A Christian Instruction Containing the Law and the Gospel, Exposition 2 · Part 25 – Part 29
Hovv ſinne can not be but voluntary, and hovv difference muſt be put in this matter, betvveene conſtraint and neceſsitie, and in vvhat ſignification they ought to be taken in this caſe.
T.
BY this accompte ſinne ſhoulde then be no ſinne, for it ſhould not then be voluntarie. And it is commonly ſaide, that eueryevery ſinne is voluntary, or otherwyſe it ſéemeth that it ſhoulde deſerue no puniſhmente.
D.
There are many thinges to be conſidered in this matter. The firſt is, that it behoueth to put difference betwéene neceſſitie and conſtraint. For by wanting this diſtinction, many doe very filthily erre in the matter of frée will, and of predeſtination, and in the conſideration of the nature of ſin. For to ſpeke properly, we may ſay that we do all ſinne of neceſſitie and not by conſtraynt.
T.
What difference putteſt thou then betwene neceſſitie and conſtraynt? for they ſéeme to me to be both one.
D.
Yea, but there is notwithſtanding great difference, but it is requiſite for the better vnderſtanding of it, that we doe firſte well conſider in what meaning and in what ſignification theſe words ought to be taken. Firſt of al, this worde of neceſſitie, is commonly for want of ſome thing whereof we hauehave néede, in ſuch ſort that we do oftentimes take it for lacke, pouertie and miſerie, but we do not properly take it in that ſenſe, when we do ſpeake of the neceſſitie whereby man is brought to ſinne by meane of the naturall corruption that is in him: but ſo farre foorth as we may ſay that he ſinneth by neceſſity, that is to ſay through defaulte and lacke of goodneſſe, iuſtice, innocencie, holineſſe, and other vertues and giftes and graces of God, wherof he hath ben ſpoyled through ſin, vntounto whom he was made ſubiect.
T.
In what ſignification doſte thou then take this worde in this matter?
D.
I do take it for a neceſſarie conſequent which followeth of cauſes that are ioyned togither with their effectes, which can not be others, but ſuch as are agreable to the nature of the cauſes and things which are ſo ioyned togither, and do depend the one of the other.
T.
GiueGive me an example of this that thou ſpeakeſt of.
D.
Behold the Sunne, his nature is to ſhine, and by his light to make the day for vsus, I ſay then, the ſunne ſhineth, it is therefore day of neceſſitie, that is to ſay, it muſt néedes be day, and it can not be otherwiſe, for ſuch is his nature, and therfore of neceſſitie he muſte bring foorth ſuche an effecte of his owne nature, without any conſtraynt or violence at all, bicauſe that he hath that cauſe naturall in him ſelfe. But there where conſtraynt is, there is ſome force and vnolence that commeth from elſe where, than from the thing that is enforced and conſtrayned: as if a woman be violated by force, ſhe ought not to be accounted a whore, in ſuche ſorte as we doe accounte hir, who willingly conſenteth to the whore maſter: we doe then ſinne all neceſſarily and of neceſſitie, in ſo muche as it is not poſſible that of our nature it ſhoulde doe otherwyſe, it beeing corrupted as it is, and béeing not regenerate by the ſpirite of God: and that by meane of the naturall corruption which ſinne hath engendred in all mankinde. And yet for al that, none conſtraineth vsus but onelyonly our owne malice and wycked will, which béeing wicked, can applie it ſelfe to nothing but to euill. Therefore it is not without cauſe ſaide:Oſee. 13. thy perdition is of thy ſelfe, O Iſraell, but thy ſaluation is onelyonly by me. It dothe then followe that our wicked will dothe euill of neceſſitie, for ſo muche as it is of a wicked nature, that can doe none otherwiſe, as we ſay, that an euil trée doth neceſſarily bring foorth euill fruite, bicauſe that his nature is ſuche.Matt. 7.12. For as it is written: that which is borne of the fleſhe, is fleſhe, and that whiche is borne of the ſpirite, is ſpirite. But nowe the will ſhould not be a will, if it did not willingly,Iohn. 3. and not by conſtraynt, for will and conſtraint are contraries, wherfore wil ceaſeth where conſtraint hath place: yea and it is not poſſible that will may be conſtrayned: it may in déede be corrupted and chaunged from good into euill, or elſe from euill to good. Wherefore euen as a good will dothe neceſſarily that which is good, bycauſe it can not otherwyſe doe, béeing good, as the good trée of neceſſitie bringeth foorthe good fruite, and yet doth ſhe it not by conſtrainte, but voluntarily: euen ſo dothe the wicked will, for ſo muche as it is wicked, neceſſarilie the euill, bicauſe that his nature is ſuche as can not otherwyſe doe, and yet dothe it not at all by conſtraynt, but voluntarily, for there is no force nor violence from any where elſe that dothe conſtrayne hir agaynſt hir owne diſpoſition or inclination, but onelyonly in ſo much as ſhe hath in hir the ſpring and the cauſe from the which the euill which ſhe dothe, procéedeth.
