Common Places, Part 1 · Chapter 7
The ſeuenth Chapter. Whether yong and incontinent men, and finallie anie other ſort are to be excluded from hearing of the word of God.
IT ſhould ſéeme that Ariſtotle may for iuſt cauſe be blamed, when he wold exclude a yoong man frō hearing of morall philoſophie: for thus he ſaith; He will heare in vaine, & without fruit, bicauſe he hath not experience: and that although he hauehave his right reaſon, yet is he ouercome with luſts and affections, and ſo ouercome, as he cannot doo thoſe things that he would: and therfore (he ſaith) that as his reaſon is ouercome, ſo is this learning vnderſtood of him ouercome, & that ſince he is not able to produce the ſame into act, his labor in hearing will be fruſtrate. Howbeit hereof is gathered an argument of the contrarie, to wit; that they by this facultie are verie greatlie holpen, which doo ſuffer their affections to be ruled by reaſon. Againe, it belongeth to thoſe that be perfect men, to ſubdue the affections of their mind to reaſon: and yoong and incontinent men, which hauehave moſt néed of amendement, are not iudged méet for theſe things. Theſe being plucked awaie from hearing, there will be no kind of men left, vntounto whom theſe things will bring anie commoditie. Whervpon Ariſtotle ſhall hardlie auoid it, but that this will become ſuperfluous. Euſtratius anſwereth, that there be ſome men, and thoſe not a few, which are lead onlie by cuſtome to become good; but they cannot procéed therein by an order and waie preſcribed, ſéeing they are deſtitute of infallible rules, which when they hauehave afterward procured to themſelues by this doctrine, they are moſt of all eſtabliſhed in iuſt and honeſt actions, not being now anie more led by cuſtoms, but throughlie perſuaded by a full aſſurance of their mind. And there be ſome, which of a certeine naturall inclination doo flie from wickednes, and deſire goodnes; but how thoſe things doo differ one from another, or by what meanes they may, of the good things, which without doubt are manifold, followe the better, they are ignorant by themſelues: neither is there anie doubt, but that they which be ſo framed, may thereby obteine great helpes. That incontinent men may receiue fruit by hearing of good doctrine.And therefore we are not to thinke that the incontinent, and they which be ſubiect to their affections, ſhall (as we hauehave heard of Ariſtotle) be altogither vnprofitable hearers: for vnleſſe they be wholie without ſenſe, they, when theſe things are ſet before them, will at the leaſtwiſe knowe, whither they are brought by their luſts, and wil perceiue how far off they are now diſtant from the right courſe: & it cannot poſſiblie be, but that ſome maner of waie they will be ſtirred vp vntounto better things; wherevpon they may by little and little both be healed and reape commoditie; as we read that it happened at Athens to the moſt deſperate yoong man Polemon, That yoong men may be profitable hearers.when he had heard Xenocrates diſpute manie things of temperance.
Wherfore theſe things which are here ſpoken, muſt not be vnderſtood without exception. For ſometime there be yoong men ſo framed by nature, and ſo amended onlie by diſcipline and education, that euen by this kind of learning they are able to profit much, as touching outward iuſtice and ciuill conuerſation, which I thinke dooth moſt take place in them, which being inſtructed from their youth in the chriſtian faith, doo imbrace godlines from their hart. And this, A praiſe of Edward the ſixt, king of England.by a moſt manifeſt example did Edward the ſixt, king of England, teſtifie, who without doubt being a yoong man, was euen in his firſt age moſt prompt to the exerciſe of all vertue. The verie which thing alſo will happen to you, if yée folowe the doctrine of the goſpell with that indeuour which you hauehave begun. Wherefore Ariſtotle ment not to exclude all yong men vniuerſallie; but this did he moſt regard, to put awaie the obiections which might hurt the woorthines or eſtimation of this facultie. And this he did, leaſt if thou ſhalt ſée yoong men trained vp in learning to becom at anie time nothing the better, thou ſhouldeſt aſcribe that vntounto the fault of this facultie, as though it were of no eſtimation, and ſerued to no vſe: wherefore he laieth the fault in the want of age, bicauſe it is deſtitute of experience, and is troobled with perturbations of the mind. Theſe, he ſaith, be the impediments, for which the procéedings of doctrine and approoued fruits of the ſame hauehave no good ſucceſſe. And neither was Ariſtotle alone of this mind, but Pindarus alſo, who ſaith; foreign, that is, For light wits or yoong heads want experience: and Homer, foreign, that is to ſaie, For yoong folke are alwaies raſh & vnſtaid. Moreouer Horace, pronounceth thus of a yoong man, that,
Youth vntounto vice, like waxe is ſoone applide,
And fierce to thoſe that warning them doo chide.
