Common Places, Part 1 · Chapter 16 – Chapter 17
The xvj. Chapter. Of Prouidence; vponupon Geneſis the 28. chapter, verſe 16.
In Gen. 28, verſe 16.THe Grecians call prouidence foreign, or foreign. The Hebrues deriue it from the verbe Hiſgiah, in the coniugation Hiphil, which is To ſee exactlie and to diſcerne. A definition of prouidence.As touching the definition thereof Cicero ſaith in his booke De inuentione, that it is that, whereby anie thing to come is forſéene before it come to paſſe. Howbeit, this definition, if it be referred vntounto diuine prouidence, dooth not expreſſe it: bicauſe this dooth onlie ſhew the knowledge of that which is to come, and the power of foreknowing. But in diuine prouidence, is not onelie comprehended the knowledge of the mind of God, but alſo his will and election, whereby things are decréed and determined to come to paſſe, rather by one way than another. Further, there is alſo a power and ablenes therein, to gouerne and direct thoſe things which it is ſaid to foreſée; for in things, there is not onlie found the nature & ſubſtance of them; but alſo the order wherewith they be knit one with another. And the one ſo reacheth to the other, that it helpeth it, or is made perfect by it: & both waies things be well ordeined; particularlie, as touching themſelues, each of them are ſaid to be good; and generallie, as touching order, excellent good. And that this order is in all things, we may prooue it by the nature of order it ſelfe: That there is an order in things. Order is defined.for it is defined by Auguſtine to be the diſpoſition of things like and vnlike, attributing to euerie one that which belongeth vntounto it. But no man is ignorant, that the parts of the world are diuers, and not alike, if they be compared one with another.
Moreouer, how conuenientlie each one of them is allotted by God to his owne place, proper ſeate, and ſtanding, both experience teacheth, and the holie ſcriptures teſtifie. For it is ſaid; That God hath ſet the ſeas and the waters their bounds, Iere, 5, 22.neither may they paſſe the limits appointed vntounto them. Eſai. 40, 12.Further; He meaſureth the aire with his ſpan, &c. And ſéeing that ſo great a benefit of his, ought to be aſcribed vntounto him, in reſpect of his prouidence, we may thus define it; A true definition of prouidence.that It is the meane which God vſeth in directing of things to their proper ends. In which definition is not onlie comprehended the knowledge, but alſo the will and power of dooing it. Wherevpon this that we auouch, Paule in the firſt chapter to the Epheſians, hath verie well expreſſed, when he ſaith; Epheſ. 1, 11.Who worketh al things according to the counſell of his will. And Cicero in his oration for Milo, taught by what tokens this prouidence may be knowne from naturall reaſon: for thus he writeth; Neither doubtleſſe can anie man iudge otherwiſe, vnleſſe it be ſuch a one, as thinketh that there is no heauenlie power, nor diuine maieſtie; and whom neither the ſunne, neither the motions of the heauens and ſignes thereof, neither yet the order and courſe of all things doo mooue; and ſo foorth. The verie ſelfe-ſame demonſtration Paule deſcribeth in the firſt chapter to the Romans. Rom. 1, …0, Iob. 12, 7.And Iob in the twelfe chapter; Aske the cattell, and the foules of the aire, the fiſhes of the ſea, and the plants of the earth, and they ſhall informe thee. Alſo in the 19. pſalme; The heauens declare the power of God. Pſal. 29, 1. Iob. chap. 39. & 40.Againe Iob in the 39. and 40. chapters; Concerning the goats, the harts, the horſe, the Leuiathan, and Behemoth.
2 Wherefore let it thus be determined; Whether al things be ruled by the prouidence of God.the order of things declare, that theſe things which be created, are not made by chance, and at all aduentures; wherefore God worketh according to his purpoſe: and vntounto his owne prouidence, as vntounto a certeine generall and chéefe art, all things are ſubiect; neither is there anie thing to be found, that can eſcape the ſame. Which neuertheles ſome are bould to denie, who thinke that onelie the chéefe and principall things are committed to the care of God: but the reſidue, if they be of ſmall account, they attribute to naturall cauſes; if they be of greater importance, to angels & diuels. Which thing a man may ſée in the dialog of Plato called Protagoras, where the creation of things is ſo deſcribed, that ſome things are granted to Epimetheus to make, and ſome things to Prometheus. Yet to the intent that mankind might be well prouided for, this only is auouched, that it was doone by the works of the gods. But in the Goſpell we be otherwiſe taught by Chriſt; Mat. 10, 19.All the heares of your head are numbred. And; Of two ſparowes not one of them lighteth vponupon the ground without the will of your heauenlie father. Againe; The Lord himſelfe hath looked downe from heauen vponupon the children of men. But if theſe men would vnderſtand the matter thus, as though the prouidence of God extended not it ſelfe vntounto all things, after ſuch a ſort as it dooth vntounto men: Prouidence ſeemes of ſundrie reſpects by reaſon of the diuers eff…c…s in things.we would grant it; not that the prouidence which is méerelie ſimple in it ſelfe, ſhould be ſaid to be manifold; but bicauſe the effects which be directed by it, are diuers and ſundrie, therefore it ſelfe alſo ſéemeth to hauehave diuers reſpects. Wherefore we grant, that the prouidence ouer godlie men ſurmounteth ſo far, as in compariſon of them, it is ſaid by the Lord vntounto them that ſhall be damned, & to the fooliſh virgins; I knowe you not, Matt. 25, 12.and ſo is it ouer men more than ouer vnreaſonable creatures. And by a liuelie faith of this prouidence, The vſe of prouidence.we reape manie commodities, and eſpeciallie a comfort in aduerſitie; where we knowe that thoſe things happen vntounto vsus, not by caſualtie, but by the will and procurement of God our father. Alſo we be dailie ſtirred vp the more vntounto good things, when we vnderſtand that God is both the knower and witnes of our actions; who afterward will giuegive a true iudgement of them. Beſides this, the gifts which we enioie, be much more acceptable vntounto vsus in this reſpect, that they be offered vsus by God which prouided them. Further, in the ſame we behold predeſtination, which bringeth ſo great a comfort vntounto godlie men, as thereby they are woonderfullie confirmed.
