Common Places, Part 1 · Chapter 1
Of the ends of good and euill among the Chriſtians. The firſt Chapter.
Out of the Epiſtle to the Rom. Chap. 8, verſe. 25.AVGVSTINE in his 19. booke De Ciuitate Dei, the fourth Chapter, very wel declareth, how Chriſtian hope is caried vntounto thoſe good things, Hope is caried to inuiſible things.which cannot be ſéen. For if thou aſkeſt (ſaith hée) a faithfull man, what he maketh to be the end of good and euill things, he will anſwere; Life and death euerlaſting: The ends that a faithfull man putteth.which things can not be ſéene, nor comprehended by mans reaſon. And therefore the wiſe men among the Ethnikes being puffed vp with pride, would not ſettle their hope vponupon thoſe things. For which cauſe, ſome held, that the ends of good things, are the goods of the mind; ſome the goods of the bodie, and ſome, either vertue, pleaſure, or both ioined togither. But GOD laughed them to ſcorne, and ſawe how vaine their cogitations were. For they would rather account thoſe things for the chéefe good, which be tempered with manie miſeries and calamities, than to receiue thoſe ſincere, perfect, and moſt firme things, which are offered by the word of God. For who can woorthilie expreſſe, vntounto what miſerable and horrible miſchances this bodie of ours is caſt out? It is ſicke, it is wounded, it is diſſolued, made crooked, torne, and maimed. Oftentimes men become blind, oftentimes deafe. And as touching the mind, they are oftentimes mad, oftentimes frantike, and they that moſt labour about the truth, can not attaine to the knowledge of the ſame, without intermingling of infinite errours. How could the Ethnikes boaſt of vertues, Naturall vertues are teſtimonies of our calamities. The end of temperance.as the chéefe good things, ſéeing we hauehave them as witneſſes of our calamities? To what purpoſe ſerueth temperance, which is therefore giuen, to bridle drunkennes, gluttonie, luſts, and the foule and ſhamefull motions of the mind? For theſe things declare, that it hath no place, but in minds, which be yet ſubiect to corruption. The which corruption, the more inward it is, the more miſerable it maketh vsus: and, as a domeſticall enimie, violentlie aſſaileth the ſecret parts of our harts. Theſe affections (ſaith Auguſtine) are vices: Rom. 7, 19.bicauſe (as Paule ſaith) they hinder vsus, that we cannot doo thoſe things which we would. Beſides, The end of wiſedome.what is the part of wiſedome, but to foreſée, that by errour we be not deceiued in the choiſe of good things, and auoiding of euill? Certainlie, if we were not bewrapped in errours and darknes, we ſhould not néed of this remedie. But ſéeing it is vſed, it argueth, that men are not yet happie; but are folded in great and gréeuous errours, vnleſſe wiſedome doo helpe on euerie ſide. Alſo iuſtice, The end of iuſtice.whereby euerie man commeth by his owne, is neceſſarie for none other cauſe, but to ſuppreſſe robberies, extortions, and violent dealings. And yet, neither can that ſo preuaile among men, but that iuſt and honeſt men oftentimes ſuffer manie things, both ſhamefullie and vniuſtlie. The end of fortitude.Now what ſhall we ſpeake of fortitude? The ſame doubtleſſe armeth men patientlie to abide all ſorrowes, dangers, torments; yea and death it ſelfe, if neceſſitie ſhall require. Among thoſe ſo great euils, theſe wiſe fellowes durſt appoint the chéefe goodnes. Which euils neuertheles, they ſaid might ſometime be ſo increaſed, as a man may kill himſelfe. Oh happie life (crieth Auguſtine) that ſéeketh the helpe of death to finiſh it! For if it be happie, why doo they cut it off, and ſhun it? But if it be miſerable, why doo they place in it the chéefe goodnes? Thus are they derided of God, bicauſe they deſpiſed that hope, which is neither ſéene, nor attained vntounto by mans reaſon. And bicauſe they mocked it, when they heard it preached in the woord, therfore hath God, by his heauenlie doctrine, condemned them, as fooles & ridiculous perſons.
Out of the Preface vponupon the Epiſtle to the Romans.2 Another ſort doubtleſſe, perceiuing the often fallings into wickedneſſe, and that of verie excellent men, thought by their religious procurements; yea rather by their ſuperſtitions, and worſhippings deuiſed of themſelues, to cauſe God to be fauourable vntounto them; of whom afterward they might obtaine all good things. The commō opinion of the chiefeſt good. The Philoſophers puffed vp thorough their knowledge of naturall things.And this for the moſt part was the opinion of the common people: who after a ſort iudged not ſo euill as did the Philoſophers. For theſe men were ſo puffed vp in the pride of their vertues, and ciuill duties, and with the knowleges of natural things, that they thought theſe things to be ſufficient vntounto themſelues for the obteining of felicitie. But the common people were not ignorant both of the filthines of ſinnes, and of the dailie offendings of the Maieſtie of God. Wherefore they thought it good to flie vntounto religions, the which ſince they had them not pure and vncorrupt, they fell into idolatrie. The Hebrues opinion of the chiefeſt good.And here came in the Hebrue people among them, and tooke part with both. For by reaſon of the ten commandements, they boaſted that they had the ſumme of all vertues among them: and that if they fell at anie time from them, they had ceremonies prepared for them, whereby they might make ſatiſfaction. Againſt theſe things Paule diſputeth in his Epiſtle to the Romanes, Paules iudgement concerning the chiefeſt good.and ſheweth, that it cannot be, that we ſhould obtaine righteouſnes by morall or naturall duties: bicauſe as well the Iewes, as the Gentiles, doo not in their life and maners expreſſe ſo much, as they acknowledge that the lawe of nature, or Moſes lawe requireth. Neither muſt we grant, that we can fullie and perfectlie obſerue the lawe. For then might we attaine vntounto perfect righteouſnes by woorks: which would be a plaine abſurditie. For herein ſtandeth our righteouſnes, that our ſinnes ſhall not be imputed vntounto vsus; but the righteouſnes of Chriſt ſhall be imputed to the beléeuers. No doubt but there happeneth ſome renewing, when we being iuſtified doo worke rightlie: but yet this is not through perfect. Alſo grace is giuen to the regenerate, but yet not ſuch, as remooueth all the lets which doo hinder the perfect kéeping of Gods lawe. Neither doo wée, in the teaching herof affirme paradoxes or ſtrange opinions, or ſet forth things that be contrarie vntounto Paul; but wée chéeflie maintaine thoſe things which are moſt agréeable to the apoſtolicall doctrine. But as for the rites and ceremonies, which on the other ſide the Iewes brag of, when they be without Chriſt and faith, they are accounted deteſtable before God: as Ieremie, Eſaie, and the prophets, which were interpreters of the lawe, hauehave moſt plainelie taught. By all theſe things it is eaſilie gathered, that whereas all men, of all ages, profeſſed themſelues to ſéeke for the chéefeſt good, yet that they which wanted the true and perfect knowledge of God, did as it were, but grope after it in the déepe darknes, and weried themſelues in booteles labors.
