Commentary on Romans, Chapter 9 · Part (3 of 3)
But before we enter into that matter this we ſay, that we in no wiſe deny, but that God by outward calling, namely, by his prophets Apoſtles, preachers, and ſcriptures calleth all men. For this man is no more excluded from the promiſes or threatninges then that man: but theſe thinges are a like ſet forth vntounto all men, although all men are not predeſtinated to attayne vntounto the fruite of them. This is diligently to be noted, if we will redely anſwere to thoſe thinges which are obiected. And when they lay agaynſt vsus, which thing they very often do, that the promiſes are common, and are vniuerſally ſet forth, neither ought to be contracted vntounto theſe men, or vntounto thoſe men, and that God dalieth not in them, but dealeth in good earneſt. Firſt as touching vniuerſallity, I will bring other propoſitions no les vniuerſall: All fleſh ſhall ſe the ſaluation of God: All ſhall be taught of God: Al ſhal know me from the leaſt to the greateſt. I wil poure of my ſpirit vponupon all fleſhe. Shall we ſay that theſe thinges are true as touching all men? no doubtles, vnles Origens fable ſhould be renewed, that all men ſhall at the laſt be ſaued. They will anſwer, that theſe propoſitions ought to be contracted vntounto the beleuers, vntounto them that are willing, and vntounto them that receaue the grace of God. And we alſo ſay, that they are to be contracted, but we referre our contraction more higher, and aſcend vntounto the election of God and vntounto reprobation: and whether reſolution I beſech you is the perfecter? & whether contraction is of more equity? And yet do we not ſay that God dalieth in theſe vniuerſall promiſes. For foraſmuch as the predeſtinate and the reprobate led theyr life together, neyther are they knowen one from an other, it is mete▪ that preaching ſhould be had vntounto all men together, and that for the reprobate the elect ſhould not be defrauded, which by the preaching of the word of God receaue profit. And by this vniuerſal preaching God bringeth to effect that end which he him ſelfe willeth. For the godly whē they ſe that the reprobate are left in their owne ſence, and beleue not, thereby vnderſtand that grace is not nature: and in them conſider what ſhould alſo hauehave happened vntounto them ſelues without the mercy of God, whoſe gift conuerſion is, and lieth not in the ſtrength of man. And the vngodly are made vnexcuſable, when as they hauehave not ſo much as performed thoſe outward workes, which they mought hauehave done, as it is declared to the Romanes in the firſt and ſecond chapters. Firſt the aduerſaries imagine, that they are ſetters forth of the mercy of God, for that they put it common vntounto alWhether ſentence aſcribeth more to the mercy of God. men. But if we conſider the matter more thorowly, we attribute much more vntounto mercy thē they do. For we affirme y• al whole dependeth of it, which thing is of thē in the meane time denied, whileſt they wil hauehave it to lye in our power, to receaue the grace of God. And if we ſay, that mercy is not a like vntounto al men deſtributed, we can not therefore be reproued, foraſmuch as the ſcriptures manifeſtly teſtify the ſame. But theſe men when they ſay that it lieth in our wil to receiue grace, although they extenuate the ſame, yet is it in very dede proued to be much: for what ſhould it profit to hauehave grace vniuerſally ſet forth vntounto al men, vnles a man would by his owne proper wil apply it vntounto himſelfe? Wherfore let them ceaſe to adorne this theyr opinion with the title of the mercy of God. They bring alſo an other argument: that foraſmuch as God prouideth for al men thinges competēt vntounto the life of the body, it is not very likely, that he wil fayle them as touching the preperation of eternal ſaluation, which he ſhould not do, vnles vntounto eueryevery man were ſet forth ſo much of the grace of God as is ſufficient. But by this theyr ſimilitude they them ſelues are reproued: for euen as God geueth vntounto eueryevery man corporal life without any theyr aſſent, ſo alſo muſt they nedes conclude of ſpiritual life, which thing by al meanes they refuſe to graunt. We graunt in dede that God thorough his mercy maketh hisThe reprobate want not all the benefites of God. Many are borne vnapt to naturall felicity. Sonne to aryſe vponupon the good and vponupon the euill, and we alſo confeſſe, that both the predeſtinate and the reprobate are pertakers of ſome of the benefits of God. And euen as in this life the commodities of the body and of life are not a like geuen vntounto al men: ſo alſo predeſtination vntounto eternall felicity is not common vntounto al mē. Some are borne leprous, blind, deafe, foliſh, moſt poore, & vtterly vnapt vntounto al maner of natural felicity, neither attayne they vntounto it at any tyme, wherefore the compariſon which they bring maketh very much agaynſt them ſelues. But ſay they God hath created al men to his owne image, and therfore hath appoynted al men vntounto bleſſednes, wherefore we ought not to ſay, that ſome are predeſtinate, and ſome are reprobate. That men are made to the image of God we graunt, & that they were able to receaue bleſſednes: but after the fal, nature was vitiated, and the image of God much blotted. Wherefore men can not of them ſelues attayne vntounto felicity, but hauehave nede to be deliuered from miſery. But that God hath now decreed to deliuer al men from miſery, and thorough Chriſt to make them bleſſed, the ſcriptures teach not. Wherfore we do not without iuſt cauſe ſay, that he hath decreed to deliuer ſome, and to leaue other ſome, and that iuſtly: the cauſes of which iuſtice yet are not to be ſought for of our workes, when as they are knowen to God only thorough hisWhether al men hauehave power to be made the ſonnes of God. hidden and vnſpeakable wiſedom. They obiect this alſo out of Iohn, He gaue vntounto them power to be made the ſonnes of God. As though they could thereof inferre, that eueryevery man may be made the ſonne of God if he wil. But they geue no hede to thoſe things which folow: for it is added, VntoUnto thoſe which hauehave beleued in him, which are borne not of bloude, nor of the will of the fleſh, nor of the wil of mā, but of God. Theſe things if they be rightly peyſed, declare, y• this dignity & priueledge is geuen vntounto the beleuers and vntounto the regenerate: for to hauehave power geuen to be the ſonnes of God, ſignifieth nothing els. Wherfore this dignity is put as an effect of regeneration and of faith, and not as the beginning thereof, as theſe men dreame. They alleadge alſo, that Chriſt dyed for vsus all: and thereof they inferre that his benefite is commō vntounto all men. Which thing we alſo wil eaſely graunt,How this is to be vnderſtanded, Chriſt hath …ed for all. if only the worthines of the death of Chriſt be conſidered. For as touching it, it mought be ſufficient for all the ſinners of the world. But although in it ſelfe it be ſufficient, yet it neither had, nor hath, nor ſhall hauehave effect in all men: which thing the ſchoolemen alſo confeſſe, when they affirme that Chriſt hath redemed all men ſufficiently, but not effectually: for thereunto it is neceſſary that the death of Chriſt be healthfull vntounto vsus, that we take hold of it, which can not otherwiſe be done but by faith, which faith we hauehave before aboundantly declared to be the giftThe cōpariſon of Adā with Chriſt how it is to be vnderſtanded. of God, and not to be geuen vntounto all men. This alſo is obiected vntounto vsus, that the Apoſtle compared Adam with Chriſt, and ſaid vntounto the Romanes, that euen as in Adam we all dye, ſo in Chriſt we are all quickened. Wherfore by this meanes they ſay that the grace of Chriſt ought vniuerſally to be layd forth vntounto all men. But if they will ſo take this compariſon, they ſhalbe compelled to graunt that all ſhall by Chriſt be brought vntounto felicity, as by Adam all are throwen hedlong into ſinne and into death. But ſeing that the thing it ſelfe declareth the contrary, they may eaſely perceaue, that this ſimilitude is not to be taken as touching all the partes thereof, eſpecially when as none fall of their owne conſent into originall ſinne: but thoſe men will not hauehave grace to be receaued but through a mans own conſent. Wherfore if they admit this difference, how dare they affirme that the matter is on eche ſide a like? The ſkope of the Apoſtle in this compariſon is to bee conſidered, and beſides the ſkope nothing is to be inferred. And in that compariſon Paul ment nothing elles, but that Chriſte is to thoſe whiche are regenerated, the beginning of life and of bleſſednes: as Adam is vntounto them that are deriued of him, the cauſe of death and of ſinne. Nowe whatſoeuer is afterwarde beſides this ſcope gathered touching the equalitye of multitude, or of the manner, the ſame is per accidens, that