 · Questions 1
1. The questions discussed.
QUEST. I. The last precept, Thou shalt not covet, whether two or ….
THou shalt not covet, &c. 1. Some thinke that this Commandement is to be divided into two: and the first to restraine the concupiscence and desire of anothers wife: the other the coveting of such things which doe belong unto him, which are either moveable or immoveable things: the moveable are of two sorts, either the things with life, and them either reasonable, as his man servant, his maid servant; or unreasonable, as his oxe or asse; or without life, as his goods: his immoveable are, his house, lands, possessions. Of this opinion is August. lib. de 10. chord. cap. 9. to whom consenteth Thomas Aquinas, and Tostatus, and it is the received opinion among the Romanists, and some other, as Pelargus, Osiander, Pellican. Their reasons shall first be examined. 1. Thomas useth this reason: Because there are but three Commandements in the first table, there must be seven in the second, to make up the number of ten. And that there are but three in the first table, he would prove by the subject or matter of the Commandements, which concerne our duty to God; which is three-fold, Diligenti Deum tria necesse est facere: He that loveth God, must performe three things: 1. Quòd non habeat alium Deum: He must have no other God. 2. He must honour him: therefore it is said, Thou shalt not take in vaine, &c. 3. Libenter quiescat …: He must rest and settle himselfe in God: therefore it is said, Remember thou keepe holy, &c.
Answ. 1. Thomas here omitteth one principall duty, which is the internall … of God: for it is not enough to know who is to be worshipped, which is prescribed in the first precept, Thou shalt have no other Gods: but after what manner he will be worshipped, that is, by a spirituall and internall worship: as our blessed Saviour saith, Ioh. 4.21. God is a spirit, and they that worship him must worship him, in spirit and truth. This manner of Gods worship is prescribed in the second Commandement, Thou shalt make to thy selfe no graven image, &c. 2. Wherefore thus rather may the … toward God be distinguished; his worship is either internall, or externall: the internall sheweth who is to be worshipped, in the first precept, and how, that is, spiritually in the second precept. The externall is either private in the confession of Gods name, in the third precept; or publike, in keeping of his Sabbaths, Vrsin.
2. Lyranus thus reasoneth: Those things which are so divers, that one may be covered, and not the other, belong not to one precept: Aliquis habens pronitatem ad … non habe… ad alterum: One may have a pronenesse and aptnesse to one, and not to another: as he may covet his neighbours wife, and not covet any of his beside: therefore these two kindes of covetings belong not to one precept.
Answ. 1. This reason may be retorted: for so one may be guilty of idolatry and false worship, who yet holdeth but one Cod: and therefore by this reason the two first precepts, which they confound and make but one, which divide the last, must be distinguished. 2. Though in particular he that coveteth a mans wife, doth not alwayes covet his oxe or asse, yet in generall he coveteth that which is another mans: for his wife is properly his, as any thing that belongeth unto him: therefore the proposition will be denied, that the coveting of that, which is not joyned with the coveting of another thing, belongeth not to the same precept: for one may covet a mans house, and ground, that coveteth not his oxe or asse, as Ahab did, that desired Naboths vineyard: and so by this rule, as many particular things there are which may be severally coveted, so many particular precepts there should be of coveting.
3. Tostatus thus argueth: Sicut se habet actus ad actum, &c. As one act is to another, the like respect hath one concupiscence to another: but the act of adultery and theft are divers, and belong to two divers precepts, therefore so should the divers concupiscence, tending to those divers acts, be divided into two precepts.
Answ. The argument followeth not, because the acts of adultery and theft are forbidden in two divers precepts, therefore the concupiscences tending thereunto should: for there is difference betweene the conception of sinne, and the birth and perfection thereof: when sinne is brought forth, and perfited, then it appeareth of what kinde it is: but being yet in the body or in the seed, it cannot be so distinguished; as darnell and corne being but yet in the grasse, cannot bee so well discerned. Beside, another difference is, because the externall acts of theft and adultery differ in the quality of the sinne, and o…e is more hainous than another, and deserveth a greater punishment, and therefore the precepts are fitly distinguished: but the like difference of quality and punishment cannot be made in the originall and first concupiscence, where the will hath not yet assented.
4. Pelargus addeth this reason: Duo sunt principia concupiscentiae, &c. There are two beginnings or occasions of concupiscence, one internall, the other externall: the Apostle calleth them, the concupiscence of the flesh, and the concupiscence of the eye, 1. Ioh. 2.16. therefore they are distinctly to be prohibited. Lyranus also saith, that there is Aliaratio boni utilis, alia delectabilis: One reason of coveting a profitable good, another of a delectable good: the coveting of the wife belongeth to one, and the coveting of the substance to the other.