Theſe things being on this wiſe declared, I will now more largelie and particularlie treat of humane ends, following ſpeciallie the courſe of Ariſtotle: and will ſhew betweene-whiles wherein he, as touching this matter agreeth, or diſagreeth with the holie ſcriptures.
3 Ariſtotle in his firſt booke of Ethicks, In the commentaries vponupon Ariſt. Ethicks. Cap. 1.indeuoreth to prooue, that before humane things there is ſet foorth ſome certeine end, bicauſe all humane things deſire ſome good thing: and that good thing wherevnto they tend, hath the conſideration of an end, and ſo humane things hauehave a preſcribed end. And therefore doth he make mention of good, bicauſe it is the chéefeſt thing whereof felicitie hath his name, and bicauſe the reſpects of good and end be verie néer alike: in ſo much as ſome hauehave thought that good and end are all one. And therfore Ariſtotle commendeth the old prouerbe, that All things doo couet good: which may not be vnderſtood of anie one thing; for it can not be, that there ſhould be ſome one certeine end of all things, but euerie thing requires his owne proper end. Euerie thing requires his owne proper end.For a horſe deſireth not the chéefeſt good of a man; neither dooth a dog wiſh for the perfection of a horſe, but euerie one his owne perfection. To bring the reaſon of Ariſtotle to a plaine ſyllogiſme, thus it is. What ſoeuer things deſire good, they hauehave an end ſet before them: Humane things deſire good, Therefore they hauehave an end ſet before them. The Maior propoſition is manifeſt: for in deſiring of good, they reſt when they are come vntounto the ſame. And ſeing the motion and action is there finiſhed, there we ſaie is the end. The Minor is prooued, bicauſe all humane things are comprehended vnderunder art, method, action, & choiſe. And I woonder much at them, Whether God be deſired of all things.which by the good that Ariſtotle ſpeaketh of, doo here vnderſtand, not onlie the chéefeſt good, but alſo thinke that God him ſelfe is deſcribed, which onelie good they ſaie is deſired of all things. And this reaſon they bring; that it is God him ſelfe which offereth all the good things of anie thing deſired, and all thoſe things are moſt perfectlie conteined in God, therefore no man can deſire them, but he deſireth God him ſelfe. But who ſéeth not that this is accidentallie, which is vtterlie remoued from ſciences, ſeing they doo not teach the things that happen accidentallie. And if this reaſon were of force, wée ſhould by this meanes prooue, that vnchaſt men, when they be delighted with anie fourme or beautie, ſhould wiſh for God: which thing would be ridiculous. We grant in déed willinglie, that in God are moſt perfectlie comprehended all good things, euen as the number of ſeuen comprehendeth all the former numbers: which alſo the holie ſcriptures doo teſtifie. For in Exodus, God ſaith vntounto Moſes, which deſired the ſight of Gods countenance: I will ſhew thee all my good. 33. verſ. 19.But Ariſtotle had no deſires of this coniunction with God: the prophet Dauid knew them, Pſal. 72, 28.who ſaid in the Pſalmes, It is good for me to cleaue vntounto God. But that this is the ſenſe of this place; which we hauehave expreſſed, the ſequele dooth ſhew. For the philoſopher treateth of bleſſedneſſe, which although that all men wiſh for, yet for ſo much as they hauehave placed the ſame in diuers things; to wit, in riches, honors, pleaſures, & vertues, hereof it commeth, that diuers men deſire diuers kinds of good things, all which things neuertheles would participate with the nature and forme of a generall good. Yea, and the philoſophers hauing reſpect to the verie ſame thing, wrote ſometimes of the ends of good and euill.