is, by chaunce, and pertaineth not vntounto the ſkope and ſubſtance of the ſimilitude. They obiect alſo the ſentence vntounto Timothe. God will hauehave all men to be ſaued. For this ſentence Pigghius perpetually inculcatethHow God will hauehave al men to be ſaued. as though it were inuincible, whē yet Auguſtine oftentimes hath tought, y• it may in ſuch ſort be expounded, that it bringeth no waight at all to proue thoſe mens fond inuention. Firſt we take it to be ſpoken of all eſtats and kinds of mē, namely, that God will hauehave ſome of all kinds of men to be ſaued: which interpretacion agréeth excellently well with the purpoſe of the Apoſtle. He had commaunded that prayers and ſupplications ſhould be made for all men, and eſpecially for kings and thoſe which hauehave publike authority, that vnderunder them we may liue a quiet life in all piety and chaſtity. And therefore to declare that no eſtate or kind of men is excluded, he added, that God wyll hauehave all men to be ſaued. As if he ſhoulde hauehave ſaid, no man is letted by that vocation and degrée wherein he is placed, ſo that it be not repugnant vntounto the word of God, but that he may come to ſaluation, and therefore we ought to pray for all kind of men. But hereof we can not inferre, that God endueth eueryevery man perticularly with grace, or predeſtinateth eueryevery man to ſaluation: as in the time of the floud all liuing creatures are ſaid to hauehave bene ſaued in the Arke with Noe: for that only ſome of eueryevery kinde were gathered together in it. Or we may vnderſtand it thus, that God will hauehave all men to be ſaued, for that as many as are ſaued, are ſaued by his will. As if a man ſhould ſay of one that teacheth Rhetorike in a city, that he teacheth all men. By which kind of ſpeach is not ſignified, that all the citizens are learners of Rhetorike, but that as many as learne, are tought of him. And this▪ alſo is like. If a man pointing to the gate of a houſe, ſhould ſay, that all men enter in this way, we muſt not thereby vnderſtand, that all men enter into that houſe, but that as many as do enter, do enter in by y• gate only. Farther there are ſome which interpretate theſe wordes of the Apoſtle of the will of the ſigne, or of the antecedent will: that all men are inuited, for that preaching is indifferently ſet forth vntounto all men, neither is there any in a maner, which inwardly féeleth not ſome pricke, whereby he is continually ſtirred vp to liue well. So that if we hauehave a conſideration vntounto this will of God, we will eaſely grant that he will hauehave all men to be ſaued. But they will not hauehave it to be vnderſtanded of the hidden and effectuall will which they call the conſequent will: and after this maner may thoſe kindes of ſpeach be vnderſtanded, God illuminateth eueryevery man which commeth into this world. Come vntounto me all ye which labour and are laden. For all men are prouoked by the oracles of God, and all men are inwardly moued by ſome pricke. All theſe interpretacions are doubtles very likely, and alſo apt. And yet is there an other beſides th…ſe, bothTwo ſocieties of mē wherof eche hauehave their vniuerſality. redy and playne. The holy ſcriptures ſet forth two ſocieties of men, the one of the godly, and the other of the vngodly, and do of eche ſociety pronounce vniuerſall propoſitions, which ought of the wary reader to be contracted ech to their kinde. The Prophetes ſay, and Chriſt citeth the ſame, All men ſhalbe taught of God. And all men ſhall know me from the leaſt to the greatest. Agayne, When I ſhalbe lifted vp from the earth, I will draw all thinges vntounto my ſelfe. Theſe vniuerſall propoſitions, vnles they be vnderſtanded of the godly which are elected, are not true. As are theſe alſo, I will poure of my ſpirite vponupon all fleſhe. And all fleſh ſhall come in my ſight and ſhall worſhip in Ieruſalem. Agayne, All fleſhe ſhall ſee the ſaluation of God. Againe alſo, God lifteth vp all them that fall. Now who ſéeth not that theſe things are to be vnderſtanded only of the Saints? Contrariwiſe to the fellowſhip of the vngodly pertaine theſe ſentences: No man receaueth his teſtimony, and yet many beleued, Ye ſhalbe hated of all men. Agayne, All men ſeeke the thinges that are their owne. Agayne alſo, All men hauehave declined, and are all together made vnprofitable, there is none which doth good, no not one. When yet notwithſtanding holy men, and they that are now regenerate, are acceptable vntounto God, and do endeuor themſelues to exhibite vntounto him ſome obedience of the law. But theſe vniuerſall ſayings ought not to be extended beyond their ſociety. This diſtinction had Auguſtine a regard vntounto in his booke de Ciuitate Dei, where he declareth and proueth that thereTwo cities hauehave euer ben two cities, namely, one the city of God, and an other the city of the deuill. Wherfore in theſe generall propoſitions we muſte alwayes hauehave a conſideration vntounto what order or fellowſhip of men they pertayne. Whiche thing if we in this preſent place do, then ſhall we apply vntounto the Saints and vntounto the elect this ſentence which we are now in hand with, namely, that God will hauehave all men to be ſaued: and by that meanes all maner of doubt is taken away. Otherwiſe that God with efficacy willeth not the ſaluation of all men, very many infantes declare, which periſh without Chriſt, and many alſo which are borne fooles and deafe, and had neuer in their life time the right and iuſt vſe of reaſon. And itSondry obiections. againſt the aduerſaries oftentymes happeneth that ſome hauehave liued long time indifferent honeſtly and faithfully, and yet in the meane time do at the laſt fall, and being taken out of the world do eternally periſh. And contrariwiſe others, which hauehave perpetually led their life wickedly, being at the end of their life endued with ſodaine faith and repentance, are ſaued. Whē yet notwithſtanding thoſe firſt mought hauehave ben takē away, that maliciouſnes mought not hauehave chaunged their mindes. Who will in theſe examples ſay, that God with efficacy a like willeth the ſaluation of all mē? They obiect alſo a ſentence of Chriſt, How often would I hauehave gathered together thy children, as a hen gathereth together her chickens, and thou wouldeſt not? But here alſo is ment of the antecedent will of the ſigne, whereby God by his Prophetes,Whether Chriſt wer …etted that he could not gather together his. preachers, Apoſtles, and ſcriptures continually inuited the Iewes, to flye vntounto him by repentance, which thing yet they refuſed to do. But yet God by his will of efficacy which they call the conſequent will, perpetually drew vntounto him thoſe that were his: neither was there euer any age, wherein he gathered not together as many of the Hebrewes as he had predeſtinated. Therefore Auguſtine ſayde, Thoſe which I would I hauehave gathered together, though thou wouldeſt not.
They thinke alſo y• this maketh on theyr ſide, which is writtē in the beginningHow the Gentles ar ſaid to be in excuſable. in his epiſtle cōcerning ye Gētils, namely, y• they were inexcuſable: which they ſay could not hauehave bene ſaide, vnles vntounto eueryevery mā were geuē ſo much grace & helpe, as might ſuffice vntounto ſaluatiō. But this is to be known, y• the Apoſtle in y• place entreated only of knowledge, namely, that the Gentils could not excuſe theyr ſinnes for that they had not a law geuen vntounto them of God, as had the Iewes, neither for y• God had not in ſuch ſort opened himſelf vntounto them, as he had opened himſelf vntounto the people of the Iewes. Ye knew God (ſaith he) by his creatures, & by the lighte of nature ye wanted not the knowledge of right & of wronge. Therefore ye are inexcuſable. Wherfore we muſt not thinke that this ſentence extendeth farther, thē wherfore Paul ſpake it. And if alſo thou weigh the matter better, thou ſhalt ſe that the Ethnikes and vngodly men, againſt whome the Apoſtle writeth, thought not that they wanted ſtrengthes to performe thoſe thinges which they knew to be vpright foraſmuch as they aſcribed all thinges vntounto frée wil. Wherefore the Apoſtle very well concludeth againſt them. As if he ſhould hauehave ſaide, do ye thinke that ye hauehave ſtrength inough, ſo that ye iudge that ye hauehave no néede of Chriſte? But foraſmuch as I hauehave proued, that ye wanted not knowledge, and hauehave yet notwithſtanding liued wickedly, I do thereof inferre y• ye are in excuſable. Furthermore infirmity and wante of ſtrengths excuſeth not, ſéeing that we hauehave it not in our ſelues by creation, & by our firſt conſtitution, but by the fal and ſinne which was brought in into our whole kinde by the firſte man. The Ethnikes alſo were excuſable, for that they performed not that in ciuill iuſtice whiche lay in them to do. Wherefore nothing can be inferred of this place, whiche can proue the ſentence of the aduerſaries.