Answ. 1. All this onelyonly proveth a difference and distinction in the severall kindes of concupiscence, not a distinction of the severall precepts. 2. And thus much may bee inferred, that because they are distinct concupiscences, therefore they are distinctly to be expressed, and so they are: but it followeth not, that they are to bee distinguished in two precepts. 3. And yet these concupiscences are not so distinguished, but that they may concurre at one and the same time in the inward desire and motion: as one may have a carnall desire to his neighbours wife, and have a covetous eye also unto her substance. Wherefore this last precept, which forbiddeth all manner of coveting, is not to bee divided into two precepts: but is one whole and entire Commandement, consisting of divers particulars. The reasons are these:
Reasons shewing the last precept of coveting to be one, and not two.1. Origen thus reasoneth: Quod si ita putetur, non complebitur decem numerus praeceptorum, &c. If the two first precepts should be made all one, there would not bee ten Commandements: ubi jam erit decalogi veritas? where then is the truth of the decalogue? Homil. 8. in Exod. The reason is this: that seeing there must bee ten precepts, and there are foure in the first table, there can bee but six in the second: but if the last be divided into two, there will bee more than six in the second, and so more than ten in all: but if wee make but three in the first, there will be but nine in all: for Origen taketh this as granted, that it is all one precept that maketh mention of coveting.
2. Another reason is, because that which is here put in the first place, Thou shalt not covet thy neighbours house, thou shalt not covet thy neighbours wife, is put in the second place, Deut. 5.21. Thou shalt not covet thy neighbours wife, neither shalt thou desire thy neighbours house: which inversion of the order sheweth, that they are all one precept: for otherwise Moses should have confounded the ninth and tenth precept together, Vrsin. So also Cajetane: Varia …ctura uxoris & domus, ex industria facta à Mose, &c. This mixture of the wife and house, Moses maketh of purpose in these two places, because they belong to one precept. This reason also is urged by Iunius upon this place.
3. This precept, Moses periodis non distinxit, sed uno versiculo comprehendit, did not distinguish by periods, as the other precepts, but comprehendeth it in one verse, which sheweth it to be one precept, not two, Vrsin.
4. Another argument is taken from the reason of this Commandement: which is added, Nor any thing which is his: we are forbidden therefore to covet the neighbours wife, house, or oxe, or asse, Quia alterius sunt, because they belong to another, Cajetan. Oleaster. There being then one common reason serving the whole, it sheweth that it is one Commandement, not divers.
5. Omnes hae species sub uno genere comprehenduntur: All these severall kindes of coveting are comprehended under one generall head, Thou shalt not covet, therefore they are under one precept, Galas.
6. Pari ratione in sex vel septem praecepta deduci posse videatur, &c. With as good reason may it be divided into six or seven precepts, as into two, because so many particular branches of coveting are rehearsed, Simler.
7. But one of the best reasons, that the precept of not coveting is one, and not two, is taken from that place of Saint Paul, Cum de concupiscentia tanquam de uno pracepto dicit, When he speaketh of concupiscence, as of one precept, Rom. 7.7. I had not knowne lust, except the Law had said, Thou shalt not lust, Vrsin. Basting.
QUEST. II. What manner of concupiscence is here forbidden, and how this precept differeth from the former.
COncerning the difference betweene this precept and the other, Thou shalt not commit adultery, thou shalt not steale: there are divers opinions: 1. Augustine seemeth sometime to bee of opinion, that in those Commandements, Ipsum opus notatum videtur, in extremo autem ipsa concupiscentia; The worke only seemeth to be noted, but in the last the concupiscence only, quaest. 71. in Exod. But this is against our blessed Saviours exposition, Matth. 5.28. that a man may commit adultery in his heart, if hee hath but looked upon a woman to lust after her: therefore in the other Commandements, not the externall act only is forbidden, but the inward purpose also and desire.
2. Thomas Aquin thus distinguisheth concupiscence, that it may be taken one way, as it is actus voluntaetis, an act of the will, another, ut est actus sensualitatis, a sensuall or carnall act: but here it is onelyonly forbidden in the first sense, as it is Consensus voluntatis, in opus vel delectationem; As it is a consent of the will, either to the worke it selfe, or in taking delight: But when the will hath once assented, sinne is brought forth, and so it is a breach of the other Commandements: as our blessed Saviour sheweth, that if a man have but lusted after a woman, with a will and desire unto her in his heart, he hath committed adultery.
