A Learned Treatise in Three Parts, Chapter 1
CHAP. I.
Sect. 1 Praeface to the Auditors concerning the ſcope.IF Plutarchs diſcourſe be reaſonable, that a Philoſopher ſhould be ſo far from being ſhy and ſhunning the converſe with great Men, that are in place and magiſtracy, that they ſhould take moſt pleaſure in taking paines to inſtruct them becauſe their lives being exemplary, their labor with them might redound to the benefit of the whole common weal: as a Phyſitian that hath any ſparke of ingenuous honeſty will delight more in the cure of that eye which ſees for many: and if that be recorded of that of the Jewes in the Eccleſiaſticall hiſtory as an act of Barbarous inhumanity, that they poyſoned the fountaines in hatred of the Chriſtians, or mankind rather: then will I labor to forget the difficulty of this imploiment, and rather think upon the publick utility of ſuch an exerciſe appointed for the training up of the Sons of the Prophets, the curing of the eyes (as they call the Univerſities) that ſee for many, the healing of the waters (by caſting ſalt into them as the Prophet Eliſha did) whoſe ſtreames make glad the citty of God, the Churches throughout the whole kingdome. Caſt thy bread upon the waters, ſayth the Preacher, thy ſeed in fruitfull ground in locis irriguis & propterea benedictionis feracibus, as Junius expounds it. Caſt it as I obſerve, with a ſecure cheerfulnes in hope of a rich and copious benediction.
He that makes an harpe would go more willingly about it, if he were aſſured, it were for one that would build the wals of Thebes with it as Amphion did: he that makes an helme if he knew it were to guide Themiſtocles his ſhip, in which he fought for the liberty of Greece, or Pompeyes in which he overcame the Pirats, or the famous Argo, in which the ancient Heroes fetch'd the golden fleece, and I think ſaith Plutarch, the Artificer had rather hew and ſquare that wood in which Solons laws were to be written, then of which a plough or ſome ſuch ruſticall inſtrument ſhould be made: The accommodation is as eaſie for me, to incourage to this worke in hand, in this ſeminary of Religion and learning: as it was for him to provoke Philoſophers, to apply themſelves to great perſons: for ſtudents in Divinity are like tables in which not the Lawes of Solon, but of God are to be written, and thoſe that poliſh them with precepts, hew and ſquare them, fit for that imploiment: like Pompeyes ſhip in which God overcomes the enemy of mankinde the Divell, the moſt dangerous Pirat, who is therefore ſtiled in Scripture foreign: like Themiſtocles, that fights for the liberty not of Greece, but of the Goſpell: like Argo that brings the golden fleece, the grace of God in Jeſus Chriſt, who is the Lambe of God that taketh away the ſinnes of the World, as John cals him: and they that furniſh them with inſtructions, do as it were make an helme to guide them: they are like Amphion that build not the wals of Thebes but of the new Jeruſalem, and he that explains the Principles of Religion, the Analogy of Faith, tunes an harpe for them, by whoſe ſweet harmony the living ſtones come together into the building: And theſe places of learning if any, are thoſe waters of the preacher which are feraces benedictionis, like that good ground in the parable that yeelds increaſe a hundred fold, or like the land in Babylon, that with good huſbandry as you have it in Pliny gives a hundred fifty encreaſe.
Artic. 2 Now that the graine may hold ſome proportion with the ground, the ſeed with the ſoyle, and have ſome ſuch multiplying virtue as they ſay the virginian wheat hath, every corn of which ſends forth many ſtalks, and eevery ſtalk in the multiplicity of ſides as it were in ſo many little granaries, ſtores up many ſcores of graine; I have made choice (according to the inſtitution and nature of this exerciſe) to handle the fundamentall points of Divinity, which though they may ſeem as they are few in number, yet are many in virtue, in ſight ſmall, but great in weight, like gold which being ſoild is contracted into a narrow room, but may be drawn into ſo large an extent, that one Angel may cover an whol acre of ground as you know the naturaliſts have obſerved: And becauſe it was the counſell of Polybius for hiſtory foreign, to frame a body of it, which is applyed by a learned Divine by better right to Divinity. I purpoſe to follow that adviſe and contrive a body of Divinity: wherein if you find me vary for the form, yet you ſhall not for the ſubſtance: if weakeneſſe make me erre, yet ſtubbornes ſhall not make me an heritick: I cannot hold it any ſhame after Auſtin to write Retractations profeſſing my name among thoſe, qui proficiendo ſcribūt, & ſcribendo proficiunt, as he ſpeaks.
I know it will be objected againſt this courſe that I ſhall not be able to make any great progreſſe in it, muchleſſe finiſh it, and therefore might more profitably propound ſome ſhorter project.
But I anſwer firſt, though I ſhould but make an entrance, yet I ſhould meet with many matters of great importance & uſe (as you ſhall perceive) which have not been explained within the memory of the greateſt part of this Auditory.
Second, I hope to ride ſome way becauſe I intend to point at onelyonly all petty paſſages and to proſecute them alone, which I ſhall judge fundamentall and neceſſary.
Third, that which ſhall remaine I meane God willing to fill up at other opportunities.
One thing more I deſire you to remember, that as he ſayd by way of Apology for himſelf, of the harſh & barbarous names of towns that are in the Catalogue of thoſe things that will not be written in a florid ſtile foreign, as the Greek; elegantly: ſo may I ſay of ſome things in Divinity; that you may not look for ornament in my diſcourſe, but emolument: Verba noſtra non lenocinia eſſe volumus ſed media, to ſpeak with Salvian: The foundations of houſes are laid under ground, and madnes it were you know, to carve or paint them: and ſo it were to deck and trim the fundamentall points of Divinity: they would be ſo fine (as we ſay of ſome effoeminate gallants) that they would be the worſe for it.
Sect. 2 And thus without any more premiſed in commendation of this manner of proceeding, I begin with that which firſt offers it ſelfe in the conſideration of any Art, the Definition of Divinity: which I will propound two wayes.
The firſt definition of Divinity according the rules of Art.Firſt according to the Method of Art; which as a ſtrait garment to the body keeps cloſe to the nature of the thing expreſſing it exactly, and cutting off all other things counting them but ſuperfluities.
Second, according to the Method of prudence, which gives a little more ſcope; which inclines and bows truths, without injurious violence, to the condition and ſatisfaction of the Auditors, in regard of ſome circumſtances. The firſt I conceive thus.
Divinity is a Doctrine of mans Happineſſe. Or in equivalent termes, of living well and happily: wherein you have according to the law of definitions, two portions.
Firſt, the generall, conteining the community, by which it agrees with other Arts and Sciences; it is as they are, a Doctrine.
Second, the ſpeciall, conteining the Propriety, by which it is divided and differenced from all other and conſtituted that which it is in its own peculiar eſſence, which two if they be rightly taken the definition muſt needs be accurate; and therfore that this may better appeare, I will indeavor to open them both ſeverally and diſtinctly.
Artic. 2 Firſt of the generall, that it is a Doctrine, by a Doctrine I underſtand a comprehenſion orderly of certaine catholicall precepts that are homogeneall one to another, and tend to one common ſcope as you know, for I do but borrow theſe from the ordinary notions without much ſcanning, becauſe that ſutes not with this exerciſe and argument, in which a Divine muſt preſuppoſe not proove thoſe generall principles: and the matter is not great whether you call it a Doctrine, or a Diſcipline, or a Science, or Art, or Prudence, or Sapience: all which words may be put upon, in the ſame ſignification, though in diverſe reſpects, as I might eaſily ſhew, if I were not afrayd I ſhould be prevented by the time in more material things: but in this indifferency & choice of words I rather call it a Doctrine then otherwiſe.
Firſt, Becauſe it is in more common uſe among the beſt Divines then any other (which is the beſt rule to follow in this caſe) and ſounds moſt gravely and fitly in my eare.
Second, Becauſe it prevents an ambiguity, which lyes hid in the other, for whereas an Art is properly, thoſe Catholicall precepts, and truths, which as I ſaid it comprehends, whether a man be habituated in the knowledge of them or not, whether they be written in books, and delivered or not, as the Logitians you know teach you to diſtinguiſh thoſe termes of Science, Art and Prudence and the like, ſignifying primarily habits of the underſtanding, have miſled many (and all the School-men) and made them miſconceive the nature of them as though they were nothing elſe, but intellectuall habits, which indeed they are conſidered as attained by us, but this reſpect is but accidentall to them and ſeperable, and no wayes eſſentiall.