They thinke that this alſo maketh with thē, which is ſpoken in this ſelfe ſame Epiſtle. Is God the God of Iewes onelyonly? and not of the Gentiles alſo? yes of the Gentils alſo. The labour of this place to inferre, that God geueth vntounto all men ſufficiente aide, for that he is the God of all men. But they ſhoulde conſider, that Paul there reproueth the Iewes, for that they thought that the beneuolence and grace of God was ſo bound vntounto them, that the Gentils were vtterlye excluded. Wherefore he declared that God hath not onelyonly elected ſome of the Iewes, but alſo hath his elect amongſt y• Gentils. Neither followeth it therfore of neceſſity, that vntounto all y• Gentils ſhould be geuen grace which mought ſuffice vntounto ſaluation, when as neither were all the Iewes pertakers of ſuche grace. And we ſpeake this, not as thoughe we deny, that God is the God of all men: for we know that euen the wicked alſo, will they or nill they are ſubiect vntounto him, neither can they auoyde his prouidenceGod is the God of all men. whome, although he bring not to eternall ſaluation, yet at the leaſt way he puniſheth for theyr euill deſertes. But he is peculiarly ſaid to be the God of them, vntounto whome he hath geuen, to acknowledge him for theyr God, and hauing acknowledgedWhoſe god peculiarly God is ſaid to be. How God is the ſauior of all men. him, to worſhip him. But that place ſéemeth to be of more difficulty whiche is written vntounto Timothy, where God is called the ſauiour of all mē, and eſpecially of ye faithful. In which wordes this word foreign, that is ſauiour, is to be takē, not as though God geueth vntounto all men eternall ſaluation, but as it ſignifieth that he preſerueth and defendeth all men from many euils, whiche otherwiſe the Deuill practiſeth againſt them. For ſo great is his rage againſt mankind, that if he were not reſtrained of God, he would deſtroy all thinges. He would ſuffer no common wealth nor church, but would bring to nought both goods and al things whatſoeuer pertaine to mans life. Wherefore in ſuch ſort is God the Sauiour of all men, in that he driueth away ſo great euils from men▪ But as touching eternall ſaluation, that is to be vnderſtanded of the elect onelyonly: and therfore it is added, And eſpecially of the faithfull. For foraſmuch as they are predeſtinated, they aboue all others attaine vntounto this benefite.
They wreſt that alſo out of the Prophet Eſay, whiche we ſhall hauehave a little afterward in this Epiſtle, All the day long hauehave I ſtretched abroade mine handes to a people that beleueth not, but ſpeaketh againſt me. Out of which place they can gather nothing els, but that which hath oftentimes bene ſaide, namely, that all men in vniuerſall are inuited of God: that the Prophets were ſent indifferentlye vntounto all men: that the holy ſcriptures are ſetfoorth vntounto all men. But this maketh nothing to that grace of efficacy whereof we ſpeake. We graunte alſo, that he ſtandeth at the doore, and knocketh, and will enter in, if any man wil let him in: but this they ſhould adde that there is no man, which can of himſelf open, but it is neceſſary that that be firſt geuen vntounto him of the méere goodnes of him that knocketh.
And to commende alſo the mercy of God they bringe a ſentence of Ieremye, Thoughe a mother can forget her children, ye will not I forget thee. Whiche ſentence doubtles very little, or nothing at all pertaineth to this matter, whereof is nowe entreated. Who euer denied but y• God is conſtant of faith, and ſtandeth to his promiſes and couenantes? This thinge doth God in that place promiſe of himſelfe, namely, that he will not forget his promiſes. And we alſo eueryevery where hetherto hauehave taught, that the predeſtination of God is moſt certaine, wherefore whether this place of Ieremy be vnderſtanded of predeſtination, or of the couenauntes and promiſes, yet doth it not thereof follow that it is to be vnderſtanded of all men.Whether the reprobat do ſerue the purpoſe of God.
Pigghius alſo cannot abide that which both Auguſtine and we ſaye, namely, that the reprobate do ſerue the purpoſe of God, to illuſtrate and to ſet forth the power of the ſeuerity of God, and ſaith farther that God hath no néede of thys cruell dealing to illuſtrate his name, whiche thing he laboureth to proue by a certaine ſentence taken out of the booke of Eccleſiasticus. But that is thus to be interpretated, That none of vsus ought to thinke, that God hath néede of the woorkes of men: for his felicity is perfect and abſolute without the aide and helpe of anye creature: But that the iuſtice of God is made manifeſt by the vnfaithfulnes & wicked facts of men, when God taketh vengeaunce of them, who dare deny, when as Paul teacheth that moſt euidently and plainely.
He citeth alſo out of the ſelfe ſame booke of Eccleſiasticus, God hath mercy vponupon all men, and winketh at the ſinnes of all men, becauſe of repentance. But the ſolucion of this obiection euidently appeareth by that whiche hath bene ſpoken, namely, that theſe wordes are to be vnderſtanded of the vniuerſallitye of the electe. For by the winking of ſinnes, it is ſo farre of, that the wicked do aſpire vntounto repentance, that rather becomming eueryevery day worſe and worſe, they fall hedlong into more gréeuous ſinnes. But it pertaineth to the predeſtinate onelye, to returne againe into the right way, after that God hath borne ſome while with them. And touching aunſwering to obiections here will I finiſh and conſequently end the third article.The reprobate maye for a while do good workes, and the predeſtinate may on the other ſyde fall into moſte greuous ſins. Howbeit this we will in the meane time put you in minde of, that the reprobate may ſometimes in ſome degrée do good woorkes, and that the predeſtinate on the other ſide may fall into ſinnes moſt gréeuous. Of the firſte parte Saul may be vntounto vsus an example and firm teſtimony: for he was at the beginning moderate, hauing a modeſt opinion of himſelfe, as the ſcripture ſaith. Salomon alſo at the latter ende of his age fell gréeuouſly, yea he fell away from God, when yet at the beginning he was moſt holy, and had in his prayers when he was conſecrated required thoſe thinges which highly pleaſed God, wherfore he was alſo heard. Achab alſo repented, which repentance God talking with Helias, commēded. And alſo Ioas the king ſo long as Ioiada the prieſt liued behaued himſelfe well. Ezechiell alſo teacheth this ſelfe thing when he writeth, If a righteous man depart from his righteouſnes, and liue wickedly, I will forget all his righteouſnes. Yea and experience it ſelfe teſtifieth, that there are many which hauehave liued indifferent honeſtly, & yet do at the length in the laſt time of theyr life periſh. Wherefore it is manifeſte, that in the reprobate good workes ſometimes hauehave place, which yet come not frō a ſincere and perfecte faith but from a fayth, that endureth but for a time: and therfore they can not ſimply be ſaid to be good, neither do they in very déede pleaſe God, but onelyonly hauehave a ſhowe of goodnes, and may as touching outward diſcipline be praiſed. And that the predeſtinate do ſometimes moſte gréeuouſly ſinne, Dauid is a witnes, who committed adultery and murther: Peter alſo is a witnes, who abiured his ſauiour. Moſes alſo & Aaron ar witneſſes, who as the ſcripture teſtifieth committed no light ſinne. We dayly alſo ſée, that they whiche are peraduenture in the nomber of the predeſtinated, do fall into horrible crimes. And therfore we may affirme, that good woorkesGood workes do ſerue both vntounto predeſtination, & vntounto reprobation. do ſometimes ſerue vntounto predeſtination, and ſometimes alſo to reprobation. Predeſtination by them bringeth the elect vntounto eternall life: and as touching reprobation, they are ſometimes reaſons why the fall is made the gréeuouſer: for they whiche fall awaye from God, foraſmuche as they were by him adorned with good woorkes, as theyr ſinne is more gréeuous, ſo alſo is theyr puniſhment more ſharpe. Sinnes alſo ſerue both to reprobation and vntounto predeſtination: for they which areSinnes alſo ſerue vntounto the purpoſe of god. reprobate, are by them brought to eternal deſtructiō: they which are predeſtinate, by thē the more illuſtrate the glory of God, when they are deliuered from thē. And therby alſo is miniſtred vntounto them occaſion, more and more to know themſelues, and to acknowledge the benifites that are geuen vntounto them of God, and ſo to geue thankes for them, and to call vponupon him for helpe. And yet are not theſe thinges ſo to be taken, that, for that God by his moſt ſinguler wiſedome vſeth theſe thynges moſt rightly to our ſaluatiō, we ſhould therfore ſin: we muſt follow the holy ſcripture, which commaundeth, that euill thinges are not to be done, that good may of them enſue.
