Discovery of Jacksons Vanity, Section 3 · Chapter 20
CHAP. XX.
Whilst God of a loving Father becomes a severe judge, there is no chang or alteration at all in God, but only in men and in theire actions. Gods will is allwayes fullfilled even in such as goe most against it. How it may stand with the justice of God to punish transgressours temporall with torments everlasting.
THe objection that by your Tenet the nature of God is made subject to change and alteration, your selfe proposed in the former chapter; but you addresse your selfe to make answere therunto in this yet not without fetching a greate compasse which inclines rather to a worke of circumvention then of satisfaction. Love you say is the Mother of all Gods workes and the fertility of his power and essence; that is the fruitfull Mother of all things, and the power and essence of God by love becomes the fruitfull Mother of all things. Yet to shew how apt you are to forget your selfe (which usually falleth out whē men discourse quicquid in buccam venerit) in the 8. chap. and pag. 91. you told us as a quaint conceyte that we may conceave wisedome to be the Father and power the Mother of all Gods works of wonder; and I thinke you accoumpt few or no works more wonderfull then the creation.
And yet that which you say here, I preferre before that which you had formerly expressed there; because the love of God hath stricter sociation with the will of God then eyther wisedome or power. But you have not discovered unto us, if love be the Mother what is to be accoumpted the Father. Or if you referre this to the loving will and affection of God, why this should be accoumpted the Mother rather then the Father of the works of God.
Agayne we have earthly parents as Father and Mother, which are indewed with wills and loves and other affections, and it is out of all course to say that theire love or theire will is the Mother of theire children; especially consideringe that will is found in the Father, as well as in the Mother, yea and love also; if not in greater measure. But I deny not but that God made the world out of love; but out of love to whome? to the creature? Nothing lesse I should thinke (as before I have shewed) but rather out of love to himselfe, as Prov. 16. 4. God made all things for himselfe. And greate reason, God who is the sovereigne Creator of all things, should be the supreame end of all things. But let this passe. Your next sentence is more serious and ponderous, but very preposterous, and unsound. First it containes a generall proposition with the reason of it; and then a qualification or limitation thereof (by way of exception) unto a certayne time. The proposition is this: No part of our nature can be excluded from all fruits of his love. Now the fruits of Gods love you make to be not only grace and glory, but our temporall being also and the preservation therof. For you make creation to be a fruit of Gods love.
Now this proposition so generall to my understanding is utterly untrue. For not only God is not bound to give grace and glory unto any. (For they are merely gratuita dona, and it is lawfull to doe what he will with his owne, in bestowing it on whome he will, and denyinge it to whome he will. And therefore the Apostle testifieth that He hath mercy on whome he will, and whome he will he hardneth.) But more then this as God was not bound to create any, so neyther can any thing (save his owne will) binde him to preserve any thing in being. But as he deales with other creatures so could he deale with men, even take theire temporall being from them, without any purpose ever to restore it, and not only the being of theire bodyes, but of theire soules also, turning both into nothing. Yet thus could God deale with men and Angells were they never so innocent, never so holy as Arminius confesseth.
But let us consider the reasons wherupon you ground this. Now these are two, the one because God hath created our natures: Now the unsoundnesse of this reason appeares by this, that God hath created other things as well as man; Yet who will conclude herehence, that God must needes preserve them, and not exclude them from this fruite of his love. Your other reason is because, God cannot change and this is as weake as the former. For like as God though at one time he gives us life, another time takes life from us; yet all this is done by him without any change in himselfe, like as in course of nature, though he causeth changes and alterations in the seasons of the yeare in the wether, in the heavens, in the earth, in the Sea, in the states and Kingdoms of the World, and in the bodyes of all creatures, yet without any change at all in himselfe; yea though he set an end to this visible World, this can inferre no variablenesse in God, so if he should take all manner of being from men and Angells, and so exclude them from all fruits of his love: Yet should all this come to passe without any shadow of change in God.
Yet you have a third reason, which is this; Love is the nature of God as Creator: You could not be ignorant that God did freely create the World, and therfore that it was not naturall to God to create it; therfore you say that Love is the nature of God as Creator, the sense and meaning whereof I comprehende not. And I have made it already appeare that though God creats a thing, yet is he not therby bound to preserve it any longer then he seeth good; and what other sense you imply when you say, Love is Gods nature as a Creator, I discerne not. You make creation to be a fruite of Gods love; it is very incongruous to say that this love of God, wherby he creats any thing belongs unto him as a Creator: But rather creation of things belongs unto him as he loves them. For fitter it is that the effect should be thus modified by the cause, then the cause by the effect in denominating any subject. Who ever sayd that a man was rationalis quatenus risibilis and not rather risibilis quatenus rationalis?
But let us proceede to the limitation of this your proposition; and that is this: No part of our nature can be excluded from all fruits of his love, untill the sinister use of that contingency wherwith he indued it, or the improvement of inclinations, naturally bent unto evill come to that hight, as to imply a contradiction for infinite justice or equity to vouchsafe them any favour. First touching your meaning in this, then touching the manner how you expresse this meaning; your meaning in briefe is this. No part of our nature can be utterly excluded from all fruits of Gods love: untill men have filled up the measure of theire iniquity. Of this your opinion I have spoken often; I hope it shall be sufficient now to consider the reason whereupon you ground it. And that is this, Such an hight of sinne implyeth a contradiction to infinite justice to vouchsafe them any favour.
Now of this proposition of yours I see no reason. Nay I seeme to observe manifest reason to the contrary. For justice consists in giving to every one his owne; Now seeing the wages of any sinne is death even everlasting death; Not to condemne him that hath deserved to be condemned, seemes as contradictory to justice as not to condemne him that is come to an hight of impiety.