Examples and ſimilitudes for declaration of the difference that is put betweene Neceſsitie and Conſtraint.
T.
I Can not yet throughly well vnderſtand that difference.
D.
I wil make the matter more playne vntounto thée by examples and compariſons. The fire doth neceſſarily warme and giuegive light, bicauſe that it can not otherwiſe do, in ſo muche as the nature of it is ſuche: and yet is it not conſtrayned ſo to do. The water on the contrary, abiding in his natural, doth refreſh and make moyſt. By the like reaſon, a liuing body hath breathing and reſpiration, mouing and féeling, and can not otherwiſe be. On the contrary, a dead body is depriued from all theſe things, and may neceſſarily engender nothing but corruption: and yet for all that is there no conſtraint, neither in the one nor in the other, onleſſe we do cal the nature of any thing conſtraint.
T.
For ſo much as in maner all theſe ſimilitudes are giuen of things that hauehave no will, ſhewe me ſome others more méete for our purpoſe.
D.
I will ſo do. We may not doubt but that God is neceſſarily good, iuſte, wiſe, holy, almightie and perfecte, for he can be none other, nor do any thing but that which is godly, iuſtly, wiſely and holily done, and yet can he in nowiſe be conſtrained. In like ſorte the Angels, for ſo much as they be Angels, and doe continue ſtill in that nature, wherein they were created of God, they can not neceſſarily doe any other thing, but prayſe God, and ſerue to his glory: for if they did the contrary, they ſhould be no more Angels, ſuch as they were created by God, but they ſhould be Diuels, like vntounto their felowes, which are fallen from their firſt ſtate: And further, if they did that which they do by conſtraint and not willingly, thē ſhould they hauehave no praiſe with God, nor ſhould be any more accepted, than is the Deuill, for the good which he is conſtrained to doe, for ſo much as God dothe turne will he nill he, his wicked will, & alſo his wicked workes, making them to ſerue to his glory: on the other ſide, the Deuill being ſuche as he is now at this preſent, fallen from the Angelicall ſtate, wherein he was created of God, can neceſſarily doe nothing but euill, and diſhonour God, for if he ſhould doe otherwiſe, he ſhould be no more a Deuill, and yet ſurely he doth not that which he doth of cōſtraint, but volūtarily: For who ſhould conſtraine him to do euill? ſhould God ſo doe, who hath forbidden & condemned it, & can doe nothing but that which is good? it is very true that there is none other cō ſtraint, but only of his owne wicked wil, whiche hath as great delight in doing euill, as that of the Angels of heauen hath in doing well: But the like is not in the doing of the good that he doth: for in that he doth nothing but by cōſtraint, and that whiche is alwaies euill, in ſo much as it procéedeth frō him: & cā not be good, but ſo farre forth as God through his power & infinite goodneſſe, will he or will he not, doth draw out goodneſſe of it, & maketh it to ſerue to an other end, thā to that whervnto the Deuill did pretēd.
T.
I do now begin already to diſcerne more perfectly in this matter, than I did before.
Of the free neceſſitie to do vvell, that vvas in man before ſinne: and of the neceſſitie to doe euill, vnconſtrayned notvvithſtanding, into the vvhichwhich he is fallen through the ſame, and in vvhat meaning this vvord of neceſſitie ought to be taken, vvhen it hath regard to good things.
D.