Now let vsus at the length come vntounto the fourth article, in which we purpoſe to entreate of three thinges in eſpeciall. Firſt, whether by the predeſtination orWhether of predeſtination bee inferred neceſſitie. reprobation of God is brought vntounto vsus any neceſſity: Secondly, if there be any neceſſity, whether the ſame do hinder free will: Laſtlye, whether by the foreknowledge or predeſtination of God be taken away his iuſtice, whereby he is ſayd in the ſcriptures to render vntounto eueryevery man according to his works. Theſe thinges being thoroughly declared, I truſt, the article propoſed ſhalbe fully ſatiſfyed. Touching the firſt part, this we ſayd firſt, that neceſſity is defined to beWhat is neceſſitie. Diſtinctiō of neceſſity. that, which can not be otherwiſe: but the principles or grounds of neceſſity are ſometimes inward, and ſometimes outward. Things which of theyr owne nature ar of neceſſity, & of an inward principle, ether they are ſimply neceſſary, as God, and whatſoeuer things if they ſhould be changed include contradiction as they ſpeake. As, that fower is not an euen nomber, or that fower and three are not ſeuen. And this is called a geometrical neceſſity, for that it ſuffreth no variety. Other things are of neceſſity of an inward ground, but yet not abſolutely and ſimply, vnles we followe the accuſtomed courſe of nature. Fire is ſayd of neceſſity to burne that which is apt to be burnt. And the Sonne alſo of neceſſity perpetually moueth: but theſe are not ſimply neceſſary: for God is able to let them & to cauſe theſe phiſical & natural thinges ſometimes to ceaſe from theyr proper operation: as it is manifeſt of the three children put into the ouen of fire, which were not burnte, although the flambe were moſt great. The Sunne alſo ſtayd from his courſe, whileſt Ioſua purſued after his enemies. And in ye time of Helias it is moſt likely that there were vapors drawen out of the earth, & out of y• ſea, and yet for all that for the ſpace of three yeares came not downe out of the cloudes, dew, or rayne. This alſo is manifeſt of Ezechias, that his diſeaſe was by nature to the death. And theſe things ſhall ſuffice touching inward neceſſity.
That neceſſity alſo which commeth outwardly is of two ſortes, the one violent, when thinges are compelled to abide or to worke contrary to theyr nature,Neceſſitie outwardly put to. Diſtinction of thys neceſſitie. A ſence cō poſed, and a ſence deuided. the other is by ſuppoſition: by occaſion whereof the ſcholemen hauehave ſayd, y• there is one neceſſity of the conſequence, & an other of y• conſequent. By which diſtinction they ment nothing els, but that the connexion is ſometimes neceſſary, although that which is inferred be not of it ſelf neceſſary. The logicians alſo hauehave thus diſtinguiſhed them, that they call the one a compoſed ſence, and the other a deuided ſēce: as, if thou wilt ſay y• it is not poſſible that white ſhould be blacke, that will they graunte, if theſe two thinges be taken coniunctly, and together: namely, that one and the ſelfe ſame thing ſhould be both white and blacke, which is by no meanes poſſible: but if they be taken a part, then it may be ſayd not to be impoſſible. For that which is now white, may be changed and made blacke. Wherefore the Scholemen thinke, that the whole difficulty of this controuerſy conſiſteth in the neceſſity of the conſequence, and of the conſequent, in the compoſed ſence, and in the deuided ſence. But we for more perſpicuityNeceſſitie of coaction & of certainty will adde an other diſtinction, that there is a neceſſity of certainty or of infalliblenes, and an other of compulſion. Now let vsus more narrowly ſerch out, how thoſe diſtinctions of neceſſity may be applied vntounto this preſent purpoſe.Our actiōs hauehave not neceſſity of inward beginninges. Our actiōs hauehave neceſſitie by ſuppoſition. Firſt I ſay that our actions hauehave not neceſſity by an inward principle: for the ground of them is the will, which of his owne nature, that is, as God hath created it, is mutable and flexible vntounto eyther part: howbeit they hauehave neceſſity by ſuppoſition. For that ſo ſone as thou conſidereſt the foreknowledge and predeſtinatiō of God, it followeth of neceſſity, that it ſo come to paſſe as it is of God foreknowen and predeſtinated. Our will in dede hath an aptnes, that it may alike be bowed to either part: but it hath not the action therof, namely, the turning or boweng, but to that parte only which God hath foreknowē. Wherfore the neceſſity falleth vponupon the connexion and coniunction of the predeſtination of God with our workes▪ which thing they ment by the compoſed ſence, and by the neceſſity of the conſequence. For our workes, if they be conſidered a parte, and if we only hauehave a reſpect vntounto theyr nieſt ground or beginning, that is, vntounto the will, are not of neceſſitye. Here alſo is confeſſed neceſſity of certainty, or of infalliblenes, for that God can neyther be changed nor be deceaued. Neyther do we playnly graunt that predeſtination bringeth neceſſity of coaction: for coactionThe will can not bee gouerned. and violence is agaynſt the nature of the will. For if it ſhould vnwillingly do any thing, it ſhould not now be called will, but rather nill (if a man may ſo terme it) which were to deſtroy will. I knowe that the Scholmen ſtriue amongeſt themſelues, whether God foreknoweth thoſe thinges which he foreknoweth, neceſſarily, or contingently. But in this contencion I will not entermedle my ſelfe, for that there is no ſuch matter ſet forth in the ſcriptures. It isProues of neceſſity by ſuppoſition. ſufficient vntounto me to diſcharge God from all maner of change and alteration, for the contingence and newnes is in the thinges: but God alwayes and perpetually abideth one and the ſelfe ſame. But that there is ſuch a neceſſity, namely of the conſequence or of the compoſed ſence, or of infallibility found in the holy ſcriptures, we wil alledge certayne places which euidently proue the ſame, leſt any ſhould thinke it to be but a fayned inuencion. Chriſt ſayd, It muſt nede… be that he ſhould be deliuered vntounto the Iewes to be mocked. This neceſſity can be of no other thing inferred, but of the definite counſell of God▪ which thing Peter teacheth in his ſermon in the actes of the Apoſtles. Chriſt alſo ſayd, that it muſt nedes be that the ſcriptures ſhould be fulfilled. In Iohn it is written, The ſcripture can not be broken, that is, It is not poſſible, but that it muſt needes be fulfilled. VntoUnto y• Hebrues, It is impoſſible, that they which once being illuminated. &c. In which place is entreated of ſinne agaynſt the holy ghoſt, that it is impoſſible that they which are guilty of it ſhould eſcape, for that God hath vtterly decred perpetually to forſake thoſe which hauehave ſo ſinned. Chriſt alſo ſayd of the temptacions of the latter times, That the elect alſo if it were poſſible ſhould be deceaued. Agayne, Heauen and earth ſhall paſse away, but my wordes ſhall not paſſe away. In which wordes is ſignified, that all thoſe thinges which God hath ſpoken eyther in the Scriptures, or in his eternall determination, can not be by anye meanes made fruſtrate. He anſwered alſo vntounto his parentes, Did ye not know, that it behoueth me to worke thoſe thinges which pertayne to my father? VntoUnto Timothe Paul writteth, The foundation ſtandeth firme, God knoweth who are his. And in Iohn Whome the father hath geuen vntounto me, no man can take out of my hand. Laſtly, All things whatſoeuer he would be made, both in heauen and in earth. Wherfore of all theſe thinges is gathered, how euidently this neceſſity of certainty and infalliblenes is ſet forthe in the holy ſcriptures, nether is it as ſome thinke a deuiſe of man. And theſe thinges which we hauehave ſpoken of foreknowledge, pertaine alſoTheſ… thinges pertain alſo to prouidence. to prouidence: for although in this vniuerſality of things many things are ſaid to be done by chance, yet notwithſtanding bycauſe that there is nothing, be it neuer ſo ſmall, but it is ſubiect vntounto the prouidence of God, therefore alſo hath it neceſſity, which we call neceſſity of certainty, and others call neceſſitye of conſequence, And if thou wilt aſke: that foraſmuch as thinges may be called partly neceſſary, and partly alſo contingent, or free, as we hauehave declared, whitherWhether our actions are to be called nece…ſarye or contingent. of theſe conditions moſt agree vntounto them? I anſwere, that that moſt agreeth vntounto them which is natural and inward. Wherefore foraſmuch as the neceſſity whereof we nowe entreate commeth outwardly, and is onelyonly by ſuppoſition, therefore thinges ought in no wiſe to be eſtemed according to it, but according to thoſe principles or groundes which are vnderſtanded of vsus: and ſo our workes, which procede of the will ſhall be ſayd to be free: and thoſe thinges which are ſo produced in nature, that alſo theyr contrary may come to paſſe are be counted contingēt. Howbeit that neceſſity of certaynty or of conſequēce which we put is neuer to be denied, nether muſt we plucke away our workes eyther from nature, or frō foreknowledge, or from the prouidence of God. And as touching the will of God we muſt thinke that it in very dede gouerneth and moderateth all thinges which thing is of all men commonly graunted. For although mē perceaue and fele, that they by the will decree and elect thoſe things which they are minded to do, yet if they be men godly, they will alwayes ſaye, This or that will I do, if God wil permitte. But if they be men that are yet without the religion of Chriſt, as were the Ethnikes, yet notwithſtanding they alwayes make mencion of Fate or deſtiny, of the three ſiſters called Parcae, or of lot, which thing is oftentimes red in the Poets. Who, if (as we hauehave before ſayd) by the word Fate or ſuch like wordes they vndeſtode the connexion of cauſes, ouer which God himſelfe is the ruler, and moderateth and gouerneth it then is there no hurte in that opinion, although by reaſon of the abuſe of the word, it be better, vtterly to abſtayne frō it. There are ſome alſo which dreame of a certayne fatall mighty and ſtrong neceſſity afflicted vntounto the ſtarres, and vntounto naturall cauſes. Which God himſelfe can not change: which opinion is erronius, impious, and alſo ſtrange from the wiſe men of old time, who expreſſedly declare, that by Fate they vnderſtoode the will and gouernment of God The verſes of Cleanthes the Stoike which he wrote touching thys matter, Seneca in his 18. booke of Epiſtles hath turned into Latine. Whoſe ſentence in Engliſhe is thus.
