Common Places, Part 1 · Chapter 17 · Section 1
IT remaineth now, that we intreate of the queſtion; In 2. Sam. 17. verſe. 22.Whether God be the author of ſinne? For aſwell the curſe of Semei, 2. Sa. 16, 10.as the defiling of Dauids concubins, …. 12, …1.may ſéeme at the firſt vew to procéed from God. For as touching the curſe, Dauid him ſelfe ſaid, that it came from God. And as touching the adulterie of Dauids concubins, it was ſpoken by Nathan vnderunder the perſon of God. Wherefore it may verie well be called in controuerſie, whether God be the author of ſinne. Arguments inferring God not to be the author of ſin.And trulie there are verie manie and ſtrong arguments of both ſides: a good part of them I will recite, vntounto the which all the reſt may be referred. God can not trulie & rightlie be ſaid to be the cauſe of ſinne. Excellent is the ſentence of Auguſtine, in his booke of 83. queſtions; God is not the author of anie thing, whereby a man becommeth the woorſe: But no man doubteth that men are the woorſe through ſinne, Therfore God can not properlie be called the author of ſinne. It is not likelie, that God will deforme man: artificers deſire to adorne their works. Further, God him ſelfe generallie in the ſcripture profeſſeth him ſelfe a reuenger of ſinnes. If he be a reuenger, he is no author; for then he ſhould puniſh his owne. If he were trulie the cauſe of ſinne, he ſhould condemne that which he made, which thing is abſurd. Thirdlie it is ſaid, that He loueth thoſe things which he made, and hateth nothing that he hath made. But he teſtifieth that he did hate ſinne, therefore he dooth not inforce to ſinne. To hate and to louelove are contrarie; wherefore both can not be ſpoken of one thing, at one and the ſelfe ſame time. If he hate ſinne, then he loueth it not; but if ſo be it were of God, it ſhould be beloued: for God loueth thoſe things which he made. If God were the cauſe of ſinne, he in the bringing foorth of ſinne, ſhould ſinne; he that ſtealeth, is a théefe; he that committeth murther, is a manqueller: but far be it from God, that he ſhould be either ſaid to ſinne, or to be a ſinner. What is elſe to ſinne, but to ſtraie from the right end? But God is infinite, and can not be lead awaie from the end by another greater force. He is not ignorant, that he can ſtraie from the end; for he is moſt wiſe. And that he him ſelfe ſhould cauſe others to ſinne, it ſéemeth to be abſurd.
Let vsus conſider what is doone among theſe naturall things created by God. There be manie efficient cauſes; it ſéemeth that euerie efficient cauſe coueteth to make that like vntounto it ſelfe, whereabout it worketh. Fire, if it take hold vponupon wood, ſo worketh, as thoſe things, wherevpon it worketh, may be made like vntounto it ſelfe; a man dooth procreate a man. Thus in things created doo agents worke; whie ſhall we not ſaie, that in Gods dooings, his indeuour is to make like vntounto him ſelfe; and that therefore he ſinneth not? The holie ſcriptures teach vsus the ſame; they bring in lawes which ſtirre vp good works, but ſinnes at no time. If God ſhould prouoke ſinne, or would it to be doone, he ſhould ſéem to be an hypocrite; he ſhould cloſlie and ſecretlie doo another thing, than he openlie pretendeth. Ieremie ſpake of falſe prophets; Iere. 23, 21.They ranne, but I ſent them not; they propheſied, and I ſpake not with them; namelie, that they ſhould ſpeake this thing. Oſeas ſaith; Oſe. 13, 9.Thy ſaluation, ô Iſrael, is of me, thy perdition is of thy ſelfe. But no man is ignorant that ſinne is the cauſe of perdition. If perdition were of Iſrael, then ſinne alſo: but ſaluation, and whatſoeuer goeth before ſaluation, is of God. If ſaluation and perdition, being the effects, be thus diſtinguiſhed; the cauſes alſo muſt be diſtinguiſhed, the one to be of God, and the other of man. Sin ſhall procéed of men, and vertues of God. More manifeſt is that which is written in the eight chapter of Iohn, where Chriſt ſpeaking of the diuell, ſaith; Iohn. 8, 44.When he ſpeaketh lies, he ſpeaketh of his owne: if of his owne, he hath no néed to be ſtirred vp of another. And againe, Iohn. 3, 13.This is the condemnation of man, that light came into the world, but they loued darkenes more. Iames teſtifieth, Iames. 1, 13.that God tempteth no man. But by temptation, men are prouoked vntounto ſin: wherefore if God were the cauſe of ſin, it might not be ſaid, that he tempteth not anie man. It is concupiſcence whereby we be tempted, and that is not of God, but of the world.
2 In the ſecond of Paralipomenon, the laſt chapter, there is a ſpeciall place, 2. Par. 36, verſe. 15.where the cauſe of the deſtruction of Ieruſalem is giuen and aſcribed to the ſins of the people: and in ſuch ſort it is ſo diſprooued, that God is the author of ſin, as God teſtifieth that he would it otherwiſe: wherefore the cauſe muſt not be laid vponupon God. He ſent his prophets (ſaith hée) betimes in the morning, but they hardened their hart. Chriſt wept ouer the citie of Ieruſalem; he was ſorie for the ouerthrowe thereof. If the effect diſpleaſed him, much rather did the cauſe: he wept, bicauſe they ſo ſinned, as they deſerued vtter deſtruction. If Chriſt wept, who not onelie was man, but verie God alſo, he was diſpleaſed with ſins: therefore God is not the authour of ſinne. Neither can it be affirmed, that God is the cauſe of ſin, vnleſſe we will charge him with tyrannie, in that he condemneth men for their ſins, bicauſe they hauehave done wickedlie, whome yet after a ſort he hath led vntounto wickednes. Tyrants are woont to ſet foorth lawes, and then to prouide cunninglie that their ſubiects may commit ſome thing againſt thoſe lawes, whereby they may puniſh them. Moreouer, the ſcripture attributeth vntounto God the iudgement ouer all fleſh: Gen. 18, 25. Iere. 25, 31.but how ſhall he iudge the world of ſin, if he himſelfe hauehave bin the author of ſin? In the third chapter to the Romanes; Rom. 3, 5.If our righteouſnes doo ſet foorth the righteouſnes of God, is God vniuſt for puniſhing? that it may be perceiued how abſurd a thing it is, that our ſins ſhould make to the glorie of God: for if they make to the glorie of God, why doth he condemne them? If the reaſon be there of force, it more ſtronglie concludeth in this place. If God be the cauſe of ſin, how ſhal he iudge the world? Alſo there will ſéeme to be in him two wils, and thoſe one contrarie to the other: but in God there is onlie one will; if there ſhould be more, they would be one againſt another, as touching one and the ſelfe-ſame thing; ſo that he would hauehave vsus both not to doo, and to doo the ſelfe-ſame things. We will demand, to what purpoſe are ſo manie exhortations, perſuaſions, and callings to doo well, in the holie ſcriptures? All theſe things will ſéeme to be vaine. To what end did Chriſt giuegive warning vntounto Iudas, Matt. 26, 24.if he would be betraied of him? Theſe ſpéeches may ſéeme to be doone as it were in game. But God dealeth grauelie and earneſtlie in thoſe things, which he dealeth with men. Alſo there would followe a great abſurditie; for the differences betwéene good and euill, and betwéene vertue and ſin, would be taken awaie. God ſhould be appointed the authour of both; whereas he being the ſouereigne good, there can procéed nothing but goodnes from him. If a man ſhould deteſt murther, adulterie, and inceſt, he would ſaie; it is a good work. The matter would be brought to ſuch a paſſe, as good would be called euill, and euill good: yea rather there would be no difference at all betwixt them. For through the will of God, whereby he forbiddeth and commandeth anie thing, we iudge of good and euill: but by this meanes we ſhould be void of all iudgement.
In like maner would be taken awaie the iudgements of our conſciences. We reade in the epiſtle to the Romanes, Rom. 2, 15.that we hauehave cogitations, which ſhall defend and accuſe one another in the iudgement of the Lord. If this other opinion were true, we will gather, that we ſhould not accuſe our ſelues, but God the author. There is plentie of excuſe for the wicked, they will ſaie; Wherefore néed I to repent for this thing, ſéeing God himſelfe is the author of it? Repentance will be taken awaie, and a windowe opened vntounto great miſchéefes. Wherefore ſhall we giuegive thanks vntounto God, bicauſe he hath deliuered vsus from our ſins? But ſin was good; It had bin all one to hauehave lien ſtill in ſin; We will not lament our ſins, but rather reioiſe in them, for it is the worke of God; it is méete that we ſhould reioiſe for the works of God. If God himſelfe be the author of ſin, praiſe and reioiſing will followe; but not ſorrowe. Much will be drawne awaie from the eſtimation of God, if he ſhould be put the author of ſin. That ſaieng alſo, which they ſhew, might be brought; namelie, 1. Tim. 2, 4.that God would hauehave all men to be ſaued. If he will hauehave them to be ſaued, he vſeth good meanes; he incourageth not men to ſin: for ſins doo leade men to perdition. Manie more reaſons might be brought, but for this time we will content our ſelues with theſe.
Arguments on the contrarie part.3 Let vsus ſée on the other part, what things they be that might affirme God to be the cauſe of ſin. In the firſt chapter to the Romanes it is written; Rom. 1, 24.that Seeing the idolaters knew God, and would not worſhip him as God, therefore (as méet it was) he gaue them vp vntounto a reprobate ſenſe, and vntounto ſhamefull luſts. If he gaue them, he alſo prouoked and mooued them. In Exodus it is written, Exod. 9, 12.that God had hardened and dulled the hart of Pharao, ſo that he would not hearken, when Moſes commanded him in the name of God to let the people depart. In the ſixt of Eſaie, Eſaie. 6, 10.He is ſaid to blind the people, that they ſhould not ſee. When we powre out our praiers before God, we deſire him that he Matt. 6, 13.Lead vsus not into temptation, but that he will deliuer vsus from euill. To what end ſhould we thus praie, if theſe things ſhould not ſometimes be? No man intreateth, except for thoſe things which may be, or which doo hang ouer his head, or which he feareth will come to paſſe. They are woont to ſaie, that God dooth and willeth theſe things, not as they be ſinnes, but in reſpect that they be puniſhments to chaſten him that hath ſinned. But it is hard to appoint the puniſhment and fault to be all one thing, ſéeing the nature of puniſhment and fault is diuers. A fault ariſeth from the will, whereas puniſhment is laid vponupon vsus againſt our will. If it be committed voluntarilie, then it is no puniſhment. To affirme a thing to be voluntarie, and yet vnuoluntarie, can hardlie be made to agrée. That, which is the cauſe of a cauſe, may alſo be called the cauſe of the effect: but no man doubteth but that God hath giuen vsus a will, inclinations, properties and effects, whereby we are prouoked to ſinne. If God be ſaid to be the cauſe of theſe things, why dare we not ſaie that he is the cauſe of ſinnes? That which remooueth the impediments, if the thing afterward happen, or the effect followe, it ſhall be called the cauſe of ſinne. What dooth chéefelie let ſinnes? Euen grace, and the good ſpirit of God: except theſe kéepe vsus backe, we ſhall ruſh hedlong into moſt gréeuous crimes. Who can remooue grace, or take awaie the ſpirit, but onelie God which gaue them? If he remooue the lets, no doubt but he is ſome cauſe of ſinnes. Alſo, he that miniſtreth an occaſion of anie thing, he ſéemeth to be an authour thereof: although he be not the chéefeſt cauſe, if he giuegive an occaſion he ſhall not faile to be called authour. God knew the hardneſſe of Pharaos hart, and he knew that he being not holpen by the ſpirit, would be prouoked to ſin. So The lawe is ſaid to increaſe ſinne, Rom. 7, 1.if it be not propoſed to the regenerate: for we alwaies bend our ſelues vntounto that which we be forbidden, and couet that which we be denied. God commandeth [Pharao] to let the people go; what is this, but to offer an occaſion that he might be the more hardened? We cannot denie but that God dooth miniſter occaſions: yea, and he not onelie giueth occaſions, but we can alſo ſhew commandements wherein he commandeth ſinne. We hauehave in the hiſtorie of the kings, that Achab was a wicked prince; that God determined to puniſh him in battell; he would hauehave him brought to this by the flatteries and falſe perſuaſions of falſe prophets. God is brought in to talke with the ſpirits; Who can ſeduce Achab? There ſtept foorth an euill ſpirit which ſaid; 1. kin. 22, 22.I will be a lieng ſpirit in the mouth of the falſe prophets. God alloweth and commandeth it; Go thy waies, doo ſo. He giueth incouragement; It ſhall be ſo.
Further, we cannot denie, but that ſinne is a certeine humane action: but euerie déed, as it coms in act, dependeth of the firſt principle of all things. God is (as the Philoſophers acknowledge him) Actus.Primus actus, the firſt agent. Vnleſſe he be the vpholder, there can be no agent: wherefore ſinne dependeth on God, as vponupon the cauſe efficient. Sinnes for the moſt part be motions; and motions hauehave an order, ſo as the inferiour dependeth vponupon the ſuperiour: therefore the cauſe of ſinne, ſo far-foorth as it is a motion, is directed vntounto his owne moouer. Auguſtine hath certeine teſtimonies of this thing, and confirmeth it alſo by ſome places of the ſcripture. In his booke De gratia & libero arbitrio, the twelfe chapter, he ſaith; that There is no doubt, but that God worketh in mens minds, to make their wils incline, either to good according to his merciemercy, or vntounto euill according to their merits; by his iudgement vndoubtedlie which ſometime is open, ſometime ſecret, but euermore iuſt. In the beginning of that chapter he ſaith; Who can but tremble at theſe horrible iudgements of God, whereby he worketh what he will in the harts of the wicked, yéelding to euerie one according to his deſerts? And he addeth; He verelie worketh in the harts of men the motions of their will, and by them he dooth thoſe things that he will doo, who neuertheles cannot will anie thing vniuſtlie. This he prooueth by the ſcriptures. In the firſt of kings we hauehave the hiſtorie of Roboam, 1. Kin. 12, 15who harkned not to the counſell of the ancients, that he ſhould deale mildlie with the people. But it is ſaid, that this turning away was of the Lord, to the intent he might eſtabliſh the ſaieng of Ahia the Silonite. Wherefore (as Auguſtine expoundeth it) that naughtie will was of the Lord. He alledgeth another place, out of the ſecond booke of Chronicles, the 21. chapter. 2. Par. 21, 16.God ſtirred vp the Philiſtines and Arabians againſt Ioram, which followed idolatrie; God was minded to puniſh him. Vndoubtedlie the motions of the minds in the Philiſtines and Arabians were wicked againſt Ioram, inſomuch as they inuaded other mens countries, and were infected with crueltie; and yet God is ſaid to hauehave ſtirred them vp. In the ſame hiſtorie of kings, 2. Kin. 14, 8.there is ſpeaking of Amaſias, which prouoked Ioas the king of Iſrael vntounto battell. Yea and Ioas himſelfe, 2. Par. 25, 14and alſo the prophet of the Lord diſcouraged him from the purpoſe; but he being carried with ambition, hearkened not vntounto the godlie admonitions: which thing neuertheles came from God, who would that he ſhould be deliuered into his hands, bicauſe he followed the idols of Edom.
4 We reade in the 14. chapter of Ezechiel; Ezec. 14, 9.If the prophet be deceiued, I hauehave ſeduced him; and I will ſtretch foorth my hand, and will ſmite him. He intreateth of the falſe prophets, which euer betwéene whiles vainlie fed the people. Ieremie ſaith in the fourth chapter, Iere. 14, 10.that God deceiued the people. In the 63. chapter of Eſaie the prophet complaineth; Eſai. 63, 17.Wherefore hath God ſo ſeduced the people, or made them to erre, that they ſhould depart from him? Salomon ſaith in his Prouerbs; Prou. 21, 1.Euen as the violence of waters, ſo is the kings hart in the hand of God. Vndoubtedlie Pharao was a king, therefore he inclined his will vntounto what part he would. Nabuchadnezer was a king, therefore he inclined his will vntounto which part he would. In the 104. pſalme, Pſa. 105, 25.it is ſaid of the Aegyptians, that God turned their harts, ſo as they hated the children of Iſrael: they ſéemed before to louelove the Iſraelites. In the ſecond epiſtle to the Theſſalonians, the ſecond chapter; 2. Theſ. 2, 11Bicauſe men caſt awaie the louelove of the truth, therefore God ſent them ſtrong illuſions, that they might giuegive credit vntounto lies. It is written in the eleuenth chapter of Ioſua, Ioſua. 11, 20that None made peace with the children of Iſrael, among all the nations of the Chanaanites, ſaue onelie the Gabeonites. For God incouraged their hart to fight againſt the Iſraelites. And it is added, vntounto what end; namelie, that they ſhould be wéeded out by them. Aſſuredly, he did animate them, that they ſhould not deſire to hauehave peace, but rather to hauehave warre. Moreouer, he that would an end, ſéemeth to will thoſe things, which ſerue vntounto the end; and by the ſame will he would thoſe meanes which craue an end. The phyſician, willing to heale a ſicke man, ſéeth that cutting, or ſearing, or elſe a bitter potion is fit, and euen theſe he will vſe for recouerie of health. When GOD would that a teſtimonie vntounto the truth ſhould be giuen by the martyrs, and that Chriſt ſhould die, he alſo would thoſe things that ſhould procure this end; namelie, the vexation of the ſaints, and crueltie of kings and people: for it behooued to attaine vntounto that end by theſe kind of meanes. In the prophets, eſpeciallie in Eſaie, Eſai. 10, 5. and 15.kings are ſaid to be in the hand of God, like rods, hammers, and axes; which compariſons hauehave no place, if it were not vnderſtood, that God mooueth the harts: for they be not mooued, vnleſſe they be driuen forward. Alſo when God was diſpleaſed with the people of Iſrael, 2. Sam. 24, 1.he ſtirred vp the hart of Dauid to number that people by the poll; which thing was wicked. It is to ſmall purpoſe, if thou wilt ſaie that in the booke of Chronicls is read, 2. Par. 21, 1.that ſatan prouoked him: for ſatan can doo no more than God giueth him leaue. Whether God did it by himſelfe, or by ſatan, thou ſéeſt that Dauid was ſtirred vp by the will of God, vntounto that which was not lawfull. An obiection.They are woont to excuſe this matter, that God permitteth, but not helpeth. We ſaie, it is not enough; for the offenſe is ſtill left in our minds. God as yet ſéemeth after ſome ſort to will ſinne; he knoweth, that a man cannot ſtand by himſelfe. A ſimilitude.If ſome blind man ſhould walke before vsus, and we ſhould ſée him readie either to ſtumble againſt a ſtone, or to fall into a ditch; and we are preſent, we may helpe him, but we will not, we ſuffer him to go on: now when he falleth, ſhall not we after ſome ſort be ſaid to be guiltie of his fall? For thou wouldeſt hauehave him fall, if thou diddeſt not ſtaie him when thou mighteſt.
