Gods Effectual Calling, Treatise · Chapter 37
CHAP. XXXVII. Of mans Free-will.
AFter the doctrine of Faith, Hope, and Repentance, the doctrine of Free-will is to follow, becauſe the Aduerſaries do attribute Faith, hope, repentance, or as they call it, Penance, to the liberty of our will, as to the principall agent or cauſe: but they aſſigne to grace the ſecond place in the worke of Faith, hope, and repentance: for they ſay after that Free-will is ſtirred vp by a preuenting grace, man by the benefit of his free-will, doth of his owne ſtrength beleeue, hope, and repent him of his ſinnes. And as for grace, that is only a fellow-worker, ſay they, and a helper of mans Free-well, which principally worketh in faith, hope, and repentance. But to this we hauehave anſwered before in the doctrine of repentance, & we ſhal hereafter anſwer it a little more plainely. Now hauing thus far ſhewed the occaſion, why after the doctrin of Faith, hope and repentance, we ſpeake of Free-wil: let vsus come to the point it ſelfe, and diſcourſe of it. The will of man is a facultie The wil deſcribed.of the reaſonable ſoule, following next after the facultie of reaſon: for the mind firſt vnderſtandeth, and thē iudgeth. The function and vſe thereof is in willing, in nilling, in chooſing, in refuſing, and in doubting of thoſe things which were before concealed, and conſidered of in the vnderſtanding. The obiects therof are things ſimply good, and euill, and things indifferent. I call thoſe things ſimply good, which are commanded by ſome expreſſe Things ſimply good.law of God. I call thoſe things ſimply euill, which are forbidden by the ſome expreſſe lawe of God. And thoſe things I count indifferent, which are neither expreſly commanded, nor expreſly forbidden in the law of God. And if they be commanded or forbidden by anie law of God, that is by accident, to wit, ſo farre forth as they further or hinder the edification of our neigbour. Theſe obiects of the will I ſubdiuide again into their final cauſes or ends, and into thoſe meanes which tend and leade vsus to the ends.
And thus I apply the functions of the wil to the ends, and to the meanes: We be ſaid as well to will, and nill, the meanes as the ends vntounto which they ſerue: for to will and nill are things generall; but we are ſaid onelyonly to accept, and to reiect, and to doubt of the meanes: for theſe things are ſpeciall. And thus farre of the will, according to our preſent purpoſe.
There is aſcribed vntounto the will a certaine propertie, which the Latines call Libertie: the Greekes a Power, as Libertas. foreign.Rom. 9. 20. where the Apoſtle ſpeakes of the power the Potter hath ouer the clay. And 1. Cor. 7. 37. He that hath power ouer his owne will: As if he ſhould hauehave ſaid, hee that hath libertie or power of his will: in our vulgar tongue it is called Soueraingtie. This libertie of the will is as it were a royall power, and the Greeke word is vſed to ſet forth the power of a king, or ſome ſupreme Magiſtrate. Rom. 13. 27. Let eueryevery ſoule be ſubiect to the higher power. For this cauſe the will in the ſoule of man is receiued as a Queene, and in that reſpect is ſaid to hauehave as it were the iuriſdiction in her owne hand.
But to come to ſome deſcription of Free-will: This freedome of will, is a libertie, whenas a thing being offered to the wil, as to a certain Queene, whether it be good or euill, or indifferent, the will euen then can by it own A deſcripttion of free-will.proper right and power, either will it or nill it; reiect or receiue it; or hold a man in ſuſpence. For which cauſe commonly in ſchooles it is defined to be a power or facultie, to like or diſlike things that are directly oppoſite, that is, to incline to either part of the contradiction, to receiue, or reiect the one or the other: and thus commonly they deſcribe it. Yet I like beſt this deſcriptiō, to wit, that libertie of will ſhould bee in reſpect of good and euill things (for concerning them the controuerſie is) it is, I ſay, a power of the will, or a certaine right it hath, whereby of it ſelfe, and of it owne inward and naturall motion, without conſtraint, it wils onelyonly that is good, it chooſeth the good, it wils not that is euill, it reiecteth that is euill: In one word, libertie of will is a power vntounto good, not to euill.