And which is more, many thousand infants perish in Originall sinne, and yet we beleive that Manasses who unto Originall sinne added many abominable sinnes, was notwithstanding all this, saved; and will you say, there was any contradiction unto Gods justice in all this? And I wonder you so much beate upon the contradiction unto Gods justice and take no notice of Gods mercy, whereas we doe not consider the pardoning of sinnes as an act of Gods justice but rather as an act of his mercy: and without quest on it is not contradiction to Gods mercy to pardon any sinne.
And God is mercyfull as well as just; and it is very absurd in my judgment to say that God in performing an act of mercy contradicts his justice, as well as to say that in performing an act of justice he contradicts his mercy. And the reason is because it is indifferent to God to exercise eyther his mercy in commiserating whome he will, or his justice in hardening whome he will. And therefore when the Apostle proposeth such an objection, against his former doctrine of election & reprobation as this; What shall we say then, is there any injustice with God? He answereth it by this, that God is free and hath a Rom. 9. 14lawfull power to exercise mercy and compassion on whome he will. God forbid sayth he we should thinke so; For he sayth to Moses, I will have mercy on him to whome I will shewe mercy, and will have compassion on him, on whome I will have compassion.v. 15.
And yet I pray consider, what colour of contradiction to Gods justice in pardoning the sinnes of them, be they never so many never so fowle; for whome the sonne of God (as you say) hath suffered the sorrowes of death, and therby made full satisfaction for all theire sinnes; unlesse you will say, that Christ dyed to make satisfaction for originall sinne only and not for sinnes actuall, or for some of theire actuall sinnes and not for all; to which strange and uncouth opinion: You seeme to incline in the end of your 15. Chapter, where you say, that Christ only receaved our infirmities and originall disease, and not the contempt of him and his law. I have cause to suspect that you concurre with Arminians in maintayning, that all Infants, the very children of Pagans, Turkes and Saracens that perish in theire infancy are saved. For how can it be conceaved that any improvement of evill inclinations is made in them unto such an hight as that it should imply contradiction to Gods justice, to shew them any favour?
And where such an hight of impiety is not, you professe they cannot be excluded from all fruits of his love. Yet I confesse theire soules have a being and that eternall; and if this be a fruit of Gods love, then though the hight of impiety be never so greate, yet is no man or devill excluded from this fruite of Gods love: For they shall continue for ever and that to theire everlasting wo. As touching your manner of expressing your meaning, this increase of sinne, you call the sinister use of contingency that God hath bestowed upon them, your meaning must be the sinister use of the liberty of theire wills: which in your phrase is the sinister use of contingency, wherof I am perswaded you can give no example.
And by the way I observe you suppose in every naturall man, a power to use the liberty of his will, eyther will or ill. I had thought and doe still thinke there is no power in carnall man to use theire naturall liberty well, but only to use it either in this or that subject, but so as still the use of it shall be evill. For the affection of the flesh is not subject to the law of God nor can be, sayth the Apostle, and every man is dead in sinne till Rom. 8. 7.God quickneth him. Ephesi. 2. 2. And a dead man can performe no action of life naturall, if dead naturally, no action of life spirituall, if dead spiritually: But whether naturall inclinations unto evill may be thus farre improved in the children, by theire Forefathers on no, (you say) is disputable but in another place: that is, it is a disputable question, whether children may not by the sinnes of theire Father be so farre corrupt, that it implyeth contradiction to Gods justice to shew them any favour.
You might as well say it is a disputable question whether there be any God or no; For that there should be a God, and yet not able to cure the naturall corruption wherein any man is borne is contradiction. And if he were, then sure he were able to shew them no small favour. And as for contradictions to Gods justice, there is so litle colour herof in the saving of Infants, that on the contrary, there is nothing (the condemnation of the Sonne of God alone excepted) wherin the justice of God is more obscure, then in the condemnation of Infants. I thinke you have litle minde to come to an accoumpt, how you doe accommodate this your doctrine unto Infants; yet you must be called hereunto whether you will or no, unlesse you clippe the wings of your generall propositions, as when you say: None can be excluded from the fruits of Gods love untill the improvement of inclinations naturally bent to evill come to that hight of impiety as to imply a contradiction for infinite justice or equity to vouchsafe them any favour. Yet by the way you put in an exception concerning Infants, and that is in case there be a neglect of duties, to be performed to them by theire Elders; why doe you not speake plainly and say, saving in case they are not baptized? And what thinke you in this case? Are they damned? I cannot beleive you thinke so; yet the face of your discourse lookes this way. I say I cannot beleive it; and that for two reasons.
The one is, because the tenour of your tenet caryeth you rather to maintayne with the Arminians, that all children dying in theire Infancy though they dye without the Church, are saved. My second reason is, because herein you should directly contradict the discourse Kinge Iames had with certaine Divines a litle before his death, and his apparent profession to the contrary; not as his private opinion, but as the opinion generally of our Divines, whome he had learned in his younger dayes to have censured Austine for his opinion to the contrary, as one that was Durus Pater Infantum. Now I am so well perswaded of you, that I thinke you would not willingly enter upon so flat a contradictiō to such a discourse of Kinge Iames in the dayes of Kinge Charles, and that so soone after his death.
If you write only concerning men of ripe yeares, you must have a care to limit your propositions accordingly, and not to give them longer wings then is fitt.