3. Some of the Hebrewes thinke, that no concupiscence resting inwardly, though it have the consent of the will, is here forbidden: but such as commeth into some externall act, beside the perfect act of any sinne: as when one soliciteth another mans wife by gifts, speeches, gesture, kissing and dallying, though adultery be not committed. But the very consent and purpose of the heart, though there follow no outward act, is sinne, as shall afterward be more fully declared, as Levit. 19.17. the very hatred of the heart is prohibited, though no mischiefe outwardly be committed.
4. Some thinke that there is no more forbidden in this Commandement, than before: but that the Lord thought good to rehearse and declare in plaine words his will, for restraining of the inward concupiscence, for he knew, Aerius stimulandos & urgendos homines ne sub umbra obscurioris doctrina latebra… quaererent, Lest men should seeke some evasion in the obscurity of doctrine, that they were specially to be pricked forward and urged, Calvin. But it is not like, that in so compendious an abridgement of the Law, that the same things should be twice repeated: and Calvin himselfe onelyonly propoundeth this reason, hee doth not much insist upon it.
5. Therefore that we may apprehend the true difference betweene this precept and the other, wee must distinguish betweene these three, Prava… cogitationes, assensum simplicem, & certam deliberationem: Evill thoughts, a simple assent, and a setled and certaine deliberation. The first, evill thoughts, if as soone as they rise, a man reject them, he seemeth not to be guilty, though herein he must acknowledge his corrupt nature: but if he either give a simple assent, or be as it were tickled with a full desire▪ or doe deliberately purpose of any evill thing, then he sinneth. So then all those sinnes, wherein there is either a full assent, or action, are forbidden in the former precepts: the very first desire and appetite is forbidden here. These three degrees then are to be made of sinne, appetitus, assensio, actio, the appetite or first desire, the perfect assent, and the action: the first, the evill appetite is restrained here, Galas. Of the degrees to be considered in sinne.Quamvis non plane acquiescamus desiderio, si tamen nos titillat, sufficit ad re…sper agendos; Although we doe not yeeld unto the desire, if it doe but tickle us with delight, it is sufficient to make us guilty, Calvin. Here then such concupiscence is forbidden,Difference betweene the full assent of the will, and an inclination only. as hath some inclination of the will, though no full consent: Concupiscenti… enim nunquam est sine affectu, licet non▪ plane succumbat voluntas: This concupiscence is not without some affection or desire, though the will doe not plainely yeeld. So is Chrysostome to bee understood: Aliud est concupiscere, aliud velle; concupiscere passionis est, velle arbitrii; frequenter enim conc…piscimu… quod nolumus: It is one thing to desire, another thing to will; to desire or covet is of passion, to will is of the disposition; for we often covet that which we would not, &c. In Matth. homil. 52. He speaketh of a full assent and purpose: for otherwise, with concupiscence here prohibited, there doth alwayes concurre some affection and desire. So then it is evident, that even those first motions of concupiscence, wherein any taketh delight, though there be no full purpose, are sinne before God, and forbidden by this precept: for, even the Heathen did condemne impiam voluntatem, the wicked will and purpose of any, as to kill, commit adultery, and such like: but the Law of God is more perfect and spirituall, than any humane Law. Againe, it is not like that S. Paul was so ignorant, as to thinke at any time, that it was no sinne, velle occidere hominem. to have a purpose to kill a man, or to commit adultery: therefore by concupiscence, he understandeth some more inward and secret disease, which he tooke not to be sinne, before it was revealed unto him by the Law, Calvin.
QUEST. III. Whether involuntary concupiscence having no consent of the will, is here forbidden.
BUt here it will further be enquired, whether even those first evill thoughts which arise in the minde, without any inclination of the will at all, are counted as sinne before God, and so forbidden in this precept. Here first, wee are to distinguish of concupiscence and desire, which is either a good concupiscence, or bad; the good is of two sorts, either perfectly good, such as was given unto man in his creation, when he should have coveted nothing, but that which was good; or imperfectly good, such as now is in men, mixed with many infirmities and inperfections, which is either naturall in man, as the coveting of meat and drinke,The divers kindes of concupiscence. and other things necessary for the life of man, Basting. Or supernaturall, wrought in man by grace, as is the love and desire of vertue: or it is mixt, partly naturall, partly supernaturall, as matrimoniall concupiscence for procreation, which both hath a naturall cause or beginning, and is likewise guided by grace unto the right end: none of these kindes of good and commendable concupiscence are forbidden by this precept.