I am induced to like beſt this definition of libertie, by the example of the libertie of God himſelfe, who by the confeſſion and grant of all men, moſt freely wils, and Gods free-willdoth all things: notwithſtanding, the libertie of God is not ſo defined, that it ſhould be a certaine power, whereby he doth ſo will good, as though he might nill it, or doth not ſo will euill, as though he might will it; but the liberty of God is this: of his owne right, & without conſtraint, onelyonly to will that which is good, and nill that is euill. Againe, the ſame is plaine by the example of the bleſſed Angels, who hauehave liberty to that is good onelyonly, and not vntounto good, and euill: that is, they do not ſo will good, as if they might nill it: for they are ſo gouerned & Freedome of Angels.ſtrengthened of God, that their will onelyonly is inclined to good, & doth abhor from euill. To conclude, the ſame is ſhewed in the example of Adam, & of his ſtate before his fal; for then truly the liberty of his will was to will good Adams freedom in his innocencie.only, & not both good and euil, that is, he did not ſo will good, as if he might nil it, except you vnderſtād a remote power: wheras we by this word Liberty (to ſpeake properly) do vnderſtand a more neere faculty of the ſoule.
I call that a remote facultie, which is incident to the matter, as is the power or propertie of laughter in the bodie of a man, before it hath either forme or life. I call that Remota potentia:a neere facultie which is incident to the forme, as laughter Propinqua potentia.in a man that hath life. So in the will of man there is a remote power, as appertaining to the matter; and there is a neere power, as pertaining or conſequent to the forme: but we (as a little before we ſpake) by liberty vnderſtand not that remote power, which is incident to the matter, but that neere power which is conſequent to the forme: and by the forme we vnderſtand that ſanctitie which is according to the image of God, which is the ſoule as it were of our ſoule, and without which our ſoule is as it The image of God.were dead. For which cauſe the Apoſtle ſaith Ephe. 2. 1. That without this holineſſe, wee are truly ſaid to be dead in ſinnes and treſpaſſes. Whence I conclude, that the libertie of will is properly a power or facultie, which is a conſequent of ſanctity, as of the formall cauſe, and as it were, the very ſoule of the will. Wherby it commeth to paſſe, that the will in this ſtate without conſtraint, doth incline onelyonly to good, and doth decline from euill: for this libertie of a mans will, is according to the ſimilitude & image of the libertie of God himſelf. VntoUnto this liberty, conſtraint is oppoſite, proceeding from ſome outward agent, & is contrarie to the nature of the will: for it is not a wil, if it be conſtrained, neither is it ſaid, that the will is conſtrained, albeit man himſelfe, in whom the will is, may be ſaid to be conſtrained. I ſay that conſtraint is oppoſite to libertie, and not neceſſity: for thoſe things which wee will or nill freely, we will or nill thoſe things of neceſſity: firſt, becauſe of the neceſſity of Gods decree: ſecondly, becauſe of the incident forme of the will it ſelfe, as of holineſſe, of corruption, of both. As when man was holy in his creation; ſo long, as that holineſſe continued, of neceſſitie he did will that which was good, and nill the euill. So the bleſſed Angels of a certaine neceſſitie will that is good, and nill the euill, and at length when man is glorified he ſhall incline to good, and decline from euill: So The will of the vnregenerate.man being wholy corrupt, before his regeneration of a certaine neceſſitie, he wils the euill, and nils that is good, and notwithſtanding after his manner, he doth will freely, albeit this be not a true libertie, as we ſhall hereafter ſee. To conclude, a man regenerate partly of neceſſitie doth will good, in reſpect of his new birth; partly of neceſſity hee doth will euill, for that he is as yet partly corrupt; yet in both reſpects hee willeth freely: for we muſt diſtinguiſh betwixt neceſſity, and conſtraint; for neceſſitie is more generall and large then conſtraint is: for that which is conſtrained, is neceſſarie, but on the contrarie that which is neceſſarie is not cōſtrained. And thus much concerning the libertie of the will in generall.
