The Sum of Christian Religion 2, Part 2 · Subpart 8 · Section 1
1 WHETHER THERE BE A GOD.
THE great miſerie of mans nature cannot bee ſufficientlie thought vponupon, that, whereas it was created to the bright knowledge and euen the verie image of god, it is fallen ſo farre, as not onelyonly it is ignorant who, and what God is, but alſo maketh diſpute, whether there bee any GOD in heauen or no. The cauſes of this euill,The cauſes which hauehave made men to doubt whether there be a God. the Church alone doth vnderſtand: the firſt whereof is the blindneſſe and corruption of mans nature after his fall: the next the inſtigation of the Diuel, who would hauehave the whole opinion of God raſed out of the minds of men: vntounto which commeth the horrible confuſion of mans life and humane affaires, in that often-times the wicked floriſh, & the godly either are oppreſſed by them, or while they perceiue not the cauſes of theſe euils, and the ſecret gouernment of God, they fall to doubting whether there bee any God, who hath care ouer the world and humane affaires.
But that there is a God, is proued by diuerſe reaſons.
1 From the beutifull & goodly order of nature, The reaſons which proue there is a God. 1. The order of all thinges in the world. 2. The nature of mans minde.beheld in the world. Now order is inſtituted, but of a wiſe and vnderſtanding nature. In nature there is order. Therefore there is a ſuperiour mind or intelligent power which inſtituteth and maintaineth the ſame.
2 From the nature and excellencie of mans minde. For it cānot poſſibly be, that he ſhould beſtow any thing vponupon an other, which himſelfe hath not, who ſhould giuegive it: & that our reaſonable nature muſt needes hauehave his original from an intelligent & vnderſtanding nature, is manifeſt inough, for that the cauſe is not woorſer or baſer than the effect it bringeth. But the mind of mā is reaſonable or indued with reaſon, & hath ſome cauſe. Therfore it hath an vnderſtanding cauſe, which is God. The Minor is proued Whatſoeuer hath a beginning is from another: becauſe it must needes be from ſome thing. And of it ſelfe it cannot hauehave being or beginning, becauſe nothing is cauſe of it ſelfe. But mans mind hath a beginning. Therefore from another; which other must needes be God.
3 From the notions of general rules or principles in the mind; 3. The general rules and principles naturallie ingendered in the minde of man.as are the difference betweene honest things & diſhonest, numbering, vnderſtanding of conſequences in diſcourſe & reaſoning, & other notions borne together with vsus. For theſe notions of principles beeing borne in vsus, and with vsus, could not come by chance or from a ſenſible nature common to vsus with brute beaſts. Whereupon we frame this Syllogiſme: Notions are not engendred nor hauehave their being, but from a cauſe intelligent (for no man maketh another wiſe, who himſelfe is not wiſe) but in men there are notions, not comming by vſe, nor receiued frō men: Therefore they are from God. Rom. 1. God is ſaid to hauehave manifested his righteouſneſſe to men. Likewiſe, Man is the image of god. Seeing then theſe effects are attributed vntounto God as proper: there muſt needs be a God.
4. This principle it ſelfe; That God is.4 From the naturall notion of this principle, whereby wee affirme, that god is. Principles are true: Becauſe they are diuine wiſedome; and becauſe, the contrary or oppoſite thereto beeing granted, nature is thereby deſtroied. But, That God is, is a principle. 1. Becauſe eueryevery one hath experience hereof in himſelfe. 2. All wiſe men confeſſe it. 3. All nations conſent in it: becauſe they hauehave ſome religion, and about that they contend and ſtriue. 4. Rom. 1.19. That which may be known of god is manifeſt in them, that is, in the minds of men, for god hath ſhewed it vntounto them. Therefore god is.