The evill concupiscence, as Bernard doth well distinguish it, is of three sorts: 1. Sunt cogitationes …tiosa, & ad rem non pertinentes, &c. There are idle, roving and impertinent thoughts, which the minde may easily reject: 2. Sunt aliae cogitationes violentae magis, & fortius adharentes; There are other violent cogitations, which sticke more nearely, as the immoderate cogitation of meat and drinke, and such things as belong to the necessity of nature. 3. Sunt cogitationes f…tidae & immundae, quae ad luxuriam, invidiam pertinent, &c. There are filthy and uncleane cogitations, which concerne lasciviousnesse, envy, vaine glory, and such like: the first kinde is lutum simplex, as simple or thin clay, that cleaveth not: the second is limum viscosum, as a tough clay, that sticketh fast: the third is tanquam immundissimum coenum, as most uncleane, filthy, and stinking mire and mud, Bernard. serm. de tri. ge. cog. na. Seneca maketh this distinction of the motions of the minde, not much unlike to the former: 1. Primus motus non voluntarius, &c. The first motion is not voluntary, as a certaine preparation of the affections: 2. Alter cum volunta…e non contumaci, another kinde is with the will, but the same not obstinate: as when it commeth into ones minde to revenge himselfe, when he is hurt: 3. Tertius motus est impotens, &c. The third kinde is so impotent, and outragious, that it will not be ruled by reason, as when a man is carried to revenge himselfe out of measure: the first of these can be no more ruled by reason, than such things as happen to the body: as when one yawneth, when he seeth another yawne, or suddenly winketh, when one putteth the fingers toward the eyes. Thus Seneca lib. 2. de ira, cap. 4. Now the question is, whether these motions, which Bernard calleth idle and wandring, Seneca involuntary, are forbidden in this precept. Hereof there are three opinions.
1. Some thinke that even these first infused motions, Etiam citra rationem ullius objecti, even without respect had to any certaine object, are forbidden here, Iun. But it seemeth by the words of the Law, Thou shalt not covet thy neighbours house, that the concupiscence here prohibited, aimeth at a certaine object, and is not without some inclination of the affection. 2. Others are of the contrary opinion: that if a man doe at the very first reject these evill cogitations, nullius culpa reus erit, he shall be guilty of no fault, Galas. But seeing that Infants which have no such evill thoughts, yet are not cleane before God, being conceived and borne in sinne; it cannot be, but that these evill wandring and idle thoughts should carry some guiltinesse in them. 3. Therefore the best solution is, that these cogitations which doe vanish, … tequam animos afficiant, before the minde bee affected, be not comprehended in this precept, as actuall sinnes: for untill the will of man in some degree give assent, sinne is in the conception onelyonly, not in the birth: as S. Iames saith, chap. 1. When lust hath conceived, it bringeth forth sinne: but as the first fruits of originall sinne, together with that native corruption, they are contrary to this precept: wherein I finde also some difference of opinion. Iunius seemeth to thinke, that not originall sinne it selfe is here understood by concupiscence, which is as the habit, but only those involuntary motions, which are the first act of this evill habit, Iun. in Analys. But I rather subscribe to Vrsinus, that thinketh originall sinne to be a breach of this precept, as originall justice is therein prescribed, and commanded: because the Morall law is grounded upon the Law of nature, which was perfect in man by creation before his fall, from which perfection originall sinne is a declining defect. This then is the conclusion, that these involuntary motions, though they doe not venire in rationem coram Deo, come into reckoning before God, if they presently vanish, before the will and affection incline unto them; yet they doe shew the corruption of our nature, that although they breake not out into a flame, yet they are sparkles that flie upward, Iob 5.7. our corrupt nature is as the coale, and those idle and wandering thoughts as the sparks that flie up: but if these sparks doe not kindle into a flame, they shall never burne us, nor be laid unto our judgement: and so Chrysostom sath well Si concupiscentia non consentit voluntas, sola concupiscentia non damnat; If the will consent not to concupiscence, concupiscence alone shall not condemne us, Homil. 52. in Matth. which is through Gods merciemercy, for otherwise even originall corruption is sufficient to condemne us.
QUEST. IV. Why there is no precept to direct tha inward passion of anger, as of coveting.