Whether prouidence doo bring anie changing in God3 Neither muſt we ſtand in anie feare, that there is anie newneſſe in God, bicauſe of his prouidence. Men, which by their parents are brought foorth into the world without knowledge, can not atteine therevnto without alteration. Which thing we muſt not ſurmiſe as touching God, ſéeing he hath had his knowledge from all eternitie. Further, we drawe the ſame from the nature of things; but he hath it of himſelfe. Wherefore Iames did trulie write, With him there is no variablenes, nor ſhadowing by turning. Iam. 1, 17.Neither commeth it to paſſe at any time, that the knowledge of God is changed by the alteration of things. Moreouer, this excellent knowledge is ſafelie placed in God: for there is no danger, leaſt he ſhould abuſe the ſame as men doo, Ierem. 4, 12.of whom Ieremie in his fourth chapter writeth; They are wiſe onlie, to the intent they may doo euill. But God is moſt excellent, and he hath the knowledge of that thing that is moſt excellent, which knowledge who ſo euer hath, can not vſe other things amiſſe, as Plato taught in his ſecond dialogue called Alcibiades; where it is prooued, that without that knowledge, it is better to be ignorant of manie things. For it had bin much better for Oreſtes, if he had not knowne his mother when he met hir, being determined for to kill hir. Neither is God, It is no let to the felicitie of God.by reaſon of this gouernment of things, remooued from his peaceable felicitie, or from the contemplation of better things. This thing hapneth vntounto men, that ſometimes by dealing in matters not neceſſarie, be drawne awaie from weightie and better occupations. Wherefore Paule, 1. Tim. 1, 4. and 4, 7. 2. Tim. 2, 22. Titus. 3, 9.not without cauſe, condemned vaine and curious queſtions. And this commeth through the ſlendernes of our vnderſtanding, which is not able to applie it ſelfe to more things at once. But God being infinite as touching all his dooings, can eaſilie perceiue all things that now be, that ſhall be, and that at anie time hauehave bin. It ſtirreth not vp vntounto euill.Neither is God by this knowledge of things prouoked to euill: for that hapneth vntounto men, bicauſe they hauehave a corrupt deſire.
Wherefore Salomon ſaid; Behold not the wine when it ſheweth faire in the glaſſe, Pro. 23, 31.&c. Pſalme 119. Turne awaie mine eies leaſt they behold vanitie. And Iob in the 31. chapter, ſaith, Pſa. 119, 37.that He made a couenant with his eies, Iob. 31, 1.leaſt he ſhould thinke vponupon a virgin. But God, which is the principall rule of iuſtice and goodnes, can not be moued to euill. But Auerroës ſaid, Auerroës.that at the leaſt-wiſe his vnderſtanding ſhould be embaced, It embaceth not his vnderſtandingif he would looke vponupon and acknowledge all theſe ſimple things. But bicauſe he atteineth this knowledge, not from the things, but from himſelfe; therefore that is not granted, neither doth it in verie déed follow. Euen as we ſée that a glaſſe is not therefore ſtained, bicauſe it ſheweth the images of vile things; neither yet is this ſunne that we ſée, defiled, when it ſhineth vponupon places that be foule and lothſome. Labour alſo in vnderſtanding doth not diſquiet God, ſéeing in this action he vſeth no inſtrument of a bodie; It bringeth no labour vntounto God.as men doo, vntounto whome, by meanes of their bodie, there ariſeth labour in vnderſtanding, for therin the bodie is verie much afflicted and wearied. Wherefore Salomon vponupon iuſt cauſe, called this indeuour of knowledge, Eccleſ. 2, 17.A conſuming and affliction of the ſpirit: for knowledge ſometime bréedeth vntounto vsus diſquietnes. For the more men doo vnderſtand, the more things they ſée that doo diſpleaſe them, wherewith they are agréeued. Wherefore not without cauſe it is ſaid; He that addeth knowledge, Eccleſ. 1, 18.increaſeth labour alſo. For we doo not eaſilie beare thoſe things that be vnwoorthilie committed. But God is not ſubiect to theſe humane affections, who hath it in him to fore-ſée the end of things: and although the things be vnworthie, yet he directeth them, and knoweth that they ſhall tend to his owne glorie.
4 But it hath bin no hard matter, to take awaie from diuine prouidence, thoſe obiections, which we hauehave hitherto remooued: for a plaine and readie waie was offered for the confuting of them. Whether prouidence take awaie chance and fortune.But there remaine certeine other things, more hard to be expounded. The firſt is, bicauſe of chance and fortune, which ſéemeth to be taken awaie from the nature of things, if we attribute vntounto God the prouidence of all: for there is nothing more againſt fortune & chance, than is reaſon. For fortune is a cauſe that worketh beſides the purpoſe, when anie thing, not intended, or appointed, or decréed, hapneth to vsus vnawares, and beſides our expectation. But this argument we reſiſt on this wiſe; As touching vsus, fortune and chance are not taken awaie by the prouidence of God. For what doth let (as touching God) that nothing is doone by chance, but (as touching vsus) that manie things be doone raſhlie & by fortune? There is brought a méetlie fit ſimilitude: A ſimilitude.Admit that a maiſter ſend his ſeruant to the market, there to remain till nine of the clocke; which houre being not yet paſt, if he ſend thither ſome other ſeruant of his; as touching the maiſter it commeth not to paſſe raſhlie or by chance, that thoſe two ſeruants méet togither, ſéeing he fore-ſéeth the ſending vntounto that place: but vntounto them it commeth not to paſſe of purpoſe, ſéeing the one knew nothing at all of the others comming. Wherefore manie things, which are doone by the fore-ſight and knowledge of God, if thou reſpect the dull and weake cogitation of man, happen by chance and fortune. But if all things (ſaie they) be directed by God, and doone by his counſell, as we beléeue they be, where ſhall now be the chance of things? Whether prouidence take awaie the contingence of things.For all things will come to paſſe of neceſſitie. And ſome thinke this argument to be ſo ſtrong againſt the prouidence of God, as ſcarſelie the fréedome of our will can be defended. But to this reaſon is applied in a manner the ſame forme of anſwere, which a little before we vſed as touching things that happen by fortune. For it may be, that if thou reſpect the next cauſes, thoſe things that doo happen, both are, and are iuſtlie called things happening by chance; for it is nothing repugnant to that cauſe, that it bring foorth as well this effect, as another effect that is contrarie therevnto. For as touching mine owne will, it may ſo come to paſſe, that I doo ſit, as alſo that I doo not ſit. So then if theſe effects be referred vntounto that cauſe, they ſhall be, by chance; for they may be otherwiſe: howbeit, as they be ſubiect to the prouidence of God, we muſt not denie but that they are of neceſſitie. Neceſſitie of two ſortsWherefore there is granted a double neceſſitie; that is to wit, a neceſſitie abſolute, and a neceſſitie by ſuppoſition. But it may be, that thoſe things which by ſuppoſition are of neceſſitie, if thou take them without ſuppoſition, they be things contingent, and not of neceſſitie.