And that which yet is more gréeuous; A ſimilitude.if ſo be that an old impotent man were leaning vponupon his ſtaffe, and ſo after a ſort were going, and if ſome man ſhould take awaie his ſtaffe wherevnto he leaned, although he inforced him not to fall, ſhould he not after ſome ſort be called the author of the fall? God taketh awaie his ſpirit from weake men, who without this be not able to go; dooth he not after ſome ſort ſéeme to be the cauſe of their fall? Wherefore, that which they bring, will be a weake defenſe, when they ſaie that God forſaketh men. While we would ſéeme to excuſe GOD, we laie as gréeuous things vntounto him; to wit, that he is no more a God; and while we ſhun the ſmoke, we fall into the fire. If anie things be doone beſides the will of God, whether he will or no; if there be anie effects, wherof he is not the cauſe: he is not then the vniuerſall cauſe of all, nor yet God. An obiection.But he compelleth not to fall; the excuſe will not ſerue. A ſimilitude.Admit there be ſome good man of the houſe, whoſe familie behaueth it ſelfe verie ill: if he be reprooued, he will excuſe himſelfe, ſaieng; I bad them not, I commanded them not: that excuſe ſhall not be counted lawfull; for he ought not to permit that which he could hauehave hindered. Manie times the good man of the houſe cannot let wicked acts, but the power of God is inuincible. There be no wils ſo euill and corrupt, but he can amend and make them good. Anſelmus in his booke De caſu diaboli, the 91. chapter; Why (ſaith he) doo we account it abſurd, that God dooth particular actions by a naughtie will, ſéeing we knowe, that he maketh ſundrie ſubſtances, which are brought foorth by an vnhoneſt action? A ſimilitude.As when a child is procreated by adulterie. That adulterie is euill, no man doubteth, but that child is the creature of God. This ſéemeth twiſe to be affirmed in the Acts of the apoſtles. In the ſecond chapter Act. 2, 23.Peter ſaith of Ieſus the ſonne of God; that The Iewes had taken him, and deliuered him to be ſlaine by the determinate will and counſell of God. Afterward in the fourth chapter, Act. 4, 27.when the church gaue thanks vntounto God, it praieth on this wiſe; Againſt thy holie ſonne Ieſus, both Herod and Pontius Pilat, with the gentiles and people of Iſrael, gathered them ſelues togither, to doo thoſe things that thy hand and thy counſell had determined to be doone. With theſe arguments, wherevnto others might be added, I will hold my ſelfe content.
Of the queſtion.5 Now that we hauehave ſet downe the reaſons for ech part, there remaineth that the queſtion it ſelfe be expounded. Three opinions. The firſt of the Libertines.I find thrée opinions; the firſt is to be deteſted, namelie of the Libertins, which ſaie, that God is all wholie the cauſe of ſinne: and ſo ſaie, as they affirme, all ſinnes to be excuſable, and not to be reprooued, becauſe they be the works of God: and if anie fault ſhould be, they would laie it vponupon God. This one thing they indeuour; namelie, to take awaie from all men the féeling of ſinne. If anie man hauehave committed murther, it is not he (ſaie they) that hath committed it, God hath doone it. And vnleſſe that a man ſo thinke, they ſaie, that he is vnperfect, and can not allow of all Gods works. What can be more wickedlie imagined? The diuell could not hauehave found out a readier waie to hell. Let theſe men go to perdition, ſéeing we can not mend them: let vsus praie vntounto God that he will take awaie theſe peſtilent perſons out of the church. The ſecond opinion.The ſecond opinion is of certeine learned men, who miſlike not that ſenſe, which the ſcriptures appeare to hauehave at the firſt ſight. They ſaie, that God hardeneth, that he puniſheth ſinnes with ſinnes; and finallie, they grant him to be the cauſe of ſinne: but they adde, that theſe actions, ſéeing they procéed from the verie corrupt nature of men, ſo farre foorth as they be of God, hauehave a reſpect to iuſtice; and that men be not excuſed, becauſe they be inclined vntounto theſe things: they laie not the blame vntounto God, who dooth his part rightlie. If (ſaie they) it can not be comprehended by reaſon, how he dooth iuſtlie, and we vniuſtlie; we muſt referre our ſelues to the iudgement of the ſcriptures. There be manie other things, which by mans reaſon we can not knowe, which neuertheles we doo beléeue. The third opinion is of them, The third opinion.which interprete all theſe places of the ſcripture by the words; He ſuffered, He gaue leaue, He permitted, or according to the Gréeke; He did not hinder it, and ſuch like. So they thinke that all dangers are auoided.
6 But what my iudgement is, The definition or hādling of the queſtion.I will not be loth to declare; afterward your owne ſelues ſhall iudge. And that the matter may be the more eaſilie knowen, it ſhall be good to examine it the more déeplie: and ſomewhat I will ſaie, of Euill, vnderunder which generall word, ſinne is conteined. Euill is a certein priuation, What euill is.of good I meane; yet not of euerie good, but of ſuch a good thing as is requiſite for the perfection of euerie creature, which I ſaie belongeth to the perfection of the thing deſpoiled. A ſimilitude.For if we take awaie ſight from a ſtone, it ſhall hauehave no hurt: for that qualitie of nature is not méete for it. Euill being a priuation, can not conſiſt without good: for it muſt hauehave a ſubiect. A ſubiect ſéeing it is a ſubſtance, is a good thing; wherefore euill can not be but in good: euen as blindnes is a priuation of ſight, it hangeth not in the aire, but it ſticketh in the eie. So may it be ſhewed by manie other examples. But not to depart from that which we hauehave in hand; ſinne it ſelfe depriueth mans action of dutifulnes and obedience towards the word of God. Theſe things ought to be in action; but when we ſinne, action is bereft of thoſe good things. And action, ſéeing it is a certeine thing, it is in his owne nature good; wherefore euill can not be but in good. Moreouer, euill is not deſired for it ſelfe, but men doo ſinne in conſideration of good; for vnleſſe there appeared ſome likeneſſe of good, they would not depart from goodnes. So great therefore is the power of good, as euill can not be except in good, and vntounto good. Wherefore rightlie hauehave the wiſe men ſaid, that we may grant, there is the chéefeſt good; but not affirme that there is the chéefeſt euill, which can depriue good altogither: for then it ſhould deſtroie it ſelfe. It might hauehave no ſubiect wherin it ſhould be, nor yet outward ſhew, whereby it ſhould be deſired. To ſpeake now of euill; it is diſtinguiſhed into puniſhment, and fault. Fault is called that which we commit againſt the lawe of God; puniſhment is that which is laid vponupon vsus for ſinne: and that alſo hath a priuation of ſome commoditie; as when God ſendeth ſickneſſe, ſickneſſe is the priuation of health, and hath place in the bodie of a liuing creature. He ſendeth famine and barenneſſe, which is the priuation of fertilitie; and it is in the earth it ſelfe: this (I ſaie) belongeth vntounto puniſhment. But ſinne taketh place in the mind onelie: puniſhments doubtleſſe may both be in the mind, and in the bodie. There is added a third member, which is ſo a puniſhment, as it is alſo ſinne: as originall ſinne is, ſo is the naturall corruption left after baptiſme. Theſe things thus concluded, I put foorth a certeine ſentence or propoſition to be confirmed, the which hath two parts. The firſt is, A propoſition, whereby the queſtion is defined.that God is not by him ſelfe and properlie the cauſe of ſinne. The ſecond is, that there is nothing doone in the world, no not ſinnes them ſelues, without his will, determination, and prouidence.
That God by him ſelfe is not the cauſe of ſinne.7 To prooue the queſtion, it behoueth to confirme it as touching both parts. Let vsus ſpeake of the firſt; that God by him ſelfe is not the cauſe of ſinne. VntoUnto this purpoſe ſerue the arguments in the firſt place. But I adde, that when good or euill are oppoſed, as Habit and Priuation; the habit by it ſelfe dooth neuer bring in priuation. Light it ſelfe dooth alwaies illuminate, it neuer bringeth in darknes. Wherefore if we put good and euill as contrarie priuatiues, euill ſhall not be of good. God is the chéefeſt good, let vsus then put him to be the habit: wherefore by him ſelfe and properlie, he maketh no priuation. But I ſaid that he is not the cauſe of ſinne by him ſelfe and properlie. Theſe words I hauehave added, bicauſe, if we will ſpeake leſſe properlie, he may be ſaid after ſome ſort to be either the beginning, or the cauſe of ſinne: not indéed the proper cauſe; God is of ſinne the remouing or prohibiting cauſe. Two ſimilitudes.but that cauſe, which of the philoſophers is called remouing or prohibiting. I will make the matter plaine by ſimilitudes. The ſunne is altogither bright, the proper effect therof is to make light; yet after ſome maner it may be ſaid to make darknes, not in that it ſhineth, but in that it is mooued, and departeth from one place to an other. For bodies be round, therfore when it departeth, it can not alwaies by reaſon of the motion, giuegive light to that place from whence it went, but ſhadowes doo come betwéene: ſo then after ſome ſort it is ſaid to make darkneſſe by the departure thereof; bicauſe bodies are ſo ordered, and it ſelfe is mooued.
So likewiſe it happeneth as touching ſome ruinous houſe; it is held vp by a prop, ſome man approching remooueth the prop, the ſtones and buildings through their owne weight fall downe from the top; which things hauehave in them ſelues the cauſes of their comming downe: yet notwithſtanding, he which taketh awaie the prop, is ſaid after a ſort to cauſe the fall: for he remooueth the ſtaie which letted the ruine. In like maner God, in his owne nature is good, yet in reſpect that he is iuſt, he will puniſh ſinners; he taketh awaie his grace, and after ſome ſort may be called the cauſe of thoſe things which afterward be naughtilie doone; yet not the true cauſe: for that proper cauſe is inward, that is to wit, the naughtie will of them. But whie he ſometimes taketh awaie his ſpirit from men, a reaſon may be yéelded; when they ſinne, he remooueth his grace from them, not onlie to the intent he may puniſh, but that the excellencie of his fauour may be knowen: and to let vsus vnderſtand, that that which God giueth, he giueth it fréelie, and that it is not of nature. For if we ſhould alwaies hauehave [his grace] and after one and the ſelfe ſame maner, as if God would not at ſometime ſtacke his ſtrength, we would attribute vntounto our owne power the good things that we doo. But thus it is, to the intent we may acknowledge our owne infirmitie, and praie the more feruentlie for preſeruation and increaſe of the heauenlie gift. But when the grace and fauour of God is iuſtlie taken awaie from vsus, ſinne dooth naturallie followe: neither is there néede of anie other efficient cauſe; I meane, there néedeth no other cauſe, to come from our infected and corrupt affections.
This appeareth by the ſimilitudes alleaged, if the ſunne be remooued, darkneſſe dooth followe; not through anie efficient cauſe, but by it ſelfe. If the habit be remooued, Similitudes.priuation is ſtraightwaie preſent of his owne accord. If one ſo hurteth his eie, as the ſight be loſt; blindnes dooth immediatlie followe: neither is it néedfull to ſéeke anie other thing that worketh. Which ſéeing the Manicheis perceiued not, they erred moſt ſhamefullie: they would not attribute the cauſe of euill vntounto the good God; but they ſawe that there were manie euils, and they iudged that euils could not be without a true cauſe: wherevpon they affirmed that there be two beginnings. And bicauſe they ſawe a great power to be both in euill, & in good, they brought in two gods; one good, and an other bad. Of theſe we read much in Auguſtine. But that euill, which is ſinne, commeth, if the ſpirit of God be taken awaie: for then man is left vntounto him ſelfe. But whether is he ſo left, as God dooth no more anie thing concerning him, or his ſinne? That this may be vnderſtood, Three ſorts of Gods working about his creatures.I will declare thrée ſorts of working, which we may perceiue in God towards his creatures: not that other works of his can not be ſhewed, but bicauſe theſe thrée doo moſt of all ſerue vntounto the matter we hauehave in hand.
8 Some action of God is generall, The firſt action of God is generall.ſéeing by his prouidence he cheriſheth, ſuſteineth, and gouerneth all things in their conditions, qualities, and inclinations, as they ſtood at the beginning when they were created. And thus is the order of nature preſerued; which thing is excellent to be knowne. We ſée that heauen reteineth his owne nature: ſurelie it hath manie things to be maruelled at. We ſée that the nature of fire is vehement, of aire is pleaſant, of water is flowing: we ſée alſo the mettals, the trées, the works of artificers, which things aſſuredlie be woonderfull. All theſe are gouerned by God; yea, and if he ſhould withdrawe his hand from them, they would fall to nothing. Profitable doubtles is the conſideration of his diuine gouernement. Oftentimes doth God exhort vsus in the pſalmes, to magnifie him for theſe works. Rom. 1, 20.In the firſt to the Romanes it is written, that The Gentiles by theſe creatures did knowe God, and a kind of his euerlaſting force, working, gouernement, and godhead, in ſuch ſort, as Aratus ſaid; We are in verie déed the linage of God. We hauehave an excellent example of this worke in our ſelues. The ſoule which is not ſéene, is indiuiſible, yet it mooueth and quickeneth the whole bodie. Euen ſo all creatures doo reteine their properties and inclinations.
The ſecond kind of Gods working.9 Secondlie, another worke of God is, whereby the creatures are not onlie preſerued and ruled, but doo alſo obeie the counſels of God. For God vſeth the actions of all things, euen of men, and of euill men: he vſeth them (I ſaie) for the eſtabliſhment of his purpoſes. When he fauoreth his owne, he giueth them plentifull increaſe of fruits; the raine falleth earlie and late. But if he will of his iuſtice puniſh the wicked, nothing commeth well to paſſe; there is giuen a heauen of braſſe, and an earth of iron: if the fruits be ripe, they periſh in one night. Theſe things muſt not be aſcribed vntounto fortune. When we knowe not the cauſe, we take it to be fortune; wherevpon the poet ſaith,
A goddeſſe Fortune we thee call,
And place thee high in heauenlie ſtall.
Wherefore we muſt not occupie our ſelues alonelie in a generall conſideration of things of the world, How ſins do ſeruice vntounto God.but we muſt weigh the vſe wherein they ſerue the prouidence of God; whereas ſin commeth of proper cauſes, I meane of our owne will, and corrupt affections, yet doth the ſame ſerue God alſo. A ſimilitude; There be manie poiſons in the world, A ſimilitude.they hauehave manie and dangerous qualities; yet the phyſician occupieth them, and the magiſtrate rightlie vſeth them. The phyſician by tempering of the poiſons, healeth the ſicke: the magiſtrate at Athens gaue poiſon for the taking awaie of ſuch as were guiltie. So was Socrates compelled to drinke hemlocke. Although therefore poiſons are euill, yet may the magiſtrate and the phyſician vſe them well for the ſafetie of the common-weale, and preſeruation of the ſicke. Euen ſo God ruleth ſins (which hauehave their proper cauſes corrupted) for the performing & bringing foorth of his counſels to act. I might alſo vſe another ſimilitude; Thoſe things which ſéeme to be done of vsus by chance in the world, A ſimilitude.doo moſt of all ſerue the prouidence of God. For the Lord ſaith in the lawe, Exodus 21, and Deut. 19. How things that come by chance ſerue the prouidence of God. Exo. 21, 13. Deut. 19, 2.If two ſhall go togither into the groue to hew wood, & the axe flieth out of one of their hands, and he is ſmitten therewith that ſtood next him, and is ſlaine: this he did vnwittinglie, he ſhall not be guiltie of death. For God deliuered him [therevnto] and that for iuſt cauſes deliuered he him of a determinate purpoſe; we vnderſtand it not, he knoweth it. Euen ſo they which offend, indéed they doo as they would, they hauehave determined with themſelues what they will doo: but yet God vſeth theſe actions. So by the curſe of Semei, God would hauehave the patience of Dauid to be thoroughlie knowne vntounto all men, 2. Sa. 16, 10.and would open his iudgements againſt his adulterie and murther: but this man meant to ſhew his hatred againſt Dauid. God doth that which he will, as touching thoſe crimes which men of another purpoſe committed; not to the intent they might obeie the will of God, but their owne corrupt luſts.