And how wanton they commonlie are, & kindled in their affections, the Comedie giueth a moſt euident teſtimonie. Alſo the hiſtories doo declare, how Cicero was deceiued in Octauius; and how little, Ariſtotle himſelfe could bring to paſſe towards the reformation of maners in his ſcholer Alexander of Macedonia, who being alwaies inflamed with excéeding great ambition, did moſt inſolentlie beare himſelf in proſperous fortune, moſt fooliſhlie deſired to be a god, and ſo gaue himſelfe to wine, as being droonke he ſ…ue his moſt louing friend, and at the deſire of an harlot burned the moſt noble, populous, & large citie Perſepolis, which was the head citie of the kingdome, in ſuch ſort as it was vtterlie extinct. The like things dooth Plato in his dialog Gorgias ſpeake, when he ſaid, that There be two paſſages, whereby good ſtudies doo flowe out of our minds; namelie Obliuion, and Incredulitie: for by Obliuion is taken awaie the ſkill, and experience which are gathered in the memorie; and by the other, to wit Incredulitie, it coms to paſſe, that we giuegive no credit to thoſe that admoniſh vsus. But yoong men doo ſoone forget thoſe things that they hauehave once or twiſe ſéene and had experience of: wherefore they hardlie get to themſelues generall ſentences and rules. For we cannot obteine thoſe, but by long and continuall obſeruation, which yoong men cannot gather by a ſhort time of their life, neither doo they willinglie giuegive credit to thoſe that admoniſh them, bicauſe they are carried awaie by the blind ſwaie of their affections.
2 And ſaie not vntounto me that yoong men doo proteſt, and hauehave in their mouth, How yoong men behaue themſelues in hearing of doctrine.and doo kéepe in memorie ſpeciall and honeſt ſentences of philoſophie: for although they ſpeake manie things trulie, yet doo they not thinke as they ſpeake; and ſometime they perceiue & are mooued with thoſe things that be vttered, not much better than Iaies doo vnderſtand mens wordes, which they are wont to prattle; yea & drunken and intemperate men doo oftentimes iangle and tell a faire tale, where neuertheleſſe, either they iudge the contrarie, or elſe they cannot tell what they ſpeake: and bréefelie, their ſpeach is not according to their mind, but they hauehave one thing in their mind, and another in their hart: which is then moſt of all perceiued, when they get libertie, & hauehave a full fréedome of their choiſe. Then albeit they were firſt modeſt & chaſt, they bewraie their mind that lurked, and their nature that laie hidden. Who was a more commendable prince than Nero himſelfe, in the firſt yéere (of his reigne) while he was yet gouerned by the direction of Seneca? Of whō was there greater hope than of Cōmodus, who as he was of an excellent wit from his youth, ſo afterward he became a monſtrous beaſt? And doo we not remember Ioas in the holie hiſtorie, which gouerned himſelfe rightlie in the beginning of his dominion, ſo long as he gouerned by the counſels of Iohiada the faithfull high préeſt; whoſe authoritie when he afterward deſpiſed, he became ſtraitwaie corrupt, and by the libertie which he claimed to himſelfe made manifeſt the ſhameful deſires of his mind? But yet for all theſe reaſons were neuer our forefathers lead, Yong mens faults muſt be no cauſe to keepe them from hearing holſome doctrine.nor at this daie are wiſe men lead; but that they bring their children, when they become to yoong mens ſtate, vntounto philoſophers to be inſtructed by their learning and wiſedome. They ſend them alſo vntounto lawiers, that they may vnderſtand thoſe things which be iuſt and honeſt. And all this we learne out of Platos Axioms, and out of the philoſophers liues, and we alſo obſerue the cuſtome of our times. Which was therefore ſo doone in old time, and is alſo doone at this daie; for thoſe words which Ariſtotle here writeth of, hauehave not that ſenſe, as though yoong men by this philoſophie ſhall receiue no profit; but bicauſe they are not able to procéed ſo well forward as they can iudge in their mind what is here, & foorthwith to direct their actions according to vertue, and to procure vntounto themſelues good and honeſt habits of the mind: ſince theſe things require a mind fullie perſuaded and trulie aſſenting therevnto. But in perceiuing of other faculties, it is enough if the wit be applied, which whoſoeuer ſhall hauehave it but dull and blockiſh, ſhall not become ſkilfull.