Eſay. 14, 17.Eſaie in the 14. chapter ſheweth, that the kingdome of Babylon ſhould be deſtroied; which was but a chance, as touching the worldlie cauſes therof: for there was no let, but that it might otherwiſe be. And yet neuertheles, the prophet minding to ſhew that it ſhould vndoubtedlie come to paſſe, groundeth his reaſon vponupon the determinate will of God, and ſaid; God hath ſo purpoſed, and who ſhall be able to diſſanull it? The hand of the Lord is now ſtretched foorth, and who ſhall plucke it backe? Wherefore the thing now by this reaſon was of neceſſitie. And in the 33. pſalme we reade; Pſal. 33, 11.But the counſell of the Lord indureth for euer, and the purpoſes of his heart from generation to generation. Yet they ſtill vrge the contrarie; Neceſſitie ſéemeth to be a let to the prouidence of God: for we conſult not of thoſe things which cannot otherwiſe be. Whether neceſſitie be a let vntounto prouidence.Forſomuch then as there be manie things in the world, which ſéeme to be of neceſſitie, thoſe that be of this ſort ſéeme to exclude the prouidence of God. But héere we muſt vnderſtand in this place, that although all things, as they hauehave relation to the purpoſe & determinate will of God, being as it were doone and decréed, be of neceſſitie; yet as concerning God, the appointer and decréer of the act, all things are contingent; and nothing is of ſuch neceſſitie in the world, but that the ſame may otherwiſe be. Neither doo we now ſpeake of the definitions of things, or of neceſſarie propoſitions or concluſions; ſéeing theſe things are not gouerned by diuine prouidence: for they be deſcriptions of the eternall truth and diuine nature. Some there be alſo which thinke, that there ſhould be no euill found in the world, if it were gouerned of God by his prouidence. For none that dealeth prouidentlie in his works, would permit euill to take place. But theſe may be eaſilie anſwered, that there is no euill to be found, that is not either profitable to the ſaints, and furthereth them to ſaluation; or that declareth not the iuſtice and merciemercy of God; or elſe that aduanceth not the order of all things, and the preſeruation of the ſame.
¶ The ſame place is expounded In 1. Sam. 10, verſe. 2.
5 But to followe ſome order herein; firſt let vsus ſearch whether there be anie prouidence, or no; ſecondlie, what it is; thirdlie, whether all things be ſubiect vntounto it; fourthlie, whether it can be changed; and laſtlie, whether it may abide anie caſualtie of things. But before I come to the purpoſe, let vsus ſpeake ſomewhat as touching the ſignification of the names thereof. Wherefore among the Grecians a thing that commeth by chance is called foreign, What is a thing contingent, and how manie ſorts there be.which is of ſuch ſort, as both it may be, and it may not be: and whether it be or be not, there is no abſurditie, either againſt reaſon, or againſt the word of God. It is diſtinguiſhed into 3. parts; of which the firſt is called by the Grecians foreign, bicauſe it inclineth equallie as much one waie as another. The ſecond foreign, which for the moſt part vſeth to happen after this maner or after that, but yet may otherwiſe come to paſſe. The third is called foreign, bicauſe it falleth out but ſeldome, and not vſuallie. The philoſophers aſſigne two grounds or beginnings of chance, one in the matter, Two grounds of contingencethe which as it lighteth vponupon diuers and ſundrie actiue cauſes, ſo it receiueth a diuers and ſundrie forme; the other in the will, whereby our actions are gouerned: now the will hath conſideration of the matter, bicauſe it is directed and duplicate page duplicate page forced by the vnderſtanding. Auguſtine in his booke of queſtions, Prudence deuided into three parts.queſt. 31. ſaith, Wiſedome is by the philoſophers diuided into thrée parts; namelie, into vnderſtanding, memorie, and prouidence: and that memorie is referred vntounto things paſt, vnderſtanding to things preſent; and that he is prouident, Who is prouident.which through the conſideration of things paſt, and things preſent, can determine what will afterward come to paſſe. But God, not onelie vnderſtandeth and ſéeth what will come to paſſe, but he alſo addeth a will vntounto the ſame. For wée affirme not onelie a bare vnderſtanding to be in God, but an effectuall will alſo, whereby he ruleth and gouerneth all things. foreign.This of the Gretians is called foreign, that is, Prouidence. And Cicero in his booke De natura deorum, nameth it An old ſoothſaieng wife of the Stoiks; who was of ſuch account among them in old time, as in the Iſle of Delos, ſhe was woorſhipped euen for a Goddeſſe, Prouidence worſhipped as a God.bicauſe ſhe helped Latona at hir child-bearing. But that fable ſignifieth nothing elſe, but that ſecond cauſes, although they hauehave ſome force in themſelues, yet they bring nothing to paſſe without the prouidence of God. For Latona, is nature; and prouidence the midwife: ſo that vnleſſe this latter be preſent, doo helpe, and as it were plaie the midwifs part, the other bringeth foorth nothing.
6 But now, as touching thoſe fiue points, which at the beginning I determined to intreat of ſeuerallie. In the firſt place, I propound to my ſelfe, That there is a prouidence.that there is a prouidence: which thing may be prooued by manie ſure and inuincible arguments. For firſt, ſéeing that God is the author and creator of all things, and that he can doo nothing vnaduiſedlie, but that with himſelfe he hath his owne certeine and aſſured reaſons, therefore of neceſſitie there is a prouidence. For if there be no artificer, but that hée ſéeth the reaſons and ends of his worke, and conceiueth the waies by which he may bring the ſame to his purpoſed ends; it were a madnes not to attribute that vntounto God the chéefe workeman, whome the holie ſcriptures not onlie teach to be the creator of all things, but as it were a potter. Chryſoſtome in the 19. Homilie vponupon the epiſtle to the Epheſians ſaith, that If a ſhip, though it be ſound and well rigged, can not brooke the ſeas without a good maiſter or gouernour; how much leſſe can the whole workemanſhip of the world ſtand without the care and gouernment of God? For if a maiſter-workeman will not begin to build, before he hauehave deuiſed in his mind all the parts, faſhions, and fourmes of the building; ſhall we thinke, that God hath raſhlie, without counſell, or reaſon, made all things vniuerſallie? Vndoubtedlie, the heauenlie ſpheares, the ſtars, the firmament, the aire, the water, the heate, the cold, ſo manie cauſes and changes of things contrarie and repugnant one to another, would fall to ruine, vnleſſe they were ſuſteined by ſome gouernour. Without care and prouidence, our bodie might not be defended from the rigor of the heauen. We call thoſe prouident men, which being of ſuch excellent iudgement and diſpoſition, doo kéepe all the parts of their bodie in their proper office and dutie. But God hath the ſame place in the world, that the mind hath in man. Beſides this, the holie ſcriptures aſcribe vntounto God the deſtructions of kingdoms, and propheſies, and miracles, which things doo far paſſe the compas of our nature. And laſt of all, they attribute vntounto him the generall iudgement, wherein God will one daie render to euerie man according to their works. Wherefore we, being induced by theſe, and manie more reaſons, doo conclude that there is a prouidence. For we paſſe not for the Epicureans, whoſe maner of ſpéech is this;
Why the Epicures denie prouidence.Euen ſo the powers on high,
With labours toile are preſt,
The care whereof which on them lie,
Bereaue them of their rest.