And to returne to the teſtimonie now alledged. He that heweth wood, this he would doo, but the axe hitteth another man, and the hitting ſerueth the counſell of God. Ierome vponupon the twelfe chapter of Ieremie writeth, that Nothing hapneth raſhlie and without prouidence, whether it be good or euill; but that all things come to paſſe by the iudgment of God. Wherefore creatures be certeine inſtruments in the hand of God; The creatures be the inſtruments of God, but not all after one ſort.he vſeth them according to his owne purpoſe. But yet theſe inſtruments bée not all after one ſort; for ſome there be which hauehave no knowledge, nor ſenſe, nor will, and yet neuertheleſſe they doo ſeruice vntounto God. But there be others, which perceiue, vnderſtand, and will thoſe things which they doo, and yet they doo it not alwaies of purpoſe to ſerue God: yea rather they oftentimes vnwillinglie and vnwittinglie doo that which God appointeth. Wherefore we will ſaie, that as well liuing creatures, as not liuing creatures; things hauing ſenſe, and hauing no ſenſe; Angels good and bad, and generallie all creatures be the inſtruments of God, which he vſeth according to the conſideration of his prouidence. He did vſe the Aſſyrians, Chaldaeans, Perſians, Greekes and Romanes, for puniſhment of the wicked Hebrues: he did vſe alſo the diuell againſt Saule and againſt Iob. But it is further to be conſidered, that when God vſeth creatures, eſpeciallie the reaſonable creatures, and euill creatures, ſuch as be euill men and diuels; he doth not ſo vſe them, as though they did nothing themſelues; for euen they themſelues fulfill their owne naughtines, but God vſeth it [to purpoſe.] God dealeth not with theſe as with ſtones, which hauehave no ſenſe at all; they will, they knowe, and they hauehave ſenſe: and when wicked men, and the diuell doo naughtilie, and are mooued by their owne proper luſt, they doo ſeruice vntounto the prouidence of God. They perceiue doubtleſſe, and will, not that their mind is ſuch as they would ſerue God, for they ſéeke their owne. Neither are they ſo moued by the ſuperior cauſe, as they vſe not withall their owne naughtineſſe.
How one worke may be both of God, of the diuell, and of euill men.10 But thou wilt ſaie, that If God after this maner, hauehave recourſe as the chéefeſt cauſe vntounto theſe actions, and that euill men as the next cauſes doo them, it ſhall be all one worke of God, of the diuell, and of naughtie men. This indéed muſt not be denied; but yet this worke commeth far otherwiſe from the ſuperiour good cauſe, than from the next cauſe which is corrupt. This worke, as it is of the diuell, and of wicked men, is euill. It draweth infection from the wickednes of the diuell, and of naughtie men; which being euill trées, cannot bring foorth good fruit. But God, the verie beſt, and chéefeſt cauſe, as he concurreth with theſe actions, dooth them rightlie and in due order. Euen as both God and the diuell would Ieruſalem to be deſtroied, but yet in ſundrie reſpects; God, to the intent he might puniſh the obſtinate; the diuell, that he might fulfill his cruell hatred againſt mankind. Chriſt was to be deliuered vntounto the croſſe, which alſo was doone; and this worke, as it procéeded from the hatred and malice of the Iewes, was euill: but the ſelfe-ſame, in as much as God, through that moſt holie action, would hauehave merciemercy vponupon mankind, had goodnes. Wherefore it is ſaid in the Acts of the apoſtles; Act. 4, 27.that They did thoſe things againſt the Sonne of God, which his counſell and hand had determined. Yet muſt thoſe things which they did againſt Chriſt, méerelie be called euill; bicauſe they hauehave both their name and nature from the next cauſe, although that God rightlie vſed them according to his owne prouidence. The diuell and God exerciſe Iob in a farre ſundrie reſpect; alſo the Sabees, and other robbers ſpoiled his ſubſtance for the ſatiſfieng of their owne hatred: ſo did the diuell. But God did it to prooue his patience, and to teſtifie his good will towards the godlie, by a ioifull deliuerance. Wherefore the works were all one, but the purpoſes were diuerſe. For which cauſe, Iob. 1, 21.when Iob ſaid (The Lord hath giuen, and the Lord hath taken awaie) he praiſeth God, as the chéefeſt cauſe, without whoſe prouidence theſe things were not doone, and whoſe prouidence vſed all things to a good end; yet dooth he not praiſe the robbers, and the diuell. So did Dauid alſo behaue himſelfe; he commended not Semei, he ſaid not that thoſe curſings were of their owne nature good: but turned himſelfe to the prouidence of God. The worke was wicked, yet in ſome reſpect it may be called the worke of God; bicauſe he ruled it and vſed it. Alſo it is ſaid in the prophet; Iere. 48, 10.Curſed be he that dooth the worke of the Lord negligentlie: and the worke of the Lord he calleth the affliction of the people, whereby the wicked ouerpreſſed them. Wherefore, the wicked can not excuſe their ſinnes, in reſpect of this vſe of God: for they hauehave the cauſe of thoſe ſinnes in themſelues. And euen as Gods good vſe of theſe things excuſeth not ſinners, ſo on the other part, the naughtines of ſinners dooth not contaminate the good vſe and prouidence of God, who can excéedinglie well vſe the things which be doone amiſſe.
Auguſtine in his Enchiridion ad Laurentium, Auguſtine.chapter .101. declareth, that It may be, that God and man would one and the ſame thing; It is not alway iuſt for man to will as God willeth.and that God in ſo willing, dooth rightlie; but that man dooth ſinne, although he will thoſe things which God willeth. He bringeth an example. The father of a wicked ſonne ſickeneth, the will of God by his iuſt iudgement is, that he ſhould die of that diſeaſe, the vngratious child alſo would the ſame; but to the intent he may the ſooner come vntounto the inheritance, and be frée from the power of his father: God willeth iuſtlie, but the child vngodlie. And on the other ſide (he ſaith) that It may be, that a man would the thing that God would not, and yet that as well he as God willeth rightlie. Admit that the father, which is ſicke, hauehave a good child; God would that the father ſhould die: the child thorough an honeſt affection would it not, for he is deſirous to hauehave his father liue; they will diuerſlie, and yet they both will iuſtlie. It conſiſteth onelie in the purpoſe of the will; for thereof dependeth oftentimes goodnes and naughtines. But there ariſeth a doubt; An obiection.If that one maner of worke depend both on God and man, and that it drawe naughtines from the infection of man, and that it hath ſome goodnes, in reſpect that God vſeth it, ſo as nothing may eſcape God or his prouidence, wherfore dooth Zacharie in the firſt chapter complaine; Zach. 1, 15.I was but a litle angrie with my people, but they helped forward vntounto euill; that is, they paſſed the bounds. That which they ſinne, ſéemeth to excéede the prouidence of God; ſo as they did more than God had decréed. We anſwere, that It muſt not be vnderſtood, that they did more, than that thing might ſerue to the vſe of Gods prouidence: for there can be nothing at all doone beſides the will of God & his decrées, which be moſt firme. Auguſtine in the ſame Enchiridion ad Laurentium, 102. chapter, ſaith; The will of God is inuincible, how then are they ſaid to hauehave excéeded? Not the bounds of the eternall decrée, duplicate page duplicate page but the iuſt meaſure of victorie. There be certeine bounds, limits, and lawes, which ought to be kept by conquerers. They excéeded that which became them, but that they could doo more than prouidence would vſe, it muſt in no wiſe be granted.
11 The third kind of the works of God wée call that which is proper vntounto the ſaincts; for thereby he moſt mercifullie bringeth manie things to paſſe in them: Phil. 2, 13.for he reigneth, he liueth, and he worketh in vsus both to will and to performe. Otherwiſe in nature we be certeine barren trées, we are blind, we will no good things. The iudgement is corrupted, the will and choiſe is corrupt in thoſe dregs of originall ſin: but God, by his ſpirit, faſhioneth his choſen anew. We hauehave from the beginning a nature giuen according to the ſimilitude of God, wherevnto ſhould be agréeable, to will, to chooſe, to doo theſe things and thoſe things. But in that we can not doo good of our ſelues, it hath procéeded of corruption: but in that we will rightlie, and doo ſerue God by an obedience begun, it is of the ſupernaturall grace of God. Wherefore the firſt kind of Gods works, which belongeth to the vniuerſall prouidence, ſerueth not to the queſtion now in hand. The ſecond kind of working and the third belong vntounto this.
12 Although therefore that God doo gouerne euen ſins and euils; yet he is not properlie ſaid to be the efficient cauſe. Auguſtine in his twelfe booke De ciuitate Dei, the ſeauenth chapter, ſpeaketh verie well as concerning a naughtie will, when he ſaith; That euill hath no efficient cauſe.An euill thing hath no efficient, but a deficient cauſe. And if anie will ſearch out this efficient cauſe, it is euen like as if he would ſée the darkenes with his eies, or comprehend ſilence with his eares: which being priuations, it is no néed that they ſhould hauehave efficient cauſes. Yet neuertheles, they be things knowne vntounto vsus; for there is all one ſenſe of things that bée contrarie. The ſight ſéeth not other than bright things, A ſimilitude.the eare heareth not other than noiſes, and yet by theſe ſenſes we knowe euen theſe things; not by the vſe of them, but by the priuation onlie. A naughtie will doth God vſe, to the ends appointed: not bicauſe he is not able, vnleſſe it be by theſe meanes, to atteine to that which he will; but ſo it pleaſed him to declare his wiſedome and power, that he might ſhew himſelfe able to doo ſomething mediatlie [as they ſaie] and immediatelie: and that it maketh no matter vntounto him, whether the inſtruments that he vſeth be good or bad. Wherefore let vsus ſéeke out what is the deficient cauſe of euill actions, and among the reſt we ſhall find wicked affections and inclinations, The cauſes of euill actions.which ſéeing they fall awaie from the word of God, and from right reaſon, it is no maruell if things that be faultie, procéed there-from. Theſe be the inward cauſes of ſin, but they be rather deficient than efficient cauſes. The diuell alſo is ſaid to be the cauſe of ſin: for we reade in the booke of wiſedome; By the diuell death entred into the world, Wiſd. 1, 24.therefore ſin alſo: for death is the effect of ſin. But yet the diuell can not be called the proper and abſolute cauſe of our ſin: the reaſon is; for that ſuch is the nature of euerie proper and perfect cauſe, that the ſame being put, the effect doth of neceſſitie followe. But in the diuell it is not thus; for although he ſometime ſuggeſt euill things in the mind of the godlie, yet neuertheleſſe ſin doth not alwaie followe. For manie godlie men doo valiantlie reſiſt him, and when ſin followeth not, he can not be called the abſolute and perfect cauſe thereof. In déed, he prouoketh men, but yet not ſo, that ſin muſt of neceſſitie followe.
I might bring another reaſon. Let vsus imagine that the diuell himſelfe had not reuolted from God, and that man had bin created, man could yet of his owne nature hauehave ſinned, and hauehave had the cauſe of ſin in himſelfe: but the ſuggeſtion of the diuell could not hauehave bin the cauſe thereof, when he was not as yet alienated from God: ſo that he is no perfect nor full cauſe of ſin, but a perſuading and alluring cauſe. We hauehave therefore ſhewed from whence ſin hath his deficient cauſe; namelie, from our owne corruption. Yet neuertheles God doth gouerne and rule ſin it ſelfe; he doth not idelie looke on, but he doth the part of a iudge and gouernour: and he leaueth not all things without guiding. But after what ſort is he ſaid to gouerne ſin? Euen as touching time, maner, forme, and matter; In what ſort God gouerneth ſins.to wit, that it is carried ſometimes rather againſt this man, and ſometimes rather againſt that man. Our corruptions lie hidden within vsus, but God ſuffereth not the ſame at all times to breake foorth, nor yet ſo long as the wicked would: he brideleth ſins, and ſometimes interrupteth them. Further, he bringeth to paſſe, that our wickednes ſhall rather bend vntounto one part, than vntounto another; 2. Sam. 16, verſe. 10.as the rage of Semei was more bent againſt Dauid, than againſt another man. And the prouidence of God is ſhewed rather at one time than at another; God directed the power of Nabuchadnezar rather againſt the Hebrues, than againſt their neighbours.Ezec. 21, 21.
13 There is alſo a certeine other thing to bée conſidered of in ſins, How God offereth occaſions of ſinning.when they breake foorth into act. God himſelfe putteth vsus in mind of ſome things, which in their owne nature be good: and yet bicauſe ſuch things fall into the wicked, they be taken in ill part, and be occaſions of ſinning; ſo as the ſins which laie hidden before, doo breake foorth. But yet theſe ſuggeſtions, either inward or outward, can not be properlie called the cauſes of ſin, ſéeing thoſe cauſes be within in men: yet may they be called occaſions. But of occaſions, ſome be giuen, and ſome taken; in like maner as they diſtinguiſh Scandalum, that is, an offenſe. A definition of an offenſe giuen, and an offenſe taken.An offenſe taken, is the occaſion of an offenſe, not on the behalfe of him that giueth it; for he dooth that which is profitable, but an ill man dooth ill interpret this: that is, an offenſe taken. So Chriſt ſaith of the Scribes and Phariſeis; Mat. 15, 14.Let them alone, they be blind, and leaders of the blind. The apoſtle taught, that men ought to doo well; if others were offended, the fault remained not in them. An offenſe giuen, is when we doo thoſe things which we ought not to doo. But in God it is not ſo; he ſuggeſteth ſome things, that of their owne nature are good, the which falling into an euill nature, become occaſions of ſinning.
Examples of theſe occaſions.14 The matter muſt be made plaine by examples. Some godlie man ſéeth a man ſinne, he commeth to him, he diligentlie warneth him to beware: that which is put in mind is good, but it happeneth into a naughtie mind, which then beginneth more and more to breake foorth into the hatred of vertue, and to waxe cruell againſt the godlie. This admonition was an occaſion that theſe things ſhould breake out into act; God ſuggeſted by the godlie man that which in nature is good, wherefore he is ſaid to doo rightlie, for he dooth that which was his part to doo. Good things vntounto the wicked are occaſions of ſinning.But vntounto euill men, good things are made occaſions of ſinning, yea and of more gréeuous ſinning, than if perhaps they had not béene miniſtred. Howbeit this is the difference betwéene God and vsus; that we, while we ſuggeſt good things, are ignorant whether the partie will become the woorſe; but God is not ignorant. For example; Exod. 5, 1. and 2.God ſent Moſes and Aaron vntounto Pharao, he commandeth that he ſhould let his people go: this ſuggeſtion in his owne nature being good, Pharao taketh in ill part, and began to be the more cruell. If this ſuggeſtion had fallen into a godlie man, he would hauehave ſaid; It is méet I ſhould obey God: and becauſe it is his will that I ſhould let the people go, I will in anie wiſe doo it; for I can challenge no right ouer them longer than he will him ſelfe. But Pharao, when he heard theſe words, began to blaſpheme, ſaieng; Who is this God? And he brake out into crueltie. The ſame will we declare by other examples and teſtimonies of the ſcriptures. Not onelie that admonition giuen vntounto Pharao by Moſes and Aaron is a good thing, and is applied outwardlie by God; and he which was euill, vſed the ſame naughtilie: but we hauehave the ſelfe-ſame thing in the ſeuenth chapter to the Romans; Rom. 7, 12.The lawe is holie and ſpirituall, but it hath wrought in me concupiſcence and death. The commandement of God in his owne nature is vntounto life, but the filthineſſe [of ſinne] taketh an occaſion by thoſe things which are ſuggeſted. Neither is this doone outwardlie alone, but ſometimes alſo God worketh it inwardlie by good cogitations: for whatſoeuer things are good, we muſt alwaies thinke that they be of God. Pharao, Exod. 1, 9.which came after the death of Ioſeph, began to caſt thus in his mind; We muſt take héed that the common-weale ſuffer no detriment. This cogitation was good, and it procéeded from God; but it lighted into an euill mind, therefore it was wreſted againſt the Hebrues: for he ſaid; The people of the Hebrues will increaſe, and when occaſion is offered, will ſubdue vsus: wherefore let them be deſtroied. He ſet foorth an edict, that all the men children of the Hebrues ſhould bée throwen into the riuer. The firſt cogitation was good, but through his naughtineſſe it turned vntounto euill. Nabuchadnezar ſaid; It is not the part of a good prince to be idle, but he muſt exerciſe the power which he hath. The cogitation was good, but he turned himſelfe vntounto forreigne nations, and armed not his power as he ought to hauehave doone, againſt the wickedneſſe of his owne people. The ſame prince (as we read in Daniel) being in his hall, Dan. 4, 27.reckoned with himſelfe the victories which he had, & the greatneſſe of empire which he had gotten. Theſe thoughts were good; for we ſhould weigh with our ſelues the benefits of God, but they lighted into an euill mind: he ſtraightwaie thought with himſelfe, that he had eſtabliſhed the kingdome by his owne power: therein he ſinned againſt God. Gen. 37, 8.Alſo the ſonnes of Iacob weighed with themſelues, that Ioſeph was beloued of his parents, that he had diuine dreames put into him by God; this was a good thought, for we muſt behold the works of God euen in others, much more in our owne ſelues. If they had rightlie vſed that cogitation, they ſhould hauehave giuen thanks to God, but they turned it to enuie, they deuiſed how to rid him awaie, and to ſell him. Vndoubtedlie God, who ſuggeſteth theſe good things, ſéeing he knoweth of the dooing of them, he dooth not there let the occaſions of euils: he ſuffereth them to be doone; for he is at hand with his prouidence, and gouerneth them. Wherefore by Pharao he would be glorified, by Nabuchadnezar he would puniſh the Iſraelites, by the brothers ſelling of Ioſeph, he would hauehave him to be honored with great benefits in Aegypt, and to féed the houſhold of Iacob. 2. Sa. 16, 10.Semei ſawe Dauid to be caſt foorth, and the kingdome to be giuen vntounto Abſalom: he ſaid; Theſe be the iudgements of God. That cogitation was good, it fell into an euill mind, he abuſed the ſame, he ſpake contumeliouſlie againſt Dauid, he followed his owne wrath and reuenge. 2. Sa. 16, 20.Abſalom hauing gotten the kingdome, was put in mind that he ſhould harken vntounto the counſel of the wiſe, that manie eies doo ſée more than one eie. The cogitation was good, but it fell into an ill mind; and he iudged that counſels, ſo they be profitable, though otherwiſe they be wicked and diſhoneſt, ſhould be harkened vntounto. The firſt ſuggeſtion that was good, he vſed naughtilie: God ſuffered it, he would not let it, he ruled it, that the ſinne of Dauid might be puniſhed, and that the hatred of God towards ſinne might be ſhewed. Now I thinke that the matter is euident.