But in this our philoſophie two things are to be perfourmed; one, that the precepts ſhould be vnderſtood; the other, that they be put in practiſe. As touching that firſt, there is no let, but that yoong and intemperate men, which liue diſſolutelie, may attaine vntounto. For if they be anie thing prompt and wittie, they will eaſilie vnderſtand thoſe things which be taught; but to expreſſe the precepts of this facultie in this life, they will not be brought, partlie bicauſe they want experience, as Ariſtotle ſaith; and partlie for that they are caried awaie with euill affections. What kind of experience is required of them that ſhould be meet hearers.Perhaps thou wilt demand what maner of experience it is, that we require of them which ſhould be fit hearers? I will ſhew it by examples; namelie, by abſtinence to ouercome luſts. By valiant and temperate actions, if they be often practiſed, men at the length become valiant and temperate; ſo as without anie gréefe, yea rather with ſingular pleaſure they exerciſe themſelues in the duties belonging to theſe vertues. Two ends of them that be hearers of good doctrine.And to conclude, we muſt vnderſtand, that there are two kinds of ends of this art; one that we vnderſtand what is ſpoken; the other and that the chéefe & principall, that what we hauehave learned, we ſhould performe: of which latter end, ſince Ariſtotle ſawe, that as well yoong as incontinent doo faile, therefore he pronounced this kind of hearers to be vnfit, if they be compared with others, which hauehave now ſubdued their affections & motions of their mind to the rule of reaſon. For theſe may not onlie vnderſtand what is ſaid, but are able alſo to iudge rightlie thereof: which as it is manifeſt, this philoſopher did moſt reſpect, ſince all his whole reaſon leaneth to this principle, that yoong and incontinent men cannot rightlie iudge of theſe things. Alſo let vsus diſtinguiſh mankind, The kinds of men diſtinguiſhed.that ſom be ſound, and ſome be altogither incurable, and that there be others in a meane betwéene both: and they that be ſound, we thinke hauehave no néed of theſe doctrines, ſince they be faultleſſe and liue perfectlie. The incurable and intemperate, and they which hauehave vtterlie giuen themſelues to filthie pleaſures, ſhall not be holpen, vntill they hauehave laid awaie this mind: but they which be in the meane, ſhall take great fruit hereby. Trulie this diſtinction is well to be liked; ſo neuertheles, as there be added therevnto, as touching them whoſe recouerie is deſpaired of; that they muſt neuer be ſo deſpaired of, but that good counſels and holſome admoniſhments may at one time or other doo them good. For as the power of phyſicke is not onlie to maintaine the health which is gotten, and to finiſh that which is begun; but alſo to heale thoſe that be deſtitute thereof: ſo admonitions and good doctrines, which be the medicines of the mind, hauehave power not onelie to retaine good habits, and to make perfect the vertues begun; but alſo to reduce to the health of mind thoſe men which hauehave quite loſt the ſame, eſpeciallie if we paſſe not the bounds of ciuill iuſtice and outward conuerſation.