And this alſo; God walketh vponupon the poles of heauen, and conſidereth not the affaires of men. Theſe monſtruous opinions hauehave they bred, partlie for that they being of groſſe wit, could not perceiue higher things; and partlie being of a ſhamefull and abhominable life, would deuiſe for themſelues this conſolation, leaſt they ſhould be perpetuallie tormented with the feare of puniſhments. For, He that liueth wickedlie, Iohn. 3, 20.abhorreth the light. And children, when they hauehave done a fault, would not hauehave either their father to be at home, or the maiſter in the ſchoole. And as touching the firſt part, theſe things vndoubtedlie ſhould be ſufficient for Chriſtians, who are perſwaded onelie by the word of God, without other reaſon, that there is a prouidence.
7 But what prouidence is, we ſhall eaſilie vnderſtand by the definition of the ſame. What prouidence is.Prouidence is the power of God, whereby he directeth all things, and bringeth them to their [appointed] ends. In this definition, the generall word is power. Aſſuredlie, God is moſt abſolute, yet for our capacitie ſake, we ſaie that there is in him two maner of powers, to wit, the power of vnderſtanding, & the power of willing. For God vnderſtandeth and ſéeth all things; and not this onelie, but he alſo willeth all things. Héere I will make no néedles diſputation, whether the will of God be before the vnderſtanding, or vnderſtanding before the will. If anie man would knowe theſe things, I ſend them vntounto Scotus and Thomas. This power and facultie which I ſpeake of, belongeth vntounto the qualitie, for it is a naturall power. The difference is, that God by this power directeth all things, whatſoeuer either be, or hereafter ſhall be. But yet this is not enough; for he alſo conducteth them to their ends. But to what ends? Euen vntounto agréeable ends. And thoſe be agréeable, which his purpoſe hath appointed. The power is the cauſe: and, that things be brought to their proper ends, is the effect. Here hauehave we comprehended all the kinds of cauſes which can be aſſigned in this matter. All the cauſes of prouidence. No efficient cauſe of the prouidence of God.This I ſpeake, bicauſe there can be giuen no efficient cauſe of the prouidence of God. The formall cauſe is the power of God. The matter whereabout, are all manner of things whatſoeuer; for we in no wiſe except anie thing. But the finall cauſe is, that all things may atteine to their owne ends, and may redound to the glorie of God. By this definition we ſée, Prouidence is no bare but an efficient knowledge. Acts. 17, 28. Rom. 11, 36. Prou. 16, 1.that the prouidence of God is not onlie a bare knowledge, but it is ſome bringing to effect. For as Paule ſaith; In him we liue, we mooue, and hauehave our being. And againe; Of him, and in him, and by him are all things. And as Salomon ſaith; Man may prepare his heart, but God ordereth the ſpeach. For we are not able to mooue, no not the toong, being the lighteſt part of the bodie, without the prouidence of God. Matt. 10, 19.And Chriſt ſaith; that A ſparowe dooth not light vponupon the ground without the will of our heauenlie Father. And, All the heares of our head are numbered. Some dreame that God indéed made all theſe things; but after he had made them, A ſimilitude.caſt them off. So (forſooth) carpenters, when they hauehave doone ſufficientlie in building of a houſe, they afterward leaue the ſame: but if God ſhould doo ſo, this world would ſoone come to ruine. For a houſe, vnles it be oftentimes repaired and vnderpropped, falleth to ruine and decaie. If the ſoule be ſeuered from the bodie, what remaineth, but that the bodie will become putrified and rotten?
Neither are they to be heard, which ſaie; that God indéed ruleth all things: but that this is nothing elſe, but to miniſter vntounto all things the common influence, which euerie thing draweth vntounto it ſelfe. This is euen to make God, not in verie déed, but in name to be the ruler and gouernour of the world. Whether God onlie by common influence doo rule all things.For if ſo be that euerie thing, according to the nature thereof doo bend and applie vntounto it ſelfe that common influence of God, then God followeth the nature of things created; where as rather contrariwiſe all things created ought to followe and ſéeke after God. But they ſaie, that euen as he, which throweth a ſtone, A ſimilitude.or ſhooteth an arrowe, hath doone enough to hauehave firſt forced the ſame, although he himſelfe afterward followe not after them, when they be out of his hand: ſo it was ſufficient for God, in that he indued all things with a certeine power, although he do not perpetuallie gouerne them. But theſe things be not alike; for a ſtone and an arrowe doo fall immediatelie after that they be ſhot, bicauſe that force which is in things created cannot be of long continuance. Wherefore, vnleſſe that God ſhould proſecute by his euerlaſting care and prouidence, the thing which he hath forced, the nature of euerie thing could not abide. When the Peripatetiks perceiued that all theſe inferiour things, were continuallie troubled; they iudged that the prouidence of God was aboue the moone: as if it were not conuenient for it to be carefull for theſe inferiour things, no further foorth than a certeine common influence is therby miniſtred vntounto all things. But theſe are fond reaſons; for the ſcriptures teach vsus, that euen theſe things, which to vsus may ſéeme to come moſt of all by chance, That God dooth gouerne both the ſuperiour and the inferiour things. Deut. 19, 5. Iob. 14, 5.are yet gouerned by the prouidence of God. In Deuteronomie the 19. If an ax flieng by chance out of his hands that heweth wood, ſtrike a man and kill him as he paſſeth by; It is I (ſaith the Lord) that deliuered him into the hand of the ſlaier. And in the 14. chapter of Iob, it is ſaid of God; Thou haſt appointed man his bounds, which he ſhall not paſſe. Alſo in the booke of wiſdome, (which booke though it be not in the canon, yet conteineth it manie good and godlie ſaiengs) in that booke (I ſaie) in the eight chapter, it is written; Wiſedome reacheth from one end to another foreign, Wiſdo. 8, 1.& diſpoſeth all things foreign: it reacheth (ſaith he) foreign, that is to ſaie, Strong & mightie: & diſpoſeth Profitablie: for ſo ſoundeth foreign; & not Sweetlie, as the old tranſlation hath. And that profite, although it be not oftentimes perceiued of vsus, yet is it alwaies of ſuch ſort, as it dooth tend to the glorie of God.