How farre foorth Ariſtotle agreeth with the holie ſcriptures.4 But let vsus weigh how thoſe things agrée with the holie ſcriptures. Firſt, that all things doo deſire good, it ſéemes to be a certeine imitation of God almightie the author of creatures. For he while he made euerie particular thing, had reſpect vntounto a good end. According as it is ſaid in the booke of Geneſis, that God ſawe the light, Gen. 1, 18.the great lights of heauen, the ſtars, herbs, and plants, and other things, that they were good. Finallie, he reſted the ſeuenth daie, perceiuing that all things, which he had made were excéeding good. Wherefore this indeuor of good things, is in all things the ſteppe and impreſſion of the diuine propertie. As touching arts and doctrines, we will eaſilie grant that they deſire good by them ſelues, & of their owne nature, albeit that the ſame turne to euill and ſome vntounto them which be not regenerate in Chriſt: and therefore it comes oftentimes to paſſe, that the ſecrets of ſaluation are hidden from men, which be furniſhed and adorned with good arts and ſciences, and are open to them that be ſimple, according to that ſaieng: Thou haſt hidden theſe things from the wiſe, and haſt reuealed them vntounto babes. Mat. 11, 25.And Paule vntounto the Corinthians the firſt Epiſtle: Take heede to your calling (my brethren) how that God hath choſen not manie wiſe men, 1. Cor. 1, 26.but the fooliſh things of the world, that he might make the wiſe men aſhamed. Which words would hauehave no place, if arts & doctrine might attaine to the leue good things, and vntounto that which might make vsus acceptable vntounto God. Howbeit theſe things, although they be good in their owne kind and nature, yet to vsus, if we be vnbeléeuers and arrogant, they are turned to euill. As touching choiſes and actions, the ſcripture ſaith in the booke of Geneſis, that The hart of man is inclined to wickednes, Gen. 6, 5.euen from his firſt childhood. And Paule welnéere in the ſame ſenſe ſaid vntounto the Romanes; For I knowe, that in me, that is in my fleſh, Rom. 7, 18.dwelleth no good thing. Wherefore we muſt ſaie, that it is a fault of nature procured by Adam, that men not regenerate by Chriſt, are prone vntounto thoſe things, which are in verie déede wicked, vniuſt, and filthie, and which are excéedinglie repugnant to the lawe of God: and that if afterward they be inſtructed by the diſcipline of precepts, & by morall vertues, or elſe that they be indued with an excellent wit, true it is that they ouercome the fouler ſort of appetites, and of their owne choiſe are caried vntounto certeine ciuill and morall things; but yet vntounto thoſe (as we ſaid before) which both be ſinnes, and turne to deſtruction. Wherefore we muſt conſtantlie affirme, that the choiſes and actions of them which be not regenerate, are prone vntounto euill, as it is written in Geneſis. Which neuertheles is not againſt Ariſtotle, bicauſe thoſe euils are apprehended vnderunder the conſideration of good things. Yea, and we that be regenerate, are in a maner perpetuallie, whether we will or no, drawne vntounto ſinnes, and thoſe we moſt earneſtlie deſire; yet by grace & the ſpirit we reſiſt thoſe deſires, that at the length through faith in Chriſt we may become conquerours. But as for the reſt of the creatures of God, we doubt not but that they ſéeke for good, bicauſe they are gouerned by the lawes of God, and whatſoeuer they doo, they doo it by the lawe of nature: albeit that euen they, for the ſinne of man, are compelled to be ſubiect vntounto vanitie. But of faith, hope, and charitie, and e…e of the grace and impulſion of the ſpirit of God, Ariſtotle made no mention, bicauſe he knew not thoſe things, which neuertheles doo deſire the moſt true good things.
That the end of humane things is manifold.5 Alſo humane things hauehave not onelie a preſcribed end, as we hauehave taught, but that end is manifold, and in that diuerſitie of ends ſome be more excellent than others, for ſo much as this manifoldnes is of thoſe kind of things which hauehave an order in themſelues. And Ariſtotle ſpeaketh of them for no other cauſe, but that he would of manie ends chooſe the moſt excellent, which hée ſheweth to be mans felicitie. Wherefore to this effect doth Ariſtotle reaſon: Humane ends are manie, and one is to be preferred aboue an other. A proofe of the former part is: Bicauſe of ends, ſome be actions, and others beſide actions, are works; and of ſundrie arts and doctrines there is not one end: ſo is the multitude of ends ſhewed, partlie by their ſundrie natures, and partlie by the diuerſitie of their beginnings, according as they are deſired by other arts and ſciences. The other part of the propoſition was, that one end is better than another: which is prooued, in that the ends of the principall arts & ſciences, which Ariſtotle calleth foreign, be much more noble than the ends of other faculties which be ordeined vntounto them. Two ſyllogiſmes.Whervpon may be made two ſyllogiſmes: The firſt; Whatſoeuer things hauehave a ſundry nature, and belong to diuers faculties, be not one and the ſelfe ſame things; Humane things hauehave a ſundrie nature, for ſome of them are actions, and ſome works, and doo belong vntounto diuers faculties (for arts, actions, and ſciences are diuers.) Therefore the end is not one. The other ſyllogiſme is conditional: If faculties hauehave an order among themſelues, that one is better than another, the ends alſo of them muſt be ſo ordred, as one is better than another: But faculties are ſo in themſelues, as one is preferred aboue an other; Therfore ends ſhall hauehave the ſame order. Ariſtotle ſheweth that this facultie hath action for hir end, & that an excellent action; and therfore (as Euſtrathius ſaith) would hauehave it to be vnderſtood, that thoſe be not the perfecter ſort of actions, which hauehave a worke remaining when they be ceaſed, but that verie often-times the contrarie dooth rather happen. And trulie if a man ſhall rather thinke that the faculties are better which leaue ſome worke after the actions, than thoſe which are ſpent onelie in the action; ſuch a one would thinke that the felicitie of man is more vnperfect than his works, ſéeing it ſtandeth onelie in action. Wherefore yée muſt vnderſtand, that ſometime the one happeneth, and ſometime the other: to wit, that ſometime the worke which remaineth is more excellent, and ſometime the action. For the end of the phyſician is a worke, namelie health, which is remaining in a man when he is cured: which end if it be compared with a daunſe, which is the end of the art of daunſing, it is much better. On the other ſide, the end of the art of building ſhips, is the ſhip it ſelfe, the worke (I meane) which is left after the building: but this end being compared with nauigation, which is the action and end of ſhipmans craft, is more vnperfect. So that as touching woorthines, it maketh no matter, whether the end be a worke or an action: for ſometime one is better, and ſometime an other. But this is certeine, as ſaith Ariſtotle, that wherſoeuer the works are the ends, the actions which go before thoſe works, and for which they are made, are excelled in worthines, and the reaſon is, bicauſe they are ordeined to an other thing. And it is no maruell that Ariſtotle in his booke of Ethicks writeth ſo diligentlie as touching ends, ſince that maners, vertues, choiſes, affections, and other humane things be ſo plucked a ſunder, and be of diuers natures & kinds, that vnleſſe they be ioined togither by ſome ſcience or method, they can not be taught, neither are they ordred and ioined togither by any other thing, than by the ends. And in the foreſaid booke of Ariſtotle we hauehave onelie one generall & ſtedfaſt rule. Euerie worke that remaineth after anie thing brought to paſſe, is more worthie than the ſame; wherefore it behooueth that a worke be not imploied to anie other actions, than vntounto that onelie action whereby it is brought to paſſe. And that we may the better perceiue the matter, we muſt vnderſtand, that after the works alreadie brought to paſſe, doo followe other actions. For when a houſe is builded, it is inhabited; and when health is reſtored vntounto him that is ſicke, he beginneth to be diligentlie occupied according to his nature: ſo when the worke ſhall be referred vntounto theſe latter things, it is more vnworthie than they, bicauſe it is ordeined vntounto them. But there be certen moſt noble actions, which cunning works doo neither go before, nor yet followe: ſuch be the actions of vertues. Vnleſſe thou wilt ſay, that frequented actions, which be right and iuſt, doo at the length leaue a worke behind them, that is to ſaie, an habit in the mind, after which doo followe actions of vertues: which if thou ſaie, I will not much contend; although I knowe that Ariſtotle hath an other meaning, neither did he at anie time, ſo farre as I remember, call an habit, a worke.