4 Now remaineth, Why Ariſtotle omitted them which by nature are vnapt to receiue vertues.that we paſſe not ouer a verie neceſſarie diſputation, the ſame is, how it commeth to paſſe, that ſince Ariſtotle ſaid, that Yoong and incontinent men are no fit hearers; he did not alſo reckon them which be indued with ſuch a conſtitution, temperature, or nature, as they cannot be made better, and are altogither vnapt to receiue vertues. And that ſuch there be, Galens opinion of that matter.Galen ſheweth in ſundrie places, and eſpeciallie in the booke wherein he treateth of the mutuall conſequence of the maners of the mind, and temperature of the bodie, where he ſaith, that They which thinke that all men hauehave a mind apt vntounto vertues; or on the other ſide, that there be none at all; doo meaſure mankind but by the one halfe, neither hauehave they knowne and perceiued the whole nature of man. For all men (ſaith he) are not by the complexion of their bodie borne enimies of vertue, neither doo all men louelove and deſire the ſame by the power of their owne nature. An obiection that vertues and vices are not in men by nature.Afterward he remooueth this ſentence or definition of his by a certeine obiection; for that we ſée ſome ſo well allowed and praiſed for their excellent vertues, and contrariwiſe others to be condemned and diſpraiſed, bicauſe they be corrupted and infected with vices. Neither is it méet, that for thoſe things which be naturallie within vsus, we ſhould either be commended or diſpraiſed. Yea, and the one ſort, where a Common weale is well gouerned, are punniſhed; and the other ſort hauehave rewards giuen them. Herevnto he ſaith, that This is the naturall iudgement of men, That men in puniſhing and rewarding, reſpect not whether things be doone by nature or by induſtrie.to allow, ſuccour, helpe, & praiſe thoſe things which be good, profitable and comelie; howſoeuer they come, whether of nature, or of indurſtie; and thoſe things which be euill, damnable, & full of ſhame, they diſpraiſe, kéepe vnderunder, and take away (ſo much as in them lieth) not regadring the cauſe from which they procéed: which he indeuoureth to declare plainelie by examples. We kill ſpiders, aſpes, and adders; neither doo we firſt deliberate with our ſelues whether venim be naturallie planted in thoſe things, or whether they got the ſame by their owne indeuour and will. Alſo we doo louelove & worſhip God, not weighing with our ſelues whether he hath attained to his owne goodnes by indeuour and his owne proper will; or whether the ſame hauehave béene graffed in him by nature from euerlaſting.
We might alſo adde, that beautifull bodies are had in admiration of all men, & are celebrated with ſingular praiſe, although that beautie hath come by nature: and gifts fréelie giuen (as the Diuines ſpeake) ought to be praiſed. And bréefelie, this he ſéemeth to affirme, that Euill men are condemned and diſpraiſed; and contrariwiſe good men are allowed and praiſed; although it be not known for a certeintie, whether that naughtineſſe or goodneſſe came to them by induſtrie, or by nature; or by anie other meanes. And in this reſpect he blamed the Stoiks, Againſt the Stoiks which ſaie that men by nature are made vntounto vertue, but are corrupted by other mens examples.for that they iudged that all men were by nature made apt vntounto vertue; wherevnto though by nature and ſtrength they be inclined, yet by the ill example of other men, by peruerſe opinions, and by the talke and conuerſation of corrupt men, they are reuoked from the ſame. But if it ſhould be granted them, what I beſéech you could they alledge concerning thoſe firſt men; ſuch as they cannot denie, but that now & then yea oftentimes there hauehave béene in the world? When as at ſundrie and certeine times appointed they déeme that the world hath periſhed, either by the ouerflowing of waters, or by the conſuming of all things with fier; and that againe it hath béene renewed. Whom I ſaie will they affirme to hauehave corrupted either with ill examples, or ill doctrine, or with pleaſures found out, or with corrupt inuentions, theſe firſt men brought foorth againe into light? Certeinlie this reaſon is of force againſt the Stoiks. But againſt the Peripatetiks and others, which thinke that the world neuer began, they vſe in verie déed another kind of argument: & that is; Put the caſe there be certeine brethren which are begotten of the ſelfe-ſame parents, which vſe the ſelfe-ſame meats, liue all vnderunder one ſchoole-maiſter, and hauehave no conuerſation with ſtrangers; who (I beſéech you) ſhall be aſſigned the authour, that ſome be of corrupt and lewd maners, and that others doo continuallie ſhew an honeſt & chaſt diſpoſition? And if we will grant that, which for the moſt part happeneth, we will affirme, that there be verie few children, yea in a maner none at all, that of nature hauehave a diſpoſition inclined to vertue; as thoſe which muſt continuallie be ſtirred vp therevnto by threats chaſtiſements, and admoniſhments of ſchoole-maiſters. For immediatelie, euen in their firſt age, either they be too fearefull, or elſe more bold than is méet, inſatiable, ſluggiſh, wanton, ſoone angrie, and enuious. Wherefore it is a maruell how the Stoiks can deſend their opinion, namelie, that All men are by nature apt to receiue vertue.