Third, I might adde that as thoſe Arts which they call Mathematicall, have their name from learning, becauſe by reaſon of their difficulty they are not often attained without learning from others, or becauſe it was one of the firſt and common things, which the Ancient were wont to learne: ſo this name of Doctrine attributed to Divinity may intimate (as ſome have obſerved) the impoſſibility of attayning to this ſkill without a teacher (How can I underſtand without a teacher, ſayd the Eunuch in the Acts to Philip) and withall the excellency of the Doctor becauſe all that come to it muſt be foreign, taught of God as the Scripture ſpeaks, we have one Doctor, ſaith our Saviour, Cathedram habet in coelo qui corda docet, according to the Father: and ſo there will be a great Emphaſis in this word Doctrine: And for theſe reaſons, though the matter be of ſmall conſequence, and though in the originall of it, it import but an extrinſecall and adventitious relation of teaching, I rather prefer this, and call it a Doctrine: and this is the gneral part of the definition, though not a Genus in exact language and rigor of ſpeech, becauſe as I apprehend it, the diſtribution of Art is not generis in ſpecies, but adjuncti in ſubjecta, all the diſtinction of them being taken from the Objects as all agree, which in an Analogicall ſenſe are ſaid to make a ſpecificall difference between habits: and as in Method we call the precepts generall or ſpeciall, though the diſtribution be not of that kind, but integri in membra as in Logick, and the ſame may be ſaid of others.
Artic. 2 But it may be ſaid that this ſeemes not the full, and immediate Genus (for ſo we will call it) becauſe it expreſſes only that agreement which every Art hath with another, whereas without doubt ſome have neerer affinity to ſome then to other, for example, Divinity to Ethicks then to Geometry, and ſo are tyed together in neerer references: In anſwer to this I ſay,
Firſt, the diviſion of Arts is taken (as I noted even now) from the ſubjects by which the ſame thing in eſſence comes to be multiplyed and diverſified, ſo that the Generality of that word Doctrine ſeemes to be ſufficiently reſtrained and limited by the mention of the proper object without any further curioſity.
Second, It being not agreed what is the beſt and moſt accurate diſtributions of Arts, I judge it more convenient to reſt in that which is commonly received, and had rather that Generality too much ſhould be taxed as inſufficiency, then too much particularity ſhould breed obſcurity, eſpecially conſidering that this is a place not to examin, but to ſet a work thoſe grounds which Divinity muſt needs borrow from higher Arts.
Third, to give ſome ſatisfaction I will enquire of theſe three things.
Firſt of the kinde of this Doctrine (the thing now in queſtion) out of the lawfull ſubordination of Arts.
Second, of the condition, whether it be Scientia or no.
Third, of the end whether it be Practicall or ſpeculative; of all very briefely.
For the kind I will mention but a double Series of Arts out of which you may fetch the primum genus of Divinity, the firſt is known to the moſt or many of you, where Arts are firſt divided into Generall and particular, then particular into Mathematicall and Philoſophicall; Philoſophicall againe into Naturall and Morall; Morall into the root Theology, and the branches Ethicks; Oeconomicks and Politicks and the reſt; ſo that if you would frame the next Genus of divinity you muſt call it a Particular Art the root of Morall doctrine &c. I might produce many other of ancient and moderne authors if it were needfull or profitable, but I will onelyonly ſuggeſt a ſecond, and that in a word: as many precepts about a certaine ſubject collected make one Art, ſo many Arts make one foreign, between every of which there is as lawfull ſequence and ſubordination as there is between the ſeverall parts of the ſame Art: ſo that all are truly one, though we divide them (and not amiſſe neither) for our commodity, as Suarez relates the opinion of Aegidius and Antonius Mirandula concerning Metaphiſicks: now the hint of this diviſion muſt be taken from the Objects as I noted before: Therefore if the object of Art in generall, be ens, in generall as is commonly ſaid (and for ought that I know truly) the ſpecies of Art will accompany the Species of ens, and goe hand in hand with them: Now ens is firſt divided into Increatum and Creatum (ſuppoſing this to be an Analogicall diviſion according to the moſt received opinion, though there can be no genericall community between God and the Creature as the Schoolemen ſhew) and ſo ars is either de ente increato, or de ente creato: Art de ente creato, is either of it in generall or in particular: that in generall ſhall treat of the nature and affections of it and the ſpecies, and ſo cut out that which the particulars ſhall make up, which borrow their ſubjects from it: for all being compriſed there where any affection or ſpecies ſwels to too great a bulk, it will ſend forth a colony as it were, and erect a particular Art: For example, Reaſon is a generall affection of ens creatum, which is ſo large that it deſerves particular conſiderations, ſo ſpeech, ſo quantity, whence Logick, Grammer, Mathematicks are riſen: ſo there is ſcarce any ſpecies of created nature, whence ſome particular Art is not budded: the laſt of which, man, more fruitfull then the reſt is branched into many: all which guide him in his operations towards his happineſſe and perfection, as the generall Art (wherein he is handled as well as the reſt) regulate him in his eſſence and conſtitution: and they conſider man either ſingle or in ſociety, concerning man ſingle, either in ordine ad Deum, which is Divinity, or in ordine ad hominem, which is Ethicks: and out of this you may collect more ſtrictly the proper genus of this Doctrine from the ſpeciall habitude to the neereſt object, which is the operations of man ſingle, or every man as dirigible toward happines: and this may ſomething give light and limits to the generality of the word Doctrine which I uſed; But I will not inſiſt upon theſe Metaphyſicall and generall notions, which are little ſought into by reaſon of the difficult abſtraction from particulars, but for the ſame reaſon, are very ſcientificall; and hee that ſhould travaile in them with diligence & dexterity, ſhould do very good ſervice to all ſtudies: & ſo leaving the firſt inquiry concerning the kind of this Doctrine, I come to the ſecond, concerning the quality, whether it be Scientia.
Artic. 3 I promiſe a diſtinction and anſwer it briefly; Scientia is taken two wayes.
Firſt, for an Intellectuall habit apprehending an infallible truth, and this is according to the notion of the word moſt proper, and then the queſtion will be whether our knowledge of Theologicall truths be Scientia.
Second, by a Metonymie of the Adjunct for the Subject, for the truths themſelves apprehended, and this is moſt pertinent to our purpoſe, for you may remember I ſayd that was the beſt meaning, when we ſpeak of an Art or Science, and then the queſtion is whether the precepts in Theology be ſuch as are the Subject of ſuch an habit, as we call a Science. viz. of infallible truth, Catholicall and Scientificall.
According to this latter ſenſe I anſwer affirmatively to the queſtion, that they are, and therefore it may juſtly challenge the name of a Science: the precepts in this being as in other, deſinitions, diſtributions and conſectaries that explaine proprieties, all which make reciprocall and Catholicall axioms: and if it be objected that many things in Divinity dependupon contingent fact, as the fall of our firſt parents, and the Incarnation of our Saviour, with the reſt of his performances, for the Redemption of man kinde, of which there cannot be a perpetuall and unvariable rule: I ſay,
Firſt, theſe inſtances are but few (not many more I think then I have named) and therefore can bring no prejudice to an whol Art.
Second, Divinity makes not a bare hiſtoricall narration of the contingent fact; but ſuppoſing that explaines a conſtant affection with which it's proper Subject, man, in order to his happines, is inveſted upon thoſe occaſions.
Third, I diſtinguiſh the exiſtence and eſſence, or rather the condition of the things, and the connexion in the Rule, the former is contingent and mutable, yet the latter may be notwithſtanding immutable and conſtant: But theſe things ſhall appeare more plainly afterward. If the queſtion be put in the former ſence, whether our knowledge of Theologicall truths be properly Science: I ſay,
Firſt, it is not much materiall what it be.
Firſt, becauſe the conſideration of an Art is extrinſecall to the nature of it, as I concluded before of an Art in generall.
Second, if that were regarded according to the diverſe habitudes, to diverſe apprehenſions the form would be diverſe habits, yea contrary in one Scientia (as without queſtion the knowledge that God hath of Divinity is Scientia, in another opinion which apprehends them not without doubting cum formidine oppoſiti, as the Schoole ſpeaks, in another Faith that aſſents to them only, becauſe commended to him by divine authority; and ſo the ſame habit of Theology, would be all of theſe, and by conſequence none of them, which were abſurd to ſay: but to come up cloſer to the point I ſay,
Second, that it may be more fully anſwered by this diſtinction of Scientia: Scientia may be taken three wayes.
Firſt, for the knowledge of a Catholicall axiom, or an immediate propoſition as other Logicians call it, whatſover the condition of that knowledge be: and according to this acception the reſolution of this queſtion, follows from the former affirmative, becauſe there I determined that the precepts in this Doctrine are ſuch.