6 But ſince we ſpeake ſo much of ends, it ſhall be good in my iudgement to define what an end is. A definition of end.The etymologie of the word is ſhewed two maner of waies, one is of the Gréeke word foreign or foreign, which is, I make perfect, or I finiſh: whereof is deriued foreign, which is a certaine perfection of thoſe things, which are referred to it ſelfe. It is alſo taken for the terme & vttermoſt limit of anie thing. Wherefore death alſo is called an end, not that we wiſh for the ſame, or that we be made perfect therby; but bicauſe it is the terme & vttermoſt time of our life. The other etymologie is, that it coms of foreign, that is to ſaie, to ſpring or ariſe vp, bicauſe before euerie action or thing brought to paſſe, it dooth ſhine foorth like the ſunne that ariſeth; and it is defined of Ariſtotle to be that for the which another thing is, and it ſelfe is not for anie other thing. And Ariſtotle ſaid bicauſe there be manie arts, actions, & ſciences, there be manie ends. And firſt hée ſhewed the diuerſitie of ends by their natures, and then in reſpect that they be of diuers faculties. He ſaith that riches, according to the vulgar opinion, are the ends of houſhold gouernement, whereas in houſhold and politike gouernement, he ſaith that riches are rather an inſtrument for the obtaining of ſome other good thing. I might interpret that other part, how ends are ſo ordered, as one is more excellent than another: but firſt ſhall be ſhewed of certaine doubts, that are againſt thoſe things which we hauehave ſpoken. For if you ſhall heare theſe things while the matter is freſh, ye ſhall ſooner vnderſtand them, than if we defer them anie further.
It is called into doubt, by what reaſon Ariſtotle appointed two kinds of ends; namelie, action and worke. For he ſéemeth to leaue out foreign, that is, contemplation, which neuertheles in his Topicks he reckoned vp as an end. And Quintilian in diuiding of arts, the ſecond booke, & 19. chapter, aſſigned thrée ſorts of ends; work, action, and contemplation. Yea and Ariſtotle himſelfe in his Ethicks, at the end of the booke treateth of contemplation, and teacheth that the ſame without doubt is a great part of mans felicitie. Wherefore this diſtinction ſhall ſéeme to be maimed, when the third part is omitted. But herevnto we will anſwere, that vnderunder the name of foreign, contemplation it ſelfe is contained. And it is diligentlie to be noted, that Ariſtotle ſaid not foreign, but foreign, bicauſe vnderunder the name of foreign, he had not comprehended contemplation: ſo as the diuiſion is not vnperfect, neither Ariſtotle contrarie to himſelfe, nor yet is he againſt Quintilian: for although theſe thrée are rehearſed in the end, yet is there two of them comprehended vnderunder one word.
7 But the holie ſcriptures are herin more excellent than Philoſophie, The end of man of two ſorts according to the ſcriptures.that of men they appoint two ſorts of ends: whereof the one may be obtained while we liue here, but the other is waited for when we ſhall at the length be looſed from hence: which bicauſe it is the more perfect, we will declare the ſame in the firſt place. And ſuch it is, as we ſhall ſée God preſent, and ſhall fullie and moſt perfectlie enioie his ſight, which Paule writing to the Philippians did moſt earneſtlie wiſh to obtaine; Phil. 1, 23.I deſire to be looſed from hence, and to bee with Chriſt. And the ſame Apoſtle ſaid: 1. Co. 13, 12Now we ſee as through a glaſſe, and in a darke ſpeech; then ſhall we ſee face to face. Againe; Ibid. verſ. 9, and 10.Now wee knowe in part, and propheſie in part, but when that which is perfect ſhall come, then that which is in part ſhall be aboliſhed. And this excellent reward doo the goſpels ſet foorth vntounto vsus, which after manie labours and miſeries of this life we ſhall hauehave laid before vsus in heauen. The cheefe good of this life.But the chéefe end and principall good of this life, is, that we be iuſtified by Chriſt, that we be receiued into grace by the eternall Father, vntounto whoſe wrath we were thrall from our natiuitie. Wherefore iuſtlie ſaid Dauid: Pſal. 32, 1.Bleſſed are they whoſe iniquities are forgiuen, and whoſe ſins are couered: bleſſed is the man vntounto whom the Lord hath not imputed ſinne. Which place did Paule for good cauſe cite ſo diligentlie vntounto the Romans. And to conclude, thoſe are here bleſſed, which hauehave Iehouah for their God, and doo truſt and beléeue in him with all their hart: & thoſe not in vaine did Paule call bleſſed. Neither is the bleſſednes of this life altogether diſtant from the end and principall good, which with a conſtant faith and inuincible hope we looke for in the world to come. For euen the chéefe good of this life is none other thing, but the ſelfe-ſame, which at the length wée ſhall hauehave. Onelie a difference of degrées and perfection paſſeth betwéene them.
8 It is demanded moreouer, that bicauſe we brought a reaſon why the worke is more excellent than that workmanſhip, whereby it is brought to paſſe; to wit, bicauſe it is ordained to the worke, whether this be generallie true; Whether that which is ordained to an end be baſer than the end.that whatſoeuer is directed to another thing, as to an end, is of leſſe eſtimation than the ſame, which, as it may ſéeme, is not to be granted. For it is the dutie of a ſhepheard to looke to his ſhéepe, that they may be in good plight. This he endeuoureth to bring to paſſe by his cunning: where neuertheles he far excelleth his ſhéepe. For who doubteth whither a man ought to be preferred aboue ſhéepe. Yea & the angels, as it is ſaid vntounto the Hebrues, are miniſtring ſpirits, for the ſaluation of the elect; whereas neuertheles their woorthines and nature excelleth men. And finallie Ariſtotle writing of generation and corruption ſaid, that the end of the celeſtiall bodies is, that men ſhould be begotten, whereas yet none of the Peripateticks doubt, but that the heauens are of more excellent nature than men. Some thought to hauehave eſcaped the doubt, by ſaieng that the ends are mentioned to be onlie of actions, but not of thoſe actions that are efficient, to wit, of heauen, of angels, and of a ſhepherd. Howbeit this auaileth nothing. For things efficient attaine not to their ends, but by actions, wherefore the ſelfe-ſame end is to be aſſigned vntounto the thing efficient, and to the worke thereof. But we muſt vnderſtand, that as it is in Ariſtotles 2. booke De anima, the 35. and 37. chapters: there is two ſorts of ends, one end called that, for whoſe cauſe the thing is doone; and the other end is called that, to the which a thing is directed.