In the next place you touch upon a distinction much talked of, and as much advanced by some as cryed downe by others. Yet both Scotus and Durandus give a tolerable, and Aquinas with the Dominicans after him, an orthodoxe interpretation therof, though neyther suitable to the minde of Damascen commonly reputed the Father of it. Yet looke what in this kind is wanting in them is supplyed by Arminiensis, who gives both an orthodoxe construction thereof, and that also in conformity to the opinion of Damascene, of whose text he gives a very sound and orthodoxe interpretation and the more orthodoxe the more opposite to theire constructions, who with greate cry of words draw it to the countenancing of theire Arminian Tenets without cause, Love you say is the fruite of Gods antecedent will, wrath and severity are the proper effects of his consequent will. Fruite and effect you make all one (as with good reason you may.)
Now what, I pray you, is this effect which you call love? You seeme to intimate, that they are the effects of creation, as when you say, Every particular faculty of soule or body is a pledge undoubted of Gods love. Yet faculties of soules and bodyes are found in beasts, but Gods antecedent will in Damascene is referred wholly unto men. Neyther doth Damascene at all referre it to the worke of creation; but makes it to be that wherby God will have all to be saved.
Liberty of will is proper to man in distinction from beasts, but who seeth not that this indifferently makes him obnoxius unto damnation as well as capable of salvation? Then when you say wrath and severity is the effect of Gods consequent will, what doe you meane by wrath? Is it eyther a resolution to take vengeance, or the execution of vengeance it selfe? I think you take it for the execution of vengeance it selfe. Now there is an execution of reward also properly opposite unto this which whether it be the same love you speake of, it became you to expresse so much, or whether you conceave it to be different, yet it were fit you should take notice of it, and acknowledge that this is a fruite of Gods consequent will, as well as wrath; that as effectually presupposing obedience, as this disobedience: and that love in rewarding is every way as infallibly consequent to the obeying of Gods will revealed, as wrath is of our neglecting and despising it. A full explication of this distinction you promise in good time, how well you performe it we may in good time consider with Gods helpe.
Next you enter upon another forme of the same distinction (as you pretend) and you suffer it to fly with one winge; For you talke of Gods absolute will, (which you seeme to confound with Gods antecedent will) but as touching the member congruously opposite, you leave us to seeke for that. But as it is we are to consider it; Gods absolute will was (you say) to have men capable of Heaven and Hell, of joyes and miseryes immortall. This cannot be understoode of Gods consequent will; for this absolute will is indifferent to end in the bestowing of reward or punishment, and is immediately terminated only in making man capable of eyther; but his consequent will is not so indifferent. For the only effect thereof you mention to be wrath and severity, and this presupposeth rather then causeth capablenesse.
Neyther can this absolute will be the antecedent will of God according to Damascens meaning. For the antecedent will in Damascene, is only referred to the will of God, wherby he wills mans salvation: but this absolute will is (you say) to have men capable of Heaven and Hell. To helpe this you tell us: That this absolute will (whose possible objects are two) is in the first place set on mans eternall joy. But you doe not proceede to shew on what it is set in the next place, as if by such like incongrueties you desired rather to confounde your reader, then to satisfie him.
Yet by the tenour of your discourse you leave it to us to guesse, that in the second place to witt upon the dispising of Gods love, it is set upon a mans damnation. So that by this your doctrine, both Gods antecedent will and consequent will is all one, and that is Gods absolute will. But no such thinge is founde in Damascene, from whome such as you are, doe usually take this distinction of will antecedent in God, and will consequent: And indeed you doe well to make one as absolute as another; for like as wrath, the fruite of this will of God in the second place (as you imply) hath not its course but upō presuppositiō of disobedience; so in like manner, the proper opposite to wrath on the other side the fruite of this will of God in the first place, hath not its course but upon presupposition of obedience.
And that you may know what this fruite I speake of is; I say as wrath is taken for the execution of vengeance; so the proper opposite herunto must be love as it is taken for the execution of reward; And let any man judge whether this doth not every way presuppose obedience, as well as the other presupposeth disobedience. And thus shall God as truly be sayed absolutely to wish a mans damnation as his salvation, and no more conditionally will the one then the other. And like as if God be absolutely sayd to will a mans salvation, it shall not herhence follow he shall so will it, as to contradict himselfe by frustrating the contrary possibilitie, which unto man he had appointed: so though God be sayd absolutely to will a mans damnation; yet it will not follow that God doth so will it as to contradict himselfe by frustrating the contrary possibility which unto man he had appointed: Only it is absurd to call this possibility a contrary possibility. It is I confesse a possibility to the contrary, but not a contrary possibility. Like as liberty unto good and liberty unto evill are liberties unto things contrary in the way of manners: but yet they are no contrary liberties; so the possibilities of obtaining salvation or damnation, which are consequent upon the use of this liberty, though they are possibilities to contrary things, yet are they not contrary possibilities. And as Gods anger signifying the execution of vengeance doth never rise up, but upon the dispising of his love alluringe unto good; so Gods love signifying the execution of reward, doth never rise up, but upon the embracing of his love alluring unto good.
But if you take Gods wrath for his will to punish. I say that looke by what reason Gods wrath, as it signifies his will to punish, doth not arise in God but upon foresight of mans disobedience; in like sort the love of God, as it signifieth his will to reward, doth never arise in God but upon foresight of his obedience. And looke in what congruity Gods will to punish for sinne deserves to be called reprobation: in the same measure of congruity Gods will to reward for obedience, is to be called Election, if so be we will make Election and reprobation congruously opposite, as it is fit we should. Neyther can it be avoyded, but that the turning of tender love and compassion into severity and wrath must imply manifestly an extreame change in God. For like as when mans obedience is turned into disobedience, this cannot be without change; so when Gods fervent love is turned into severe wrath, this cannot be possibly without change. Which I further proove a priori thus, where that which was, ceaseth to be, and that which formerly was not, beginneth to be, there must needs be a chang, and that more wayes then one: But where tender love is turned into severe wrath and that inexorable (as before you have expressed) there that which was, ceaseth to be, and that which was not, beginnes to be: therfore there must needs be change, and that more wayes then one, to wit a change from some thing, and a change into another thing.