4 And no leſſe likelie things to be true, doo they thinke they ſpeake, which hauehave affirmed, that Mankind is ſo drawne awaie, that it cannot procéed in the ſwift courſe to vertue, by reaſon of the pleaſure that riſeth vp vntounto it. For they which ſo ſaie, dooth Poſſidonius notablie reprehend, who affirmeth, Againſt thoſe which ſaie that men by nature were made vntounto vertue, but that they were wreſted from it by pleaſure.that we from our firſt conception hauehave certeine ſparks, which kindle vsus vp vntounto vices; wherefore it coms to paſſe, that we cannot beware of our ſelues, but that we be inwardlie vicious; when as notwithſtanding we may prouide that ſuch ill ſéed and vicious ſparks ſhal not breake foorth into open wickedneſſe, and increaſe ſo far as they can be no more reſtrained. And finallie, by the iudgment of theſe men, the euill is far greater and more gréeuous, that we in our ſelues doo beare about vsus, than that which by outward contagion is procured. Indéed they grant, What nature and cuſtome is able to doo about vertues and vices.that a wicked cuſtome, when it happens, maketh vsus wicked; and that a great deale woorſe than we were before by nature. But as touching the power whereby we vnderſtand, this they teach: firſt, that it may be, that by ſchoolmaiſters, or by wiſe men, or by vnlearned men, we may perceiue true or falſe opinions: but the ſharpenes of wit, fooliſhneſſe, blockiſhneſſe, and ſuch like, which belong to the vnderſtanding, we obtaine according to the qualitie of the temperature, which we in our mothers wombe doo take, euen of the ſubſtance whereof we are begotten; whervnto afterward doo come manie and maruellous increaſes, aſwell by meanes of the meats, which doo bréed good or euill iuice; as of the qualities of the aire, and ſundrie chances that doo happen. And there he citeth Ariſtotle, who treating of the parts of liuing creatures, ſaith that men doo alſo followe the complexion of their mother. And in the firſt booke of the hiſtorie that he writeth of liuing creatures, he affirmeth, that the proportion of the inſtrumental parts are made correſpondent to the maners of the mind, and that therefore thoſe parts being well conſidered, manie things as touching the maners and inward affections may be ſhewed by them that are ſkilfull in the art of phyſiognomie. Theſe be the arguments for the which Ariſtotle in his firſt book of Ethicks may ſéeme not to hauehave ſpoken circumſpectlie; that thoſe which in nature are procreated foreign; that is, with an ill temperature of the bodie, he ſaid would not become fit hearers of this doctrine. Howbeit we will after this maner defend him, that although the greater part of men, yea in a maner all of vsus come into the world infected with the ſparks of vices and luſts, prone vntounto filthines and wickednes; yet that theſe things are not ſo ſtrong and firme, but that either they may be vtterlie ouercome, or at the leaſtwiſe qualified and mitigated; whereby either men, as touching morall vertues and outward conuerſation, may become excellent; or at the leaſtwiſe be leſſe moleſted with theſe euill affections. And bicauſe while they lacke experience of things of the mind, as in yoong men it happeneth; and that with the violence of a diſturbed mind, ſome are plucked awaie, and are ſubiect to incontinencie; it is vnpoſſible they ſhould be adorned with vertues, and performe in déed thoſe things which in this facultie they hauehave heard: therefore I ſaie did Ariſtotle pronounce, that yoong and incontinent men would not become méete hearers.
But forſomuch as men (of ripe age) may profit much, although by the violence of ill humors and by nature they be ſtirred vp vntounto vices; therefore dooth not the philoſopher remooue them from the number of thoſe that ſhould be hearers: for that which is wanting to nature, we may ſupplie by our diligence and ſtudie, ſo as prouocations and ill motions may be reſtrained and kept vnderunder. Neither to the obtaining of vertues is it required, that we ſhould altogither put off thoſe ingraffed euils; onelie it is required of vsus, that (as much as in vsus lieth) wée ſhould indeuour our ſelues to the weakening of them: which if by diligence and exerciſe we ſhall performe, the poſſeſſion of vertues ſhall not be hindered; which bicauſe we are neuer able to challenge, vnleſſe there come an experience of things which is neceſſarie, and vnleſſe there be a helpe of the weaknes of reaſon, wherewith incontinent men are troubled; therefore dooth Ariſtotle in a maner reiect thoſe hearers, and thought that of theſe there ſhould be no mention made. And he himſelfe vntounto that which Galen obiected, Why vertues are to be praiſed, and vices to be diſpraiſed.would hauehave anſwered ſomwhat otherwiſe, as touching praiſe and diſpraiſe. For he would hauehave ſaid, that the louers of vertues are therefore praiſed, not bicauſe they are led therevnto by the force of nature; but bicauſe they hauehave ſtriuen againſt the ill inclination thereof, and in that fight hauehave had an excellent victorie: and on the other ſide, that the wicked are diſpraiſed, bicauſe they being ouercome and made weake by the power of naturall violence, are thereby drawne to ſuffer ſhamefull things.