8 But whether all things be ſubiect to the prouidence of God, is a matter in controuerſie: Whether all things be vnderunder the prouidence of God.for ſome ſaie, they be; and ſome ſaie, they be not. But, as we ſaid before; if God hauehave made all things, vndoubtedlie nothing is exempted from his prouidence: for if anie thing ſhould be exempted from his prouidence, that alſo ſhould be exempted from creation. It is written in the epiſtle to the Hebrues; He vpholdeth all things by the word of his power. The Hebrue p…aſe; Heb. 1, 3.The word of his power is in ſted of His mightie word. This place agréeth with that which we cited out of the booke of wiſdome. Ezec. 18, 4. Num. 11, 29.Ezechiel calleth God; The Lord of all fleſh. And Moſes calleth God; The Lord of ſpirits. And Paule ſaith; Ephe. 1, 11.It is he that worketh all things, according to the determination of his will. Alſo Heſiodus an Ethnike poet ſaith; In this life we can no where eſcape from the mind of God. Yet there be ſome which would exempt from Gods prouidence, men and frée will, and things that either be of neceſſitie, or that come by chance. Cicero in his booke De fato ſaith; that The moſt ancient philoſophers, ſuch as Empedocles and Heraclitus, affirmed, that All things come to paſſe of neceſſitie: but the Peripatetikes were of the opinion, that manie things come by chance. And Chryſippus as a notable vmpire, although he taught that all other things were of neceſſitie; yet affirmed, that mans will, as touching the firſt election, is frée. Wherefore Euſebius in his treatiſe De praeparatione euangelica, ſaid pleaſantlie, that Democritus made men to be ſlaues; but that Chryſippus made them but halfe ſlaues.
Alſo Cicero in his ſecond booke De diuinatione, will rather exclude all prouidence, than that men ſhould not be frée. Which vanitie Auguſtine deriding in his fift booke De ciuitate Dei, ſaith, that He to make men frée, had made them rob God of his glorie. So we ſée, that there be ſome which thinke not, that all things be vnderunder prouidence: but in that they except man by name, which is the chéefeſt workemanſhip of God, that ſéemeth too contumelious a thing againſt God. For ſéeing all artificers contemne trifling works of ſmall value, but doo adorne, and hauehave a ſpeciall care of thoſe works which be excellent; who will imagin that God could deſpiſe that worke, which of all other he made moſt choice of? And if it ſhould be ſo, in what ſtate ſtand we? What refuge ſhould we hauehave in aduerſitie? Pſalm. 37, 5. 1. Pet. 5, 7. Zacharie. 2, verſe. 8. Gen. 15, 1. Pſal. 56, 12. Pſalm. 27, 3.Dauid ſaith; Caſt all thy care vponupon God, and he will nouriſh thee. And Peter ſaith, It is he that taketh care of you. And Zacharie; He that toucheth you, ſhall touch the apple of mine eie. And I (ſaith the Lord) am thy buckler, and thy ſtrong wall. The Lord (ſaith Dauid) is my helper, and I ſhall not be afraid what man can doo againſt me. Though their tents were pitched againſt mee, yet my hart ſhall not be afraid.
If prouidence doo gouerne all things, why is there ſuch a confuſion of things?9 But thou wilt ſaie, that In inferior matters, manie things are done either without order, or elſe diſorderlie: for we ſée often-times the godlie to be oppreſſed, and the wicked to flouriſh. Admit it be ſo; but is there no prouidence therefore, bicauſe we doo not ſée the cauſes thereof? If peraduenture thou ſhouldeſt be in a ſmithes ſhop, A ſimilitude.and ſéeſt manie tooles, ſome crooked, ſome bowed, ſome hooked, and ſome ſawed in; wouldeſt thou ſtrait-waie condemne them all for naught, bicauſe they appeare not ſtraight and handſome? I thinke not; but thou wouldeſt rather confeſſe thy ſelfe to be ignorant of the vſe of them. Such an honor muſt be giuen to God, as when thou ſéeſt tyrants and wicked men to enioie wealth and proſperitie, thou muſt ſaie, that they be inſtruments of the prouidence of God, although thou canſt not perceiue what God intendeth by them. Auguſtine ſaith, that God is ſo good, as he is able to drawe out ſome goodnes euen out of the wicked. Further, if there were no tyrants, what vertue & patience of martyrs ſhould there be? God will hauehave ſome to be the triumph of his goodnes, he will hauehave ſome alſo vponupon whom he may exerciſe his might and power. But perhaps thou wilt ſaie; Is it not enough that men be martyrs in the preparation of their mind? Indéed there be noble vertues hidden in the minds of the godlie, but yet oftentimes this dooth not ſatiſfie God: he will bring them foorth into act, that they may be ſéene. Wherefore our eies muſt be lifted vp, that we thinke not of the vngodlie, but of God. So the prophets call Nabuchadnezar, Pharao, Eſaie. 10, 5.and Senacherib, hatchets, hammers, ſawes, and ſwords in the hand of God.
Iob, when he was turned out of all that he had, reſpected not the Chaldaeans, nor the diuell, but ſaid; The Lord gaue, Iob. 1, 21.and the Lord hath taken awaie. He is accounted a learned phyſician, A ſimilitude.which can drawe out vntounto the outward part of the bodie the corrupt humors, which be hidden within the bodie; yet we would abhorre blanes and ſores: but the phyſician ſaith, that then the ſicke man beginneth to heale, when ſuch things breake foorth. In like maner God, with his medicines and fires of perſecutions bringeth into light thoſe things, which before laie hidden in our minds. Let the wicked doo what they will, yet can they doo nothing more than is the will of God. So ſaid Peter in the Acts as touching Pilat and Herod; Acts. 4, 24.They agreed togither, that they might doo, whatſoeuer thy will and thy counſell had decreed to doo.
