A Treatise of Paradise, Chapter 11 – Chapter 12
CHAP. XI.
Of the tree of the knowledge of good and euill, to wit, whether it was a true and naturall tree, like vntounto others. And why it was ſo called.
NOthing can bee ſo plainely ſet downe in the holy ſcripture, but there will be ſome idle braine or other, who will ſo moralize, or ſo wreſt it to a ſpirituall ſenſe, though often-times without ſenſe, that they will not ſticke to deny the truth of the hiſtory, as it happeneth here in the firſt point of our queſtion, in which ſome hauehave not feared page missing that name before, but afterwards of the euent: ſo that when God commanded our fore-fathers, that they ſhould not eate of that tree, either he called it by ſome other name, or he demonſtrated it vntounto them, as it were with his finger.
Many other reaſons do the Rabbins giuegive, of the name of this tree, but ſo farre from reaſon, that they be not worthy the repeating, I will onelyonly touch one as moſt fabulous, by which we may coniecture of the reſt. They ſay that our firſt Parents were created as infants in ſenſe, and reaſon, though men in body, ſtrength, and ſtature. Now becauſe this tree had a virtue of ripening mans iudgment, witt, and diſcretion of good from euill; it was therefore called the tree of knowledge, of good and euill: becauſe, to know good and euill, according to the Hebrue and ſcripture phraſe is as much as to hauehave the vſe of reaſon.
But this is not onelyonly contrary to the text, but alſo to reaſon: for certaine it is, that as man was created perfect in all the parts of his body; ſo was hee no leſſe in the powers of his ſoule. Yea how is it likely that he was without reaſon, who was created lord of all vnreaſonable creatures? who gaue them their names proper to their natures, and was to gouerne all things according to their nature, by his owne rule of reaſon: yea with whom God the author of nature and chiefe rule of reaſon, had made this couenant moſt conformable to reaſon: that if he liued according to the law of nature, and inſtinct of reaſon, his reward ſhould be aboue all nature, and exceed the capacitie of humane reaſon: wherefore who was both culpable in this pact, and puniſhable for his tranſgreſſion, muſt in all reaſon, hauehave then had the vſe of reaſon.
Ioſephus in his firſt booke of his Antiquities, perceiuing well the abſurditie of this opinion, fell into another, which Lyra deemeth not much leſſe abſurd: to wit, that this tree was therefore called the tree of knowledge of good and euill, becauſe it had virtue to ſharpen the wit, ripen the iudgment, and to giuegive prudence, and vnderſtanding to all humane affaires.
Lyra his refutation is this, becauſe the fruit of that tree being corporall, how could it (ſaith he) hauehave any ſpirituall effect? wherefore the minde, witt, and iudgment of man being ſpirituall, how could they be holpen by any corporall cauſe? For though the ſuperior cauſe, and more perfect then his effect may hauehave influence into the inferiour and imperfect, yet neuer the inferiour into the ſuperiour. Therefore though the ſpirituall cauſes be of ſuch excellent perfection, that they hauehave influence into our bodies: yet neuer any corporall creature (ſaith he) is ſo perfect, that it can inflow in the ſpirituall. For what is that which any corporall thing may produce in the ſpirit? not any thing corporall, ſeeing that all, that is in the ſpirit, is ſpirituall: neither againe can it be ſpirituall, becauſe nothing ſpirituall can bee contained in the vertue of a materiall or corporall cauſe.
It cannot be denied, but that this diſcourſe of Lyra might hauehave ſome force in thoſe cauſes, which (as the Philoſophers ſpeake) doe worke directè & per ſe by themſelues directly, yet in thoſe, whoſe cauſaltie is altogether indirect, true philoſophy teacheth the contrary. wherefore though it be moſt certaine that the body cannot directly hauehave any influence into the ſoule or ſpirit, yet bicauſe the ſpirit, whiles it is in this life dependeth in her operations of the body, and the diſpoſitions thereof (according to the generally receiued philoſophicall axiome) the manner of the working followeth the manner of being, it muſt neceſſarily follow, that accordingly as the diſpoſitions of the body are better or worſe, ſo may the operations of the minde be alſo more or leſſe perfect.
Yea Ariſtotle teacheth vsus in his 7. booke of his Politikes, that though thoſe men, who are borne, and brought vp in the Northerne parts of the world, bee ſtronger then others in corporall forces; yet that they bee of a much more ſlow, and duller capacity: contrariwiſe, thoſe who are borne in hotter climates of Affrica, Spaine, and Mauritania, and other more Southerne parts of the world, though they be weaker in body, and more debil of complexion, yet that ordinarily they be more quicke of apprehenſion, and more ſuttle in iudgment, then the other of the Northerne parts of the world be. Finally, that thoſe who liue neither in the extremitie of heate, nor piercing cold, doe commonly excell both the other.