The Grecians thus deſcribe them foreign and foreign. That is to ſaie, whereof, and to which. As for example, The end wherefore, and the end whereto.a creature which dooth ingender hath the end, Wherfore, to wit, that eternall and diuine end, namelie, perpetuitie, which it would attaine; which ſince it cannot abſolutelie hauehave, yet at the leaſtwiſe it claimeth the ſame by generation. The end Wherevnto, is the thing which is begotten: & the end of nature which is in plants, is to bring foorth fruits & flowers: and this is the end, Wherefore. But the vſe of men is the end Wherevnto. It may then well be, that the end Whervnto is of leſſe honor, & ſo is referred vntounto that end, which is Wherefore. And the end which is Wherefore, is the more woorthie, as matter which is directed to the forme. And no man is ignorant of this, that the forme is better than the matter. But it happeneth otherwiſe, when a thing is directed vntounto that which is the end Wherevnto, not that it ſhould be made perfect thereby, but that the ſame ſhould make it perfect. For then the end Wherevnto is leſſe woorthie, bicauſe it is vntounto ſuch an end. So of the angels and of heauen. The end of heauen Wherefore, is to be reſembled vntounto God, and to make other things perfect, which is the better end. For heauen in the dooing of theſe things is better than if it did them not. Likewiſe in angels, the end is to obtaine God, and to kéepe vsus: in dooing wherof, they be more woorthie than themſelues, if ſo be they did it not. And the ſhepheard hath an end Wherefore, euen his owne wealth and increaſe, wherewith he is better than if he were deſtitute thereof, and of the wealth of his familie and citie. But the end Whervnto, are the ſhéepe themſelues, ouer whom he is ordained, to kéepe them ſafe and ſound. And that one thing is ordeined for another, How the more worthie thing is ſometime ordeined for the leſſe worthie.that it ſhould preſerue the ſame, and withall be more woorthie than it, we hauehave an example; When as by kings and monarchs, ſome are appointed to be chéefe rulers or deputies, and are directed vntounto the people, that they ſhould gouerne and take care of them. VntoUnto which end they are not ſent to be leſſe honourable than the people, but that they ſhould be obeied and honoured of them: and yet in theſe rulers, the end is Whervnto. Howbeit, if we hauehave regard wherfore theſe things be doon, we will alwaies acknowledge that there is a more excellent end. And by this diſtinction are diſſolued the inſtances now alledged touching celeſtiall bodies, the angels, & ſhepherds. For theſe things though they be more woorthie than the end Whervnto, yet not more woorthie than the end Wherefore. For the ſhepherd is more woorthie than the ſhéepe, but yet not woorthier than his owne ſelfe, or than his lord, if he be a hired ſeruant, or than his familie or citie. For he lookes to the ſhéepe, either for his owne ſake, or elſe for his lord, familie, or cities ſake. In like maner doo the angels and celeſtiall bodies. For they miniſter vntounto vsus, not for our ſake, but partlie to pleaſe God, and partlie to exerciſe their owne perfection. But the worke when it is referred to the actions which went before, and hath no further reſpect, is the end Wherefore. Whervpon the actions which went before, are, as Ariſtotle ſaith, more vnwoorthie than it; but if afterward a further end be regarded, to wit, the vſe of the worke, the ſame ſhalbe more woorthie than the worke, as we ſaid before touching the habitation of an houſe, when it is referred to the dwelling. And the reaſon is, bicauſe the dwelling is then the end Wherefore, and the houſe the end Wherevnto.
9 Alſo the holie ſcriptures doo decrée and appoint, that there is a certaine principall end, That the holie ſcriptures decree of a principall end.wherevnto men direct all their actions: wherevpon Salomon, at the end of Eccleſiaſtes, when he had in manie words treated firſt of ends, according to the common ſort of mens opinions (ſpeaking of the feare of God, which in the Hebrue phraſe ſignifieth true and ſound godlines) added; And this toucheth all men: Eccl. 12, 13.bicauſe men are herevnto ordeined and made, that they ſhould worſhip and honor God. And Dauid: One thing hauehave I deſired of the Lord, Pſal. 27, 4.& this will I ſeeke for, that I may dwel in the houſe of God. And Chriſt ſaith: This is life eternall, Iohn. 17, 3.that they knowe thee to be the onlie verie God, & whom thou haſt ſent Ieſus Chriſt. But that ſéemes to be repugnant which Salomon ſaid: Eccleſ. 1, 2.All is moſt vaine, and but plaine vanitie. But this is not in reſpect, it is the appointed end; but bicauſe that men either knowe not the ſame, or elſe refuſe it, and ſéeke for the chéef good elſe where. Wherfore their deſires hauehave an infinite ſcope, neither doo they at anie time reſt. The vngodlie walke their circuit. verſ. 9.Pſal. 12. And this is the difference betwéene vsus and the Philoſophers, that they ſet foorth their end, as it ſhould be attained by their owne proper ſtrength and induſtrie: but we decree out of the holie ſcriptures, that the chéefeſt good cannot be obteined, vnleſſe wée be holpen by the ſpirit and grace of Chriſt.
