Discovery of Jacksons Vanity, Section 3 · Chapter 16

Discovery of Jacksons Vanity · Section 3 · Chapter 16

SECT. III.

That Gods will and pleasure is never frustrated, albeit his unspeakable love take no effect in many to whom it is unfainedly tendered.

CHAP. XVI.

In what sense God may be said to have done all that he could for his vineyard, and for such as perish.

I Have now waded thorow fifteene Chapters of these your Contemplations, and should by this in reason be pretie well acquainted with the manner of your discourse. But I finde my selfe as much pus…ed in searching after the coherence of the parts of the first Section here, as hitherto I have beene in any part of the Treatise. But it may be I doe but labour to gather that which you never strewed, and then no marvell if I labour in vaine.

As in other parts so in this it may be your purpose was to write Quodlibets: well, such as they are, I purpose to consider them as I finde them. To summe up the particulars; in the first place you discover unto us the causes of conceiving difficulties, and of ignorance in assoiling them, and that is because p. 586we extend this Maxime, (Both parts of contradictories cannot bee true,) not so farre as we should, and the reason thereof is (you say) because we extend our power to the utmost, yea farther then justice or goodnesse can accompany it: To this you adde … our nature is humourous and inconstant, and therefore nothing can imply any constant contradiction to our nature, and that looke what is constant and still the same, that will at one time or other contradict our humour. And humours, you say, enraged with contradiction arme power against whatsoever contradicts them.

By the way you tell us, that the use of power in creatures sensitive is to satiate their appetite of sense; in man, to accomplish his will and desire of good. And that being corrupt, his power becomes an under-commander unto his unruly appetites, as in voluptuous men; and that in men esteemed good, motions of equity are so weake, that men yeeld their consents to such proposals, as were they firme, they would offensively contradict them. And the reason why they yeeld, is lest upstart appetites, which custome countenanceth, should bee enlarged by reluctance: But love, you say, is not alike set on divers objects, but divides itselfe unequally, when it comes to opposition betweene sense & reason; our selves and friends or common equity: And the inconveniences whereto the world and flesh exposeth us are reducible to two heads, the blinding of the judgement, and consequently the abusing of power and authority.

Then againe you returne to our unconstant humour, and upon the backe of that tell us, that though none doth good, yet we may doe lesse evill then others. And lastly, that they who love equity, are hardly drawn to dispense with injustice; and at last having sate long, you hatch an excellent Maxime, that where judgement is infallible, and love to justice invincible, there …s not possible to transgresse in judgement. All which when I compare together, and with your theame proposed, How God may be said to have done all that he could for his vineyard, it cals to my remembrance a certaine mad fellowes discourse, when I was a Scholler at Winchester, that would talke of p. 587master Killigree, and Abbey lands, fat venison, and such like uncoherences a long time together.

But let us examine them apart: Both parts of contradiction cannot be true; and it is as true that both parts of contradiction cannot be false. But whereto this tends, and how pertinent to your purpose in this place, I cannot devise; OnelyOnly you tell us that the not extending of this Maxime so farre as we should, is the cause why wee conceive difficulties in your wilde discourse premised, as also of our ignorance in assoiling them. A strange conceit, and whereof I see no colour of reason, neither do you take any paines to explicate it, by accommodation or instance, but let flie at randome, as if you would imploy your readers in seeking after sense and reason where there is none to be found. And if this were true, your selfe should have assoiled the difficulties conceived in the points proposed, by extending this Maxime to the utmost, to serve your turne; and shewed, how by not extending it so farre as is meet, difficulties are conceived, and no meanes found to assoile them: but your selfe have taken no such course: And who was ever knowne, not to extend this Maxime to the uttermost? where can you finde any limitation or confining of it? what doe you meane to abuse your readers patience with such incredible fictions?

Againe, herehence it followeth, that whosoever doe extend this maxime so farre as naturally it would reach, they shall not be apt to conceive difficulties in the points proposed, nor be touched with ignorance in assoiling them. For the truth whereof I appeale to every mans conscience that reades your writings: of whom I am perswaded not one of a thousand, if Schollers, doth deny but that this Maxime holds universally; yet you take upon you to give a reason why we extend it not so farre as naturally it would reach, and that you say is our proneness to extend our owne power to the utmost, even farther then true goodnesse can accompany it. So then the honester men are, the more apt they are to extend this Maxime to the utmost, and consequently lesse apt to conceive difficulties in the points proposed, and lesse ignorant to assoile p. 590them: and the reason why men doe conceive difficulties in your writings, or are not able to assoile them, is for want of honestie. And you in the meane time would not be supposed to shew any want either of wit or honestie in your discourses. Well, this article of your naturall Creed is observable, They that doe things unjustifiable, they doe not extend this Maxime (Both parts of contradiction cannot be true) so farre as naturally it would reach, which is a mysterie unto me, and whereof I can devise no reason, neither doe you give any. For although our natures are humorous, unconstant, and wee finde contradiction, and are enraged with contradiction, and arme power against that which doth contradict us, yet herehence it followeth not that we limit or restraine the rules of contradiction; unlesse out of some such curious sophistrie and subtiltie as this, you dispute in this manner; We oppose them that contradict us, therefore we doe restraine the rules of contradiction: I doubt my reader would scarce thinke me sober, if I should goe about to dissolve this sophistry; yet the face of your discourse lookes no other way then this. And I confesse the law of God, and rules of good manners shall never faile to contradict him that is of a dishonest disposition. And though passions turne commonly into their contraries, yet notwithstanding all such inconstancy, true morality will alwaies be an opposite to him that is dishonest. But yet I finde no propension herehence to maintain, that both parts of contradiction are true, or both false.

Power, you say, is for the execution of will, and so is wit too, and no marvell if sometimes both of them are in knaves keeping. This is stuffe serving to fill paper. And if S. Paul complained of a law in his members rebelling against the law of his minde, and leading him captive to the law of sinne, no Rom. 7. 23Rom 7:23marvell if naturall men, esteemed good and sober, doe sometimes yeeld to things unfit: but that it is out of such mature deliberation as you speake, to prevent forsooth the enraging of carnall appetites, (which why you should call upstarts, I know not, unlesse you deny them to bee as old as the fall of Adam) I see no reason. I give a theefe my purse, lest I should p. 591lose my purse, and somewhat else also. But if I give over unto my passions my honesty, to be defiled by them, alas what have we more or greater to lose? And let them rage while they will, wee can but lose our honesty, therefore in reason we will not stop passions mouth at the first with our honesty, we will rather tugge and pull for it, and keepe more adoe then Michah for his gods; Yee have taken away my gods, Iud. 18. 24Judg 18:24and the Priest, and goe your waies, and what have I more? The motions of the flesh must needs offend the spirit, for they are lustings against the spirit. But there is no proportion between Gal. 5. 17▪Gal 5:17this contradiction, and that which is betweene paine and pleasure. For paine and pleasure are not felt at once, as this contradiction is.

Love, as not alike set on divers objects, is brought in by way of adversative, whereas the sentence is no other then that which went before, touching the contradiction between carnall desires, and vertuous motions. Yet to betray some quaint straine of learning, by way of parenthesis, you make question whether Love be one simple and indivisible quality, or an aggregation or cluster of divers inclinations rooted in one center: neither doe you determine it, but leave your reader to gaze upon it, as a childe doth upon a cluster of grapes first ripe, and the more like to be first rotten: you might make the same question of hatred also. For Quot modis dicitur unum oppositorum, tot modis dic…tur & alterum. It was wont to be said of love, that it was as the weight of the soule. Anima amore quasi pondere fertur quocunque fertur. But it hath different acceptions. For there is amor amicitiae, and there is amor concupiscentiae. And this amor concupiscentiae is either ordinate or inordinate: ordinate love becomes morall vertue, and inordinate, morall vice. And S. Iohn divides this inordinate concupiscence into three kindes; concupiscence of the flesh, concupiscence of the eie, 1 Ioh. 2. …1 John 2and pride of life. And will you put all these into one cluster, or posie rather, consisting partly of garden flowers, partly of stinking flowers of the field? The two originals you speak of, if subordinate, they are not two originals, there is but one; and the love of the world and the flesh carie men on, even in p. 590despite of judgement and conscience to the contrary, into manifest impi…ties, iniquities, impurities.