The minor is prooved; For if the same tender love did still continue, it could not be sayd to be turned into wrath, but rather it should be sayd to consist with wrath. Likewise wrath formerly was not in God; for as much as you make it arise out of the ashes of his love despised, wherby that phrase (the ashes of Gods love) doth manifestly argue that you will have Gods love as it were consumed to ashes; therefore it must needs cease towards those that have thus dispised it.
Neither is it true but a bold affirmation without all truth, to say that the changs is wholly seated in mans deviation, which you avouch without any colour of proofe: But I have allready prooved that this Tenet of yours maintaynes a change in God, unavoydable by all the wit of man.
It seemes you would reason thus, the cause why the love of God is turned into wrath, is wholy seated in man; therefore the change is onelyonly in man. But this is so inconsequent that it seemes common modestie would not suffer you expresly to insist upon it.
Though we sinne, yet can we not make any change in God; I the Lord am not changed: therfore yee Sonnes of Iacob are not Mala. 3. 6.consumed. To touch this by the way; Adam I confesse deviated from the good course of obedience, which he might have taken: but I deny that any naturall man hath liberty, to take any good course of obedience, till God hath renewed him; yet such Pelagian acknowledgements are so frequent in your discourse, that they are found in every hedge.
2. The Sunne indeed never changeth with the Moone, nor without the Moone, saving from place to place, and so he never changeth, one time only excepted in the dayes of Iosuah.
But what meane you to say, that it is one & the same heate, that is with us in the spring time, and with them that travaile in the sandes of Affricke? Can it be one and the same accident in so not different only but distracted subjects. Yet it is one in kinde but not in degree; like as grace and glory in the Saints of God is the same kinde though different in degree; and produced in them all by one and the same love of God, that neyther differs in kinde nor in degree. The same heate of the Sunne enflames matter capable of cumbustion not other matter. So God the same and without all change doth refresh the good, and consume the wicked. We nothing doubt of this; but then we must not say, his love is turned into wrath. For like as the heate of the Sunne could not be turned into colde without change in the Sunne; so neyther could Gods love be turned into wrath without alteration in God himselfe: God consumes the wicked, but not by love. God saves his Elect, but not by wrath; Yet his will is one and the same in both, though the effects be different, and no marvnile; For his will is free, as wherby he hath mercy on whom he will and whome he will he hardneth; and as the one tends to the salvation of some, so the other tends to the condemnation of others.
It is true, there is none but hath bin partaker of Gods blessings one way or other. It is true, the measure of his wrath is equall to the riches of his bounty despised thus farre. The more riches of his bounty we dispise, the greater will by the measure of his wrath, of we continue in impenitency. Yet there is a subordinate difference, according as the same riches of Gods bounty, may be in greater measure despised by one then by another. You are pleased needlesly to phrasifie this over and over agayne insteede of affoording better matter to satisfie your reader; but you are very liberall of words. But by the way you foist in a false dye as thinking, that in the multitude of wordes it might not be perceaved, as truly I was like to have overslipped it. As when you say, the only rule for measuring sinne or transgression right, must be taken from the degrees of mans opposition to Gods delight or pleasure in his salvation. Wherein you manifestly contradict your selfe; For before you sayd it was to be taken from the degrees of mercy despised; But now you say it is only to be taken from the degrees of mans despising it. Which indeede is the righter of the two. So then the measure of Iudas his sinne is to be taken from the degrees of his opposition unto grace; which you in a strange manner expresse by the delight that God doth take in his salvation; Why what meane you by this? Is Iudas saved thinke you or shall any reprobate be saved and not damned rather? what mooved you then to talke of Gods delight in the salvation of them, that are or shall be damned?
Is it possible that God can take delight in that which never was, nor is, not ever shallbe? You may as well say that God takes delight in a multitude of other worlds of men and Angells, which were and are possible.
Yet as if this conceyte of yours were a principle of credite you tell us demurely, that not a dramme of Gods delight or pleasure can be abated not a scruple of his will, but must be accomplished, to wit of that delight in Iudas his salvation, which you doe very gravely attribute unto God, and so consequently, Gods will you speake of, which must be accomplished, is his will of Iudas his salvation.
And this must be accomplished, & indeede so it had neede, before God can take any delight and pleasure in it. But how or when shall Gods will of Iudas his salvation be accomplished? Will you give me leave to reade this riddle out of your intimations? You seeme to mee to imply that this will of God is accomplished in Iudas his damnation. Because looke in what measure of love, God would have saved him, in such a measure of wrath, he doth damne him and so accordingly, looke in what measure, Gods delight would have bin in Iudas his salvation had he bin saved; in the same measure God doth delight in his damnation he being damned. Vous avez; thus have you the interpretation of this riddle.
And by the same reason, you may proceede to make other riddles, and aske how is the will of God as touching Peters damnation, and Gods delight and pleasure therin accomplished to every dramme and scruple; and answere that this is accomplished in his salvation. For looke in what measure God would have delighted in his damnation had he bin damned; in the same measure God now delights in his salvation, he being saved.
