A Treatise of Paradise, Chapter 31
CHAP. XXXI.
Why God commanded Adam that he ſhould not touch the tree of knowledge of good and euill, eſpecially ſeeing he fore-knew his fall.
THe anſwer is eaſie, to wit, that by the tryall of his obedience, in this one commandment, hee might ſubiect the whole man vntounto himſelfe in all things, and that man by the breach, or keeping of the ſaid commandement, might know by wofull experience (as he truely did in his wofull fall) the difference, betweene good and euill; ſo that whereas before hee knew it onelyonly by contemplation, now he ſhould find it by a lamentable experience: yea, in this, his ſinne was the greater, in that the obiect of his obedience was ſo facile, and the commandement ſo eaſie to be kept.Aug. li. 14. de ciu. Dei, cap. 15. For (as S. Auſtine ſaith) like as the obedience of Abraham is highly extolled, becauſe the ſlaying of his ſonne with his owne hands was of ſuch difficultie; euen ſo the diſobedience of Adam in Paradiſe was the more hainous, by how much the precept which he had impoſed was the more facile to hauehave beene fulfilled. Againe, as the obedience of the ſecond Adam was ſo much the more admirable, becauſe hee was obedient euen vntounto death; ſo the diſobedience of the firſt Adam was the more deteſtable, by which he became diſobedient euen vntounto death: for where the puniſhment of the diſobedience is great, and the thing commanded eaſie, who can expreſſe how great an euill it is, not to obey, and how great an iniurie to ſo great a power, eſpecially threatning ſo great puniſhments?
Now as touching the ſecond point, I anſwer, that therefore God as abſolute in his will, ſcience, and power, would create Adam, and giuegive him the aforeſaid precept, which hee knew neuertheleſſe hee would ſo preſently violate; to the end that his vnhappy fall might bee an occaſion of our moſt happy Redeemer: for as the Schooles commonly hold, if Adam had not ſinned, the Sonne of God had not beene incarnated: ſo that (as Gregory ſaith) in regard of this it was a happy fall, which deſerued, or rather required to hauehave ſuch a Redeemer: O foelix culpa, quae talem ac tantum habere meruit Redemptorem: in which I know not whether I ſhould more admire the goodneſſe of God in the creation and reſtauration of man, or the ingratitude of man towards God, in and after both his creation, redemption, and infinite offences and falles; but that as it is the nature of that infinite goodneſſe to effectuate the greateſt good, of the greateſt euill, ſo is it no leſſe conſequent to mans naturall propenſion, and of himſelfe, as it were an infinite of euill, of the greateſt good to worke the greateſt euill: a thing not eaſily beleeued, if our daily and wofull experience did not ſo manifeſtly proue it: for as God by our greateſt and originall euill, did worke our greateſt and originall good, and this onelyonly out of his infinite goodneſſe (the incarnation I meane of his eternall Sonne) ſo man out of his infinite malice, did by occaſion of this ſo infinite a benefit, worke the moſt wicked outrage that could bee imagined, againſt his benefactour, by ſeeking his diſhonour and death, who ſo abaſed himſelfe, to giuegive him life: ſo that I know not whether I ſhould more admire God ſhedding his bloud for man, or man ſpilling the bloud of God; mans ingratitude towards God, or Gods infinite bountie towards man.
And hence it is, that as faith teacheth vsus, this euill and ſinne of Adam was foreſeene and permitted of God, ſo is it no leſſe a blaſphemous hereſie, to auerre, that this or any other ſinne is wrought by God, wrought I meane by his particular command or concourſe; not by his vniuerſall, which is due vntounto all entitie and being, yet in ſome ſenſe neither due vntounto this of ſinne, as which in it ſelfe hath neither entitie nor being: but rather (if wee ſpeake formally) is a priuation of all rectitude, goodneſſe, and being.