Leade me (o ſoueraigne Sire, and Lord, that ruleſt the heauens hye)Verſes of Cleanthes touching deſteny.
Where pleaſeth thee: for I obey: to follow ſpedely.
Lo preſt I am without delay. Though loth thou makeſt me.
Yet groning forward ſhall I go. And euill while I be,
What being good I might hauehave done, to do I ſhalbe fayne.
The willing perſons, fates doo leade: vnwilling they conſtrayne.
Although in theſe verſes be auoutched fate, or deſtinie, yet is the gouernement thereof put in the hand of God: for he calleth vponupon the moſte high father, and deſireth to be led of him. Whoſe will notwithſtanding he affirmeth to be both certain and infallible. The ſelfe ſame thing ſéemeth Homer in his Odiſea to hauehave ment in theſe verſes which are thus in Engliſh.
Such is the minde in earthly men, and ſo themſelues they bend,
As moues the Sire of men and Gods, that dayly doth aſcend.
And when we ſpeake of foreknowledge we exclude not will, for, as we at theThe foreknowledge of God is not to be ſeperated frō his will. The foreknowledge of God ouer throweth not natures beginning admoniſhed, God can not foreknow that any thing ſhall come to paſſe, but that which he willeth ſhall come to paſſe, for there can nothing be, but that which God willeth to be, and that which God willeth, he alſo bringeth to paſſe in vsus. For as Paul ſayth, He worketh in vsus, both to will and to performe. But this will ioyned to foreknowledge, neither inuerteth nor deſtroyeth things naturall, but ſo worketh in them, as is agréeing with them: and therefore foraſmuch as the nature and propriety of the will of man is, to worke fréely and by election, the foreknowledge and will of God taketh not away this faculty or power from it, althoughPredeſtination is the cauſe of all oure good workes. Prayers of the church. his predeſtination be the cauſe of all good actions, which are done of the elect, and in the elect. Which thing is not only proued by teſtimonies of the ſcriptures, but alſo the conſent of the Church in their prayers affirmeth the ſame, for thus it prayeth, O God from whome all holy deſires, all good counſels, and iuſt workes do proceede. &c. And ſinnes, although after a ſort they are ſubiect vntounto the will of God, yet are they not in ſuch ſort produced of it, as good workes are. Howbeit this ought to be for certaine, that they alſo are not done vtterly without any will of God. For permiſſion, which ſome put, differeth not from will for God permittethPermiſſion pertayneth vntounto will. that which he will not let: neither ought it to be ſaid that he permitteth vnwilling, but willing as Auguſtine ſaith. Wherefore in either kind of works the will and foreknowledge of God in ſuch ſort vſeth it ſelfe, that it ouerthroweth not the faculty or power of mans will. In the predeſtinate it prouideth, that nothing be of them committed, which may ouerthrow their ſaluation. And in the reprobateNote this that is ſpoken of the reprobate. he taketh away from them no naturall power, which pertaineth to their ſubſtance or nature, neither compelleth he them againſt their wil to attempt any any thing: but he beſtoweth not vponupon them ſo much mercy nor ſo much grace as he doth vponupon the elect, and as ſhould be nedfull for their ſaluation. But a great many hereat ſtomble, for that they thinke with themſelues, If God hauehave foreknowen that we ſhall méete together tomorrow, then muſt it néedes be that our will was vtterly determinate to this part, otherwiſe that could not be foreknowē But we anſwere as we hauehave alredy ſignified, that that determination in in ſuchWhether our will be determinate to one part. ſort with God, as is agreeing with the propriety or nature of the will. But vntounto it, is proper, ſo to will one part, that of his nature if can alſo will the other part. Wherefore we confeſſe that if we hauehave a reſpect vntounto God, it is appointed and decréed, what we ſhal do. For his knowledge is not in vayne called foreknowledge for he hath not an opinion of things ſo that his knowledge can be changed, but hath a certaine and ſure knowledge, or ſcience, and there can be no ſcience vnles as we hauehave ſaid it be certaine and firme. But this determination and certainty of his we both hauehave ſaid and do ſay, inuerteth not the nature of things, neither taketh away liberty from our nature. Which thing is proued by this reaſon. GodMany thinges are poſſible which neuer ſhall be. foreknewe that many thinges are poſſible, which in very déede ſhall neuer be: and although they ſhall neuer be, yet the foreknowledge of God taketh not away from them, but that they are poſſible. Which thing we will declare by an example of the ſcripture. Chriſt when he was taken ſayd, I could hauehave aſked of my father, and he would hauehave geuen me eleuen legions of Angels, which ſhould defend me from theſe ſouldiors. Wherefore Chriſt affirmeth, that it was poſſible for him to aſke, and that vntounto him mought be granted ſo many legions of Angels: which yet was neither done, nor was by any meanes to be done. And yet notwithſtanding God foreknew that it mought hauehave ben done, and although it ſhould neuer come to paſſe, yet was it not letted by foreknowledge, but that it was poſſible. Wherfore as the foreknowledge of God letteth not poſſibility, ſo alſo taketh it not away contingēcy and liberty. This neceſſity of infalliblenes is not only declared and proued by the holy ſcriptures, and by reaſons, as we hauehave now ſhewed, but alſo is acknowledged of the fathers. Origen againſt Celſus in his ſecond booke againſt the argument of Celſus, which he obiected againſt ye Chriſtians, ſaying. Your Chriſt at his laſt ſupper foretold, as ye ſay, that he ſhould be betrayed of one of his diſciples: if he were God as ye contend he was, could he not let the doing thereof? Origen here wondereth, and anſwereth, that this obiection is very ridiculous: for foraſmuch as he foretold that that thing ſhould come to paſſe, if he had letted it, then had he not ſpoken the truth: and therefore he added, that it was of neceſſity, neither could it otherwiſe be, but that that ſhould come to paſſe which was foretold. Howbeit becauſe that this foretelling chaunged not the will of Iudas, therefore is he worthely accuſed, neither ought the blame to be layd vponupon Chriſt which foretold it. Origen in that place acknowledgeth either, namely, the neceſſity of certainty, and that the nature of the will is not letted. Ambroſe alſo when he interpreteth thoſe words of Paul, Iacob hauehave I loued, and Eſau hauehave I hated, referreth the ſentence of the Apoſtle to works foreſéene, and yet addeth, that it could not otherwiſe hauehave come to paſſe, but as God foreſaw that it ſhould come to paſſe. Chriſoſtome alſo expounding that which is written vntounto the Corrinthians, It behoueth that hereſies ſhould be, cōfeſſeth that this neceſſity is a neceſſity of foretelling, which is nothing preiudiciall vntounto the power of our will and choyce. Neither is this neceſſity taken away by certaine places in the ſcriptures which otherwiſe at the firſt ſight ſéeme to put a chaunge of the ſentences of God: as is that of Eſay, when he threatened vntounto Ezechias the king preſent death, which propheſie yet God ſéemed to change, when he prolonged his life fiftene yeares. And vntounto the City of Niniue it was foretold that it ſhould be deſtroyed within forty dayes: which thing yet came not to paſſe. Thoſe things in very dede make nothing againſt the truth before taught: For God foretold vntounto Ezechias, death which was euen at hand according to the cauſes of the diſſeaſe whereof he was then ſicke, and therein was made no lye. ButThe certaintie of ye foreknowledge of god is conſtant, and is not chaunged. as touching foreknowledge, as God foreknew that the king ſhould be in danger of that deadly diſſeaſe, ſo alſo foreknew he that his life ſhould be prolonged fiftene yeares. And as he foreknew that the ſinnes of the Niniuites deſerued preſent deſtruction, ſo alſo foreknew he, that of his mercy he would geue vntounto them, to repent and to be preſerued. By which ſelf rule is to be expounded that place of Ieremy in the 18. chapiter, wherein God ſayth, that he alſo would chaunge his ſentence, or repent him of the plage which he had threatened to any city, nacion, or kingdome, if they would repent. But what ſhall we ſay of Paul, who writeth to the Corrinthians that he chaſtiſed his body, and brought it into bondage, that he might not be made a reprobate. What ment he to chaunge that firme purpoſe of God? Verely Paul ment not, that he was able to inuert the order of the predeſtination or reprobation of God: and therefore he