5 The terors of conſcience.5 The terrors of conſcience which are ſtroken into the mindes of the wicked after they hauehave ſinned. The torment of minde, which enſueth vponupon ſinnes committed, is inflicted of a iudge which knoweth both honeſt and diſhoneſt thinges, deteſteth thoſe things which are diſhoneſt, beholdeth the mindes and harts, exerciſeth iudgement vponupon the minds: But in al the wicked is this torment. Rom. 2.15. They ſhew the effect of the law writtē in their harts, their conſcience alſo bearing witnes. Iſa. 57.20.21. The wicked are like the raging ſea, that cannot reſt. There is no peace, ſaith my god, to the wicked. Iſa. 66.24. Their worme ſhall not dy, neither ſhall their fire bee quenched, Therefore there is ſome ſuch iudge. But he cannot be, except he be God: becauſe this puniſhment cannot come but from God. Deutr. 4. God is a conſuming fire.
Againſt the beaſtes of the world, who think this doctrine of God to bee but a cunning deuiſe of the wiſer ſort to keepe the ſimple people in order.And hence is apparant the impudencie of Epicures and Academicks, who deeme al religion to be deuiſes of ſubtill men, coined to this end and purpoſe, that the reſt of the common people might, through fear of a ſuperiour power, be kept in good order. For firſt, if through deceiueablenes other men beleeue that God is, and dread him; why then are theſe men themſelues, who wil ſeem by their ſharp inſight to eſpy the guile moſt of al tormēted with the conſcience & priuy acknowledgement both of this their blaſphemy, as alſo of other their miſdeeds? Moreouer the ſole and bare aſſeueration & word of a few could not hauehave bin ſufficient neither to perſuade al mankind, nether to maintain the perſuaſion, once brought in, to al ſucceeding ages. Neither doth that lightē the force of thoſe argumēts, which are deducted from this notion, that there is a God; & from the conſcience, in that they ſay, there are many found, who neither beleue there is a god, nether are moued with the conſcience of their ſins. For although they couet neuer ſo much to perſuade themſelues, that there is no God, yet is their conſcience alwaies againſt them. And therefore it is moſt falſe that theſe men imagine that any one of the wicked is free from the gnawing of his conſcience. For how much the more eueryevery one deſpiſeth God and al religion, and endeuoreth to repreſſe the prickes of conſcience: ſo much the more is he tormented, and at eueryevery mentioning and ſignifieng of God hee trembleth and ſhaketh with horror; and how much the ſlowlier, with ſo much the more ſeuere dolor & paine is his ſecurity ſhaken from him. Whereupon wee ſee, thoſe, whoſe whole life was profane and ſecure, for the moſt part, when they are oppreſſed with the terror of gods iudgement, to periſh in deſpair. Now that which is ſaid Pſa. 10. The vngodly is ſo proud, that hee careth not for god: neither is god in all his thoughts: & Pſ. 14. & 53. The fool hath ſaid in his hart, there is no god: that this hath not this meaning, as if the wicked were void of al knowedge and fear of god, or do not confes that there is a god: but that framing vntounto themſelues another, than he indeed is who hath manifeſted himſelf, to wit, one that careth not for mens affairs, defēdeth not, nor deliuereth the good, and puniſheth the wicked; they place an idol in the roum of the tru God: Dauid himſelf doth ſufficiciently declare, when as he deſcribeth the ſame prophaneneſſe of the wicked, Pſ. 10. in theſe words: For he hath ſaid in his hart, tuſh, god hath forgotten, he hideth away his face, and he wil neuer ſee it.