Second, for the certaine knowledge of any axiom, whatſoever the cōdition of it be: which is the moſt common ſignification of ſcire in common phraſe of ſpeech: and thus alſo the reſolution of the queſtion is affirmative, becauſe the certainty of faith by which we aſſent to divine truths upon a divine teſtimony is as great as of any demonſtrative ſyllogyſme: and for this reaſon, ſaith Gregory de Valentia the nobility of this Doctrine deſerves the name of a Science, amd cannot well be ſtiled by any other.
Third, for the evident knowledge of a concluſion by a convincing reaſon, or demonſtration, and in this ſenſe it ſeems to be uſed by Ariſtotle; and after him the Schoolmen, and according to this ſtrict acception the queſtion is more doubtfull: for this including that which was moſt reſtreined in both the former, that the object muſt be a Catholicall axiom as the firſt required, and that the aſſent muſt be certain, as the ſecond exacted, ſuperads three qualifications.
Firſt, that the Object muſt be a Concluſion.
Second, that the aſſent muſt be evident.
Third, that the motive muſt be a eonvincing Reaſon or demonſtration, as it were neceſſitating the underſtanding to aſſent: The firſt and laſt addition I paſſe over, as impertinent, becauſe few precepts of any Art are ſuch Concluſions, for neither definitions nor diſtributions (which make the greater part) are ſo demonſtrated being moſt prime, and immediate, and therefore cannot be proved by any that are priora or magis immediata & perſe, then they are. Only it is ſaid that paſſions may be ſo demonſtrated of their proper ſubjects which may well be called in queſtion by the ſame reaſon that I alleadged for the other.
Second, few Arts have ſuch precepts except onelyonly the Mathematicks as is obſerved, when it is that foreign, are grown almoſt into a Proverbe.
Third, if they were neceſſary, Divinity is in the like condition with the reſt for the precepts of the Art, though not for other acceſſary: We will therefore enquire of the ſecond condition, and propound the queſtion a new; whether our knowledge of Theologicall truths be evident or not.
To anſwer it then with as much circumſpection of judgement, and yet with as little circumſtance of words as may be.
Firſt, I lay this foundation, that Evidence is a metaphoricall ſpeech, from the eye to the underſtanding, and a relative thing importing a faire proportion of the object, to the faculty in both; ſo that there is a concurrence of three things to it.
Firſt, the aptitude of the object to be diſcerned.
Second, the ability of the faculty to diſcerne.
Third, the diſpoſition of the medium fit for conveyance, which is diſtinct in the viſion, but included in the two former, in the action of the underſtanding.
Second, I diſtinguiſh the three principall termes of the queſtion.
Firſt, the knowledge of which muſt be conſidered according to his different condition either in natura integra or corrupta, for many things he did know then ſcientifically, which now he doth ſo much as opinio natively: and againe as corrupted, he is either immerſed in it, or elevated by the infuſion of grace.
Second, the precepts of Divinity are in a double difference, ſome are aeternijuris, ſome are liberae voluntatis, that I may ſpeak ſo for diſtinction ſake: for inſtance, in the ſtate of innocency the promiſe of another life, to which Adam ſhould have been exalted upon obſervance of the covenant, was liberae voluntatis, as the moſt agree, and the precept of that I call ſo, though it alſo be indeed aeternae veritatis, as all rules of an Art ſhould.
Third, Evidence is either in regard of the ſimple termes, the things themſelves, which by reaſon of more or leſſe abſtraction or ſuch like circumſtances, may be evident or obſcure, more or leſſe.
Or ſecond, in regard of the connexion and cohaeſion of them one with another:
And now thirdly, I reſolve the queſtion in theſe Aſſertions.
Firſt, all Theologicall precepts areevident in themſelves though not to us, as Thomas Diſtinguiſhes of propoſitions that are per ſe nota ſecū dum ſe though not quoad nos, of which this he gives as one Deus eſt: the reaſon is becauſe the termes are eſſentiall one to another as they muſt be in all Catholick axioms.
Second, Man in his integrity had proper Science of all thoſe precepts, which I called juris aeterni: though of the other, as a better ſtate in another life, he had not without a double helpe.
Firſt, ex parte objecti, which was Divine Revelation to convey it.
Second, ex parte facultatis, which was an oration of grace ſtrengthening, and comforting it; the reaſon of the firſt part of this aſſertion, that man had Science of thoſe which were juris aeterni is, becauſe they were evident of themſelves, and there was no impediment of his part, his faculty being proportionable to them: of the ſecond, that the other he could not ſcire of himſelf, becauſe they depended on the free liberall grace of God, which he could not penetrate, till it pleaſed him to ſignifie his good pleaſure by Revelation, and withall were ſupernaturall to him, and above his Spheare: the reaſon of the third part that thoſe helps ſuppoſed, he could, is becauſe then nothing was deficient, either in object or faculty, as I ſaid of the firſt three Aſſertions: Man faln, can know neither the one kinde nor other, ſcientifically and ſavingly, without Revelation of the object and elevation of the faculty, and then he may evidently: ſo that his knowledge may in truth and propriety be called Science, for the reaſons hitherto intimated: I confeſſe I ſeeme in this to ſtrive againſt the ſtreame of the Schoolemen, who ſeem to make evidence of the nature of Faith, out of the Apoſtle, who ſaith faith is of things that are not ſeen, and make faith and ſcience oppoſite habits; but they alſo may admit a good interpretation: for I think they meane of the condition of ſome things, not the connexion of the termes in the precepts, or of man conſidered with naturall reaſon only, to which I grant they are not evident: But if there be any doubt of this laſt (to which I have without any neceſſity condiſcended) I think the former anſwers may ſuffice: And ſo I will paſſe from this, adding but this one obſervation, that when an Art or Doctrine is called Scientia, there is a Synecdoche in the word, for properly the knowledge of one ſcientifical axiom is a ſcience, and in that ſenſe, neither Divinity (as Durand and Ariminenſis well diſpute) are one Science, but ſo many concluſions (ſo they call them) as there are ſo many ſciences, yet by this Synechdoche as I ſayd the collection of many are called one, and are ſo unitate ordinis, which ſufficeth ſayth Gregory of Valentia to the unity of a Science.
Artic. 4 And now I come to the third inquiſition of the end, whether this doctrine be Speculative or Practicall: where I premiſe a few neceſſary obſervations for the better underſtanding of it, and then reſolve it in a word.
Firſt obſerve Speculative and Practicall are not ſpecificall differences of Arts and eſſentiall, but accidentall only, as Valentia rightly judges more probable, though I like not his reaſon, becauſe ſayth he, they are taken from the objects as things, for Arts as I ſaid are ſpecifically diſtinguiſhed by their objects in that large ſenſe of ſpecificall before mentioned, but becauſe they are taken from the habitudes, which Art, have to us, who uſe to aime at Speculation, or operation in the purchaſe of them and end in thoſe.
Second, every Praxis doth not conſtitute and denominate a Practicall Art, but you muſt note a threefold latitude in the uſe of this word.
Firſt, in the largeſt extent of the ſignification, it comprehends theſe three things under it foreign and foreign for all theſe are operation, the firſt of the underſtanding, the ſecond of the will, the third of all the faculties.
Second, in the narroweſt it is oppoſed on one ſide to foreign on the other to foreign, and then imports nothing but the ſecond, the elicitus actus voluntatis, as Scotus ſpeakes, or an immanent act perfected within it ſelf.
Third, in the middle way it is oppoſed to foreign, but includes the two latter: now in both theſe latter acceptions, it is taken when we ſpeak of a practicall diſcipline, but more principally and more particularly in this queſtion, in the firſt of them the middle of the three:
Third, the foreign, and character of a practicall Science is not the end that any particular man makes to himſelfe, for that is fallible, for in both kinds of practicall, foreign & foreign, they may propound to themſelves Speculation as a Gentleman may ſtudy Architecture for delight in the contemplation, and do ſtudy both Divinity and Morality whoſe purpoſe if it be not bare Speculation I know not, but the iſſue we ſee is not practiſe; therefore the judgement of this muſt be from the nature of the object, and the end of the art it ſelf: Theſe obſervations being thus diſpatched, I anſwer in a word affirmatively that Divinity is a Practicall Doctrine, and conclude this truth in this one Reaſon: That Art is practicall whoſe Subject is res operabilis à nobis, in the language of the Schoole, and whoſe proper end is operation, for theſe make it practicall, and it is ſayth Durand very well, practicall, radicaliter à ſubjecto formaliter à fine, but Divinity is ſuch as ſhall appeare in the explication of the latter part of the Definition immediately ſucceeding; therefore Divinity is Practicall.
Second, things may be objected againſt the Aſſumption of this Syllogiſme.