I doe not finde it strange that things seeme not impossible to us, if they are within our power, yet though they be within our power one way, I see no cause but they may seeme unpossible, and be unpossible another way. And bee our variousnesse never so great, yet I see no reason to justifie you in saying, that what cannot be admitted to day, will be allowed of to morrow. For the vicious person,

Qui non est hodie cras minus aptus erit,

to that which is good. And Absolom two yeares together watched opportunity to revenge himselfe on his brother Amnon, and afterwards continued as setled in his course os aspiring 2 Sam. 13. 22, 23.2 Sam 13:222 Sam 13:23to the kingdome: And therefore herein certainly you reckon without your hoast. Yet it is most true, that the better men are, the more hardly are they drawne to unjust courses: this I say is as true, as that all this is nothing to the purpose: yet hereupon you commend unto us by way of consequence, a truth in great state, and scored in the margent as verie remarkable, and yet you call it an experienced truth, That if any mans judgement in matters of equitie and justice were infallible, and his love to justice constant and invincible, it would be unpossible for him to transgresse in judgement; and indeed if this were not true, both parts of contradiction manifestly should prove true. For tis unpossible to transgresse but either by errour in judgement, or corruption in will: And therefore where judgement is infallible, and will incorruptible, tis not possible for such a one to transgresse. This is as true as one of Euclides elements. But it depends upon such Ifs and Ands, that the world is nothing like to profit either in wit or honestie by this information. OnelyOnly in this clause alone I finde some coherence with the former, to wit, with the first sentence of this Section: for that laid downe the thesis, this delivers the selfe same in hypothesis.

The conclusion is, that Gods ideall perfection in integrity and p. 593constancie hath no mixture of vice or humerous impotency. And our conceit of this perfection in God, you say, is rectified thus, to wit, by experience of the strength of unconstant humerous desires, & of the faintnesse of our love and equity, as well as by the contrary vertues. Your wit hath plaid his part here, when you strained to derive the rectification of our conceits, touching Gods integrity and constancie, from the contrary disposition in man.

Belike, if Adam had never fallen, our conceits could not have beene so rectified touching Gods integrity and perfection as now they are, neither shall they bee so well rectified in the kingdome of heaven, because there we shall be acquainted with no such humourous inconstancy, or faintnesse of equity in man.

2 In the former Section you complained of not extending the maxime mentioned, so far as naturally it would reach, and you discoursed unto us the dangerous consequence of such an humour, and the cause of it. The consequence was partly aptnesse to conceive difficulties in the points proposed by you, and ignorance to assoile them. The cause was the extending of our owne power too farre. And in this Section you endeavour to rectifie our conceits hereabouts; now whereas I was intent (as it is fit every Reader should bee) to observe what was your drift and scope in all this, in the end of the former Section, you fell upon the rectifying of our conceits touching Gods ideall perfection, in the way of integrity and constancy, as if that were the scope you aimed at: but neither did your discourse in any handsome manner tend thereunto, though finally it lighted thereupon, neither doe I yet perceive whereunto this ideall perfection of God, you speake of, is directed, as being nothing congruous, for ought I discerne, to the point in hand. I rather thinke, that was delivered (as many other things in that Section) on the by, and that the immediate end you aime at, is this here mentioned in the beginning of this Section, namely, the rectifying of our conceits, touching the right extending of the aforesaid maxime, which is the principall negative touching contradictories. p. 594Both parts of contradiction cannot bee true, (no, nor false neither) you had rather expresse it thus, To make both parts of contradiction true (or false) is no object of power omnipotent: Now wee seeme to have found the hare againe, at least the tract and sent of the hare, and desire to pursue, without making any fault, as neare as wee can. Now the rule you give us for the right extending of the maxime mentioned, is this, Many effects are very possible to power alone considered, which imply contradiction to some other divine attributes. This passage hath seemed wondrous harsh unto me, and as it were, Iuterpretationem commodam indignata, such as could not admit a commodious interpretation: and the issue of searching into the meaning thereof, is not to justifie it, but rather to discover sundry incongruities involved herein.

In the former Section you complained of men, as extending their owne power too farre, which you conceived to bee the reason why they did not extend the maxime there proposed so farre as naturally it would reach.

But here you admonish us of extending the power of God aright, not considering it at large, but rather as joyned with other attributes of God.

Secondly, you complained, that men did not extend the maxime you speake of so farre as naturally it would reach, and therfore when here you come to give rules for the extending of it aright, every man would imagine that you take a course to enlarge it at full, whereas indeede you take a course to restraine it, for you tell us here, that a thing is not to be accounted possible in reference unto power, but in reference unto other attributes of God also, as love, truth, goodnesse, and justice, which manifestly doth restraine the possibility of any thing, rather then enlarge it.

Thirdly, whereas the effect of power which you treat of in this place, is onelyonly this, To make both parts of contradiction true, when you tell us, that, Many effects which are very possible to power alone considered, do necessarily imply contradiction unto some divine attributes. What doe you but hereby give us to understand, that this effect, to wit, of making both p. 595parts of contradiction true, though it bee possible to power alone considered, yet it is not possible in respect of some other attributes divine.

Now I demand in the name of common sense and sobrietie, whether this be a decent thing to say, that to make both parts of contradiction true is possible to power alone considered, whereas indeed it is no more possible, in reference to any power to make both parts of contradiction true, then to make both parts of contradiction false. Neither indeed is it in the power of God, as touching any one part of contradiction, if it be not true, to make it true, or if it be true to make it false. As for example, I am alive; it is not in the power of God to make it false. Hee may take my life from me, but that is not a course to make that proposition false. For it was true onelyonly for that time when it was pronounced, not for the time to come when my life is taken from mee. So when Socrates is dead this proposition is false, Socrates is alive, neither is it in the power of God to make it true: for though hee can restore life to Socrates, yet thereby he shall not make that proposition true. For that proposition was true for that time only, when it was pronounced, not for the time to come, least of all for that time when God had restored life to Socrates. But you will say, the being of a thing is the cause why a proposition concerning the being of that thing is said to be true, not on the contrary. And God is the cause of the being of things.

This I confesse is a truth in part. God is the cause of the being of things, yet not of all things, but onelyonly of things contingent. God is not the cause of that which hath necessary being, such as he is himselfe. So that these like propositions, God is eternall, omnipotent, omniscient, most simple, &c. no way depend on the execution of God his power, which proceeds alwayes according to the counsell of his owne will. But hereupon depends not the nature of God, nor many other principles containing necessary truth: I grant many things are denominated possible to the humane nature, which are not so in reference to the divine. For the humane nature hath power p. 596to transgresse, the divine nature hath not. Yet if you marke it well, this which in this case is called power, will finally be resolved not so much into power, as into impotency: For it is not to be presumed that our Saviour had lesse power then another man, because he could not sinne; or the Angels since their confirmation, then they had before, or that men in their glorified condition shall be more impotent then before. And indeed confirmation of integrity and innocency, doth not abolish power, but onelyonly rectifie the use of it, and establish that rectitude in the use of power. Yet there is a denomination of power attributed to man, and denyed unto God, as when we say man can transgresse, God cannot: But the ground of this is not the want of power in God, and a surplusage of power in man; but onelyonly this, that a man is capable of restraint from a superiour power, God is not. For to say, that man can transgresse, is as much as to say, that man can doe that which he is forbidden to doe, or from the doing whereof he is restrained. But this cannot be affirmed of God, as who hath no superior power to restraine him.

Your next sentence is full of non-sense, as when you say, It is more shamefull then impossible for rich men to lye or coozen, or for Magistrates to oppresse and wrong their inferiours; albeit the ones riches or others power were infinitely encreased, without internall encrease of their fidelity. For the better opening whereof I will resolve it into its parts. And they are two, considered apart without comparison.