Whie God ſuggeſteth thoſe things which he knoweth that men will abuſe.15 But it is demanded, that Séeing God knoweth that wicked men will abuſe theſe inward and outward motions, although they be good, wherefore dooth he ſuggeſt them? The reaſons of his owne counſels are knowen to himſelfe; but yet two reaſons are ſet before vsus. The firſt is, that his iuſtice may appeare the more: for to behold the iuſtice of God we are blind. But by making cōpariſon it is knowen; namelie, by vnrighteouſnes, whereof in God there can be none ſéene: but in diuels and corrupt men we ſée it. The ſecond is, that the boldnes of men may be reſtraind: for manie would ſaie; If God ſhould put into our minds good cogitations, we ſhould hauehave a will and power to doo good things. Behold, good cogitations are giuen, the which, while they fall into a corrupt nature, except it be reſtrained, ſinne (through our owne fault) dooth ariſe euen of things be they neuer ſo good: of occaſions (I meane) taken, but not giuen. And ſo I vnderſtand the words, Auguſtine.which Auguſtine hath in his booke of Grace and Frée-will; namelie, that God dooth ſometime incline our wils, either vntounto good or vntounto euill; bicauſe if the things, which he ſuggeſteth, doo light vponupon good men, they are inclined vntounto good; but if they fall into ill men, they are inclined vntounto euill. And ſo I vnderſtand that which he writeth againſt Iulianus the fift booke, and 3. chapter; that God worketh not onlie in the bodies of men, but alſo in their minds. So likewiſe I vnderſtand thoſe things which Zuinglius (of godlie memorie) a learned and conſtant man, Zuinglius.did ſometimes write; that Men are otherwhiles by Gods prouidence prouoked to ſinne: and that one and the ſelfe-ſame action commeth both from God, and from wicked men; iuſtlie from him, and vniuſtlie from them. And thus I vnderſtand thoſe places of the ſcriptures, Rom. 1, 28.wherein it is ſaid, that God gaue them vp to a reprobate ſenſe, that He ſtirred them vp.
Of permiſſion.16 Certeinlie a permiſſion is there, but ſome thing that is more ample is ſhewed by theſe effectuall ſpéeches. And we grant, that there is a permiſſion; for if God would reſiſt, theſe things ſhould not be doone: therefore he permitteth; howbeit we muſt vnderſtand, that permiſſion is a certeine kind of will. In déed it is not the efficient will, but yet it is a kind of will. For as Auguſtine ſaith in his Enchiridion ad Laurentium; Auguſtine.God permitteth either willinglie or vnwillinglie: doubtles vnwillinglie he dooth not, for that ſhould be with gréefe, and there ſhould be a power greater than himſelfe: if it be with his will, he permitteth; permiſſion is a certeine kind of will. But thou demandeſt, that If he will it anie waie, wherefore dooth he forbid it? On the other part I would demand; If he would it not at all, how commeth it to paſſe that it is doone? For the will of God is inuincible. Paule ſaith; Who can reſiſt his will? Rom. 9, 19.God willeth, and that which he willeth, he willeth iuſtlie. They which ſinne, doo will vniuſtlie that which they will. That ſame Iulianus, againſt whom Auguſtine diſputeth, held, that there was a bare permiſſion in thoſe things; to the intent we might vnderſtand, that God dooth nothing at all: and he ſaid, that God dooth rather ſuffer, and that this belongeth to his patience. Auguſtine anſwereth; Not onelie to his patience, but alſo to his power: bicauſe he ruleth ſinne, and thereof he worketh what he will. And he alledgeth a place vntounto the Romans; If God, Rom. 9, 21.willing to ſhew his wrath, and make his power manifeſt, did ſuffer with great lenitie the veſſels of wrath, &c. Héereby indéed we ſée, that he ſuffereth; but that mention is alſo made of his power. In the firſt epiſtle of Peter the fourth chapter, it is written; 1. Pet. 4, 19.Wherefore let them that ſuffer, according to the will of God, commit their ſoules vntounto him. So that he attributeth the afflictions of the Chriſtians to the will of God. But they cannot ſuffer, vnleſſe there be a dooer. If he would the ſuffering, he would the dooing: for ſuffering procéedeth from a dooer. This will is a permiſſion, but yet ſuch as belongeth alſo vntounto the will.
This did Auguſtine ſhew in his Enchiridion ad Laurentium, the 100. chapter, where he treateth vponupon that place of the pſalme; Pſal. 111, 2Great are the works of God, ſearched out vponupon all the wils of them. He followeth the Gréeke tranſlation. The hebrue text hath, VntoUnto all the will of them. He writeth; that So farre as belonged to them, (he intreateth of ſinners) they did that which God would not. This could they not by anie meanes bring to paſſe, as touching his power: for euen in this, that they did againſt his will, his will was wrought vponupon them; therefore great are the works of the Lord. He addeth, that by a maruellous and vnſpekeable means, euen that which is doone againſt his will, is not doone without his will: for vnleſſe he ſuffered it, it ſhould not be. Neither dooth he ſuffer it vnwillinglie, but willinglie: neither would he, being good, ſuffer ill to be done; but that he béeing almightie, of that euill, can make good. The will of God concurreth both to good things, and to euill; but after a ſundrie maner: to euils, indirectlie: he ſuffereth them to be done. He ſuggeſteth good things, but bicauſe they happen into euill men, ſins doo inſue. But as for the good things, he not onelie ſuggeſteth them, but hée bringeth them to paſſe. Yet he ruleth and gouerneth ſin alſo, that it may not rage againſt euerie man, neither at all times, nor beyond meaſure. Thoſe euils lurke within vsus, but when they breake foorth, they can not eſcape the prouidence of God. But good things (as I hauehave ſaid) he not onlie letteth not, but he bringeth them to effect, he worketh together with vsus, and hée ſwéetlie bendeth our will, that we may be glad to doo thoſe things that did miſlike vsus.
Wherefore the reſpect of generall prouidence is one; the reſpect of vſing of things, though euill, is another; and the reſpect of things, which he doth in vsus that be regenerate, is another. So vnderſtand I, Exod. 8, 15.that Pharao was hardened by God, and that alſo he hardened himſelfe: for he had in himſelfe the cauſe of obduration. But God is ſaid to hauehave hardened, by reaſon of ſuggeſting and gouerning: further, bicauſe he ſo ruled ſin, and vſed the ſame to his owne glorie. And Paule ſaith, Rom. 9, 17.that he raiſed him vp for to declare his power. So vnderſtand I The veſſels of wrath to be prepared vntounto deſtruction. By what meanes? They be of themſelues, of their owne naughtines, of their owne corrupt nature prone vntounto ſin. In like maner it may be ſaid, that they after a ſort are prepared by God; bicauſe through his good ſuggeſtions, wickednes breaketh foorth: and while it breaketh foorth, it is yet in the hand of God to applie the ſame as he will, one waie or another; for God with a good will doth that, which we doo with a moſt peruerſe mind. Permiſſion is a kind of will, but yet not abſolutelie: for the will of God properlie is the cauſe of things. It is not as mans will is, wée will manie things, which we bring not to paſſe. What is then the cauſe why God would not hauehave ſin? It is, for that ſin is among thoſe things which hauehave no néed of a cauſe efficient, but of a deficient cauſe. Therefore ſin doth not properlie come vnderunder the will of God. And if that God be put as the cauſe, not efficient but deficient, ſhall we ſaie that God doth faile in himſelfe? No; but he is ſaid to faile, bicauſe he doth not hinder, nor reſiſt, nor cauſe to relent. What maner of will ſhall this be? A will not to hinder, a will not to mollifie, a will not to illuminate.
17 Neither for all this, doth God, either by ſuggeſting anie thing, or by not letting, conſtraine the will; neither can the diuell doo this. That God conſtreineth not the wil.For if the will ſhould not worke of his owne accord, it were no will; but rather an vnwillingnes. It may as ill be aſcribed vntounto the will to be compelled, as to the fire that it ſhould not be hot. Wherefore our nature and will being ſo corrupt, if the fauour of God be withdrawne; of his owne accord, and by it ſelfe, it inclineth to euill. The which neuertheles, from the time of his beginning was not euill: but bicauſe it is brought foorth of nothing, and is confirmed and ſuſteined by the grace and power of God; if that be withdrawne which confirmeth it, ſtraitwaie it will to worſſe of his owne accord. But if mans will be not conſtreined to euill, neither is euill of his owne creation, but onlie is ſaid to ſin by deprauation; what ſhall we ſaie as touching the ſin of the firſt man? In him nature was good, grace and the helpe of God was not wanting, and yet neuertheles he ſinned. Héere we ſaie, that we muſt iudge one thing, as concerning the firſt man; and another as touching our nature, which we hauehave now corrupted. God beſtowed vponupon him manie gifts, The difference betweene the firſt man and our nature now corrupt.but yet he ſo made him, as he might ſtand; he might alſo fall. No doubt but God, if he would, might hauehave made him ſo perfect, as he could not hauehave ſinned. Which the ſtate of the bleſſed ſaincts doth declare; for the holie ſpirits in the heauenlie habitation, and we when we ſhall be there, ſhall be ſo confirmed, as we ſhall not be able to ſin anie more: otherwiſe it would be no perfect felicitie; it ſhould be ioined with a feare of falling. But yet he did not this vntounto Adam; and whereas by his preſcience or foreknowledge he knew that he would fall, he might hauehave kept him there-from; but he would not, but would ſuffer him to fall, and by his eternall decrée had Chriſt to be the remedie of his fall. The reſt of the things concerning that ſtate, we can not more particularlie declare, bicauſe we hauehave not the perfect knowledge thereof. Let vsus returne to our owne ſtate; the which is ſuch, as before the renewing by Chriſt, we were not able to will anie good thing, but of neceſſitie to lie in ſins, neither might we lift vp our ſelues: ſo far is it off, that we ſhould be able to ſtand vpright, as it was granted vntounto the firſt Adam.
But although God, as we ſaid, is not properlie the cauſe of ſin; yet muſt he not be drawne out of his throne, but that he alſo ruleth ſins, and maketh a remedie for them. And this we may be aſſured with our ſelues, that there can be nothing done either of vsus, or of anie creature, beſides the will of God. But yet let vsus not héereby excuſe our ſins, as though we would obeie the will of God by committing of ſin. We muſt accuſe our ſelues, ſéeing we hauehave the originals of ſin in vsus. As concerning the will of God, wée muſt followe that which the ſcripture teacheth; and we muſt not depart from his lawe. And when we otherwhile depart from him, we muſt weigh with our ſelues, that the motion of turning awaie from God, and of the inclination to allurements of this world, is a thing proper vntounto our will being now corrupted, not as it was inſtituted by God. Wherefore there be deficient cauſes of this motion; but an efficient cauſe which hath God a worker together with vsus, we muſt not ſeeke. Wherevpon we note in the booke of Geneſis, that it is not ſaid that darkenes was made of God; Gen. 1, 2.The darkenes (ſaith he) were vppon the face of the deepe, yet God did ſo order them, as they ſhould preuaile by night: they were priuations. So this motion of turning awaie from God, ſéeing it forſaketh, and depriueth mens actions of conuenient goodnes, a cauſe ſurelie it hath, but the ſame is deficient.
18 Theſe things being declared, there remaine thrée things to be ſpoken of: the firſt ſhall be of the giltines of ſins, or bond vntounto puniſhment: the ſecond of the ſubiect of deformitie and priuation; that is, of the act it ſelfe of mans will: the third is (which alſo is commonlie receiued) that ſin is the puniſhment of ſin; and whether vnderunder theſe thrée conſiderations it may be ſaid, that ſin dependeth on God. As for the firſt, Of the bond of ſins vntounto puniſhment.we muſt vnderſtand, that the deformed and naughtie act, is in ſome reſpect the groundworke vntounto the puniſhment that is due; for The reward of ſin (ſaith the Apoſtle) is death: Rom. 6, 23.and when we ſin, there groweth a bond, whereby we muſt ſuffer puniſhment for the wickednes committed. That giltineſſe is ſaid to ariſe through the iuſtice of God, in conſideration that he will yéeld to euerie one that which belongeth vntounto him: but the bond ariſeth not, except that ſin be or hauehave bin; ſo as by ſinning we giuegive a iuſt occaſion of the bond vntounto puniſhment. Wherefore, if by ſin we vnderſtand the giltines and the bond, we doubt not but theſe things are of God, as of the efficient cauſe. Howbeit, theſe things ought not properlie to be called ſin, ſéeing they belong vntounto iuſtice, yet ſometimes they are ſo called; as when we ſaie, that God doth remit, blot out, and forgiue our ſins: for he bringeth not to paſſe that they be not, nor hauehave not bin (and vndoubtedlie there remaine euill motions in vsus) but the bond of ſuffering puniſhment, for the wickednes committed, is taken awaie, which (as we hauehave ſaid) belongeth vntounto iuſtice, and is a good thing.
19 Secondlie, let vsus conſider of the ſubiect it ſelfe, Of the ſubiect, vntounto which the deformitie of ſin cleaueth.vntounto which the deformitie of ſin doth cleaue; and of this, if we ſpeake as the thing is, we ſhall not be afraid to ſaie, that God is the cauſe, ſéeing the action it ſelfe is a certeine naturall thing. And whatſoeuer is, in reſpect that it hath a being, is brought foorth, not by creatures alone, but by God: Gen. 1, 3.for All things (ſaith the ſcripture) were made by him. This vniuerſall particle comprehendeth all things, whatſoeuer they be, by what meanes ſo euer they be, and how far foorth ſo euer they be. Auguſtine.Auguſtine in his booke De moribus monachorum, about the beginning ſaith; that The catholike church beléeueth, that God is the author of all natures and ſubſtances. What he vnderſtandeth by nature, he declared a little before, by theſe words; Nature is nothing elſe, but that which is vnderſtood to bée ſome certeine thing in his kind. Wherefore as we now, by a new name, of that which is Eſſe, to be, doo call eſſence, which manie times alſo wée name ſubſtance; ſo they in old time, which had not thoſe names, The names of nature, eſſence, and ſubſtance.in ſtead of eſſence and ſubſtance, called it nature. Séeing therefore the motions of our minds be certeine things, there is no doubt but after this maner they depend of God. God aſſuredlie worketh as the higheſt cauſe; the creatures worke together with him. Wherefore Anſhelmus in his booke De caſu diaboli, wrote, that Euen the euill willing of the diuell, ſo farfoorth as it is to will, dependeth on God. And the thing it ſelfe is not wicked, but in reſpect that he himſelfe doth naughtilie will it. And that the ſame act is ſomething, héereby it appeareth; bicauſe it is in the generall word or predicament of action: Euerie act and moouing is of God.wherefore as it is ſomething, it is of God, and is a creature. Yea and Auguſtine in his ninth booke De trinitate, and tenth chapter, ſaid, that The accidents of the mind are better than the accidents of the bodie; by reaſon of the worthines of the ſubiect. Wherefore the forme or beautie, as it is in the mind, is more excellent, than as it is outwardlie found in the bodie. Alſo the ſoule it ſelfe, being a ſoule, how ill ſoeuer it be, is yet more noble than anie bodie. Séeing therefore the déeds of the mind (wherevnto afterward, through our owne fault, there cleaueth priuation) ſo farfoorth as they be things, are not brought foorth without God.