WE may eaſily vnderſtād by theſe exāples, what we may iudge of mā, cōcerning this matter wherof we doe now intreat. For after yt mā was created by God, in ſo much as he was created of God, good, iuſt, & holy, he did neceſſarily & willingly all yt wherfore God had created him: For ſeing yt God had created him good, as he did all his other creatures, it was naturall for him to do well, & continuing in the ſame, being ioined to God: & hearing his voyce, he coulde none otherwiſe do. For in as much as his will was good, he could not will, nor yet do, folowing that good will, but yt which was good: but when he once gaue eare to the coūſel of ye deuill, & chaūging both his will & nature, by folowing of him is fallen into an other neceſſitie wholy cōtrary to ye firſt: For in the ſtead yt before he did neceſſarily good, & was wholy giuen to God, for that of his nature he coulde not then will nor do otherwiſe, through conſtraint, hauing changed both nature & will, he can not but folow his nature: wherefore this neceſſitie of wel doing, did not procéede of any wāt yt was in him, as it ſéemeth vntounto vsus that the woorde doth ſignifie, for when wée ſpeake of good things, we doe not in that behalfe take neceſſitie, for néede or lacks, but for a diſpoſitiō of things which cā not be other but ſuch as ſhe is hir ſelf, according to the declaration that hath bene already made: if wée ſpeake of euill, wée may well then ſay that the neceſſitie whereof wée ſpeake, is ioyned with lacke of goodneſſe, contrarie to this euill. For the euill which man doth, is not done but for wante of goodneſſe which ought to be in him in the ſteade of the euill into the which the good was chaunged: the which euill of his nature engēdreth euill, where as the good engendreth good: Wée ſée the like againe of this in ſome other thing, as in the darkeneſſes whiche the night doth bring vntounto vsus, & in that which foloweth: for what is the cauſe of the night, but only the ſhadow of the earth whiche taketh from vsus the light of the ſunne, & bringeth vntounto vsus darkneſſes, cōtrary to that light? by meanes whereof we hauehave the day turned into night, and then when we are couered all ouer with the night, we can not doe that which we doe in the day, nor go forth right but clean contrarie: and that, bicauſe that wée hauehave darkneſſe in the ſteade of light, without the which we can not walke directly, & yet all this while, is the neceſſitie without conſtraint: For albeit that the lacke which may be in a mā (the which we cal neceſſitie) be by chaūce an occaſion to make him to ſteale, yet notwithſtāding he cannot iuſtly ſay that he was conſtrained to ſteale, for if he had bene an honeſt man, and not a théefe, he would rather hauehave endured all kinde of miſeries & neceſſities, than to hauehave ſtolen: but for ſo much as he had rather liue at his eaſe, than he would endure paine & miſery according to the will of God, he had rather ſteale than to obey God.
Hovv that the neceſſitie that is here ſpoken of, is free and commendable in good things: and hovv it ought to be othervviſe conſidered in God than in Creatures.
T.
THen by as much as I can vnderſtand of ſuch matters, if this neceſſitie be ſound in a good thing, it is cōmendable & ioined with great libertie.
D.
We doe ſée it in the nature of God, as it hath bene already touched. For yt which God can not bée neceſſarily but all mighty, all wiſe, all iuſt, all good, & al perfect, infinite, eternal & immortall, doth not carrie with it a neceſſitie of lacke, nor conſtraint, nor yet doth in any reſpect diminiſh ye power, the glory, & maieſtie of him, but on the cō trary it doth magnifie & declare the great excellencie & perfection of his nature. For it is not a true libertie & cōmendation to be able to ſinne & to doe euill: but it is a token of an excellent nature to be ſo perfect in goodneſſe, that it doth holde in it cō tinually that goodneſſe which it naturally hath, in ſuch ſorte that it cā not by any accident whatſoeuer it be, be chaunged, diminiſhed or aboliſhed, it is as if we ſhold ſay, that it is impoſſible that God ſhould not be God, & good, and iuſte. Who would not cōclude thē by that ſame, that God is not all mighty, & that there is ſomething impoſſible to him. Are we more ſtronge than he, bicauſe we may be wicked, vntrue, vniuſt, & liers, ye which he cā not be? For goodnes is in him a thing which hath ſubiect & ſubſtāce, & the accidēts agreable to the ſame, as we do ſée in the ſunne & in his light, which doth