6 From the puniſhmēts of the wicked, 6. The puniſhmentes of the wicked.which they ſuffer beſides the torments of conſcience. For the euents of al times cōſtrain men to confeſſe that their ſins are puniſhed with grieuous puniſhments in this life; & cōtrariwiſe the lot & end of the good to be more pleaſant. Wherefore there is a minde or vnderſtanding power, which diſcerneth honeſt things frō diſhoneſt, iudge of mankind, puniſhing the wicked, & defē ding the good. And that this may not be aſcribed to the wiſedome or ſeuerity of magiſtrats or other men, this firſt withſtādeth & hindereth, for that it muſt needs be that this natural inſtinct, whereby men iudge that offender▪ are iuſtlie puniſhed, muſt proceed from ſome mind which is enimy to wickednes. Again, for that oftentimes by marueilous & inexpected and vnlooked for meanes they are drawen to the iuſtice and puniſhment of the Magiſtrates, whoſe ſinnes before had beene priuy, or who ſeemed to hauehave bin able by their owne power or ſubtilty eaſily to eſcape their handes; and that eſpecially, for that many, who through either the negligence or whiteliuerdnes of Magiſtrats are not puniſhed by them, yet run into calamities and hauehave allotted vntounto them ruthful ends. And whē tranſgreſſions & ſins encreaſe too much, & their impunity, whole nations and common-wealthes with horrible and manifeſt examples of gods wrath periſh: as the world in the deluge: Sodom by fier caſt from heauē: Pharao in the red ſea: the Iewes, & many floriſhing kingdomes by moſt lamentable ouerthrowes. That theſe things cānot come to paſſe by chaunce, neither any other way than by the iudgement and power of him who is Lord of mankind & nature, both Gods comminations and threatnings, and the conſcience of eueryevery one, and the order of iuſtice, whereby theſe folow and enſue vponupon impiety, and the very hugenes, waight and greatnes of things doth conuince. Wherefore it is ſaid, Pſ. 58. The righteous ſhal reioice when he ſeeth the vengeāce: he ſhal waſh his footſteps in the blood of the vngodly. So that a man ſhall ſay, Verily there is a reward for the righteous: doubtles there is a god that iudgeth the earth. And Pſa. 9.16. The Lord is knowen to execute iudgemēt: now albeit the wicked floriſh often for a while, & the godly are oppreſſed, yet neuertheles exāples which are fewer in nūber, do not weaken the general rule, vntounto which moſt euēts agree. But if it were ſo that fewer of the wicked did ſuffer puniſhment, yet thoſe ſelfſame examples, though but a fewe, would teſtify that god is, & that he is diſpleaſed with the offences of others alſo, who ſeem to be leſſe puniſhed. But this is not true, no not of any of them, that they are not puniſhed in this life. For al thoſe who are not before the end of this life conuerted to god, if puniſhment do not ſooner ouertake them, yet at length they die in diſpaire, which puniſhment is more grieuous than all the euils eyther corporall or externall, and is the beginning & teſtimonie of euerlaſting puniſhment. Now in that this puniſhment is not ſufficient, it doth therein agree with all euen the moſt tragicall caſes of the wicked: and therefore wee are taught by the doctrine of the Church, that Gods lenitie, which he doth not ſeldome vſe in this life towards the wicked: and his ſeueritie, which hee ſeemeth to ſhew towardes the godly, doth not at all weaken his diuine prouidence and iuſtice, but rather declareth his goodnes, whiles by differring of puniſhment he inuiteth the wicked to repentaunce, and by exerciſing the godly with chaſtiſementes and croſſes, hee perfecteth their ſaluation; and alſo it confirmeth the certaintie of iudgement after this life, wherein perfect ſatisfaction ſhall be made by the wicked to Gods iuſtice.
7 From a bodie politique, which is wiſelie ordered by lawes. 7 Common weales wiſely ordered.This coulde not hauehave beene ſhewed vntounto men, but from a minde, vnderſtanding and approouing this order, which minde is God himſelfe. Moreouer, that which is not preſerued by humane wiſedome, or by force, or naturall cauſes, neither yet can be ouerthrown by Diuels & the multitude of wickedmen, hath a defender more potent & mightie than theſe. Common-weales are not preſerued by humane ſtrength or wiſedome, & are oppugned by the wicked and Diuels. Therefore they hauehave a ſuperior and mightier defender than all theſe. And this defender is God alone.
8 From the order and nature of efficient cauſes. 8. The order and nature of efficient cauſes.For it can not bee, that the proceſſe and race of efficient cauſes ſhoulde bee of an endleſſe and infinite extent: wherefore there muſt bee ſome firſt and principall cauſe, which may either mediately or immediately produce and mooue the reſt, on which alſo all other cauſes may depende. Nowe that the progreſſe of cauſes, which hauehave their moouing and beeing eache of other, is not infinite, they ſhewe by this reaſon. If the cauſes of anie effect were infinite, whereof ſome ſhould mooue or produce other ſome, one of theſe abſurdities ſhould follow; that either within the compaſſe of a finite time ſhould bee effected infinite motions and mutations, or elſe at no time thoſe infinite cauſes euer to attaine vntounto their end, that is, vntounto their purpoſed effect. Both which beeing manifeſtly falſe, and impoſſible, it muſt needes be that the original of mutations dependeth of ſome cauſe immutable, eternal and omnipotent.