And thus the delight and pleasure that any man takes in his childes salvation may be sayd to be accomplished in the delight and pleasure, which he shall take in his childes condemnation. For the Saints shall judge the World, even the Godly Father joyne with Christ in pronouncing the sentence 2 Cor. 6.of condemnation upon his ungodly Sonne, &c. God delights in our obedience and in our repentance when it is; but where there is no repentance or obedience how is it probable he or any should delight in that which is not. 1 Sam. 15. 22. Hath the Lord as greate pleasure in burnt-offrings and sacrifices as when the voyce ef the Lord is obeyed? Perhapps you will say, yet his will is that all should repent; I answere his will commanding, is so to all that heare it; but his will decreeing is not that all shall repent that are commaunded to repent. For then all should repent: To say, that God will have any thing come to passe which yet never comes to passe, Austine hath long agoe professed to be as good as to deny Gods omnipotency. And whereas repentance is the gift of God, as the Scripture plainly testifieth, it is apparent that God doth not give repentance Act. 11. 1…. 2 Tim. 2. last.unto all, and therefore neyther did he will or determine to give repentance unto all. God is sayd to love persons in as much as he willeth good things unto them. God may be sayd to love things morall as repentance and obedience, in as much as he will reward persons for theire repentance and obedience.
Neyther of these loves is accommodable to punishment, no more then unto reward. Yet looke in what respect God may be sayd to love the one, so may he be sayd to love the other; And the Apostle professeth of himselfe, and his fellows that they were the good savour of the Lord even in them that perish. And every man knoweth reward to be a fruite of justice 2 Cor. 2…remunerative, as well as punishment is of justice vindicative; and each presupposeth the will of God, as well one as the other. For God is not bound to punish sinne, he may pardon it. Nay how is he not bound to pardon all sinne, of all men, if so be Christ hath made satisfaction for the sinnes of all?
And with these Tenets of yours you are growne so farre in love, that because some schoole poynts doe not beare such faire wether towards them as might be wished; you woulde put the maintayners of them upon some better explication of such Tenets. The Tenet is, that God doth punish sinners in the life to come citra condignum. The Moderne divines (as it seemes) by your margent are Calvin & Zanchy that maintayne this; against whom you oppose Coppenius, a Lutheran I guesse, I doe not thinke he is a Papist. Sure I am, Bradwardine and Gerson maintayne the same; and as I remenber it is And Aquinas 1. 9. 21. Art. q. ad. …most generally receaved amongst the Schoolemen. And as for Coppenius his reasons; when he demaunds whether God doth remit ought for Christs satisfaction or no: I answere it is not for Christs satisfaction; but merely according to the good pleasure of his owne will.
And when he urgeth that of Iames, Iudgement mercylesse shall be to him that sheweth no mercy: I answere that like as when 2 Tim. …the Apostle prayeth for Onesiphorus that he may find mercy at that day, his meaning can be no other then this, that his sinnes might be pardoned and his soule saved: so likewise in just proportion they may be sayd to tast of judgement mercylesse, whose sinners are not pardoned and whose soules are not saved. As for your reason it is grounded merely upon a fiction of your owne, that subjecteth the delight of God unto degrees, (whereas his simplicitie freeth him as well from composition of degrees, as from any other kind of composition,) as also unto change even there where you undertake to cleere God from change: If Iudas had bin saved and Peter damned, God had still bin the same and no other then now he is, as touching will and delight, and every thinge that is in God. But by the way let me tell you, you corrupt the state of the question in supposing that by this Tenet, which you dislike, the punishment of reprobation is lesse then divine justice exacts. For they maintayne no such thing, but rather the contrary that no degree of punishment is exacted by any justice in God, but left indifferent to the determination of Gods will; And therefore Bradwardine distinguisseth betweene meritum actuale and meritum potentiale. Meritum actuale is in reference Bradward. lib. cap. 39. pag. 360.to such a degree of punishment or reward, which the will of God hath determined.
But meritum potentiale is in reference to any degree of reward or punishment which God might have determined. And Gerson professeth that when a sinne is committed, it is merely in the good pleasure of God to inflict what kinde or Gers. de vita spiritualli anima lect. 1. Coroll. 8.degree of punishment he will.
2. Your text is to proove that Gods nature admitteth no change, albeit of a loveing Father he becomes a severe judge; albeit his tender love be turned into wrath. And for proofe of this you thinke it enough to say that the change is in man: and that Gods wrath kindles not but out of the ashes of his love despised. To this you take on an other poynt (nothing at all to the purpose) that Gods wrath is in proportion to mens sinnes, neyther lesse nor more; and this you prosequu…e a whole leafe and more, that what you want of solid answere, you may supply by silling mens eyes with an idle discourse. Well we have considered what your discourse hath bin on the by, touching this, that mens punishments are not lesse then theire deserts. Now let us consider your following extravagancy, in shewing that mens punishments are not more then theire deserts.
And here you tell us that to thinke God should punish sinne, unlesse it were truly against his will, or any sinne more deeply then it is against his will and pleasure is one of those 3. grosse transformations of the divine nature which Saint Austine refutes. For thus to doe, is neyther incident to the divine nature, nor to any other imaginable. I would we were worthy to know 3. things. First who they are whom you oppose in this: Secondly what those 3. so grosse transformations are, which you speake of out of Austine. Thirdly, to what end tends all this, on which you spend so many words.
But to take it as we find it. No Christian I think ever doubted, but that all sinne is foreign, a transgression of Gods law, & accordingly contrary to the commaundment of God, which is usually called the will of God. But that any sinne should be committed contrary to the will of God, as it is taken for the decree and determination of God, I had thought no sober man would have affirmed. Austine I am sure plainly professeth that Non aliquid sit nisi omnipotens feri velit, vel sinendo ut fiat vel ipse faciendo. And albeit Aquinas seemes concealedly Enchirid. cap. 95.to oppose Austine in this in q. 9. 19. art. 9. Yet notwithstanding concludeth thus: Deus igitur neque vult mala fieri, neque vult mala non fieri, sed vult permittere mala fieri: Ibid. ad tertium. Yet I willingly graunt that every sinne is against Gods will and pleasure, as it signifieth his pleasure what shall be our dutie to doe; which is nothing els but his commaundment. And it is as true that herein are no degrees, every sinne is equally against the commaundments of God.