10 Againe it is doubted, when Ariſtotle ſaith; bicauſe there be manie arts, actions, and knowledges, there be manie ends alſo, whether the propoſition may be turned both waies; If where there be many ends, manie things be alſo referred vntounto them.namelie, that whereſoeuer there ſhall be manie ends, there be manie things alſo referred vntounto the ſame ends. We anſwere to the queſtion, that this is not of neceſſitie: bicauſe nature hath oftentimes ordeined manie ends of one and the ſelfe ſame thing. For example ſake: the toong is not onelie directed vntounto ſpéech, but vntounto the reliſh of taſts: alſo the téeth doo chawe and grind the meat, and doo helpe the ſpéech. And by the force of Logicke, we not onelie confirme true things, but we alſo confute falſe. Wherefore ſince there be manie faculties and arts, we will grant that there be manie ends; and yet by the number of ends the number of things can not bée gathered. Likewiſe we doubt, Whether the end of phyſicke be health; and of warfare, victorie, &c.bicauſe Ariſtotle ſaith, that the end of phyſicke is health; of the art of war, is victorie, &c. (Againſt which opinion he him ſelfe writeth in the firſt booke of his Topicks the 2. chapter, and Quintilian in his 2. booke and 12. chapter) ſéeing the end of phyſicke is, not health, but to applie all things, and to omit none of thoſe things which may further vntounto health. And if that the ſicke man, either by the intemperance of his diet, or by too much weaknes of nature, or by the fierce and intollerable violence of his diſeaſe, be not healed, the phyſician ſwarueth not from the end of his art. The like is to be ſaid of an orator, whoſe end is to ſpeake all things which may ſerue to perſuade, & to omit nothing that belongeth thervnto: wherfore though he ſhall not be able to perſuade, yet if he hauehave a regard thervnto, he doth not ſtraie from his end. The ſame may we ſaie of the gouernour of a houſe, and of a chéefe captaine. Howbeit in diſſoluing of this queſtion, we are not to take anie great paine. For Ariſtotle in bringing of examples ſheweth the matter after ſomwhat a groſſe maner, and was not very carefull that examples ſhould alwaies agrée in all points, but alledged them as they are vſed of the common people. Moreouer, although that to heale, to perſuade, and to ouercome, doo not alwaies followe the actions of phyſicians, rhetoritians, and ſouldiers; yet can it not be denied of anie man, but that theſe faculties hauehave reſpect vntounto theſe things, & indeuor as much as they can to attaine vntounto them.
Laſtlie, bicauſe we are in hand with ends, How a worke can be the end of an action, when it is after the action.there is a doubt how anie worke is the end of an action, or of an art. For if the thing be conſidered which is made by the artificer, the ſame is the effect, & therfore not the cauſe. For it behooueth that the cauſe be before the effect, and nothing can be before it ſelf. Here doo ſome anſwere, that the thing made, is the end, not in reſpect it is extant and now perfect, but in that it was firſt comprehended in the artificers mind. And a thing may be before it ſelfe in a ſundrie reſpect; for it is firſt pondered in the mind of the artificer, before it be in act. But I ſtaie not my ſelfe with this anſwere: for that ſame knowne forme which is conuerſant in the mind of the artificer, hath a reſpect of him that is the efficient thereof: for as an obiect it mooueth his mind. Beſides this, it is not the artificers deſire to hauehave ſuch a forme as he hath conceiued in his mind, but would hauehave it to be expreſſed in the thing, and directeth it therevnto, as to the end. Wherefore the outward thing it ſelfe is the finall cauſe, not in that it is extant or brought to paſſe, but in that it hath a reſpect of good, and that either the efficient partie, or elſe his action is made perfect thereby. I grant that theſe things ought firſt to be vnderſtood and knowen of the efficient partie, but I denie that theſe things hauehave the nature of an end, in that they be formes and ſhapes conceiued in the mind, but in reſpect of thoſe things which they ſignifie and repreſent vntounto the vnderſtanding of the artificer.
11 Moreouer, Why manie ends are referred vntounto one.there be manie arts ioined togither vntounto one, and manie ends alſo vntounto one certeine end, that they may reach vntounto that, for the which man hath his béeing. And it muſt bée vnderſtood, that as faculties are more excellent among them ſelues, ſo are alſo their ends. The examples of Ariſtotle are drawne from the art of thoſe that make bits for horſes, and of other arts, of trappers & ſaddles for horſes, all which he affirmeth to be conteined vnderunder the facultie of riding of horſes. Alſo of the ſame art of riding of horſes, and of all other warlike actions, as to ride, to ſhoote, to throwe a dart, to weare ſhéelds, there is one architectonicall or principall art. Whervpon he ſaith, that vnderunder the art of warre, are conteined all theſe things: and it is to be vnderſtood, that the ſame principall art, or architectonicall facultie, dooth command and preſcribe vntounto thoſe inferior ſorts which it hath vnderunder it, and that the end thereof dooth gouerne the ends of them. Why art is called power.Ariſtotle in his booke of Ethicks calleth art, power, reſpecting (ſaith Euſtratius) the matter. For euen as the matter is power, and by power is knowen: euen ſo arts are in power to atteine, or not to atteine their end. A phyſician dooth ſometime heale, and ſometime he looſeth his labour: an orator otherwhile perſuadeth, and otherwhile bringeth not this to paſſe. Alſo they are in power vntounto contraries: as a phyſician both may heale, and may alſo hurt the health: an orator may perſuade and diſſuade: a Logician may prooue and confute.
Againe Ariſtotle affirmeth, that there is no difference betwéene the woorthines of faculties, whether they hauehave worke for their end, or whether they hauehave action. For if a facultie ſhould in that reſpect be counted more noble, bicauſe after the act it would leaue a worke: then would carpenters art be better than the art of ciuill profeſſion, whereas felicitie is ordeined to be the end of ciuill profeſſion, which felicitie is no worke, but an action: which would be moſt abſurd, ſince nothing can bée found better or more happie than felicitie. And this alſo we ſhewed before: neither is this doctrine weakened by that former diſtinction of ends, that otherwhile ſome are actions, and that other are ſometime works.
But herein is a doubt, that when Ariſtotle gathereth a worthines of euerie end by the noblenes of the facultie, what kind of demonſtration this is. And we anſwere, that it is of the effects, or (as they commonlie call it) of that which followeth. For in verie déede faculties doo drawe their excellencie and worthines from their ends. That the excellencie of ends and faculties, is aſwell towards the one as the other.Wherefore ſince they be made excellent by them, to trie the excellencie of the ends by the worthines of the faculties, is to procéede from the effects to the cauſes, although this propoſition is true, which waie ſoeuer ye turne it. For as we ſaie that the end of the better facultie is the better; ſo likewiſe we may ſaie, that it is the nobler facultie which ſhall hauehave the worthier end.