Anſhelmus in the place aboue cited, ſaith, that God himſelfe is the bringer foorth of things, and that not alonelie of ſubſtantiall things, but alſo of accidentall, vniuerſall, and particular things, yea, and of the euill motions of the will: for the power of God is infinite. Wherefore there is nothing can be brought foorth whatſoeuer it be, but is vnderunder his action; for if anie thing could eſcape the ſame, then ſhould it not be infinite, then ſhould it not fill all things? neither might our will breake out into act, vnleſſe that high ſupreme will wrought together with vsus. Auguſtine in his treatiſe De vera religione, the 34. chapter, writeth thus; that The verie being it ſelfe, be it neuer ſo little, is good; for the chéefeſt being, is the chéefeſt good. And a little after hée ſaith; The chéefeſt beautie is the chéefeſt good, the leaſt beautie is the leaſt good, yet is it good. So as, if that action, which we ſpeake of, doo by anie meanes perteine to the being, it is of ſome goodnes. Wherefore, if we diſpute of ſinne, wée muſt diſtinguiſh it, and we muſt ſée what is therein of the poſitiue, as they reaſon in the ſchooles: and the firſt ſubiect it ſelfe muſt be conſidered; and on the other part, to ſée what defect and priuation cleaueth therevnto. But in the verie ſame priuation, ſince we ſée a defect, the deficient cauſe thereof muſt be ſought, and not the efficient cauſe. But that which is there found poſitiue, hath néed of an efficient cauſe; and the ſumme of all efficient cauſes is God.
20 But here ariſeth no ſmall doubt. There be certeine ſinnes, Sins of omiſſion, or negligence.called ſinnes of omiſſion [or negligence,] and there ſéemeth not to be grounded the verie act and worke of will, wherevnto either defect or priuation ſhould cleaue; howbeit whatſoeuer is there, it ſéemeth to be priuation. A man is ſaid to omit his dutie, bicauſe hée dooth not that which he ought to doo. As for example; If a man louelove not his neighbour, if one come not to the congregation to heare the word of the Lord, and to participate the ſacraments; here in this ſinne, there ſéemeth onelie a priuation to be, without anie certeine act, wherevpon this ſhould be grounded. Some anſwer, that euen in this place alſo, we are to ſéeke a nature or action, a worke or a thing, that is the groundworke vntounto priuation: and they ſaie, that it is the will which maketh defect. For euen that ſame ſinning will, as it is a nature, is kept in his order by God; but not in reſpect that it ſinneth. This ſaieng may be borne withall. But in ſearching the matter more narrowlie, it ſéemeth otherwiſe vntounto me; and I ſée euen in thoſe ſins of omiſſion, that there is an act. For the ſame omitting of our dutie, is ſometimes doone by contemplation; and then that corrupt perſon hath a will not to louelove his neighbour, hath a will not to go to the holie aſſemblie.
Wherefore we ſée here, that the act of will, and that ſame action thereof, which is the action of nature, dooth depend of God; deformitie and priuation dooth not ſo. But ſometime they be omitted, bicauſe a man dooth not thinke of thoſe things, I meane not, of a contempt. Héere, ſaie I, that although there be no action there of that kind, yet is there an other, which contendeth with right reaſon. He is not mindfull of the holie congregation, bicauſe he will walke about for his pleaſure, or elſe vſe ſome paſtime; and thoſe actions be aduerſaries to right working. Or if that be no action at that inſtant, yet was it a little before. For example; Ouer night he would féed like a glutton, afterward he could not riſe earlie to be preſent in the holie congregation. Wherefore in the ſinnes of omiſſion, we ſhall find an action, either proper to that kind; or elſe an other ſtriuing with the good motion of the will, either which is then preſentlie reteined, or elſe that went before.
21 God then is the cauſe of all things; How ſin is drawn from the nature of the ſecond cauſes,and inferior things, according to their owne nature, receiue the moouing of the firſt cauſe. Wherefore, if ſinne be drawen, it is drawen by the nature of the ſecond cauſes. I will make the matter plaine by a ſimilitude; A ſimilitude.In liuing creatures we hauehave that power which hath his name locall motion, and it mooueth beaſts either to walke or to runne; and thoſe creatures are mooued according as they receiue their moouing from that locall motiue power: but if a legge be defectiue, be out of ioint, or crooked, that motion hath halting in that courſe ioined therewith; but that halting, as it is a moouing, commeth from the moouing power of the ſoule; as it is faultie and lame, it dependeth of the faultines of the leg which was broken. And thus it is as touching that continuall moouing, wherewith God ſtirreth his creatures. There is indéed a common influence, and it is receiued in things according to the qualitie of them: ſo the ſubiect of deformitie or priuation is of God; and the moouing of God ſometime paſſeth through the mind corrupted, whervpon the fault of the action is not of God, but is drawen from the next cauſe. But what it is that God there dooth, and how he gouerneth that deformitie, is declared before: now we treate of the act which breaketh foorth from our will. Wherefore it is rightlie ſaid, that the priuation of righteouſneſſe followeth not the worke of our will, and the motion thereof, ſo farre foorth as it is in the kind of nature, but as it is in the kind of moouing.
Auguſtine in his ſeuenth booke De ciuitate Dei, the 30. chapter ſaith; that God dooth ſo gouerne his creatures, as he permitteth them to exerciſe and worke togither with him their owne proper motions. For God dealeth not alone, but (as I ſaid before) the wicked men, and the diuell alſo doo vſe their naughtie endeuor in working. But when we ſaie, How the ſelfeſame act is produced by God and by vsus.that the act it ſelfe (which afterward through our owne fault is euill) is brought foorth by the chéefeſt cauſe, that is by God; and by vsus, that is, by our will: how ſhall we vnderſtand this? Whether that God doo it wholie, or we wholie? Or whether it be partlie from him, and partlie from vsus? And héere we drawe this producement to the verie act of our will. We anſwere; If conſideration of the whole be referred vntounto the cauſe, we muſt ſpeake after one ſort; if it be referred vntounto the effect, after an other ſort. If the whole be referred to the cauſe, ſo that we vnderſtand our will to be the whole cauſe of the action, that it be able by it ſelfe to worke without God, it is not true: for vnleſſe God would aſſent thervnto, it ſhould not be able to bring foorth action. So God, although by his abſolute power he might performe the worke it ſelfe by him ſelfe, yet as the courſe of things is, he will not deale alone, but will hauehave the creature to be a doer togither with him: by this meanes are neither the will nor yet God, ſaid to be the whole cauſe. But if it be referred to the effect it ſelfe, God and the will are the full cauſe; for God and the will make the whole effect, although they be ioined togither in action. I will ſhew the thing by an example; For bringing foorth of an action, A ſimilitude.we hauehave a will and an vnderſtanding, and our will maketh the whole effect, and our vnderſtanding is the cauſe of the whole effect; but the one is nigh, the other further off. How it is that the will dooth all and God dooth allAnd ſo is it of the will and of God; the will dooth all, and God dooth all; but one is the firſt cauſe, and the other is the ſecond.
22 As touching the third point, the ſinne which followeth is ſometimes ſaid to be a puniſhment of the ſinne that went before; How ſinne is the puniſhment of ſinne.and ſo God is ſaid to puniſh ſinnes with ſinnes. Then if the ſinnes, which followe, be weighed as they be puniſhments, they after a ſort be attributed vntounto God; not that God dooth inſtill new naughtines, or that he driueth men directlie vntounto ſinning; but when he hath withdrawne his gifts, then dooth ſinne followe, whereby the mind is deſtroied. And thoſe deſtructions, & thoſe wounds of minds, as they be puniſhments, they come vntounto vsus by iuſt deſart. Hereof we reade in the firſt chapter to the Romans; Rom. 1, 24.that God gaue them vp vntounto a reprobate ſenſe, as we hauehave declared before. And that ſinne hath the reſpect of puniſhment, inſomuch as it corrupteth nature, it is manifeſt. Auguſtine ſaith, and it is vſuallie receiued; Thou haſt commanded Lord, and trulie ſo it is, that eueryevery ſinne is the puniſhment of him that ſinneth. This alſo doo the Ethniks acknowledge, Horace ſaith;
The Sicill tyrants yet could neuer find,
Than enuie, greater torment of the mind.
Thoſe euill affections doo drie vp the bones, ma…e féeble the ſtrength, & doo afflict the minds; yet this is iuſtlie doone: for God is iuſt and righteous in all his waies. But if we be depriued of grace, we hauehave deſerued the ſame.
23 Wherefore we conclude this queſtion of ours, A concluſion of the queſtion.and ſaie; that, To ſpeake properlie and plainelie, God is not the authour of ſinne; neither would he ſinne to be. And yet is not God ſaid to be the vnperfecter, or the weaker; bicauſe he cannot make ſinne: for that is not imperfection and impotencie, but perfection. Theſe things cannot God doo, bicauſe he is the chéefe good, and the chéefe perfection: naie rather, he eſtabliſheth lawes againſt ſins, he crieth out againſt them, and he puniſheth them. And maruell not, when I ſaid that God cannot properlie will ſinne; for then might he turne away men from himſelfe, then ſhould he denie himſelfe to be God. Paule ſaith vntounto Timothie; 2. Tim. 2, 13.God cannot denie himſelfe. By which reaſon Barnard in his little booke De praecepto & diſpenſatione was mooued to ſaie, Barnard.that God can vndoo ſomewhat of the precepts in the ſecond table, but not of the firſt table. Of the ſecond he did relinquiſh ſome thing, as when he willeth Abraham to kill his ſonne; Gen. 22, 2. Exod. 11, 2.ſo likewiſe while he commanded the children of Iſrael that they ſhould carrie awaie other mens goods: but whatſoeuer things be of the firſt table can not he remitted. If God would not be looued and worſhipped, he ſhould denie his owne ſelfe. If he be the chéefeſt good, ſhould we not looue and worſhip him? And ſome alledge this reaſon; that The good things which belong vntounto our neighbours, be particular; and God can take awaie any priuate good thing, to put a greater in place. But thoſe things which apperteine to the worſhipping of him, hauehave reſpect to the vniuerſall good, and therefore cannot be taken awaie. Auguſtine.Auguſtine in his booke which is intituled Confutatio catholica quorundam ſibi falsò impoſitorum, the third chapter ſaith; Whatſoeuer is condemned in anie man, is far from the author of nature. In the ſame place; That opinion is to be deteſted, which holdeth God to be the author of any naughtie déed, or of anie naughtie will.
24 Now hauehave we generallie declared the proper cauſes of ſinne; The proper cauſes of ſinnes particularlie.but to ſhew them particularlie, we ſaie that the cauſe of ſinne is mans will, his vnderſtanding, his depraued ſenſe, his licentious appetite, the ſhew of good which offereth it ſelfe (for nothing is deſired of vsus, but in reſpect of ſome good.) Herewithall the corruption remaining of originall ſinne, from thence as out of a ſtanding puddle, doo alwaies breath out euil affections. A cauſe alſo is our owne infirmitie & ignorance, alſo the ſuggeſtion of the diuell and of naughtie men; who neuertheles are able to preuaile no further than God dooth giuegive them leaue. There be ill examples alſo, ſinne it ſelfe is the cauſe of ſinne; for ſom prodigall men ſtealeth for the ſatiſfieng of his luſt. Wherefore ſéeing there be ſo manie true cauſes of ſinne, we muſt not make God to be author, to the intent we may excuſe our ſelues. Now it may appéere, that the wicked opinion of the Libertines muſt be condemned, who excuſe all maner of ſinnes. They which make God to be the cauſe of euill, but yet not ſo as we ſhould be excuſed, ſéeme not well to expound this queſtion. In like manner is it of them, which allow but of a bare permiſſion.
Firſt therefore (to gather all into few words) we hauehave ſaid, The ſumme of thoſe things which are expounded in this queſtion.that God is not properlie the authour of ſinne; ſecondlie that God, when he will, dooth iuſtlie withdrawe from vsus his grace, which ſhould be the hinderance of ſinne. Moreouer, we hauehave ſhewed that God dooth ſo gouerne ſins by his prouidence, as they ſhall not rage anie further than he permitteth; and in no otherwiſe than may be expedient for his prouidence. We hauehave declared that God dooth ſomtimes ſuggeſt both inwardlie and outwardlie, ſuch things as in their owne nature be good; but if they fall into corrupt men, they become occaſions taken and not giuen of ſinnes. Alſo that God dooth not let, but permit ſinnes; and that the ſame permiſſion is not altogither without the will of God. Further, that ſéeing ſinne is a falling awaie and priuation, it hath no néed of an efficient, but of a deficient cauſe. Further, that our motion of turning awaie from God, is proper vntounto our will, as it is corrupted, not as it was inſtituted by God. We ſaid alſo, that the guiltines dependeth on God; and then, that the action which is the ſubiect of deformitie, commeth as well from God as from vsus, in the kind of the cauſe. And we ſhewed, that ſinnes are puniſhed with ſinnes. And laſt of all, we reckoned vp the true cauſes of ſinnes.
What is to be ſaid to the reaſons of the firſt part. To the firſt.25 But now hereafter we will examine the former reaſons alleadged. They which denied God to be the cauſe of ſinne, as we alſo ſaie, vſed theſe reaſons. In the firſt, Auguſtine ſaid in the 83. booke of queſtions, queſt. 3. A man is not made the woorſe, by hauing a wiſe man to be author: neither is he therefore [the woorſe] by hauing God to be author. I grant it; for man became not the woorſe, in reſpect that God gaue a lawe; for by his lawe, he commanded not euill: neither is man become the woorſe, as touching the naturall act which God bringeth foorth; but he becōmeth the worſe by reaſon of his backſliding, whereof we our ſelues hauehave deficient cauſes in our ſelues. Wherefore the diuell, wicked men, our owne ſenſualitie, and eſpeciallie the corruption of our owne will doo make vsus the woorſe. And ſo it is granted that we are not made the woorſe by God or by man. The ſecond reaſon; To the ſecond.Fulgentius ſaith, that God is no reuenger of the things, whereof he himſelfe is the author. We grant the argument; God dooth not reuenge that act, as it is a naturall thing, as it dependeth of him; neither [dooth he reuenge] his own gouernment which he vſeth, but the naughtines which procéedeth from vsus, and which commeth from our owne ſelues. The third reaſon; God hateth not thoſe things which he maketh, but he hateth ſinne. To the third.The reaſon is firme. But the doubt is, that if he verelie hate ſinne, whie he dooth not forbid it, ſéeing he may.
Why God taketh not awaie ſinne ſince he hateth it.Scarſelie can humane reaſon diſcerne Gods perfect hatred againſt ſinne, ſéeing he taketh not the ſame quite awaie. Doubtles it is a difficult thing. Howbeit it commeth oftentimes to paſſe, that ſome thing which diſpleaſeth, is, for ſome good end and purpoſe, not taken awaie; wherof there are plentie of examples in the ſtate of mans life. There happeneth ſome man to be diſeaſed in the bodie, A ſimilitude.whereby the corruption breaking out, there ariſeth a gréeuous ſore in ſome member; notwithſtanding that this be verie painefull vntounto him, yet bicauſe he knoweth that it will turne to the benefite of his bodie, he ſuffereth the paine, neither dooth he ſtop the ſore. Alſo among the good corne there ſpringeth vp cockle and darnell; it diſpleaſeth, yet are they not quite rid awaie, bicauſe men ſtand in feare, leaſt the corne ſhould be plucked vp. So might we ſaie of God, he hath his ends; namelie, that not onlie his goodnes, but alſo his righteouſnes may be declared: and therfore he hateth ſinnes; yet not ſo, but that he will accompliſh by them ſuch an end as he hath preſcribed.
Other arguments; If he did make ſinne, To the fourth and fift.he ſhould be a ſinner; and if he would induce vsus to ſinne, he ſhould doo againſt his owne nature: for naturall things working, indeuour to make that which they doo, like vntounto themſelues. Theſe arguments be firme. Neither is the action of God and working togither of the creature, that is, of mans will, ſo to be affirmed, as if we our ſelues applie not our owne lewdnes. To the ſixt.God might ſéeme to deale hypocriticallie, if he ſhould on the one part command good things; and on the other part ſhould will ſinne. I anſwere, that the argument would be of efficacie, if it might be ſaid that God powreth in new lewdnes: but in that he gouerneth ſinne, he worketh nothing againſt his lawe. Moreouer, we muſt diſtinguiſh as touching the will of God, what reſpect it hath towards the commandements, and towards men. A diſtinction of the will of GodThe commandements written we ſaie are the will of God, for they expreſſe his nature and propertie: but if we marke how the will of God is towards men, and doo ſaie, that God would equallie further all men to the kéeping of his commandements, and that he giueth his grace equallie vntounto all men, this muſt not ſo be allowed: for God hath his elect, & hath others alſo whom by his iuſt iudgement he ouerſkippeth, and leaueth to ſinne and deſtruction. The Lord ſaith; Exo. 33, 19.I will hauehave merciemercy vponupon whom I will hauehave merciemercy: that is, VponUpon whomſoeuer it liketh me, I will hauehave merciemercy. But they ſaie that Men hauehave frée will, whereby they be able to kéepe the lawe of GOD, if they will themſelues; and that there is no difference to be put in the helpe of God and grace, which is not giuen to all men after one ſort. But I affirme that there is frée will in God, he is frée in his election, and in diſtributing of his graces: but his fréedome dependeth not of vsus, who ſhall verelie be frée, if the ſonne will make vsus frée.