There is then a foure fould hate of man to diuers conditions 1. State.or ſtates of man to be conſidered. The firſt ſtate of his innocency before his fall: ſecondly, the ſtate of his corruption after his fall: thirdly, the ſtate of regeneration: fourthly, the ſtate of glorification. Firſt then concerning the firſt ſtate, it is a queſtion whether man in his innocency had liberty of will? I anſwere, if you follow the former definition of liberry, which is a faculty, or power reſpecting inclining to either, ſide, I graunt that in things▪ indifferent it had a liberty, but in things ſimply good and euil, man had not in that ſtate of innocency, that liberty of wil, whereby when he did will good he might nill it, and when he did nill euill, he might will it: except you vnderſtand a remote power: for in reſpect of his neer power, he was inclined to good, only becauſe of the form of ſanctity and goodnes in the will which was in him, according Propinqua potentia.to the image of God; but if you follow the latter definition of liberty, which is, when the wil of it ſelf of an inward motion without coaction, or conſtraint of any externall agent, is carried to that which is good only: if I ſay you follow this definition, I anſwere, that man in the ſtate of innocency had a liberty of will.
Concerning the ſecond ſtate of man, the queſtion is, whether man in the ſtate of corruption now hath liberty 2. State.of will. I anſwer, if you follow the former definition of liberty, I doe not deny that in things indifferent he hath his liberty: But in things ſimply good and euill, he hath not liberty. For man which is wholy corrupt, doth not ſo will euill as that he may or can nill it: neither dooth he ſo reiect that is good as that he may or can will it; except yee vnderſtand a power remote: for in man vnregenerate that neere power of the will is only inclined to euill, becauſe of the form of corruption & of impurity which doth wholy poſſeſſe his will. But if you follow the latter definition of liberty; then verily we cannot aſcribe that liberty of the wil which is according to the image of the liberty of God himſelfe, and is a neere power or faculty, and wherby without conſtraint he is caried to that only which is good, we cannot, I ſay, truly attribute this vntounto the vnregenerate and his will. For a faculty to euil cannot truly be ſaid a liberty; but rather a certaine ſeruitude: And in verity the vnregenerate mans will is not free but bound: yet becauſe the vnregenerate dooth not will euill by conſtraint, but of his owne accord and meere motion, in ſome ſort it may be ſaid that his will is free.
Here our aduerſaries diſſent from vsus, aſcribing liberty of wil to the man vnregenerate, whereby alſo of his owne meere power he may will good; where as this liberty or Papiſts of free will.ſelfe power, before preuenting grace lyeth indeede a ſleepe: yet notwithſtanding (ſay they) it is in him like as a man though he be a ſleepe, yet he is both a man and liuing. From whence it followeth neceſſarily (as they would hauehave it) that there is ſome holines and integritiy in the will of a man vnregenerate. For there is no ſelfe power of the will to good, vnleſſe there be in it the form of ſanctity and integrity, which is as it were the life of the will, and quicknes of this ſelfe power in the will vntounto good.