Firſt, that God is the object of Divinity, who is not res operabilis à nobis, and therefore the firſt condition of a Practical Art is not found in this: I defer the full anſwer of this till I come to a particular deciſion of that queſtion which ſhall be the next time, for the preſent I ſay God is not the ſubject of Divinity nor principally conſidered in it according to his nature for he that doth ſo ſayth Durand, ſumit formam Philoſophi, but in Relation to our works as they are terminated in him objectivè, and in ſome ſenſe that is true, which the ſame Author affirmes, not qua Deus, as the Thomiſts would have it, but qua ſalvator, not qua cognoſcendus, ſay I, but qua colendus.
Second, it is objected that the laſt end of Divinity is the viſion of God, which is ſpeculative and therefore the ſecond condition of a Practicall Art agrees not to Divinity, to which I anſwer.
Firſt, the laſt end of Divinity is eternall happineſſe, but not the whol end, and in eternall happines that viſion is ſomething, but not all, for without doubt there ſhall be many other operations, as prayſing of God &c. To wch that is rather ſubordinate then otherwiſe.
Second, the next end makes an Art Practicall not the remote, but that viſion is as Durand diſputes: yet that is produced by an habit of glory, which is of another kinde, then our habit of Divinity; but theſe things ſhall appeare better in that which follows: Therefore I ſtill hold that concluſion that it is Practicall: and that Scripture gives good teſtimony to this truth, Evidenter apparet conſideranti omni Scripturam a principio uſque ad finem, quia ſemper pro una ſcripturae columna in qua agitur de his quae ſunt pure ſpeculabilia à nobis ſunt pluſquam quingenta folia in quibus agitur de pure practicis, as Durand writes: I will alleage ſome few places to make this good in part. 1. Tim. 15. The end of the Commandement is charity. Out of which and ſuch like places Alexander Hales made it a third, neither Speculative nor Practicall; but Affective, which opinion is true though not in oppoſition to practick, for that affection is in order to action, that that is the laſt: more plainly. 2. Tim. 3.16.17. All the ſcripture is profitable for doctrine for inſtruction in righteouſneſſe that the man of God may be perfect, throughly furniſhed foreign, to every good work: John 13.17. If you know theſe things, bleſſed are yee if ye doe them, ſayth our Saviour. James 1.22. But be ye doers of the word and not hearers onelyonly deceiving your ſelves. I ſhall not need to heap up more: for Scotus and many of the beſt Schoolemen concurre in this opinion, and all our modern and orthodoxe Divines with one conſent agree in it: and therefore I will conclude this in the words of Bernard, Is recte legit Scripturas divinas, and ſo Theologiam, qui verba vertit in opera: Bleſſed are they that heare the word of God and keep it.
Artic. 5 The laſt time I propounded the firſt definition of Theology conteyning ſo much, as I conceived neceſſary for the accurateneſſe thereof: which was this that Theology is a Doctrine of mans happineſſe: and then I diſpatched the former and generall part of it, that it was a Doctrine, explayning foure things for the clearing of it.
Firſt, how it was a doctrine and wherefore I called it ſo, rather then by any other name.
Second, what kind of doctrine in particular that ſeeming large and generall.
Third, what manner of doctrine for the condition and quality whether ſcientia or not.
Fourth, what was the end of it whether Speculation or Praxis.
It remaines now that I proceed to the ſecond and particular part of that definition that this doctrine is of Mans happineſſe, that this ſame thing may be expreſſed in other equipollent terms I touched before, and mean not to trouble my ſelf, or you with unneceſſary ſcruples in that kind: whether you liſt to ſpeak as I have done, or like beter to call it, a doctrine of living well; with Ramus, or a Doctrine guiding man to his happynes; or ſuch like, the ſenſe being the ſame, the terms are indifferent: but thus much I wiſh to be obſerved in the words.
Firſt, that I call it happines rather then Salvation, becauſe this latter word in the common acception there of implies and preſuppoſes a ſtate of evill and miſery from which man is to be ſaved, which is not generall enough for our purpoſe, being but one parcell of that divinity doctrine as it is uſually and rightly handled of all, and as you ſhall perceive by that ſhort declination of the parts, which I ſhall make the next time.
Second, I rather mention happynes in generall then eternall happines, as the moſt either expreſſe, or underſtand it; for the ſame reaſon: becauſe though that be the higheſt and laſt and principall, to which all other things in Divinity are in their kinde ſubordinate, yet it is not all: for both Adam in the ſtate of integrity had actuall felicity, and ſhould ſtill have had ſo long as he continued in integrity & ſo have the children of God in the ſtate of Regeneration, though they be tranſlated into the kingdome of heaven and glorified, though this be of a lower ranck and order then that other: ſo that Eternall happineſſe is too narrow for the generall end of this Art: except perhaps it be widened two wayes.
Either firſt, by extending the ſignification of the word eternall happineſſe (which is ordinarily taken for that eſtate which abides with the children of God in the kingdom of heaven; becauſe that is to indure without alteration and change to all eternity) ſo that it may take that happineſſe of this life along with it, both together making but one context of Eternall happines.
Or ſecondly by changing the whole phraſe, delivering the ſenſe in theſe or the like terms that it is a Doctrine teaching to live well here, that we may live happily hereafter and that to all perpetuity, which will come to the ſame effect: thus much you may obſerve for the word
Second, under the word Happines, I comprehend both the end it ſelf, to which that word is in a manner appropriated, and all thoſe means that lead unto it which are either, thoſe gracious acts of God ſuch as are Redemption, Vocation, Juſtificatiō, Sanctificatiō & the reſt, or thoſe pious acts of man, wch are neceſſary for the obteining thereof, eſpecially thoſe that directly and immediately have God for their object, being his proper worſhip and ſervice: whether theſe actions have a Relation of efficiency to that happines, under which notion we conceive of meanes ordinarily, and perhaps not amiſſe in this caſe, if we ſpeak of happines as it ſignifies that future eſtate of glory; or whether rather thoſe actions are parts of it, or happines it ſelf; which reſpect ſeemes to agree better to it, as it is taken generally for the whol end of man, and makes the adaequate ſubject of this Art: becauſe as you know the Phyloſopher defines felicity to conſiſt in the operation according to virtue: And according to this explication of the word, you may eaſily diſcerne that thoſe opinions would not ſtand in oppoſition one to the other, one of which ſaith that mans operations are the ſubject of this Doctrine: as Durand doth, expreſſing it in theſe words actus meritorius, (ſayth he in their Popiſh language) is the ſubject of Divinity, and better actus humanus ordinabilis in beatitudinem: as Arminius alſo in his private diſputations makes, actio hominis quam Deo praeſtare tenetur, and in word Religio, which is the ſame with the former, only it omits the reference that thoſe actions have to the end, happines, which notwithſtanding the ſame author addes expreſly in his definition of Theology: But the other makes Happines the ſubject of this doctrine: which hath no repugnancy to the former as I ſaid but includes it as ſubordinate: And thus I judged it to ſute better then the other: for theſe two reaſons,
Firſt, becauſe actus Religionis, is not large enough for the whole latitude of Theologicall precepts for there be ſome, as I noted of the Acts of God which are neceſſary to make man happy: it being as impoſſible in ordinary courſe, that man ſhould bee reduced to his perfection, his happines, without the culture of Gods grace, as it is that other inferior creatures ſhould be reduced to their perfection, their laſt end; without intervention of mans care: there being the like proportion in the dependance of other creatures upon man, to be managed by him, that there is of man upon God, to be managed by him, and ſomething more:
Second, the acts of Religion, may be reduced to happines by a more direct attribution then happines can be reduced to them: and therefore ſeeing both are conteined, and it is not needfull to expreſſe both, I made choice as neere as I could of the fitteſt: And ſo much alſo of the ſignification of theſe words.
Third, therefore to diſpatch the explication of this latter part of this definition, and ſhew how theſe words of mans happines, conteine the ſpecialities of divinity: they may ſuſtaine a threefold relation.
Firſt, of the ſubject, becauſe this doctrine is converſant about the nature and affections and parts of happines.
Second, of the form, becauſe Arts being diſtinguiſhed by their objects the form is alway included in them.
Third, of the end, which indeed is primarily either of the artificer, or rather of the ſubject; and ſo ſecondarily may be conſidered as of the Art it ſelfe: the firſt therefore of the ſubject is the moſt principall and eſſentiall relation as you ſee, and requires a little further illuſtration.
That is the ſubject of a Science or Art ſaith Gregory de Valentia, which is the ſubject of thoſe concluſions (as he cals them) or precepts that are principally intended in that Science: and diſtinguiſhes nicely between this ſubjectum & objectum, which he makes the precepts themſelves where you may note ſcientia, to be taken for the habit of our underſtanding: Durand alſo diſtinguiſhes between ſubjectum in quo, which he makes the underſtanding to be of all Arts, and ſubjectum de quo, of which the preſent queſtion is, and that ſaith he muſt have theſe three conditions.
