Common Places, Part 2 · Chapter 13 · Section 10
VVhether faith muſt be kept toward him that breaketh his promiſe.
42 In the beginning of the ninth chapter of the ſecond booke of Samuel, Dauid demandeth; Whether it were lawfull to doo good for Ionathans ſake.Is there anie man left aliue of the familie of Saule, to whom I may doo good for Ionathans ſake? When he ſpeaketh of Ionathan, he excludeth not God; naie rather, that which he did for Ionathans ſake, he did chéefelie for God and godlineſſe ſake. So God ſaith, that he would doo well to the people of the Iews, for the couenant which he had made with Abraham; yet dooth he not exclude his owne goodneſſe. Naie rather, he chéefelie includeth the ſame therein; ſéeing that couenant procéeded of the méere goodneſſe and merciemercy of God. But thou wilt demand, whie Dauid ſaith that he will doo good vntounto anie of the houſe of Saule, for Ionathans ſake; and not for Saules owne ſake. For in the 24. chapter of the firſt booke of Samuel, what time as he had cut off the ſkirt of Saules cloke, verſe. 22, and 23,he being inforced by Saule to ſweare, promiſed, that he would not root out his ſéed. Whereby he was bound, not onelie vntounto Ionathan, but alſo vntounto Saule. Some anſwer, that Dauid was now diſcharged of his oth; bicauſe Saule kept not promiſe with him, but had doone him excéeding great wrong. For he that breaketh his faith (ſaie they) let faith be broken with him. And Cicero, in his third booke of Offices, citeth a verſe out of Accius an old Poet; Haſt thou broken thy faith? Atreus, whom he bringeth in to ſpeake, anſwereth; Neither hauehave I giuen neither doo I giuegive my faith to anie faithleſſe perſon.
But this is no ſure rule at all times. For if one be wicked, and falſe of promiſe: yet oughteſt not thou for that cauſe to ſhrinke from thy promiſes; ſéeing God dooth oftentimes kéepe promiſe euen with vsus that doo euill. He promiſed, that he would continue the kingdome, or elſe ſome great honour in the familie of Dauid, euen vntounto Meſſias. He promiſed that he would giuegive a ſonne which ſhould redéeme mankind. Men vndoubtedlie were euill, vnfaithfull, and vnworthie to hauehave the promiſes kept with them: yet did he performe theſe things to them, according to his excellent faithfulnes. Some anſwer on this wiſe, that faith in déed muſt be kept with an euill and vnfaithfull man, if he be vnfaithfull towards other, ſo he be no ſuch towards vsus; or elſe, if he doo hurt vsus, ſo it be not in the ſelfe ſame thing, wherein it was agréed vponupon betwéene vsus. Naie rather, if he faile euen in the verie ſame thing which is agréed vponupon, yet muſt we kéepe promiſe: if by that meanes, neither his naughtineſſe be increaſed; nor a greater power to doo hurt be giuen vntounto him. We be therefore looſed of our promiſe, if the thing cannot be, which we hauehave promiſed; or elſe, if it ſhould fall out ill vntounto himſelfe, to whom the promiſe is made: as if thou deliuer a ſword vntounto a furious man, which thou didſt promiſe vntounto a man of ſobrietie; or if he wax woorſe and woorſe, as though, through thy patience, he meaneth to reape a benefit of his vnfaithfulneſſe: or elſe, if thou ſhalt promiſe ſuch a thing, as is againſt the word of God, or the profit of the Church or Common-weale. Therfore it is written in the 22. cauſe, queſtion ſecond; In euill promiſes breake thy faith.
But moſt of all, we be at libertie of our promiſe, if we being circumuented by anie fraud, hauehave promiſed anie thing that we ought not to hauehave doone; or elſe, if the things themſelues be now changed. Some hauehave added; If thou being compelled either by force or feare, dooeſt promiſe anie thing that thou wouldeſt not. But it can ſcarſelie be perceiued, how ſo great a feare and compulſion can happen vntounto a couragious and good man, that he ſhould promiſe that, which might be againſt either his dutie, or the word of God. Howbeit, if a man be fallen in ſuch wiſe, he is at libertie. But aboue all, we muſt take héed, that we doo not craftilie colour our promiſes, and ſéeke by fraud and counterfet meanes to vnwind our ſelues out: ſéeing fraud (as Cicero verie rightlie ſaid) dooth not vndoo periurie, but it tieth it faſt. Dauid, when as perhaps he might hauehave inuented manie things to breake his promiſes; yet would he doo no ſuch thing. For being a godlie prince, he was rather minded to followe truth and faithfulneſſe.