And the will and pleasure of God whereby he will have this or that to be our duty to doe or leave undone, hath no degrees. For Gods simplicity freeth him as well from composition of degrees as from any other composition. But yet some transgressions are greater then others in as much as God may be more or lesse wronged by us, or our selves, or our brethren. It is neyther incident to the divine nature nor to the humane, to punish any more then it is ones will and pleasure to punish. But to a man it is incidēt to punish for those crimes wherein themselves take delight. For a man may be condemned and punished for adultery by them who are adulterers themselves; as appeares in those that brought unto our Saviour a Woman taken in adultery. For when our Saviour sayd. Let him that is amoungst you without sinne cast the first stone at her, the text sayth herupon being accused by theire owne conscience, Iohn. 8.they went out one by one beginning at the eldest, even to the last. Iohn. 8. 7. Wherfore you doe overlash in not contenting your selfe to affirme this of the divine nature, but extending it to every nature imaginable.
Agayne, what meane you to call that a way wardnesse of men, whereof you professe the humane nature is uncapable; as namely to be offended at that which doth not offend them? What is a wilde manner of discourse, if this be not? Nothing inferiour in absurdity is that which followeth, as when you say, that To punish any which doe not contradict theire wills, is an injustice scarce incident to the inhabitans of Hell. If the Divills punish any, as you say they doe; doe they punish them for sins committed in contradiction to theire wills? And how many Magistrates doe punish even such sinnes, wherof themselves are guilty? They are bound by law to punish profane swearers, to punish drunckerds; is it necessary that every such Magistrat should be free from such sinnes themselves? But the Divills themselves you say doe not vexe the wicked but the Godly; this being a most absurde conceyte at first sight, you have taken a course to charme the absurdity of it by adding, concerning the wicked. Till Gods justice overtake them; might you not as well adde concerning the Godly, Till Gods will and pleasure is, and so farre as his pleasure is, the Divill shall vexe them; as appeares in the example of Iob? But ordinarily in the course of Gods providence; who are more vexed by the Divill, the godly or the wicked rather?
Now because it it apparent that in your opinion the Divill torments infernally the damned and hath no power over the Saints of God; though they are more prone to vexe the godly then the wicked as you thinke: therefore you put your selfe to devise a reason why the Divills torment the damned, wheras the sinnes of the damned men were committed only in following the will of the Divill too much.
But the reason you give is of the wildest and most contradictious nature that ever any I thinke was heard of. For the reason you give is this: Therfore the Divills cease not to torment them, because they can find no ease in tormenting them: Whereas if they could finde any case in tormenting them, then (you say) they would be lesse displeased with them, and consequently torment them lesse; which if it were true the Divills should be as arrant fooles as ever lived; as namely in ceasing to doe that, by the doing whereof they should finde ease, by this supposition of yours.
And in the meane time you represent unto as a proper modell of Gods providence, while you conceave, the tormenting of the damned to be put over by God to the will of the Divill; as if the dispensation of the degrees of punishment, therby to justifie Gods proceeding, were remitted to the discretion and equity of those Angells of darkenesse. And who I pray shall be the dispenser of that punishment, that in justice belongs to the Divills themselves? Yet as if you had performed some greate exployte against some body, you demaunde bravely; Whether they did not rather dreame then thinke of God, that some times write, as if it were not as much against Gods will, to have men dye, as it is against mans will to suffer death. In writing this, you thinke, they did rather dreame then thinke on God in writing of the former, sure I am you did if not dreame yet thinke of the Divill.
But which writing yours or theirs, be like unto a sicke mans dreame, let not the indifferent only, but the unindifferent also judge. For you show as litle sobriety in the impugning of these, in theire writing concerning the will of God, then in inventing your former fancies concerning the Divill. Is it not by the will of God appoynted that all must dye? And is it probable then, it should be against Gods will that any should dye? O but you speake belike of the second death, I answere; Is it not as well appoynted by the will of God that all that dye the first death in sinne, shall dye the second death of everlasting sorrow; as it is appoynted by the will of God that all shall dye the first death? And will it not by the same reason follow; that looke in what sense it is impossible that any should dye the first death against the will of God, in the same sence it is impossible that any should dye the second death against the will of God? and if they suffered death (as you say) to this end, that Gods will may be fullfilled in theire suffering; how is it possible that this theire suffering of death should be against the will of God? which yet you boldly affirm and that with such confidence as to breake out into a censure of them that thinke the contrary, as if they did rather dreame then thinke the contrary.
And yet when you breake forth in avouching manifest contradiction, would you have your reader conceave your selfe to be in a sober discourse waking? or in a dreame sleeping? Yet this is usuall in your writings.