10 But thou wilt ſaie; Whether things of neceſſitie be vnderunder prouidence.Some things be of neceſſitie, which cannot otherwiſe be than they are; doo thoſe fall vnderunder the prouidence of God? Yea trulie, there is nothing created of ſuch neceſſitie, but if it be referred vntounto God, it hath the nature of a thing that commeth by chance. For as we ſaid; God reacheth from end to end, and ordereth all things. What thing is of more neceſſitie than the courſe of the ſ…nne? And yet Ioſua made the ſunne to ſtand ſtill. Ioſua. 10, 1….What thing is of more neceſſitie, than that the fire ſhould burne, if fuell be applied therevnto? Therefore it hath béene an old ſaieng; If actiue things be applied to things paſſiue, the action muſt follow of neceſſitie. Yet neuertheles God brought to paſſe, that thoſe thrée yoong men walked ſafelie in the flaming fornace. Dan. 3, 93.What is of more neceſſitie, than that the ſhadowe ſhould followe the ſunne ſhining? And yet God brought to paſſe, that when the ſunne did ſhine, Eſaie. 38, 8.the ſhadowe went backward. But man ſéemed to hauehave béene made, and to be left in the hand of his owne counſell. Eccleſiaſticus. 15, 14.Thou ſhalt keepe thoſe things (ſaith Eccleſiaſticus) & they ſhall keepe thee. I grant that man, as concerning the inward cauſes, was ſo made at the beginning, as nothing could be to him of anie neceſſitie: but we doo not therefore exclude the grace of God and prouidence. Let vsus heare the holie ſcriptures as touching that matter. For Eccleſiaſticus is not among the number of the canonicall books; Prou. 16. 1.The kings hart (ſaith Salomon) is in the hand of God. Ezec. 20. 11.But God ſaith; I hauehave giuen them precepts. Ezec. 36. 26.But he alſo ſaith; I will make you to walke in my commandements. Againe; I will giuegive you a new hart, Man is not exempted from the prouidence of God.and a new ſpirit. Wherefore man is not to be exempted from the prouidence of God.
11 But much leſſe are thoſe things to be excluded, which ſéeme to be doone by chance. Things by chance are vnderunder the prouidence of God.For although we can not perceiue the reaſon of the ſecond cauſes, yet God ſéeth it; yea, the Philoſophers teach vsus, that euerie cauſe, which they call Per accidens, that is, Comming by chance, muſt be reuoked vntounto that which is a cauſe by it ſelfe: for that which is Per accidens, can not be anie cauſe. Wherfore Ariſtotle in his litle booke De bona fortuna, when he demanded for what cauſe ſome were fortunate, and ſome not? He anſwered, that it is doone by a certeine violent motion, and impulſion; whereof neuertheleſſe, he that is driuen, can not yéeld a cauſe: hereby it commeth to paſſe (ſaith he) that ſome are fortunate, Why ſome be fortunate and ſome not.and ſome not. Furthermore he ſaith, that this euent, if it be referred to our will & knowledge, happeneth by chance; but that inforcement is a cauſe by it ſelfe. But the queſtion is not thus diſſolued. For how commeth it to paſſe, that this fortune is giuen to one man, and not to another? The Aſtrologers would ſupplie that, which they thought Ariſtotle wanted. Ptolome in his booke foreign, referreth this vntounto the ſtarres; by which (he ſaith) men being diuerſlie borne, are carried ſome to proſperitie, and ſome to aduerſitie. And this, ſome called, A power, Daemoniū hath relation aſwell to ill fortune, as to good.ſome Conſtellation, and other ſome Particular deſtinie; Socrates called it Daemoniū. But whie it happeneth more to one man, than to another; & more at one time, than at another; none other cauſe can be aſſigned, but the prouidence of God: which vndoubtedlie is, that all things ſhould be referred to the glorie of God.
Gen. 45. 8.It is not you (ſaith Ioſeph to his brethren) that ſould me into Aegypt; but God ſent me hither before you. So God ſaid that he ſent Saule vntounto Samuel, 1. Sa. 9. 16.although it ſéemed as if he had turned out of the waie to him by chance. So Chriſt ſaid vntounto his Apoſtles; Mar. 14. 13.There ſhall one meete you bearing a pitcher of water. Theſe things were certeine vntounto the prouidence of God, although otherwiſe in the ſight of men, they might ſéeme but things comming by chance. But thou wilt ſaie; Be there then no ſecond cauſes? Dooth God nothing by his angels? We take not awaie the ſecond cauſes; but we make them inſtruments of the prouidence of God: for Angels be adminiſtring ſpirits. Heb. 1. 14. Pſal. 102.And Dauid ſaith; Who doo execute his will. But although God ſend his angels, yet he him ſelfe is preſent and principall ouer all things; If I ſhall aſcend (ſaith Dauid) into heauen, Pſal. 139. 8.thou art there; if I go downe into hell, thou art there alſo. For he dooth not ſo giuegive his angels charge, as though he him ſelfe were abſent. Which thing the poets feigne of Apollo, that he placed P…aëton in his chariot, and by that meanes all the heauens in his abſence were ſet on fire. But ſinnes, (will ſome man ſaie) depend not on prouidence. How ſinnes doo depend of Gods prouidence.How ſinnes be ruled by God, ſhall be ſhewed afterward. In the meane time this I ſaie; The cauſe of ſinne vndoubtedlie commeth from vsus: but at what time, and againſt whom it ſhould breake foorth, that is in the power of God. It was wholie determined by Nabuchadnezar, Ezec. 21. 21.that he would oppreſſe ſome people; but that he ſhould oppreſſe the Iewes more than others, that was prouided by God.
12 The next queſtion is, Whether prouidence be vnchangeable. Mala. 3. 6.Whether this prouidence be immutable. Whie ſhould it not? For it is the rule of all things that be doone. It is written in the third of Malachie; I am the Lord, & am not changed. In the firſt of Iames; With him there is no variablenes, Iames. 1. 17.nor ſhadowing by turning. And in the 19. of Prouerbs; There be manie cogitations in the hart of man, Prou. 19. 12but the counſell of the Lord continueth ſtedfaſt. In the 46. of Eſaie; It is I that ſpeake, Eſai. 46. 10.and my counſell abideth ſurelie, and I doo what ſo euer pleaſeth me. For ſéeing prouidence is both the knowledge and will of God, and that thoſe things belong to the verie eſſence of God, it can not be changed, except God him ſelfe be changed therewithall. The ſecond cauſes indéed, ſéeing they be diuerſe and ſundrie, they oftentimes hinder themſelues; A ſimilitude.which thing we ſée come to paſſe in the influences of heauen, that ſome of them be an impediment to others; but the will of God can not be hindred by anie violence. In old time God ordeined the ceremonies of the Iewes, God would once hauehave ceremonies, and afterward he abrogated them.afterward he would hauehave them to be abrogated. How then? Is not the prouidence of God mutable? I anſwere; that In God is altogether one and the ſelfe-ſame will; but that he fore-ſawe from the beginning, what might agrée with the diuerſitie of times. Auguſtine to Marcellinus ſaith, that A huſbandman doth ſometime ſowe, ſometime reape, and ſometime compaſſe the ſoile; yet we muſt not ſaie that the art of huſbandrie is therefore mutable. Vindicianus ſaith, that A certeine phyſician miniſtred a medicine to a ſicke man, and healed him; and that he manie yeares after falling into the ſame diſeaſe, tooke the ſame medicine without the counſell of the phyſician: but when he waxed woorſe, he came to the phyſician, ſhewing him the matter, and began to complaine of the medicine. No maruell (quoth Vindicianus) then; for I miniſtred not the ſame vntounto thée. Now when ſome men marueled thereat, and were of opinion that he vſed ſome inchantment; There is no ſuch matter (ſaith he) for now is he of another age, and hath other humors than he had when I gaue him that his medicine. But ſhall not therefore the art of phyſick be like it ſelf? Euen ſo in anie wiſe God, although he foreſée all things, yet he hath not decréed, that all things ſhould be done at one time.
