A Treatise of Paradise, Chapter 64
CHAP. LXIIII.
The obiections of Simon Magus againſt the aforeſaid doctrine of the creation of man, and his placing in Paradiſe.
AS there is nothing ſo manifeſt vntounto reaſon, but hath beene oppugned by reaſon; ſo neither hath there beene any thing ſo euident in Scripture, but hath beene oppugned with Scripture. So the Phariſees reſiſted the Meſſias, and Simon Magus the doctrine of Moſes, eſpecially about the creation.
For either (ſaith hee) the God which created man was omnipotent, or not; if omnipotent, how is it that hee would that Adam ſhould not fall, who neuertheleſſe did fall? if he was not omnipotent, how can he be God?
To this wee anſwer, that though Adam ſinned, and by his ſinne did contrary to the will of God; neuertheleſſe hee remained in ſome ſort conformable to the will of God: for as hee created him, endued with vnderſtanding, that thereby hee might diſcerne good from euill; ſo was hee alſo created with free will, whereby hee might embrace the good, and eſchew the euill, obey or diſobey his Lord and maker: this was the perfection in which he excelled the beaſts of the earth, paulò minor factus Angelis, in this he reſembled the pureſt Angels, yea in this hee is ſaid to bee made to the image of God himſelfe.
But God (ſaith Simon Magus) would not that Adam ſhould hauehave eaten of the forbidden fruit, who neuertheleſſe did eat of that fruit; it followeth therefore that hee remained not as his Creator would hauehave had him to hauehave remained; how then can God be omnipotent, or his will alwayes fulfilled?
It were neceſſary, if we ſhould fully ſatisfie this argument, to intreat more largely of the will of God, then were conuenient for this place: wherefore, that wee may briefly anſwer this obiection, wee muſt preſuppoſe with the Schoole-Diuines a threefold diſtinction of the will of God,Aquinas 1. n.i. te quaeſtione 19. Ibidem Molina, VaſqueZ, Suarius, Sumel, Banneſius, & alij plures. according to the diuerſitie of their proper obiects: the firſt they call his efficient, effectuall, or working will, by which God doth ſo effectually intend any thing, that hee performeth it actually by ſome externall operation and worke, either actually produced, or to be produced.
The other kinde of will, which the Diuines diſtinguiſh in God, in regard of ſome obiects which he doth not really produce, is called inefficax voluntas, a kinde of propenſion or inclination of his diuine will to the effectuating of any good effect, which might redound to the felicitie of man: yet for the attaining of the end, which out of his vnſearchable wiſdome hee hath prefixed, hee oftentimes permitteth the contrary to this his diuine inclination and will; the which therefore is called Gods permiſsiue will. As for example, God would that all men ſhould bee ſaued, according to that of the Apoſtle, Deus vult omnes homines ſaluos fieri; to wit, in his vniuerſall grace, calling, and inſpirations, and other generall meanes, offered to all, ſo that out of his infinite goodneſſe hee wiſheth and willeth in this ſort all to bee ſaued, and that hee might the more manifeſt his infinite mercy by the efficacie of his working will, he actually ſaueth ſome, euen ſo to manifeſt his iuſtice by his other permiſſiue decree, he permitteth others to worke their owne ruine and eternall damnation.
So that according to this diſtinction, it may truly be ſaid, that the tranſgreſſion of Adam was in ſome ſort contrary to the will of God, in ſome againe agreeable to the ſame: for firſt, in that it was permitted by God, it was for the further benefit vntounto mankinde, and the greater glory of God, by which hee wrought that miraculous effect of the hypoſtaticall vnion betweene the ſecond perſon of the bleſſed Trinitie, and our nature, taking occaſion of the greateſt euill to worke our greateſt good: inſomuch that it may well bee deemed (as Gregory tearmeth it) foelix culpa, quae talem & tantum habere meruit Redemptorem; a happy fall in regard of the iſſue, not as it was a ſinne, but as an occaſion of a more perfect aboliſhing of ſinne; neither as willed by God, but permitted; foreſeene by Gods wiſdome, effected by mans wickedneſſe, yea in ſome ſort effected by God, to wit, by Gods vniuerſall concourſe, but determined by mans depraued will, Gods action being indifferent, or rather of its owne nature, and as Gods, ordained to good, but by mans depraued will determined to euill; which yet againe by the infinite goodneſſe of God is made an occaſion of our greateſt good. So that, if it bee demanded, whether God would that Adam ſhould eat of the forbidden tree, or no? and if hee would, why did hee forbid it? if he would not, why did he not hinder it?
The anſwer is, that in ſome ſort hee would it, and againe after ſome ſort he would it not: hee would it not, as a ſinne; hee would it neuertheleſſe as a meane, or rather as an occaſion of a greater good. Wherefore he forbad it as a ſinne: he concurred with it, as vniuerſall cauſe of all things being, not as a particular cauſe, or agent in ſinne, as it was ſinne, though in ſome ſenſe hee would it (as hath beene ſaid) as a meane of an infinite greater good: and as the greateſt occaſion of ſhewing his infinite wiſdome, and goodneſſe; of his wiſdome, becauſe he knew to produce ſuch an excellent effect, of ſo infinite an euill; of his goodneſſe likewiſe, in that being moued onelyonly by it, and for it, he was pleaſed to effect our greateſt good, of the greateſt euill: a worke ſo excellent and admirable, as which could onelyonly proceede and flow from that onelyonly infinite ocean of goodneſſe.