9. The endes of all thinges.9 From the final cauſes of al things. To appoint the endes of all thinges belongeth to a nature which is wiſe, and adminiſtreth al things. Now al thinges are ordeined to their ends, and thoſe alſo certaine. (But theſe endes and vſes of thinges hauehave not their beeing by chaunce, or from a nature onelyonly endewed with ſenſe) Therefore from ſome nature which is wiſe and omnipotent, which is God alone.
For, that nature worketh for ſome end, this is ſo farre from remoouing the framer and artificer from it, as rather it moſt of all confirmeth, that there is a minde maker and framer of the woorlde, which appointed the actions of nature to theſe ends, and nature deede intendeth to an end thtough the ordination and appointment of another, but neither vnderſtandeth it, nor is moued thereby to work.
And further, that there are manie things in the world which not onlie ſeeme vnprofitable to all, but are alſo troubleſome and pernicious: this alſo doth not infringe the generall rule, That all thinges were made to a good vſe. For by reaſon of ſinne thoſe things nowe hurt, which would hauehave profited men if they had not ſinned. And therefore to the godly al thinges turne to their ſafetie, yea that puniſhment it ſelfe, which God inflicteth by other creatures vponupon mē, ſerueth for an vſe agreeable to the wiſedome and iuſtice of God. Many thinges alſo, whereby men feele diſcommodities, hauehave withal ſome vſes acceptable, & preſeruatiue to mans life. And farther there is no one thing among all things which yeeldeth not matter of agnizing and celebrating the wiſedome, bounty, power, and iuſtice of the author.
10. Certaine & euident foretellings of euents.10 From certaine and cleare ſignifications of future euentes, which neither by humane ſight or perceiueablenes, neither by naturall cauſes or ſignes coulde hauehave beene foreknowen: but only beeing reuealed by him, who hath both mankinde and the nature of all thinges ſo in his owne power, that nothing can bee doone but through his motion. Such are the prophecies of the deluge, of the poſterity of Abraham, of the comming of the Meſſias. Which firſt is thereby manifeſt, for that the decrees and counſailes of that minde, which is the firſt cauſe of his owne workes, no man can knowe before himſelfe: and therefore they cannot bee foreknowen of others, but beeing diſcloſed by him. Furthermore, many Prophecies hauehave beene vttered in ſuch ſort, that God hath not onelyonly foretolde things ſhould ſo come to paſſe, but alſo that thoſe thinges ſhoulde bee doone and brought ſo to paſſe by him, Ezech. 12. Of all thinges foretolde by him hee ſaith, I will ſpeake the woorde, and I will doe it. Laſty, it muſt needes bee that he knoweth all things who promiſeth that hee will giuegive aunſwere concerning all purpoſes and euentes neceſſary to bee knowen, which ſhall bee demaunded of him, and dooth indeede perfourme this; euen as God did among the people of Iſrael. And therefore God himſelfe alleageth this as his worke alone, for proofe of his diuinity againſt all forged & fained Gods. Iſa. 41.23. Shew the things that are to come heereafter, that wee may knowe that you are Gods.
11 From heroicall inſtinctes, that is, wiſedome,11. Heroical and noble inſtincts of minde. and excellent vertue, in vndertaking and atchiuing thoſe woorkes, which ſurpaſſe the common capacity of mans nature. Such is the felicity and happineſſe of noble artificers or gouernours, in ſearching or poliſhing artes, and in finding out deuiſes and counſailes: Likewiſe the couragiouſneſſe of mind in performing the actions of vertue, and in menaging matters: ſuch as was in Achilles, Alexander, Archimedes, Plato, and others.