5 Neither was Galen againſt this opinion, though at the firſt ſight he may ſéeme to miſlike the ſame. For in his little booke which treateth of the knowing & curing the affects of the mind, he teſtifieth, that No man ought to be diſcouraged from the indeuour of making himſelfe better; yea, although he were thrée ſcore yéeres of age. And moreouer he ſaith, We muſt indeuor to become better although we cannot attaine to perfection.that If anie man certeinlie knowe, that he could neuer obtaine wiſedome; yet ſhould he at the leaſtwiſe indeuour this, to wit, that he hauehave not a mind vtterlie deformed, as the bodie of Therſites was to be cured, although otherwiſe it were moſt ill fauored. But and if it happen, that we be not able with excellent and moſt wiſe men to occupie the firſt places; yet this neuertheles muſt we indeuour, that we may be receiued into the ſecond, third, or fourth places. And he aduiſeth vsus by what meanes and by what reaſon this may be doone; ſaieng, that by reaſon, and by earneſt exerciſe whoſoeuer will, may obtaine it. And to incourage mens minds, he ſaith; Thou laboureſt verie much to become a Grammarian, and refuſeſt no paines to become an excellent Muſician: why then dooſt thou not ſuffer thy ſelfe to be made a good man? Then in the ſame booke he compareth this diligence of obtaining a good life, with the induſtrie which huſbandmen vſe about plants. I grant indéed (ſaith he) that a huſbandman cannot by his labour and induſtrie change a bramble, and take awaie his nature, or to make it beare fruit: but yet vines within their owne nature are ordained to beare fruits; if they be neglected, if they be left onelie to the gouernement and fertilitie of the ſoile, they will beare either woorſe fruit, or in a maner none at all: euen ſo good wits, though they be otherwiſe capable of good maners, if they ſhall want their tilth, doo ſoone become either wicked or ſlothfull. But although that in yoong men this exerciſe of moderating their affections from their tender age, may ſéeme a difficult thing; yet in proceſſe of time the paines will be leſſened. For by theſe laudable exerciſes, reaſon will be more confirmed, which being made ſtrong, it will be better obeied of the inferiour powers of the mind.Plutarchs opinion of this matter.
And from theſe things dooth not Plutarch diſagrée, who writing of the increaſe of good maners dooth alſo confeſſe, that there is ſetled in our minds a certeine infinite & vnſpeakable naughtines, which neuertheles by acceſſe therevnto may be increaſed, and by ſome forſaking of it be diminiſhed. And the ſame Plutarch treating of the education of children ſaith; There are thrée things required to the making of a man perfect, nature, diſcipline, and exerciſe. What thou maiſt vnderſtand by nature, it hath béene alreadie ſhewed; a temperature (I ſaie) of the bodie, and a naturall inclination. And there néeds no labour to expound what is exerciſe; the doubt onlie ſéemes to be as touching diſcipline. Therefore we ſaie, What diſcipline is.that the ſame is a certeine facultie, which applieth the actions and choiſes of men vntounto reaſon, and this it worketh by doctrine, corrections, admonitions, and (when néed ſhall require) by puniſhments. And whatſoeuer of theſe things anie man wanteth, he cannot be made perfect as touching ciuill maners and vertues. VntoUnto this his doctrine he compareth huſbandrie, vntounto the good ſucceſſe whereof is required a fertile ſoile; ſecondlie, a painefull and conuenient huſbanding of the ground; laſtlie, good and profitable ſéed: and if anie of theſe thrée things be wanting, we faile of the fruits that we looke for. VntoUnto nature anſwereth the ſoile, vntounto diſcipline the tilth, and the ſeed vntounto exerciſe. And if the drops of water by a continuall fall doo make ſtones hollowe; if iron & braſſe, be they neuer ſo hard, be worne with vſe: ſo are bodies by ſloth and ſluggiſhnes made féeble, and féeble bodies by holſome diet & iuſt exerciſe brought to an incredible ſtrength. A barren land well huſbanded is not vtterlie without fruit, and a fertile ſoile neglected waxeth wild, and bringeth foorth thornes and wéeds both hurtfull and vnprofitable. Alſo the moſt fierce wild beaſts, by mans labor and induſtrie are made tame: yea and thoſe beaſts, which in their owne nature would be mild and tractable, if they be ſo let alone, vſe to become wild, as we ſée it comes to paſſe in horſſes and buls.