12 Now ſince the matter is on this wiſe, let vsus ſée how theſe things agrée with the holie ſcriptures. Sundrie ends of chriſtians in working.Firſt, we will grant, that a Chriſtian man in working hath manie ends. For ſometimes he hath herevnto reſpect, that he may call vponupon God him ſelfe, that he may celebrate his name, that he may giuegive thanks, and ſuch like, where he hath reſpect vntounto God without anie meane. But ſometime he laboreth to reſtore himſelfe, and by vertues and excellent actions to recouer the image of God, wherevnto he was created. Sometimes alſo, yea, and that verie often, he is occupied in the helping of other men, either by his riches, or by doctrine, or by counſell. Wherfore it is manifeſt, that euen of a Chriſtian life there be manie ends, which ends neuertheles, as we ſaie, hauehave degrées and order among themſelues. But whereas Ariſtotle ſaith, that where the worke remaineth after the act, That the works of Chriſtians are not better than the working thereof.the worke it ſelfe is better than the working therof going before, it ſéemes not to hauehave place in our ends, if we ſpeake vniuerſallie. For when a man being mooued with charitie, ſhall cloth a poore man, nouriſh, heale, and inſtruct him; it is certeine that after the act, he leaueth a worke behind, namelie, health, nouriſhment, or raiment, or inſtruction in the poore man: in which kind of works, the action which goeth before, namelie obedience towards God, and the vſe of charitie, are farre more pleaſing vntounto God, and more to be eſtéemed, than the worke remaining after the act, ſéeing that is tranſitorie, and ſhall periſh. What order the ends of Chriſtians hauehave.But how in him that profeſſeth himſelfe a Chriſtian, the ends which be many, may hauehave an order among themſelues; it may be perceiued in faith, hope, and charitie. For as the faith is greater, and God more knowen by it, the more is charitie inflamed about the end thereof: in ſuch ſort that the end, and as they ſaie, the obiect of faith dooth preſcribe vntounto charitie: and ſo much as the confidence is towards God, ſo much is the louelove towards our neighbour. Wherefore the end of charitie, which is the good of our neighbour, is thus conteined vnderunder the end of faith, and ſo it cauſeth that the power of faith as touching this matter, excelleth and is better than the power of charitie. And thirdlie, as the faith is firme, and the charitie actiue; ſo the hope is more conſtant, and with a ſtronger patience and fortitude, we expect the performance of Gods promiſes, in how much we apprehend thoſe things with a greater faith, and hauehave more fruitfullie exerciſed our ſelues by charitie. And ſo theſe thrée powers, namelie faith, hope, and charitie, ſhould bée ſufficient vntounto that which we would ſhew. But when the order of the table of the ten commandements is ſet before vsus, we may manifeſtlie in them declare the ſelfe-ſame thing. For the firſt table hath reſpect vntounto God without anie meane, but the other is directed vntounto our neighbour. And wée muſt vnderſtand that there is a greater dignitie of the firſt table, and that the end thereof is more noble, bicauſe it conteineth the other, and hath them vnderunder it, as it were the chéefe builder, bicauſe the end of the latter table is ruled and gouerned of the firſt. Whervpon Luther in his Catechiſme did in euerie precept of the later table, moſt prudentlie repeat the end of the firſt table. For example: Bicauſe God is to be loued with all the hart, and with all the ſoule; therefore thou ſhalt not kill. Againe, bicauſe God is to be loued with all the hart, and with all the ſoule, thou ſhalt not commit adulterie.
13. When Ariſtotle had ſet downe that there is a certeine principall end preſcribed vntounto men, he then exhorteth vsus to ſearch the knowledge thereof. Then in ſearching out of the ſame, he pronounceth that he would treate of two things; namelie, to expound what it is, then, vntounto what ſcience or facultie it belongeth. As touching the firſt, let this be the propoſition: The knowledge of the principall end is to be ſought for. He bringeth a reaſon from profitablenes. That which profiteth our life is to be ſought for, The knowledge of this end is of great importance vntounto life, Therfore we muſt obtaine the ſame. He prooueth the Minor propoſition by a ſimilitude of archers. Ariſtotle precéedeth verie artificiallie. For bicauſe, if there were no ſuch end, who would labour to attaine therevnto? Again…, if there were ſuch an end, and ſhould bring no profit vntounto vsus, the knowledge thereof would be vnprofitable. Laſtlie, if it ſhould profit, and yet not much, we would giuegive ouer the ſtudie of knowing the ſame. But now, ſince there is ſuch an end, and that it profiteth, and is of great importance to the whole life, we are moſt earneſtlie ſtirred vp to ſearch out the ſame. The example of archers hath reſpect vntounto this, that euen as they, if they hauehave not the marke in their eie, doo hit at all aduentures; but hauing the marke fixed, they doo it with effect and artificiallie: ſo wée likewiſe, hauing fixed in our mind the principall good, ſhall not deale by chance, but by reaſon. And certeinlie he walketh not rightlie in his iournie, which knoweth not the end of his waie.
The holie ſcriptures teach that the knowlege of the end is profitable.Neither doo the holy ſcriptures diſſent from this opinion, that the knowledge of the chéefe end is profitable. For why did Chriſt ſo long teach in the earth? Why did he ſend his Apoſtles into the world to preach? Why did hée hid men to followe him, but that they might at the length knowe the principall end? For the not knowing whereof he complained, that the people did ſtraie like vntounto ſhéepe without a ſhepheard.
As touching the ſcience or facultie, whereto this principall end belongeth, Ariſtotle ſaid is the ciuill knowledges, ſéeing it is that which ruleth other arts, and hath them ſubiect vntounto it; and dooth vſe them. Let this be the propoſition: It belongeth vntounto the ciuill power to take order as touching the laſt or chéefe end. Wherevpon the argument is framed in this forme. This matter belongeth vntounto that ſcience which is moſt architectonicall, The metaphor borrowed of building.Such is the ciuill ſcience, wherfore it belongeth thervnto to treate of the principall end. The Maior propoſition was declared before, when it was ſaid, that of the better facultie is the better end. The Minor is prooued, namelie, that the ciuill facultie is the higheſt and moſt architectonicall.