NOw why there is not the like precept given, to direct the inward act of the irefull power of the mind▪ as to forbid the first motion of anger and rage, as there is virtutis concupiscibilis, of the coveting and desiring facultie, these reasons are alleaged: 1. The like is to be understood in other Commandements, that the very internall act, and first inclination of the heart unto evill is forbidden, but expresly the concupiscence is named, because it is more hard to resist the concupiscence, whose object is some apparent good, either delectable, or profitable: whereas the inward passion of anger, movet ad aliquid triste, moveth alwayes to some heavie thing, not delightsome, or profitable. So Tostatus. The same reason is yeelded by Thomas Aquin, Homicidium secundùm se non est concupiscibile, sed magis horribile, &c. Murther is not of it selfe a thing to be desired, but to be abhorred: but adulterie, Habet rationem alicujus boni, scilicet delectabilis, furtum, boni scilicet utilis, Hath respect unto some thing that seemeth good, namely, delectable good, and theft to profitable good: therefore the concupiscence of these required a speciall precept rather than the other, &c. But this is no sufficient reason, for both it is as hard to resist anger, as any other passion, because of all other it is most violent and sudden: and beside, the angrie man in purposing to doe mischiefe, taketh delight therein, and thinketh it good for him so to doe: so that this passion also, hath an object of some thing seeming good, for otherwise the will of man naturally is not carried unto that which is taken to be evill.
2. In this precept even that concupiscence is forbidden, which is involuntarie, and hath not the assent of the will: for as Chrysostom saith, Concupiscimus frequenter etiam quod nolumus: We covet often that which wee will not. All other voluntarie inclinations of the minde, to adulterie, or theft, are prohibited in those other precepts: but there is no anger, without a purpose of revenge, and so hath a consent of the will, and so there need no speciall precept for that, it properly belonging to that precept, Thou shalt not kill: as our blessed Saviour sheweth, Matth. 5.22. To this purpose Tostatus saith well: Ira audit rationem syllogizantem, &c. Anger heareth reason disputing, whether it be meet to take revenge; and before reason hath thus concluded, anger riseth not: but anger hearing this first conclusion, that it is fit to take revenge, staieth not to heare the second, whom, and how wee are to revenge: but as a quicke messenger, that goeth away before hee hath halfe his arrand, and as angrie dogges, that when they see one, doe straightwayes imagine, that it is their part to barke, not considering who it is that they barke at, whether their master or no: so anger being an hot and hastie passion, resolving by reason of the thing, yet weigheth not every circumstance. Now concupiscence, when any object is offered, heareth no reason at all, but presently falleth to coveting of it. Ex Tostat. qu. 27.
QUEST. V. Whether sinne properly consist in the internall or externall act.
IT is here the opinion of the Hebrewes, that if a man onelyonly desire another mans wife in his heart and goe no further, he sinneth not: and Iosephus lib. 12. Antiquit. reproveth Polybius the Historiographer, for saying that Antiochus died miserably, because he would have spoyled the Temple: adding further, Si solùm cogitavit, non egit peccatum: That if he onelyonly thought to doe so, he sinned not: therefore he was not punished for that, but for other evils which he had done in Jerusalem. Ex Lyran.
Contra. But it may bee made manifest by divers reasons, that sinne consisteth rather in actu interiori, quàm exteriori; In the internall rather than externall act. 1. That maketh a good or evill act, which is in a mans power, but the externall act is not often in mans power, but the internall is, as the act of the understanding and will: as the Apostle saith, Rom. 7.18. To will is present with me, but I finde no meanes to performe that which is good, &c.
2. OnelyOnly it is proper unto man, beyond beasts, to doe a good or evill act: but the externall act bruit beasts can doe as well as man: therefore it is the internall facultie, of the understanding and will, that maketh the act good or bad.
3. If in the externall act good and evill onelyonly were found, then Angels should doe neither good nor bad, which have no externall act, because they have no externall faculties, powers, or instruments: the will therefore and understanding, which onelyonly are in Spirits, are the causes of good and bad actions.
4. The same externall acts may bee done as well by those that sleepe, by fooles and mad men, as by the waking, by wise and sober men: but the externall act in those is not sinne, because it proceedeth not from the will and understanding.
5. Both divine and humane lawes make a difference betweene voluntarie and involuntarie acts: as in wilfull and casuall murther; but the externall act in both is all one.
6. Therefore, Actus exterior secundùm se nec bonus nec malus est: The externall act of it selfe is neither good nor evill: but yet in men because of the connexion which the externall act hath with the internall, there is some goodnesse or evilnesse found, though not so properly as in the internall: for there are two acts of the will and understanding: the immediate act, as to understand, to will, which is called act… elicitus, the act which issueth out: and there is a mediate act, as to kill, to commit adultery, which is act… imperatus, the act commanded: therefore the externall worke being by this coherence and connexion, an act of the internall powers, hath some good or evill in it, though not so properly as the internall, Sic fere Tostat. quast. 29.
QUEST. VI. The law of Moses did not onelyonly restraine the hand, but the minde.