But what ſhall I ſaie more? Did not the two whelps comming both of one dam and fire, which Lycurgus brought foorth into the open aſſemblie of the Lacedaemonians declare by their running vntounto things moſt contrarie, what the diuerſitie of education is able to doo? An obiection of Plato that vertues cannot be taught.But what ſhall we ſay vntounto Plato in his Protagoras, who ſéemeth there to affirme that vertues cannot be taught? For Pericles (ſaith he) and other excellent men, although they cauſed their children to be inſtructed in learning, muſicke, and ſuch like good arts, wherein their children did greatlie profit, yet did they not make them to be adornd with vertues, which vndoubtedlie we muſt beléeue, that they would hauehave deſired moſt, if they could hauehave obtained the ſame by learning & induſtrie. Wherevpon it ſéemes to be prooued, that there be ſome of nature ſo eſtranged from vertues, as they are not able to attaine vntounto them; and that others ſhall labour in vaine, when they indeuour to traine them vp to vertue. Howbeit, this alſo dooth nothing at all weaken thoſe things which we determin; bicauſe either their parents laboured not ſo much as they ſhould in bringing of them vp, or elſe if they did vſe ſufficient diligence, and that the nature of the children (by reaſon of the temperature of their bodie) was not giuen to vertues, yet did they by their labor and induſtrie bring ſomwhat to paſſe. For although, if they ſhould be compared with the chéefeſt, perfect, & moſt abſolute citizens, they might ſéeme to be vtterlie deſtitute of vertue; yet neuertheles being compared with rude and ſauage men, which are altogether trained vp without diſcipline, they might be counted ciuill, gentle, and adorned with ſome ſhew of vertues. Wherefore we conclude, that indeuour, diſcipline, and ſtudie are not altogither in vaine, euen as touching them which by naturall inclination be enimies vntounto vertues.
6 Now let vsus ſée how thoſe things, How theſe things agree with the holie ſcriptures.which Ariſtotle hath ſaid, doo agrée or diſagree with the holie ſcriptures. Yoong and incontinent men in the holie ſcriptures are not excepted; neither be anie remooued from hearing the word of God, in this reſpect, that they be as yet diſquieted and ouercome with troubles of the mind; neither for this cauſe, that they want experience, and the vſe of things. Thou maiſt ſée that Publicans, Matt. 9, 11▪ and 19, 11. Matt. 19, 14.and harlots, and alſo théeues were admitted by Chriſt vntounto his diſcipline; and that not onlie yoong men, but yoong children were called. And we might alledge manie out of hiſtories, which before time hauing liued ſhamefullie and moſt wickedlie, were ſtraight-waie ſo reformed and amended by the doctrine of Chriſt, as afterward they not onlie attained to a ſingular innocencie of life; but alſo with an incredible fortitude did ſuffer themſelues to be put to death with great torments, leaſt they ſhould violate the decrées of our faith, and the godlines which they had attained vntounto, when as there was both deliuerance and great rewards offered them, if they would hauehave forſaken their determination. And we ſée, that not onlie men hauehave fallen into this kind of conflict; but we are not ignorant that women being otherwiſe but weake, yea boies & girls hauehave with great courage indured theſe things.