Wherefore in the lawe or commandements, God ſheweth what his propertie is, and what he iudgeth to be right: but as touching the fauour, wherwith he fauoureth particular men, to kéepe thoſe commandements, the queſtion is otherwiſe. It was ſaid, in the ſecond of Chronicles; God roſe vp earlie, 2. Par. 36, 12and ſent his prophets vntounto them, wherefore he is no cauſe of ſinne. It is moſt true; To the ſeuenth.God did ſo; but yet thoſe ſuggeſtions, which in their owne nature are good, fell into men, which were naughtie of nature; who through their owne lewdnes were made the woorſe by thoſe admonitions: for by their owne fault they were ſtirred vp to ſinne. God gaue that warning, to the end he might ſpare his people; and the warnings were ſuch, as being receiued, they brought pardon with them. But yet we muſt not ſaie, that it was the determination of God to ſaue them wholie at that time; for he vponupon iuſt cauſe did withdrawe his grace from them, and they of themſelues, neither could nor would obeie the admonitions of the prophets. The ſonne of God wept for the deſtruction of Ieruſalem: Luk. 19, 41.To the right.and this happened for ſinne; wherefore God will not that ſinnes ſhould be. I grant, that ſinnes are not doone properlie by the will of God. Why then did he wéepe? He was now our neighbour, and the euils of his neighbours could not chooſe but make him ſorrowfull: alſo he knew that ſinne was againſt the will of God, although he were not ignorant that it could not be doone without his will.
Oſe. 13, 9.26 It is written in the prophet Oſea; Thy perdition commeth of thy ſelfe, ô Iſrael, but thy ſaluation commeth of me. To the ninth.The ſentence is moſt true: for ſéeing that ſinnes procéed from our ſelues, as from the proper cauſes, perdition alſo is of our ſelues. The guiltines or bond to abide the puniſhment, may be ſaid to come from God: but that (as we ſaid before) is not properlie called ſinne, but belongeth vntounto righteouſnes. Ioh. 8, 44.Iohn the eight; The diuell, when he ſpeaketh a lie, To the tenth.ſpeaketh of his owne. It is moſt true; God inſtilleth not malice into him, but yet he is woont to vſe his falſhood, euén as he dooth other things. Ier. 23, 21.We read in Ieremie; They ran, and I ſent them not. To the eleuenth.In that place there is no ſpeaking of the prouidence of God, but of the lewd dealing of falſe prophets, which feined themſelues to hauehave receiued the word from GOD, their owne conſcience bearing them record that God ſpake not vntounto them. They ſaid, that they had drempt dreames, and they vainelie babled that God had reuealed ſome things vntounto them, when as neuertheles they lied, and knew that they did lie. Wherefore no reproches ought to be laid againſt God for this matter, as though it ſhould not be lawfull vntounto him by his prouidence to vſe their lies.
This is the condemnation of them, Ioh. 3, 19.that light came into the world; To the twelfe.but men loued darkenes more than light: wherfore God is not the cauſe, but they which loued darkenes. We grant the argument; The will of man, of his owne proper naughtines, hath in it the motion of turning awaie from light to darkenes. It was ſaid; that God tempteth no man: Iam. 1, 13.but if he were the cauſe of ſin, he ſhould tempt men. To the 13.As touching that place, vnderſtand it after this maner. It is not there ſpoken of euerie kind of temptation, In what reſpect God tempteth.otherwiſe the word ſhould not be true. For God ſomtime tempteth his people, not that his owne knowledge may be augmented, but that men may knowe him; and that others alſo may ſée how great things God hath wrought in them, and what grace he hath beſtowed vponupon them. Alſo there is a certeine kind of temptation to be deſired: as in the pſalme Dauid ſaith; Tempt Lord or prooue me, Pſal. 26, 1.examine my reines and my hart. Neither muſt we forget that which we affirmed; namelie, that God dooth ſomtimes ſuggeſt inwardlie and outwardlie, things which in nature be good, and are receiued according to the diſpoſition of men; neither muſt theſe kinds of temptations be remooued from God. But Iames ſpeaketh of inward luſting, whereby properlie are ſuggeſted euill things, which prouoke vsus to doo againſt the lawe of God. Neither dooth ſuch luſting depend on God, except ſo far foorth as he dooth not reſiſt it: euen as alſo he dooth not alwaies hinder the diuell.
It was added; To the 14.that God might ſéeme to deale tyrannicallie: whereto we anſwer, That he dooth not properlie ſtir vp men vntounto ſinne; but yet he vſeth the ſinnes of wicked men, and alſo guideth them, leaſt they ſhould paſſe beyond their bounds. It is added; Gen. 18, 25.How ſhould he iudge the world? For if he were authour of ſinne, he ſhould iudge himſelfe. To the 15.We ſaie that God ſhall iuſtlie iudge the world: for what wickednes ſoeuer men doo, they doo it againſt the lawe of God, they doo it willinglie, and of their owne accord, not by conſtraint: and The ſpirit of God ſhall reprooue the world of iudgement, of ſinne, &c. Beſides this it was inferred, To the 16.that by this meanes it would followe, that there be wils in God one repugnant to another. We anſwer, that in GOD, as concerning his nature, there is but one abſolute and onelie will, which is the eſſence and nature of God: but yet, The will of God is manifold.if we conſider moreouer the ſundrie obiects, it may be called manifold. In reſpect of his commandements it is iuſt, good, and one onelie: but in reſpect of men, ſome it promoteth, and other ſome it iuſtlie depriueth of Gods fauour. But they be no repugnant wils, bicauſe they be not occupied about one thing. Certeinlie ſuch things as be repugnant, it behooueth that they be referred to the ſelfe-ſame ſubiect. A father hath two ſonnes; his will is, that the one ſhould attend vntounto learning, and the other not. But be there two wils of the father? No forſooth; it is but one, and he dooth rightlie, ſo he doo it vponupon good conſideration.
Iames. 4, 15.Moreouer Iames, in the fourth chapter ſaith; Ye ſay, We will go into ſuch a citie: ye ought rather to ſaie; If God will, we will doo this or that thing. Wherefore the will of God is, not onelie as touching the lawe and commandements; but it is alſo concerning thoſe things, which be dailie doone of men. And that will belongeth not to the commandements: for theſe things are not conteined in the decalog, and they after a ſort be things indifferent. Verie well did Auguſtine write in his Enchiridion vntounto Laurence, in the 102. chapter; The omnipotent God, whether through his merciemercy he hauehave pittie vponupon whom he will; or through his iudgement ſhall iudge whom he will; dooth nothing vniuſtlie: neither dooth he otherwiſe than with his will. Afterward it was ſaid; If he ſhould be a cauſe of ſinne, to what end tend ſo manie warnings, and ſo manie obteſtations of his, To the 17.by the ſonne of God, by the prophets and apoſtles? We ſaie, that theſe things are not doone in vaine; naie rather, they bring profit and vtilitie. Admonitions are not vnprofitable.Firſt they which admoniſh, rebuke, and exhort, do obeie the commandements of God, who would this to be doone. But thou wilt ſaie; It will not profit me, the euent muſt be committed vntounto God. Further, theſe things doo profit the ſaints, which are predeſtinated; though it appéere not preſentlie, yet in ſome caſe they hauehave their fruit: doubtles they make the vngodlie the leſſe excuſable. Of this matter reade in the booke of Auguſtine De correctione & gratia; for theſe things were alſo obiected to him.
To the 18.27 It was argued, that If the matter ſhould be on this wiſe, all difference betwéene good and euill would be taken awaie; all things without exception ſhould be the works of God, as the Libertines doo ſaie. We grant, that if God were verelie the cauſe of ſinnes, the Libertines ſhould ſaie rightlie, but their opinion is deteſtable. To the reſt of the arguments.The iudgement of conſciences would be taken awaie, inward accuſations, and repentance would be diſpatched, a windowe would be opened vntounto miſchéefes, giuing of thanks would be withdrawne; for we would delight in ſinne, and a great deale of the eſtimation of God would be loſt. All theſe things be moſt true, but they make not againſt vsus; for we affirme not God to be trulie the cauſe of ſinne. Laſtlie was brought foorth, that God would hauehave all men to be ſaued: 1. Tim. 2, 4.if he will this, he vſeth good meanes, not euill; therefore he is not the cauſe of ſinne. We moſt plainelie confeſſe, that God is not properlie the cauſe of ſin: but yet out of this place I affirme with Auguſtine in his Enchiridion the 103. chapter, How God would hauehave all men to be ſaued.that the ſentence muſt not be ſo abſolutelie vnderſtood, as though there were not ſome, which God would not hauehave to be ſaued. This ſentence (ſaith he) is thus ment; God hath his elect among euerie ſtate & condition of men; ſo in this reſpect, he accepteth not the perſon. He calleth kings and priuate men, bond men & frée men, man and woman. And excellentlie well dooth this interpretatiō agrée with the place of Paule. He had commanded to praie for princes: but ſome man might hauehave thought, that the condition of them was ſuch, as ſaluation ſhould be repugnant therewith. In no wiſe (ſaith he,) God hath his elect among euerie kind of men.
The like reaſon he bringeth there, out of the 23. chapter of Matthew; Matth. 23. 23. and Luk. 11, 42.Yee tyth mint and rue, & euerie herbe; that is, all kinds of herbs that are among you, not which be in India and Europe: for how could they tyth herbes of all the world? From which opinion diſagréed not he that was author of the booke De vocatione gentium, which they attribute vntounto Ambroſe. For he ſaith, that God hath his generalitie; Generall propoſitions muſt be reſtrained.wherfore he iudgeth that this generall propoſition muſt ſo be reſtrained, as if it were ſaid, that God would hauehave them to be ſaued, which belong vntounto his flocke and number: euen as, when it is ſaid; All ſhall be taught of God: And againe; Eſai. 54, 13. Luke. 3, 6.All fleſh ſhall ſee the ſaluation of God. An other waie, whereby Auguſtine vnderſtandeth this place, is euen there alſo; We vnderſtand (ſaith he) that none ſhall be ſaued, but ſuch as God will hauehave to be ſaued. As if thou ſhouldeſt ſaie; A Grammarian is at the citie of Tigurie, which teacheth grammar vntounto all: he ſaith not, all the citizens, but that there is none which is taught grammar, whom he teacheth not.
And ſo likewiſe he vnderſtandeth [that place,] He lightneth euerie one that commeth into this world; that is, Iohn. 1, 9.How manie ſoeuer be lightened, are lightened by this word. But that he would all men abſolutelie to be ſaued, he ſaith it is not true. For in the eleuenth of Matthew it is written; Wo be to thee Chorazin, Matt. 11, 21.Wo be to thee Bethſaida: for if the miracles that were doone in the citie of Tyre and Sidon, had beene doone in you, they had long agoe repented of their wickednes in ſackcloth and aſhes. Chriſt would not ſhew foorth the power of miracles among them, who (he ſaid) would hauehave repented, if they had béene ſhewed foorth. And he addeth; Expound it which waie ye will, ſo we be not compelled to beléeue that God omnipotent would hauehave ſome thing to be doone, and is not doone: when as the truth ſpeaketh, that All things, Pſal. 135, 6.whatſoeuer he would hauehave doone in heauen and earth, he hath doone: & ſurelie what he would not, that hath he not doon. And thus much touching the arguments made vntounto the 1. part.
An anſwer to the arguments on the ſecond part. Rom. 1, 24. To the firſt.28 Now let vsus take their arguments, which affirme God to be the cauſe of euill. In the firſt to the Romans it is ſaid, that God gaue them vp to a reprobate ſenſe. The interpretation is eaſie; he gaue them vp to the deſires of their owne hart, as afterward he himſelfe expoundeth it: wherefore theſe deſires were firſt euill. What did God? Verelie he permitted them to obeie their owne naughtie deſires; he himſelfe did not euill, but, in leauing them deſtitute of his grace, foorthwith wicked deſires tooke place in them; priuation of it ſelfe followed: howbeit God vſed their naughtie deſires to the performance of his iuſtice, To the ſecond.namelie, in puniſhing of them. Exod. 9, 12.Of the hardening of Pharaos hart, it is ſufficientlie declared before. In the ſixt chapter of Eſaie, Eſaie. 6, 10.when God ſaith by the prophet; Blind thou the hart of this people, To the third.that they hearing may not heare, and ſeeing may not vnderſtand, &c. This is two waies to be expounded. Ierom for interpreting of theſe words, taketh a place out of the 11. chapter to the Romans, where it is ſaid of the Ethnikes and Hebrues; The Gentils were in times paſt vnbeleeuers, Rom. 11, 30when ye did beleeue, but now they hauehave obteined merciemercy, through your vnbeleefe. While the Gentils beléeued not, the Iewes ſéemed to hauehave the true worſhip: & on the other ſide, when preaching was afterward offered vntounto them, and they beléeued not, the apoſtles forſaking them, turned to the Gentils: and ſo they were to become vnbeléeuers, to the end that the Gentils might be admitted vntounto grace. Thus did God vſe the incredulitie of the Iewes, and therefore he added; Rom. 11, 32.that God did ſhut vp all vnderunder vnbeleefe, that he might hauehave merciemercy vponupon all. Wherfore that ſame blinding of the vnbeléeuers was, The blinding of vnbeleeuers.to doo ſeruice to the prouidence of God, which the prophet foreſheweth.
Another interpretation there may be, and that more commodious. Gods mind was, that Eſaie ſhould be ſent to preach; but leaſt hée might be diſcoraged afterward, when he ſhould ſée their obſtinacie, and that they were offended at the word, God telleth him before, that the ſame would come to paſſe. The word of God of it ſelfe hath not this, but he iuſtlie withdrew his ſpirit and grace from them. This word of thine (ſaith he) will be an occaſion taken, through which they ſhall become more blind, & be turned awaie from me. This muſt be vnderſtood as touching the greater part; for there were ſom good men among them. VntoUnto this end it is declared, that this ſhould come to paſſe, that they by periſhing, might make manifeſt the iuſtice of God; who of his iuſt iudgement would make this their blindnes to doo him ſeruice. But that the blindnes came of God, we muſt not vnderſtand it otherwiſe, than as touching outward things; for he offered them his word by Eſaie.
29 Another place; To the fourth. Matt. 6, 13. Of leading into temptation.Lead vsus not into temptation. It is ſo ſpoken, as though God dooth lead ſome into temptation, and by that meanes is the cauſe of ſinne. This ſentence of the Lord Auguſtine in his booke De natura & gratia, the 58. chapter interpreteth; To the intent we may reſiſt the diuell, we praie that the diuell may flie from vsus, when we ſaie; Lead vsus not into temptation. Therefore alſo are we warned, as it were by a grand capteine exhorting ſouldiers, and ſaieng; Watch and praie, Matt. 26, 41,leaſt ye enter into temptation. Wherefore Auguſtine in that place referreth theſe things vntounto the temptation of the diuell, who is able to bring nothing to paſſe further than God will giuegive leaue. And in the 67. chapter of the ſame booke he addeth; Two maner of waies we prouide againſt the diſeaſes of the bodie; namelie, that either they may not happen at all; or elſe if they doo come, that we may quicklie be deliuered of them. Thus when we ſaie, Lead vsus not into temptation, we deſire that God may turne awaie ſinne, that it happen not: but if we hauehave fallen, and committed ſinne, we praie him that he will remit and forgiue it. The ſame author againſt the two epiſtles of Pelagius, in the fourth booke and ninth chapter, by the teſtimonie of Cyprian writeth, when it is ſaid; Lead vsus not into temptation, that we be warned of our infirmitie and weakenes. For it is ſaid by the Lord; Watch and praie, leaſt ye enter into temptation: the reaſon is added; For the ſpirit is readie, but the fleſh is weake: let vsus not be inſolentlie puffed vp. In this place, temptation is aſcribed to the fleſh, and to weakenes; ſo as God is excluded from being author.
In his booke De bono perſeuerantiae, and ſixt chapter, he ſaith, that Cyprian bringeth in that particle in theſe words; Suffer vsus not to be led into temptation: for he ſéeth that the diuell can doo no more than God hath giuen him leaue to doo. And God, as touching his owne people, bringeth to paſſe, that he ſhall not preuaile: but as touching the wicked, if he hauehave the ouer hand, God cannot be blamed; vnles he will ſaie he is to be blamed, for that he hindered not, and that he ruleth euils, and vſeth them according to his prouidence. Here we obiected, Whether the puniſhment and fault be all one.that it can hardlie be, that the puniſhment and the fault ſhould be all one. For it is called ſinne, in that it is voluntarie; but puniſhment is alwaies laid vponupon men againſt their wils. And how agréeth it, Of voluntarie, and not voluntarie.that voluntarie and not voluntarie ſhould be all one? We anſwer, that we may conſider our will as touching ſinne two manner of waies; one waie, as ſinne procéedeth from thence, and is brought to effect by meanes of the ſame, and in that reſpect it is called a voluntarie thing; an other waie, ſinne is conſidered as it is in the mind or will, and deformeth it, and after this ſort it cannot be voluntarie: for no euill men would hauehave their mind to be polluted, wounded, or deſtroied. Wherefore ſinne, as it is brought foorth from the will, being the effectuall cauſe, is voluntarie; but as it bringeth in blemiſh or deformitie, it is doone againſt the will: for we would be all perfect. To the fift.It was added; God is the cauſe of the cauſe of ſinne, therefore alſo the cauſe of ſinne. By what things doo we ſinne? By the will and affections, the which God hath brought foorth; therfore he is alſo the cauſe of the laſt effect. We anſwer, that ſinne dependeth not of the will and affections, as they were made by God; but as they are now corrupted: I ſhewed an example before of halting.