The Papiſts therfore erhere two manner of waies: firſt, becauſe they will hauehave ſome ſanctity and integrity to remaine in the wil of man vnregenerat now after the fal: & ſecondly, becauſe they wil hauehave this ſelf power of the wil (which neceſſarily is a conſqeuent of the formall cauſe thereof, which is holines, as is aforeſaid) they will hauehave this ſelfe power (I ſay) vntounto good to be in the will. For as touching holines and righteouſnes, it is certaine that all the image of God was loſt in the fall of man, and what portiō ſoeuer hereof we ſhal hauehave in this life, it is repaired & as it were created a new by Ieſus Chriſt: for which cauſe it is called a new creature. And if this in any reſpect bee old, wherefore is it called new? And if any ſanctity (which is the ſoule of our ſoule, remaine in man after the fall) why is man ſaid after the fall, before regeneration, to be dead, and not halfe dead? We forbeare to vſe teſtimonies of ſcripture in this matter, which are infinite. And as concerning the liberty or ſelfe power which they aſcribe to the will of man, how many euidences of ſcripture might be produced to refell ye ſame? Ioh. 6. 44. No man can come Propiqua materia.to me, except the father which ſent me draw him. Rom. 8. 5. The wiſdome of the fleſh, it is not ſubiect to the law of God, neither indeede can be. 1. Cor. 2. 14. The naturall man perceiueth not the things which are of God: for they are fooliſhneſſe to him, neither can he diſcerne them. Theſe places of ſcripture and other ſuch like, are to be vnderſtood of that neere power of the wil vntounto good, which therfore the ſcripture denieth to man in his corruption, becauſe there is in him no holineſſe left ſince the fall of Adam. For as touching the remote power of the will vntounto good, which is a conſequent of the matter, not of the forme, we do not deny, that it is in the wil of a man vnregenerat. And that this alſo becomes of a remtoe power a neere power, ſo ſoone as any holyneſſe is wrought in the will of man by the ſpirit of Ieſus Chriſt. Seeing then we leaue this remote power to the will of the vnregenerate man, that is, a certaine power of the cauſe materiall: there is no cauſe why our aduerſaries ſhould ſay, that we make men very ſtocks and blocks, becauſe we denie free will vntounto them. For this power of the materiall cauſe vntounto good, which we aſcribe vntounto the will of man vnregenerat, may not truly be aſcribed to any dead ſtock, or trunke.
We muſt vnderſtand in this place, that wheras we deny this neere power to the vnregenerate, that is, a liberty to good; we meane hereby that which is good, as it is truly good: For euen the vnregenerate perſon may wil that which is good, in it ſelfe; as the conſeruation of his countrey, iuſtice, equity, &c. But that which in it ſelfe is good, becomes euill in ſome ſort, in regard of the man vnregenerat; who dooth not will well, that which is good in it ſelfe, that is to ſay, neither in that manner, nor to that end doth he will it as he ought to will it, becauſe himſelfe is not good, and cleane; and to the vncleane, all things are vncleare, as to the cleane all things are cleane. Tit. 2. 15.
Againe, be aduertiſed that in this matter of free will, I hold that there is one, & the ſame reaſon of good things of what kind ſoeuer they be, naturall, or ciuil; and humane or ſpirituall: for the vnregenerat man hath not this liberty, or neere power to any good thing, as it is good and acceptable to God, and agreeable to his law: albeit by nature his will is moſt farre eſtranged from ſpirituall things, which the naturall man perceiueth not, & which (as the poſtle ſaith, He cannot know, yea they are fooliſhnes vntounto him. By ſpirituall good things I meane faith, hope, repentance, iuſtification, eternall life it ſelfe. There is no cauſe therefore why our aduerſaries ſhould aſcribe faith, hope, repentance to the liberty of our will, that is to ſay, to the ſtrength of nature, as to the principal efficient cauſe of the ſame: as if we by nature, & the ſtrength thereof could beleeue, could hope and truly conuert our ſelues vntounto God.
But to the intent this thing may yet be more manifeſt, we muſt vnderſtand that there bee two kinds of good things, the one is of humane good things: the other is of kinds of good things.diuine and ſpirituall good things. Humane good things are either morall, and pertaine to eueryevery priuate man, or Oeconomicall, and pertaine to a mans family: or they are Politicall, and pertaine to the whole common-wealth, or to the whole City. Spirituall good things are faith, hope, repentanceiu, ſtification, ſanctification, life eternall. To both theſe kinds of good things mans will is not like affected, for vntounto humane things, or vntounto humane good things, it is ſomewhat more inclined: as for example, nature doth incline vntounto temperancy, fortitude, liberality, iuſtice, albeit it doth neither will nor chooſe theſe things, which in themſelues are good, in that manner or to that end it ought. Whereby it commeth to paſſe, that thoſe things which in themſelues are good, yet (in reſpect of him, who is vnregenerate) become euill and very ſinnes before God. And concerning things ſpirituall, the nature of man is more eſtranged from them: and when they offer themſelues to the will, nature it ſelfe doth wholy abhorre from them.