ſayde not, ne & reprobatus efficiar: that is, that I be caſt out as a reprobate, but ne reprobus efficiar: The ſaints worke wel, to the ende to be obediēt vntounto predeſtination. Why Paul chaſtiſed his body. It is a diſhoneſty for a man to geue good monitiōs & to liue wickedly.that is, that I be not a reprobate. For he indeuored himſelfe by all induſtry and diligence to bee obedient vntounto the predeſtination of GOD: for they whiche are predeſtinated vntounto eternall life, labour to mortifye the fleſhe. And he ſayde that he woulde not bee made reprobus, that is, he woulde not bee founde and accuſed to leade his life otherwiſe then he preached: whiche kinde of vice all men diſallowe, deteſt, and condemne. Wherefore in that place was not entreated of the reprobation of GOD, but of that kinde of crime, whiche they are giltye of, whoſoeuer geue good monitions, and in the meane time they themſelues leade theyr life moſt wickedly. Although if a man will néedes referre theſe thinges to the iudgement of God, we might wel graunt the ſame as touching preſent iuſtice or iniuſtice, but not according to firme purpoſe, whereof we at this preſente entreat. Cicero a man otherwiſe full of wit and excellently well learned was excéedingly deceaued in this queſtion, as it is euident by his ſecond booke de Diuinatione: Cicero was deceiued.which thing Auguſtine declareth in his fiueth booke de ciuitate Dei, the 9. & 10. chapters. For he thoughte that it was not poſſible, that the foreknowlege of things to come ſhould not ouerthrow the faculty or power of mans will: therefore he tooke away all manner of prediction or foretelling: whiche opinion how muche repugnant it is vntounto our religion all men vnderſtande, when as it is ſtaide vponupon the oracles of the Prophets, as vponupon ſure foundations. And we read not that God did euer any thing, which was of any waight, but that he firſt reuealed it vntounto theGod reueleth vntounto Prophetes the greate works whiche he will do. Prophets. He ſhewed vntounto Noe the deſtruction that ſhould come by the floud, long time before it came to paſſe. VntoUnto Abraham he forſhewed the burning of Sodoma: And vntounto him he ſignified the oppreſſion and deliuery of his poſterity in: Egipte. And vntounto the ſelfe ſame Prophets in a manner he gaue charge to foretell the captiuity of Babilon, and the returne from thence. He alſo commaunded all the Prophets to foretell the comming of Chriſt. Therfore vntounto vsus ſo conſtant is the autorityThe autoritys of the Prophet is conſtant. of propheſies, that to deny it, is vtterly to ouerthrow all religion. Wherefore Augustine not without iuſt cauſe ſaid, that thoſe men which were called Geneth liaci, which auoutched the fatal neceſſities of the ſtarres, were more tollerable thē Cicero: for they gaue ſome place vntounto God. But if he be denied to foreknow thingsIf God be denied to know thinges to come thē i… he de…d to b…e God. No…e this that i… ſpoken of Cicero. to come, therby alſo is he denied to be God. Dauid ſaith, the foliſh mā ſaid in his hart There is no God. Which ſaying of the wicked he hereby proueth, for that they whē they commit wicked facts, thinke that God ſéeth them not, and that he will neuer puniſh them. And Cicero hath geuē vsus occaſion to ſuſpect, y• he was after a ſorte enfected with this impiety, for that in his booke de Natura Deorum, he bringeth in Cotta, and the high prieſt thus reaſoning together, that Cotta deſired much that he mought hauehave vndoubtedly proued vntounto him that there are gods. Howbeit becauſe he ſaw that it was a thing odious, hatefull, and in a maner infamous to deny that there is a God: therfore towards the end of the booke, he gaue ſentence on Balbus ſide, who defended that there are Gods: but yet he ſo gaue ſentence, that he ſaid vntounto Ʋelleius, that the opinion of Cotta ſéemed vntounto him more likely. Verely a Godly man, and one confirmed in religion, woulde neuer ſay that that ſentence is likely to be true, wherein the diuinity is called into doubt. But theſe are the cogitations or reaſoninges of our reaſon whereof Paul aboundauntly wrote in the firſt chap. But afterward Cicero himſelf in his booke de diuinatione vnderunder his owne perſon taketh away frō God ye foreknowledge of things to come, and maketh anſwer to Quintus his brother, who had in ye whole courſe of the firſt booke confirmed oracles and Propheſies. But why denied he foreknowledge? was he driuē vntounto it therfore for that he ſaw that he muſt néedes graunt an order of cauſes and of effectes whichWhy Cicero denied the forknowledge of Go…: ſhould be vnmoueable and conſtante for otherwiſe thinges to come coulde not be foretolde. Now if ſuche an order ſhoulde be graunted, he ſuppoſeth that nothing ſhould remaine in our hande and power. But as in God there is to be put a moſte ſingular wil ioyned with a moſt ſinguler power, ſo alſo vntounto him is to be attributed the knowledge of all thinges: yet let vsus not therefore be afearde, but that we do thoſe thinges whiche we do, by our owne will and choyſe. The Stoikes which did appointe fate or deſteny, ſéeme alſo to hauehave bene ſomewhat moued with Ciceroes How the Stoikes diſcharged the will of mā frō fate.reaſon, for they did place the motions of the will of man not to be vnderunder fate or the connexion of cauſes, Not that they vtterly made frée the wil of man, but only they affirmed that in it lay, by the choyce thereof to meddle or not to meddle with ſome things: which if they meddled with ſtraight way they were wrapped into the neceſſity of fate. By an example the thing may be made more plaine. They ſay that it was in the power of Oedipus to hauehave fellowſhippe with a woman, or to temperAn example of Oedipus himſelfe therefro. But if he once ſhould hauehave felowſhip wt her it could not be auoyded, but that he ſhould committe inceſt, of which inceſte ſhoulde be borne children, which ſhould pollute themſelues with murthering one the other, and ſhould ouer throw theyr fathers kingdome. The auncienter Philoſophers, as Democritus▪ and Empedocles, affirmed that the will alſo is ſubiect vntounto fate, or vntounto the connexion of cauſes. But Chriſippus the Stoike hereunto rather inclined, to excepte the will of man, as Oenomaris Cynicus (as Euſebius Caeſarienſis de Preparatione Euangelica▪ citeth him) ſaith, that Democritus made men bondmen, and Chriſippus halfe bondmen. But leuing theſe, let vsus returne vntounto Cicero who ſaid, If there be foreknowledge, then thinges ſhould in ſuch ſort come to paſſe, as they were foreknown, neither can the euent foreſéene be auoyded: ſo that then the liberty of men is vtterly takē away. Lawes thē are in vaine, admonitions are in vayne, rewards, puniſhmēts, and ſuch like things are in vaine: wherfore he ſetteth forth a choyce, that a man ſhould chuſe, whether he would rather admitte foreknowledge, or liberty of the will, for that they could not conſiſt both together, as farre as he iudged. And becauſe he was man hauing to do in ciuill matters, and delt in lawes & iudgemēts, he rather reiected the foreknowledge of God, then he would looſe the liberty of the will of man. Wherefore Auguſtine ſayth of him, Thoſe which will be free he maketh ſacrilegious perſons, ſo that to defend their liberty they ſpoyle God of his foreknowledge. Ciceroes reaſon was, If the wil be frée, there can not be a certaine and ſure connexion of cauſes: for if it were certaine, it could not be broken of our will, and if there be no certaine connexion, then can there be put no foreknowledge: and therfore he affirmed that God alſo foreknoweth not what thinges ſhall come to paſſe, for if he ſhould foreknow them, then ſhould there be a certaine and firme order of cauſes, which being graunted, there ſhoulde bee nothing remayning in the power of our will. But we ought to hold either of theſe ſentences: for of the one we hauehave by ſence experience. For eueryevery man may conſider in himſelfe, how he woorketh by counſels and deliberation, and electeth that whiche pleaſeth him. But the other, that is, the foreknowledge of God, we hold by faith, whiche knowledge is of no lesThe elections & counſels of man are not againſt the prouidēce of of God. The wil of man is placed in the order of cauſes. God by his foreknowledge changeth not the nature of cauſes. Fortune & chaunce are referred vntounto vsus & not vntounto God. force, then the apprehenſion both of ſence and of reaſon. Wherefore we deny vntounto Cicero this conſequence. There is a certaine and conſtante order of cauſes whiche God foreknew, therfore there is nothing in our will. And we therfore deny the argument, for that our will alſo