30 Beſides we ſaid, that God remooueth his grace and holie ſpirit, To the ſixt.which doo hinder ſins, and therefore, &c. This we grant, but we adde, that he dooth iuſtlie remooue his ſpirit. Indéed the remoouing of that which letteth is a cauſe; but yet that is not the proper cauſe: for there doo alſo reſt in vsus inward cauſes of euill. He giueth occaſions; It is true, he ſuggeſteth both outwardlie and inwardlie, To the ſeuenth.but yet good things; the which, men through their owne lewdnes doo vſe amiſſe. But he not onlie giueth occaſions, but he alſo gaue out his commandements. 1. kin. 22. 22.He ſaid vntounto the diuell; To the eight. God is brought in by the figure Proſopopoeia.Go foorth, doo this: hereof will I note a few things. The prophet, by the figure Proſopopoeia, dooth as it were bring in God to ſit vponupon a ſeate like a iudge: he would that Achab ſhould be ſlaine, he ſéeketh who ſhall deceiue him. Wherevnto tendeth this inquiſition? It putteth vsus in mind, that this ſhould elſe-where be ſought; bicauſe it is not in the nature of God, to deceiue. The end is there ſet foorth by his iuſtice; he willeth that Achab ſhould now be ſlaine. Diuers waies are deuiſed, this ſpirit ſhewed one waie, and that ſpirit another waie: to the intent we may vnderſtand, that the prouidence of God hath innumerable waies, whereby he can puniſh men.
Thoſe waies were there propounded, but not put in practiſe; bicauſe the prouidence of God was not minded to vſe them. A ſpirit ſtept foorth, who ſaid; I will deceiue him. Hereby it is gathered, that diuels are prompt and redie to deceiue; and when they doo deceiue, it is of their owne dooing. In the meane time we be taught, that thoſe ſpirits be able to doo no more than God dooth giuegive them leaue: and in reſpect that he will vſe them, they be executioners [appointed] of God. Wherefore God ſaid; Go foorth: this is the imperatiue mood. If we reſpect the end, it was to ſlaie and puniſh Achab. But this leaue was giuen, to the intent that the diuell ſhould exerciſe his naughtie will, and deceiue. And God vſed the ſinne of the diuell, and would not hinder his worke, nor yet let Achab, but that he ſhould beléeue the falſe prophets. Auguſtine, in his booke of the 83. queſtions, queſt 53. noted thrée things; The firſt is, that that which God did againſt Achab, he did it by iudgement; ſecondlie, that he did it by an angell, and not by himſelfe; thirdlie, he ſaith not by euerie maner of angell, but by an euill angell; readie of his owne nature to deceiue.
It was ſaid, that ſinne is a motion, To the ninth.and a certeine action, and that the firſt moouer is God: nothing is concluded, but that the ſubiect of ſinne, that is, the act it ſelfe, hath will to be the néereſt cauſe, and alſo God himſelfe, in reſpect it is a naturall thing. The ſaieng of Auguſtine De gratia & libero arbitrio the 21. chapter, is expounded of the inclination vntounto good by himſelfe, and vntounto euill indirectlie. Alſo the dealing of Roboam, To the 10. 1. Kin. 12, 15 2. Par. 21, 16.and the ſtirring vp of the Philiſtines, and that Amazias would not harken vntounto the warnings of the king of Iſraels prophet, apperteineth to the iuſtice of God: God was minded to puniſh them. To the 11.As touching the words of Ahia the Silonite, for performing wherof, &c. Theſe things were not doone, bicauſe they were foretold; but foretold, bicauſe God foreſawe that they ſhould be. And to the end that they might ſo be, he appointed them for puniſhments of the wicked; and he knew how he would vſe them, and his reaſons were allowed of God. It is written in the 14. chapter of Ezechiel; Ezec. 14, 9.If the prophet be deceiued, To the 12.it is I that hauehave ſeduced him. Here hauehave we nothing elſe, but that the ſinne of the falſe prophet may be two waies conſidered. As it procéedeth from the will of an ill prophet, ſo it diſpleaſeth God; and therefore he ſaid he would puniſh it: but if afterward the vſe of it ſhould be weighed, that God by ſuch ſeducing would be reuenged of the people, then he did iuſtlie withdrawe his grace from them further, he vſed that ſeducement, which properlie and by it ſelfe may not be aſcribed to God.
31 There was brought a place out of the 21 chapter of the prouerbs, where it is ſaid; Prou. 21, 1. To the 13.that The hart of the king is in the hand of God, and he inclineth the ſame which waie ſoeuer he will. The propoſition is generall; Which waie ſoeuer he will, he inclineth the ſame. Here is no exception; therefore as well vntounto good things, as vntounto euill things. In the twelfe of Iob, Iob, 12, 24.it is ſaid; that God dooth take a waie the harts of them that be rulers of the earth, and that he maketh them ſtagger like droonken men. And how theſe things muſt be vnderſtood of inclination, I hauehave declared. Wherefore I vnderſtand this ſentence of Salomon no otherwiſe, than thoſe words of ſaint Auguſtine, in his booke De gratia & libero arbitrio; to wit, that he inclineth our wils vntounto good or euill, according to his good pleaſure. To the 14.Another argument was out of the 105. pſalme, Pſa. 105, 25.where it is ſaid; God turned their hart, ſo as they hated them. What maner of turning that is, which he made in their harts, Auguſtine dooth teach verie well in the ſame place; it was no good hart that GOD made euill. But ſuch is the goodnes of God, that he vſeth both angels and men; and when they be euill, he piketh good things out of them. He increaſed the Iſraelites with children and with wealth; theſe things were good: wherfore God, by dooing good vntounto the Hebrues, turned the hart of the Aegyptians vntounto hatred; for hatred ariſeth through other mens felicitie. Wherefore God turned their hart, which naturallie was euill, vntounto a hatred againſt the Hebrues; not by making of their hart euill. Ye ſée therefore that I feined not, when I ſaid that God ſuggeſteth either inwardlie or outwardlie, ſuch things as in their owne nature be good; but through our fault doo come occaſions of ſinning, but yet occaſions taken, not giuen. And the occaſions which be offered, be not the furtheſt remooued cauſes, as is the firre trée hewen vponupon mount Pelion; but they be immediate occaſions, which ſtir vp our deſires: euen as the Hebrues happines was the immediate occaſion, why the Aegyptians enuied them.
Eſai. 63, 17.Eſaie the 63. chapter; Wherefore haſt thou made vsus to erre, To the 15.Lord? Which ſaieng Ierom interpreteth of Gods louing kindnes. God did not ſtraitwaie puniſh their ſinnes; wherefore they began to contemne his iudgements: God did ſuggeſt this his merciemercy in them, which was good; but through their fault, it was drawne to contempt. They may alſo be the words of the wicked, which caſt vponupon God the cauſe of their ſinnes. Or elſe the godlie, when they thinke themſelues, by the iuſt iudgement of God, to be forſaken of his grace; and afterward, they acknowledging their ſinnes, ſpeake after ſuch a ſort: doubtles not in blaming of God, but in maruelling at his iudgements. But howſoeuer thou vnderſtand it, God is exempted from the fault. Ierem. 4, 10.It is written in the fourth of Ieremie; Thou, To the 16.ô Lord, haſt ſeduced thy people. Ierom anſwereth, ſaieng; Thoſe things, which were now ſpoken, ſéemed vntounto the prophet to be repugnant to the other words, which were ſpoken in the third chapter before: where God declared vntounto him, Ierem. 3, 17.that Ieruſalem ſhould be called the ſeate of God, and that all the heathen ſhould flocke about it. But now God ſaid, that The hart of the king, & of the princes ſhould quaile, the preeſts and people ſhould be aſtoniſhed: and therefore the prophet cried; Thou ſaiedſt, we ſhall hauehave peace, but behold the ſword. But the times (ſaith Ierom) muſt be diſtinguiſhed; for thoſe things, which were firſt ſpoken, were to be fulfilled after the captiuitie of Babylon: and that calamitie, which was ſhewed of afterward, was euen at the doores.
32 Ioſua ſaith, To the 17.that God hardened the harts of thoſe nations of the Canaanites, Ioſua. 11, 20that they ſhould not make peace with Iſrael; bicauſe God was minded to caſt them out before his people: and therefore he ſéemeth to be the cauſe of ſinne. We anſwer with Auguſtine, To harden what it is.out of the eight chapter, De gratia & praedestinatione: it is alſo intituled The booke De voluntate Dei; What is it to harden? That he will not mollifie: What is it to blinden? That he will not illuminate: what is it to inforce or reiect? That he will not call. Which he ſpeaketh, not of the generall calling; but of that which is effectuall; God powreth not in new hardnes, which is not in the hart. Wherefore it may be ſaid, that God hardened thoſe nations; bicauſe he would not make them relent, whereby they might hauehave made peace with the Hebrues: neuertheles, they were alreadie to be deſtroied, by reaſon of their owne ſinnes. But it is further obiected, that no creature is appointed to perdition. God created not man, to the intent he would caſt him off. And Ierom vponupon the prophet Abacuk, the ſecond chapter is alledged; Although that the ſoule, by reaſon of the naughtines thereof, be made an habitation for the Chaldaeans; yet by nature it is the tabernacle of God. And no creature indued with reaſon is herevnto made, that it ſhould be an habitation of the diuell. Indéed theſe words dooth Ierom ſpeake. But if thou vnderſtand him abſolutelie, he is againſt the ſcripture, which ſpeaketh otherwiſe. It ſaith, Rom. 9, 17. verſe. 22.that The potter hath power of one lumpe, to make one veſſell to honour, and another to diſhonour. And it is ſaid of Pharao; To this purpoſe hauehave I raiſed thee, that I might ſhew foorth my power. God ſuffereth the veſſels, prepared vntounto deſtruction, to the intent he may make his power manifeſt. It is alſo ſaid by Salomon in the 16. of Prouerbs; Prou. 16, 4that The vngodlie man is made for the daie of wrath. In the epiſtle of Iude, Iude. 4.there is mention of certeine men, which were before ordeined to this iudgement, or to this condemnation.
But true it is, that this decrée of God, before it be put in execution, hath iuſt cauſe of condemning any man. For ſinnes are committed in the meane time, for the which they that ſhould be condemned, are condemned: yet is it the decrée of God, that he calleth them not effectuallie; and ſurelie that decrée is iuſt. But as touching Ierom himſelfe, I anſwere; that the reaſonable creature is not made, to the end he ſhould be compelled to ſinne; for he ſinneth through his owne fault: yet it is in the decrée of God, not to hinder that fault of his. I anſwere further with Zuinglius, Zuinglius.in his little booke De prouidentia Dei, the ſixt chapter; [Hereof] it would followe, that God dooth procure theft, and ſuch other things. He ſaith; procéed yet further, and thou maiſt ſaie, that this is doone for the declaration of his iuſtice. Then we ſée, to what end the reaſonable creature is made; euen that on the one ſide the goodnes of God, and on the other ſide his ſeueritie may be declared. What wiſe man is there, that would ordeine a thing to anie ſuch end, as he knew he could not atteine vntounto? God fore-knoweth all things, he knoweth that the wicked ſhall be dammed; it ſhall not therefore be ſaid, that he maketh thoſe to ſaluation which ſhall be condemned.
To the 18.An other argument was; If God would the end, he alſo would the meanes to come by that end. I grant; for he would that the patience of martyrs ſhould be, therefore he would that perſecutions ſhould be. He would vndoubtedlie, but not after one maner; for that which is good, he would for it ſelfe ſake: the perſecutions which be doone by tyrants, he would after a ſort, that is, for ſome other conſideration; he would ſuffer them, not hinder them; he would vſe thoſe things. Where I ſaie, that he would thoſe things after a ſort, it muſt not bée inferred, that therefore he would them falſelie, or like a ſubtill ſophiſter. Iohn ſaith; He that is borne of God dooth not ſinne; that is to ſaie, againſt the holie ghoſt, and without repentance. And ſéeing ſuch a one dooth ſome waie ſinne, it muſt not be ſaid, that he dooth ſinne ſophiſticallie and falſelie; for there is no ſuch conſequent: for he ſinneth in verie déed, and not ſophiſticallie and falſelie. In like manner, the lawe of it ſelfe is holie; and yet after a ſort, it is the cauſe of wrath and damnation: but yet not falſelie nor ſophiſticallie; for ſo Paule himſelfe ſpeaketh, and that trulie. Wherefore it followeth not, that God would after a ſort, therefore he would that thing falſelie and ſophiſticallie. An obiection.But if God would thoſe things, which be vntounto an end; and ſinnes after a ſort, bicauſe he hath determined not to let them, and is minded to vſe them: then his will being immutable, there ſhall followe an vnauoidable neceſſitie. I anſwere, that there ſhall be a neceſſitie, but no conſtraint; and if our will be forſaken by the grace of God, it is in the neceſſitie of ſinning.
Verelie, the prouidence of God, as touching his decrées, is as the iron & the adamant. For Zacharie as touching the chariots and empires, Zacha. 6, 1.which ſhould ſuccéed after him; They went (ſaith he) through mountaines of iron. The decrées of God are moſt ſtedfaſt. And Chriſt ſaid; Iohn. 10, 21.Thoſe whom my father hath giuen me, none can plucke out of my hands. Yet there is ſomwhat, that may ſéeme to withſtand this ſaieng. It is written in the 68. pſalme; Pſal. 69, 29.Let them be wiped out of the booke of the liuing: wherefore if they be wiped out, who were written in before, the will ſéemeth not to be conſtant. Read Auguſtine vponupon that place; A man commonlie ſaith, Quod ſcripſi ſcripſi; What I hauehave written, that hauehave I written: and will God wipe out that which he hath written? How then are they ſaid to be wiped out? The kind of ſpéech is according to the hope of them. In verie déed, they were not regiſtred, but they thought themſelues to be regiſtred. But there be ſome, which refer blindneſſe and hardening of harts to foreknowledge onelie. Howbeit, there is not a bare preſcience of theſe things, but there is a certeine will of God, whereby God cannot foreknowe things to come, vnleſſe they be ſuch as ſhall come to paſſe. And thoſe things that ſhall be, or be, cannot come to paſſe, or be, vnleſſe that God, with ſome kind of will, will hauehave them to be, or to come to paſſe. Wherefore there is ſome will of God that preceadeth fore-knowledge: he hath a will, not to let things; and he hath a will to vſe them according to his predeſtinated counſels.
33 An other argument; To the 19.Theſe tyrants Nabuchadnezar, Senacherib, and others, Eſaie. 10, 5. and. 19,were in the hand of God, as a ſtaffe and rod; and therefore God ſéemeth to be the cauſe of ſinne. Indéed it is true that they were as a rod; and when they had executed their office, they were throwne into the fire: yet were they not without ſenſe and perceiuing, but were mooued forward by their owne naughtie will, and therefore are iuſtlie puniſhed. For there is two kinds of inſtruments, as I declared before. Howbeit this is no beguiling; that God will vſe theſe things, & yet command that they ſhall not be doone. Theſe men doo them of a naughtie will, but God vſeth their naughtines. Men alſo can vſe well the naughtie actions of their aduerſaries, and manie times they doo vſe them without anie craftie dealing, euen to the intent they may take héed to themſelues, and may ſhew patience. Sometime God vſeth ſinnes, to puniſh the ſinners themſelues: yea rather, he vſeth them ſo alwaies, for bicauſe ſinne is alwaies a puniſhment of the ſinner. And otherwhile he vſeth them for the puniſhment of others.