The first is this, It is shamefull for rich men to lye and coozen, for Magistrates to oppresse and wrong, albeit the ones riches and the others power were infinitely encreased, without internall encrease of their fidelity. Now I say there is plaine non-sense in this, and that in divers respects.

First in saying it is is shamefull for rich men to lye and coozen, albeit their riches be never so much encreased: for the coherence by vertue of the particle albeit, doth imply, thatit is a shamefull course for them to lye, though never so much provoked thereunto. This I say should be the sense. But your sentence hath a quite contrary sense. For whereas according p. 597to the most convenient sense it should run thus; It is a shamefull course for a man to lie and coozen, though he be never so poore, poverty indeed being usually a provocation unto lying and coozening, as wee reade Prov. 30. 9. you pronounce it in a quite contrary sense thus: It is a shamefull thing for a rich man to lye and coozen, though he be never so rich.

Secondly, your adversative is as unreasonable in respect of the latter part of it, which is this, Albeit he be without encrease of internall fidelity: As much as to say, it is a shamefull thing for a rich man to lye and coozen, though hee be never a whit the more honest for his riches: and tis like unto his speech that said of a swine, It was a creature which though it was polluted yet it was not cleane, as if there were an opposition between being polluted, and being not cleane: so you imply an opposition betweene being never the more honest, and doing that which was shamefull. Whereas indeed he that doth shamefull things, is hoc ipso never a whit the more honest.

The solecisme is the same applyed to the Magistrate, as touching the latter part, not as touching the former; because their power and authority may seeme to countenance them in dealing more hardly with inferiours, then if they were not in magistracy would seeme fit.

The second part is this; It is possible for rich men to lye and coozen, though they were rich, and never a whit the more honest.—It is possible for the Magistrate to oppresse and wrong, though they were never so powerfull, and never a whit the more honest. Here the solecisme is alike in both, as touching the latter part. For you imply by the forme of the sentence, that want of honesty were some hindrance to lying and coozening, some hindrance to oppressing and wronging.

But as touching the former part, the solecisme is most foule in the speech concerning the Magistrate, as when you imply, that the great power the Magistrate hath, is an hindrance to his possibility of oppressing and wronging his inferiours, whereas it appeares manifestly, that rather it is a furtherance thereunto.

But it is impossible for God to speake an untruth, or to do wrong. p. 598Before, I have shewed, that to have a power to transgresse, is to imply a being in subjection to a superiour power that restraineth him, and consequently such a power is resolved into weaknesse and impotency. In speciall to speake untruth implyeth lesse power then to speake truth; for to speake truth implyeth knowledge of truth: And to know truth is a thing of more power, then to be ignorant of truth.

But it may be you propose this of lying, which is to speak contrary to a mans knowledge: but this is not power to doe ought: For the speaking of this or that is not the lying: but lying is a denomination of the act of speaking, arising from the contrariety of the speech, to the knowledge or intentions of the mind. So that if he speake the same thing in his dream, or if another delivereth the same words, yet is it no lying. In a word, power to doe ill, or peccabilitas, which is per naturam, doth no more rellish of true power, then impoccabilitas per gratiam doth savour of impotency and weaknesse. But God you say cannot speake untruth. The truth is, God cannot speake at all in proper speech; for God hath no tongue to be the interpreter of his heart. But God doth inspire his servants with truth, and move them to speake it, or to write it: And it is Aug. Ep. 174. Ille in servis sui loquitur.impossible hee should inspire with falshood; man himselfe would never speake falshood, but alwayes truth, if hee might advantage himselfe as much with telling truth, as telling untruth. Now though a man sometimes promotes his ends by false courses, yet it is absurd to thinke that God needs false courses to promote his ends, seeing he is almighty.

As for the doing of wrong, it is well knowne, that if hee should command Abraham to sacrifice his sonne, and see him execute it; or command Sampson to sacrifice himselfe by dying with the Philistins, he shall doe no wrong either to the one or to the other; or by making Prince Iob as poore as poore Iob, in destroying his substance, his children, and last of all striking his body with a sore boile, yet shall hee not doe any wrong to Iob. Nay were Iob as innocent as Adam was in his creation, or as the elect Angels are now in their confirmation, and should deale so with them as he did with Iob, yet should p. 599they have just cause to say as Eli did, He is the Lord, let him doe what seemeth good in his sight.1 Sam. 3. 1…1 Sam 3:1

Arminius confesseth, that the most innocent creature God Exam. praedest. Perk. p. 107. In 12. q. 87. art. 8.can annihilate without prejudice to his justice, yea to inflict the torments of hell upon such a creature. Medina maintaines, that God as Creator hath such power over his creature, Ex … omnium Theologorum sententia: yet doe wee distinguish betweene potentia absoluta, and potentia ordinata; God can doe that by power absolute, which he cannot doe on supposition that he will not doe it: for that were to change, and that were impotency, rather then power. And to speake in proper termes; It is not fit to say that God cannot doe this because he will not; for there is no consequence in this, either in respect of God or man: Such a one will not doe this or that; therefore he cannot doe it.

But supposing Gods will to doe this or that, tis more proper to say, that upon this supposition, it is impossible God should do otherwise, because it is impossible he should change his will. For there are but two causes of the change of the creatures will and resolution, the one ficklenesse of the will, the other improvidence of the understanding, in not foreseeing all that might come to passe. But neither of these is possibly incident unto God. So then if God hath promised ought, tis unpossible that it should not bee performed, or that God should provountrue. If God loves a man, tis as much as to say, he is determined to doc him good, and tis impossible it should be otherwise then he hath determined. But to say that God in point of justice cannot performe that, without performing whereof he shall be untrue, is a paradox of paradoxes. For if in performing it he shall be true, then in not performing of it he shall be untrue. And doth Gods justice binde him to be untrue? you might as well say, it bindes him to bee unjust.

Againe, if God out of his love hath resolved to doe this or that good unto man; shall his justice hinder the fulfilling of the counsailes and determinations of his owne will? This is strange Divinity; yet you deliver these uncouth assertions like p. 600a positive Theologue, without all proofe, as if they caried their evidence in their foreheards. Men are bound by rules of a superiour power to worke after this or that manner; and therefore it is not lawfull for them to doe many things, from the doing whereof they are restrained by lawfull authority, which commands them. It is not so with God, who doeth what hee will in heaven, and amongst the inhabitants of the earth, and no man can say unto him, What dost thou? In this sense you thinke you may say that all before Christ were theeves and robbers. And though I thinke this interpretation is very aliene from the true meaning of the Text you point at, yet I Ioh. 10. 8.John 10:8doubt not but that every one, Christ excepted, hath beene found in sinne, and thereby more or lesse found to play the theefe, and rob God of that glory of obedience which is due unto him.

I doubt not but the Angell of the Lord that discomfited the army of Senacherib, might in like manner have smoakt away the army of the Romanes, yea and God might have done so to, even the one as well as the other, had it pleased him, without any prejudice to his justice. For if it be justly possible to him to pardon our sinnes, tis as justly possible to him to remove his judgements. And both Suarez and Vasquez, though opposite in some specialities about the justice of God, Disput. de just. Dei. In 7. disp. 86.yet concurres in acknowledging that there is no justice in God in reference to his creature, but upon presupposition of his will. Tis just with God to approve a mercilesse warre. And tis as just with God to approve a mercifull peace: neither is it disgracefull to God though by his long suffering and patience he gives space for repentance, although his goodnesse were despised unto the end.