This thing may be yet more plain by example, & experience. There are two certaine good things, to wit, iuſtice by works, and iuſtice by faith, which is called the iuſtice Righteouſnes by works naturall.or rightcouſnes of God: we all hauehave experience that our will naturally is inclined to that righteouſneſſe which is by works, and which is a certain humane good thing. Hence it comes that euen to this day, all the world following nature ſeekes to be iuſtified by good works. But the ſame will doth wholy abhorre, and vtterly diſlike that righteouſneſſe whichis by faith: the reaſon is, becauſe it is a certaine ſpirituall & vnknown good thing. Hence it comes to paſſe that ſo few ſeeke to be iuſtified by faith, and by the alone mercy of God in Ieſus Chriſt.
By this and other ſuch like examples it appeares, that mans will is more inclined by nature to humane good things; and wholy to abhorre ſpirituall good things. Albeit in truth, to ſpeake exactly, it is inclined to no good at all, as it is truly good. It is not inclined at all, no not to thoſe humane things, as they be truly good and acceptable vntounto God: for it wils them neither in that maner, neither to that end it ought. So far forth then, as it willeth them, euen thoſe things that are good in themſelues are ſins, and vnpleaſing to God. Notwithſtanding they differ from thoſe euils and ſinnes, which euen in themſelues, & in their own nature are ſinnes, as manſlaughter, adultery, theft, and in which I graunt there be more degrees of ſin; for in theſe things men ſinne both in the ſubſtance of the things themſelues, and in the manner of doing, and in the end. And the will of man vnregenerate is more inclinable vntounto theſe things by it owne nature, then vntounto thoſe things, which are good in themſelues. For firſt, it is caried of it owne accord to thoſe which are euill in themſelues. Secondly, it hath but ſome inclination to things humane, which in their owne kind are good. Laſtly, it doth wholy abhorre ſpirituall good things before regeneration. Againe, I conclude, that humane good things, ſo farre forth as mā vnregenerate doth wil them, become in ſom ſort euill; and the man vnregenerate doth ſin in the very deſire of them: which thing alſo is true in things indifferent, which are neither good nor euill in themſelues. For ſo far forth as man vnregenerate doth will them, ſo far forth they become euill; and the vnregenerate man doth ſin, when he doth wil & deſire euen that, which of it own nature is indifferent, becauſe he doth wil it, neither in that manner, nor to that end he ought.
Now concerning the eſtate of regeneration, the queſtion is, whether the regenerate man hath his free-will: I anſwer, if you define free-will to be a liberty or power to chooſe, or wil (they ſay) any of both ſides: Firſt, in things indifferent, we ſay that he hath this liberty. Secondly, wee do not denie vntounto him this liberty alſo in things good & euil: for ſeeing there is double act & a double form in the wil of the regnerat man, to wit, the forme of holines, and the form of corruption; & becauſe he hath the firſt fruits of the new man, and the remnant of the old, it cannot be, but that the neere power of his will be double alſo, one inclining vntounto good, the other declining vntounto euill: So that this receiued definition of free-will ſeemes vntounto mee to agree beſt with the will of the regenerate perſon. But if you define liberty to conſiſt of a power not conſtrained, tending to good only, and not to euill; then verily the man regenerate is not ſo free; but proceedes only to this liberty, which ſhall at length be perfected in another life.
Finally, concerning the eſtate of glorification, the queſtion is whether man whē he ſhall be glorified, ſhall hauehave this liberty of will? I anſwer, if you define free-will a power to make choiſe of either part, euen in good things, and in euill; then I ſay, man in this ſtate of glorification ſhall not hauehave it. For hee ſhall hauehave that neere power to good only, becauſe of that forme of holineſſe, or glorie rather, wherewith then, his will ſhall be indued withall. I deny not that there ſhall be in him alſo a remote power to euill in reſpect of the neceſſarie mutability of the creature; but this remote power ſhall neuer be a neere power, becauſe God ſhall for euer ſtrengthen him, and ſuſtaine him in yt ſtate of glorie. But if you follow that latter definition of free-will, the glorified perſon ſhal at length be ſet free: for he ſhal wil that only which is good and acceptable to God, and that without conſtraint, and for euer. Man had free wil in the ſtate of innocency, according to the image of that diuine liberty; but in the eſtate of glorification, wherein he ſhall come more neere vntounto the image of his God, and ſhall beare the image of that heauenly man Ieſus Chriſt, his wil ſhall be much more free, and far more ready to that which is good only. And thus hauehave we ſpoken hitherto of the liberty of will, that is, of that propriety, or naturall quality of the wil.