43 Certeinlie, the nature and conſideration of theſe two vertues; [namelie, truth and faith] is both alike, yet is it not altogither the ſelfe-ſame: wherein they doo agree, and how they differ, I will in few words declare. Wherein truth and faith do… differ.Truth is a vertue, whereby we are readie to ſpeake thoſe things, which the meanings and cogitations of our mind doo expreſſe: for hereby, bicauſe we ſpeake thoſe things which we thinke, are we called faithfull and true of our word. And faith is a vertue, whereby is brought to paſſe, that our déeds be anſwerable to our promiſes. There is ſome conformitie on both parts. In truth there is a conformitie of words with the meaning of the mind, and in faith a conformitie of déeds with promiſes. So as lieng is contrarie vntounto truth, and falſehood vntounto faith. For Cicero thinketh; that Faith is ſo called, bicauſe that is doone which is ſpoken. And he defined the ſame after a ſort on this maner; A definition of faith.Faith is a conſtancie of words and of couenants. In another place he ſaith, that Faith is the truth of a mans word.
But thus the definition will be more full; Faith is a good habit, according to right reaſon, whereby we are readie to doo thoſe things that we hauehave promiſed. This definition (as I hauehave ſaid) is more perfect, and it conſiſteth of a generall word, and of a difference. For faith apperteineth vntounto iuſtice, and it cauſeth vsus to yéeld vntounto euerie man, that which perteineth to him; ſéeing what thou ſhalt promiſe to anie man, that is now become his, to whom thou haſt promiſed. And the ſame vnleſſe thou performe in time, thou withholdeſt that, which is another mans. And ſo great is the force of faith, as it comprehendeth in one all the parts of mans life: bicauſe neither matrimonie, neither the bargains which citizens hauehave among themſelues, neither anie part of the Common-weale can conſiſt without faith. It differeth (as I ſaid) from truth, although with the ſame it hath manie things that be like. The matter of truth is infinite: for all things that we ſpeake, are either true or falſe; whether they be paſt, whether they be preſent, or whether they be to come. But faith hath to doo onelie in promiſes: neuertheleſſe, thoſe promiſes muſt be of the thing that is good; and not of that, which is euill, or a hinderance to good: otherwiſe they ought not to be firme.
Wherefore, faith ſhould hauehave the verie ſame companions ioined therewith, that an oth hath; namelie, truth, righteouſneſſe, and iudgement. So as he, that breaketh his prom…ſe, dooth not onelie ſinne in ſo dooing; but he muſt alſo make amends for the hinderance, which through his vnfaithfulneſſe the other partie receiueth, to whom the promiſe is made. Dauid, being ſingularlie adorned with theſe vertues, would not depart from the promiſes. For he made the promiſe of his owne accord, being not forced thereto by anie feare or violence: and that, which he promiſed, was neither repugnant to the word of God, nor yet hurtfull to the Common-weale. For is was a matter of good example, that ſo notable a king did fulfill his promiſe: neither was there anie danger, leaſt they, to whom he had promiſed, ſhould become the woorſe by his promiſe: for they were alreadie dead. Wherefore, there was no cauſe, why he ſhould ſhrinke from it. And bicauſe he would performe his promiſe vntounto Saule, therefore he demanded, whether anie of his familie were remaining, whom he might doo good vntounto. But he ſpeaketh of Ionathan by name, bicauſe he was bound vntounto him; not onelie by the bond of promiſe, but alſo of fréendſhip, and moſt néere acquaintance. Vndoubtedlie, he that faileth of his faith, is vnwoorthie to hauehave faith kept with him. Howbeit, we muſt hauehave a ſpeciall regard vntounto theſe circumſtances; leaſt for the naughtineſſe of another, we alſo ſhould become naught our ſelues, and ſéeke corners for periurie.