4. The mayne poynt proposed: (to wit how God without change of a loving Father becomes a severe judge) you dispatched in a few words saying, the change is wholly in man; and therin giveing us your word for it; and afterwards served your selfe with certayne illustrations nothing to the purpose. And to refresh your spirits and get some breath you turned aside, to the consideration of the proportion of mens punishments to theire sinnes; poynts merely extravagant. And now you take liberty to maintayne your extravagant discourse by inquiring, how it stands with Gods justice to inflict eternall punishments for temporall sinnes. VVe must be content to follow you in your wilde goose race; For seeing we are in, we must goe thorough and get out as we can. Yet you acknowledge the doubt proposed nothing pertinent; but to make matter of farther discourse you tell us, it were pertinent, if the immortall happinesse wherunto the riches of Gods bounty did dayly leade them here on earth, had not farther exceeded the pleasure of this life, then the paynes of Hell doe those grievances which caused them to murmur against theire heavenly Father. You are very bold to acknowledge, God to be the heavenly Father of the reprobates. Whereas the Apostle professeth that we are all the children of God by faith in Christ Iesus. Gal. 3. 25. And if sonnes then heyres even heyrs of God and coheyres with Christ. Rom. 8. Much more bold, if because our Saviour Christ exhorts the Apostles to be like theire heavenly Father, therfore you will acknowledge him the heavenly Father, even of reprobates also.
This is by the way, I come to the maine: and say first; were it so as you speake, yet this doubt were nothing pertinent to this place, of cleering God from innovation and change of nature, as often as his tender love is turned into feirce wrath. Secondly, your argument contracted being this. Immortall happinesse doth more exceede the pleasures of this life, then the pains of Hell exceede the grievances of this life: therfore it is impertinent to make a doubt how Gods justice doth appeare in inflicting eternall punishment for temporall sinne. I see no just consequence at all in this. I will drawe it to the best forme I can devise, in congruity to your meaning which I desire to picke out as well as I can. And that is this; Theire obedience should be rewarded with infinite joy: therefore theire obedience may be justly punished with infinite sorrow: and no doubt is to be made hereof. And this I confesse is more suitable, speaking of the protension & duration of each then of theire intension as you doe. For though the joyes of Heaven were never so greate beyond the degree of sorrows of Hell.
Yet if they were not everlasting the comparison would not hold. Because there could be but a finite difference betweene theire intensions; for joys of man cannot be infinite in degree. But if the one were everlasting the other not; there should be an infinite difference in this. And albeit the joys of Heaven were but of equall degree, in proportion to the sorrows of bell; Yet the argument would every whit proceede as well upon supposall of inequality, and that of exuberancy on the part of joyes.
Now I will shew, what exception may be taken against this. First no laws of the World (the execution whereof are reputed just) doe or can proceede after any such proportion? Let a man take a purse upon the high way, or kill a man he shall dye for it; Let him give tenn times as much to the poore; let him save ten mens lives, they neyther doe, nor can reward, in proportion to the punishment; Let the greatest honour or any other kinde of rewards be heaped upon him; all are inferiour to his life. For all that ever a man hath, he will give for his life.
But then you will say, if it be just with man, to punish with Iob. 1.death; though they cannot possibly administer rewards in any proportion therunto; how much more is it just with God, to punish with eternall death, seeing be can and will reward obediency with eternall life? And I nothing doubt but that it is just; but the question is wherin consisteth this justice? For it seemes that justice in this kinde should stand in reference to the worke, and not be measured by any aliene consideration. Especially considering that the question may be revived on the part of the reward. For how stands it with justice to reward with everlasting blisse a temporall obedience, so that still we shallbe to seeke of the right measure of justice in this kinde.
Agayne, if a Master shall say unto a servant; doe such a thing and I will give thee an hundred pound; it will not herehence follow, that for his disobedience the Master may make him pay an hundred pound. And the reason is because it is manifest, that like as a man may give what he will freely; so he may reward as liberally as he will. But it is not so manifest that God himselfe mai doe what evill he will unto his creature, and accordingly afflict what punishment he will for the transgression of his creature.
And therefore the reason that you give for justifying God in this is unsound; and you seeme to be sensible of it, when you desire to helpe your selfe with the consideration of mens multiplyed contempts of grace, all which neverthelesse doe make up but a short continuance in sinne. Besides that, this consideration hath no place in such infants as perish in originall sinne. You cannot find any neglect in them, much lesse often, and yet to say, and barely to say That often and perpetuall neglects turnes slames of eternall love into an eternall consuming fire, is to please your selfe in your own dictates, but to proove nothing. The same song you sing still; when you tell us, the oftner God pardons a man, the greater is his wrath against impenitency; save that the prosequution of it is more absurd then the former; For it hath reference rather to the intention of his wrath, which is greater or lesse according to the qualities of mens sinnes, not to the protension and duration of it, which is equall to all.
But by the way, where I pray doth it appeare, that God doth often pardon the sinnes of reprobates or that he doth at all pardon them? Doth God pardon any sinnes without repentance? Or are the reprobates at any time brought by God unto repentance? I am sure Austine professeth the contrary, where he saith, Istorum neminem adducit Deus ad salubrem spiritualemque Contra. I… lia. Pelag. lib. 5. cap. 4.poenitentiam, qua homo reconciliatur Deo in Christo, sive illis ampliorum patientiam sive non imparem praebeat. But to returne to the poynt; with farre more reason doe they discourse, that considering the infinite nature of God against whom sinne is committed, doe therhence inferre the desert of infinite punishment, and because a creature being but finite is not capable of infinite punishment in intention, therfore make him liable to infinite punishment in duration. Though I well know also, this is excepted against; and therfore Miranrandula whom you mention makes choyce to reply on this, that as many as dye in sinne, theire sinnes, being never broken of, continue with them in infinitum, and therfore doe justly expose them to infinite punishment in duration.
Yet I very well consider what just exceptions may be taken against this also, and the lesse we can satisfie our selves in the reason herof, the more cause have we to referre all to the will and pleasure of God; untill such time as the wonderfull wisedom and congruity of his actions shall be more clearly discovered unto us.