Firſt, it muſt be aliquid incomplexum ſcilicet terminus & non propoſitio.
Second, it muſt be primo & principaliter conſideratum in ſcientia, and all things there muſt have attributionem ad ipſum.
Third, it muſt be ſuch de quo aliqua praedicari poſſint denominativè: that third of theſe is obſcure by reaſon of a Scholaſticall terme, but included in the former, for any thing materiall: and the two former agree with that I brought out of Valentia: ſo that not to hold you longer in this, I conclude that in a word to be the ſubject of a Science, that is the ſubject of the Scientificall precepts therein conteined: now I aſſume, But mans happines ſo taken as I have explained it, including all the meanes unto it and the parts of it, is the ſubject of the precepts of divinity which are principally intended in it, as might appeare by a particular enumeration now, and ſhall better afterward: for except the definition it ſelfe of Theology, wherein it is a part of the praedicate it or ſome part or affection of it is the ſubject in all the reſt: there being many precepts of this Art, becauſe there be many particulars of this ſubject, as I ſhewed the laſt time that Arts are multiplied becauſe their ſubjects are multiplied: and the unity of a Science likewiſe depends upon the unity of of the ſubject: I conclude therefore that mans happineſſe is the Subject of Divinity: man is as it were the materiale and happines the formalis ratio ſubjecti: And thus much of this firſt definition of Theology that it is a Doctrine of mans happines.
There may be diverſe things objected both againſt this latter part, which I have paſſed over more lightly and leſſe diſtinctly then I purpoſed for ſome reaſons, and againſt the whole: but I ſhall meet with them more conveniently in another place, and that by and by, and therefore will not meddle with them here, the rather alſo becauſe I have deteined you too long already in the entrance.
Only give me leave to illuſtrate this definition out of the Scripture, for though the word of God aime not at the laying down of artificiall and notionall truths; but beats almoſt altogether upon fundamentall in a method of divine wiſedome and prudence: yet even thoſe muſt have the ground and ſubſtantialls, from thence, though Art may put a form and modification upon them: therefore it will not be amiſſe to give ſome light to this definition out of it: The places are infinite, which I might alleage, but I will confine my ſelfe to afew, and that of two ſorts.
The firſt point at it, in generall as for inſtance. John 6.68. Peter cals the doctrine of our Saviour, foreign, for when our Saviour upon occaſion of the going back of many of his diſciples from him asked his Apoſtles, will ye alſo go away, this is Peters anſwer; whether ſhall we go? thou haſt the words of eternall life: Luc. 1.77. It is ſtiled foreign, for in Zacharies ſong this is ſaid to be the ſcope, and imploiment of John the forerunner of Chriſt, to prepare the wayes of the Lord to give knowledge of Salvation to his people in the forgivenes of their ſins: Acts 13.26. Paul termes the preaching of the Goſpell by himſelf, and the reſt of the Apoſtles foreign: as that evill ſpirit in the maid, Act. 16.17. to the ſame effect in a Scripture metaphor cals it foreign. the way of Salvation. I will content my ſelfe with theſe that I have already mentioned though many more offer themſelves and perhaps more pregnant.
The ſecond ſort of places ſeeme more fully to comprehend the definition, of which it ſhall ſuffice to have produced but three, 1. Tim. 6.3. the Apoſtle Paul expreſſeth it in theſe words, foreign, a Doctrine of Religion or godlines, or according to godlines, which by ſome of our Divines is uſed in ſo many words to this purpoſe; and therefore I need not ſtand to explain it: only I obſerve that this defines it by the means to happines rather then the end happineſſe it ſelf, as you may remember I ſaid ſome Divines did: the ſecond place is more plaine and full. Tit. 1.1. foreign, where you may have both expreſly mentioned: the third and laſt place, is rather more accurate for, 2. Tim. 3.15. the Scriptures, and ſo the rule of Divinity conteined in them are thus circumſcribed, foreign: I ſhould inlarge theſe with explication and accomodation of them to my preſent ſcope, but they are perſpicuous of themſelves; and I have been too tedious in this matter: I will therefore obſerve this onelyonly in all together, that the Scripture inſtead of happines uſeth rather to name eternall life and Salvation, the latter becauſe it is directed all to man faln, who muſt be raiſed from miſery; ſo that his happineſſe is properly Salvation: the former, becauſe the moſt noble member of our happines is eternall life, and therefore by a familiar Synechdoche names that for all and inſiſts in that: and both in a diſpenſation of heavenly wiſdome, becauſe they carry moſt majeſty and divine authority with them, and are moſt powerfull & efficacious to work upon the heart of man: And ſo I leave this firſt definition, and paſſe to the ſecond.
Sect. 2 Now the ſecond, as you may remember I ſaid in the beginning, is to bow the ſame truth a little to the common apprehenſion taking liberty to diſpenſe with the ſtrictnes and ſeverity of Art, by Prudence, and that I think may be fitly conceived in theſe or the like words; Divinity is a Doctrine revealed by God in his word which teaches man how to know and worſhip God, ſo that he may live well here and happily hereafter: I intend not to ſpend any time about thoſe parcels in this definition, wherein it agrees with the former: and for circumſtantiall differences, I will paſſe them over likewiſe; becauſe I ſuppoſe there will not ariſe any difficulty, which may not tolerably be ſatisfied out of that which hath been ſaid already.
There be two additions onelyonly of moment, which muſt be expended.
Firſt, concerning the Scripture.
Second, concerning the knowledge of God.
The firſt, I ſhall cleare in the opening of theſe three propoſitions.
Firſt, that divine Revelation is not the formalis Ratio of the ſubject of Theology.
Second, that mention of the Scripture is not to be inſerted into the definition of divinity, when we go about to lay downe the nature of it accurately.
Third, that for ſome circumſtances of prudence it may be convenient to do it: the truth of which three I ſhall ſhew in a word.
For the firſt: Valentia diſtinguiſhing of formalis ratio quae & ſub qua, makes divine Revelation the formall reſpect of the ſubject of Theology acccording to the latter, and the Thomiſts generally make ens divinum Revelabile: and make good the unity of this Doctrine by that, though it treat of many different things as God and the creatures &c. Yet it is one becauſe all are conſidered in one formall reſpect as they are revealed, which is enough: and he goes ſo far that in anſwer to an argument of Aureolus, to the contrary, that if that were true, if God ſhould reveale Mathematicks and Metaphyſicks to one man they would be but one Science becauſe there would be the ſame ratio formalis ſub qua, viz. divine Revelation he thinks it no abſurdity to grant ſo much.
But, I take it, this cannot be: for if Revelation were the formalis, by which any thing were brought into the compaſſe of Divinity; then,
Firſt, nothing ſhould be handled there, but quatenus Revelatum, and ſo Divinity ſhould have no proper ſubject of it own.
And ſecond, every thing quatenus Revelatum, ſhould be handled there, upon which muſt needs follow this inconvenience that the truths of all Arts ſhould belong to Divinity, becauſe many of them are revealed in the Scripture (as for example, naturall, morall, Politicall, Hiſtoricall, Architectonicall, Mathematicall, and almoſt of all kinds) at leaſt all of them may be revealed, if God pleaſed, as well as Theologicall are.
And ſecond it would follow, that Theology ſhould not be diſtinguiſhed from other Arts by any eſſentiall difference; but only by this extrinſecall reſpect, of being revealed which may as I ſaid be a common affection of all truths: 'tis true indeed that de facto, all truths neceſſary to Salvation are Revealed and de jure they had need to be revealed, and if that opinion aimed at no more I think it ſhould offend not againſt the verity of the thing ſo much as the propriety of the language but they ſeeme to ſay more, and in that ſenſe I reject it.
For the ſecond, that mention of the Scripture is not to be made in the definition of Divinity, when we go about to lay down the nature of it accurately I ſhew it thus.
Firſt, becauſe it is but an extrinſecall relation as hath been ſaid, and therefore as it were abſurd to ſay of Logick, that it is an Art of Reaſon delivered in Ariſtotles Organon, or in Ramus, and it were inconvenient to define any Art, that it was ſuch an one attained to by naturall reaſon and humane induſtry, (which have the ſame habitude, to the Sciences of humanity that Revelation hath to the Doctrine of Divinty) ſo in a like (I ſay not an equall) proportion, it would be at leaſt unneceſſary to interpoſe this in the definition of Theology that it is revealed by God in his word:
Second, becauſe it is not of ſo generall conſideration as to be placed in the title and frontiſpiece of the Art, as may if you do but remember,
Firſt, the finis cui, or the object of the Scripture, which is either onelyonly, or eſpecially man faln, in which eſtate it is abſolutely neceſſary that he ſhould have the word of God, to bee his guide toward his true happines.