Yea Adams eating of the forbidden fruit was an euident argument, that hee remained free to ſinne, euen after his ſinne: according to the pleaſure and will of God: for ſuch was his diuine will, that Adam ſhould be endued with free will, that it might be in his power to chuſe the good, and eſchew the euill, not of himſelfe, but by grace: ſo that thus ſinning he ſhewed his power, and conſequently by the ſame ſinne hee ſhewed in ſome ſort himſelf to remaine according to Gods diuine will and pleaſure with freedome to ſinne: for ſeeing that no ſinne can be committed without ſome actuall exerciſe of free will, and that by the ſame exerciſe the precedent power is manifeſted, it followeth, that by this exerciſe, and action of Adams free will, I meane his tranſgreſſion, it was made manifeſt, that hee was created, and alwaies preſerued according to his diuine will, in that he was endued, and afterward remained with free will ſufficient to ſinne, though inſufficient in it ſelfe to the actions of grace.
In this ſenſe then wee ſee that although Adam ſinned, yet remained he according to Gods will, becauſe hee remained alwaies endued with free will.
Likewiſe, we may vnderſtand in an other ſenſe, how Adam remained according to Gods will, yea and this euen in regard of his ſinne; I meane, according to his permiſſiue will: for Almighty God (as we hauehave ſaid before) out of his incomprehenſible wiſdome foreſeeing the infinite good, which might proceed from thence, to wit, the hypoſtaticall vnion, and being determined by his abſolute and ſecret will, to effectuate the ſame, hee permitted this ſinne of Adam, as a negatiue meanes, or rather occaſion, of ſo excellent an end.
But God (ſaith this heretike) would hauehave had man to hauehave perſiſted in that bleſſed eſtate, from which neuertheleſſe hee fell: how then was not Gods will more then his power, ſeeing hee obtained not, that which he would?
But here we may ſee both the malice and ignorance of this heretike, which both are the rootes and ſprings of all hereſies: his malice, in that hee preſumed againſt God himſelfe; his ignorance, in that hee taxeth that hee vnderſtandeth not: for if he had vnderſtood either what belongeth to the free will of man, or rightly apprehended the power & wiſdom of the omnipotent, he might eaſily hauehave perceiued, that the fall of our firſt father, did rather demonſtrate the wiſdome of God, then contradict his omnipotence, and will: for ſeeing it pleaſed his diuine maieſtie to giuegive vsus free will, and to place vsus in ſuch eſtate, in which by his grace we might perſiſt, and which being rejected, we might fall of our ſelues: what can bee more euident, but as that our perſeuerance ſhould hauehave beene attributed to God, and to the right uſe of his grace, ſo our fall onelyonly vntounto our ſelues, and the want of our concourſe with his grace, the which in that eſtate was not onelyonly ſufficient, but very abundant. Seeing therefore it was once in the power of our firſt father, to hauehave withſtood the temptation of Satan; and not to hauehave caſt off ſo eaſie a yoke, as was impoſed him, with ſo abundant grace; he deſerued no doubt to bee depriued of that grace, thruſt out of Paradiſe, yea finally to bee diſrobed of the beautifull robe of immortalitie.
In the combination of which we may magnifie, and admire the omnipotent wiſdome, and infinite wiſe power of God, in that hee knew and could ſo excellently combine iuſtice, with mercy; the which two attributes, as they are to be found in all his workes, ſo without all queſtion moſt admirable in this: his iuſtice, in not leauing vnpuniſhed ſo foule a fact as originall ſinne; his mercy, in the mercifull manner of the puniſhment: his iuſtice againe, in that he depriued man of the veſture of immortalitie; his mercy, euen in the ſame penalty and depriuation of immortalitie, leaſt as Moyſes Barſephas doth moſt excellently anſwer in this point, ne ipſius prauitas foret immortalis, qualis eſt diaboli: leaſt his wickednes ſhould become immortall, ſuch as the Diuels is, following the nature of the ſubiect, to which it is adherent.
Furthermore God therefore puniſheth man with this mercifull puniſhment of death, that thereby hee conſidering the effect, might eſchew the cauſe: or laſtly, becauſe out of this mortalitie of man he would produce a more perfect immortalitie in the ſame man: for God fore-ſeeing that out of Adams poſterity ſhould come an infinite multitude of martyrs, the ſentence of death was pronounced againſt Adam, to the end that many of his poſteritie ſuffering death for the Redeemers ſake, might ſupply the places of falne ſpirits.