is to be placed amongſt the cauſes of thinges, yea it hath not amongſt them the vnworthieſt place. Wherefore euen as God can foreknow, what ſhall come to paſſe of other cauſes, in like ſort is he able plainely to ſée what our willes wil elect. And as in foreſéeing other cauſes and theyr effectes he in no wiſe deſtroyeth nor chaungeth the natures of them: ſo alſo leaueth he in their ful ſtate the willes of men. This alſo moued Cicero that then nothing ſhould come by chaunce: But foraſmuch as very many thinges happen by chaunce and fortune it is manifeſt that there cannot be a certaine or ſure order of cauſes, neither alſo any foreknowledge. In this ſort reaſoned he. But we aunſwere, that thoſe thinges which are ſaid to come by chance, ar ſo called things cōming by chance, as they are referred to our vnderſtanding, whiche foraſmuch as it is weake, by reaſon of the dulnes therof ſeeth not the courſe or connexion of cauſes: but if their be cō pared vntounto the mind of God from which nothing is hidden, they can not be ſaid to come by chance or raſhely. The infirmity of the mind of man is that it maketh fortune or chance to be, with thing we wil declare by an example. If a maiſter ſhould ſende his ſeruaunt to the market, and commaunde him to be there by ſixe of the clocke, and ſhould alſo commaund his Baliue apart to doo the ſelf ſame thing, doubtles both the Baliue and the ſeruaunt ſhould mete together, which to either of them ſhould come by chaunce, for that they knew not of their maiſters commaundement: but the maiſter he ſelfe who knoweth the matter, will not iudge this to come by chance: which thing hereby alſo may be made more plaine. Suppoſe that I knewe that there were treaſure hidden in a place, and I ſhould commaund one to digge in that place, when he ſhould find the treaſure, he would cry good fortune, but I which knew the matter would attribute nothing vntounto fortune. So God foraſmuch as he knoweth the courſe and connexion of all cauſes neuer aſcribeth any thing to fortune. Wherefore let vsus put all thinges to be ſubiect vntounto the purpoſe of God, and amongeſt all other thinges our wils, alſo which we affirme hauehave that power which God willed, who tempereth the natures of all thinges. There is a certayne cauſe, as ſayth Auguſtine, which ſo worketh, that it is by no meanes wrought, and ſuche a cauſe is God. And there is an other cauſe which ſo worketh, that it alſo is wrought of an other, of which kinde is our will, which ſo willeth and worketh, in that that it alſo is wrought of God. Wherefore we ought neyther to aſſent vntounto Cicero, nor to the Stoikes, for as we ought to withdraw nothing fromOur wils are not free frō the foreknowledge of God. Note a ſa… ing of Auſtine. the foreknowledge of God, ſo leſt of all are our willes to be exempted from it: for they pertayne to y• better part of the world. For what ſhould he hauehave a care of, or what ſhould he foreknow, if he ſhould neglect men? Our willes (as ſayth) Augustine, are able to doo ſo much, as God would and foreknew they ſhould be able to doo: and therefore whatſoeuer they are able to doo, they moſt certaynly are able to doo, and whatſoeuer they ſhall doo, they ſhall without all doubt doo, for that he whoſe foreknowledge can not be deceaued foreknew that they ſhould be both able and alſo do it. And in y• Neceſſity of two ſortes.10. chap. of the fifth booke before cited, he deuideth, as we alſo did, a neceſſity in to two parts: one whereby we are compelled to ſuffer thoſe thinges whiche we would not, as is the neceſſity of death, wherunto will we or nill we, we muſt g…ue place. The other neceſſity he ſayth is that, according to which any thing is ſayd to be neceſſary, that is, ſhall vndoubtedly come to paſſe. And touching this there is no nede that we ſhould be aferd concerning our will, for by it the will is not diminiſhed, the firſt indede is repugnant vntounto it, for it is not poſſibleNot eueryevery neceſſitie h…tteth the will. that it ſhould will anye thing vnwillinglye. But this latter is nothing at all agaynſt the nature of the will. The life and foreknowledg of God, although they are neceſſarily attributed vntounto him, yet they nothing hurt his nature nor will: He can not neyther be deceaued nor dy, and yet ſuffreth he not any thing which he willeth not. So alſo we ſay y• when we will any thing, by will we neceſſarily wil it, and yet do we not thinke that hereby our choyce is violated. And how theWhat thinges wicked men wiſhe for in this queſtion. foreknowledge of God hurteth not our will, Auguſtine in his 3. booke de libero arbitrio in the 2. and 3. chapiters very well declareth. And firſt he ſayth, that by this queſtion are excedingly ſet a worke a greate many wicked men, which eyther would, that if the will be free, God had no prouidence nor care of thinges pertayning to men, that they might with the more licentiouſnes geue thēſelues vntounto luſtes, in denying the iudgments both of God and of man, and to the vtter moſt of theyr power auodyng them: or if it can not be auoyded, but that it muſt nedes be graunted that God prouideth and vnderſtandeth the things which are done of vsus, yet at the leaſt they would obteyne this, that his prouidence ſhould ſo compell the willes of men, that they may be excuſed from blame of theyr wicked factes. But how theſe mens deuiſes are deceaued he eaſely declareth in ſetting forth, how the forknowledge of God may ſtand with will, and that a free will. He demaundeth of him with whome he reaſoneth, whither he knew that he ſhould hauehave to morrow a wil vpright or corrupt? He maketh aunſwere that he could not tel. Doost thou thinke, ſayth Auguſtine, that God knoweth thys? The other confeſſeth, that he thinketh that God knoweth this▪ Wherefore ſayth Auguſtine: foraſmuch as God foreknoweth this, he alſo foreknoweth, what he will do… with thee, that is, whither he will glorifie thee at the end of thy life: and if he foreknowe and can not be deceaued, then of neceſſity will he glorifie thee. But in the meane time tell thou me? Shalt thou be glorified agaynſt thy will, or with thy will. Verely (ſayth he) n…ot agaynſt my will, for I moſt earneſtly deſire the ſame. And hereby is concluded, that that which God wil of neceſſity do in vsus, hindreth not the wil. He ſheweth alſo that this ſhal be more plaine, if we cōſider of foreknowledge as though it were ours, Suppoſe that I foreknowe that a certayne man ſhal come vntounto me to morrow, ſhal this my foreknowledge take away from him wil, but that if heOur memory cōpelleth not thinges paſt to be paſt▪ come, he commeth thorough his owne election? Doubtles we can not ſo ſay: for he willingly commeth, neyther ſhal my foreknowledge diminiſh any thing of his liberty. And as our memory compelleth not thinges paſt to be paſt, ſo foreknowledge compelleth not thoſe thinges which ſhall come to paſſe to come to paſſe. This thing alſo may an other way be declared. If a mā ſhould ſe Plato diſputing with Socrates, or the Sunne or Moone to be eclipſed, the ſight of the beholder cauſeth not that they which diſpute together, ſhould of neceſſity or agaynſt theyr willes diſpute together, neyther alſo cauſeth it that the Sunne or Moone ſhould be eclipſed by chance, when as thoſe eclipſes of the heauenly lights hauehave theyr neceſſary cauſes. Wherefore he which ſeeth both, maketh not by his ſight that which is contingent, neceſſary, neyther maketh he that which is neceſſary, contingent. Neyther ought we to imagine that the foreknowledge of God obteyneth his certaynty of the neceſſity of thinges, for ſo greate is the perſpicuity of the minde of God, that it can alſo moſt certaynly vnderſtand thinges contingent. Neyther is thys reaſon any thing hindred by that which we before oftē admoniſhed, namely, that the foreknowledge of God hath alwayes will ioyned with it, when as nothing can be foreknowen of God to be, which he him ſelfe will not to be. But yet this will, wherby God worketh all in all, applieth it ſelfeHow the wil of God bringeth not neceſſitie to thinges. to the natures of thinges. For in meate it noriſheth, in the Sunne it ſhineth, in the vine it bringeth forth wine, and in the will of men it cauſeth, that they of theyr owne accord and freely wil thoſe thinges which they wil. Paul as we rede in the Actes, cited that ſentence of Aratus, In him we liue, are moued, and hauehave our being. Whereof it followeth, that the wil of man, hath his motions of God. But if a mā wil ſay, that it receaueth of God ſuch motions, as it ſelfe before willeth, then ſhal he ſpeake things abſurd: for thē ſhould our wil meaſure and gouerne the influences of God, which thing is far from the