And ſecond, if you remember the efficient cauſe of the Scripture which beſide the principall, the holy Spirit, is inſtrumentall, holy men inſpired by God the pen-men of the holy Ghoſt which were alway extraordinary miniſters of the Church having ſuch immediate aſſiſtance of the Spirit: now both theſe the fall of man and extraordinary officers of the Church, without which the nature and uſe of the Scriptures cannot well be unfolded, are of later conſideration and follow afterward in the body of this Art: and therefore the treating of the Scripture cannot be exalted ſo high as the definition without an obſcure anticipation of exact order.
For the third, that this notwithſtanding, it may be convenient to define it, ſo for ſome circumſtances of prudence, it will be no hard matter to demonſtrate.
Firſt, becauſe it conteines all thing neceſſary to Salvation, and therefore is coextended with the object of Divinity; and in this ſenſe alſo the Scripture may be called a Rule or Canon, becauſe though it be not every way adaequate, as that uſes to be (conteining many things in it which are not properly Theologicall, as I noted before) yet it hath all thoſe things in it: but it is more aptly reſembled to a Rule or Canon, as it reſpects faith and things to be beleeved, with which it is every way reciprocated, for every thing revealed in the Scripture is to be beleeved, and every truth to be beleeved is revealed in Scripture.
Second, becauſe all men now are in the ſtate of corruption of the fall, ſo that it is abſolutely neceſſary as the caſe ſtands for all men: and ſo it is well commended to all in in the very entrance as a principle and ground of all that followes, and is placed at the top as a candle upon a candleſticke to give light better to all the roome: And thus much of the firſt addition in this latter definition, that Divinity is a Doctrine revealed by God in his Word.
The ſecond follows, which is, that this Doctrine teaches man to know God; concerning which, I ſhall deliver my minde what I think in ſo many propoſitions likewiſe.
Firſt, that God is not the ſubject of divinity.
Second, that he is not (according to his nature) at all to be handled in divinity.
Third, that there is juſt reaſon why he may and ſhould according to the method of prudence.
The firſt may appeare by the ſame argument negatively concluded, by which I proved that man, as he is to be guided to his end or foreign (which in a reaſonable nature is called happines) is the true ſubject about which all the precepts in this Art are converſant: but I paſſe over that.
Second, it may appeare by this reaſon, becauſe divinity as hath been proved, is a practicall Art not a Speculative: now a Practical Art is that whoſe end is operation and that immediate not mediatè, as Valentia well obſerves, for the remote and mediate end of any contemplative Science, may be operation; and a Practicall Art hath alway ſuch an object, as is res operabilis à nobis: but if God be the ſubject, neither of theſe can agree to it, as it is more then manifeſt: therefore God is not the Subject.
The ſecond, that God is not at all to be handle in Divinity, though perhaps it be included in the former and might be proved by the ſame reaſons; if he be neither the ſubject nor part of the ſubject, yet becauſe it will ſeem more ſtrange to ſome. I will rather prove it diſtinctly, and ſeverally.
Firſt, becauſe Divinity, as we for the moſt part generally conceive of it, is a particular Art one of the loweſt and laſt: but God muſt be needs handled in the firſt, or very neer the firſt: for if ars be ranked according to ens, God who is the firſt being, may juſtly challenge the firſt Art at leaſt, next to that of Art in generall if there be any ſuch in the whole foreign,
Second, becauſe if there were any reaſon why God ſhould be handled in this Art, it would be this, becauſe he is the object of the operations of man which are here regulated namely (in which regard I deny not, but he may be called a remote object of it) but this is not ſufficient, becauſe by the ſame reaſon the nature of man ſhould be handled here alſo, he being the object of ſome acts, as for example, of charity and the reſt: which to ſay would be held abſurd:
Third, becauſe ſuppoſing that to be, true that it is an Art Regulating mans actions and directing him to his happines, which I think is out of queſtion, I cannot ſee how things of ſo different nature can be homogeneall to the ſame ſcope, and beſide the unity of a Science will not beare it, as Keckerman ſayth well, even in this reſpect, becauſe it ſhould be both practicall and Speculative, which are indeed incomputible though ſome Schoolemen have attempted ſuch a reconciliation: It may be objected,
Firſt, that it can be handled in no other Art: But I have prevented this objection when I reaſoned that it muſt be in the firſt art, before we deſcend to the treatiſe of ens creatum: and Bradwardine confirms me in this, ſaying that Deus eſt that truth is the firſt of all, upon which all other verities have dependance.
Second, the very name Theologia argues God the ſubject of it: I anſwer.
Firſt, I granted before that he is the remote object namely of mans operations performed to him, and that may ſalve the Etymologie.
Second, the name ſuppoſed, the reaſon may be drawn otherwiſe then from the ſubject, as from the author and efficient God, or from the end becauſe it is to bring us to God, &c.
Third, which Durands Arts (or habits as he ſpeakes) are many times denominated not a formaliratione ſubjecti, but a digniori, & ſo it might well come to paſſe that Divinity, which is Scientia ſalutis humanae, might be denominated from God: where I obſerve that he fals upon the ſame definition that I have given.
Fourth, the impoſition of the name uſually follows the common opinion (which was ſo, I confeſſe) rather then the accurate truth of things, which perhaps would rather call this art Anthropologia, or ſome like name then Theologia: laſtly the conſent of all may bee objected as a prejudice againſt this opinion: But I anſwer.
Firſt, it is no ſtrange thing for many to erre in ſuch a matter of notion, artificiall rather then ſubſtantiall truth, and yet many give good hints of that which I have ſaid.
Second, the error hath been not ſo much pofitive in defending, as negative in not attending or expending this truth, not ſo much of judgement maintaining, as practiſe following this, which alſo they had good reaſon for, which I muſt ſhew in the laſt propoſition,
Thirdly, therefore I ſay that the Doctrine of God is not unfitly handled in Divinity.
Firſt, becauſe the nature of God and our actions tending to happineſſe are of ſo neere affinity, for the former affords a firm ground to build the latter upon, ſo that the explication of that is neceſſary to this which indeed ſhould be ſuppoſed out of an higher Art as I have often intimated; but ſeeing God communicates the knowledge of the one, to men of the common ſort, it would not be expedient to diſtract them between two arts; but it is much better to compriſe them in the ſame, by a diſpenſation of Prudence condeſcending to their capacity.
Second, becauſe they are conjoyned in Scripture in which the knowledge of both is conveyed unto us joyntly, therefore Divines finding them there together thought it not meet to ſeperate them in their treatiſes.
Third, this is a ſingular priviledge and prerogative of the Schoole of Chriſt, that in it all Chriſtians beſides the way to their own felicity, in which they are properly directed, do withall learne the knowledge of God in all his excellencyes, which muſt needs adde much grace and majeſty to the former: and thus much of this third propoſition, and of both the definitions of Divinity in generall, me thinks too much, and yet when I looke to the particulars too little, too jejunely & nakedly.
The uſes may be,
Firſt, for inſtruction to teach us that this Art concernes all, every one muſt be of this trade, for it is of Mans felicity.
Second for exhortation.
Firſt, to thankfulneſſe, ſecond to diligence, from the Certainty, Nobility and Neceſſity of this Doctrine.
I will not trouble you with repetition of any thing that hath been formerly delivered, only becauſe that which follows hath the riſe and ground out of that which is gone before, Let me call to your mind the definitions of Theology, which I have hitherto propounded and in ſome homely manner expounded, and that in generall only: the firſt was a Doctrine of mans Happineſſe, or of living well and happily, which I thought ſufficient for accurateneſſe: the ſecond was this, that Divinity is a doctrine revealed by God in his word, which teacheth man to know and worſhip God ſo that he may live well here, and happily hereafter. Which perhaps as I ſaid may give more popular ſatisfaction though according to the rules of Art, if it were examined, there may be ſome ſuperfluityes in it to be cut off as I ſhewed: and thus having only preſented theſe a freſh to your conſideration, that you may the more clearly underſtand the ſucceeding diſcourſe, I begin with that where I left, then to draw ſome practicall obſervations out of that which hath been taught, before I proceed any further: and they ſhall be but two.
Firſt for Inſtruction, we may learn from hence that this Art or Doctrine belongs not to ſome few, onelyonly, but concernes every man to know and practice.
Second for Exhortation, and that twofold.
Firſt, to thankefulnes, that God hath planted us like trees by the rivers of waters, and taking ſuch care to guide us in the way of happineſſe.