As many live prosperously in sinfull courses unto the death and then obtaine foreign, an easie departure at last, as Guiccia…dine observes in the particular of Pope Alexander the sixt; and no marvell: for what is wanting in the condigne vengeance in this life, God can and will supply to the full at the day of judgement. And the reason why God leaves some mens sinnes unrequited in this world, is out of a speciall providence, p. 601as Chrysostome hath observed of old, namely to this end, that wee may entertaine some conceite of a resurrection, foreign. And though God doth not afflict them with outward terrours, yet he hath inward terrours enough to exercise the wicked, and to keepe peace as farre from them, as a guilty and tormenting conscience is neare unto them, according to that of Salomon, The wicked flieth when no man pursueth him. The Deere when hee is stricken, albeit Sylvas saltusque peragrat Dictaeos, yet, haeret lateri laetalis arunde. O what an uncomfortable sentence do you edge this Section withall; as if Gods infinite power could not save them that stubbornly abandon the waies of peace, and wilfully neglect saving health, so often and lovingly tendred unto them? For consider, did you never abandon the waies of peace, or wilfully neglect saving health, lovingly tendred unto you? Were you never out of the state of grace? For Austine hath taught me, that Libertas sine gratia, non est libertas sed Aug. ep. …contumatia. Or were you converted at the first, or second, or at the third sermon that you heard? Nay, when Gods children are converted, doe they not too often abandon the waies of peace, and wilfully neglect saving health? Did not David in the matter of Vriah and Bathsheba? Did not Salomon in his idolatry? Did not Manasses in his idolatrous fury, sealing it with bloud? Saint Paul exhorts Timothy, to carry himselfe 2 Tim. 2.2 Tim 2gently towards them without, foreign, if at any time God give them repentance, implying manifestly, that God can at any time give repentance to any man if hee will. Neither are wee taught, that God hath denied possibility of renovation Heb. 4. 5. …Heb 4:5by repentance unto any, but such as sinne the sinne against the Holy Ghost.

3 You say, it had beene unjust with God to strike the men of Sodome with blindenesse, before lust had entred their eies. A manifest untruth which yet you deliver, satis magistraliter, as a dictate without any reason to enforce it. In the ninth of Iohn wee read of one that was borne blinde, is it not just with God to deale with any one so as hee dealt with him? You will not deny I hope this worke to have been the p. 602worke of God; if you should, our Saviour would convict you of errour, when hee saith, that hee was borne blinde, to the Ioh. 9. 3.John 9:3end the mighty worke of God might bee manifest in the curing of him. And this work to this end could be no others but Gods worke.

I had thought, to have beene borne blinde had beene a judgement, yet you make it to bee a blessing, as whereby the Sodomites had beene guarded from temptations. And indeede, lust usually enters into the heart by the windows of the eyes. Yet the Poet tells us also of one,

Qui nunquam visae slagrabat amore p…ellae.

So then it had beene a mercy of God that their eies had beene pulled out of their heads in your divinity. I doe not deny, but the greatest temporall blessings may bee cursed unto Mal. 2. 2.Mal 2:2a man by the power of God, and the greatest temporall …nrses, blessed unto him. But I never heard or read before, that blindenesse should bee considered onelyonly as a mercy, and such a mercy as whereby wee are guarded from temptation. But were a man never so lustfull, yet I thinke in just reason he should rather desire to enjoy his eies then to lose them, that so hee might be partaker of Gods word by private reading, which hath more power to his salvation, then the sight of any Cocatrices to his destruction.

And if Democritus had beene acquainted with this word of God, I doe not believe hee would have pulled out his eyes, in pretence as if they hindred his meditations. Alas, what had the Sodomites beene the better for the blindenesse of their eyes, if God had not corrected the lusts of their hearts? Especially considering that fancy can supply the want of sight, for the provocation of lust in any degree upon any unknowne object. For a man can fancie him as hee lusteth. Say rather, God could not in justice change their hearts, seeing they had wilfully contemned his goodnesse, and abused his long suffering and loving kindenesse.

Yet this saying of yours should bee farre enough off from p. 603truth and sobriety? Who hath not wilfully contemned his goodnesse, and abused his long suffering? All out of the state of grace doe so; for, Libertas sine gratia non est libertas sed contumacia. Aug. Ep. 89.Yea and too often wee doe so in the state of grace also. Then againe, a yeare before, this sinne of the Sodomites was not so obstinate, lesse a yeare before that, and so the farther we descend to times passed, they were lesse and lesse obfirmate. Why did no… God then change their hearts; or if you wil have this to be a fruit of mercy, why did he not blind their eyes in mercy to keepe them from these temptations? But you put it out of question, that to have prevented the Sodomites former contempt and abuse of his long suffering and loving kindnesse, did imply contradiction to his goodnesse, and eternall equity. A most unreasonable assertion. For I demand, Hath God prevented your wilfull contempt of his goodnesse, yea or not? your abusing his long suffering and loving kindnesse, yea or not? If he hath not prevented it, then either your selfe have prevented it without his grace, or you are guilty or have beene guilty of wilfull contempt of his goodnesse, and abusing his long suffering and loving kindnesse: which if it be so, what would become of you, if God should deale with you according to these immutable and eternall rules, according whereto you professe he deales with all? I perswade my selfe you have a good opinion of your owne sufficiency to prevent these foule symptomes of humane corruption, otherwise you should make but a bad reckoning.

The reason you give to enforce this assertion, is in part nothing for you, in part against you. For though all his wayes are truth, yet this is nothing for you, unlesse you can prove that in such a state of sinne as the Sodomites, God hath determined to use no effectuall meanes to the curing of them. But how will you prove this? for hitherto you have not. You might as well say, God could not cure …he sin of those Iewes, to whom our Saviour said, It shall be easier for Sodome and Gomorrah Mat. 10. 15Matt 10:15in the day of judgement, then for you: If this were granted you, yet herehence it followes onelyonly, that God cannot cure them, because he will not, for hee hath determined the p. 604contrary. But you undertake to prove, that God cannot doe it in point of justice, although hee would doe it out of his love to mankinde.

But when you say that all Gods waies are merciemercy, that is directly rather against you then for you. For mercy doth rather incline to pardon sinne, then not to pardon it: and withall we are given to understand, that as touching the execution hereof, God will have mercy on whom hee will; and therefore surely he can have mercy on whom he wll.

You talke after your fashion of an eternall rule of goodnesse appointing his justice to debarre the fruits of his mercy. But you are a meere talker, and prove nothing. Who is not wilfull in the state of nature in contemning Gods goodnesse? Yet doth not he by his grace and holy Spirit ex nolentibus volentes facere? Doth not Austin professe that God hath converted Ep. 107. ad Vital.not onelyonly aversos à vera fide, but adversus verae fidei voluntates also, and bindes it with a Novimus, we know it to have beene so. Was it not so in Saul? Doth not God professe of his wilfull and stubborne people, that he will rule them with a mightie hand, and make them passe under the rod, and bring them under the bond of his covenant, Ezech. 20. 37. Doth he not call some at the first, some not till the last houre of the day?