truth. But rather let vsus ſayThe wil receueth ſuch motions of God as he will. Second cauſes may be doubtfull, whē yet the will of God is certaine. that it receaueth of God ſuch impulſions and motions as he will geue. And let vsus in y• meane time marke, that God ſo worketh in our will, that it gladly, willingly, and of his owne accord receaueth the motions which God putteth into vsus. But how it commeth ſo paſſe, that God moſte certainly foreſeeth thinges to come, when yet the willes of men, and many naturall cauſes are doubtfull, and worke contingently, it may thus be declared. It is true in dede, that thoſe which conſider thinges onelyonly in theyr cauſes, are oftentymes deceaued, for that all cauſes doo not neceſſarilye produce theyr effectes: for ſometimes they are letted, and enclyne an other way then they were ſuppoſed. Wherefore men are not deceaued, when they now behold the effect brought forth: but they are deceaued when they iudge of effectes lying hid in their cauſes. But the foreknowledge of God not only knoweth what thinges ſhall come to paſſe in their cauſes, but alſo thorowly ſeeth thē, as if they were alredy brought forth, and of their cauſes made perfect: and hereof it commeth that we may of the foreknowledge of God infer neceſſity of certainety and of infalliblenes, and ſo can we not do of the ſecond and nieſt cauſe. For when we ſay, that God foreknew that this or that thing ſhal come to paſſe to morrow, we wel conclude,All thinges are neceſſary whileſt they are. y• therefore it ſhal of neceſſity be. Neceſſity is not applied vntounto a thing known, but as it is foreknowē of God as preſent and alcedy brought forth, which maketh not onelyonly to perſpicuity, but alſo to neceſſity. For eueryevery thing whileſt it is, is of neceſſity, neither muſt we afterward graunt, that y• thing is of neceſſity, for that it is not taken in ſuch ſort as it was foreknowen of God. HethertoWe do not defend free will. hauehave we defended the power of mans will, whiche yet we wil not ſhould be taken vniuerſally, but only as touching foreknowledge and predeſtination. For although therby (as it is proued) be not letted free wil, yet doth not it otherwiſe want impedimēts or lettes. For we are borne in ſins, & wil we or nil we, we are wrapped in original ſin, neither can we by any meanes wynd our ſelues out of ſinne. And before regeneratiō what maner of power ſo euer we geue vntounto the will of man in thinges indifferent & ciuil, this firſt we ought to thinke, y• which way ſoeuer it do turne it ſelfe, it of neceſſity ſinneth, neither cā it do any thing which is in very dede acceptable vntounto God, neither alſo can it geue vntounto ciuill works y• ſucceſſe which it purpoſeth. Wherfore Augustine worthely wrote in his Enchi…idion, that the firſt man in ſinning, loſt the liberty of choyſe or will. This moreouer is to be conſidered that the wils, motions of the mind, & actions euen of men not yet regenerated, are directed of God, and ſo directed, that by his prouidence they are brought vntounto the ende by him prefixed and determined. Yea alſo when we are regenerated, althoughe after a ſort we obteyne liberty thorough Chriſt, yet is not it full, but only begonne. For the firſt motions whiche ſtirre vp vntounto ſinne, crepe vponupon vsus agaynſt our willes: whiche motions to be ſinnes, we hauehave in the ſeuenth chapter proued. And Ambroſe plainly confeſſeth, that our hartes are not in our owne power, neyther is there any of the beleuers, which continually falleth not, when yet he would ſtand. Wherefore we ought all to pray, Forgeue vsus our treſpaſſes. And vntounto the Galathians Paul ſayd, The ſpirite fighteth againſt the fleſhe, and the fleſhe agaynst the ſpirite, ſo that ye do not thoſe thinges which ye would. And in his epiſtle as we hauehave heard it is written: The euill that I hate, that I do, agayne, I feele an other law in my members ſtriuing with the law of my mind, & leading me away captiue into the law of ſinne. Which wordes can not be vnderſtanded but only of a man regenerated. For he had ſayd, In minde I ſerue the lawe of God, but in fleſh the lawe of ſinne, which in no wiſe can be referred to a man not yet iuſtified. We graunt in deede, that God coulde if heGod coulde kepe vsus frō all maner of ſinne but he doth not. would geue vntounto men ſo much ayde that they ſhould not ſinne at all: but that hetherto hath he not done, neyther hath he promiſed that euer he will do it. Wherfore our will is ſubiect yet vntounto ſome ſeruitude which as we deſire to remayne certayne and vndoubted, ſo on the other ſyde we affirme, that by the foreknowledge and predeſtination of God the will is not letted.
We hauehave hetherto in this third article ſene, what neceſſity commeth of the foreknowledge and predeſtination of God, namely, ſuch a neceſſity which is not abſolute, but by ſuppoſition, which we call neceſſity of conſequence, of infalliblenes, and of certainty, but not of coactiō. And ſeing that it is ſo, it is now euident, that no iniuſtice is committed of God, when he condemneth ſinners, and glorifieth the iuſt. For vntounto eueryevery man is rendred according to his works: ſo that no man can ſay that his ſinnes are not his owne workes, when as he is not compelled to committe them, but excedingly alloweth them and willeth them. Neither are lawes, admonitions, promiſes, and puniſhements in vaine,Monitiōs, lawes, and puniſhmēts are not in vayne. as it was obiected: for they are ſo much of force as God hath decreed they ſhall be of force, as Auguſtine writeth in his fifth booke de Ciuitate Dei, in the chapter before cited. For Gods will is to vſe them to the ſaluatiō of many: and though they profite not ſome, yet they want not theyr end, for they conduce to the condemnation of the wicked. Prayers alſo are not made vnprofitable, for by themPrayers a… not vayne. Sinnes are not excuſed by the predeſtination and counſel of God. An example we obteyne thoſe thinges which God hath decreed to geue vntounto vsus by them. Wherfore this is an excellent ſaying of Gregory in his dialogues: That by prayers can not be obteyned but thoſe thinges onelyonly which God hath predeſtinated to geue. And howe by predeſtination, or foreknowledge, or predictions ſinnes are not excuſed, we are taughte by very many teſtimonies of the holye ſcriptures. Chriſt foretold that Iudas ſhould betray him: verilye that foretelling neyther tooke away from Iudas his wickednes, nor alſo powred it into him. He followed the entiſementes of couetouſnes: he betrayed not the Lord to the end to fullfill his propheſy. Chriſt alſo was by the will of God ſlayne. For he ſayd in the garden: Let this cup paſse away from me if it be poſsible, but not my will be done but thine, And touching himſelf he foretold: I will geue my life for my ſhepe. Yea Herode and Pilate are in the Actes of the Apoſtles ſayd to hauehave ioyned together, to doo thoſe thinges which the counſell of God had decreed. Are by reaſon of thys eyther the Iewes or thoſe princes to be acquited from ſinne, when as they condemned and ſlew an innocent man? Who will ſay ſo? Can any man alſo diſcharge of villany the brethern of Ioſeph, whē they ſold theyr brother, although God would that by that meanes Ioſeph ſhould come into Egipt? Neyther ſhall the cruelty of the king of Babilon be excuſed, although the iuſtice of God decreed to hauehave the Iewes in ſuch ſorte puniſhed. He which is killed, is ſayd to be of him deliuered into the hande of his enemy. And God is alſo ſayd to deliuer a city, when it is wonne by aſſault. And Iob ſaid that thoſe thinges, which were by violence and theft taken away from him by the Caldeans and Sabeans, were taken away by God. The Lord (ſayth he) gaue, & the Lord hath taken away. Wherefore of that counſell of God, whereby he vſeth ſinnes to theyr appointed endes, can not be inferred any iuſt excuſes of ſinnes. For wicked workes are iudged and cōdemned, bycauſe of the vitiate and corrupt harte from whence they are deriued. Wherefore let no man be offended with the doctrine of predeſtination, when as rather by it we are led to acknowledge the benefites of God, and to geue thankes vntounto him only. Let vsus alſo learne not to attribute more vntounto our owne ſtrengths then we ought: let vsus hauehave alſo an aſſured perſuaſion of the good will of God towardes vsus, whereby he would elect his before the foundacions of the world were layd: let vsus moreouer be confirmed in aduerſities, knowing aſſuredly that whatſoeuer calamity happeneth, it is done by the counſell and will of God, and that it ſhall at the length by the gouernment of predeſtination turne vsus to good, and to eternall ſaluation.