Lifes Preservative Against Self-Killing, Tract · Chapter 2 · Section 32 – Section 33
§. 32. Of indifferent things, how they become ſinfull.
Indifferents accidentally evill.But, in ſubject ò indifferente, in things that are of themſelves but indifferent (whoſe uſe is neither directly nor abſolutely commanded nor forbidden by Gods word, as are kinds of meate, drinke, apparrell, and the like, and for which we ought not to command to death) the uſing, or not uſing of them becomes ſinfull onelyonly accidentally, either by reaſon of externall circumſtances, about the action, or omiſſion of them; or of ſome erroneous qualities in the agents, or omitters; and not from the intrinſecall nature of the things, or morall diſpoſition of the action, or omiſſion abſolutely conſidered, without reſpect of circumſtances and Law.The individual acts of things indifferent, are not indifferent when they are done. For touching the uſe of indifferent things, onelyonly mans individuall voluntary actions about them, ſpecially proceeding from deliberate judgment, are morally either good or evill; well done or ill done; becauſe, they are accompanied, and indowed with ſuch actionall circumſtances, as do ſo affect and qualifie them, that they are no more indifferent;Not Phyſically. either Phyſically to be done, or not done; (for, Vnumquod que dum eſt, neceſſario eſt, Every thing when it is, it is neceſſarily, and then cannot be otherwiſe than it is;)Nor morally. or morally, becauſe, if the ſame were otherwiſe than it is, it muſt neceſſarily be either better or worſe than it is. For, no action can ſtand equally morally affected with differing circumſtances; and at the ſame time, to be done,Tho. prima ſecundae, quaeſt. 18. artic. 9. Cum enim rationis ſit ordinare, actus a ratione deliberativa procedens, ſi non ſit ad debitū finē ordinatus; ex hoc ipſo repugnat rationi, et habet rationem mali; ſi vero ordinetur ad debitū finē, convenit ad eum ordine rationis unde habet rationem beni. Ex Filliucio To. 2. p. 3. Patet actiones humanas, quatenus à ratiene, & volūtate diriguntur, dici morales, hoc eſt dignas laude velvituperatione, ex Ariſt. Ethic. c. 13. actio homini propria eſt voluntaria, & libera & adeodigna laude aut vituperatione. Tho. 1.2. q. 1. art. 1. Azor. l. 1. c. 1. or not to bee done, cannot be equally morally indifferent. For, Thomas Aquinas ſaies, That it falls out that an action may be indifferent, ſecundum ſpeciem, in the generall kind of it: qui tamen eſt bonus vel malus in individuo conſideratus, which notwithſtanding is either good or evill, conſidered in its individuall ſubject and act. Whereof hee gives the reaſon, quia actus moralis non ſolum habet bonitatem ex objecto, à quo habet ſpeciem; ſed etiam ex circumſtantijs: becauſe, a morall action hath its goodneſſe, not onelyonly from its object, by which it is ſpecified for kinde, but alſo from circumſtances; of which every individuall act of neceſſity hath ſome, whereby it is drawne to be good or bad, Ad minus ex parte intentionis finis, at leaſt in reſpect of the end intended: And therefore, he concludes properly, neceſſe eſt omnem actum hominis à deliberativa ratione procedentem in individuo conſideratum, bonum eſſe vel malum: it is of neceſſity, that every act of man proceeding from deliberate reaſon, and conſidered in its individuall performance and ſubject, is good or evill: For, ſeeing the will of man rightly ordered is ſubject to right reaſon and divine Law, then all actions proceeding from it, as it is ſo guided in all performances, are morally good or bad: and as all things are deſtinated to an ultimate end of Gods glory, and to other particular ſubordinate ends of effecting any good; ſo is their uſe ſubject to proportionable rules and Lawes, for ordering the ſame thereby, that they may attaine their end intended: and in that reſpect, when they are done; they are morally either well or ill done, according to that proportion, or diſproportion that their uſe then hath to their due ends and rules; and to be a fit and effectuall meanes of accompliſhing the ſame: or contrariewiſe.
Concluſion.So now, wee have ſeene how that, for to prevent ſuffering, and death, we are not wittingly and willingly to doe evill of ſin (in any caſe) ſpecially, or any thing directly againſt Gods Law. And therefore, doe conclude with David à Mauden, touching the aforeſaid three generall caſes; wherein a man ſuffering to death is exempted from indirect ſelf-murder, pro bono publico fide, religione Catholica, alijſ que de cauſis bonis & honeſtis vitam propriam periculo expouere, non ſolum laudabile, ſed etiam interdum neceſſarium eſt: For a man to expoſe his owne life to danger for the publike good; for his faith, for the true religion, and for other good and honeſt cauſes; it is not onelyonly commendable, but alſo ſometimes neceſſary.
§. 33. Of the properties of an indirect ſelfe-murderer.
An indirect ſelf-murderer hath two bad properties.
The firſt property. Folly.Firſt, hee is fooliſh in adviſedly and wilfully uſing mortall meanes, and fatall to himſelfe; and yet thinks not thereby to die, but to live more happily; as Eve, in eating of the forbidden fruit, that was the meanes of death, did conceit to attaine thereby to a more excellent life, as if a man ſhould looke to gather grapes of thornes; and good & comfort of deadly courſes.Frō unbeleefe. Which proceeds from the ſtupid unbeleefe of man, who would rather make God a lyer, than he will be diverted from his deſperate courſes, or will beleeve more, than hee comprehends, or conceives, by his ſenſes, being as the horſe or mule, which have no underſtanding: whoſe mouth muſt be kept in with bit and bridle: as the Prophet tells us, Pſal. 32.9.
The ſecond property, Wicked.Secondly, an indirect ſelf-murderer is wicked; for, knowing both his courſe, and the event thereof to bee evill, oppoſite both to the will of God, and to his owne future good, he doth wilfully continue in, and proſecute it ſtill, which is damnable impiety.
The ground of it ſelf-content.Which flowes from the ſelf-contentment, that men take in their owne ſinfull waies; and from their miſconſtruction and abuſe of the long patience of God, not executing his threatned judgements ſpeedily upon ſuch as themſelves areaEccleſ. 8.11.: which takes away from them all remorſe for their evill courſes, and all care of reformation to be better.