light all the world: for the euil is nothing els, but a priuatiō, lacke & want of ye good which ought to be, euen as the darkeneſſes are nothing els than priuation & lacke of light. Or if thou haddeſt rather to hauehave it ſpoken in other termes: it is nothing but a corrupted qualitie & a vicious accident, which are come vpō a good ſubſtance & creature of God, & hauehave corrupted it: the faute whereof may not be ſought in God, albeit that nothing cā come to paſſe without his prouidence & his eternal counſell: but it muſt be ſought in cauſes more neare vntounto vsus, leauing a parte the ſecrete counſelles & iudgments of God, which is in ſuch ſorte the cauſe of cauſes, yt no fault may be imputed vntounto him, or that he cā do any thing other than iuſtly. For he hath in ſuch ſort diſpoſed ye ſecōd cauſes, that when ye euil is a doing, the wicked will either of the Deuill or man, cōmeth betwéene, in ſuch ſorte that that fault reſteth in thē, albeit that God doth cauſe their wicked worke and will to ſerue him, and make the worker good, in ſo much as God is ſerued therewith. As touching the reſte, thou oughteſt to note, that there is none which of his own nature is of ſuch an vnchaungeable and infinite goodneſſe, but God only, which is onelyonly vnchangeable, and the moſt frée of all others, and doth giuegive a law to al creatures, & is aboue all lawes, himſelfe being a lawe to all creatures. For the ſame cauſe our Lorde Ieſus Chriſte hath ſaide that none is good,Matth. 19. but the onelyonly God: bicauſe that goodneſſe is to him naturall, eſſentiall and ſubſtantiall, and it is inſeparable with him, and not accidentall and ſeparable, which may be ioyned vntounto him, or taken away from him by any manner of meanes: But the like is not of creatures how excellent ſo euer they be: as we may ſée firſt in the Angels, and afterwarde in man.
T.
I ſhall alſo very gladly vnderſtand this point.
Of the creation and fall of the Angels, and hovv that God in the ſame hath declared the difference that is betvveene the Creator and the Creature, and hovv it is onelyonly he that is perfect and vnchaungeable.
D.
WHen he did create the Angells he created them all good: for he could make them none other, for ſomuch as he is in ſuche ſorte good, that he can do nothing but well: otherwyſe he ſhoulde not be God. Wherfore we may not imagine two Gods, with the Manichees, the one good, and the author and Creator of good things, and the other euill, and the author and creator of euill: For the euill can not bée God, nor any other than the deuill himſelfe, which is a creature, and not a Creator, although he be the author of all euill: who notwithſtandyng was not created ſuche an one of God, but is become ſuche of his owne malice, when he turned away from God, and renounced the goodneſſe that he receyued of him. Wherin he hathe ſhewed the difference that is betwéene the creator and the creature, and betwéene the nature and goodneſſe of the one and the other. For if God had created the Angels of ſuch perfection as he is, and of a goodneſſe ſo vnchangeable of his nature, that it coulde neuer hauehave ben changed into malice, no more thā his own nature & goodneſſe mought, what difference ſhould there be betwéen God & his angels? The creature by this mean ſhould be no more a creature, if his nature wer ſuch as is ye nature of his creator, but he ſhould be very God, which it can not be. For ther is nothing yt may be both maker & creature, vnles we will attribute ye ſame to our lord Ieſus Chryſt, who béeing very God & very man in one only perſon is both maker & creature togither:Iohn. 1. Luke. 1.2. Matth. 1. Maker, inaſmuch as he is God eternal: & creature, in that yt he is mā, which was cōceiued in ye wombe of the virgin, & born in his time ordeined by god: but this belōgeth vntounto him by ſundry reſpects, by meane of the two diuers natures yt ar ioyned togither in one perſon in him. Wherfore, although he be both the one & the other in one very perſon, yet is he not ſo in one nature, but creator, by reaſon of the one: & creature by mean of the other: but ye like is not of angels: for as they hauehave but only one nature, ſo may they be therein but very creatures, greatly differēt from their creator, as the fall of thoſe yt are fallen, hath plainly declared: For in falling frō the ſtate wherin they wer, they hauehave ſhewed in déed that they were not ſuch of themſelues, nor Gods vnchaungeable of their owne nature, & that they could not ſo continue of their owne power.