5. As for Lactantius I am not apt to quarrell with him about any incommodious speeches; but willing to accept any convenient interpretation of them; In anger, as it is in man, we all know there is something materiall as the kindling of the blood about the heart, and something formall, which is the desire of revenge.
But as diverse other passions doe include imperfection in the very formall part of them, so doth anger, for it supposeth griefe: Yet some passions in the formall part of them imply no imperfection as love and joy. And accordingly the rule that Aquinas gives is this: Cum nihil horum Deo conveniat secundum illud quod est naturale in eis: illaque imperfectionem important; etiam formaliter Deo convenire non possunt nisi metaphoricè propter similitudinem effectus: Quae autem imperfectionem non important de Deo propriè dicuntur ut Amor & Ga…dium, tamen sine passione, ut dictum est: 1. q. 20. art. 1. ad 2. And in another place, Ira non dicitur in Deo secundom passionem animi, sed secundum judicium justitiae: prout vult vindicta facere de peccato. 12. q. 47. art. 1. ad. 1. God you say is more deeply displeased with sinne then man, as if Gods displeasure and mans differed only in degree, and not rather toto genere.
Neyther are there any degrees of displeasure at all in God properly, but attribuuntur Deo secundum similitudinem effectus, as anger is, when God punisheth; so he shewes a grenter anger when he punisheth more severely, and a lesse anger, when he punisheth Iesse severely. You make God unchangeable in worde yet not so allwayes neyther, as where you discoursed of an impotent immutability. But if you maintayne that God did for a time will the salvation of any man before he had filled up the measure of his iniquity, and not afterwards: or that his tender love is turned into severe wrath, it cannot be avoyded but you must make change and innovation in the nature of God.
6. It is true that love includes no imperfection in it, as touching the formall part therof, unlesse it be considered as a passion, but anger doth, in as much as it supposeth griefe. But take love as it signifieth a will to doe good, and anger as it signifeth a will to take vengeance on them that doe evill; and the one is as naturall unto God as the other. The truth is, neither of them naturall, but free; Gods love to himselfe is: naturall and nessary, but his love to his creatures is not, no more then his mercy, and he hath mercy on whom he will. He is neyther tyed by any naturall inclination to make the World, nor being made, is he bound to maintayne it, but as he made it according to the good pleasure of his will, so he doth maintayne it. Every love of God to his creatures is not suitably opposite to his anger. … …he anger of God being the will of punishing, nothinge is congruously opposite herunto but his love, as it signifieth the will of rewarding, and rewarding presupposeth obedience, as well as punishing presupposeth disobedience; but the will of doing the one or the other presupposeth neither.
You might as well say that justice is not so naturall to God as mercy; and I wonder at your unreasonable declination of this comparison in this place; wheras in other places you insist so much on Gods justice, as to take litle or no notice of his mercy. Yet if it be true, as you have hertofore discoursed, that there is a justice before the will of God, by which the will of God is ordered; how can you make that doctrine conformable unto this? It is true, God condemnes no man but for sinne; and it is as true that God rewards no man but for obedience; only here is the difference. The best obedience of mans is no meritorious cause of his salvation, but only disposing therto: but mans disobedience is not only a disposing cause, but meritorious of his condemnation.
It is untrue that compassion come naturally from God; it comes freely …so doth punishment also, not naturally, much lesse unnaturally, but freely: For he could pardon sinne in allof it pleased him, and doth pardon it in all his elect. … God when he punisheth, relinquisheth the exercise of his mercyfull nature, but undoubtedly he exerciseth his vindicative nature. Now indeede the exercise of his merciful nature is proper to his owne people, as whom he hath made vessells of mercy, and for whom Christ hath made satisfaction upon the crosse.
And therfore when he proceedes to punishment against them, he may be sayd to exercise alienum opus, and is represented unto us loathe to come unto it. How shall I give thee up. Ephraim? how shall I deliver thee, Israell? how shall I make thee as …os. 11. 8.Admah? how shall I set thee as Zeboim? Myne heart is turned within me, &c. Gods anger is seene and felt by the effects of it, but to whom? only to those that know God to be the Author of the things they suffer.
But the Angells and Saints of God doe otherwise see God in the joyes of Heaven. In this world the manifestation of Gods wrath doth not alwayes hide God from men, but rather is many times a meanes to make God known unto them; yea a better meanes then continuall prosperity, which makes men grow proude and say, Who is the Lord? If anger and hate are Pro. 30. 9not in God, but upon supposall of sinne, then they cannot be sayd to be in God, but only by eternall denomination attributed unto him, least otherwise we should introduce a manifest innovation into the nature of God.
And indeede anger sayth Aquinas is often attributed unto God propter similitudinem effectus, and so as often as he punisheth: and not till then is he sayd to be angry. But if you take it for voluntas vindicandi, this must needs be as everlasting as Gods will; and if you deduce any cause herof from the creature you were as good to derive from the creature the cause of Gods will, which Aquinas professeth never any man was so madde as to doe. And Gods hatred of Esau, is in Scripture v. q. 23. art. 5.made suitable to Gods love of Iacob, and if this love be the will of election, then hatred must be the will of reprobation. And if the everlasting purpose of God to give both grace and glory; be deservedly accoumpted Gods love, why should not the everlasting purposu of God to deny unto others both grace and glory, be as deservedly accoumpted Gods hatred? You undertake to shew how, Love and anger being passions or linkt with passions are rightly conceaved to be in God; but I hope you will not attribute them unto God, either a… passibus, or linkt with passions. For albeit love and joy mans formally be attributed unto God, because they include no imperfection, yet not as passions saith Aquinas in the place lately alleaged out of him.