Now we be to ſpeake of *free-will. But there be which referre the word Arbitrium to the mind: for that they deeme it is nothing els but the iudgement of the mind, which goeth before the free action of the will: but the word free, they ſay, doth pertain to the wil: notwithſtanding I think the word Arbitrium doth ſignify the decree of the wil it ſelf, that is, that by this word, we vnderſtand the fūction of the will, whatſoeuer it be, whether it wil, or nill, whether it chooſe or reiect. We aſcribe liberty to this purpoſe or endeuour of the will, and it is ſaid to bee free, euen as the will it ſelf is called Free-will, for that euer the propriety of the cauſe doth predicate (as the Logitians ſpeake) both of the effect, and of the action of the ſame cauſe. Free-wil then is nothing els in my iudgment, but the decree or endeuour of the wil, which is without conſtraint, and which proceedeth from ſome inward motion of the will, and not from any externall conſtraining power. A queſtion may be demaunded whether the will when it doth freely execute his function & office in willing freely, or nilling any thing, whether I ſay, the mind and vnderſtanding hauehave not ſome working herein? I anſwer, that obiect, whatſoeuer it be which the wil, & ye free functiō therof doth reſpect, is firſt diſcerned by the mind.
The iudgment aiſo of the mind is two fold: firſt, ſimple Iudgment of the mind twofold.and intelligible; as when without any diſcourſe and reaſoning, it iudgeth that this is good, & that is euil; this is to be followed, and that to be auoyded. This iudgment of the mind is of the end, or of ſome meanes ſeruing to the end, which is but only one. Next, the iudgement of the mind is, when as by diſcourſe, and arguing, it iudgeth any thing to be good or euill; to bee auoyded, or to be followed. This iudgment is where diuers meanes fall out, of which, after diſcourſe had in the mind, one is choſen, and the other is reiected. Now the obiect which by the mind and vnderſtanding is in ſome ſort ſhewed and diſcerned, the will doth freely will, or nill; chooſe, or refuſe: howbeit ſince the fal of man, ſuch is the confuſion of theſe faculties, or powers of the mind of man, that what the vnderſtanding iudgeth to be euill, and diſalloweth, the very ſame doth the wil chuſe, and proſecute: The diſorder and confuſion. which is by nature in the ſoule of man.and on the contrary, that which the mind approueth for good, and alloweth, that very ſame the wil reiecteth. Of the mind it may be demaunded, whether it can diſcerne betweene good and euil; approue the one, improue the other. This queſtion muſt be anſwered by the conſideration of that fourefold ſtate of man. But becauſe the queſtion chiefly is of the vnderſtanding of man in the ſtate of corruptiō, whether that can approue or accept the good, and reiect the euill: our anſwer ſhal be accordingly: We ſay therefore, that if you vnderſtand that neere power, which is a conſequent of that corrupt eſſential forme, the mind of man, in this ſtate can but only allow that which is euil: It may alſo allow that which is good in it ſelfe, but not as it is truly good, becauſe it cannot allow it, neither in the manner, nor to the end it ought, as is aforeſaide of will. But to approue that good, which we call humane good, the mind of man in the ſtate of corruption is more inclinable: but far is from intertaining any ſpirituall good at all, for as the Apoſtle Saint Paul ſaith, 1. Cori. 1. 2. 4. It iudgeth eueryevery ſpirituall grace to be folly; for the things which are of the Spirit of God are fooliſhneſſe vntounto him. And thus farre hauehave we ſpoken concerning the freedome of mans wil, or of free-will. It followeth now that we ſpeak next of the grace of God, which is contrary to free will, or to nature, and which is not onelyonly the principall efficient cauſe of Faith, Hope, & repentance, but alſo the ſole efficient cauſe of them: It followeth then that we treate next of the free grace of God.