BEside this opinion of the Hebrewes, some other doe hold that the law of Moses did onelyonly restraine the hand, and not the minde: and to this purpose they urge that place, Matth. 5.27. where our Saviour saith; It was said unto you of old, Thou shalt not commit adulterie, &c. But I say, &c. So that of old it seemeth the law onelyonly restrained the outward act: but Christ doth forbid more, even the inward desire, &c.
Contra. 1. Our blessed Saviour, secundùm corum opinionem loquebatur, speaketh according to their opinion, because they thought they were onelyonly obliged and tied to the outward act, and therefore he doth deliver the law from their corrupt interpretations: he giveth not a new exposition: and this appeareth vers. 43. Yee have heard, that it hath beene said, Thou shalt love thy neighbour, and hate thine enemie: but in all the old Testament there is no such precept given by God, or libertie for any to hate their enemie: our Saviour then meaneth not such sayings as were found in the law, but such expositions as they made among themselves. Now that even the law of Moses did binde not onelyonly the hand and externall act, but the inward will and desire, it thus is proved:
1. None are said to repent but of that which is evill: but they under the law were to repent and to shew themselves contrite, even for the internall acts of their minde: as Psal. 4.4. Tremble and sinne not, examine your heart upon your bed, &c. Ergo, &c.
2. It is directly forbidden, Levit. 19.17. Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart: which was an internall act: and many other such like sinnes of the heart are reproved by the Prophets.
3. The law doth not justifie that which is naturally unjust, but forbiddeth it: now to covet another mans wife is naturally unjust. Ergo.
For the proposition, or first part of the argument, if the theft of the Israelites, the killing of Isaack intended by Abraham, the fornication of Ose, chap. 1. be objected: these were singulares casus, which the the lawgiver commanding, thereby declared, quod non includerentur sub lege communi, that they were not included under the generall law: but if this whole law, Thou shalt not covet, had given a generall libertie for the Jewes to covet anothers wife, Non jam declaretur lex, sed destrucretur: The law should not by this meanes be declared, but destroyed.
For the assumption, that it is against the law of nature to covet another mans wife, it is evident: 1. Because he faileth in the end, coveting her onelyonly of lust, not for procreation. 2. Matrimonie est de jure naturali, is grounded even upon the law of nature: if then to breake and violate matrimonie bee against the law of nature; then to will, and purpose so to doe, is against nature also: yea the will and purpose is rather sinne than the act it selfe: for it may fall out that the externall act is sometime without sinne, as when a man ignorantly lieth with another woman, taking her to bee his wife, as Iakob tooke Leah for Rachel: but the will and desire is never without sinne, Tostat.
Burgens. addit. 7. in cap. 20. would thus excuse this assertion, that Moses law, prohibebat manum, … an…um, did inhibit the hand, not the minde: not that their meaning is, that in no part of Moses law, there is any prohibition to be found of the minde: for hatred is directly forbidden, Levit. 19.17. but that when any externall act is forbidden, Non intelligitur ex vi illius praecepti prohiberi actus interior: The internall act is not understood to bee forbidden by vertue of that precept: as in this precept, Thou shalt not kill, he is not judged to be guiltie, which purposeth to kill, and yet killeth not.
Contra. 1. But our Saviour saith, that even this precept is transgressed by the anger and hatred of the heart, Matth. 5.22. therefore the law intendeth even by the externall act to forbid the internall also.
QUEST. VII. Whether any morall and naturall duties were to be restrained by positive law.
BUt it will further be objected, that the old law was not to give precepts of morall duties: 1. The morall precepts are grounded upon the law of nature, and such precepts are knowne unto all: but the divine law prescribeth such things, as otherwise are not, neither can bee knowne. 2. The keeping of the morall law giveth life, Galath. 3.12. but the old law was the ministration of death, 2 Cor. 3.7. therefore the old law was not to containe morall precepts.
Contra. 1. The law of God was not onelyonly to give rules of such things as men know by the law of nature, but to keepe and preserve them also from errour, in those things which they know. And therefore because men doe erre and swarve in such things as they know, their will and affection not giving way to reason, it was fit that a law should be given as well to rectifie their affection, as to direct their understanding. 2. Beside, although these morall duties are grounded upon the law of nature, yet seeing the naturall instinct is obscured by mans corruption, that dimme light of nature had need of a clearer light by the law to helpe it. If man had continued in the perfection of his creation, hee should not have needed any other law: but seeing mans naturall knowledge is much decaied, it was to be revived, and renewed by the divine law. 3. The rules of direction of mens actions, are of foure sorts: 1. Some are so well knowne by nature, as none can doubt thereof: as these, (that evill is to be shunned, and good to be desired, that no unjust thing is to bee done) of such knowne principles it is not necessarie that any law should bee given. 2. Some things may so be searched out by the law of nature, as yet that many may erre therein: such … the particular precepts, of not committing fornication, not coveting another… wife▪ therefore because many may erre in these duties, it was requisite they should bee determined by the law of God. 3. Some things are so derived from the law of nature, as yet they are onelyonly searched out by those which are wise: such are the positive and judiciall lawes of men, that wisely can applie the principles of the law of nature to particular circumstances: of this kinde are Moses Judicials. 4. Some things cannot at all be concluded by naturall reason, but altogether depend upon the will of the institutor and law-maker: of this kinde were Moses Ceremonials. So then for a full answer to the first objection, wee say, that if morall duties were so generally and perfitly knowne, as that none could doubt of them, as are the first rules of direction, there needed not be any law given of them: but they are of the second sort, so knowne by the law of nature, as that many doe doubt of them, and doe erre about them.