Things comming by chance. A diſtinction of neceſſitie. Looke part 2. Art. 22. chapter. 2. and part. 3. chap. 1. Art. 49.13 Now let vsus come to chance. If ſo be that the prouidence of God be ſo certeine, whether can it admit anie caſualtie? Here will I firſt vſe two diſtinctions, and afterward I will anſwere. There is one neceſſitie which is abſolute, and an other conditionall. For when we ſaie, that God is wiſe or iuſt, we vnderſtand that that is ſimplie, and abſolutelie neceſſarie. There be other things neceſſarie by ſuppoſition; as that which is commonlie canuaſſed in the ſchooles, to wit, that whatſoeuer is, while it is, is neceſſarie. Chriſt and the prophets fore-ſhewed that the citie of Ieruſalem ſhould be ouerthrowne; therefore of neceſſitie it ſhall be ouerthrowne: not that this neceſſitie is in the nature of the citie, but bicauſe Chriſt & the prophets hauehave foretold it, Matt. 24, 1.who could not be deceiued. Paule ſaith; that There muſt needs be hereſies: 1. Cor. 11 verſe 19. Matt. 18, 7.& Chriſt ſaith; It is neceſſarie that offenſes come. For theſe cauſes being ſet downe; namelie, the corrupt natures of men, & the diuels hatred towards mankind: & the end being granted, to wit that the elect ſhuld be tried, it is neceſſarie by ſuppoſition, that it ſhould ſo com to paſſe. Two ſundrie reſpects of things.Alſo things may be conſidered two maner of waies, either as they be in act; & in that caſe they hauehave the nature of neceſſitie, for they be no longer indefinite. As, to write, or not to write, is by chance: but if thou be now in the act of writing, it is no more chance, but neceſſarie. Wherfore we ſaie that the knowledge of the ſenſes is certeine, bicauſe the things themſelues cannot otherwiſe be. Or elſe things may be conſidered, as they lie hidden in their cauſes: but ſéeing cauſes may ſometime bring foorth effects, and ſometimes not, therefore there is no neceſſarie power of working in them. But if thoſe things be referred vntounto God, the reaſon is far otherwiſe: Rom. 4, 17.For he calleth thoſe things which be not, as though they were; for he comprehendeth all time, and hath neither beginning nor ending. All things alſo, which are to come for euer hereafter, are notwithſtanding preſent vntounto him. Here alſo commeth in the will of God; for we muſt not aſcribe vntounto him a bare knowledge; but ſuch as is effectuall, or actuall. And by this meanes I ſaie, that the verie things themſelues are to be conſidered as neceſſarie. Auguſtine In geneſi ad literam, the ſixt booke, chapter 15. There be manie waies whereby man, and other things might hauehave béene made by God, and thoſe meanes had ſome poſſibilitie, and no neceſſitie: but this is by the will of God, In what reſpect things be of neceſſitie, and in what reſpect contingent.whoſe will is the neceſſitie of things. And though ſuch things, being referred vntounto God, be neceſſarie; yet of vsus they muſt be weighed according to their inward and proper cauſes, and ſo be called things contingent, or that come by chance. For it is of no neceſſitie, that ſuch as the efficient cauſe is, ſuch alſo ſhould be the effect.
14 If thou demand, Why in nature ſome things be neceſſarie, and other ſome contingent.Whie theſe two kinds of cauſes be in the nature of things, ſo as ſome be limited and neceſſarie, others indefinit and contingent? Nothing elſe can be anſwered, but that God hath laid theſe conditions vponupon all things. God bringeth foorth all things, and he limiteth and boundeth all things; but yet ſo, as he neither confoundeth nor deſtroieth the nature of things. Boëtius in his Topiks ſaith, that Deſtinie is ſo called, of drawing to, and giuing place fitlie: for God draweth all things; but yet after a ſort ſo giueth place, as he diſturbeth nothing. Euen ſo things, although in their owne nature they incline indifferentlie on both parts; yet by God, they are made to incline more to one ſide than to another. The will of Saule, God maketh things of equall weight to incline on the one ſide. 1. Sam. 9. 16.of his owne nature, was no more determined to go than to tarrie: but when God would ſend him vntounto Samuel, that will began to incline to the one part. And therefore God put into his mind the will of his father, and brought to paſſe, that the ſame ſhould effectuallie mooue and perſuade his mind: and that all other deſires of reſt and eaſe (if anie were) that might hauehave reteined him at home, ſhould be ſubdued. Wherfore it came to paſſe, that the will of Saule obeied the prouidence of God. But yet in the meane time, the nature of the thing was not violated; but that the will of Saule was alike frée vntounto either part. Hereby it appéereth, how neceſſarie the grace of God is vntounto vsus. For our owne will, as it is all manner of waies corrupted, turneth all things to the worſer part. Alſo there be manie things, which doo dull and blind our vnderſtanding, that the will cannot eaſilie followe. God therefore propoundeth good vntounto our vnderſtanding, afterward he kindleth faith, & ſtirreth vp the will that we doo will the ſame effectuallie.