Neither can it be made good by any tolerable colour of reason, that because a creature cannot be impeccabilis from his creation, therefore God cannot cure mens wilfulnesse in the way of his mercy towards them, as you most incoherently discourse, as if you were in potting verses, rather then upon meditating a coherent and methodicall course of argumentation: yet the maxime here mentioned, though brought in with some state of selfe conceit, is very preposterously contrived by you. We commonly say, a reasonable creature cannot be impeccabilis per naturam, uncapable of sinne by nature; he may be impeccabilis per gratiam, uncapable of sinne by grace, as the elect Angels are, elect men shall be in the state of glory: but of being so some while after the creation, and not immediately from the creation; of being so absolutely, and of being so not absolutely, I know no sobriety in these conceits, neither doe p. 605I thinke you have any authority to countenance them. The Sonne of God I doubt not but you will confesse that hee was impeccabilis from the first: So might Angels have beene, so might men have beene by grace, had it so pleased God to make them; I see no reason to the contrary; yet had not this beene absolutely impeccable, but meerly upon the supposition of the will of God. Such is the impeccability of the elect Angels at this present, such shall bee ours in the world to come. God indeed without supposition, & out of his own absolutenesse is no way obnoxious unto sinne: If Angels are, or we at any time shall be free from this obnoxious condition, it is and shall be by the meere will and good pleasure of God; whereby yet I meane not to exclude all second causes in the way of Gods glorious qualification of our natures: And therefore it is an idle discourse to say that God intended to make us happy after a certaine manner, to wit, by way of reward of our obedience; therefore he could not make us immutable at first. For thus to discourse, is to professe that God could make them so upon supposition, to wit, upon supposition of such an end as was incompatible with their impeccability. And this is not to prove that God could not make them absolutely impeccable, but to prove that God could not make them impeccable onelyonly upon a certaine supposition. Such is the miserable incongruity of your miscellaneous discourse. If to decline to evill, implyes no contradiction but only to omnipotent being, then seeing neither the elect Angels for the present have, nor the Saints of God for the time to come, shal have any omnipotent being, it followes that to decline from evil is neither contradictorie to the present state of the elect Angels, nor to the future glorified condition of the Saints of God: God is impeccabil…s per naturam, the creatures some are & others shal be impeccabilis per gratiam, & to decline to evill implyeth contradiction to them both. To say that to decline to evill is possible to all creatures, is true onelyonly in men, in the confirmed Angels tis not true. It was once of them also I confesse, but now it is not: It is false for the present of the Saints of God in heaven; it ever was false of the p. 606manhood of Christ, which yet was and is a creature, yet i… Christ as man more like to his Creator, then either Angell or any other Saint of God. If restraint of possibility in man to decline from good to evill, doth cause him not to be truly and inherently good, then either Christ as touching his manhood could have sinned, or else he was never truly and inherently good. Further, if the elect Angels from within few dayes after their creation have continued truly and inherently good, notwithstanding their impeccability, from that time forward, why they should not have beene altogether as truly and inherently good, if their impeccability had begunne a few daies sooner, even with their creation, I see no reason. For did not God make them good, yea truly and inherently good? Surely he did; therefore if immediately they had beene impeccable by grace, they had notwithstanding their impeccabilitie continued unto this day truely and inherently good: Gods goodnesse is his happinesse, this happinesse of his being increate, cannot be communicated unto us subjectively, but objectively onelyonly.

Yet there is a goodnesse created, called Gods goodnesse, because it proceeds from God, which is our happinesse of grace, shall be our happinesse of glory, not the foundation of it, but it; save that the happinesse of grace is the foundation of our happinesse of glory, but to this manner of foundation you seeme to have no reference.

Neither is there any colour of reason to inferre as you do, that therefore Gods justice and loving kindnesse did remove all necessity from mans will, because that had utterly extinguished that goodnesse wherein onelyonly it was possible for the creature to expresse the Creators goodnesse manifested in creation. And you may as well say, that Christ also might have sinned; for necessity to keepe him from sinne would have utterly extinguished that goodnesse, wherein onelyonly it was possible for his manhood (being a creature) to expresse his Creators goodnesse manifested in his creation and assumption into one person with the Sonne of God. Nay the truth is, if from the beginning wee had beene necessarily enclined unto good, wee had more lively expressed Gods p. 607goodnesse, then now wee doe being freely good. For God himselfe is good necessarily, not freely.

It is a senslesse speech to say that mans goodnesse expresseth Gods goodnesse communicative: for mans goodnesse is Observe, communicative good ness is here taken for the goodnes of God which is communicable, and opposed to Gods good nesse incommunicable.the very goodnesse communicative of God. For Gods goodnesse communicative is no goodnesse formally in God; but Gods formall goodnesse is uncreate, and therefore incommunicable unto creatures. Therefore it must be goodnesse create which is Gods goodnesse communicative; and that is the verie goodnesse of man it selfe. For God is the author of it, in genere causae efficientis. Create in mee a new heart, and renew a right spirit within me. And therefore the distinction of the goodnesse of God communicative, and communicated is very absurd: like as your similitude resembling it to a seale, and the stampe thereof: OnelyOnly the Sonne is the image and character of his Father, we are made after the image of God. His Psal. 51.Ps 51goodnesse increate is that which doth communicate goodnesse unto us in genere causae efficientis. And our goodnesse is the worke of Gods goodnesse. But no more proportion betweene them, then is betweene nature increate, and nature create. But it is your usuall course to affect similitudes contrary to all sobriety.

Yet you have found out a proportion betweene Gods goodnesse and ours: but in as disproportionable a manner as could be invented. For you compare Gods working freely with mans being freely, most incongruously. God communicates his goodnesse freely, that which duly answereth unto this, is mans communicating his goodnesse freely. But seeing Gods being good, is as a being necessarily, if God had made us to bee good necessarily, that is impeccable by his grace, herein had wee better exprest the manner of his goodnesse. And if otherwise we could not be like unto God, it followes that the Angels now for many thousand yeares have not been good like God, because they have beene good by necessity, and not freely. So neither Gods Saints in heaven are good like God, because they are good by necessity, and not freely. Tis untrue which you adde, that man could not be confirmed p. 608in such goodnesse as hee had, or translated unto everlasting happinesse, but by continuing freely good for some space. For Christ was impeccable from the first moment of his conception, yet this never hindred his confirmation in his goodnesse, or translation to everlasting happinesse. And it is a most absurd conceit to say that impeccability should hinder confirmation in that goodness which man had from the beginning, even from the creation. For if God made him good and withall impeccable, how was it possible he should not be confirmed in that good wherein hee was created? And yet here you decline to the corrupting of the question, as when you oppose impeccability to the doing of good freely. For I hope your selfe will not deny, but that Christ was impeccable, and that what good soever he did, he did it freely: For like as the wicked, in state of nature, cannot but sinne in generall, that is one way or other; yet because they are not necessitated to any particular sinne, therefore there is no particular evill that they doe, but they doe it freely: In like sort though Christ could not but doe good in generall, so that whatsoever he did should be good; yet seeing he was not necessitated to any particular good, therefore what good in particular soever he did, did it freely. So doe the Angels, so shall we in the kingdome of heaven.

Hitherto under colour of consequence, which yet indeed was no tolerable consequence, you did stride very wide from the matter you had in hand, (to wit, of Gods obligement in justice to make men taste of the fruits of his mercy, after their wilfull contemning of it) into an aliene matter farre removed, touching impeccability.

Now you seeme to returne to your former discourse, but in such a manner, as if you meant utterly to overthrow it: for here you give us to understand, that so long as man doth lesse evill then he might doe, he may be confirmed in goodnesse, and translated unto happinesse. Now I pray, as bad as the Sodomites were, yet were they not lesse evill then they might be? For if God had suffered them longer, and left them destitute of his grace, had they not profited in pejus, growing worse and p. 609worse? And yet I confesse hereupon to bee confirmed in no better goodnesse then they had, had not beene much, seeing this their goodnesse had beene never a whit: but you say not onelyonly this, that they that doe lesse evill then they might, may hereupon not onelyonly bee confirmed in that goodnesse which they have (which may be very farre off from any goodnesse at all) but also translated to everlasting happinesse. Since mans fall (you say) wee are not capable of mercy, but by free abstinence from some evills.

Now I demand whether this free abstinence from some evills, be of grace or no? If of grace, whether this grace be not a fruite of merciemercy? If so, then it appeares that before we abstaine from any evill, wee are capable of mercy, thereby to obtaine grace, to abstaine from evill.

I know no state that makes a man uncapable of mercy in this life, but onelyonly the state of sinning against the holy Ghost. I doe not like your distinction of doing good, and doing it naughtily; for, whatsoever we doe naughtily, therein we cannot be said to doe good, but evill rather: for therein we sinne, and in sinning wee doe not any good, but evill rather. Yet I confesse, wee may be said to doe good imperfectly, but not naughtily in my judgement. Though we doe both lesse evill, and the good that we doe lesse naughtily then possibly we might doe, God still you say diminisheth the riches of his bounty towards us. I professe at first sight, I tooke this to bee a notorious untruth, but when I considered a claw of your sentence, which is this, lesse evill then possibly we might doe. I reverse my judgement, and finde it to be a most vulgar and despicable conceit, though in the way of truth. For the contrary proposition to your supposition is a thing impossible. For how is it possible that a man can doe at once all the evill that he can doe? Now if he doth not doe all the evill that possibly hee can doe, there is some comfort in your paramutheticall contemplations, and hee neede not feare lest God proceede to diminish the riches of his bounty towards him. And so might the Sodomites comfort themselves at the worst, for certainly they had not done all the evill that possibly they might doe. Now it was well p. 610worth the having, to heare you explaine unto us, what you understand by the influence of Gods gracious providence, which you say God restraines, and by restraining suffers men to fall from one wickednesse to another, suffering the reines of our unruly appetites to bee given into our u…ieldie hands. Here be good phrases, which if you would bee pleased to interpret unto us in plaine termes, I doubt not but wee should finde good matter to worke upon.