2 The old law was the ministration of death, not of it selfe, but occasionalite…, by occasion: because it commanded such things as were not in mans power to keepe: and so the morall precep…s also did mortifie and kill: Quia importabant difficultatem ad conservandum ea: Because they did bring in a difficultie, or rather impossibilitie to keepe them: therefore in this respect there was no difference betweene the old law and the Morall law, Tostat. quast. 32.
QUEST. VIII. Of the perfection and sufficiencie of the morall law.
BEside, it will be thus objected against the sufficiencie of the morall law.
1. Because the law prescribeth onelyonly duties concerning God, and our neighbour, it speaketh nothing of the sinnes of man toward himselfe.
2. It forbiddeth perjurie, whereas blasphemie and heresie were as needfull to be forbidden.
3. The precept of the Sabbath is expressed, whereas there were many other festivities, as of the Passeover, Pentecost and others, which the Israelites were bound to keepe.
4. The dutie toward parents is commanded, but not the love of parents againe to their children.
5. The inward act of murther is not forbidden, as the inward act of adulterie, namely concupiscence: therefore there is not a sufficient enumeration in the morall law, of all morall duties.
Contra. 1. That the Morall law is perfect and every way sufficient, it appeareth first by the generall contents thereof, in prescribing all kinde of duties both toward God and man. For first, as three things are to bee performed to terrene governours, namely fidelitie, reverence, and obedience; so likewise the like duties, but in an higher nature and degree, are required toward God: 1. Fidelitie, in acknowledging him our onelyonly God, which is commanded in the first and second precept. 2. Reverence in the third, not to prophane his glorious name. 3. Obedience and service, which is performed in consecrating the seventh day wholly unto Gods worship. Toward our neighbour our duties are either speciall toward those to whom we are bound by any speciall kinde of benefit, as we are to our parents, and superiours, which is required in the fift precept: or generally toward all, in forbearing to doe them any hurt: first, either in deed, as in their single person concerning their life, or their coupled person, touching their wife, or in their goods, we must not steale: either in word, where false witnesse bearing is forbidden: either in heart, as in the tenth Commandement. There can be no dutie rehearsed appertaining to God or man, which is not comprehended under some of these: therefore the Decalogue containeth a perfect law.
2. Now for answer to the objections in particular: 1. It was not necessarie that any particular precept should bee given as touching the duties of man toward himselfe: both because nature is not so corrupted in such duties (but that a man still retaineth love to himselfe) as it is in our love toward God and our neighbour: … also for that the rule of our love toward another, is taken from a mans love toward himselfe: he shall love his neighbour as himselfe: therefore this is presupposed as granted of all, and as a ground of the rest, that a man loveth himselfe.
2. The law giveth instance of the more generall and notorious transgressions, such as at the first would be acknowledged of all: and therefore because perjurie is more generall, and more easily discerned, than blasphemie or heresie, under that the rest are understood.
3. The other festivals were memorials of particular benefits which concerned the Israelites onelyonly, as the passeover and feast of Tabernacles, of their deliverance out of Egypt: but the Sabbath is a memoriall of the generall benefit of the creation, which concerneth all nations: therefore this precept concerning the Sabbath onelyonly, of all other festivals was onelyonly to be inserted in the morall law.
4. The love of parents toward their children, though it be naturall, yet the dutie of children toward their parents is more agreeable to the law of nature, and the contrary, namely, their disobedience more unnaturall, and therefore instance was to bee given in this rather than in the other: and beside, the names of father and sonne being Relatives, the duties of each toward other are reciprocall; and one may bee inferred upon the other.