15 But thou wilt ſaie; How it can be ſaid contingent, when it is determined by God.Why is anie thing ſaid to be contingent, ſéeing God hath alreadie determined of the one part, and ſo it is made a thing of neceſſitie? I anſwere; Euerie thing of his owne propertie and beginning is contingent; but prouidence, which bringeth a neceſſitie, is an outward cauſe, of which nothing ought to be named. I knowe there be manie, which affirme, that thoſe things which can not be done by mans power, are brought vntounto that paſſe by God, that our will may either chooſe or refuſe them; That God worketh our will to chooſe or refuſe, and that prouidence goeth no further.and that there the prouidence of God ſtaieth, and goeth no further: but when as God foreſéeth what euerie man will chooſe, and what he will refuſe, his foreknowledge hindreth nothing at all. Howbeit, theſe ſaiengs doo not ſufficientlie agrée with the holie ſcriptures. For they teach, that God doth not prouide for things, that he will forſake them; but that (as we hauehave ſaid) he may conduct them to their ends, and thoſe ends doo ſerue the prouidence of God. For ſo ſaith Paule; God hath made all things according to the purpoſe of his will. Epheſ. 1, 11.So ſaid God himſelfe in Eſaie; Eſai. 46, 10.All things that I will, I doo. Matt. 10, 29.And Chriſt ſaith; Verelie, euen a little ſparowe lighteth not vponupon the ground without the will of our father. I knowe that Origin, Cyrill, Chryſoſtome, and others being vrged by certeine manifeſt places of the ſcriptures, ſuch as theſe are; Luk. 24, 26. Luk. 22, 23.It behooued Chriſt to ſuffer; The ſcripturs ought to be fulfilled, do thus interpret them; to wit, that theſe things did not therefore come to paſſe, bicauſe God fore-ſawe them; but therefore God fore-ſawe them, Whether things com to paſſe bicauſe God fore-ſawe them, or contrariwiſe.bicauſe they ſhould come to paſſe. This iudgement of theirs, if they ſpake as touching abſolute knowledge, could not much be reprehended. For, not bicauſe I ſée a man writing, therefore he writeth; but bicauſe he writeth, therefore I ſée him writing. Howbeit, we cannot affirme a bare knowledge in God, but we muſt alſo attribute vntounto him a will, whereby he directeth and ordereth all things. Yet ſhall it be true that they ſay, if their meaning be of the effect, or (as they ſaie) A poſteriore, that is, of the latter. For we hereof, that a thing is doone, doo vnderſtand, that it was the purpoſe of God that ſo it ſhould be. Otherwiſe the ſcriptures ſpeake verie plainelie; It behooued Chriſt to die; Luk. 24, 26. Iohn. 19, 36.It behooued that the ſcriptures ſhould be fulfilled. But how did it behooue? By ſuppoſition; bicauſe God ſo for-ſawe it: not that that neceſſitie was in the nature of the thing.
How cauſes are infinit.16 But peraduenture thou wilt ſaie, that therefore the cauſes in the nature of the thing it ſelfe be infinit, for that I take not the perfect and full cauſes, in ſo much as I ſhould hauehave added the prouidence of God. I anſwere; I onelie take the inward and proper cauſes of euerie thing, whoſe effects, bicauſe they might or might not be brought foorth by them, be things contingent. But I adde not prouidence, bicauſe the ſame is an outward cauſe. The which being added, it cannot be auoided, but that by ſuppoſition, 1. Sam. 10, 3.ſome neceſſitie muſt followe. For, Saule met with men carrieng of kids, bread, & wine: their will, in reſpect of the nature thereof, was infinite, either to hauehave giuen him, or not to hauehave giuen him anie thing: but God by his prouidence did limit that will vntounto the one part. They went to Bethel, there to ſacrifice; they met with Saule wearie vponupon the waie, & almoſt dead with hunger; it ſéemed a courteſie to refreſh him: this did God put into their minds. And if there were anie thing, which might be a let vntounto this will, thoſe things he bridled. And theſe things we diſpute onelie concerning the wils of men: for otherwiſe, in other things which be contingent, I knowe the means be infinite, which God is woont to vſe. Another example of this matter we hauehave out of the 21. chapter of Ezechiel; Eze. 21, 23.Nabuchadnezar marched into Syria, and when he was now onward on the waie, at a place where two waies met, he began to conſult with himſelfe, whether it were better for him to lead his power againſt the Iewes, or elſe againſt Rabath the chéefe citie of the Ammonits. Hée drew lots therevpon, the lots did God ſo frame, that he brought him to Ieruſalem. The nature of the thing it ſelfe was contingent, but the ſame being appointed of God became a thing of neceſſitie. Gen. 37, 28.Ioſeph was ſo ſold and carried into Aegypt, that as concerning the nature of the thing, it might be, that either he ſhould liue alwaies in bondage, or elſe that he ſhould at one time or other be deliuered. But God ſent dreames into the Baker and Butler; thoſe dreames did Ioſeph interpret: afterward he ſhewed Pharao a dreame, which when none of the diuinours could expound, the Butler gaue him intelligence of Ioſeph: and by this meanes it came to paſſe, that Ioſeph was deliuered out of priſon. Wherefore be it thus determined (as we hauehave ſaid) that all things hauing relation to the prouidence of God, be neceſſarie; but of their owne nature are contingent.
But thou wilt ſay; Whether effects be neceſſarie or contingent.Shall th…ffects be abſolutelie called things comming by chance, or rather of neceſſitie? Some there be, that for the dignitie of prouidence, will hauehave them called neceſſarie: but I would rather call them contingent, according to their owne nature. Albeit I will not greatlie ſtriue, ſo that the ſame neceſſitie be vnderſtood onelie by ſuppoſition. Rightlie did ſome of the Gréeks name prouidence foreign, of paſſ…ing through; bicauſe it paſſeth through euerie thing: others called it foreign, bicauſe nothing can eſcape it. Some will ſaie, that we receiue the opinion of the Stoiks concerning deſtinie. That is not true; for they defined their deſtinie to be a neceſſitie by a knitting togither of cauſes, and affirmed that the ſame did ouer-rule euen God himſelfe. But contrariwiſe, we teach that God gouerneth all things, and that he vſeth them to his owne glorie. But if they affirme that deſtinie is nothing elſe, but the prouidence of God; the queſtion is onlie as touching the word, and not of the thing: as Auguſtine elſe-where hath taught. Laſtlie, thou wilt ſaie, that by this meanes, Whether counſels & admonitions be taken awaie by prouidence.there will be no place for aduiſements, admonitions, and corrections, ſéeing that which God will, muſt néeds come to paſſe. The ſelfe ſame thing was obiected to Auguſtine, wherevpon he wrote the booke De correptione & gratia. Vndoubtedlie God, although he hauehave decréed a thing to be doone, yet he vſeth meanes in bringing the ſame to paſſe. He will change the naughtie will of man; he vſeth admonitions, preachings, and chaſtiſements. For theſe be the inſtruments of Gods prouidence: ſo farre is it that the prouidence of God excludeth them. In this queſtion we hauehave ſet in a maner the roots, and laid the foundations of predeſtination: but of it we will intreate an other time, when opportunitie ſhall ſerue.
¶ I knowe I am miſreported, that I make God to be the author of ſinne; but that is not true, as it ſhall plainlie appeare. But I onlie indeuour by my doctrine, to ſhew how the ſcriptures must be vnderſtood, when they ſeeme ſo to affirme: Alſo what Auguſtine ment, who ſaid, that God bendeth the wils of men aſwell vntounto good, as vntounto euill: And in like maner, how Zuinglius & Oecolampadius, and other great learned men, profeſſors of the Goſpell, must be vnderstood, when they ſeeme to auouch the ſame.