But to the comfort of all profane persons bee it spoken, God doth never deal thus with any by your computation, but such as have done as much evill as possibly they can doe. To be capable of well doing is to be capable of Gods mercy, and you have already told us to our comfort, that to do lesse evill then possibly wee can doe, doth make us capable of Gods mercy; yet here you say, this cannot bee done without Gods love and favour. Now to my judgement, no person is so profane or impious, but that hee doth lesse evill then possibly he might doe; whence it followeth, that to this state of impiety considered as lesse then possibly might be, he is arived through the love and favour of God. Yet what you meane by the love and favour of God I know not, and throughout I finde cause to doubt, that you meane nothing lesse then to advance the honour of Gods grace, but onelyonly your scope to advance the power of mans free will.

And I wonder you consider not how you enterfare, and crosse your owne shinnes in your discourse, when you conceive the love and favour of God as a meanes to make us capable of the mercy of God; you might as well say, that the mercy of God makes us capable of his mercy: for love and favour shewed unto him that is in misery, is in the way of mercy. So when you make a great difference betweene withdrawing a mans selfe from the extremities of mischiefe, and the doing of such good as may make a man capable of well doing, you contradict your selfe: for to do lesse evill then possibly might bee, what is it other, then to withdraw from extremities of mischiefe? yet that is enough to make a man capable of well doing, as you have signified in this very page p. 611more then once, as namely, both in the first sentence, and in the third, yet this is wilde enough to say, A man must doe good to make himselfe capable of well doing. By the sentence following it seemes that this good that is to be done to make us capable of well doing, is to repent, and this you say cannot be done without the attractions of infinite love; yet usually you make a worke of nature to bee a preparation to grace, and sometimes you call that worke of nature humility, sometimes the doing of lesse euill then wee might doe. And what you meane by the attractions of infinite love, I know not, for you make it incident to men without the Church, who are not so much as drawne hereunto by the word, so that, as it seemes, it can be no other then Gods patience in sparing them, and so leading them to repentance, that you meane in this place.

Yet see into what absurdity of conceit you cast your selfe, while you make shew to honour the grace of God; as namely, when you say, since Adams fall, our love to sinfull pleasures is so strong, that we cannot repent without the infinite attractions of love, implying thereby that before Adams fall, wee could repent without infinite attractions of love. But I pray consider, what need was there of repentance before Adams fall? Yet such obedience as then was congruous to innocent and und… filed nature, could he performe without speciall grace? Yes you thinke he could: this is a bit you can swallow easily, and digest with as great facility.

And so belike your opinion is of the Angels, to wit, that the good Angels stood by the meere freedome of their owne wils, having no other adjutorium gratiae then the reprobate Angels had: directly against Austin de Civitate Dei, l. 12. c. 9. You beginne to discover the mystery of your meaning, when you say, that Many whom this infinite love doth daily imbrace, because they apprehend not it, are never brought by the attractions of it, to true repentance. So then the attractions of Gods infinite love are the causa sine qua non, but what is the cause, qua posita ponitur effectus? O this is our apprehending of it. And I pray what stile doe the learned give to that causa sine qua non? p. 612doe they not commonly account it causam fatuam? So then you make shew to magnifie the attractions of Gods love, and the efficacy thereof, but tis onelyonly in a fatuous manner, and you make but a fatuous efficacy thereof: but mans will alone, in the apprehending of it, hath the true efficacie of repentance in the course of your Divinity. Now I pray what is this love you speake of, and what manner of attraction is it, and wherin doth it consist? and how are we said to apprehend it? and wherein doth that consist? By the place alledged out of Rom. 2. 4. you signifie that this love of God is no other then that goodnesse whereby he leadeth unto repentance, and that goodnesse there mentioned seemes to bee no other then Gods forbearance and long suffering. Call you this the attractions of his infinite love? Yet notwithstanding Austin was bold to professe, Quantamlibet praebuerit patientiam nis… Deus dederit quis Cont. Iul. Pelag. l. 5. c. 4.aget poenitentiam? Though God affords never so much patience, yet who shall repent except God gives repentance? your present discourse preacheth unto us another doctrine, to this effect; Quantamlibet praebuerit patientiam nisi homo apprehenderit quis aget poenitentiam? Though God affords never so much patience, yet who shall repent except he apprehends it? And I pray what is it to apprehend Gods patience, or his leading of us to repentance by his goodnesse and patience? Can it be any thing else then the taking of the opportunity offered, and to repent indeed?

So then your meaning is this in plaine termes, Many whom this infinite love of God doth embrace, (to wit, in leading them by his goodnesse and patience unto repentance) yet are never brought by the attraction of it to true repentance, and all because they doe not apprehend it, that is, because they doe not repent.

Is not this issue of your discourse very grave and Theologicall? yet when you say the reason why by this love they are not brought to repentance, is because they doe not apprehend it, you seeme to imply that they may apprehend it if they will. Yet because the Text alledged by you is expresly against this, therefore you are contont to nicke your former assertion your p. 613selfe, with a crosse blow, that so your selfe may have the first credit of contradicting and confuting your selfe, as when you say, of whom speakes he thus, of sueh onelyonly as truly repent? A mad question as ever was proposed, as if there were any colour that the Apostle should say of them that repent, that they despise the riches of Gods goodnesse, leading them to repentance; yet that you may have some matter to worke upon, having erected an enemy of straw, you foile him most valiantly, by answering, Nay, but of them who for hardnesse of heart cannot repent. Not considering how fondly herein you contradict your selfe. Nay by the way I note an aknowledgement of yours, to wit, that a man may despise the goodnesse of God leading him to repentance, though through the hardnesse of his heart he cannot repent at all.

4. You demand in the next place, whether the riches of Gods bountie were fained, or whether hee did onelyonly profer, but not purpose to draw them to repentance which repented not? I answer, it was not fained, neither doe I finde any thing that he profered at all in this passage of the Apostles. But that this is a meere fiction of yours, ut recto stet fabula talo, and that hee did truly draw them to repentance; but how? as by patience and longsuffering he may be said to draw them, and no other goodnesse of God drawing them to repentance is mentioned in this place. Like as opportunity is said to draw and invite men to the doing of something in season.

In like sort the judgements of God invite unto repentance, the mercies of God provoke unto▪ obedience, to thankfulnesse. But yet Austin was bold to say, Quantamlibet praebuerit Cont. Iul. … Pelag. l. 5. c. 4.patientiam nisi Deus dederit, quis aget poenitentiam? So that this is a tacite exhortation and invitation to repentance by Gods workes. And much inferiour to the power of the exhortations of his word: yet God doth exhort by the ministery of his word, many whose hearts notwithstanding he hardneth. As is apparent in sending unto Pharaoh, and commanding him to let Israel goe; yet withall made knowne to Moses, that hee would harden Pharaohs heart, that hee should not let Israel goe.

p. 614And dare you professe this course of his, so plainly testified in holy Scripture, to be no part of Gods protection, no fruit of that wisedome which is from above, but a point of earthly policie devoid of honesty, a meere tricke of worldly wit, to whose practise nothing but weaknesse and impotency to accomplish great designes, can misin…line mans corrupted nature? And the truth is, in this course of God nothing is profered at all, but onelyonly something suspended, to wit, the execution of just vengeance. In his word something is profered, but what is that? Not repentance, as you misconceive, that rather is required and commanded onelyonly upon repentance, remission of sinnes, and salvation is profered. And if repentance were profered, I pray upon what termes? you will say, in case they would apprehend it. This have I already shewed to be all one, as if you should say, In case they did repent; and of the sobriety hereof let any man judge.