Neither let anie man ſaie, Whether ſinners againſt the holie Ghoſt muſt be excluded from hearing the word of God.that thoſe which ſinne againſt the holie Ghoſt take no profit at all by the word of God, and that it may therefore ſéeme that they ſhould be driuen from hearing of the ſame. We grant indéed, that they which ſo ſin, doo heare the word of God in vaine; howbeit, ſince thoſe can by no vſuall meanes be knowne from others, they are not excluded. God verie well knoweth who they be which are wrapped in this kind of ſinne; but men ſéeing they knowe not, who are by nature fallen into ſo great a wickednes, may not remooue them from the holie doctrine. It is requiſit (no doubt) that thoſe which are ſinners againſt the holie Ghoſt, be not ſuch as fall by ignorance, or infirmitie, but that they be ſuch as are led therevnto by a hatred of the truth to ſtriue againſt the ſame, ſo that willinglie and wittinglie they oppoſe themſelues againſt the truth, reſiſt it, and to the vttermoſt of their power hinder the courſe thereof; which neuertheles they will knowe to be the truth. How are men able to vnderſtand this thing, ſéeing they cannot attaine to the ſecretnes of anie mans mind and will? Wherfore thoſe which be thus ill affected, doo heare the word of God without fruit; although they be not excluded from the hearing thereof; euen for this cauſe, that they cannot be perceiued: howbeit, that which they heare, dooth increaſe their greater condemnation. For of ſuch force is the word of God, Iam. 1, 21.as either it ſaueth the hearers, or becommeth a deſtruction vntounto them. And ſo great héed dooth the church take, 1. Cor. 1, 18.that it driueth not awaie anie from the word of God; Excommunicate perſons are not excluded from hearing the word of God.& it admitteth thervnto euen thoſe which be excommunicate, and them which doo not yet beléeue, whom otherwiſe it driueth both from the ſacraments and from publike praiers. Perhaps thou wilt demand: How cōmeth this difference betwéene the word of God, and the doctrine of the philoſophers? Herof aſſuredlie it commeth, Wherein the word of God, and the philoſophers doctrine differ.that mens ſaiengs, although they be famous and commendable; yet are they not indued with that ſtrength and power, as they be able to change or correct vnprofitable and corrupt minds. But the power and ſtrength of the word of God, to call men vntounto God, is incredible. Not as though euen thoſe things which the philoſophers alſo taught or put in writing, be without their ſtrength. For we denie not that moſt ancient common ſaieng, wherin it is ſaid, that Whatſoeuer is true, of what author ſoeuer it was ſpoken, procéedeth from the holie Ghoſt. But thoſe things, which be ſpoken by the motion of the holie Ghoſt, cannot be altogither void of ſome effect, although it be of much leſſe effect than the vehemencie, wherewith the holie ſcriptures are furniſhed. Who will denie that the common ſort of ſtones are adorned with their owne ſtrength and proper power, and the ſame not vnprofitable to our life, although they may not be compared with the ſtrength of pretious ſtones?
VntoUnto whō the holie ſcriptures muſt not be imparted.But I returne to the matter. I find onlie one kind of men, vntounto whom the holie doctrine muſt not be imparted; and they be ſuch as deride and openlie ſlander the doctrine of Chriſt. For he commanded his apoſtles, that they ſhould not commit the heauenlie doctrine to dogs & hogs: which in verie déed muſt be vnderſtood of contempt and outward deriſion; that is, Matth. 7, 6.when with ſlanders and contumelies they raile vponupon true godlines. Which if they doo ſecretlie to themſelues, ſo that they will heare quietlie, and will ſuffer themſelues to be admoniſhed and taught, they muſt not be put backe from hearing the ſame. Neither muſt publike preaching be left off for their ſakes, which are open ſcoffers, railers, & reprochfull perſons, when ſuch cannot be driuen awaie, bicauſe perhaps they be ouer mightie; leſt for one or two mens cauſes the whole people ſhould be defrauded of the food of their ſoule. Yée ſée therefore that onlie theſe are to be remooued from the holie doctrine, from whence other men, of what condition ſoeuer they be, muſt not be forbidden; naie rather they muſt be exhorted to come verie often therevnto. Thoſe things, which I hauehave ſpoken, belong to the vſuall and receiued ordinance of the church, ſince I knowe that the ſpirit hath ſometime forbidden the apoſtles, and may now reſtraine ſome, that they preach not in ſome places to thoſe, to whom otherwiſe they had determined to preach: which bicauſe it is a worke of God, not of men; therefore it ſerueth not to this purpoſe.