But that we may returne from whence we digreſſed, if God were therefore to be counted deficient in power, becauſe he created Adam with ſuch liberty, that he could contradict the commandment of his Creator: after the ſame manner might likewiſe be inferred, that now alſo he hath the like defect, or impotencie; ſeeing that now alſo man hath the like liberty to tranſgreſſe: becauſe as hee commanded Adam, that he ſhould not touch the tree of the knowledge of good and euill: ſo likewiſe hath hee commanded vsus his poſteritie, that wee ſhould follow the good, and eſchew the contrary euill: now therefore if we do tranſgreſſe this law, it muſt needs bee God either allowing or contradicting this tranſgreſſion: if it be by Gods approbation, why doth hee prohibite it? if contrary to his will, why doth he permit it? or if hee permit that which is againſt his will, how can ſuch a God bee called omnipotent? or laſtly, if he can hinder that which is euill, and doth not; how is he good, who conſenteth, and concurreth ſo euill?
To theſe I anſwer out of the former principles, that euen this permiſſion of ſinne doth moſt manifeſtly demonſtrate the infinite wiſdome, power, and goodneſſe of God; his wiſdome, in that out of this in a manner ſo infinite euill, hee did worke ſuch an infinite good, as is the manifeſtation of his glory, and the incarnation of his Sonne; his power, in that he could, his goodneſſe in that hee would.
But why (ſaith the aduerſarie) did God prohibite Adam the eating of the tree of the knowledge of good and euill? what elſe could bee his meaning, but leaſt he ſhould be able to iudge betweene good and euill, and conſequently leaſt hee ſhould eſchew the euill, and proſecute the good? how then is not God enuious, or how can hee be God, who enuieth and prohibiteth that which is good?
I anſwer, that God did neither abſolutely decree that Adam ſhould eat of this fruit, neither that he ſhould not eat, though he did command him, that hee ſhould not eat, but left him to his owne free will to eat, or not eat: hee did forbid him to eat, not becauſe the fruit was morally, or of it ſelfe good or euill, but in the iſſue; good, if he had abſtained; euill, if hee abſtained not: good by obedience, euill by diſobedience: where fore God did intend in this prohibition to try his obedience, and that only was reſpected in this commandement: ſo that if Adam had obeyed God, accordingly as was in his power by the grace of God, hee ſhould for a time hauehave enioyed that terrene Paradiſe, in which he was created, and afterward hauehave beene partaker of the celeſtiall eternally with his Creator.
Hence wee ſee how impiouſly God is accuſed of wickedneſſe, and enuie in the forbidding of our firſt fathers the eating of the tree of good and euill; ſeeing that the eating of this fruit was indifferent of its owne nature, as out of which neither good nor euill could proceed: but that which God did regard in this commandment, was our obedience or diſobedience: in reſpect of which hee was after a manner indifferent, neither abſolutely decreeing the one, neither effectually willing the other: onelyonly this wee may adde, that God did deſire and will our firſt fathers abſtinence, and therein required his obedience; but as this his diuine will had not his efficacie, ſo did hee and might permit the contrary for other reſpects worthy his diuine prouidence and infinite wiſdome, which hauehave been already touched. Not of enuie (as ſome hauehave blaſphemouſly imagined) leaſt Adam become immortall, for if this blaſphemie, were conſequent to the fore-ſaid prohibition; certainely, God, who foreſaw all future euents, either would not hauehave created man, or hauing created him, would not hauehave placed him in Paradiſe ſo neere vntounto the tree of life; or at leaſt way, hee might either hauehave hidden, or not hauehave created the tree of life. Wherefore the true reaſon, why he forbad him the tree of life, was (as Moyſes Barſephas well noteth) ne perpetuò viueret in peccato, leaſt he ſhould liue in perpetuall death of ſinne, as the Deuill doth, euer liuing, euer dying.
Laſtly, the aduerſarie obiecteth againſt the curſe of the Serpent: for why (ſaith he) did God curſe the Serpent? if hee curſed him as the author of the euill committed, why did he not hinder it, leaſt it ſhould be committed? but if he curſed him as author of that good, which was conſequent vntounto the euill, how is that God called good, and not rather enuious and wicked, who puniſheth, yea enuieth the author of ſuch an excellent effect? Againe, if neither of theſe was the cauſe of the Serpents curſe, how may God bee excuſed of wilfull maliciouſneſſe, or malicious fooliſhnes?
The anſwer to this blaſphemy is patent out of that, which hath beene already ſaid out of the former obiections, to wit, that God did therefore curſe the Serpent as author of euill, neither did hinder him pretending the euill to the intent, that he might out of ſo infinite an euill, as was the tranſgreſſion of the firſt Adam, worke that infinite good of the incarnation of his Sonne, and birth of the ſecond Adam: for though it be an argument both of his power, and goodneſſe; ex bono efficere melius, of good to make better: yet it ſeemeth much more excellent, and conuincing euen our naturall capacitie, that hee is infinitely potent, and good: who can ex nihilo perfectiſsimum producere effectū: vel ex peſsimo efficere optimum; who can (I ſay) produce the moſt perfect, good, and moſt excellent effect, yea farre exceeding all other created perfection and excellencie, of nothing; yea euen of that nothing which is moſt remote from any goodneſſe, yea is the very priuation of all goodneſſe and excellencie.