An other argument was; To the 20.that God put into the hart of Dauid to number the people. Indéed, 2. Sam, 24, 1. 1. Pa…. …1, 1.the ſcripture ſpeaketh after this maner. Theſe kind of ſpéeches we heare not in the poets, but in the word of God: Plato might baniſh poets out of his common weale, but we may not driue out ſcriptures, which ſpeake on this wiſe. But how theſe things muſt be vnderſtood, I hauehave declared before. God withdrew his helpe from Dauid, he hindered him not; he would vſe that worke for puniſhing of the people. But it is obiected; If God withdrawe his grace, hée dooth it iuſtlie. I grant it, yet notwithſtanding he dooth the ſame: further, he vſeth the diuell alſo. Ibidem.In the booke of Chronicles it is ſaid, that the diuell ſet on Dauid; therefore God alſo did it, inſomuch as he gaue the diuell leaue. But they obiect againſt that, which we hauehave oftentimes ſpoken; namelie, that grace being remooued from vsus, ſinne dooth créepe on of it ſelfe, ſéeing our owne will, of it ſelfe inclineth vntounto it, euen as darknes dooth naturallie come, after the light is gon. God (ſaie they) is euen as the ſunne, bicauſe his light ſhineth in euerie place; but there be men, which conueigh themſelues into corners; but if his lightening be in euerie place, into what corners ſhould men go where that light is not? The diuine ſcripture ſaith otherwiſe: for it ſaith of him that abuſed the talent; Matt. 25, 28Take it awaie from him, &c. Dauid praieth; Take not awaie thine holie ſpirit from me: wherefore God ment to vſe the ſinne of Dauid for puniſhment of the people. And Aeſchylus the tragicall poet, is by ſome vniuſtlie accuſed, who ſaith; that God, if he will deſtroie and take awaie anie, he giueth the cauſes and occaſions, ſéeing the ſcripture ſo ſpeaketh, which can ſpeake againſt the lawes of Plato, but not againſt the lawes of God. 1. Sam. 2, 25For it ſaith, that the ſonnes of Helie did not hearken to their father, bicauſe the will of God was to deſtroie them: 1. Kin. 12, 15and that Roboam would not giuegive eare vntounto the elders, bicauſe the turning awaie was of God.
It was ſaid, that If the matter ſhould be thus, To the 21.then God ſhould not be the cauſe of all things, if he be not the cauſe of ſinnes. It followeth not; for although God be not the cauſe of ſinne, yet he gouerneth the ſinnes, which be committed, he vſeth them, and maketh the verie ground-worke, ſo farre foorth as it is a naturall thing. But it behooueth (ſaie they) that ſinne be voluntarie. If we ſpeake of actuall ſinnes, it is true; but of originall ſinne, it is not true. Alſo the firſt motions which be ſinnes, are not voluntarie. Barnard.And Barnard in his treatiſe of frée will, ſetteth downe certeine degrées of mans nature. Men that be bleſſed in the heauenlie habitation cannot ſinne; it was in Adam, not to hauehave ſinned: after ſinne committed, we cannot chooſe but ſinne. So be the damned, ſo be the reprobate and wicked. But the godlie & regenerate are able not to giuegive place vntounto ſinne, and bring to paſſe that ſinne ſhall not altogither reigne in them; and this they hauehave of the ſpirit of God. Whereby it appéereth by this diſtinction, that the ſinne of the damned is of neceſſitie; We cannot make choiſe of anie part without the ſpirit of God.and yet ſinne neuertheles. For although it be a thing of neceſſitie, yet it is voluntarie; but not ſo voluntarie, as we be able of our ſelues to make choiſe of the other part, which is contrarie therevnto: for we cannot hauehave the choiſe on the other part, but through the ſame ſpirit of God. In puniſhing, there is no reſpect what wee are able or not able, but what we doo againſt the lawe of God.Sinnes are iuſtlie puniſhed, but there is no reſpect had what thou art able or not able, but whether that which thou dooeſt, be doone againſt the lawe of God or no.
And God dooth iniurie vntounto no man. Wherfore this obiection is not of force, if we reſpect God. If one ſée a blind man to be falling, & dooth not ſtretch foorth his hand to helpe him, or ſetteth him not vp againe, it ſéemeth to be crueltie: To the 22.God ſéeth a man readie to fall, he putteth not foorth his hand, it ſéemeth to be crueltie. In whom? In men; bicauſe the lawe is preſcribed vntounto them: GOD is not ſubiect to theſe lawes. Zuinglius.This anſwer maketh Zuinglius in his booke De prouidentia, and in his booke De falſa & vera religione, where he intreateth of merit. And although God beſtowe not ſo large gifts vponupon the reprobate, as he dooth vponupon others; yet he giueth them manie things. The preaching of the Goſpell is ſet foorth vntounto them, manie other things giueth he vntounto all men, although he hath not merciemercy vponupon all vntounto ſaluation: God may doo with his owne what he will. Theſe, thou ſaieſt, reiect his merciemercy. Ierom ſaith vponupon Ionas; God is mercifull and pitifull of nature, readie to ſaue thoſe by his merciemercy, whom he cannot by his iuſtice; but we caſt awaie his merciemercy, which is offered. I grant it, inſomuch as it is offered vsus by generall preaching: neuertheleſſe, God dooth not change their wils; that he can doo this, who denieth? If he will not, it is vponupon iuſt cauſe that he will not. Auguſtine De bono perſeuerantiae, the fourth chapter, ſaith; that In one and the ſelfe-ſame thing, we ſée a difference of Gods iudgement; and in diuerſe things we ſée one iudgement. There were two twins in the wombe of Rebecca, before they had doone either good or euill, yet is ſaid; I hauehave loued Iacob, and hated Eſau. Some laboured in the vineyard a whole daie, others laboured but one houre onelie, and yet receiued all one reward.
As for the inſtance of the goodman of the houſe, whoſe ſonnes and ſeruants doo offend; To the 23.I (ſaith he) inforce them not. The goodman of the houſe is rightlie accuſed, bicauſe he hath a lawe: but God hath no lawe preſcribed vntounto him, he himſelfe hath preſcribed to himſelfe, that he will doo nothing vniuſtlie: but his will is the chéefe rule of iuſtice. God forſaketh the reprobats, and is alſo forſaken by them, and he dooth rightlie. But in that he leaueth ſuch as leaue him, that is teſtified in the ſecond booke of Chronicles, the 15. chapter. The prophet Azarias, the ſonne of Obed, 2. Par. 15, 16ſaith vntounto king Amazias; Seeing that ye forſake him, he will forſake you. God is euerie where by his eſſence and his power, but in thoſe that are his, by fauour, grace, and readie helpe. He leaueth not the wicked in the two former ſorts, To the 24.but in the third. There was alledged the ſentence of Anſhelme De caſu diaboli; If God (ſaith he) by a diſhoneſt worke, ſuch as is adulterie, doo bring foorth a child; why cannot that will of God, by a naughtie will bring it foorth as it is a naturall thing? We grant that the ſubiect may be brought foorth of God; but afterward it behooueth to conſider the defect in it ſelfe.
Acts. 2, 23. Acts. 4, 27.34 It is read in the acts, that they came togither againſt Chriſt, to doo whatſoeuer the hand and counſell of God had decréed; and that Chriſt was deliuered by the determined counſell of God. Touching the death of Chriſt, the will of God hath another meaning towards Chriſt, than it hath towards the Iewes. As touching Chriſt, God would that he ſhould beare the croſſe, according to obedience and charitie, bicauſe he is our redemption; and the diuine nature brought to paſſe in him, that he did beare it. The the Iewes ſhould deale ſo cruellie, God permitted them; but in that permiſſion there was a will, not to hinder their naughtie will, that he might vſe the ſame, and that redemption might followe. By this it appéereth, that he could hauehave letted it, if he would; Could not my father (ſaith Ieſus) giuegive me eleuen legions of angels to fight for me? Matt. 26, 53.He vſed that ſinne to redéeme vsus. Manie good things were offered by God vntounto the Iewes; ſuch were the prechings, miracles, and reprehenſions which he vſed, but through their default, they were taken in the woorſe part: wherefore they are left euen in the neceſſitie of ſinning.
Of free wil.Where ſhall now be frée will? It is loſt. Auguſtine in the thirtie chapter of his Enchiridion to Laurence ſaith, that After man had ſinned, he loſt himſelfe, and his fréewill alſo: he ſaith ſo twiſe in that chapter, and elſe-where alſo; and we hauehave it in the ſecond booke of Sentences the 25. diſtinction. But Barnard ſaith, that it is not loſt. The reconcilement betweene Barnard and Auguſtine touching freewill.Theſe fathers diſagrée not if they be rightlie vnderſtood; for Auguſtine taketh frée will for frée power of chooſing things contrarie, this or that. And while we be not regenerated, we cannot trulie doo acceptable things vntounto God, vnleſſe we be reſtored by the ſonne of God; bicauſe frée will, as touching thoſe things dooth not remaine in vsus. Whereas Barnard ſaith, that frée will remaineth, what is his meaning? He meaneth, that although men ſinne, they are not compelled, they hauehave a conſent, they are willing: and ſuch frée will remaineth. And he himſelfe expounds himſelfe, when he ſetteth downe thrée ſorts of libertie. He hath frée will, What maner of libertie the godlie hauehave.from compulſion; from ſinne, when his will is regenerate; from miſerie, when he ſhall come into the kingdome of heauen. We hauehave no fréedome from miſerie in this life, frō neceſſitie we hauehave; by neceſſitie, he meaneth compulſion. This appéereth out of Barnard, for he placeth a fréedome of will in God; he of neceſſitie is good, and yet this taketh not awaie his frée will. The angels, and holie men in the heauenlie countrie cannot ſinne, yet they hauehave a frée will. Alſo he granteth a fréedome vntounto the diuell, and damned ſoules; and yet they cannot be good: but the euill which they will, they will it of their owne accord, not that they be able to doo the contrarie.
The ſame author ſaith; It is grace which preſerueth, and frée will which is perſerued. By what meanes? It taketh health willinglie, that is, it aſſenteth, it conſenteth: but he ſaith not that it conſenteth of it ſelfe, naie rather he alledgeth the place of Paule; 2. Cor. 3, 5.that We cannot of our ſelues thinke a good thought, much leſſe giuegive our conſent thereto: And; Phili. 2, 13.God worketh in vsus to will and to performe. God (ſaith he) without vsus, ſetteth before vsus good cogitations, by preuenting vsus; afterward he changeth the will: he changeth (ſaith he) the affection, that the ſame being changed, the conſent may followe. Wherfore he ſaith; that God dooth foure things in vsus; firſt, he ſtirreth vp, by ſending in good cogitations; ſecondlie, he healeth, that is, he changeth the will; thirdlie he confirmeth, that is, he leadeth to the act; fourthlie, he preſerueth, that we may not féele the want, that we may perſeuere, and that the good worke may be accompliſhed.
35 To be bréefe, we alſo affirme that God, as concerning ſinne, is (as Epiphanius ſaith) foreign, that is, cléere from the cauſe of all ſinne; bicauſe properlie, he is not the cauſe, and yet he ſléepeth not. This word alſo ſignifieth vnblameable. God cannot be drawne into lawe by vsus; what he dooth, he dooth iuſtlie. And for our part we adde, that it is a generall opinion, and muſt ſtill be reteined in the church; that There is nothing doone in the world, That nothing is doone without the prouidence of God. Mat, 10, 29. and 30.be it good or bad, without Gods prouidence. Humane actions cannot paſſe out of the bounds of Gods prouidence, ſéeing All the heares of our head are numbered. If ſparrowes, being ſmall ſéelie birds, of the leaſt eſtimation, doo not light on the ground without the will of God; what ſhall we ſaie of mans dooings, the which ſo far excell? Diuine prouidence hath an excéeding great ſcope; albeit it deale not all after a ſort towards good things, and towards bad; yet are they not doone without the prouidence of God, which is Gods diuine will, whereby things be mightilie and verie well gouerned, and directed to their owne proper ends. Neither ought it to be anie offenſe vntounto vsus, that he leaueth ſome euils in the world; for although they be againſt particular natures, yet they be auailable for common commoditie. If all euils were taken awaie, we ſhould be deſtitute of manie good things: wherfore it is ſaid, that There would be no life of lions, if there were no ſlaughter of ſhéepe, wherewith the lions be fed: neither would there be patience of martyrs, vnleſſe the crueltie of tyrants were permitted by God.
Plato.That which Plato writeth in the ſecond booke De Republica, An obiection.ſéemeth to be againſt this doctrine of ours: he ſaith, that God is author but of few things vntounto men, bicauſe there be manie euils amongſt men, and God is the cauſe of none of them: whereby he ſéemeth to ſtreighten the prouidence of GOD into a narrowe roome. If he meane the cauſe effectuall, and ſpeake of ſinnes, we doo grant it: and yet in the meane time prouidence is not in a profound ſléepe. But Plato in the ſame place hath, that, which muſt not be granted generallie of the godlie: for he denieth, that God commeth vntounto men in the likenes of ſtrangers: That God appeereth in viſible forms.but angels were enterteined by Abraham & Lot in gheſtwiſe. Whereas he ſaith, that God cannot be changed, as touching his ſubſtance; it is true: but that he appéered ſometimes in certeine forms, it muſt be granted. He talked with Moſes out of the burning buſh; he declared himſelfe vponupon mount Sina by voices; he exhibited himſelfe vntounto the prophets by ſundrie likeneſſes. I thinke that Plato meaneth thoſe vile changes, which the poets ſpeake of; that he was changed into a ſwan, an eagle, or a bull: which things muſt in no wiſe be attributed vntounto God.
Another obiection.36 But whereas I ſaid, that all things, whatſoeuer they be, are ruled by the prouidence of God; and that Platos ſaieng can be no let, it ſéemeth not ſufficient. For Damaſcene alſo is againſt it, who ſaith in his ſecond booke, the 29. chapter; that Thoſe things, which be not in vsus, are ſubiect to the prouidence of God: for he addeth, that the things within vsus are not of Gods prouidence, but belong to our owne frée will. But ſhall not therfore our actions, which he ſaith are within vsus, be in the prouidence of God? Let them beléeue this that will; for I beléeue it not. He addeth that which is more hard; namelie, that The choiſe of dooing things is in vsus, but that the perfection and accompliſhment of good things is the worke of God togither with vsus. Who will ſaie, it commeth from vsus, if we chooſe to be doone ſuch things as are good? The apoſtle ſaith, Phil. 2, 13.that God worketh in vsus, to will and performe. And whereas Damaſcene taketh awaie theſe things from diuine prouidence, I like it not. He diſtinguiſheth prouidence, into good pleaſure and permiſſion; theſe I am not againſt, I affirme both: namelie, that prouidence not onelie ruleth good things, but that it alſo bringeth them to paſſe; and that it permitteth euill things, but yet not ſo as it permitteth them all wholie to themſelues: for it vſeth them.
And he diſtinguiſheth that ſame permiſſion or good pleaſure, and ſaith, that one is a diſpenſing and inſtructing permiſſion; bicauſe it turneth to the diſcipline of ſaints, if they be left without helpe for a time. Sometime it is called a full growne permiſſion, and as it were without hope of recouerie; as when men, through their owne default, periſh and béecome paſt amendement. Euen we alſo ſaie, that God leaueth his elect for a time, but others for euer. Moreouer he ſaith; that God by an inward cauſe will hauehave men to be partakers of ſaluation; but that he will afterward puniſh them when they offend. He calleth it a following will, as though it dooth followe by our owne default. I [for my part] ſaie, that the will of God is of one ſort, but that the obiects be diuerſe. There is a choſen ſort, whom he will hauehave to be ſaued; and there be reprobates alſo, whom he will for their ſinnes to be puniſhed. But yet we muſt not there make a ſtaie, he will ſhew his power in them. Wherefore I affirme, that prouidence is vniuerſall, whatſoeuer Damaſcene ſaith. Of which mind Auguſtine alſo is in the 58. ſentence, ſaieng; that There is nothing doone, either viſiblie or ſenſiblie, which is not either commanded or permitted from the inuiſible or perpetuall pallace of the high Emperour: and ſo he excepteth nothing from the prouidence of God.
37 Theſe be the things, The concluſion of this place.that I thought méet to be ſpoken of concerning this matter. There remaine manie other things, but an end muſt bée had. Indéed I knowe, Philip Melanchthon.that the reuerend man Philip Melanchthon, whom I louelove & honour, ſéemeth to ſaie otherwiſe: but here I appele to the ſame man himſelfe, in his old common places; read ye thoſe things which be there, concerning predeſtination and frée will. He ſaith, that the word [frée will] which peraduenture I would not hauehave ſaid, is moſt ſtrange vntounto the diuine ſcriptures, and from the iudgement and meaning of the ſpirit. Further he ſaith, that Platos philoſophie, in the beginning of the church, ſubuerted pietie. In the concluſion of that place; If we come (ſaith he) to our owne inward and outward dooings, thoſe being referred to God prouidence, all things doo come to paſſe euen as they be appointed. But in outward actions, if they be referred vntounto will, there is a fréedome [in vsus.] If we ſhall conſider the inward good things, which GOD dooth require, there he ſaith is no fréedome: if our inward affects begin to paſſe meaſure, they cannot be ſtaid. The ſame thing ſaith Ambroſe vponupon Luke, and it is often alledged by Auguſtine, that Our hart is not in our owne power. There be others alſo, which diſagrée not from them; of which number are Zuinglius and Luther, the noble inſtruments of reformed religion; likewiſe Oecolampadius, Bucer, and Caluine: and I might allege others, but I ſtriue not to bring manie witneſſes. I ſaid, that to ſpeake properlie, God is not the cauſe of ſinne: and that there is nothing doone in the world, be it good or euill, without the prouidence of God. But & if I hauehave not hit the marke I ſhot at; I am ſorie for it. If anie man ſhall by anie ſufficient proofs ſhew this opinion to be vngodlie, or hurtfull to good conuerſation, I am readie to alter the ſame. I hauehave diſcourſed the more at large herof, bicauſe it is a thing of great importance: and it falleth out oftentimes in the holie ſcriptures. And things are better vnderſtood, which be ſet downe to the full; than ſuch as are declared here and there by péecemeale.