Againe, you professe that this is profered to such men as through the hardnesse of their hearts cannot repent, and judge whether the same incongruities which you charge upon our Tenet, are upon any other ground then this, and while you maintaine this, whether they doe not reflect upon your Tenet also.

Now on the contrary, whereas we object against you, that if God willeth, and so ardently as you speake, that all men should repent and be saved, how comes it to passe that they doe not repent? Considering that the Apostle professeth that Gods will cannot be resisted, and that it manifestly implies an impotency or weaknesse in God, in not being able to bring to passe what he so ardently desires. Now to the latter objection of these, you answer, by deniall that it implyeth any such impotency in God; yet Austin long agoe did acknowledge this consequence, Enchirid. 96. Deo quam facile est quod vult facere, tam facile est quod non vult esse non sinere. Hoc nisi credamus, periclitatur, ipsum nostrae fidei confessionis initium, qua consitemur in Deum Patrem omnipotentem credere. Neque veraciter ob aliud vocatur omnipotens, nisi quia quicquid vult potest; nec voluntate cujusquam creaturae, voluntatis omnipotentis, impeditur p. 615effectus. Et cap. 27. In caelo & in terra non quaedam voluit & fecit: quaedam vero voluit & non fecit, sed omnia quaecunque voluit fecit. Et cap. 98. Quis porro tam impii desipiat ut dicat Deum malas hominum voluntates quas voluerit, quando voluerit, ubi voluerit, in bonum non posse convertere.

And whereas you say, that man is not capable of endlesse joyes, unlesse he will be wrought by meere love, without the impulsions of unresistible power to love him, to love God, the same insinite love which drawes him unto repentance in congruity leaving a possibility not to be drawne by it: This is a notorious untruth. For was there any possibility in Christ to sinne, or not to bee drawne to that which was good? I thinke you will not avouch it: And was he not therefore capable of endlesse joyes? And if Gods will be unresistible, as the Apostle plainly testifieth, shall not the operation whereby his will is accomplished, bee irresistible? And shall such a bug-beare deterre us from acknowledging God to be the author of repentance? and move us to give the glory thereof to the will of man, who through the hardnesse of his heart cannot repent, as the Apostle speaketh.

Againe, the Scripture testifieth that whatsoever God willeth, that he doth both in heaven and earth; whether it be by power resistible or unresistible is nothing to the purpose. But you maintain, that what God ardently willeth, is not brought to passe, by reason that man willeth not. Neither doe w…e maintaine, that God in working whom hee will unto repentance, doth doe this by bereaving man of power to resist, (which alone denominates the operation of God irresistible) but onelyonly by taking away the will of resisting, while ex nolentibus volentes facit. And consequently wee say not, that God takes away all possibility of refusing to be drawne by it. For we maintaine that God brings to passe contingent things contingently, that is, with a possibility to the contrarie; though supposing Gods wil to the contrary, this possibility shall not be actuated. And so when God workes a man to faith and to repentance, nullum humanum resistit arbitrium, No mans will resists; and that the grace which God gives, a nullo duro corde p. 616respuitur, is refused by no hard heart. So that all this is done without all coaction. For neither can the will be constrained, and God in making men volentes ex nolentibus, cannot without great absurditie be said to constraine them, as you would fain insinuate, having no sound argument for it, but such poore trickes to serve your turne withall.

And when God promiseth to circumcise the hearts of his people, and thereby to make them love the Lord their God with all their heart, and with all their soule, hee doth not say he will constraine them to repent, Deut. 30. 6. So when hee promiseth to take away their stony heart, and give them an heart of flesh, and put his owne Spirit within them, and cause them to walke in his statutes and judgements, and to do them, Ezech. 36. 27. hee doth not signifie that hee will constraine them. For God can change any mans will without constraining. Nay in making them willing, it is contradiction to say he doth constraine them to be willing: for constraint is against the will: but it is impossible a man should bee willing against his will; yet this you obtrude upon your adversaries, as though they maintained that God by his power did make them repent against their wils.

Neither yet can we like that other extreame which you approve, that men must first be brought to a willingnesse, and then God makes them repent. For to will to repent, is to repent; for repentance is the very change of the will. Neither can you in any sober manner expound unto us, how God is said to make men repent after they are made willing hereunto. And yet the very will to repent is the worke of God, as who it is that worketh in us both the will and the deed, according to his good pleasure, Philip. 2. 13. not by such attractions onelyonly you speake of, though you are loath to betray your Pelagian Tenet, though you expresse the threatning of judgement and thereby imply what you meane by attraction of love, to wit, the promises of reward.

Now this apparantly is not to worke it: for this is onelyonly suadere, and suadere is not to worke it. And the case is cleere, even by your opinion, that God doth not work it, as oft as he p. 617doth exhort unto it, which yet he should, if suadere and hortari thereunto were to worke it. And indeed suadere & hortari ut resipiscamus; is onelyonly to exhort and perswade, that wee would worke our selves unto repentance: And in this sense to interpret S. Paul, where he saith, God workes in us both the will and the deed, according to his good pleasure, was of old the practise of the Pelagians, as S. Austin hath discovered long agoe, de grat. Christi cont. Pelag. & Calest. cap. 10. For thus Pelagius plaid the commentator upon S. Paul: Operatur in nobis velle quod bonum est, velle quod sanctum est, dum nos terrenis cupiditatibus deditos mutorum more animalium tantummodo praesentia diligentes, futurae gloriae magnitudine & praemiorum pollicitatione succendit; dum revelatione sapientiae in desiderium sui stupentem suscitat voluntatem; dum nobis suadet omne quod bonum est. And therefore he urgeth Pelagius to confesse another manner of grace then this, if he will be accompted a Christian: Ibid cap. 11. Nos eam gratiam volumus isti aliquando fateantur, qua futurae gloriae magnitudo non solum promittitur, verumetiam creditur us speratur. Nec solum revelatur sapientia verumetiam & amatur, nec suadetur solum omne quod bonum est, sed & persuadetur: han… debet Pelagius gratiam consiteri, si vult non modo vocari, sed & esse Christianus.

And thus to circumcise our hearts in causing us to love him, and to walke in his wayes, and to keepe his statutes and judgments, and to doe them; this I hope is not to strangle us, yet here is no violent operation in all this. For, Dum non mod…versas à vera side, sed adversas verae fidei voluntates convertit & ex volentibus nolentes facit: it is so farre from violence, that the will rejoyceth that God hath thus reformed it; we do but as Scriptures teach, when we make the work of faith a worke of power, 2 Thess. 1. And shall not the raising of men from the dead be a worke of power? and is not the worke of grace such a worke, Eph. 2. 2?

But you doe ill, under colour of magnifying the love of God, to dishonour both his love and his power; his love, in confining it onelyonly to promises, and threatnings, as if by these operations alone he moved us unto repentance; his power, in p. 618denying that God brings to passe those things which hee desires to bring to passe, and that ardently. And this latter is Austins objection as well as ours; and hee makes the former to be meere Pelagianisme, as wel'l as we doe.

In the next place you tell us, We are to beleeve that Gods infinite power shall effect all things possible for them that love him; but constraines no mans will to love him. But doth he make mans will to love him without constraint? why did you not expresse your minde on this point? you are willing to acknowledge God to be the author of glory; but I doe not finde you so ready to acknowledge God to be the author of all goodnesse, the author and finisher of our faith, of our repentance, of our obedience. Did you acknowledge this, there should bee no difference betweene us. For we doe not affirme that he works faith and repentance in us, by way of constraint. And when the Apostle prayeth that God would worke in the Hebrewes, Heb. 13. 21.Heb 13:21that which was pleasing in his sight; you shall never finde in any of our Divines, that the meaning of the Apostles prayer was, that he would constraine them to doe that which is good and acceptable in the sight of God: I know no power in God but infinite, and seeing what worke soever he workes, is by the exercise of his power, it cannot be denied, but that it is the exercise of that power which is infinite.