Second, to diligence, in the uſe of thoſe meanes and golden oportunityes, which God hath afforded us, toward the gaining of our happines in this ſeminary of Religion and learning, which we cannot let ſlip unleſſe we will ſhamefully betray our owne ſoules.
The firſt appeares out of the definition becauſe it is a doctrine of mans happines: where you ſee both the materiall ſubject man, and the formall happines intimate unto us, and commend the conſideration of the generality of this Art, that the uſe thereof extends it ſelfe indifferently unto all men: indeed if there be any that have drunk ſo deep of Circes cup, that are ſo bewitched with the Sirens ſongs ſo beſotted with the charmes of pleaſure, that they have put off the ſhape and name of men, and are turned into beaſts, or if any that beare the name and ſhape of men are ſo degenerated from their nature that they are not aſhamed to confeſſe themſelves altogether voyde of humanity; they may perhaps conſequently to that hypotheſis though not reaſonably, reject this Art as nothing appertayning to them: but if they be men homo ſum, humanitas nihil à me alie num puto, as you know he ſaid, if they be men, this is the doctrine concerning man to guide and regulate him, of which therefore they may not only claime the uſe, but alſo challenge propriety in it: for it is a Doctrine of mans happineſſe: man may be conceived as the materiall object of it, and ſo that implyes the generality of it reaching to every man: Againe if there be any Art concerning man, which perhaps concerns not every man in particular, and ſo the former illuſtration be thought inſufficient; yet that which is of mans Happineſſe, the generall end of all, muſt needs belong to all: except there be any that have ſo far defaced the image of God in their Soules, that they have blotted out alſo even thoſe common principles which nature hath left engraven and imprinted not only in men, that are endued with the higheſt perfection of reaſon, but alſo in all creatures (at leaſt in a kind of Analogy) that have but the loweſt degree of being; all which have a naturall impetus or appetitus to their perfection, which in the reaſonable nature is called properly Happines: and though men be divided in their deſires and inclinations toward particular good, ſome affecting one thing ſomeanother according to the variety of their diſpoſitions, yet all agree in this generall, all hunt after happineſſe: Though bonum be not defined according to the proper eſſence accurately, quod omnia appetūt, yet with the emphaticall article. I think it may be not abſurdly deſcribed as the Philoſopher hath done it, foreign: that good is that which every one deſires, every one deſires to be happy: and though all they miſſe their marke when they thinke to finde it here below, beatam vitam quaerunt in regione mortis, as Auſtin ſpeaks, yet in groſſe they aime at this: and therefore this Art, as this end, is generall and concerns every man: And thus it appeares that this obſervation is reduced out of the former definition, which I therefore mention leaſt any here ſhould think the ſtudy of this alienum opus, a matter that pertains little to him, and therefore behave himſelfe as it is ſaid of Gallio in the Acts, as if he cared not for theſe things: whoſoever thou art if thou haſt but the nature of a man, if thou haſt but any propenſion un…o happineſſe, hoc ad te pertinet, the ſtudy of Divinity belongs unto thee: the wiſdome of ſwaying ſcepters and managing Kingdomes and Common wealthes, which the Philoſopher ſtiles the Architectonicall art, may preſcribe to every man a particular imployment and vocation, according to their naturall abilities in ſubordination to the publick utility, but every one muſt take this along with him, this is the generall calling of all men, which they muſt walke in directing all their actions to this end: this is one difference of this▪ from other Arts: The great Turk himſelfe they ſay, you know though born to beare rule and inherit the Empire, yet beſide is trayned up to ſome trade of life, which he exerciſeth perhaps in his Royall pallace and chaire of eſtate: I am ſure the greateſt Princes and Potentates muſt be ſkild in this trade or elſe all their glory will be not only ſplendida ſervitus as he ſaid, but alſo ſplendida miſeria: the Rabbins had ſuch a conſtitution that all their Doctors together with the profeſſion of Divinity ſhould joyne the practiſe of ſome handicraft: what the conveniency of that was I know not, but I ſee a neceſſity of the contrary, that every craftſman with the profeſſion of his craft, ſhould joyne the practiſe of Divinity; Some are imployed in Magiſtracy, ſome in Merchandiſe, ſome in Agriculture, or otherwiſe, but from the higheſt Stateſman to the loweſt craftſman, all ſhould be divines; all ſhould be imployed in this: Not ſo that every one ſhould be, or labor to be a teacher of others, as we commonly take the name of a Divine, otherwiſe then that generall obligation to the private duties of charity, as admonition and the like, that is not my meaning: but that he ſhould be able at leaſt to teach himſelfe and guide his owne actions to the laſt end of all his happineſſe: And thus far I ſay it ſtands every one in hand to be a Scholar in this Schoole, leaſt any ſhould be miſ-led with that vulgar opinion which rejects all knowledge and ſtudy in this kind, as proper to Divines: But wherefore then hath God tempred the ſtile of his word, and bowed it to the capacity of all ſorts of men; modus ipſe dicendi ſacrae Sripturae quo contexit? ſayth Auſtin, quamvis paucis penetrabils omnibus tamen acceſſibilis: that I may a little alter his words, Nam quae aperta continet ea quaſi amicus familiaris ſine fuco ad cor loquitur indoctorum ac doctorum: eaverò quae in myſteriis occultat, neceloquio ipſo ſuperbo erigit, quo non audeat accedere mens tardiuſcula & inerudita quaſi pauper ad divitem ſed invitat omnes humili ſermone quod non ſolum manifeſta ſed etiam ſecreta exerceat veritate &c. And wherefore hath God erected his oracles every where in his Church, and his Schools and the chaire of Moſes in every Congregation, to have them taught and expounded: whereas other Sciences are profeſſed and practiſed in ſome places only of the Commonwealth: but that they belong to all, & muſt be part of the care of every man? but I need not urge this, neither did I purpoſe any more then to propound it when I firſt thought upon it: eſpecially in this place and among you, who both by the generall appellation that is given to Univerſityes, that are called the Schooles of the Prophets, and by particular ſituation of this, compaſſed with hils as Jeruſalem the vally of viſion, and by proper dedication of this Colledge, whoſe gates will ſcarce admit of any, but ſuch as are at the leaſt welwillers to Divinity, but as Plato's Auditory exacted Geometry foreign, ſo this ſeemes to examine as it were and poſe every one it receives in their purpoſe for Divinity Sacrae Theologiae ſtudioſis poſuit: All which do put you in mind that howſoever others may ſtand affected to this ſtudy, yet it behoves you to be in a ſingular meaſure addicted thereunto, and deſire to be in the number of thoſe that not only in the Apoſtles words, let the word of God dwell in them richly and plentifully, but alſo labor for it, and therefore as it were dwell continually in the ſtudy of it: and true it is of theſe places that Nazianzen ſpeaks, I think of his mother at leaſt a godly mother, foreign, or to that purpoſe for I do not well remember his direct words: they are mothers in Iſrael to nurſe and give ſuck; that ſame foreign the ſincere milke of the Word as Peter cals it to us that we may prove Nathaneels true Iſraelites in whom there is no guile: ſo doth ſhe deſerve that title of Alma mater, which you ſee written in her Arms: and we may well beare that deviſe which Domitian uſed where his word was this optimae matris: as you have it in Tacitus: And thus much of the firſt obſervation that the uſe of this Doctrine extends it ſelfe generally to all men, and to us in a more particular manner: wherein becauſe I have been longer then I purpoſed, I will paſſe over the reſt, though more material, the more briefly.
The ſecond follows for Exhortation,
And firſt to thankefulneſſe upon a double ground.