5. The concupiscence is expressely forbidden, rather than the first motion of anger and revenge: 1. Because it is harder to resist the motion of concupiscence than of rage and revenge, and wee are more apt to sinne by that than this. 2. Because the inward wrath and purpose of revenge, N…scitur ex concupiscibili, beginneth with a desire, for there are two things in revenge, ipsa persequnti…. id quod persequimur, that which we pursue, and pursuit it selfe: that which we pursue, we judge to be evill, and so hate it; but the action of pursuit, we thinke to be good, namely, to seeke revenge, and so we thinke it good, and desire it. Seeing then all kinde of coveting and desire is forbidden, even that also is included, from the which rage and revenge taketh beginning: but in the other kinde of coveting, when wee propound unto our selves an object of some delectable or profitable good; both the thing which is pursued with desire, is judged good, and the action it selfe of pursuing it with desire. Sic fere Tostat. quast. 24. But the better answer is, why the first motion of anger is not expressely forbidden, as of concupiscence, because anger never riseth, but with the consent of the will, and therefore being a voluntarie motion, it belongeth to the other precept, Thou shalt not kill; but concupiscence, which is involuntarie, and hath not the full consent of the will, is forbidden in the tenth precept. See more of this difference before qu…st. 1.
QUEST. IX. Of the abrogation of the law.
NExt unto this question of the perfection of the law, it followeth to consider of the perpetuitie and continuance of it: for in some places the Scripture testifieth, that Christ came to fulfill the law, not to destroy it, Matth. 1.17. and some where againe it so speaketh, as though the law were abrogated, a… Rom. 6.14. Yee are not under the law, but under grace: Heb. 7.12. If the priesthood be changed, there must of necessitie be a change of the law. For the solution hereof, thus much is to be added here, though this question partly be touched before.
Of the ceremoniall law.1. First then, concerning the ceremoniall law, which was prescribed unto the Jewes, to be observed in the worship of God, it is wholly abrogated: 1. Because the bodie being come, the shadow must give place: but all those ceremonies, in their sacrifices, purifications, festivals, and the rest were shadowes, the bodie is Christ, Coloss. 2.17. Ergo. 2. Those ceremoniall observations were tied unto a certaine place; first, to the Tabernacle, then to the Temple of Salomon; but now the worship of God is not tied to any certaine place, as at Jerusalem, where the Temple was, Ioh. 4.21. 3. Other Sacraments are instituted in place of the old, as Baptisme and the Eucharist; therefore the old are abrogated. 4. The ceremonies did bind the observers to the keeping of the whole law, and the rites thereof: he which was circumcised was bound to keepe the whole law, Galath. 5.3. but we are not bound now to the whole law, from which bondage Christ hath freed us. Ergo. 5. The ceremonies were a wall of partition and distinction betweene the Jewes and Gentiles; but now that distinction is taken away, all being one in Christ: therefore that wall whereby they were parted and distinguished, is removed also, Simler.
Of the judiciall law.2. As touching the politike and judiciall lawes of Moses, neither doe they absolutely …ind now: 1. Many of these lawes were peculiar to the policie of that Common-wealth, as the lawes concerning their inheritances and possessions, which were not to passe from tribe to tribe: and they shewed the fashions and manners of that countrie, as in building their houses with flat roofes, as Deut. 22.8. Of these positive constitutions, there is now no use among other nations. 2. The condition of all people is not alike: some are more stubborne and obstinate, some more civill and tractable, and therefore some have need of more strict and severe lawes than others: one kinde of politicke law then cannot serve for all nations. 3. The Gospell which is perpetuall, prescribeth not a certaine forme of government to all nations, neither overthroweth their severall policies; but in generall commandeth obedience to all higher powers, Rom. 13.1. Ergo, much lesse the law, which was to be changed, Simler. But the judiciall law is not abrogated, Quoad substantiam. finem, & universalem …quitatem, In respect of the substance, end, and universall equitie, which is in punishing of vice, and maintaining of peace, Bucanus. See more hereof, quest. 4. general. cap. 1.
How the Morall law bindeth.3. The Morall law is not now in force, quoad justificationem, in respect of justification, Rom. 3.28. A man is justified by faith, without the works of the law; but it bindeth quoad obedientiam, In respect of obedience; we are bound to keepe all the precepts of the law: but yet quoad terrorem & modum obedientiae, in respect of the terror of the law, and manner of obedience, which was to be obedient and subject unto it, for feare of punishment, wee are freed now from it: and therefore the Apostle saith, The law is not given to a righteous man, 1 Tim. 1.9. because they of love rather than feare, do yeeld their obedience, and so are a law unto themselves, Simler. But this is a privilege onelyonly of the regenerate: As for carnall and unregenerate men, they are still under the curse and terror of the law, according to that saying, Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things which are written in the booke of the law, to doe them, Bu….