Againe, is man or Angell able to circumcise our hearts, so as to make us to love the Lord our God with all our hearts; It is not, as I presume you will confesse; why then shall not this worke of Gods love in circumcising our hearts, and making us to love him, be accounted a worke of power infinite? And Austin divers times professeth, that God doth convert our hearts, omnipotenti facilitate, by an almighty facility, and when God regenerates us he quickneth us and raiseth us from death to life, Eph. 2. 2. and is said to transform, us as it were of beasts to make us become men, Esay 9. and how can this be wrought by lesse then power infinite, as when Bernard confesseth of God saying, Bern…n circumcis. Dom. Serm. 2. Numquid non vere admirabilem experti sumus in imitatione utique voluntatum nostrarum. As for Gods power to the immediate parent p. 619of our love to God, it is no article of our Creed, but a Deut. 30, …Deut 30tricke of yours to insinuate any thing on your adversaries part that may make your owne cause seeme plausible: wee rather conceive Gods grace and mercy to be the immediate cause of the circumcision of our hearts, whereby wee are brought to love him. Neither doe we say, that he workes in us the love of himselfe immediately, but rather by faith brings us first acquainted with the love of God towards us, according to that of Iohn, 1 Ioh. 3. 19. We love him, because he loved us first; and to that of S. Paul, The end of the Law is love out of a pure heart and good conscience, and faith unfained, 1 Tim. 1. 5. No other seed of our love to God, doe I acknowledge to be sowne in our soule.

Yet I doubt you referre this to a seed of nature, and not to a seed of grace, though you doe not affect to manifest your meaning so plainly, as it were fit you should. And no marvell. For they which doe evill hate the light. As for constraint; Ioh. 3. 2… ▪John 3:2we hold that infinite power cannot so worke the will: Bodies may be constrained to suffer the execution of mens lusts upon them, and may justly breed loathing in the parties so constrained.

As for the will, that non potest cogi, cannot be constrained: And I wonder you that take notice of so many choice points of philosophy and divinity, whereof others doe not, should not all this while take notice of so popular a Maxime as this: though I confesse your taking notice of it in this place had marred your game; for the furthering whereof you are content to obtrude upon your adversaries so unreasonable a conceite, as if they maintained, that the will of man may be constrained: yet suppose the will were constrained by God to love him, would this breed in God a loathing of him? Thus the foule and uncivill resemblance you make transports you. Yet I have read, My soule loathed them, and their soule abhorred mee: but I never heard the contrary, My soule loathed them, Zach. 11. …Zech 11and their soule loved mee: for while we abhorre God, as enemies unto him, yet notwithstanding even then hee loved us, Rom. 5. 8. how much more when we love, will he continue p. 620to love us, and not turne his love into loathing; as mens lusts turne into loathing sometimes, as being satisfied, and disdaining to be scorned by them, whose bodies though they could force to be subject to their lusts, yet could not winne their loues.

But God never makes us unwillingly to love him (it is a thing impossible) but as Austine saith, Ex nolentibus volentes facit. Tis true, God loves a cheerefull giver, but who makes this cheerefulnesse but God? and whose workes is it fit hee should love but his owne? Like as it is said of him, that Cor…nat non merit a nostra sed donasua, he crownes not our works, but his owne: And where there is a willing minde, there it is accepted, not according to that which a man hath not, but to that which he hath: but whose worke is this willing minde? Is it not God that worketh in us both the will and the deede? And that God doth not wrest any obedience from us, but makes us willing, and ready, and cheerefull in the performing of it, not onelyonly in the way of doing what hee commandeth, but in suffering what hee inflicteth, or permitteth the sins of others to inflict upon us. In so much that the Apostles rejoyced that they were accounted worthy to suffer for the name of Christ. And if a father prevaile to worke his childe to dutifulnesse, though with much a doe, yet in the end masters his stubbornnesse, will hee love his childe, or his obedience, or dutifulnesse the worse for this: yet God more effectually, and with a great deale more case changeth our hearts, even omnipotente facilitate, as Austine speaketh, and shall hee love our obedience, our thankfulnesse, our repentance the lesse for this?

5 Now wee are like to receive something concerning the maine probleme, to wit, In what sense God may bee said to doe all that he can for his vineyard: All this while you have beene as it were in trimming your instrument, and it seemes not to bee yet in tune: the first musick is so harsh, and without all harmony, I cannot devise a construction thereof to carry any tolerable sense. But the sentence following seemes to bee of the same nature: where you call that Revenue, which before you called Charge very incongruously, as if a mans revenues p. 621were a burthen unto him, whereof he did exonorate himselfe. Or if it bee spoken of Bursers accounts in Colledges, the incomes are not to them that are charged, and put to exonerate themselves, but to the Colledges; this at the best is but a gamboll, lets come to the naked truth. Though mans love to his dearest friend, bee in respect of Gods love to us, but saint, and his power small, yet because his love to justice is much lesse, he… ofttimes effects that for his temporall good, which God, though infinite in power doth not effect for those whom he infinitely loves. I thinke I may bee bold to say that this is infinitely false: God loved Iacob, and hated Esau: now all whom God hates as he hated Esau, he damnes; and all those whom he loves as hee loved Iacob, he saves; yet this love was but infinite: and what love of man or Angel, vicious or vertuous, can effect the like? Yet God blessed both Esau and Ismael with temporall blessings; and what friend by good courses or lewd courses was able to equall it? what creature can equall that temporall good that God affords to any reprobate? for hee gives him his being and all that hee enjoyes; nay, what man or Angell can doe ought for him, in the effecting whereof, God hath not a greater hand then the man or Angell himselfe? Yet you suppose that God infinitely loves the very reprobates. It is familiar with you to suppose, that God loved Esau, and that infinitely, of whom the Scripture professeth, that God hated him. Your suppositions are fat and well fed, but your arguments are more leane and ill favoured then the leane kine of Pharaoh.

Yet I will be content to helpe you a little in the way of argument: Gods love, saith Aquinas, is in respect of designing some good to his creature; now God doth will temporall good to the very reprobates, and that in such a manner as cannot be supplied unto them but by power infinite.

In no other sense doe I finde, that it may bee tollerably avouched, that God loves them infinitely, though you are pleased to suppose it often.

It is untrue, that his grants made to man, must undergoe the examination of justice; for it is law full for him to doe what p. 622hee will with his owne, to bestow being, and gracious being, and consequently glorious being on whom he will; for both grace and glory is executed on man in the way of mercy, and hee hath mercy on whom hee will. And though he hath revealed unto us by what rules hee will proceede in pronouncing the sentence of salvation, or condemnation, yet hath he revealed unto us no rules, according whereunto hee proceedeth in giving grace unto some, and denying grace unto others. And both Suarez and Vasquez (though opposite in other points about the justice of God) concurrently professe, that there is no justice in God towards man, but upon presuposition of his will.

And those unchangeable rules you speake of, for confining God in the execution of his power, according to his gracious will, are like Castles in the aire that have no foundations, and fit for nothing but to discover the new world in the Moone, and to ease the man there of his burthen, that travelled so long with a bush at his backe: God may convert whom hee will, and consequently save whom he will, as the Holy Ghost teacheth us; this is no fiction, Quis porro, saith Enchirid. cap. 98.Austine, tam impie desipiat ut dicat Deum malas hominum voluntates, quas voluerit, quando voluerit, ubi voluerit, in bonum non posse convertere? Who doth so impiously doat as to say, that God cannot convert the evill wills of men, whom hee will, when hee will, and where hee will. Yet you say as much as this comes to, when you tell us of unchangeable rules of justice, restraining God from converting and changing the hearts of men, without all feare of imputation, either of dotage or impiety: God you say loves justice more then mankinde: God loves himselfe better then hee loves mankinde, or all his creatures; for he made all things for himselfe, Prov. 16. 4. But as for any justice in God that limits his will, I know none, neither are you able to prove any as I am verily perswaded. What you have hitherto delivered, I thinke I have not suffered in any materiall part to passe unsaluted, unanswered.