Firſt, that God hath ſet us in ſo honorable a ſtation, a calling ſo worthy as you ſee that of a Divine muſt needs be, whoſe imployment is about that knowledge, a ſmall portion of which to have attained is the happineſſe of other men: what though the tribe of Levi hath no inheritance among their brethen, ſhall not we thinke this a Royall recompenſe of that want, ſince the Lord is their inheritance, the Lord is their portion, foreign, as Lucian ſpeaks of his Preiſts, not their revenues are their, God as ſome prophane perſon might invert the words & pervert the meaning, like them whom the Apoſtle Paul reproves that would have gaine to be godlineſſe, which he corrects affirming that godlineſſe is great gaine, ſo here God is their revenues: let other profeſſſions pleaſe themſelves in the gaine or glory that they procure, Dat Galenus opes, dat Juſtinianus honores, I envy them not: but let my Soule delight in the law of the Lord and meditate therein day and night, and let me alway account that the chiefe part of my bleſſednes: Prayſe the Lord ye houſe of Iſrael, for in Jury is the Lord known, he hath given his ſtatutes to Iſrael: great is the priviledge of the Jew, for them did the Lord betruſt with his Oracles: but eſpecially prayſe the Lord ye houſe of Aaron, prayſe the Lord ye houſe of Levi, whom he hath entertained into neerer ſervice: though your condition be full of difficulties and your vocation obnoxious to the obloquies of the world, ſay with the Pſalmiſt, The lots have faln to me in pleaſant places, yea I have a faire heritage: and this may be the firſt ground of thankfulnes, in a word plainly, that God hath honored us with ſuch a calling in which we have liberty and meanes to ſtudy for that which all deſire, the Art of Happineſſe:
The ſecond is from this, that God affords ſo many meanes unto us to furniſh us for the diſcharge of this calling, foreign, that the name of God may be even and ſquare and perfect to all due performances, you all know and have heard often how Plato thanked the Gods that he was borne a Graecian, an Athenian, and eſpecially in the time of Socrates: and you can all make the application without my helpe, that you have greater cauſe to thank God that you are born Chriſtians in the wombe of the true Church, that you are brought up Athenians in the boſom of a moſt famous Univerſity, and that in this flouriſhing eſtate of Religion, and time of the goſpell, when God hath powred forth of his Spirit ſo plentifully among us eſpecially in theſe places, that as Plutarch ſaith of the neighbour villages of Rome in Numa's time, that ſucking in the aire of that City they breathed foreign, righteouſneſſe; ſo from the overflow of this place, all parts of the kingdom are full of knowledge, I wiſh I could ſay of Religion and Piety: Behold a greater then Socrates is here: even God himſelfe in his ordinances; we are wet with the influence and dew of heaven, as Gedeons fleece, though all the region about be dry in compariſon; and againe when all about us are wet with the waters of affliction, we are dry and free: we are in the land that floweth with milke and hony: and though it were but a wilderneſſe otherwiſe, yet God raining Mannah from heaven the food of Angels, in that reſpect it were a mappe of heaven: we ſit under our vines every man, and under our figtrees: and are planted in Paradiſe neere the tree of life, plainly, we injoy all bleſſed meanes for the knowledge of the way to Salvation in the practicall ſtudy of Divinity: and of that knowledge which was ſo dainty heretofore we have Gods plenty: Silver is like duſt, and gold like ſtones in our ſtreets, the moſt pretious treaſures of divine wiſdome and underſtanding are open unto us: And have we not as good cauſe to thanke God as Plato had? The Queen of Sheba came from the South to heare the wiſdome of Solomon, and accounted his men happy, and thoſe his ſervants happy that ſtood ever before him and heard it: Behold a greater then Solomon is here even the Spirit of God, teaching us in the doctrine of Divinity, the way of life and happineſſe: Bleſſed are your eyes that ſee and your eares that heare theſe things: Yea bleſſed be God that hath given us theſe meanes and oportunities: Deus nobis haec otia fecit.
But I paſſe to the ſecond exhortation which ſhall be to the diligent ſtudy of this Doctrine and uſe of the meanes thereunto: becauſe there I ſhall lay open better the grounds of our thankfulneſſe, and withall keep my ſelfe cloſer to the matter in hand: Now we may be provoked to alacrity and diligence in this ſtudy from ſome conſiderations out of the definitions: the ſumme of all which is the excellency of this doctrine above others which may appeare in three particulars.
Firſt, the Certainty of the truths conteined in it from the manner of the conveiance of them to us which I told you was by Divine Revelation.
Second, the Nobility of the object which as this Art is uſually and wiſely handled, is God and divine things.
Third, the neceſſity of the end, which is mans happineſſe, or Salvation: a word of each of theſe and ſo I will conclude.
Firſt, of the Certainty of the truths: whereas all other Arts, the ſkill of which we are to attaine unto by naturall reaſon upon obſervation and experience are ſo uncertain for the moſt part that a man when he hath done his beſt may remaine a Sceptick or Academick: by reaſon of the weaknes of our underſtanding, proceeding from the wound of originall ſin; it is not ſo with this where we receive all our light and information from God himſelf, who being the fountaine of wiſdome not ſubject to the leaſt ignorance, and the Ocean of goodneſſe far from all malice can neither deceive nor be deceived; and therefore the light of our knowledge being derived from his light in lumine illius videmus lumen, is pure from all darkneſſe and eclipſe of error: and as among all the delight that Mathematicks afford to the ſtudents of them, the evidence and certainty of the truths, is one great part of the witchcraft, which makes them dote with love upon them: ſo I do ſee no reaſon why in this the ſame convenience ſhould not be an effectuall argument to incourage us to digeſt the labours of our calling with much alacrity and cheerefulneſſe,
Second, for the Nobility of the object, God and divine things, if the Poets thought ſo highly of the ſtudy of Aſtronomy, becauſe it is occupied about the Spheares and ſtars and celeſtiall bodies, that he pronounceth the firſt authors thereof and profeſſors happy:
Felices animae quibus haec cognoſcere primum,
Inque domos ſuperas ſcandere cura fuit.
Then how happy are thoſe that are buſied in the contemplation of God himſelfe, who made the heaven and ſtars and all, for it is not onelyonly true which the father ſaid, facilius invenit ſyderum conditorem humilis pietas, quam ſyderum conditionem ſuperba curioſitas, not only facilius, but I am ſure much more felicius: this is the chiefe happineſſe (in an higher degree then here we do) which we look for in heaven as all the Schoolemen determine, foreign, ſaith Nazianzen: this is an Angelical office, for I ſay unto you, their Angels behold the face of their heavenly father continually ſayth our Saviour.
Third, for the neceſſity of the end which is that one thing that is neceſſary eternall life and happines: we read in the 19. Acts. That of thoſe that beleeved many which uſed curious Arts foreign, brought their books and burnt them before all men, and they counted the price of them, and found it fifty thouſand peeces of ſilver, all other Arts and books in compariſon of this are but ſuperfluous and curious: this is that one thing that is neceſſary: and if all were either burnt as they did, or baniſht as Lycurgus did all unneceſſary trades out of Sparta, that they might be the more unneceſſary, that wee might more excell in this, the matter would not be ſo great.
Fourth, I might adde to this the Antiquity, and uſe no other probation for it then the laſt commendation: for as Peter Martyr hath well obſerved, as the Athenians proved themſelves the moſt ancient people, becauſe the invention of corn, that moſt neceſſary helpe for the life of man proceeded from them, ſo that Doctrine muſt needs be moſt ancient, which hath the bread of life, and is therefore moſt neceſſary.
Fifth, I might commend it from the Author which I touched in the 1 condition, God himſelf: which makes much to inflame our affections toward it: for who would be aſhamed to be Gods Scholler? Or who would not rather think himſelf highly honored? When Moſes had talked with God in the mount, his face ſhined: and ſhall not the Doctrine of Gods own mouth, make their face ſhine whom God vouchſafeth to inſtruct in it.
Wherefore ô yee Prophets ſons, caſt off all impediments, and let no other imployment hinder your alacrity in this ſtudy: conſider the excellency of this Science, and know the time of your viſitation: while the Sun of proſperity ſhineth, labor whiles the harveſt of the Goſpell laſteth, gather the ſheaves unto the barn that winter find not you unprovided:
foreign
foreign.
When the Emperor paſſing through Jury, beheld the Land a goodly land, but without culture and tillage through the lazines of the people, he cryed out; O marcomanni, ô Sarmatae, ô Qua di &c. O lazy Germans, I have found a people more lazy then you: take heed this be not ſaid of you, that Themiſtocles ſaid of them; foreign: that foole hath a price in his hand, but he hath no heart to uſe it.
Firſt, be diligent therefore in reading the word of God, ſay with David, thy word O Lord is more ſweet unto me than hony, and more pretious than gold; Deſiderabilia ſuper aurum pretioſum multum, as the old tranſlation hath it in the 19. Pſal. aut multum aurum aut multum pretioſum, aut multum deſiderabilia tum multum hoc haeretico parum, as Auſtin gloſſes upon the variety of the conſtruction.
Second, Be diligent in hearing the word of God: let every word be pretious unto thee, and let not one of them fall to the ground. O how rich, how ſoon would this divine huſbandry make us:
Third, Be diligent in prayer: the father ſaid he got more by Prayer than by ſtudy, 'tis moſt true in this Art: if thou want wiſdome, faith James, ask it of God: the ſecret of the Lord is with them that feare him, ſaith the Pſalmiſt: this knowledge is better gotten by praying to God, then prying into Schoolemen:
And to conclude, alway remember that this is a Practicall Art, and requires not knowing but doing: bare and naked ſpeculation is the tree of knowledge, that bears nothing but the apple of ſtrife betweene us, and God, and death: Practiſe, Practiſe is the tree of Life.