A fortiori therefore may the qualities, and diſpoſitions of our foode, eſpecially that of the tree of good and euill, hauehave had no ſmall operation in the inward diſpoſitions, and powers of our ſoules, for to make vsus of a more ripe iudgment, and quicker apprehenſion. yea finally make vsus more apt to diſcerne both good and euill, at leaſt way in morall and ciuill matters, if not in ſupernaturall, and things belonging vntounto grace, for ſo it was ſaid of the Meſſias, butyrum & mel comedet, vt ſciat reprobare malum & eligere bonum, Iſa 7.15.butter and hony ſhall he eate, that he may know to refuſe the euill and chuſe the good, the which though it be ſpoken more peraduenture for the myſticall meaning, then for the literall or materiall, yet no doubt but that the myſticall ſenſe hath ſome ground euen in the materiall compariſon of butter and honie.
But becauſe it ſeemeth not ſo probable, that God would hinder our ſpirituall good (ſuch as this was, of the knowledge of good and euill) who hath made vsus perfect in all corporall powres, and perfections; therefore I deeme moſt probable in this point either the opinion of Rupertus aboue alleadged;Aug. lib. 14 de ciuit. Dei cap. 17. & lib. 8. de Gen. ad literam cap. 6. & 15. Lombardus cum ſcholaſticis 2. lib. ſen. diſt. 17. or if that ſeeme to hauehave ſome inconvenience, then that of S. Auſtin may be rather followed, which now alſo is the common opinion of the ſchooles, with the maſter of the ſentences, to wit, that this tree was called the tree of the knowledge of good and euill, ab euentu, from the euent, for that which preſently followed in the eating thereof: which was, that Adam then knew by woefull experience the difference betweene good and euill.
CHAP. XII.
Of the creation of man.
NOw all things being created, and this inferiour world perfectly repleniſhed, there wanted only one, who ſhould be gouernour and lord ouer all other creatures,Gen. 1.26. 5.1. 9.6. 1. Cor. 11.7. Eph. 4.14. Col. 3.10. Faciamus therefore ſaith God hominem ad imaginem & ſimilitudinem noſtram, 1. cap. Gen. 26. let vsus make man in our image, after our likenes, and let him hauehave dominion ouer the fiſh of the ſea, and ouer the fowle of the aire, and ouer the cattell, and ouer all the earth, and ouer eueryevery creeping thing, that creepeth vponupon the earth.
But peraduenture ſome may demaund why man was created laſt of all creatures? ſeeing that hee being the moſt perfect and modell of the reſt, hee ſhould conſequently hauehave beene created as prototypon and firſt type of the reſt, and therefore as he was the firſt in perfection, he ſhould alſo hauehave beene firſt in his being and production.
I anſwer, that euen for the very ſame reaſon, he was created laſt, becauſe in a certaine manner hee was the end and perfection of the reſt: and thus beſide other interpretations, this alſo may be admitted of the philoſophicall axiome, quod est primum in intentione, est vltimū in executione: that which is first or cheifeſt in the intention, is laſt in the execution, or production.
Secondly, man being to be lord of all the maine Machina of this world, it belonged vntounto the diuine prouidence, firſt to prouide the habitation, and then to create him that was to inhabite.
Or thirdly, becauſe man had neede of all theſe things, either for his corporall ſuſtenance, or for his ſpirituall exerciſe.
Or fourthly, becauſe it was conuenient, firſt to create the great world, containing eueryevery thing in his due and diſtinct order; then afterwards to conſummate, perfect, and as it were to crowne the end of all his workes, with one, who was to be the crowne, end, and perfection of all corporall creatures, yea containing in a more perfect manner and degree, the perfection of all, whatſoeuer he had created before.
Finally, hauing created both corporall, and ſpirituall things each ſeparate, and diſtinct in their proper natures, it remained only to conioyne them both in one: inſomuch that, as in all things, whatſoeuer is compoſed of matter & forme, the parts hauehave their being, prioritate naturae, by prioritie of nature (as the Philoſophers ſay) before the conioyning of both together, becauſe the parts are for the whole, and not the whole ordained for the parts. In like manner it was no leſſe conuenient, that man being compoſed of both corporall and ſpirituall ſubſtance, hee ſhould alſo be created after them both, as who was to be the ſecondarie end of all other inferiour creatures.