14. But (whatſoeuer Ariſtotle ſaith) that propertie of principall power, or (as he calleth it) architectonicall, muſt be aſſigned to the power of the diuine ſcriptures; for therein is conteined the chéefe and principall knowledge of the moſt perfect good. Wherefore God ſaid vntounto the Iſraelites, that the ſame ſhould be their chéefeſt wiſedome, whereby they ſhould at the length he had in admiration of all nations. Which if it were then true, when they had receiued onelie the lawe, what ſhall wée afterward iudge, when the writings of the prophets, & volumes of the new teſtament, were added? Here without doubt is the ſcience and facultie which beareth rule ouer all others, and which hath all others vnderunder it, how excellent ſoeuer they be, and vſeth all things vnderunder hir end. For that which was ſaid of the ciuill knowledge, that it may decrée what arts and ſciences the common weale ſhould admit, The holie ſcriptures preſcribe what arts muſt be admitted.and which it ought to refuſe, that we find is moſt exquiſitelie doone in the holie ſcriptures. For thoſe allow magiſtrates, they will there ſhould be paſtors, biſhops, and teachers; alſo that there ſhould be handie crafts, that poore men might labour, and by their indeuour prouide neceſſaries, not onelie for them ſelues, but for others alſo, whom otherwhile it behooueth to helpe. And contrariwiſe, they exclude ſorcerers, witches, and ſouthſaiers, and alſo the art of harlots and brothers. And as that ciuill facultie forbad to appoint what arts euerie one ſhould addict them ſelues vntounto, bicauſe all men are not apt to all things: Alſo they teach what arts euerie one ſhould learne.ſo the holie ſcriptures command, that wée confound not vocations, and that no one man intrude him ſelfe into an other mans calling. Let euerie man (ſaith the apoſtle) abide in the vocation wherein he was called. For if thou ſhalt be in matrimonie, 1. Cor. 7, 10.ſet not aſide houſhold affaires, the care I meane of wife, children, and familie, ſo as thou wouldeſt prepoſterouſlie take to thy ſelfe ſole life. But if, on the other ſide, thou liueſt a ſole life, and therein dooeſt more promote the glorie of God, and haſt ſtrength giuen thée from the holie Ghoſt, there hold thée. Againe, ſince that all can not be teachers, prophets, or paſtors, let eueryevery man content him ſelfe with his owne gift, & let him vſe the ſame with all diligence. Alſo the holie ſcriptures doo preſcribe how far foorth wée ſhould procéed in faculties and functions. Alſo how farre wee ſhould proceed in thoſe things.The primitiue church in déed did grant that chriſtians ſhould vſe the old ceremonies, but yet for a litle while onelie. Alſo it commendeth obedience towards magiſtrates, but yet ſo farre foorth as Gods lawe dooth permit. It willeth that a prophet doo inſtruct the people, but yet no longer than it be reuealed to another, 1. Cor. 14, 30Which when it is done (ſaith Paule) let the former hold his peace. Alſo it commendeth and alloweth godlie and chriſtian libertie in meats, Rom. 14.and other outward and ciuill things, but yet ſo farre foorth as the offences of the weake be auoided. Col. 2.It teacheth in like maner a moderation which we ſhould applie to the infirmities of the ſimple, but yet ſo farre foorth as by our diſſembling we confirme no abuſes. Alſo it preſcribeth number, as policie and order: 1. Cor. 14, 27for Paule would that there ſhould be two or thrée prophets which ſhould ſpeake by courſe, and appointed that the gift of toongs ſhould giuegive place to more profitable gifts. Alſo it hath vnderunder it moſt noble functions.Alſo the holie ſcripture hath vnderunder it moſt noble functions; for it commandeth kings, magiſtrates, gouernors of houſholds, & orators. For there is none of all theſe faculties, which hath not ſpeciall precepts appointed vntounto it in the holie ſcriptures, and dooth vſe all theſe magiſtrates and princes, for the defence of godlines, and for the true worſhipping of God: eloquence, that it may perſuade profitable and godlie things: gouernement of houſhold, that new ofſprings may alwaies growe vp vntounto Chriſt: and finallie, all Arts, aſwell to the glorie of Chriſt, as to the profit of our neighbours.
How magiſtrates and miniſters of the Church muſt behaue them ſelues one towards another.15 And now, as I thinke, it may appeare, how the miniſters of churches which profeſſe theſe holie ſcriptures, ſhould behaue themſelues towards magiſtrates, and magiſtrates towards them. They out of the holie ſcriptures drawe precepts and rules of the princes function: thoſe precepts ought the magiſtrate to heare, which alſo if he otherwhile tranſgreſſe, muſt ſuffer admoniſhers, and muſt not be offended, if modeſtlie, and with iuſt reuerence he be corrected. And on the other ſide, when miniſters ſhall behaue them ſelues either negligentlie in their office, or againſt the rules of Gods lawe, they may be kept in their duetie by the magiſtrate: and if they will not amend their faults, they may be remooued from their place. And thus let the miniſterie of the church helpe the ciuill power; and againe, the ciuill power ouerſée the miniſterie, that it may be pure, and profitable to the chriſtian Commonweale.
And in that wée attribute the chéefe power vntounto that wiſedome, which we hauehave in the holie ſcriptures, it muſt not be thought that anie thing is plucked awaie or diminiſhed from ciuill adminiſtration; for that authoritie remaineth ſtill vntounto princes and magiſtrates: but we would onelie ſhew, from whence they them ſelues ought to take the rules and principles of their authoritie, that they ſhould not ſo eſtéeme of the doctrines of the philoſophers, and lawes of men, as they would ſtraie from the moſt pure fountaines of iuſtice and honeſtie, which flowe in the holie ſcriptures. And they ſhall be able to get vntounto them ſelues this knowledge, either be diligent reading of the holie ſcriptures by them ſelues, which God commanded kings to doo: or elſe they may bée inſtructed by miniſters of the church. And whereas it is ſaid, that it belongs to the ciuill power to hauehave authoritie ouer thoſe profeſſions which are to be reteined in a citie, and ouer thoſe which are to be reiected from thence: let princes & magiſtrates vnderſtand, that the regard of diuine worſhip belongeth vntounto them; namelie, that they preſerue, promote, and defend that which is lawfull, and that they prohibit, and vtterlie roote out that which is vnpure & forbidden.